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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Divyanshu Mishra on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Divyanshu Mishra on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mishradivyanshu8203?source=rss-f42d6958aaa7------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Divyanshu Mishra on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mishradivyanshu8203?source=rss-f42d6958aaa7------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 18:37:03 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[After Sindoor and Beyond: Objects in the Mirror are Closer than they Appear]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mishradivyanshu8203/after-sindoor-and-beyond-objects-in-the-mirror-are-closer-than-they-appear-aa22d46cbcad?source=rss-f42d6958aaa7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defence-industry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disruptive-innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Divyanshu Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 18:34:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-22T07:19:53.399Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This article was originally written on 7th May, 2026, the 1st anniversary of Operation Sindoor. The following video essay, released around the time, was actually its summary: </em><a href="https://youtube.com/shorts/JjZYhO5GOAc?si=6HK32jzyVqePtmI5"><em>https://youtube.com/shorts/JjZYhO5GOAc?si=6HK32jzyVqePtmI5</em></a><em>.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L9v-sJqIdMkSuadIBqHoRw.png" /><figcaption>Objects in the Mirror are Closer than they Appear — AI Generated Image — Courtesy ChatGPT</figcaption></figure><p>Operation Sindoor was, in many respects, a military success. Precision strikes on Pakistani airbases and terrorist infrastructure, corroborated through open-source satellite imagery, demonstrated that India has significantly improved its stand-off strike capability, precision targeting, intelligence integration, and layered air defence architecture. Systems such as the S-400 and Aakash validated their operational utility, while India’s expanding missile arsenal and indigenous technological base showed meaningful progress.</p><p>Yet Sindoor also exposed uncomfortable realities. Tactical success alone cannot conceal deeper structural weaknesses in procurement, force modernisation, defence-industrial capacity, information warfare, strategic communication, and institutional reform. The operation should therefore not merely be celebrated as a successful punitive strike, but studied as a warning sign and strategic wake-up call.</p><p>The central lesson of Sindoor is simple: India’s geopolitical ambitions are growing faster than the pace of its military modernisation.</p><p>Modern warfare is changing rapidly. The Russia–Ukraine War, the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, the Iran War and India’s own recent experiences all demonstrate that future wars will increasingly be shaped by drones, precision missiles, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, cyber operations, space-based surveillance, and network-centric systems rather than purely conventional force-on-force engagements. India cannot afford to prepare for the wars of the past while its adversaries prepare for the wars of the future.</p><p>One of the clearest priorities is the strengthening of India’s strategic deterrent and missile forces. As the recent conflicts in the Ukraine and the Gulf have shown, precision missile strikes can cause a lot of asymmetric damage and humble even great powers such as Russia and the US. Now, to be fair, India already possesses capable systems such as the Agni-P and Agni-V, but future ballistic missile development must focus decisively on mobility, survivability, canisterisation, and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle and Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicle capabilities to dodge enemy air defences.</p><p>In light of the tripling of Chinese nuclear warheads in recent years, the expanding reach of Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles, their increasingly sophisticated missile defences and nuclear weapons delivery systems such as mobile silos, survivable second-strike capability is indispensable. India’s longstanding political hesitation regarding a true intercontinental ballistic missile capability appears increasingly outdated in a geopolitical environment defined by hard power competition rather than moral restraint. A fully realised Agni-VI programme would strengthen deterrence credibility against both China and any future nuclear coercion.</p><p>Similarly, India must accelerate the development of hypersonic cruise missiles such as BrahMos-II. Supersonic systems remain potent, but they may soon get outdated as air defences improve at breakneck speed. Hypersonics will be the next major leap in strike capability, survivability, and penetration against advanced air defence systems. The future battlespace will reward speed, manoeuvrability, and reaction-time compression.</p><p>Air power modernisation requires equally urgent attention. Modern aerial warfare is increasingly determined by sensor fusion, electronic warfare, stealth, beyond-v isual-range engagement capability, and integrated battlespace awareness rather than traditional close-range dogfighting. India therefore requires a dramatic expansion in BVR missile inventories, including additional Meteor missiles for Rafales, expanded procurement of Astra missiles, and accelerated development of Astra Mk III. Existing fleets such as the Su-30MKI must also receive long-overdue upgrades in radar, avionics, and long-range missile integration.</p><p>Airborne Early Warning and Control platforms and indigenous early warning radar systems are another major gap. Situational awareness increasingly determines survivability in modern combat. India cannot indefinitely rely upon imported radar ecosystems while facing adversaries with rapidly expanding aerospace capabilities. Indigenous development and rapid induction of such systems must become a strategic priority rather than a bureaucratic afterthought.</p><p>The fighter aircraft situation is particularly concerning. India’s squadron strength has fallen to roughly 29 squadrons, far below the Indian Air Force’s sanctioned requirement of 42–43 squadrons for a credible two-front contingency with both China and Pakistan. The Tejas programme symbolises both India’s technological potential and its institutional dysfunction. Development delays from the government-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited have repeatedly resulted in aircraft entering service behind schedule and being outdated or obsolete on arrival. The lack of sovereign jet engine capability remains the single greatest bottleneck in Indian aerospace development. The DRDO’s Kaveri engine project has dragged on for four decades without operational fruition, delaying not only Tejas variants but potentially the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft programme as well.</p><p>Meanwhile, the strategic environment around India is deteriorating rapidly. China already fields fifth-generation aircraft in the hundreds and may possess over a thousand stealth fighters by the next decade. Credible reports of Pakistani pilots training on Chinese J-35 platforms indicate that the regional air power balance could shift significantly against India within a few years. India must therefore accelerate the AMCA programme with wartime urgency. The decision to open participation to private industry was strategically correct, but the programme remains embryonic and must move far faster if India wishes to avoid dependence on expensive foreign stopgap procurements in the future.</p><p>At the same time, India cannot ignore sixth-generation aerospace technologies. China has already flown experimental next-generation platforms, while the United States continues active development under NGAD initiatives. India should simultaneously pursue participation in collaborative programmes such as the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS while incorporating sixth-generation technologies into later AMCA phases, particularly loyal wingmen, advanced sensor fusion, manned-unmanned teaming, and AI-assisted combat systems.</p><p>Drone warfare represents perhaps the single greatest revolution in modern conflict, with the Ukraine and the Gulf being live examples of the game-changing shift. The proliferation of inexpensive unmanned systems has fundamentally altered the economics of warfare, wherein weaker-on-paper countries can now overwhelm the defences of their much-stronger-on-paper adversaries with swarms of cheap drones and destroy assets worth millions or even billions of dollars. This sort of asymmetric strategy is tailor-made for use against India by hostile countries such as Pakistan.</p><p>Ergo, India requires mass-scale indigenous development of Medium Altitude Long Endurance drones, loitering munitions (aka kamikaze/suicide drones), swarm drones, and interceptor drones. Turkish Bayraktar systems, Iranian Shahed drones, and Ukrainian drone interceptors have all demonstrated how asymmetric systems can impose disproportionate costs upon larger conventional militaries.</p><p>Counter-drone capability must receive equal emphasis. India requires layered anti-drone architecture including RF jammers, GPS spoofers, anti-drone rifles, interceptor missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, directed-energy weapons, and even low-cost last-resort kinetic solutions such as shotguns. Systems such as Bhargavastra, Indrajaal, and indigenous interceptor drone programmes represent promising beginnings, but their scale and sophistication must increase dramatically.</p><p>Maritime strategy requires similar transformation. Chinese naval expansion into the Indian Ocean has become increasingly adventurous. It now involves not just underwater exploration vessels, but also ‘visits’ by warships and submarines. The consolidation of their so-called ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, with the construction/lease/purchase of over a dozen ports in the Indian Ocean by Chinese state-linked entities, including, but not limited to, Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Kyaukpyu (Myanmar), etc., necessitate a far more ambitious Indian naval posture. India’s maritime doctrine can no longer remain confined primarily to coastal defence and sea denial. It must evolve towards sustained blue-water power projection.</p><p>This requires accelerated induction of diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion, expansion of India’s nuclear submarine fleet to strengthen second-strike survivability, and eventual development of a nuclear-powered CATOBAR aircraft carrier equipped with EMALS technology. A future INS Vishal would not merely be a national science project, but a strategic instrument for maintaining deterrence and influence across the Indian Ocean Region. Experimental concepts such as drone carriers should also at least undergo feasibility evaluation rather than being dismissed outright. The recent inductions of new indigenously developed Arihant-class SSBNs are a positive sign, but a handful of such submarines will not be sufficient. The S5-class SSBN project needs to leave the drawing board and materialise at the earliest.</p><p>Space and cyber warfare are becoming increasingly inseparable from conventional military operations. India currently lacks sufficient reconnaissance satellite coverage relative to the scale of the Chinese challenge. Even Pakistan has launched more spy satellites into orbit than India since the ceasefire following Op Sindoor, with the aid of the Chinese, of course. Anti-satellite capability has been reached, with the successful test of the Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark-II, but has not been expanded beyond it. India’s own satellite navigation system, NavIC, stands unoperational following consecutive launch failures by ISRO. Recent reforms such as opening the space sector for private players are an encouraging sign, but they still leave a lot to be desired. Real-time surveillance, targeting, communications, and battle damage assessment all depend upon resilient orbital infrastructure. India therefore requires major expansion in reconnaissance satellite constellations alongside continued refinement of anti-satellite capability.</p><p>Institutionally, India should seriously consider the establishment of dedicated aerospace, cyber, and rocket forces. China, the United States, and Russia increasingly treat these as distinct operational domains rather than auxiliary support functions. Pakistan has begun the process of consolidating its own rocket forces under the aegis of the Army. Thus, India’s proposed Integrated Rocket Force and theatre command reforms cannot remain perpetually trapped in bureaucratic deliberation and lethargy, and must speedily move from the drawing boards to actual implementation on the ground.</p><p>As good as many of these reforms sound, they all beg the same question: Why aren’t they being done in earnest? Of course, the most ambitious reforms require political will, but the many lower-hanging fruits require bureaucratic will. Indeed, bureaucratic inertia itself has become a national security vulnerability.</p><p>India cannot sustain long-term strategic competition with China while relying upon a slow, state-dominated defence-industrial ecosystem characterised by procurement delays, technological dependence, weak private-sector participation, limited competitive dynamism, and long waits for approvals, ‘commissions’, and ‘kick-backs’. Liberalisation and deregulation of the defence sector are no longer merely economic preferences; they are strategic necessities. The result would not only be a reduction in the wastage of taxpayer money, but this money can also be re-directed by the government to gradually increase defence spending towards 2.5% of GDP over the coming years to fund the procurement of modern equipment.</p><p>India requires an indigenous ecosystem capable of producing fighter aircraft, engines, missiles, drones, radars, avionics, semiconductors, cyber systems, satellites, submarines, tanks, artillery, ammunition, and advanced electronics at scale. The corporatisation and public listing of Ordnance Factory Boards (previously akin to a government department) was a small step in the right direction. A country that can manufacture automobiles at scale (read Maruti, Tata, Mahindra, etc.) and houses major construction firms such as L&amp;T should be able to build its own military equipment at a similar scale. No major power has ever achieved strategic autonomy while remaining dependent upon foreign supply chains for core defence technologies. The fixation on Transfer of Technology from supposedly ‘benevolent’ partners is a fatal fantasy that must be abandoned in earnest.</p><p>Simultaneously, India must invest aggressively in artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, supply-chain resilience, critical minerals, and energy diversification. Twenty-first century geopolitical competition is increasingly determined not merely by raw head counts of troops and equipment, but by industrial capacity, technological sophistication, and resilience under prolonged strategic pressure. India is home to a robust IT sector and a budding start-up culture, yet it still lacks an indigenous Large Language Model akin to the ones possessed by the Americans, the Chinese, and the Europeans. Factor market (land, labour, capital) reforms, while politically difficult for any Indian government to implement, can help draw much-needed private investment in the IT, defence, and space sectors, the three of which are becoming increasingly intertwined. India already houses one of the world’s largest petroleum refineries. It must also build refineries of critical minerals to break out of the Chinese chokehold on such minerals.