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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Spentron on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Spentron on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[When Grants Become Crutches: The Catalyst Funding Problem.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@minted.venture/when-grants-become-crutches-the-catalyst-funding-problem-394e00121cd2?source=rss-01140bffe76d------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[project-catalyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cardano]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Spentron]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:38:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-13T19:11:49.854Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A case study in how good intentions, when unchecked, can turn decentralized funding into a closed loop.</em></p><h3>The Promise vs. the Pattern</h3><p>When Cardano launched <a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/"><strong>Project Catalyst</strong></a>, it was suppose to be a bold experiment in decentralized funding. A treasury governed by the community, designed to empower builders and democratize innovation.</p><p>Five years later, the destination originally set out for has drifted off course. Funding continues to flow, but the pattern of distribution tells a different story. The same well-established entities repeatedly secure the largest allocations, while newer builders struggle for visibility.</p><p>Among them, <a href="https://www.nmkr.io/"><strong>NMKR</strong></a>, operated by <strong>UTXO AG</strong>, stands out. Not because of malice or manipulation, but because it represents how well-intentioned, seasoned builders can thrive within a system that rewards <strong>persistence over measurable progress.</strong></p><p>UTXO AG and NMKR are the same entity. Yet today, the company’s focus has substantially shifted toward <a href="http://masumi.network/"><strong>Masumi</strong></a><strong>. </strong>Masumi, is a decentralized protocol empowering AI agents to collaborate and monetize their services efficiently.</p><p>In publicly recorded discussions, founder <strong>Patrick Tobler</strong> noted only one person remains working on “NMKR stuff,” while the rest of the team now develops Masumi, with plans to transition all staff into a newly formed company under that name.*</p><p>This isn’t an indictment of Patrick Tobler, NMKR, or Masumi. It’s an indictment of <strong>Catalyst; </strong>a system through its own design, continues to funnel large sums to the same recipients without an effective evaluation of impact, return, or due diligence. NMKR simply happens to illustrate the pattern clearly as one of the top recipients of Catalyst, having received funding in successive rounds. Masumi’s proposals<strong> </strong>total <strong>₳1.8 million in fund 13 </strong>and <strong>₳900,000 in fund 14 pending approval.</strong> Both approved with explicit support from the <strong>Cardano Foundation</strong>. <em>Also, worth noting; Emurgo, took a 100,000 USD strategic investment in NMKR in May of 2024</em> (<a href="https://x.com/nmkr_io/status/1769710257645732149">NMKR Post</a>, <a href="https://x.com/Padierfind/status/1976678875263562144">Patrick T.</a>).</p><p>Catalyst was designed to create self-sustaining builders and drive on-chain adoption. Yet for some of the top fund recipients, it’s become more of a cycle of dependence or payroll, as incomplete milestones continue to pile up every fund. Without tangible metrics to prove real returns or impact, the pattern keeps perpetuating itself.</p><h3>Funding Concentration in Practice</h3><p>To understand how Catalyst has created disparities in funding, we have to follow the <strong>₳</strong>.</p><p>According to Catalyst records, <strong>NMKR (UTXO AG),</strong> and its founder <strong>Patrick Tobler</strong> have been approved for more than <strong>₳6.6 million</strong> in total Catalyst funding across multiple rounds. A scale unmatched by nearly any other entity in the ecosystem.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EC-WCxC5TKexKJGpHaCIAQ.png" /><figcaption>Tallies include all funds except fund 14 results.</figcaption></figure><p>These figures show before Fund 14:</p><ul><li>The total approved funding of <strong>₳6.6 million</strong>, spanning both direct company proposals and Tobler’s individual submissions.</li><li>Another <strong>₳2.2 million</strong> remains locked in milestone completions in 9 different proposals.</li><li><strong>4.5% of all</strong> Catalyst Funds have been awarded to Tobler and NMKR.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0-aDv7FFJKEhfRgszTqJRg.png" /><figcaption>Active NMKR proposals with milestones to complete can be found here: <a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=NMKR&amp;sort=relevance%2CDESC&amp;type=all&amp;status=Active">https://projectcatalyst.io</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>NMKR and its CEO have received allocations in nearly every Catalyst round since the program’s inception. </strong>A<strong> </strong>level of continuity that effectively transforms temporary seed funding into an ongoing operational subsidy.