<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by YourVoiz on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by YourVoiz on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@monicapiccinini?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 07:25:10 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@monicapiccinini/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Brazil’s colonial hangover]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/brazils-colonial-hangover-2f786a01839d?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2f786a01839d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[land-ownership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:13:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T08:13:24.006Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*efrkWDG428MBubqWgC0I-Q.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>This work by Oscar Pereira da Silva depicts the Bandeirantes, the Portuguese colonial explorers, on their journey to the mines in Brazil. It illustrates the historical context of 17th-century exploration and colonisation. Source: The History Collection/Alamy.</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Five centuries after Portuguese colonisation, Brazil’s economy remains closely</strong> <a href="https://balanca.mdic.gov.br/balanca/publicacoes_dados_consolidados/pg.html"><strong>tied</strong></a> <strong>to the extraction and export of natural resources. Efforts to tackle inequality and protect the environment continue to face resistance from powerful interests rooted in the country’s past.</strong></p><p>Brazil is now one of the world’s major exporters of agricultural products, minerals and oil. It has developed industries, built large cities and become a very different country from the one ruled by Portugal. But control over land and natural resources still plays an important part in determining who has wealth and political influence.</p><p>When the Portuguese arrived in 1500, millions of Indigenous people were already living in what is now Brazil. The colonisers began changing the land into a source of wealth for European markets, starting with Brazilwood (Pau-Brasil) and followed by sugar plantations, gold, coffee and rubber.</p><p>There was plenty of money to be made, but much of it depended on enslaved labour, the taking of Indigenous territories and the concentration of land in relatively few hands.</p><p>Brazil has changed enormously since then. Industries developed, education and public services expanded, and millions of people have <a href="https://www.ibge.gov.br/en/home-eng.html">gained</a> opportunities that earlier generations never had.</p><p>President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, recently re-elected, has promised to reduce inequality, strengthen environmental protection and defend Indigenous rights. But he governs a country whose economy still relies heavily on large-scale agriculture, cattle ranching, mining, oil and gas.</p><p>These industries bring jobs, investment and export earnings. They also create difficult choices when their expansion comes into conflict with environmental protection and the rights of people living on the land.</p><p>The Cerrado and the Amazon offer plenty of examples. Agricultural expansion, infrastructure and mining projects and the search for new oil reserves have raised questions about who controls Brazil’s natural wealth and who lives with the consequences.</p><p>These are not entirely new questions, as Brazil has been dealing with versions of them for centuries.</p><p><strong>Land</strong></p><p>Sugar made fortunes in northeastern Brazil during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Large plantations depended on enslaved Africans, while forests were cleared and Indigenous communities lost their territories.</p><p>Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the discovery of gold in the state of Minas Gerais brought another opportunity to make money.</p><p>Portugal collected taxes, merchants prospered, and settlers and enslaved workers moved into the mining areas.</p><p>By the time Brazil declared independence in 1822, large landowners already held considerable economic and political power. Independence changed who governed the country, but it did rather less to change who owned the land.</p><p>Slavery continued for another 66 years. The Land of Law of 1850 <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/land-law-1850-brazil">made</a> purchasing public land the main legal way to acquire it, although certain existing land claims could still be recognised.</p><p>For anyone without money or established property rights, acquiring land remained extremely difficult.</p><p>When slavery was abolished in 1888, formerly enslaved people received no general programme for land redistribution. They had gained their freedom, but very little support to build and independent livelihood.</p><p>Meanwhile, Brazil was <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/journal/country-profile/migration-brazil-making-multicultural-society">encouraging</a> immigration.</p><p>As Michael Reid explains in <em>Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power</em>, millions of immigrants arrived in Brazil between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.