</p><p>Sindoor also demonstrated that information warfare now matters almost as much as battlefield success itself. After all, this is an era where the populace gets their news first from social media, even before switching on their televisions, and newspapers have only become an afterthought.</p><p>India won important military exchanges, but struggled during the early phases of the conflict to dominate the international information environment. Pakistani military and ISPR rapidly spread their narratives across social media through short-form videos, viral clips and memes, and sections of international media ran with it, all before India could even establish a consistent strategic communications framework. The bureaucratic and military press briefings were delayed by hours and days, and by then, the fire had spread, and the damage had been done by the other side. Limited battlefield transparency during the days of the Operation created informational vacuums that adversarial narratives exploited effectively.</p><p>This must change.</p><p>Future conflicts require integrated information warfare doctrine, daily operational briefings, rapid-release battle damage assessments, multilingual digital outreach, coordinated diplomatic messaging, and professional engagement with global media ecosystems. Information dominance is no longer supplementary to military operations; it is an operational domain in itself.</p><p>India must also improve strategic signalling and doctrinal clarity. Serious powers require clearly articulated National Security and National Defence policies that establish strategic objectives, institutional responsibilities, threat perceptions, and long-term modernisation roadmaps. Ambiguity may occasionally provide flexibility, but excessive ambiguity often produces institutional drift. The lack of a formal National Security Strategy document does not bode well for a country like India that wants to be taken seriously on the world stage.</p><p>During Sindoor, it was due to a political decision that the Indian Air Force had to attack Pakistani terrorist bases without a prior suppression of Pakistani air defences, which resulted in initial losses as acknowledged by the CDS Gen. Anil Chauhan. Political leadership must define escalation boundaries and strategic objectives, yes, but operational flexibility within those boundaries must remain sufficient to avoid constraining battlefield effectiveness. Future operations must incorporate rapid suppression and destruction of enemy air defences wherever necessary rather than allowing political caution to generate avoidable tactical risk.</p><p>India must also abandon the artificial separation between the Pakistani military establishment and Pakistan-based terrorist organisations. The relationship between the two is symbiotic rather than incidental. Counter-terror strategy and deterrence strategy therefore cannot operate in isolation from one another. To borrow from the late President Pranab Mukherjee, non-state actors do not descend from heaven; they reside in and come from a state.</p><p>At the geopolitical level, India must recognise that Pakistan increasingly functions as a strategic proxy through which China constrains India’s continental and maritime rise. Beijing provides Pakistan with military hardware, intelligence cooperation, infrastructure financing, technological support, and diplomatic shielding. As acknowledged by the deputy chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Rahul Singh, China used the India-Pakistan skirmish as a ‘live-lab’ to test out its own weapons and intelligence. Consequently, India’s China challenge cannot be addressed solely along the Himalayan frontier.</p><p>India must compete with China across South Asia and the Indian Ocean through infrastructure, trade, connectivity, diplomacy, and regional integration. Relations with non-hostile neighbours such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Afghanistan must be approached through sustained strategic engagement rather than episodic crisis management and personalist patronage. Connectivity with our neighbours through highways, railways, waterways, aviation, digital infrastructure, trade and commerce will matter as much as military deployments. Active neighbourhood diplomacy is an essential component of national security.</p><p>Simultaneously, India should maintain economic engagement with China where beneficial while exercising strategic caution regarding technological dependence and supply-chain vulnerability. The massive trade deficit with China, amounting to billions of dollars in annual trade, should already ring alarm bells in New Delhi. The Chinese may be tempted to use it as leverage to turn the screws whenever things heat up again, as they have already done against Trump’s America. There needs to be a concerted effort from the government and the private sector to diversify and reduce the chronic dependence on Chinese raw materials, if not finished goods.</p><p>At the same time, India should avoid overreacting to periodic fluctuations in US–Pakistan relations. Pakistan has historically oscillated between phases of relevance and irrelevance within broader American policy towards the Greater Middle East, while military-to-military relations between Washington and Islamabad have generally remained functional and manageable. The current warmth reflects both Donald Trump’s preference for transactional relations with strongman-led states and Pakistan’s longstanding role as a strategic rentier state leveraging its geography for geopolitical utility.</p><p>This only reinforces a larger lesson: India cannot afford to place all, or even most, of its strategic eggs in one basket. The objective of Indian diplomacy should be strategic autonomy rooted in comprehensive national power, not ideological non-alignment. That autonomy need not be anti-American or anti-Western; rather, it should remain non-Western in orientation and focused pragmatically on maximising India’s own national interests.</p><p>India must therefore build partnerships on the basis of converging strategic interests such as supply chain resilience, regional security, AI safeguards, climate standards, semiconductor investments, shipping lanes, etc., rather than expecting counter-terrorism alone to serve as a durable foundation for geopolitical alignment. Diplomacy today is increasingly shaped by comprehensive national power rather than personalised optics. Symbolic gestures, leader-centric diplomacy, and soft-power projection have their utility, but they cannot substitute for military capability, technological sophistication, economic resilience, and industrial depth. Soft power is overrated, and without credible hard power to back it up, it ultimately matters little. Coca-cola, blue jeans, and rock music, all symbols of American soft power, are also commonly consumed by anti-American protesters worldwide.</p><p>The central lesson of Operation Sindoor is therefore not merely that India can retaliate. It is that the era of episodic crisis management is ending. South Asia is entering a prolonged phase of technologically accelerated and increasingly escalatory competition shaped by drones, missiles, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, space-based surveillance, and precision strike systems. The next major confrontation may arrive sooner than policymakers expect. When it does, the side possessing greater industrial depth, technological adaptability, institutional coherence, escalation dominance, and strategic clarity will shape the outcome.</p><p>Objects in the mirror are indeed closer than they appear.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa22d46cbcad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the Pakistani State: The Present]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mishradivyanshu8203/on-the-pakistani-state-the-present-357a498c4ac7?source=rss-f42d6958aaa7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/357a498c4ac7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[authoritarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan-army]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Divyanshu Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 15 Aug 2026 21:27:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-17T16:34:53.261Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e7O3pbApTCPeRM9dEbykeQ.png" /><figcaption>Representational Image — AI Generated — Courtesy Gemini</figcaption></figure><p>The apex decision-making body in both India and Pakistan is the Cabinet Committee on Security. In India, the CCS comprises the Prime Minister, Home Minister, External Affairs Minister, Defence Minister and Finance Minister as permanent members, while there may also be temporary members and observers, such as the National Security Advisor (a senior IAS, IFS or IPS officer), the secretaries of the concerned ministries, and sometimes even the Chief of Defence Staff, who may be invited, especially during a conflict. In Pakistan, however, the CCS comprises not just the aforementioned ministers and secretaries, but also the chiefs of the army, navy and air force, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the Director-General of ISI as permanent members. Thus, the Pakistani CCS has a 50–50 split between civilian and military leaders. That itself is a big giveaway of how power is distributed in Pakistan.</p><p>It is not just the CCS. The military has its men embedded in the Cabinet of Pakistan too. The Defence Secretary and the Defence Production Secretary of Pakistan have almost always been serving or retired army generals, and the current ones are no exception. In India, these posts are always held by senior IAS officers. Apart from the Cabinet, there is more <em>wardi</em> (uniform) elsewhere in the various government departments.</p><p>In Pakistan, the current chairmen of the National Database &amp; Registration Authority, National Disaster Management Authority, and Water &amp; Power Development Authority, and the Directors General of the Anti-Narcotics Force and Airport Security Force, are all either serving or retired generals or brigadiers. Equivalent posts in India are almost always held by either senior IAS or IPS officers.</p><p>The apex strategic (read: nuclear-related) decision-making body in both India and Pakistan is the National Command Authority. While in India the NCA is headed by the PM and NSA, with the CDS serving as an adviser, in Pakistan the NCA is headed by two serving army generals who ‘advise’ the Pakistani PM. Until recently, the chairman of Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) had been a serving or retired army general. In contrast, the chairman of ISRO has always been a senior astrophysicist, space scientist or aerospace engineer.</p><p>If one moves away from these government departments, one will find more khaki in the various government agencies. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is Pakistan’s equivalent of India’s Central Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement Directorate fused into one agency, making it doubly powerful and thus prone to abuse. This is further accentuated by the fact that while the CBI and ED are headed by senior IPS and IRS officers respectively under their corresponding ministries, the Pakistani NAB is headed by retired army generals. This is the primary agency the Pakistani army uses to harass civilian politicians. NAB is the same agency that arrested former PM Imran Khan, and had even arrested, in the past, the current PM Shahbaz Sharif, current President Asif Ali Zardari, and current Defence Minister Khawaja Asif when they were out of power.</p><p>The military’s footprints and fingerprints can also be found in Pakistan’s paramilitary organisations or gendarmeries, including the Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps and Gilgit Scouts. Although dubbed the Civil Armed Forces, the DGs of these organisations are, ironically, serving army generals. This gives the Pakistan Army overarching control over the civilian paramilitary forces. In contrast, India’s equivalent organisations, such as the Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, Central Reserve Police Force, and Central Industrial Security Force, are all headed by senior IPS officers under the Ministry of Home Affairs.</p><p>Even the Pakistan Civil Services has a 10 per cent reservation for military personnel. This might look similar to the Indian system, wherein military personnel are provided similar reservations in government examinations, except that in Pakistan military personnel can bypass the civil services entrance examinations altogether and be directly appointed to the civilian bureaucracy.</p><p>This entire discussion would be futile if one did not bring forth the Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI was originally envisioned as a military intelligence agency, akin to India’s Directorate of Military Intelligence. However, over time, the ISI gained immense powers under successive military dictators. While Ayub expanded its powers to engage in domestic intelligence in 1958, Mr Bhutto established a political cell within the ISI in 1975, and finally, Zia expanded its powers further in 1980 to also engage in foreign intelligence following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, the ISI amalgamated into itself powers equivalent to those of such Indian agencies as the Intelligence Bureau, Research &amp; Analysis Wing and National Investigation Agency, thus making it extraordinarily powerful, with unparalleled jurisdiction. The ISI actively recruits its agents from other Pakistani agencies such as Military Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, Foreign Intelligence Agency and Counter-Terrorism Department. And while all these equivalent agencies in India are headed by senior IAS or IPS officers and report directly to the PM or Home Minister, the Director General of ISI is always a serving army general. The current army chief, Asim Munir, is also a former DG ISI.</p><p>The ISI does not simply engage in all sorts of intelligence, though. It also has a media-facing arm, the ISPR, which engages in regular press conferences, as is expected. What is not expected, however, is that the ISPR also owns a media production company that produces everything from blockbuster war films (<em>Waar</em>, <em>Parwaaz Hay Junoon</em> and <em>Sherdil</em>), popular TV dramas (<em>Alpha Bravo Charlie</em>, <em>Ehd-e-Wafa</em>, <em>Sinf-e-Aahan</em> and <em>Ek Thi Marium</em>) and reality shows (<em>60 Hours to Glory</em>), to patriotic songs (‘Bara Dushman Bana Phirta Hai’, ‘Aik Qaum, Aik Manzil’), documentaries (<em>Through Storms and Sacrifice</em>), film festivals (National Amateur Short Film Festival), and even cartoons (<em>Team Muhafiz</em>) and video games (<em>The Glorious Resolve</em>). These are merely tools the Pakistani army uses to shape the narrative within the country in its favour. This author ends the comparative analysis with India here itself, because there is no Indian equivalent to whatever the ISPR’s media production arm is, and all that is yet to come.