</p><p>After fund 14 has concluded, UTXO AG and its CEO will likely have over <strong>₳4 million in unfulfilled Catalyst milestones. </strong>New proposals continue to be submitted and approved, including <strong>Masumi’s ₳1,800,000 million </strong>proposal approved<strong> in Fund 13, </strong>and now with an additional <strong>₳900,000 </strong>most likely<strong> approved in Fund 14.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7avK0MkiOamDIYs-Q2lGPQ.png" /><figcaption>Completed NMKR Proposals found here: <a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=NMKR&amp;sort=relevance%2CDESC&amp;type=all&amp;status=Completed">https://projectcatalyst.io</a></figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong>Patrick Tobler</strong> later issued his own <a href="https://x.com/Padierfind/status/1976672714497954260">clarifications</a> about these funds below, which underscores how impossible it is for the public to understand where the monies actually go. The graphic of his explanation does not disclose how much ₳ from each proposal is paid to NMKR, UTXO AG, Masumi, or their affiliated companies, nor how any funds are distributed among the related entities behind the approved proposals.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uF9MQxU93qZv1bjFpj9erQ.png" /><figcaption>This underscores the need for an oversight committee with access to information that regular voters simply do not have. How can anyone reasonably expect everyday Cardano holders or users to make informed funding decisions when this might be the best level of transparency the public receives?</figcaption></figure><p>This is <strong>“trust and unable to verify,” </strong>not <strong>“verify don’t trust.” </strong>The graphic<strong> </strong>above<strong> </strong>in the screenshot shows:</p><p><strong>₳486,000</strong> worth of proposals aren’t affiliated but are “using” <strong>NMKR or UTXO AG</strong> names in the proposal, and may drive them business,</p><p><strong>₳1.27 Million in proposals</strong> tied to <strong>Finest Investments GmbH</strong> (where UTXO AG owns 33%),</p><p><strong>₳1.3 million</strong> in active proposals through a sub-company you say UTXO AG owns shares of, and</p><p><strong>₳1.8 million</strong> is through Masumi under Serviceplan Group which you are paid out from.</p><p>Is there documentation showing how much of those funds reach the companies, share holders, or how they payout to them as 33% owners in other companys? The <strong>companies &amp; sub-companies</strong>, along with share holder and ownership in them does not give us the full picture, or how it can be accessible and easily digestible by the voters to make an informed decision. Especially if the information is <strong>not verifiable</strong> for the <strong>public</strong>.</p><blockquote>It also raises issues with how teams use other large recognizable names to help their proposal get passed, and its benefit through different companies, that could be personal benefactors in direct or indirect ways. Should teams be allowing this, even with good intentions?</blockquote><p>The overall concentration of funding around one entity and their founder receive is not inherently unethical. <strong>NMKR’s infrastructure contributions, NFT tooling, marketplace integrations, and open-source libraries</strong> have <strong>genuinely</strong> supported builders on Cardano. Yet, the scale and recurrence of these grants raise a structural question:</p><blockquote><em>Should Catalyst funding be cyclical for the same entities/people, or catalytic? Especially with incomplete proposals totaling almost </em><strong><em>₳3,120,000</em></strong><em> in funding including Fund 14’s Masumi’s </em><strong><em>₳900,000</em></strong><em> new proposal?</em></blockquote><p>Without transparent mechanisms to evaluate return on investment, Catalyst risks converting its treasury into a <strong>revolving stipend for a few incumbents rather than a springboard for new innovators.</strong></p><h3>From NMKR to Masumi</h3><p>As Catalyst rounds continued, NMKR’s focus quietly evolved. Once regarded as the backbone of Cardano’s NFT infrastructure, NMKR provided minting and marketplace tools that helped thousands of creators onboard to the chain. But as NFT activity slowed, its parent company, <strong>UTXO AG</strong>, began redirecting attention to a new frontier — <strong>Masumi</strong>.</p><p>Masumi on paper represents a technological step forward, and aligns with the global trend toward on-chain AI systems.</p><p>Yet, this exposes one of Catalyst’s blind spots: <strong>the lack of accountability when Catalyst-funded organizations repurpose their teams, assets, and ongoing grants toward entirely new ventures.