</p><p>Many Europeans settled in São Paulo, where coffee production was expanding, while others established family farms or moved into towns and cities.</p><p>Immigrants from Japan and the Middle East also became part of Brazil’s changing society. But European immigration was encouraged for reasons that went beyond the need for workers.</p><p>Some members of Brazil’s ruling elite believed that bringing more Europeans into the country would make the population whiter. They regarded this as progress, drawing on racist theories presented as scientific knowledge at the time.</p><p>It’s an uncomfortable part of Brazil’s history, but an important one. The country was moving away from slavery while continuing to shape policies around ideas of racial superiority.</p><p>Brazil eventually became an industrial and increasingly urban country, and millions of people gained opportunities that had been denied to their ancestors. But the large estates remained, and owning land continued to bring wealth and political influence.</p><p>The colonial economy had changed, but some of those who benefited from its arrangements had managed to keep their advantages.</p><p><strong>The Cerrado</strong></p><p>Some of the consequences of this history can still be seen in the Cerrado, a vast region of savannah, grassland and woodland covering much of central Brazil. It’s one of the richest <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/feb/12/hidden-cost-beef">ecosystems</a> in the world, although it receives far less international <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/feb/12/hidden-cost-beef">attention</a> than the Amazon.</p><p>The Cerrado is sometimes described as land available for agricultural development, almost as though it were an empty space waiting to be used. But Indigenous peoples and traditional communities have lived there for generations, alongside an extraordinary variety of plants and animals.</p><p>Its deep-rooted vegetation also plays an important role in maintaining the soil and water systems that support several of Brazil’s major river basins.</p><p>More than half of its original vegetation has already disappeared, according to <a href="https://natureconservation.pensoft.net/article/168273">research</a> published in <em>Nature Ecology and Evolution</em>, and the clearing continues.</p><p>Figures published by MapBiomas show that the Cerrado <a href="https://ipam.org.br/the-cerrado-accounts-for-55-of-deforestation-and-has-had-the-highest-rate-for-the-third-consecutive-year/">lost</a> approximately 540,000 hectares of native vegetation in 2025. Although this was less in 2024, the region still accounted for about 55 per cent of all land deforested in Brazil that year.</p><p>Much of the pressure is concentrated in Matitoba, an agricultural region covering Tocantins, and parts of Maranhão, Piauí and Bahia.</p><p>Soya plantations and cattle ranches have expanded across large areas, along with environmental damage and disputes over land.</p><p>According to MapBiomas, Matitoba <a href="https://rad.ia.mapbiomas.org/rad2025/publication-web-resources/html/publication-11.html">accounted</a> for 70 per cent of the Cerrado’s deforestation in 2025. These figures should make us question what agricultural development means when it comes at such a cost. And this rapid expansion didn’t happen by accident.</p><p>The construction of Brasília in the late 1950s and early 1960s helped open Brazil’s interior to further development. During the military dictatorship, government policies encouraged road building, settlement and large-scale agriculture.</p><p>There’s also a connection with what people eat outside Brazil. Brazilian soya is <a href="https://trase.earth/insights/brazilian-soy-exports-and-deforestation">exported</a> to international markets, much of it to feed animals, meaning that a crop grown in the Cerrado can become part of a meat supply chain thousands of miles away.</p><p>The environmental consequences are not always visible in the final product.</p><p><a href="https://trase.earth/insights/indirect-land-use-change">Research</a> by Trase, which examines the links between commodity trade and deforestation, shows that soya can contribute indirectly to the clearing of native vegetation.</p><p>A soya plantation may expand onto land previously used for cattle grazing. Ranching then moves into other areas, sometimes involving further clearance. The soya itself may be growing on land cleared years ago, with no obvious connection to recent deforestation.</p><p>But the cattle have gone somewhere else, and that movement can put pressure on native vegetation in other areas. This is why looking only at the land directly cleared for soya can give a misleading picture of its environmental impact.</p><p>A product may appear to come from an established agricultural area while the expansion of that area has helped put pressure on native vegetation elsewhere.</p><p><strong>Rights</strong></p><p>For Indigenous peoples and traditional communities, land isn’t just an economic asset. It’s where they live, grow food, maintain their cultures and pass knowledge from one generation to another. But the struggle to have their territories recognised continues.