</p><p>If making films, series and video games sounds bizarre, one ought to hold one’s breath for a while. The tendrils of the Pakistani military do not just creep into the Pakistani state or the media, but also spread into the economy. The Fauji Foundation is the epitome of this phenomenon. Created under the leadership of Governor-General Malik and PM Bogra in 1954 as a charitable trust, the foundation’s original purpose was to relieve the budget of Pakistan by providing for the perks (housing, education and healthcare) of the Pakistani army from the foundation’s own commercial profits. This left only salaries and pensions to be provided by Pakistan’s budget, while all the perks came from whatever profits the foundation made from its initial grant of a textile mill and a hospital.</p><p>The Fauji Foundation gradually expanded dramatically into many other sectors, including fertilisers (<em>Fauji Fertilizer Company</em>), urea (<em>Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim</em>), phosphorus (<em>Pakistan Maroc Phosphore</em>), banking (<em>Askari Bank</em>), finance (<em>Foundation Securities</em>), insurance (<em>Askari General Insurance</em>, <em>Askari Life Insurance</em>), currency exchange (<em>Askari Exchange</em>), petroleum (<em>Mari Petroleum Company</em>), natural gas (<em>Foundation Gas</em>), green energy (<em>FFC Energy</em>), thermal power (<em>Fauji Kabirwala Power Company</em>), wind power (<em>Foundation Wind Energy</em>), dairy (<em>Fauji Foods</em>), fresh and frozen foods (<em>Fauji Fresh n Freeze</em>), meat (<em>Fauji Meat</em>), cornflakes (<em>Fauji Cereals</em>), cement (<em>Fauji Cement</em>), and logistics (<em>Fauji Akbar Portia Marine Terminals</em>, <em>Fauji Oil Terminal &amp; Distribution Company</em>). The boards of directors of all these companies are stacked with retired army officers. Apart from these companies, it also runs many schools and hospitals where army officers and their families receive free or subsidised education and healthcare. As of today, the Fauji Foundation is, by far, the largest business group and conglomerate in Pakistan.</p><p>The ‘<em>fauj</em>’, or the army, is not the only branch of the military that does business. How can the air force and navy stay behind? The air force runs the Shaheen Foundation, named after its nickname, the eagle. Conceived as a charitable trust, the Shaheen Foundation now operates schools, colleges and hospitals and also runs businesses such as cargo handling at airports (<em>Shaheen Airport Services</em>), aeroplane parts trading (<em>Shaheen Aerotraders</em>), real estate (<em>Shaheen Complex</em>, <em>Fazaia Housing</em>, <em>Shaheen Welfare Housing</em>), defence manufacturing (<em>SAMTEC</em>), textiles (<em>Shaheen Knitwear</em>), radio stations (<em>FM 100 Pakistan</em>), advertising (<em>Hawk Advertising</em>), bodyguard services (<em>Shaheen Foundation Security Services</em>), and employment in the Gulf (<em>Overseas Employment Agency</em>). The Shaheen foundation even operated a commercial airline, <em>Shaheen Air</em>, before its liquidation in 2019.</p><p>The navy runs the Bahria Foundation, originally envisioned as a charitable trust. It too operates many schools and colleges, engages in the construction of ports and shipbuilding (<em>Maritime Works Organization</em>), real estate (<em>Bahria Estates</em>), travel agencies (<em>Bahria Travels</em>), securities (<em>Bahria Security Systems &amp; Services</em>), medicines (<em>Bahria Pharmacy</em>), confectionery and catering (<em>Bahria Bakery &amp; Catering</em>), paints (<em>Bahria Paints</em>), petrol pumps (<em>Bahria Filling Stations</em>), import-export (<em>Al-Falah Trading Agency</em>), government employment (<em>Bahria Recruiting Agency</em>), and even IT services (<em>Bahria Enterprise Systems and Technologies</em>).</p><p>All this might sound overwhelming, but hold tight for one final ride, this time with the Defence Housing Authority. The DHA was initially an entity that was tasked with securing land for the development of defence housing localities for serving and retired military personnel. Over time, the DHA expanded to sell plots commercially and to build and construct villas, apartment complexes, retail shops, banks, corporate office towers, shopping malls, boulevards, roads, hospitals, medical colleges, clinics, schools, colleges, universities, mosques, golf clubs, cricket stadiums, gymnasiums, sports complexes, man-made lakes, theme parks, public green spaces, power grid stations, water filtration plants and underground wiring. The magnificent bungalows and sprawling localities built by DHA have transformed into posh residential areas, cocoons where the Pakistani elite reside, completely detached from the everyday realities of the rest of Pakistan.</p><p>With this, it is abundantly clear that the Pakistani military has had enormous control over the country’s state, government, politics, media and economy. Yet these are not new phenomena, and the military has been this powerful for a very long time now. However, the changes that we are witnessing now under the current army chief, General Asim Munir, are both foreseen and unforeseen simultaneously.</p><p>Asim Munir is unlike army chiefs of yore. While almost all of his predecessors graduated from the Pakistan Military Academy (equivalent to India’s NDA and IMA) or the colonial-era Sandhurst Academy, Munir graduated from the Officers’ Training School (equivalent to India’s OTS, which recruits cadets for short-service commissions). His father was a local <em>imam</em> (cleric) and a <em>Syed</em> (religious scholar) who taught in a madrasa. Munir received his early education in that madrasa. This is again in direct contrast with previous army chiefs, all of whom had a rather secular and British-style public-school education. Even Zia, whose father was also an imam, attended the elite St Stephen’s College in Delhi before Partition.</p><p>Munir could not attend such elite institutes, as he was from a family of modest means, unlike his predecessors, who all came from either well-established military families, landed dynasties (<em>zamindars</em>) or upper-middle-class households. Munir’s religious upbringing during his formative years seems to have had a huge impact on him, as he later went on to become a <em>Hafiz-e-Quran</em> (one who has memorised the Quran) during a military assignment to Saudi Arabia.</p><p>This also reflects in the fact that he does not drink, at least not publicly, as it is considered haram (sinful) in Islam. This again is in contrast with older army chiefs, almost all of whom drank whisky. Ayub Khan drank whisky, Yahya Khan was notorious as a heavy drinker, Musharraf drank whisky, but Zia did not drink whisky, though he did let people around him drink. Asim Munir has followed in Zia’s footsteps in this regard. This should not be surprising, as Munir is what is sometimes called a ‘Zia recruit’. This is a generation of Pakistani army officers who were recruited after Zia had taken power and enacted his Islamisation policies in the military.</p><p>These policies included the replacement of the army’s motto from the secular ‘Unity, Faith, and Discipline’ to the highly religious ‘<em>Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah</em>’ (‘Faith, Piety, and Jihad for the sake of Allah’); the institutionalisation of mandatory prayer sessions for all army units; encouragement for officers and soldiers to keep long beards; making piety a factor in promotions; prohibition of alcohol across all military messes and clubs; and routine sermons from <em>maulavis</em> (chaplains) of such organisations as the <em>Tablighi Jamaat</em>. Munir is a product of this batch of recruits from the 1980s. Therefore, his early life and early career are essential to understanding the psyche of the man.</p><p>After serving in the military for over 40 years, Munir was promoted to the rank of DG ISI in 2017. This is another departure from his predecessors, as none of them served as the head of intelligence. He was later promoted to the rank of corps commander in 2019, a crucial stepping stone on the path to becoming army chief. By 2022, he was about to retire, when the then army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, orchestrated the deposition of then PM Imran Khan through a no-confidence motion. PM Khan wanted then DG ISI Faiz Hameed to become the next army chief, an affront to the authority of the army that could not tolerate a mere civilian politician interfering in its internal affairs. Khan’s removal paved the way for Munir to succeed Bajwa as army chief following the latter’s retirement the same year.</p><p>Now at the helm of the military, Munir acted quickly to consolidate power. He first went after Imran Khan, embroiling him in a corruption case conjured up by NAB. In 2023, Khan was subjected to a show trial in a kangaroo court and sentenced to imprisonment in solitary confinement for over a dozen years. A similar fate was handed to his accomplice, General Faiz Hameed, a few years later. Khan’s imprisonment led to massive unrest, protests, violence and vandalism against the military. Munir cracked down on the unrest and then proceeded to weaken Khan’s political party, arresting hundreds of its politicians and disbarring it from contesting the next elections.</p><p>With arguably Pakistan’s most popular leader by far behind bars and its most popular political party in tatters, Munir presided over a not-so-free and not-so-fair general election. The result was a hung parliament, with Shahbaz Sharif’s Muslim League and Asif Ali Zardari’s People’s Party gaining seats and forming the government with some other smaller parties, while a significant number of former PTI politicians won seats as independents. This was the perfect outcome for the army, which quickly stitched together a coalition government, with Sharif as PM and Zardari as President, with the blessings of the army chief, of course.</p><p>Success in politics did not automatically transform into success in economics. Pakistan found itself defaulting yet again and sought another bailout from the IMF. Munir then decided to take matters into his own hands, and thus was formed the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), a one-stop body for deregulating the investment regime. Except that this body also had a rather peculiar member: the army chief himself. Munir now had a say in macroeconomic policy.</p><p>Why stop at the economy when there is so much opportunity in other areas? In 2024, army loyalists in parliament passed the 26th Amendment, which limited the tenure of the Chief Justice of Pakistan to three years or until the age of 65, whichever came first. It also changed the procedure for the appointment of judges from an independent collegium to a mixed collegium of parliamentarians. This was curiously done against the backdrop of increasing cases of the Pakistani Supreme Court overturning draconian laws passed by parliament.</p><p>Beginning in 2025, Munir adopted increasingly vitriolic and provocative rhetoric against India. His infamous speech in April 2025 justified the Two-Nation Theory by claiming that Hindus and Muslims cannot coexist. He even compared Pakistan with the first Islamic state of Prophet Mohammad, <em>Riyasat-e-Madina</em> (the State of Medina), as the second state formed on the basis of the <em>kalma</em> (words of God). This was just weeks before the even more triggering and obviously rage-baiting terror attack in Pahalgam. Survivors recounted that the victims, exclusively and deliberately male, were segregated on the basis of religion, stripped and checked for circumcision, and forced to recite the <em>kalma</em>, failing which they were shot dead, with their wives and girlfriends spared to tell the tale.</p><p>The attack was carried out by an organisation that goes by the name of ‘The Resistance Front’. Indian government officials are convinced it is a rebranded version of Lashkar-e-Taiba, just as they fathom that the ‘People’s Anti-Fascist Front’ is a similar repackaging of Jaish-e-Mohammad. These obviously secular-sounding names have replaced their too on-your-face Islamist names of yesteryears. This rebranding exercise was carried out under Munir’s predecessor, General Bajwa, following India’s revocation of Jammu &amp; Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status via the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. Yet, the nature of the attack left nothing to the imagination as to what these organisations really were. There was no hiding behind the seemingly secular names of these organisations, for their true face was as jihadist as it gets.</p><p>The motive of the attack was shamelessly obvious: to elicit an aggressive response from India, which came a couple of weeks later in the form of Operation Sindoor. Notwithstanding the losses incurred by India on the first day, there was absolutely no denying that Pakistan had been hammered. The ample amount of independently verified satellite imagery, including from American companies such as Maxar, laid bare, in front of the whole wide world, the Pakistani airstrips, army bases and jihadist madrasas struck cleanly by Indian missiles and drones. No such comparable damage was done to India.</p><p>Yet Munir, cunning as he is, sensed an opportunity in the crisis. What should have been a total embarrassment for the Pakistani military was quickly turned into a PR exercise. First, PM Sharif quickly acknowledged US President Donald Trump’s claim of brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan with a lot of enthusiasm. Then, he even went so far as to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. This brought Munir into Trump’s good books, and he was invited to have a private luncheon at the White House, completely sidestepping PM Sharif.</p><p>As Mr Sharif continued singing the praises of Mr Trump anywhere and everywhere, Mr Munir was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal, only the second since Ayub Khan promoted himself back in 1959. He was also awarded the <em>Hilal-i-Jurat</em>, Pakistan’s second-highest gallantry award, for his actions during the skirmish against India. If all of this was not enough, army loyalists in parliament steamrolled another amendment to the Constitution later that year.</p><p>Dubbed the 27th Amendment, it allowed Munir to retain the rank of Field Marshal for life and also provided him with lifelong legal immunity. The post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) was created as the equivalent of India’s CDS, with suzerainty over all branches of the military. The only difference is that Pakistan’s CDF can only be the army chief, unlike the Indian CDS. This automatically made Munir the first CDF and cemented the army’s dominance over the navy and air force. It also replaced the separate post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, meaning the CDF, in this case Munir, now answered to no one but the PM with respect to the strategic (read: nuclear) forces command. Finally, the amendment also restarted his tenure and increased it from three years to five years, with the option of an extension.</p><p>Another change the amendment brought in was the establishment of the Federal Constitutional Court as the new apex court to handle all constitutional interpretations, fundamental rights enforcement and federal-provincial disputes. Thus, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has been effectively stripped of its constitutional jurisdiction, reducing it to an appellate court for regular civil and criminal matters. To top it off, the ratio of judges was also lowered in the judicial collegium to ensure executive and political influence over judicial appointments and transfers.