</strong></p><p>In a publicly recorded discussion from the Cardano Builders DAO, <strong>Patrick Tobler</strong> acknowledged that <strong>one person remains working on NMKR</strong>, while the rest of the staff are now building Masumi with plans to move the entire team under the new company structure once formed. *</p><p>This means a <strong>single individual</strong> is currently responsible for nearly <strong>₳2 million ADA</strong> in unfinished NMKR Catalyst milestones. While still receiving some of the largest new funding packages in Catalyst history to pursue Masumi. Leaving millions in proposals half-fulfilled as attention shifts to the new venture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/1*UAJFhj80mXUxQg1YGp1mYQ.png" /><figcaption>* This is a Cardano Builder DAO meeting. Minute 13–19 is where Patrick Tobler, CEO of NMKR, discusses the relation of MUSAMI, NMKR and who is working on what.* <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Py5tFfq2yjr34smJoH_pJ3pmkCG_h3H9/view">https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Py5tFfq2yjr34smJoH_pJ3pmkCG_h3H9/view</a></figcaption></figure><p>The transition itself isn’t inherently wrong. Companies pivot all the time. But within the Catalyst framework, this raises a critical questions:</p><blockquote>When does an already funded project’s pivot become a new venture? Should that new venture still qualify for additional Catalyst funding before their other grants are even completed?</blockquote><p>Masumi’s approved proposal is <strong>₳1.8 million in Fund 13,</strong> with <strong>₳900,000 in Fund 14</strong> most likely to pass<strong>. </strong>Catalyst is funding <strong>the same team, under two different brands, for two consecutive funding cycles</strong>, without requiring full delivery or reporting from the original projects funded grants totaling millions.</p><p>This isn’t an accusation of deception, it’s a design failure. Catalyst was built to fund innovation, but its mechanisms currently <strong>don’t distinguish between iteration and reinvention.</strong> That allows well-connected builders to perpetually rebrand their efforts and continue receiving grants under new banners, even while earlier deliverables remain incomplete.</p><p>The NMKR-to-Masumi future handoff highlights the need for <strong>continuity oversight. </strong>Catalyst needs a way to track whether resources, teams, and deliverables are evolving transparently rather than quietly migrating under new proposals. Without it, Catalyst is less of a growth engine and more of a revolving funding ecosystem for the same circle.</p><h3>Liquidity Doesn’t Lie</h3><p>NMKR’s story isn’t just about grants; it’s also about market performance. Before Masami, <strong>NMKR conducted multiple token sales</strong>, raising between <strong>₳2.3 million</strong> (per<a href="https://x.com/nmkr_io/status/1525506729165082624"> NMKR’s</a> own disclosure) and approximately <strong>$5 million</strong> (per <a href="https://www.lcx.com/the-highlights-of-lcx-2022-journey/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">LCX’s</a> report as the regulated issuer). At the time, it was one of the largest retail raises in the Cardano’s ecosystem.</p><p>This in addition to receiving <strong>4.06% of all </strong>disbursed<strong> </strong>Catalyst funds to date,<strong> a</strong>nd <strong>4.5% of all </strong>catalyst funds ever approved in its history.</p><p>Three years later, the numbers tell a different story. <strong>NMKR’s total on-chain liquidity now sits around ₳169,000 ADA</strong>, with around <strong>₳85,000 ADA</strong> paired in its main liquidity pool.</p><p>Its token market cap remains near ₳<strong>5.6 million.</strong> The liquidity pool currently on Cardano is small in comparison. The token price has fallen over 92%<strong> </strong>since launch against ADA and almost 90% against its EUR/USDC pairings on LCX.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/674/1*UpFhxQ3OilLNTDRsaCs-Ow.png" /><figcaption>$NMKR Information can be found at; <a href="https://www.taptools.io/charts/token/f5808c2c990d86da54bfc97d89cee6efa20cd8461616359478d96b4c.be4e7db856a751f5f8120e1f3a67ba36600951f98544b0ded0544b5df86e7a31?table=Trade%20History">https://www.taptools.io</a>, and <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/nft-maker/">coinmarketcap.com</a></figcaption></figure><p>This mismatch between funding outflows and real market traction paints the picture: <strong>Catalyst has no performance feedback loop.</strong> A project can raise millions in both private and public funding mechanisms, underdeliver on milestones, and still qualify for additional Catalyst grants.</p><p>While NMKR’s early contributions to Cardano’s NFT infrastructure were significant, its token performance and limited liquidity on-chain show that <strong>market adoption has not mirrored the level of community investment.</strong> Despite this, Catalyst continues to provide additional funding to the same leadership and teams without measurable validation or tangible ecosystem growth from the monies invested.