</p><p>One of the most controversial disputes concerns the <a href="https://apiboficial.org/en/marco-temporal/"><em>marco temporal</em></a>, an attempt to restrict Indigenous land claims by using 5 October 1988, the date Brazil’s <a href="https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm">Constitution</a> came into force, as a cutoff.</p><p>There is an obvious problem with this. What happens to communities that were forced from their land before 1988?</p><p>Under such a rule, people could be denied recognition of their ancestral territories precisely because they had previously been expelled from them.</p><p>Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court rejected the 1988 cutoff in 2023. Congress nevertheless passed legislation seeking to establish it. In December 2025, the Court once again ruled that the legal provision imposing the cutoff was <a href="https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-considera-inconstitucional-trecho-de-lei-que-institui-marco-temporal-para-terras-indigenas/">unconstitutional</a>.</p><p>It was an important decision for Indigenous rights, although disputes over the recognition and protection of territories have continued.</p><p>These disputes show just how differently people see the same piece of land. For investors, a territory may represent an opportunity for agriculture, mining, oil or gas. For the people who live there, it may be the place where their families have lived for generations.</p><p>One group sees economic opportunity, while the other may be fighting to remain on its own land. And the people making the investment decisions are not necessarily the ones who will live with the consequences.</p><p><strong>Power</strong></p><p>It would be misleading to blame these problems on one president or one political party. Brazil’s economy has changed considerably, but the influence of those who control land and natural resources has developed over generations.</p><p>Agribusiness is a powerful political force, with strong representation in Congress.</p><p>Large scale agriculture, including cattle ranching, the bioeconomy, mining, energy companies, infrastructure businesses, financial institutions, international buyers and government authorities all have interests in maintaining commodity production.</p><p>These interests do not always agree with one another, but they can have huge influence over decisions about land use and environmental protection.</p><p>The debate over Brazil’s new environmental licensing law <a href="https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/lei/l15190.htm">15.190</a> in 2025 offered a good example. The legislation, known by critics as the ‘devastation bill’ introduced changes to the procedures used to assess and authorise projects that may affect the environment.</p><p>Supporters argued that the changes would reduce bureaucracy, provide greater legal certainty and encourage investment. Environmental organisations warned that some provisions could weaken scrutiny of damaging projects and reduce protections for affected communities.</p><p>There is a reasonable argument for making administrative procedures more efficient. Businesses need clear rules, and unnecessary delays can discourage investment. But environmental licensing is not simply a bureaucratic obstacle. It’s one of the ways governments examine what a project might do to the land, wildlife and people around it.</p><p>President Lula vetoed <a href="https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/1186832-lula-sanciona-novo-licenciamento-ambiental-com-63-vetos/">parts</a> of the legislation, fully aware that Congress could overturn it. That’s exactly what happened in November 2025, when Congress <a href="https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2025/11/27/congresso-derruba-52-itens-de-veto-a-lei-geral-do-licenciamento-ambiental">overturned</a> 52 vetoed items, restoring provisions involving exemptions and simplified licensing. This was a huge setback for Brazil.</p><p>A project may be approved more quickly, but that does not necessarily mean its consequences have become less serious.</p><p><strong>Independence</strong></p><p>Brazil is not the same country it was under Portuguese rule.</p><p>Slavery has been abolished, democratic rights have expanded and generations of Brazilians have fought for education, healthcare, land and political representation.</p><p>Indigenous organisations, environmental campaigners and rural workers have challenged powerful interests and achieved important victories. And those achievements should not be overlooked.</p><p>For centuries, Brazil produced wealth that was concentrated in the hands of a relatively small part of society.</p><p>The Portuguese Crown profited from land and labour, while enslaved Africans, Indigenous peoples and poor rural communities paid a huge price.</p><p>Today, Brazil controls its own political and economic decisions. But land remains concentrated in a few hands, powerful industries continue to influence national priorities, and communities are still fighting for recognition of their territories.</p><p>Political independence did not bring an end to every relationship established under colonial rule.</p><p>As long as a country respects the limits of nature and avoids harming the environment, there is nothing wrong with using its natural resources to improve people’s lives.</p><p>Brazil needs investment, employment and economic opportunities, particularly for those who have historically been excluded from them. But we should look carefully at what’s being promised and what may be lost along the way.