</p><p>In the spring of 2026, after the US found itself trapped in a quagmire in the war against Iran, Pakistan projected itself as the mediator. Ever the wily man, Munir became the face of this initiative, ditching his combat fatigues, ceremonial uniforms and muftis for bespoke, tailor-made business suits, acting the part of a statesman and negotiator, all the traits loved by fellow dealmaker Mr Trump. As Pakistan continues to curry more favour with the Americans and the Gulf Arabs, Mr Munir’s stature grows. The recent defence pacts with the Saudis, Turks and Kuwaitis, along with rumours of upcoming deals with the Egyptians and Malaysians, are not merely strategic decisions, but also exercises in public relations to cosmetically inflate Munir’s domestic image as a respected world leader.</p><p>Then there were also the shady cryptocurrency and critical-minerals deals done by Mr Munir with Trump and his family, complete with the former bringing the latter a suitcase full of cherry-picked critical minerals from Pakistan. One could not help but remember a similar performance put on by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1976 when he walked into a press conference with a bottle full of crude oil, announcing his plans to turn Pakistan into an oil-producing country. We know how that turned out.</p><p>This should not be viewed as contrary to the situation at home. Pakistan continues to face political and economic uncertainty; skirmishes with Afghanistan occur every now and then, insurgency in Balochistan has become even more audacious, protests rock Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and yet Mr Munir continues to play the peacemaker abroad even as his own house is sitting on a powder keg. As has been argued by this author, Munir’s dealmaking is as much directed at an international audience as it is at a domestic audience.</p><p>There are whispers and rumours of an upcoming 28th Amendment later this year by army loyalists. It would supposedly revive the Concurrent List, abolished after Musharraf’s ouster, and bring back ministries such as education, health, labour, environment and local development under the federal government. It would purportedly redistribute finances and resources to favour the federal government over the provinces.</p><p>The proposed amendment is rumoured to increase the voting age from 18 to 25, in light of the recent youth and student protests across the subcontinent and as a signal of the army’s fear of its own youth. It may reinstate military tribunals and may even reorganise the provinces by carving up the existing provinces into smaller administrative units, as proposed by the army insider and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi. This would spell disaster for regional parties such as Mr Sharif’s Muslim League and Asif Ali Zardari’s People’s Party, which draw their power from Punjab and Sindh respectively. It also explains their unease with and opposition to such proposals. If these proposals were to materialise, Mr Munir would have virtually no challengers left.</p><p>All this means that Asim Munir is now, for all practical purposes, the latest addition in the line of military dictators of Pakistan in all but name, and can remain so for the next ten years. By hook and by crook, he has tactfully institutionalised military control over Pakistan. The military is no more a state within a state or a parallel deep state. The military is the state. No matter where one looks, the <em>khaki wardi</em> is ubiquitous. the military has embedded its men in every upper strata and sector of Pakistani society and state respectively, barring the very lowest levels. Ergo, Pakistan has evolved from being a praetorian state to a quasi-stratocracy.</p><p>Mr Munir has laid bare his intentions to be the de facto ruler of Pakistan. From here, he is only poised to consolidate even more power. With the blessings of Mr Trump, he now has no incentive to democratise the country. Do not expect him to retire and play golf in a veterans’ club or voluntarily go to London for a permanent vacation any time soon. He is here to stay. And there is nothing stopping him from plotting another terrorist attack on India.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=357a498c4ac7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the Pakistani State: The Past]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mishradivyanshu8203/on-the-pakistani-state-the-past-f7a92dc036e7?source=rss-f42d6958aaa7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f7a92dc036e7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dictatorship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[partition-of-india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Divyanshu Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 15 Aug 2026 20:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-16T08:08:46.772Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Yqi3WZvMY6lzr424X6FrCA.png" /><figcaption>Representational Image — AI Generated — Courtesy Gemini</figcaption></figure><p>That the Pakistani military rules the country is but an open secret. However, not many know how it actually does so. The common wisdom is that the Pakistani Army carried out coups four times, three of them successfully, and four of its erstwhile serving generals ruled the country as heads of state. This does not explain the reality of Pakistan today as a quasi-stratocracy. Many countries have had coups in the past yet today are democratic, namely France, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, et al. As they say in finance, past performance is not an indicator of future success.</p><p>Pakistan is nowadays described as a hybrid regime by most observers, including its own politicians, such as Defence Minister Khwaja Asif. But how exactly? On the 80th year after the creation of Pakistan, this author lifts the layers and delves deeper into the past and present of the Pakistani state and its evolving hybrid regime under its new leader, Asim Munir.</p><p>The origins of the current ailments of Pakistan can be traced back to India in the 19th century. After the British suppressed the revolt of 1857, India&#39;s Muslim elite had been stripped of its major power centres (Mysore, Delhi, Awadh, Rohilkhand), but even more so of its sense of pride and prestige as the erstwhile masters of the subcontinent. Having lost the favour of the British after their active participation against them in the revolt, the easy solution for recovering said prestige was to curry favour with the new masters.</p><p>Thus began a concerted effort by India’s Muslim elite to look, sound and act more and more like the British themselves. This culminated in the establishment of Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College (now Aligarh Muslim University) by Syed Ahmed Khan in 1875, and later, in the establishment of the All-India Muslim League in 1906.</p><p>The British, too, entertained the Muslim elite and adopted a new version of their divide-and-rule playbook which was thoroughly supported by the latter. This included such policies as the adoption of Hindustani written in Perso-Arabic script (1837) and sidelining Hindi written in Nagari script; the establishment of separate Hindu and Muslim schools, colleges and universities (AMU, DAVs, BHU); the partition of Bengal along religious lines (1905); separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims (1909); and national censuses that stressed religion, caste and tribes. This induced a sense of otherness in Indian Muslims that gradually grew over a century.</p><p>Then there was the idea of a separate state for Indian Muslims, initially floated by the poet Muhammad Iqbal in 1930. The term Pakistan itself was manufactured by Rehmat Ali in 1933 in England, by combining the initials of the provinces he thought should constitute the Muslim state. Finally, the idea was picked up by a rebel Congress leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, by then a Muslim League leader, and Pakistan became the primary demand of the party. The demand was finally met in 1947.</p><p>Pakistan was born from the amputation of a partitioning India, brought forth amid the blood, upheaval and anguish of a subcontinent torn in two. The country was originally imagined by its founding fathers, most prominently Jinnah, as a modern Islamic democracy in a federal constitutional republic with some socialist characteristics.</p><p>Jinnah became the Governor-General and appointed his protégé and right-hand man, Liaquat Ali Khan, as the Prime Minister at the helm of a hand-picked cabinet. This was in direct contrast with India, wherein the spiritual leader of the country, Gandhi, refused to participate in the upcoming government and retired from politics, leaving the job to his relatively younger comrades, namely Nehru, Patel, Rajagopalachari, Prasad, Ambedkar et al.</p><p>The Muslim League was not similar to the Congress Party of India. Fortunately for India, the Congress Party had been transformed by two triumvirates, Lal-Bal-Pal and Gandhi-Nehru-Patel, from an elite-run civil society organisation and pressure group into a mass movement and grassroots party. Granted, its leaders were foreign-educated, English-speaking elites, but the lower cadres of the party comprised partially educated or uneducated men and women who spoke vernacular languages. Even children, teenagers and students were active or passive participants.</p><p>The Muslim League, in sharp contrast, did not have a robust organisation at the grassroots and severely lacked a lower cadre of common folk. Beneath the foreign-educated, English-speaking elites, it had few vernacular-speaking or semi-educated people with an ear to the ground. Ergo, apart from the two stalwarts of Pakistan, Jinnah and Liaquat, the depth of the civilian leadership was rather shallow.</p><p>This became obvious when Jinnah died a year after the creation of his country. Bereft of its equivalent of the father of the nation, Pakistan found itself an orphan. While India promulgated its Constitution rather quickly by 1950, Pakistan remained in a bind, unable to create consensus and tangled up in bickering and trivialities. Yet Liaquat Ali Khan was still alive and provided the country with some semblance of leadership and stability. That did not last long, as he was assassinated in 1951 by an Afghan man. Pakistan now found itself a widow.</p><p>With the core of its civilian leadership in the grave, Pakistan was left to be run by aristocrats, bureaucrats and retired military officers. This imbalance was further accentuated by the fact that Pakistan had inherited one-third of the British Indian military even though it was only one-fifth the size of India in terms of area. These military officers themselves were overwhelmingly Punjabi Muslims and Pashtuns. This was a product of a century-old British policy of recruiting from so-called ‘martial races’, namely Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Pathans, Dogras, Rajputs and Gurkhas, as they were considered reliable and warlike by the British.</p><p>The fact that half of these ‘martial races’ came from Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) meant that these provinces were already heavily militarised and policed even before Partition. The British Raj had already transformed the north-western regions of India into frontier states with garrison towns, a phenomenon this author describes as the garrison state. The rationale behind such an arrangement was that the British Raj wanted to safeguard Delhi and the mainland from the Emirate of Afghanistan and Qajar Iran.</p><p>Remnants of this system can still be seen in India, wherein a disproportionate number of military recruits hail from erstwhile Punjab (Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh). However, what initial Indian leaders, such as Nehru, did right was to curb the special powers of the military, such as the unilateral imposition of martial law. Nehru devolved the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army into two posts: an elected civilian politician as Defence Minister and a serving general as Chief of Army Staff.</p><p>Nehru then moved into 7 Race Course Road (now 7 Lok Kalyan Marg), which used to be the bungalow of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army. Nehru also established various paramilitary organisations under the Home Ministry that answered to Patel and ultimately to him. These organisations, which patrolled the border and fought insurgencies alongside the regular military, were staffed in their top brass by civilian bureaucrats from the Indian Civil Service.</p><p>In sharp contrast, while Pakistan had inherited that already militarised system, it had also lost its core civilian leaders, and its subsequent leaders did little to curb the military. After Liaquat&#39;s death, the President, Khwaja Nazimuddin, took his place as the next Prime Minister. A former Nawab from Bengal and educated at AMU, he quickly found himself in a tussle with the new Governor-General he himself had appointed, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, a former ICS officer. Malik imposed martial law in Lahore during the 1953 riots against Ahmadis. In its aftermath, he used his emergency powers to dismiss Prime Minister Nazimuddin and then moved to unilaterally dissolve the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1954.</p><p>Malik&#39;s hand-picked replacement for the post of Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, was a serving diplomat. Ironically enough, Bogra, a Bengali, steamrolled a draconian piece of legislation combining all the western provinces to create a single province of West Pakistan, as a parallel to the province of East Pakistan. Dubbed the One Unit Scheme, this was a ploy to counterbalance the rising regionalist and later nationalist sentiment in Bengali-dominated East Pakistan. The sentiment arose because Pakistan had adopted Urdu as its official language alongside English, while completely sidelining Bangla.</p><p>Urdu, a heavily Persianised and Arabised offshoot of Hindustani, was a language that originated in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) of British India. It was spoken only by the Indian Muslim elite, which comprised a meagre 5–10 per cent of Pakistan&#39;s population at the time of Partition, primarily the Muhajirs (Indian Muslim migrants in Pakistan). Bangla, on the other hand, was spoken by a little more than half of the population of Pakistan, but was concentrated almost exclusively in East Pakistan.</p><p>This paradox was central to the ethno-linguistic question of Pakistan. India, too, faced its own version of this question and was tempted to impose Hindi as the sole national language. But its leaders pragmatically tackled it by quickly course-correcting after pushback. India also regularly carved smaller states out of larger ones on the basis of their regional languages, while also recognising their respective languages constitutionally, such as Punjabi, Bangla, Tamil, Telugu et al., to placate the various peoples of India.</p><p>Nothing of this sort was done by Pakistani leaders of the era, Malik and Bogra, whose One Unit Scheme further centralised control in the hands of the aristocracy, bureaucracy and military. If anything, Bogra sought to crush the growing dissent in East Pakistan and appointed one Ayub Khan, Pakistan Army&#39;s Commander-in-Chief, as his Defence Minister to crack down further.