</p><p>As NMKR’s focus shifts toward <strong>Masumi</strong>, a new AI-driven venture under the same leadership, a natural question emerges:</p><blockquote>Will the ecosystem see yet another token launch under the new company, and another cycle of fundraising built atop already unfinished proposals? Cardano has already invested <strong>₳1.8 Million</strong> of its Catalyst grant monies this year alone in Masumi.</blockquote><p>When treasury-funded projects can consistently raise capital, both privately and publicly, without delivering any proportional value back to the network, the system begins to resemble a <strong>subsidy program rather than a meritocratic grant program fostering innovation.</strong></p><p>The lesson here is that <strong>Catalyst hasn’t learned to effectively measure success.</strong></p><h3>Governance Proximity; The Visibility Advantage</h3><p>When analyzing recurring funding patterns within Catalyst, it’s important to consider how reputation and proximity within the ecosystem can influence outcomes. Not through intent, but through <strong>familiarity and visibility.</strong></p><p>Over time, Catalyst has developed an ecosystem of recognizable names and teams that have become fixtures in each funding round. Established projects benefit from that familiarity of being known to voters with credibility they’ve built over years of contribution. Meanwhile, new builders enter the process at a structural disadvantage. Often lacking visibility, historical context, or the networks that help proposals gain early momentum.</p><p>In a system built to decentralize opportunity, <strong>reputation can quietly centralize it.</strong> Well-known teams tend to receive trust by default, while newer entrants are held to higher standards or overlooked entirely. This pattern isn’t corruption; it’s inertia. A reflection of how social capital compounds in open ecosystems of early adopters.</p><p><strong>NMKR and Masumi’s cumulative success in securing Catalyst funding shows how proximity and reputation can amplify reach when accountability mechanisms remain weak. Catalyst has matured faster in its funding power than its checks and balances.</strong></p><h3>A Broader Look at Funding Concentration</h3><p>When the scope widens to include the some of the top ten Catalyst-funded entities and individuals, the same pattern emerges.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TWur6scGdLIUGW9zB2foCg.png" /><figcaption>The projects and people listed in the table above include: <strong>NMKR and Patrick Tobler, Anastasia Labs and Phil DiSarro, Fluid Token and Matteo Coppola., Minswap, SundaeSwap, Atrium Labs, Charli3 and Robert Hever, Iagon, Pritesh Gosai, and Snek Labs/SNEK. </strong>Data collected from <a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/">https://projectcatalyst.io</a>. T<em>he totals displayed on Catalyst’s proposer pages often don’t align with the actual disbursed amounts listed within each proposal. Also, many founders and projects have proposals under similar names but different proposer and project accounts. </em><strong><em>T</em>hese figures are estimates, as some proposals overlap between the same or different teams.</strong><em>The figures shown here represent the most accurate estimates available, tallied from public data on </em><a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/funds"><em>Catalyst.io’s</em></a><em> website.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Collectively, before Fund 14, these ten entities and their founders represent <strong>₳33.9 million of all Catalyst funds,</strong> with over <strong>₳13 million </strong>pending from milestones that need completed. This totals <strong>23.08% of all catalyst funds</strong> allocated or reserved for these names and projects.</p><p>This chart shows Catalyst data before fund 14:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*5qTsUldQDoTVujZ8C5kvXw.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>23.08% of all Catalyst funds approved went to just ten entities or their founders.</em></strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zWrdERM3B4XHfjPpe0M75A.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>30.13% of all Catalyst funds left to distribute are from just ten entities or their founders.</em></strong></blockquote><p>Catalyst was built to democratize opportunity, but the numbers show a quiet consolidation of funding power. The same teams are being repeatedly rewarded, often across multiple proposals and even overlapping ventures.</p><p>Below are the Fund 14 proposal amounts by the same teams:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/978/1*B53wh_LDy1TLZiG0aTW2qw.png" /><figcaption>* Snek Labs and Sundae Swap are both listed on the same proposal for Fund14.</figcaption></figure><p>A pattern that repeats across many Catalyst projects, is the cross-over with multiple recognizable names on proposals. This structure often blurs accountability, allowing funds to sit idle while milestones are completed at each team’s own pace.</p><p>When combined with the rising price of Cardano since these proposals were approved, it effectively locks up resources in an anticompetitive way. Funds are taken from key categories, and instead of completing older milestones, it becomes easier for teams to apply for new funding before finishing the previous proposals. A competitive advantage, whether intended directly or indirectly, is locking up funds each round that would otherwise of gone to potentially competing proposals.