</p><p>When a new plantation, mine or oil project is announced, an investment usually receives plenty of attention. These are figures for jobs, production and export earnings. But what about the people already living on the land?</p><p>What happens to the soil, rivers, forests and wildlife? Who will actually benefit in the long run, and who will be left to pick up the pieces and deal with the damage? What happens to them?</p><p>Brazil won its independence more than 200 years ago, but independence means more than having the freedom to sell the country’s natural wealth.</p><p>The Portuguese no longer decide who benefits from Brazil’s land. Brazil does, and the question now is whether the country will continue to allow wealth and power to remain concentrated in a few hands, while those who live on the land are left fighting for a voice in its future.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f786a01839d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Amazon is burning. And we know who is responsible.]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/the-amazon-is-burning-and-we-know-who-is-responsible-e973507abc0f?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e973507abc0f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[degradation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amazon-rainforest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fire]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deforestation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 12:21:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T12:35:19.691Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9DRZpiGQF4xG72umCQy7gg.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Drone aerial view of deforestation on farm with illegal burning of forest trees to make pasture for cattle in Amazon rainforest, Para, Brazil. Source: Paralaxis/Alamy.</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>New research reveals how deforestation and human-caused fires are turning the Amazon into a major source of carbon emissions. As droughts intensify, the consequences for the forest, its people and the global climate are becoming difficult to ignore.</strong></p><p>The Amazon is losing its ability to absorb the carbon dioxide we continue to pump into the atmosphere. At the same time, its destruction is disrupting rainfall, intensifying droughts and making vast areas more vulnerable to fire. For the millions of people who depend on the forest, these changes are already affecting everyday life.</p><p>But what happens when a forest that helps regulate the climate becomes a growing source of the emissions driving global warming?</p><p>New study <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-026-11168-1">published</a> in <em>Nature</em>, led by Brazilian scientist Luciana Gatti of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), provides a disturbing answer.</p><p>After 15 years of measuring gases in the atmosphere above the Amazon, researchers found that human activities, particularly deforestation and fires, are responsible for most of the region’s carbon emissions. Extreme droughts make the damage worse, but they are not the main cause.</p><p>Using small aircraft, Gatti and her colleagues collected atmospheric measurements across four areas of the Brazilian Amazon. They compared carbon measurements with records of deforestation, burned areas, rainfall and temperature to understand what was driving the changes. The differences between the years are revealing.</p><p>During the wetter years of 2011–2014 and 2017–2018, annual deforestation averaged 6,389 square kilometres, while fires affected 55,115 square kilometres of vegetation. The region’s net carbon balance was relatively low, at 0.11 petagrams (PgC) of carbon annually.</p><p>Between 2019 and 2022, deforestation almost doubled to 12,580 square kilometres, while burned areas increased by 25 per cent to 68,747 square kilometres. Net carbon emission rose sharply, reaching approximately 1.58 billion tonnes of CO2 annually.</p><p>But these were not even years of exceptional drought. Temperatures remained close to those of the wetter period, and rainfall was only moderately lower.</p><p>The forest was releasing substantially more carbon mainly because more of it was being destroyed.</p><p>During three consecutive La Niña years, from 2020 to 2022, increased rainfall helped the Amazon absorb more carbon, partly offsetting emissions caused by deforestation and forest damage.</p><p>Gatti explained that without this extra rainfall, the impact of the destruction would have been much worse. She said:</p><blockquote><em>If we removed the effect of La Niña, emissions would have been much higher. Deforestation was increasing, forest degradation was increasing, and emissions should have increased too. But at the same time, the forest was absorbing more carbon because of those three consecutive La Niña years.</em></blockquote><p>For Gatti, the findings expose the consequences of weakened environmental protections during the government of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro.</p><p><strong>Pushed to its limits</strong></p><p>The situation became worse during the drought years of 2010, 2015, 2016, 2023 and 2024. Burned areas reached 105,819 square kilometres, almost twice the level recorded during wetter years, while annual net emissions climbed to 1.8 billion tonnes of CO2.</p><p>The study found that around 98 per cent of fires were associated with human activity.</p><p>Drought made the vegetation easier to burn, allowing fires to spread further and become more destructive. And the consequences don’t disappear when the flames are extinguished.</p><p>Over the past 46 years, annual rainfall across the Amazon has declined by 8 per cent, while rainfall during the peak of the dry season has fallen by 20 per cent. Average temperatures have increased by 1.3°C, rising by 1.8°C during the driest months.</p><p>These changes are altering the conditions that allow a tropical rainforest to survive. Trees weakened by heat and water shortages become more vulnerable to fire and death.</p><p>For Gatti, the most alarming evidence comes from the southeastern Amazon, particularly parts of Mato Grosso and southern Pará. The region has already lost approximately a third of its forest, while rainfall during the driest months has fallen by roughly a third and temperatures have risen by 2.2°C over the past 46 years.</p><p>She points to the extraordinary length of recent dry seasons as evidence of how hostile the conditions are becoming for trees adapted to a humid tropical climate. Gatti said:</p><blockquote><em>In 2015, this region experienced seven months of dry season. That is practically impossible for the trees of a humid tropical rainforest. One of the conditions they need is for the dry season to be shorter than the rainy season.</em></blockquote><p>The consequences may last for years. Gatti suspects that many trees died during these prolonged droughts and that their decomposition continues releasing carbon into the atmosphere.</p><p>But there is another possibility, one with far more serious implications for the future of the forest.</p><p>Since the severe El Niño event of 2015–2016, the southeastern Amazon has remained a source of carbon even when emissions directly associated with fires are excluded. Gatti fears this could indicate that the region is approaching, or may already have crossed, a threshold beyond which recovery becomes increasingly difficult. She explained:</p><blockquote><em>This could be an indication that the region may have already reached the point of no return. But we cannot say that for certain. Another hypothesis is that so many trees died during the severe droughts that their decomposition is still releasing carbon, therefore indicating the possibility that the point of no return has not yet been crossed.</em></blockquote><p>Gatti stresses that more research is needed to determine whether the forest is still recovering from past droughts or has undergone a more lasting change. Additional measurements associated with photosynthesis may help answer that question.</p><p>What makes these findings particularly disturbing is that the destruction does not end when a tree is cut down. Deforestation also changes the climate of the surrounding forest, creating a second, less visible wave of damage that threatens trees still standing. Gatti explained:</p><blockquote><em>Deforestation means the death of the forest in two different ways. The first is the direct destruction that everyone counts. The second, which almost nobody counts, is the impact on the climate caused by the loss of the forest itself.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Every tree is a rain factory. It helps produce rainfall and keeps temperatures down. When we destroy the forest, we are not just losing trees. We are changing the climate that the remaining trees need to survive.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Rivers running dry</strong></p><p>For communities along the Amazon’s rivers, the consequences are much more immediate than any discussion about carbon balances.</p><p>When water levels fall, boats cannot always reach isolated communities. Food, fuel and medicine become more difficult to transport. Fishing families struggle as river conditions change, while farmers face unpredictable rainfall and longer dry seasons.</p><p>Smoke from the forest fires can spread across enormous distances, affecting air quality in towns and cities as well as remote communities. Children, older people and those with respiratory illnesses are particularly vulnerable.</p><p>For Indigenous peoples and traditional communities, the loss goes beyond livelihoods. Their territories hold generations of knowledge about the forest, its plans, animals and waterways. When these places are damaged, cultural practices and relationships with the land are threatened alongside the ecosystems themselves.</p><p>And the damage goes beyond the Amazon. Moisture released by the rainforest helps generate much of South America, sustaining agriculture, rivers and water supplies.</p><p>To illustrate the extraordinary influence of the rainforest on the climate, Gatti points to the enormous volume of water its trees release into the atmosphere every day. She explained:</p><blockquote><em>Every day, the Amazon rainforest releases into the atmosphere an amount of water comparable to what the Amazon River discharges into the Atlantic Ocean.