</p><p>By 1955, Malik&#39;s deteriorating health rendered him unable to continue, and he gave way to his Home Minister, Iskander Mirza, a retired army general, to become the new Governor-General. Pakistan finally adopted a Constitution in 1956, six years too late. There was no relief for Pakistan&#39;s nascent democracy, however, as Mirza abused his newfound presidential powers to constantly interfere in governance and dismissed four Prime Ministers in a span of just two years.</p><p>As if to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Mirza too proceeded to unilaterally dissolve the Parliament of Pakistan and imposed martial law across the country in 1958, out of fear of being deposed like his predecessor. He scrapped the Constitution and began rewriting a new constitution, installing Pakistan&#39;s C-in-C, General Ayub Khan, as Chief Martial Law Administrator.</p><p>Ever the opportunist, Ayub Khan carried out a coup against his own benefactor, Mirza, and declared himself the new President. Thus began the rule of the military in Pakistan. In 1959, Ayub abolished universal adult suffrage and replaced it with a limited electorate comprising local elites and patrons. Dubbed ‘Basic Democracy’, it effectively cut the wings of the fledgling Pakistani democracy. It was under Ayub that the army began actively portraying itself as the ultimate guardian and saviour of Pakistan, as opposed to the corrupt and indecisive civilian politicians. This coincided with the coining of the term ‘The Establishment’ as a euphemistic shorthand for the military-intelligence nexus, whose invisible hand ‘guided’ Pakistan’s ‘democracy’, and was the ultimate arbiter of its politics.</p><p>Ayub also hastily privatised state-owned enterprises and poorly implemented land reforms, which only resulted in the concentration of wealth in the hands of the descendants of zamindars (landowners) of yore. One statistic from his own chief economist claimed that just a couple of dozen families owned two-thirds of Pakistani industry. In 1960, Ayub shifted the capital from the cosmopolitan Karachi to the Punjabi- and Pashtun-dominated Islamabad, further alienating the East Pakistanis. Facing the sister of the late Mr Jinnah, Fatima Jinnah, Ayub rigged the elections and snatched victory. Blinded by his arrogance, he also launched an unsuccessful war against India in 1965.</p><p>Weakened in the aftermath of his misadventure, Ayub continued to cling on to power until 1969, when he had become so unpopular that he was forced to step down. To fill in his military boots, he chose as the new President his right-hand man, Yahya Khan, another serving army general. Facing heat over his predecessor’s mishandling of the East Pakistan question, Yahya presided over the 1970 elections. It was the only free and fair general election in Pakistani history and resulted in the victory of former Muslim League rebel and Bengali nationalist politician Sheikh Mujibur Rahman against Yahya’s hand-picked candidate, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Yahya also presided over the subsequent crackdown on Sheikh Mujib’s party, the Awami League, and the Bengal genocide, which quickly transformed into the 1971 war after India’s intervention. Consequently, Pakistan was decisively defeated and bifurcated, and Bangladesh was born. The One Unit Scheme had terribly backfired.</p><p>Yahya was replaced as president by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a popular civilian politician who had served as a minister in various ministries under Ayub Khan, apart from being Yahya’s candidate against Sheikh Mujib in the 1970 elections. Bhutto, a self-described Islamic socialist, ironically began the trend of the Islamisation of the Pakistani state. While he promulgated the current Constitution of Pakistan in 1973, he also enshrined in it the infamous laws against blasphemy and declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.</p><p>Bhutto established the Federal Security Force, a paramilitary force and secret police, to counter the influence of the Pakistani Army and curtailed freedom of the press. He bent the rules of succession and appointed a junior general as Chief of Army Staff, namely one Zia-ul-Haq. There is a popular anecdote in Pakistan that Bhutto openly mocked Zia in front of his associates to display his dominance. In yet another twist of irony, Bhutto was ultimately deposed by Zia in 1977 and then executed by hanging after a frivolous court case in 1979. Zia imposed martial law and then declared himself President.</p><p>If Bhutto started the process of Islamisation, Zia turbocharged it. In 1979, Zia established a theocratic court, called the Federal Shariat Court, to bypass secular law. He took a leaf out of Sharia law to criminalise adultery, introduced public floggings as a mode of punishment, exacted Islamic taxes such as <em>Zakat</em> (wealth tax) and <em>Ushr</em> (agricultural tithe), reduced the weight of women’s testimony in court (<em>Qanun-e-Shahadat</em>), criminalised Ahmadi practices, increased the penalty for blasphemy from life imprisonment to the death sentence, and criminalised eating during Ramzan.</p><p>Zia did not just stop there and proceeded to abolish the sale and consumption of alcohol for Muslims, banned nightlife, introduced clothing guidelines for men and women on television, promoted the hijab for women, introduced <em>Islamiyat</em> (Islamism) and Pakistan Studies as compulsory subjects in all schools and universities, revised the curriculum to focus more on Islamic aspects of history, and even attempted to abolish banks incurring interest (<em>riba</em>) on loans. He was also the chief architect of the ISI pipeline to train, arm, aid and fund the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets, framing it as a <em>jihad</em> (holy war) against <em>kafirs</em> (infidels). Thus, Zia completely revamped the Pakistani state and termed it the Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the Prophet).</p><p>With Saudi and American money, he built several jihadist <em>madrasas</em> (seminaries) along the porous Af-Pak border, many of which still continue to operate to this day. In 1981, he ordered judges to swear oaths of allegiance to the military. He amended the 1973 Constitution to give himself the power to unilaterally dismiss the Parliament. If all of this was not enough, Zia conducted a rigged referendum to legitimise his rule and ushered in what he described as ‘partyless democracy’, with a hand-picked puppet Prime Minister at the helm. Zia eventually died in a plane crash in 1988.</p><p>What followed in the 1990s was an anarchic period of Pakistani politics, where political power switched hands between Nawaz Sharif, a protégé of Zia, and Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the late Mr Bhutto. This was made possible by successive army chiefs, namely Asif Nawaz Janjua, Abdul Waheed Kakar and Jehangir Karamat, who were rather non-interventionist, somewhat forgiving and hands-off when it came to Pakistani politics. While Janjua died of a heart attack, later suspected to have been a poisoning, Kakar retired in a timely manner, and Karamat was axed by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif over policy disagreements. This was an anomalous period in Pakistani politics and was soon over.</p><p>Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of the communist regime in Kabul, scores of Mujahideen were left unemployed. Their benefactor, the Pakistani military and intelligence, made sure to provided them with fresh employment opportunities, such as that of radical Islamist preachers in madrasas, and as trainers and coaches of a new generation of militants to infiltrate and destabilise Kashmir. Two men, namely Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar, were cultivated by the ISI over the course of this decade and went on to form the notorious jihadist organisations, <em>Lashkar-e-Taiba</em> (Army of the Pure) and <em>Jaish-e-Mohammad </em>(Army of Mohammad).</p><p>In 1999, one year after Pakistan successfully conducted its nuclear tests, then-COAS General Pervez Musharraf persuaded then Prime Minister Sharif to wage a war against India under the nuclear umbrella and annex Kashmir. The failure to do so in the subsequent Kargil War was dumped on Sharif, who was scapegoated by Musharraf. The latter then orchestrated a coup, deposed Sharif, declared an emergency and appointed himself Chief Executive of Pakistan. A few years later, Musharraf changed his title to President to be on an equal footing with his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Vajpayee.</p><p>Musharraf fired and/or arrested many judges. He did conduct elections, but not before the formation of his own political party, dubbed by his opponents the ‘King’s Party’, primed to win in rigged elections. This was followed by alternating terrorist attacks on India (<em>2001 Parliament Attacks, 2006 Mumbai Train Blasts, 2008 Mumbai attacks</em>), and peace overtures to India (<em>Agra Summit 2001, 2003 Ceasefire, Cricket Diplomacy 2005, Four-point Formula</em>), all with the tacit approval of Musharraf. It was under Musharraf that terrorism against India had become state policy. By the late noughts, the ‘loyal’ LeT had become a proxy of the army in all but name and the apple of its eye, while the ‘rogue’ JeM had been reigned in and used selectively to avoid international pressure.</p><p>However, Musharraf was severely weakened after his military stormed the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in 2007, in a desperate attempt to crack down on radical Islamists. His popularity took a nosedive when Mrs Bhutto was assassinated shortly after her return to the country, with widespread allegations of Musharraf’s involvement in it. As public sentiment in Pakistan turned against him, he was subsequently forced to step down in 2008, and the sweeping executive and federal powers were curtailed and decentralised via subsequent amendments.</p><p>Since then, Pakistan has been run by what observers have described as a hybrid regime. What this means is that, while on the surface, Pakistan does look like a common-law country, with an executive, a legislature, a judiciary, a bureaucracy, civil society and media, lift the layers and one would find the khaki uniform everywhere. Over the course of its almost 80 years of existence, the Pakistani military has spread its roots into all parts of the Pakistani state and does so to this day. We shall look at the make-up of current institutions in the country to make this even clearer.</p><p>Continued in part 2, On &#39;Pakistan&#39;s State: the Present&#39;.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f7a92dc036e7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the Behaviour of States]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mishradivyanshu8203/on-the-behaviour-of-states-e7b4b9325315?source=rss-f42d6958aaa7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e7b4b9325315</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[realism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Divyanshu Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 15:38:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-22T17:27:46.534Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wVJqqJpPY6CQdXS2RviUvw.png" /><figcaption>The Great Game — Representational Image — AI Generated — Courtesy Gemini</figcaption></figure><h3>Why Do States Behave the Way They Do?</h3><p>The title gives it away. This has been a central question in international relations since time immemorial. There is no single, definitive answer to it: <strong>Why do states behave the way they do?</strong> Numerous eminent thinkers have attempted to solve this puzzle, which has befuddled leaders and policymakers for millennia. Successive generations of scholars have proposed competing models, each attempting to isolate the principal variables governing state behaviour. None has yielded a universal theory.</p><p>Some assume that ideas, identities, and norms cause nations to act as they do. Others argue that cooperation through international institutions and shared universal or liberal values should shape state behaviour, and that states should strive towards these ideals. Still others contend that the nature of government influences such behaviour and therefore seek to promote democracy, purportedly the most peaceful form of government , through the active use of power. Then there are those who attempt to explain the actions of nations through the lens of class conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, culture wars, the clash of civilisations, the ‘foreign hand’, the battle of the sexes, and what have you. This author, however, seeks to explain this fundamental yet enigmatic question using the seemingly simple concepts of power and security.</p><p>Before we delve deeper into the concepts of power and security, however, we must first address these alternative theories. Before we address these alternative theories, however, we need to address the elephants in the room: what do we mean when we use jargon such as ‘states’ and ‘the international system’? Political analysis, like any scientific inquiry, depends upon clearly defined terms. First, states are defined in the Westphalian sense. This means that a state has internationally recognised borders, exercises supreme authority over its territory within those borders, possesses sovereignty, the right to govern itself without external interference, and is legally equal to all other states on the world stage, at least in theory.</p><p>Second, the inhabitants of a state are referred to as citizens rather than subjects. They are subject to the laws of the land and to taxation and, in return, enjoy certain rights, privileges, and public services. Third, states possess both coercive and extractive capacities, maintaining a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force through such institutions as the military and the police while raising revenue through centralised taxation. Fourth, states are neither the personal property of, nor beholden to, an individual, a group of individuals, a family, or a dynasty. Fifth, there exists an international ‘system’. This system comprises states that may or may not trust one another, cooperate with one another, or be friendly towards one another, but which nevertheless recognise each other’s existence.</p><p>Now let us tackle the aforementioned alternative theories. The first is the argument that shared ideals and identities are the principal determinants of state behaviour. If that proposition were true, however, Nazi Germany would never have signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union in the build-up to the Second World War; the British Empire and the United States would never have aligned themselves with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany during the Second World War; and the United States would never have normalised relations with Communist China in the 1970s. These were all strange bedfellows, entering into alliances of convenience as strategic calculations overrode ideological hostilities. Fascism, communism, and liberal democracy are mutually opposing ideologies, yet whenever it suited these powers, they readily set aside their ideological differences.</p><p>The second and third arguments naturally arise from the first: namely, that democracy, cooperation through international institutions, international law, globalisation, and free trade ought to shape state behaviour. Some take this argument even further, contending that active leadership by liberal democracies, the promotion of democracy, and the willingness to use military force should be the guiding principles of foreign policy. Such thinkers advocate the theory of democratic peace, which holds that democracies are not bellicose and do not fight amongst themselves. A close examination of this claim, however, reveals several anomalies. For starters, the notion that democracies do not fight amongst themselves, while true to some extent, is not entirely accurate.