</p><p>This list isn’t exhaustive, nor does it necessarily represent the ten largest Catalyst recipients, it simply highlights ten that stood out and were included for context. Each of them have made contributions to the ecosystem, and earned community support through the Catalyst voting process, as well as had milestone completions through a reviewer process to receive funds.</p><p>The purpose of this information is not to take away from what they have contributed or received, but to show how concentrated Catalyst funding has become in the hands of a small group of early teams. What was meant to serve as a launchpad for new builders is now repeating itself, with opportunity circulating among the same few, instead of expanding to invite new participants into Cardano.</p><p>Many of these projects are not only among the largest recipients of Catalyst funding, but have also raised substantial amounts through successful token sales throughout Cardano’s history. This further concentrates resources in the hands of the few, giving massive advantages over any new team or builder trying to compete. After years of continuous funding rounds and already having revenue-generating products and large token sales, some operate with DAO controlled treasuries larger than entire categories in Catalyst (<a href="https://x.com/MinswapDEX/status/1910341911400816642">Minswap</a>).</p><h3>Dissecting Fund 14</h3><p>Before Fund 14 results are out, a handful of entities dominate the funding proposal landscape again.</p><p>For example, <strong>Masumi’s ₳900,000 proposal</strong> represented <strong>10.59 %</strong> of all funds in the <em>Partners &amp; Products</em> category.</p><p><strong>Fluid Token</strong> requested <strong>₳739,000 </strong>or<strong> 8.69%</strong> of that same category. Combined, these two entities alone account for <strong>19.28% of the entire Partners &amp; Products </strong>category if approved, effectively pushing out potentially dozens of smaller proposals from different teams in the ecosystem.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/860/1*znLo9_0qssqeWp4JdBBu3g.png" /></figure><p>To date, Fluid Token and founder Matteo account for <strong>2.1% of total Catalyst funding</strong>. An additional <strong>₳1,879,400</strong> remains tied to eight ongoing proposals, equal to <strong>4.71% of all unreleased milestone funds</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*32QU2iNtI9yuYZ18y-0Kyw.png" /><figcaption>Fluid Token’s Proposals: <a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=Fluid%20tokens">https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=Fluid%20tokens</a>. Matteo Coppla’s Proposals:<a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/proposers/fluidtokens">https://projectcatalyst.io/proposers/fluidtokens</a></figcaption></figure><p>Anastasia Labs, NMKR, along with their founders are responsible for <strong>10.7% of all remaining ₳</strong> left to be disbursed in Catalyst. Despite this concentration, collectively they are asking for <strong>19.3% of all funds in the largest category in Fund 14</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cSFPRUCkpHfJ2BGvAFTFyA.png" /><figcaption>Catalyst Statistics to date.</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://charli3.io/"><strong>Charli3</strong></a> and founder Robert have already received <strong>1.84% of all Catalyst funds before fund 14</strong>, underscoring how repeat proposers continue to dominate funding rounds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vpyE19GNHbApEgeqMur39g.png" /><figcaption>Charli3 Proposals: <a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=Charli3&amp;type=projects&amp;page=1">https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=Charli3&amp;type=projects&amp;page=1</a> Robert Hever’s proposals: <a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/proposers/robertc3">https://projectcatalyst.io/proposers/robertc3</a></figcaption></figure><p>For Catalyst fund 14<strong> Charli3</strong> submitted proposals across <em>every category</em>, requesting a total of <strong>₳955,000</strong>, or <strong>5.3% of all Funds this round</strong>.</p><p>Iagon, has<strong> ₳3,845,000 </strong>left to claim from previous funds on four different proposals. This is <strong>9.63% of all ₳ </strong>left to disburse in Catalyst, and they have another <strong>₳690,000 </strong>proposal<strong> </strong>in Fund 14. Not including their <strong>₳750,000</strong> Cardano Builders DAO approved proposal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zO_Zp3JsgQ2W3Vbc-l1Y-w.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=iagon">https://projectcatalyst.io/search?q=iagon</a></figcaption></figure><p>The issue isn’t ill intent, it’s a system running on habit. Breaking these patterns will require difficult conversations and implementing new standards in Catalyst.