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>This is an enormous process in the planet’s energy and water balance. It affects the entire Earth system, not just the Amazon or Brazil. But we are the first to suffer the consequences.</em></blockquote><p>When trees disappear, less moisture returns to the atmosphere, disrupting rainfall and making remaining forest more vulnerable to drought.</p><p>Globally, the loss of the Amazon’s capacity to absorb carbon means more greenhouse gases accumulating in the atmosphere, adding to the warming that makes future droughts more severe.</p><p>What’s happening in the Amazon will not remain confined to the Amazon.</p><p><strong>Profit from destruction</strong></p><p>Large areas of the Amazon have been cleared for cattle ranching, agriculture, mining and other commercial activities. Roads open previously inaccessible forest to further occupation, while fires are used to clear vegetation and prepare land of other uses.</p><p>These activities have generated vast wealth, but the environmental and social costs are left to the communities living closest to this destruction.</p><p>Gatti is particularly critical of the political decisions that have allowed this to continue. She argues that the weakening of environmental protections under former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro contributed to rising deforestation and forest degradation. But she also warns that the methods used to destroy the forest are changing.</p><p>Although Brazil strengthened its policies against deforestation in 2023 and 2024, Gatti says fire is increasingly being used as an alternative way to clear land, threatening to undermine those gains. She warned:</p><blockquote><em>If we do not change our policies to combat fires, we will lose the Amazon to fire. I would say that fire is the new deforestation. Fire is being used as a tool to destroy the forest.</em></blockquote><p>Her concern is specifically with fires deliberately used to destroy vegetation, rather than controlled burning for land management. She argues that authorities must impose stronger penalties and prevent illegally burned land from being commercially exploited.</p><p>Meanwhile, much of the international discussion about protecting the Amazon now revolves around a bioeconomy, carbon markets, biodiversity credits, conservation finance and investment opportunities.</p><p>There is no question that the region needs investment, as communities need healthcare, education, transport, reliable energy and economic opportunities. Conservation cannot mean expecting people to remain poor just because they live near a forest the rest of the world wants protected.</p><p>But turning the Amazon into a source of environmental assets raises another question: who will control the benefits?</p><p>Gatti questions whether the growing enthusiasm for carbon markets is distracting attention from the more urgent task of reducing emissions. She is particularly critical of schemes that allow companies to compensate for their pollution by paying to protect forests that already exist.</p><p>In her view, preventing the destruction of an existing forest does not automatically create new carbon absorption that can justify additional emissions elsewhere. Gatti argued:</p><blockquote><em>It is misleading to say that someone can emit more carbon simply because we have decided not to destroy a forest. That forest was already there. We have not created any additional carbon absorption to justify those emissions.</em></blockquote><p>She draws a distinction between protecting existing vegetation and restoring land that has already been cleared. In her view, genuine carbon removal through forest restoration is fundamentally different from claiming credits for leaving an existing forest standing.</p><p>Her scepticism also extends to the wider green economy. Gatti fears that environmental promises can conceal commercial activities that continue damaging natural ecosystems, particularly when forests are replaced by plantations promoted as sustainable alternatives. She said:</p><blockquote><em>I have serious concerns about this green economy because there is so much greenwashing involved. People are destroying forests to establish monocultures of something that is supposed to be green.</em></blockquote><p>For Gatti, a genuinely sustainable Amazonian economy should be built around activities that support both the forest and the people living within it, including forest products, fruits, seeds and ecotourism.</p><p>Protecting the Amazon will also require stronger enforcement, political commitment and meaningful participation by Indigenous peoples and traditional communities in decisions affecting their territories.</p><p>Wealthy countries must also reduce their own emissions rather than relying on forests elsewhere to compensate for continued fossil fuel use.</p><p><strong>Choices</strong></p><p>The Amazon’s importance to the global climate is enormous. Its vegetation and soils store large amounts of carbon stored for centuries and the rainforest helps regulate rainfall and temperature across the entire continent.</p><p>Losing more of that forest would release additional carbon while reducing the amount the remaining vegetation can absorb.</p><p>Gatti’s latest findings show that the Amazon’s future is being shaped not only by a changing climate, but by choices made today.