</p><p>The British Empire was perhaps the epitome of imperialism and colonialism, conquering vast swathes of territory across the globe. But what was Britain itself? It was a constitutional monarchy with an increasingly representative parliamentary democracy, and yet that did not prevent it from waging wars against indigenous peoples and colonising India, North America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong, <em>et al.</em> During the Cold War, the United States also supported violent coups against communist dictatorships and even democratically elected socialist governments in order to install and sustain right-wing dictatorships across South America (Operation Condor), West Asia (Iran), Southeast Asia (Indonesia and South Vietnam), and East Asia (Taiwan and South Korea). Several such regimes, including the Gulf monarchies, continue to enjoy American support today.</p><p>Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, the world’s oldest continuous democracy, has attacked multiple countries, including Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and, more recently, Iran. These ‘interventions’ were carried out under the pretext of promoting democracy, freedom, human rights, and so forth. Most of the countries concerned are now governed by authoritarian regimes. More recently, Israel, the sole democracy in West Asia, has adopted an increasingly bellicose foreign policy, attacking multiple countries, including, but not limited to, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Qatar, Yemen, <em>et al.</em> One could argue that these are examples of democracies fighting dictatorships, juntas, theocracies, terrorists, and so forth, and that democracies do not fight amongst themselves.</p><p>That claim, however, also falls flat upon closer examination. For instance, ancient Athens, a direct democracy, waged a devastating war against Syracuse, a fellow democracy, however imperfect. In 1812, the United States went to war with Britain over control of Canada. More recently, in 1971, India, the world’s largest democracy, went to war with Pakistan shortly after it had held the only free and fair general election in its history, partly to protect the Bengalis of East Pakistan from genocide and partly to alter the regional balance of power decisively in India’s favour. Pakistan has not widely been regarded as having held a free and fair general election since. Democratic Japan and South Korea continue to experience periodic strains in their relations because of their shared history. Likewise, Turkey and Greece remain at loggerheads despite both having been more or less democratic, albeit imperfectly, since the end of the Second World War.</p><p>Finally, we come to the outliers. Some have presented class conflict as the underlying explanation of international politics. Yet class conflict, a central concept of communism, does not explain why the Soviet Union and Communist China split in the 1960s and even fought a border war with one another; why China attacked Vietnam, a fellow communist state; why Vietnam invaded Cambodia, another communist state; or why the Soviet Union invaded communist Afghanistan. Comrades fighting comrades has, in fact, been a common occurrence throughout history, and a shared commitment to class conflict has never prevented them from killing one another.</p><p>Then there are those who advance a postcolonial framework. This is the notion that there ought to be a sense of solidarity amongst nations formerly oppressed by colonial powers, and that they would cooperate because of their shared historical experiences, much as two people in a romance novel bond over shared trauma. This, however, does not withstand the litmus test of history. Repeated wars and skirmishes between postcolonial states, including India and Pakistan, Israel and its neighbours, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Thailand and Cambodia , demonstrate that colonialism, if anything, often creates more rifts and grievances amongst fellow victims and is therefore not a reliable predictor of state behaviour.</p><p>Let us now examine the explanation advanced by feminists: namely, that the inherently patriarchal and misogynistic nature of society, together with male leaders’ notions of toxic masculinity, machismo, and male ego, drives international politics in a cynical and unhealthy fashion. This explanation rings hollow when one examines the conduct of women in positions of power. Chinese Empress Wu Zetian waged wars against the Tibetans, Turks, and Koreans, and tacitly sanctioned the deaths of both her sons. Byzantine Empress Irene fought a civil war against her own son, ending it by having him blinded and killed. Russian Empress Catherine the Great launched several wars, including against the Turks and Poles, and was complicit in her husband’s murder. The Falklands War and the Indo–Pakistan War of 1971 were both prosecuted under the leadership of women: British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, respectively. Golda Meir frequently employed incendiary rhetoric against the Palestinians, even though the war in which she led her country was not initiated by her. These examples suggest that simply replacing a male leader with a female counterpart does not, by itself, resolve the underlying issues that already exist in international politics, which is that any leader, man or woman, must take decisions or face circumstances that exceed the bounds of their personal morality.</p><h3>If Not Ideas, Then What?</h3><p>From our last observation, we arrive at our first argument. If men and women indeed behave similarly when in positions of power, then the problem must be human, not simply male. Thus, one can argue that conflict is inherent in human nature. To paraphrase Napoleon Bonaparte, human nature is inherently selfish and fearful. Human beings are naturally ambitious, and their desire for power and control is innate. Ergo, international politics reflects human nature. It operates as a self-fulfilling prophecy, or rather a positive feedback loop, wherein the worst human impulses, such as insecurity, jealousy, and competition, are amplified. This may well explain why nations behave as they do.</p><p>Their behaviour is an extension of the men and women who lead them and, by extension, of human nature itself. This also means that states act under conditions of incomplete information, as the unpredictability of human nature means that no leader is so clairvoyant as to second-guess what the leader of another state is thinking. It is difficult to determine whether another state’s actions are genuine, a bluff, or deliberate disinformation. This is why private morality and a personal sense of justice are valuable in individual leaders and can even be reflected in domestic governance. In the international arena, however, these ideals count for little, as the leaders of one state do not exercise authority over the citizens of another. Consequently, prudence and common sense prevail. Thus, leaders often decouple their own ideologies from their foreign policy posturing, and end up being cunning and ruthless towards others, even if they are fair to their own people. Their actions on the world stage may appear evil in and of themselves, but they are necessary evils.</p><p>Human nature alone, however, cannot fully explain state behaviour. Nations do not simply act on the whims and wishes of those who lead them. What, then, influences their actions? The answer becomes clearer if one simply zooms out. No state is an isolated system, insulated from external pressures and interactions. Every nation exists within a neighbourhood, a region, and, ultimately, the world. If one were to assume that the world was inhabited solely by good, well-intentioned people and benevolent states, then everybody would live happily ever after, and humanity’s lust for power, appetite for conflict, and recurrent insecurity would never manifest themselves. Within their own borders, states possess governments with a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, together with police, militaries, bureaucracies, and courts to maintain law and order. If only the world were governed and policed by a supranational authority capable of enforcing international law, we would never have to worry about war or conflict. Yet, as we all know, such a world does not exist.</p><p>The very fact that nations do not exist in a cocoon of eternal bliss, and that the world is not a place of rainbows and sunshine, means that they are always looking over their shoulders. Their leaders, therefore, are not merely making decisions driven by inherent human flaws but are also responding to structural pressures within their regional and global environments. There is no world government that consistently polices or regulates states. Those that have attempted to play such a role, the British Empire, the League of Nations, the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and the United States, have often found themselves humbled. The absence of such an authority means that the world is fundamentally anarchic. Anarchy does not mean chaos; it simply denotes the absence of a supreme international authority.</p><p>In fact, the very reason states exist is to solve the problem of anarchy at the domestic level. They do so by providing security, order, peace, justice, welfare, and freedom, in that order, as part of their social contract with their citizens. To uphold security, states either maximise their sovereignty by remaining strategically autonomous or cede a measure of their sovereignty by entering into alliances with other states that serve as strategic counterweights against potential rivals. However, this problem cannot be solved at the international level by individual states because of the absence of a world government. This means that states cannot prevent warfare or instability abroad.</p><p>The anarchic nature of the international system forces states to make the decisions they do, and over time, such decisions influence those that future leaders will make. This structural anarchy, coupled with the unpredictability of human nature, also means that states cannot reliably discern the intentions and ulterior motives of other states and therefore cannot depend upon others for assistance or protection. Indeed, many a war has been triggered or lost over the course of history simply because of misunderstandings, incomplete information, or outright misinformation. Promises may be broken. Treaties may collapse. War always remains a possibility, however remote. States therefore have no choice but to look out for themselves.</p><p>This is not to say that there have been no attempts to address the problem of anarchy. The League of Nations was one such attempt to establish some semblance of global governance after the First World War. We know how that ended: the League effectively collapsed with the outbreak of the Second World War. The United Nations was another such attempt, purportedly incorporating the lessons learned from the failures of its predecessor. Its repeated inability to prevent wars or coordinate effective responses to humanitarian disasters, however, suggests that it has not been particularly effective. The Western-led alliance system, comprising NATO and the European Union, also represented an attempt to bring a measure of predictability and stability to an otherwise anarchic international order. However, the Western-led ‘rules-based’ liberal international order, if one could even call it that, was not particularly liberal towards the ‘others’, namely, non-aligned and neutral states, and largely addressed the problem only for an exclusive group of developed Western countries.</p><p>For much of the so-called Third World, the Cold War was anything but cold. In fact, there were numerous hot wars, coups, and counter-coups orchestrated by the very architects of the ‘liberal’ order. As discussed earlier, the United States and its allies were quite comfortable supporting dictatorships, provided they were anti-communist or otherwise willing to serve their strategic and commercial interests. This glaring inconsistency is not merely a Western phenomenon. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and Comecon, and later the Russian-led CSTO and EAEU, represented similar attempts to address the same problem. These fared even worse. The former two dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the latter two were undermined by Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine.</p><p>The real weakness of such groupings is that they are only as strong as their weakest member. If even one state is insufficiently committed or fails to cooperate consistently with the others, the entire grouping suffers, regardless of the rationale that working together would help them achieve their common goal. Trust and cooperation are the two variables that cannot be taken for granted. This reinforces the fact that anarchy did not simply disappear because a group of countries, Western or otherwise, united against the ‘other’. Anarchy is inherent in the international system, just as competition is inherent in human nature, and the former complements the latter.</p><p>Before we delve any deeper into this dilemma, we must acknowledge certain axioms. First, states, in the Westphalian sense, are the primary actors on the world stage, not multinational corporations, NGOs, terrorist groups, or international organisations. Only states possess legal sovereignty, control militaries, wage war, and sign treaties. Second, states are, by and large, rational actors. This does not mean that they always make the correct decisions, for they are led by selfish and fearful human beings. Rather, their choices reflect attempts to maximise what they perceive to be their national interest. We shall return to this concept shortly.</p><p>Third, war is not unnatural, even if it is despicable, and sometimes it is unavoidable and may even be necessary. To borrow from Carl von Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means. This is not to promote or encourage war but to discourage wars fought merely for ideals, ideology, or morality, and to advocate only those wars that are either defensive in nature, where security or survival is threatened, or, if offensive, have clear objectives and a near-guaranteed prospect of victory. Fourth, treaties and alliances last only as long as they remain expedient. As the saying goes, there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Fifth, the imposition of one state’s ideology upon another is both dangerous and foolhardy. Sixth, the international system is little more than the aggregate of the national policies of the hegemonic states. Seventh, power and morality have little in common. Hypocrisy is a bitter truth of politics.</p><p>Taken together, these assumptions imply that, in an anarchic world inhabited by selfish human beings, it is every state for itself. Stronger states dominate their weaker counterparts because of power differentials. As the law of the jungle prevails, survival becomes the ultimate objective. No state can pursue prosperity, democracy, human rights, trade, and so forth if it first ceases to exist. Most states conclude that survival can be ensured only through security, and security, in turn, can be achieved only through the pursuit and accumulation of power. Power is the fulcrum upon which international politics pivots. Analytically, it is best understood as a vector possessing both magnitude and strategic direction. Power may be defined as a function of military, economic, political, geographical, or demographic variables. Thus, power and security are symbiotic. Power increases and guarantees security. Security enables states to acquire and consolidate power. International politics is ultimately a struggle for power among states, just as politics itself is a struggle for power over men.