</p><h3>The Opportunity Cost of Centralization</h3><p>Every ecosystem has limited resources and with Catalyst, those resources are finite in both <strong>funding and voter attention.</strong> Fund 14 has already shown clear voter fatigue, with almost a 30% decrease in wallet turnout according to the Catalyst team (<a href="https://x.com/Catalyst_onX/status/1976607141915173119">Livestream</a>). When a handful of established entities capture recurring, high-value grants across multiple rounds, the cost isn’t just measured in <strong>₳</strong>; it’s measured in the <strong>projects that never got funded</strong>, the <strong>builders who never returned</strong>, and the <strong>ideas, projects, and/or people that never had a chance to compete on equal grounds.</strong></p><p><strong>NMKR, Masumi, and others repeated success</strong> in securing funding is an example of how this imbalance can compound over time. Each new allocation not only consumes a portion of Catalyst’s funds, but also shapes the expectations of voters and reviewers, who begin to associate “trustworthy” with “familiar.”</p><p>As a result, <strong>Catalyst’s potential for innovation and growth has become a culture of incumbency and complacency.</strong></p><p>The opportunity cost is enormous. Smaller teams often operate on lean budgets and can produce meaningful outcomes with a fraction of what established players receive. Yet these newer voices are frequently overshadowed, as proposal visibility and voter confidence gravitate toward names they recognize.</p><p>This isn’t the fault of the builders who benefit, it’s a function of a system that <strong>rewards continuity over completion and adoption.</strong> And while Catalyst was designed to create cycles of innovation, it now faces the risk of <strong>funding the same circles, expecting new results. </strong>The consequence is subtle but significant: <strong>ecosystem stagnation.</strong></p><p>When treasury allocations concentrate rather than diversify, Cardano’s growth becomes dependent on fewer experiments and perspectives. The result is slower progress, lower voter engagement, and diminishing faith in Catalyst and governance as a mechanism for truly decentralized development.</p><p>If Catalyst wants to remain the heartbeat of Cardano’s innovation, it must find ways to <strong>re-balance its funding priorities. </strong>Give new builders, ideas, and communities room to emerge without being crowded out by legacy success.</p><h3>Catalyst 2.0 Needs Guardrails</h3><p>The goal of this analysis isn’t to dismantle Catalyst or the projects it has empowered, it’s to help it evolve. Catalyst has already proven that decentralized funding can scale; now it must mature into a system that values <strong>accountability and responsibility</strong>.</p><p>Catalyst distributes millions of <strong>₳</strong> each round, yet it still lacks the basic guardrails needed to ensure that outcomes match requests. To strengthen its foundation and rebuild community trust, several simple but essential reforms should be adopted.</p><ol><li><strong>Funding Rotation Limits</strong><br>Place reasonable limits on consecutive funding rounds for the same entities or leadership teams. Before applying again, teams should demonstrate completion and impact from previous grants. This ends the culture of continuous dependency and restores Catalyst’s role as a launchpad, not a payroll.<br><strong> 23% of all Catalyst funds approved went to just ten entities or people.</strong></li><li><strong>ROI and Impact Reporting <br></strong>Require concise, standardized proof of outcomes for all completed projects. Not glossy marketing, just facts. What was delivered, how it helps the ecosystem, and what value it returned. Clear data transforms opinion into accountability. <br><em>This will help guide the community to overall better decision making, and help make Catalyst resources be used more efficiently.</em></li><li><strong>Completion Before Expansion <br></strong>No project should receive new Catalyst funding while major milestones from previous rounds remain unfinished. This simple principle would stop the cycle of overlapping proposals and ensure focus on delivery before new ambitions are funded. <br><strong><em>Over ₳13 million</em></strong><em> in unfinished milestones remains locked with these ten teams. Funds that could instead fuel new builders and projects if repeat applicants paused to complete what’s already been funded.</em><strong><em> </em>30.1% of all Catalyst funds still waiting to be distributed through milestone completions belong to just ten entities or their founders. Nearly all of them have new proposals in Fund 14.</strong></li><li><strong>Oversight and Verification</strong><br>Establish a small, <strong>independent review body, </strong>separate from voters, to audit completed projects, verify deliverables, and review repeat allocations. Its purpose isn’t control; it’s <strong>credibility.</strong> Oversight ensures that trust in Catalyst is earned and accountable, not assumed.