</p><p>After decades studying the region, she is frustrated that so much of the environmental debate continues to focus on ending deforestation without recognising that the damage already inflicted on the forest also needs to be repaired. Gatti said:</p><blockquote><em>What makes me desperate is that so many people still believe that achieving zero deforestation is the solution. There is enormous difficulty in getting science through to the people making decisions.</em></blockquote><p>For Gatti, the scale of the crisis demands more than existing conservation commitments.</p><p>She believes governments should treat the destruction of the Amazon as an immediate emergency rather than a problem to be addressed through distant targets and promises. She urged:</p><blockquote><em>We need zero deforestation now and an extremely intensive programme of forest restoration.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>A state of emergency should be declared in the Amazon. We cannot afford to lose it. Everything is connected, and the consequences go far beyond the Amazon or Brazil.</em></blockquote><p>Her frustration is not confined to the scientific community. Gatti believes that researchers have spent decades producing evidence of the dangers facing the Amazon, yet too much of that knowledge has failed to influence political decisions.</p><p>That failure has become personal. Gatti explained:</p><blockquote><em>There is an enormous difficulty in getting science through to the people making decisions. Even in a progressive government, that is a problem. This is why I decided to go into politics.</em></blockquote><p>The Amazon needs deforestation and fires to stop, damaged areas to have a chance to recover and the people who depend on the forest to have a genuine say in its future.</p><p>The science has identified the causes of this destruction. The question now is whether governments are prepared to confront them before the damage becomes irreversible.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e973507abc0f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lula’s Amazon contradiction]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/lulas-amazon-contradiction-a17b1eee0ebf?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a17b1eee0ebf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amazon-rainforest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lula]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 13:37:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-30T13:37:37.794Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vBcvdQhhKecjN16O-WPkow.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva celebrates his re-election following a historic comeback in the runoff, during a press conference at the InterContinental Hotel in Sao Paulo on Sunday evening, 25 October 2026. Credit: IMAGO / Andre Pera Sao Paulo Brasil Copyright: xAndrexPerax / Alamy.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s latest electoral victory has been welcomed by environmental campaigners and political leaders around the world. After Jair Bolsonaro’s attacks on environmental institutions, Indigenous rights and the Amazon rainforest, the relief is understandable.</p><p>Lula’s return to power brought renewed promised to protect the forest and tackle climate change.</p><p>Brazil’s latest deforestation <a href="https://www.gov.br/inpe/pt-br/assuntos/ultimas-noticias/brasil-alcanca-menores-taxas-de-desmatamento-da-serie-historica-na-amazonia-e-no-cerrado">figures</a> provide grounds for optimism. According to the national Institute of Space Research (INPE), deforestation in the Amazon fell by 41.8 per cent between August 2025 and July 2026, reaching 3,335 square kilometres, the lowest annual figure since monitoring began in 1988.</p><p>Environmental enforcement has also been strengthened. But Lula’s government continues to support oil exploration, mining and major infrastructure projects in environmentally sensitive regions.</p><p><strong>Degradation</strong></p><p>A forest doesn’t have to be cut down to be destroyed. Fires, drought and degradation can kill trees and release large quantities of carbon while leaving damaged forests still standing.</p><p>A study <a href="https://bg.copernicus.org/articles/22/5247/2025/bg-22-5247-2025.html">published</a> in <em>Biosciences</em> in October 2025 estimated that fires degrading Amazon forests released 791 million tonnes of CO2 in 2024, exceeding the 625 million tonnes attributed to deforestation across the Pan-Amazon. Together, these sources accounted for approximately 1.42 billion tonnes of CO2. Brazil was responsible for around 61 per cent of the fire-related degradation emissions.</p><p>Trees continue dying, forests are becoming drier and fires become more likely. But Brazil’s 2024 National Inventory Report <a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2025-12/undp_brazil_brazils_national_inventory_report_of_anthropogenic_emissions_by_sources_and_removals_by_sinks_of_greenhouse_gases.pdf">acknowledges</a> that certain emissions from fires not resulting in land-use change are not fully accounted for.</p><p>Research lead by Brazilian scientists Luciana Gatti, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-026-11168-1">published</a> in <em>Nature</em> in October 2026, reinforces these concerns. Drawing on 15 years of atmospheric measurements, the study found that the Amazon was a net of carbon source, with fires dominating emissions and human disturbances amplified by several droughts.