</p><h3>What Do States Really Want?</h3><p>Here we introduce the concept of national interest. Nowadays, the term is often invoked rather loosely. In its most basic sense, however, national interest refers to the objectives necessary for a state’s survival and prosperity. It is generally defined in terms of territorial integrity, sovereignty, security, economic well-being, and strategic influence. Thus, rather than asking, ‘What is morally correct?’, states ask, ‘Given the world as it actually is, what policy best advances our interests, and what can realistically be achieved?’ Every state must therefore provide for its own security because of the inherent anarchy of the international system and the uncertainty of human nature. It is a classic illustration of the old adage: ‘God helps those who help themselves.’</p><p>As stated earlier, the pursuit of power can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. One state may increase its military spending to bolster its security, but another state cannot know for certain whether those weapons are intended for defensive or offensive purposes. Consequently, the other state may increase its own military spending to maintain parity, which, in turn, may prompt the first state to arm itself further. This self-reinforcing cycle of uncertainty and suspicion steadily increases strategic entropy and drives arms races and militarisation. Herein lies the central security dilemma of international politics. In the process of increasing their own security, both states ultimately become less secure. Their tit-for-tat actions represent attempts to maintain a favourable balance of power, which they fear, if it were to shift in the other’s favour, could jeopardise their own security and survival.</p><p>Even states that are satisfied with the status quo, generally those at the top of the food chain or protected by such states, find it difficult to preserve it whenever other states behave in this manner, simply because the absence of an international sovereign means that war remains a constant possibility. The stronger a state becomes, the greater the pressure it feels to project strength, lest it be perceived as weak by its rivals, which, in turn, pressures those rivals to become stronger themselves. This quickly devolves into a zero-sum game, wherein even a marginal increase in one state’s security is automatically interpreted by its rival as a corresponding decrease in its own security, prompting it to respond according to how adversarial it perceives the first state to be.</p><p>Therefore, states seek to prevent one another from becoming overwhelmingly powerful. This balancing is carried out either vertically, <em>i.e.</em>, by increasing military spending and technological development, or horizontally, <em>i.e.</em>, through military and economic alliances. History provides an abundance of precedents for this. The British Empire balanced first against the Spanish Empire, then against France, then Russia, and finally the German Empire. The United States and the Soviet Union balanced against one another through military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and economic blocs (the European Community and Comecon). Pakistan balanced against India by first joining SEATO and CENTO before eventually aligning with Communist China. India balanced against Pakistan by first aligning with the Soviet Union before later diversifying its strategic partnerships with the United States, France, Israel, <em>et al.</em> These are but a few of the many examples that recur throughout history.</p><p>The security dilemma cannot simply be resolved through balancing. If anything, one could argue that balancing itself is fraught with risk and often produces greater insecurity. Thus, the question of how much power a state should acquire in order to feel secure is of paramount importance. If a state concludes that a certain amount of power is sufficient to ensure its security and survival, it will be content with that level. Such states are known as status quo powers. They are generally cautious and restrained because they believe that aggression often provokes balancing by others. They only seek to preserve an existing strategic equilibrium. Examples include modern-day Britain, France, and India. These states focus on maintaining credible deterrence, strong but not excessive armed forces, limited strategic objectives, careful alliance management, avoiding unnecessary wars, preserving favourable balances of power, and maintaining the status quo wherever possible. This helps explain crisis management amongst great powers, the stability of nuclear deterrence, and the formation of grand alliances.</p><p>On the other hand, if a state concludes that no amount of power is sufficient to ensure its security and survival, it will strive for regional hegemony. This stems from the uncertainty of human nature and the inherently anarchic character of the international system. How does one define a reliable quantum or threshold of power sufficient to ensure security? Since it is impossible to determine the true intentions of other states and their leaders, the continuous accumulation of power appears to be the safest strategy whenever feasible. Such states are known as revisionist powers. They are generally bellicose and expansionist because they believe that, if successful, aggression will enhance their security. Examples include the United States, Russia, China, and Israel.</p><p>These states build overwhelming military capabilities, exploit favourable shifts in the balance of power, prevent rival regional hegemons from emerging, maintain credible deterrence, avoid allowing competitors to gain decisive relative advantages, and use alliances instrumentally rather than sentimentally. They pursue regional rather than global hegemony because of the constraints imposed by geography, including vast oceans and great distances. This helps explain the persistent great-power rivalry in international politics, spheres of influence, and accelerating arms races.</p><h3>If the Rules Are the Same, Why Do States Behave Differently?</h3><p>There are, however, questions that remain unanswered even after accounting for human nature, the international system, and differing perceptions of how much power is necessary for security. One such question concerns the variation in behaviour amongst the great powers. States operating within the same international system, facing similar systemic pressures and led by broadly similar leaders, may nevertheless respond in markedly different ways. The European Union and NATO, for instance, comprise countries that were once bitter rivals, yet today cooperate on almost every aspect of governance and policymaking. Their members have ceded aspects of their sovereignty in exchange for deeper economic integration and military protection from the United States.</p><p>Europe welcomed German reunification rather than opposing it, even though it shifted the balance of power somewhat in Germany’s favour. Moreover, an increasing number of European countries aspire to join the European Union and NATO. Compare this with the Indian subcontinent, where the strategic contours are markedly different. The countries there have not historically been rivals in the same sense, yet the subcontinent is perhaps one of the least economically integrated and most heavily militarised regions in the world. India and Pakistan face similar security pressures, India even more so because of the additional challenge posed by China, yet their nuclear doctrines differ markedly. While India maintains a policy of ‘No First Use’ and a doctrine of minimum credible deterrence, Pakistan has adopted no comparable self-imposed constraints.</p><p>Thus, it appears that, on their own, systemic pressures and human agency are insufficient to explain state behaviour. That is because domestic politics also plays an important role in shaping foreign policy. After all, a country’s national interest is defined in terms of creating a conducive environment in which its domestic policies can flourish. Hence, it can reasonably be argued that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy onto the international stage. This helps explain why states often underreact or overreact to threats, why domestic politics sometimes overrides structural incentives, and why leaders sometimes misperceive the external environment. Systemic pressures generated by the anarchic international system certainly shape states’ actions, but those actions are filtered through domestic political structures, leaders’ perceptions of their environment, state institutions, strategic culture, and state capacity before ultimately being translated into foreign policy.</p><p>Leaders rarely possess perfect information and therefore often exaggerate threats, underestimate rivals, misread intentions, and overestimate their own national strength. A society’s absolute wealth counts for little if it cannot be translated into state capacity, enabling the government to mobilise national resources in times of crisis. Institutions, whether the executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, military, law enforcement agencies, intelligentsia, media, or civil society, shape the trajectory of decision-making either directly or indirectly. Competing elites within a state may disagree over threats, alliances, military spending, and diplomacy. Public opinion also matters, not only in democracies with elections and media scrutiny but also in autocracies, whose leaders fear public unrest and revolution. A nation’s strategic culture is another significant factor, as historical experience and institutional memory influence military doctrine, threat perception, and the preferred instruments of statecraft.</p><p>If one takes all these factors into account, one can understand a central puzzle of international politics: why some states underbalance. While the logic we have spent so much time establishing suggests that states naturally seek to balance against threats, many, in fact, do not. History is replete with examples of states ignoring dangers, delaying military expansion, and failing to form alliances. Notable examples include the Soviet–German Non-Aggression Pact, which failed to prevent the German invasion of the Soviet Union; Britain’s policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany; India’s lack of preparedness in the build-up to the 1962 Sino-Indian War; and the way in which the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev ended the Cold War but also accelerated the Soviet Union’s collapse. The resulting variance can largely be explained in terms of intervening domestic political variables, including elite disagreement, weak institutions, domestic fragmentation, and faulty threat perception.</p><p>There is also the opposite phenomenon of states overbalancing, whereby they exaggerate threats, overspend on defence, and enter unnecessary conflicts. One need only look at the United States’ interventions in Iraq and Iran, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to see how both aggressors became bogged down in prolonged conflicts. This occurs because domestic political pressures can produce excessive responses. Of course, domestic political considerations are by no means the primary drivers of foreign policy, nor should they be. They are certainly not an appropriate framework upon which to formulate prudent foreign policy. They are, however, undoubtedly a significant factor in explaining why nations behave as they do. Examining domestic pressures helps us understand the behaviour of states vis-à-vis the outside world, even if conventional wisdom suggests that foreign policy ought not to be driven by them. One could argue that this framework ceases to be coherent because it introduces too many variables.</p><p>Hence, this author argues that foreign policy should be guided principally by three factors: the systemic pressures of the anarchic international system, the uncertainty of human nature, and the pursuit of the national interest. All this should be done while remaining cognisant of domestic political pressures, but without allowing them to become the determinant. This requires carefully assessing systemic pressures, strengthening state capacity, improving intelligence and strategic assessment, recognising domestic political constraints, and aligning foreign policy with long-term national capabilities rather than short-term political pressures.</p><h3>So, Why Do States Behave the Way They Do?</h3><p>The central question of international relations has never been whether states desire peace, prosperity, or cooperation. Nearly all do. The real question is under what conditions they believe those objectives can be secured. This essay has argued that the answer lies neither primarily in ideology, regime type, class, gender, identity, nor historical grievance. Human nature shapes leaders’ ambitions and fears, the anarchic international system compels states to provide for their own security, and domestic politics filters how those external pressures are interpreted and acted upon. Together, these forces explain why states facing similar circumstances often pursue markedly different foreign policies.</p><p>Ultimately, states behave not according to abstract ideals, but according to what they believe is necessary to ensure their survival and advance their national interest. Power, whether military, economic, political, or diplomatic, remains the principal means through which that objective is pursued. The challenge of statecraft, therefore, is not to eliminate competition, which is an enduring feature of international politics, but to manage it prudently through sound judgement, credible deterrence, and a clear understanding of the realities imposed by both human nature and the international system.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e7b4b9325315" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On Vaibhav Suryavanshi: To debut him sooner, or to debut him later–that is the question]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mishradivyanshu8203/on-vaibhav-suryavanshi-to-debut-him-sooner-or-to-debut-him-later-that-is-the-question-a57312519323?source=rss-f42d6958aaa7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a57312519323</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vaibhav-suryavanshi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[t20-world-cup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cricket]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-cricket-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ipl]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Divyanshu Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 18:25:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-16T15:18:16.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QKzAzAomAXs9Qvg7APVG-A.png" /><figcaption>Representational Image — AI Generated — Courtesy ChatGPT</figcaption></figure><p>Vaibhav Suryavanshi. If there has been one boy whose early career has generated as much buzz as the great Sachin Tendulkar, it has got to be this 15-year-old. This author does not claim to be clairvoyant, but deliberately invokes Tendulkar because, since the Little Master, we have never seen cricket fans this excited to see someone so young and so talented. Suryavanshi’s ability to pull crowds and enchant even casual watchers of the game into switching on sports channels on television is proof that we are witnessing someone extraordinary.