</li></ol><p>These are practical steps toward restoring balance and trust. Catalyst already has the infrastructure and the people. What it needs now is a <strong>framework that prevents good intentions from becoming permanent dependencies.</strong></p><h3>The Mirror Moment</h3><p><strong>Project Catalyst wasn’t meant to be a faucet, it was meant to be a forge.</strong></p><p>It was built on the belief that a decentralized community could not only fund innovation, but also sustain it through shared accountability. Over time, however, the forge has dulled. Grants have become cycles. Familiar names reappear. Progress gets measured in approvals instead of outcomes.</p><p>This is Catalyst’s take a look in the <strong>mirror moment. </strong>A<strong> </strong>point in the process to pause, and ask what decentralization truly means when power, visibility, and resources keep orbiting the same few players.</p><p>For Catalyst to live up to its vision of equitable, community-driven growth and innovation, it should be introducing funding rotation limits, transparent impact reporting, completion of proposals before expansion, and real oversight insights in the process.</p><p>The true test of decentralizing grant funding through Catalyst isn’t how much or many people receive, it’s how many can turn that support into lasting value for the chain, building a sustainable ecosystem for themselves and, ultimately, for all of us on<strong> Cardano.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=394e00121cd2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Huawei’s Emurgo Partnership]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@minted.venture/huaweis-emurgo-partnership-567b09d00041?source=rss-01140bffe76d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/567b09d00041</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[emurgo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cardano]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[huawei]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Spentron]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Apr 2024 16:34:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-13T16:34:06.655Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is <strong>Huawei</strong>?</p><p><strong>Huawei Technologies </strong>is a leading global provider of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and smart devices. They have been on a significant endeavor with its <strong>HarmonyOS</strong>, aiming to establish a robust mobile operating system to compete with <strong>iOS </strong>and <strong>Android</strong>.</p><p>Originally conceived for the <strong>Internet of Things</strong>, HarmonyOS has evolved into a comprehensive ecosystem, propelled by Huawei’s determination to reduce reliance on Android, especially after facing U.S. sanctions in 2019.</p><p>Currently in the US Huawei is in a court battle over intellectual property and that trial is set to start in 2026. The Justice Department unsealed an indictment charging Huawei with sanctions evasion for allegedly deceiving HSBC and other banks about its business in Iran.</p><p>In 2020, prosecutors added additional charges to the case, accusing the company and its subsidiaries of racketeering and a conspiracy to steal trade secrets. After an initial slump caused by the sanctions, <strong>Huawei</strong> reported last week that its net profits last year had more than <strong>doubled</strong>. The earnings announcement came after Huawei last year surprised U.S. authorities with the release of a new smartphone, the <strong>Mate 60 Pro</strong>, that uses its own homegrown chips.</p><p>The company is <strong>investing heavily</strong> in training developers<strong> </strong>and collaborating with universities to nurture a skilled workforce. By focusing on app development specific to HarmonyOS and fostering a vibrant software ecosystem, Huawei aims to achieve full autonomy in chips, operating systems, and applications.</p><p>HarmonyOS has already gained traction in China, with significant market share and increasing developer interest. The recent success of Huawei’s Mate 60 series, powered by HarmonyOS, has further fueled optimism about its potential.</p><p>Huawei’s strategy involves gradually transitioning users and developers away from Android, with ambitious plans for feature enhancements and performance boosts.</p><p>The Emurgo partnership with Huawei will enable the utilization of a Cardano validator node. Rex Lei Yang, Managing Director of Huawei Cloud Singapore, shared: ‘This partnership will serve as a springboard for our Web3 service.’</p><p>The Cardano community has had some mixed reactions to this partnership from Emurgo. Overall, a prevailing sentiment was that this should help expand ADA’s reach into new markets and into an expanding Fortune 500 company.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a6kZaP3oWOfQZiDMTayOuQ.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=567b09d00041" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Goofy Gopher Gossip]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@minted.venture/goofy-gopher-gossip-f3a6c7d219d5?source=rss-01140bffe76d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f3a6c7d219d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cardano]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nft]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mining]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Spentron]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Apr 2024 18:02:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-01T22:32:12.448Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1/ GGMC had a net income of 43.5k USD in February, during a time when they did not have their full machines up and running. With more miners coming online this is a great time for an update on all things gophers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YhhEZ5oIU6XNlNq2" /></figure><p>2/ Starting March GGMC holders were posed with a difficult decision to prepare for the L9 miner release, outdating the projects L7’s that mine DOGE and LTC. This would also allow our newly purchased machines to move to Dubai which has had better hosting capabilities and uptime.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2uLHIpuPleFfs4s8" /></figure><p>3/ The community ultimately voted to sell all L7’s to compound those monies into newer machines. While keeping a portion of those funds incase the new L9 machines are released. This netted $120.9k USD from the sales.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*XmDuFeUnrjfFTL8mqC_sDQ.gif" /></figure><p>4/ KS5 Pro’s are one of the most sought after machines in the world. Currently ~140$ profit/day. A portion of the L7 sale funds were used to pre-order two more KS5 pros for the GGMC arsenal; totaling 3 for GGMC and 3 KS5 Pros for Tribes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/688/0*Sqp2ZhhyoVETKDBq" /></figure><p>5/ GGMC created the Wilton’s Well stake pool to grow your bag, the Kingdom, and potentially win gophers. Check it out if you’re a gopher holder and see if you want to delegate your Cardano.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*or3JkjNYQM6XKTr2" /></figure><p>6/ Development has started for V2 of Kingdom Connect (KC), aiming for a redesign of the GGMC api to accommodate the UAE move and utility upgrades for the Kingdom Trust ecosystem. The end result will provide a good user experience with end-to-end tracking of all aspects of GGMC.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9zmS9evW1XMUOidX" /></figure><p>7/ GGMC Treasury gets funded by:</p><p>Recieving 20% of all mined coins from the Tribes collection, 17.5% of all mined coins of the GGMC collection, and 4–5% from all the KT holders. Including Derp Birds, House of Titans, Fuzzy Fellas, BANK, and the other KT’s from individuals or businesses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*zkUFMXDb0DR3veWbbXQggg.gif" /></figure><p>8/ The continuous incoming treasury coins will have a structured vesting period with 80% vested for 3 months then paid out. Then the other 20% vested for 6 months then paid out to holders. Treasury allocations outside of mining will be considered if feasible and legally viable per the team.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/532/1*56IG-mEz_CrP6SG2odNjXQ.png" /></figure><p>9/ <strong>Tribes Collection </strong>raised over 600k USD towards the second large bulk miner order, and has now started hashing to bring liquidity back into Cardano from CKB, DASH, BITCOIN, KDA and KASPA. With a 3 month compounding period, holders will likely vote to get the new L9’s if available at the time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GXLoE_Z9LA_hDF6SMbGmYQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>10/ Tribes collection has 17 K7s (CKB/Nervos) online, 5 D9s (Dash) online, 5 KA3’s (Kadena) waiting for arrival, 8/17 S21s (Bitcoin)online, and 10 S21 Hydro’s hashin in the next 10 days. Bitmain is releasing the rest of the S21’s in monthly batches as they are on back order. All 3 KS5 pro’s (Kaspa) arrived prior to April’s release in Dubai and will be hashing in ~10days.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/860/1*WR089qCVkOIE5LgvFe04ig.jpeg" /></figure><p>11/ GGMC’s portion of the batch 2 order, including the S19 Sale monies was; 4 K7’s which are online, 10 S21 Hydro’s arrived ahead of April release and should be hashing in the next ~10 days, 1 KS5 Pro arrived along with Tribes. *2 additional KS5’s pre-ordered with L7 sale*</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rggKhj5L7su_2axu" /></figure><p>12/ With the addition of Tribes to the GGMC brand, <strong>mining rewards</strong> for the OG GGMC main collection has increased from <strong>40% to 45%. </strong>As Ryan and the team have funding from multiple streams now. Might be why less than 1.7% of these little gophers are listed. Happy Easter Gopher fam!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/930/0*eL2P6fsYF-nWABRE" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f3a6c7d219d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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