</p><p>After an impressive performance in the U19 World Cup and having broken virtually every record in this year’s edition of the IPL, Suryavanshi “practically forced [the selectors] to pick him”, as was put rather succinctly by Ajit Agarkar. Yet, even as the chap has been selected for India’s tour to the British Isles, he has yet to be fielded, and the chatter revolving around his much-anticipated debut gets louder than ever. That many people turned off their smartphones and smart TVs after it was announced that the boy was not in the playing XI is a poetic parallel to the old anecdote wherein people would similarly switch off their tellies if Tendulkar got out.</p><p>The wunderkind from Bihar, a state not traditionally associated with producing cricketing talent, first turned heads back in 2024 for debuting in the Ranji Trophy at the exceptionally young age of 12. He then proceeded to turn even more heads when he scored a lightning-fast century in a Youth Test against Australia U19. After modest performances in the domestic circuit in his very first year, Suryavanshi was scouted the next year into the IPL by Rajasthan. Becoming the youngest player to be sold at the auction, Suryavanshi naturally generated chatter around him. While some were pleasantly surprised and intrigued by the bold call, others were dismissive of him as yet another youngster aboard the hype train. Questions were even raised around his actual biological age as opposed to his stated official age. It is but an open secret that age-gaming is pretty common in youth sports, especially in the subcontinent. An old video clip was cited as evidence of him unintentionally admitting the same. The BCCI had to do a bone test of the kid to settle the facts.</p><p>Notwithstanding the discrepancies surrounding his age, Suryavanshi made it quite clear that he meant business when he debuted in the IPL against Lucknow and hit his very first ball for six. Critics remained sceptical of the youngster even as he played a bombastic cameo in that match. And, as if to prove them wrong, in the very next match, Suryavanshi scored an explosive century against Gujarat that stunned experts, fans and casual watchers alike. It is one thing to dismiss a cameo, but to dismiss a century? No, Sir. One could always argue that the IPL is frivolous and that it was a belter of a pitch, yet how does one explain a teenager whacking international bowlers for boundaries and maximums as if they were schoolboys? And that, ladies and gentlemen, is when Suryavanshi really went from all hype to something more serious and concrete. The open stance, the free-flowing bat swing, the extraordinary talent, the fearlessness, the positive intent, the temperament, the hunger, and the immense potential were all there for everyone to see.</p><p>Still, there were people who, rightly or wrongly, harboured doubts about Suryavanshi. Maybe he was a one-hit wonder? A string of uninspiring performances made their argument plausible. The chap, however, ended his maiden tournament with a couple of quickfire knocks, the last one being a half-century. Critics still had their doubts. Yes, his performances were impressive for his age, but that was about it. They were not enough for him to be seriously considered for the big stage; they argued. Then came the India U19 tour of England. In the Youth ODIs, Suryavanshi scored a half-century and a century. This was followed by a half-century in the Youth Test against England U19. If this was not enough, he scored yet another century in the Youth Test series against Australia U19.</p><p>These strings of impressive performances in youth cricket meant that the selectors had to take him seriously, and he was picked up for India A. In the Rising Stars Asia Cup, he gave the UAE a royal beating by scoring a century in less than half as many deliveries. However, after multiple unremarkable performances on the trot in crucial matches, especially against Pakistan A, the young man was under fire for his swashbuckling style of play. The criticism only aggravated in the U19 Asia Cup the next month, where despite blasting a 150 against UAE and then a quickfire half-century against Malaysia, he failed to perform in crucial matches, including those against Pakistan U19.</p><p>Now, social media can be a vicious thing, even more so for a kid, because some people cannot digest seeing someone doing too well, too early. Bringing someone down by engaging in schadenfreude has been an ancient habit for some of us Indians. Even if it is just a kid, some people will not stop being vitriolic. It is a form of modern-day bullying in a sense. Yet, it is as if this young man is unfazed by any of this outside noise, at least for now. Suryavanshi nonchalantly proceeded to make his mark in the domestic circuit by scoring a century each in both the Vijay Hazare and the Syed Mushtaq Ali trophies.</p><p>If 2025 was the year Suryavanshi made his presence known, 2026 was the year he proved that he is ready for the highest levels of the cricketing world. It began with the boy scoring a half-century and a century against South Africa U19. He did not just stop there. In the U19 World Cup, Suryavanshi amassed three half-centuries, albeit against the U19 squads of Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, and Afghanistan. One could still be dismissive of him, but then came the final against England U19. The fledgling rose to the occasion, blasting yet another 150 in less than half as many balls. His Herculean effort single-handedly won India U19 the final and the tournament, with him ending up as the highest run-getter and the man of the tournament. The kid proved he could handle the heat when it mattered the most.</p><p>This exceptional knock under pressure in a high-stakes scenario was Suryavanshi’s first real test of temperament. The next test came in the IPL a month later. His first season had been more of an experimental trial. Back then, everybody had given him a chance, a benefit of doubt, or as they say in gully cricket, “Pahli ball to try hoti hai na” (“The first ball is a trial, isn’t it?”). If he had to strip off the “one-time wonder” label once and for all, this was his chance. And boy, did he do it, and how. He lit up the group stage with three half-centuries and yet another IPL century, along with multiple flashy cameos. In the knockout matches, he came close to scoring a century not once, but twice, missing the record for the fastest T20 century by a single hit. So, even though his team crashed out of the knockouts, Suryavanshi had already proved his mettle and convinced his doubters that he was a really special player.</p><p>Amassing 750 runs, with a century and five half-centuries (three of them being nineties), the teenager ended up as the highest run-getter, the emerging player, and the man of the tournament, breaking the record of T20 legend and the “Universe Boss”, Chris Gayle, for hitting the most sixes in a single IPL season. Fans augmented Gayle’s moniker and began dubbing Suryavanshi as the “Universe Boss Baby”. His back-to-back, mind-blowing performances in the U19 World Cup and the IPL had made him a household name, and the ripples and aftershocks were felt around the cricketing world. Everybody began talking about the chap, and not simply because of his age as they used to before. They realised, rightly, that there was more to the young man than his youth, and that his skill was on par with the best in the business.</p><p>Chatter around his India debut began to emerge. Another impressive performance by Suryavanshi in the final of the tri-series against Sri Lanka A, where he broke the record for the fastest List A half-century and came dangerously close to breaking the equivalent record for centuries, meant that the chatter only grew louder. By this point, the selectors realised they simply could not ignore him anymore, and that they had no choice but to pick him up on the national side. He was then named into the squads for India’s tour to the British Isles and the Asian Games. Thus, Suryavanshi did not merely knock the door for entering the Indian team; he broke the door down.</p><p>There was huge anticipation and excitement vis-a-vis his supposed T20I debut against Ireland. The popular logic was simple enough. India were the all-conquering three-time world champions on a roll, while Ireland were minnows who did not stand a chance against us. A perfectly convenient stage to debut this kid and let him shine. There is a case to be made that, given his incredible talent and white-hot form, why not strike the iron while it is still hot? Yet, the team management decided against it, and, in hindsight, rightly so. Three reasons buttress it. First, an Ireland series is generally a prelude to an England series, meaning India treat said series as crucial practice before the more high-stakes series in the Albion. This is why India generally field their best XI against Ireland, as they did this time too, so that the top players get acclimated to the conditions of the British Isles. Hence, Suryavanshi gets to be a part of the squad, but the team sticks with its original playing XI.</p><p>Second, the very fact that this is roughly the same team that won India the World Cup just a few months ago means that chopping off a player to make room for another is already quite difficult. Doing so for an untested player is even more challenging and might set a dangerous precedent. India’s top five, which is where Suryavanshi could realistically play, comprises Sharma, Samson, Kishan, Iyer, and Varma. Barring Iyer, who is the new captain, the rest four are all world champions and in red-hot form. In fact, looking at the entire squad, most of them are world champions, and some of them are even two-time world champions. Who then does one drag to the altar and sacrifice for the sake of Suryavanshi? It is a difficult call to make and is inherently unfair to the players who have been performing so well for this team for the past couple of years.</p><p>Third, and let’s address the elephant in the room, is that Suryavanshi is just a kid. He has indeed been working miracles and launching fireworks from his bat at an age when most of his peers are only launching fireworks on Diwali or watching cartoons over the telly or playing gully cricket at best. Suryavanshi is a child prodigy and a generational talent; there is absolutely no doubt about this. However, for the last two years, he has been continuously thrust into the limelight more than any other boy his age. He has already been pushing himself hard enough, and the pressure of these various tournaments, even if U19, A teams, or IPL, takes its toll, especially on a kid. For the sake of his physical and mental well-being, it is pertinent that he is not rushed into the cauldron, lest he end up with a burnout. This has been a problem with many a prodigy. Too much was asked of them too early and too quickly, and most of them remained frozen in that stage forever, trying to prove themselves their entire careers, trying to make comebacks, and juggling with the various labels they never asked others to put on them.</p><p>In hindsight, with India’s embarrassing loss in the series against Ireland, one could take a sigh of relief that Suryavanshi was not fielded. Just imagine, had they fielded him, and God forbid, had he performed poorly, many of the same people pushing for his premature debut would have turned vehemently against him. Given how fickle public opinion in India is, they would have labelled him a flat-track bully, a flop, an IPL fraud, probably even a PR stunt, even though he is just a boy oblivious to such worldly affairs. That the management decided not to give him a go just yet; instead letting him get acclimated to the practice sessions, dugout, and the general environment of the Indian team, was the correct decision. The fact that they also had to give him a separate dressing room and let his parents travel with him is yet another reminder of how unique this situation is and how unique a player Suryavanshi is.</p><p>As a youngster, Suryavanshi needs to be taken care of, and unlike us fans, followers, admirers and audiences who bear little responsibility, the team management bears a great deal of responsibility towards this young man, the rest of the team, and the entire Indian cricketing ecosystem. This means that even though the rest of us would want to see as much of him as we can and as soon as we can, the team management will take its time with Suryavanshi. Let’s not forget that he is still only in his mid-teens and comfortably has two decades’ worth of cricket in front of him, provided he keeps improving and avoids any major injury. There is ample amount of time at hand to pilot this kid whenever his moment arrives.</p><p>The coming England series will comprise five matches. Suryavanshi can be given his chance in the very last match of this series, provided it does not become a series decider. Even if he does not get an opportunity in this series, there is a three-match T20I series against Zimbabwe later the same month. There are also the Asian Games in September. He could be given a go there, but that would depend on whether the team management treats the Zimbabwe series as a prelude to the Asian Games or decides to give its top players a rest. If it is the latter, then the lad will get his chance. And if he shines, say he puts up a couple of half-centuries or maybe even a century, then he will most definitely be playing in the Asian Games. But if it is the former, Suryavanshi might not get the green light in either and will have to wait even more. He will still have plenty of chances, though.</p><p>There is also a five-match T20I series against West Indies in early October, another five-match series against New Zealand in late October, and a five-match series against Sri Lanka before the end of this year. The point this author is trying to make here is that Suryavanshi will have more than enough opportunities to kick-start his career, and the team management seems to be in no rush to serve the boy more than what he can chew at the moment. They will unleash him onto the world stage, in time. It is only a matter of when, not if. And his premiere, whenever it happens, will be a celebration for many of us cricket romantics, with a billion eyes on him, even if it may seem unfair towards some of his fellow teammates whose shoes he will have to fill. Yet, the restless teenager should not flinch or jitter, because he has rightfully earned his place on the national side.</p><p>Yes, he will continue to be scrutinised, doubted, and criticised in this world saturated by social media. But the ironical thing about the fledgling’s career so far has been how consistently many have waited for him to fail on each successive level — be it the IPL, U19, or A team, and the same will be true when he begins his senior career — and yet, each time, instead of failing, he has stunned everyone with his authoritative performances. This author hopes that Suryavanshi will continue to do the same in the future when his time comes. And yes, his time will come. To borrow the fabled line from the Bollywood film, Gully Boy, “Apna time aayega!” Until then, we wish all the luck to the boy wonder.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a57312519323" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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