</p><p>These findings raise serious questions about celebrating falling deforestation rates while significant carbon losses from forest degradation continue.</p><p><strong>Oil</strong></p><p>In October 2025, Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil company, began <a href="https://www.gov.br/anp/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/boletins-anp/arquivos-informe-mensal-de-exploracao/2025/novembro.pdf">drilling</a> an exploratory well in the Foz do Amazonas basin, offshore from Amapá. Brazil’s Ministry of Mines and Energy welcomed the decision. And earlier that year, the National Petroleum Agency <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/06/25/brazilian-activists-vow-fight-amazon-oil-auction-court-hail-partial-victor-unsold-blocks/">offered</a> 172 oil and gas exploration blocks, <a href="https://www.gov.br/anp/pt-br/rodadas-anp/avisos/oferta-permanente-de-concessao-anp-conclui-homologacao-dos-34-blocos-arrematados-no-5o-ciclo">awarding</a> 34.</p><p><a href="https://reporterbrasil.org.br/2025/12/raoni-and-other-indigenous-leaders-lament-lulas-support-for-oil-exploration-at-the-mouth-of-the-amazon-river/">Lula’s</a> government has <a href="https://courthousenews.com/brazils-lula-backs-oil-exploration-in-the-amazon-ahead-of-hosting-un-climate-talks/">defended</a> oil exploration as <a href="https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2023-2026/silveira-comemora-liberacao-de-licenca-para-exploracao-do-poco-fza-m-59-na-margem-equatorial">necessary</a> for employment, investment and energy security. An exploratory well doesn’t guarantee commercial production, but it creates the possibility of further extraction.</p><p>Brazil’s ongoing search for more oil reserves conflicts with its promises to fight climate change.</p><p><strong>BR-319</strong></p><p>Lula’s support to paving the BR-319, the <a href="https://yourvoiz.org/2026/07/06/br-319-the-road-that-could-cost-the-amazon/">controversial</a> highway connecting Manaus to Porto Velho, predates his return to the presidency.</p><p>In May 2021, while out of office, he <a href="https://www.estadopolitico.com.br/sou-favoravel-a-reconstrucao-da-rodovia-br-319-diz-ex-presidente-lula/">defended</a> its paving as necessary for the regional development. He repeated his position in 2023, arguing that the road could be “rebuilt” with environmental safeguards.</p><p>His commitment continued in office. In May 2026, Lula visited the BR-319 works in Amazonas as the federal transport department <a href="https://www.gov.br/dnit/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/presidente-lula-visita-o-amazonas-e-acompanha-agendas-em-importantes-empreendimentos-da-br-319-am">authorised</a> improvements to a 120.5-kilometre section. Four contracts were announced that year covered more than 339 kilometres of interventions, with investments exceeding R$1.45 billion.</p><p>For a long time, scientists have <a href="https://theecologist.org/2024/mar/07/highway-amazon-collapse">warned</a> that rebuilding the highway could accelerate deforestation by encouraging land grabbing, logging, cattle ranching and secondary roads, including the AM-366.</p><p>The risks go beyond just forest clearing. Road fragment ecosystems, increase human access and make surrounding forests more vulnerable to degradation and fires.</p><p>Brazil’s environmental licensing legislation has added to this controversy. Lula vetoed 63 provisions of the so-called “devastation bill”, fully aware that Congress could overturn those. This is exactly what happened. Congress overturned 52 of those vetoes.</p><p>Meanwhile, his administration continues <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/apr/18/reckoning-amazon">advancing</a> the BR-319 works, maintaining that reconstruction could proceed with environmental safeguards.</p><p><strong>Mining</strong></p><p>Mining remains central to Brazil’s development strategy, including projects that have faced opposition from Indigenous communities and environmental organisations.</p><p>In Amazonas, Canadian mining company, Potássio do Brasil, is developing a major potash project in Autazes, an area traditionally <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/mpf-reforca-pedido-de-anulacao-de-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas-por-violacao-de-direitos">occupied</a> by the Mura people. Lula fully <a href="https://ir.brazilpotash.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/65/brazils-government-supports-potash-construction-financing">supports</a> the project, promoting it with the intention to reduce Brazil’s dependence on imported fertilisers. The project has attracted the attention of federal mining authorities.</p><p>The project has divided Mura communities. Some representatives support the employment and opportunities it promises, but others <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/my/latest-news/brazil-viii-assembly-of-the-mura-people-reaffirms-their-opposition-to-brazil-potashs-mining-project/">fear</a> the damage to their territory, water resources and traditional livelihoods.</p><p>Federal prosecutors have <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/mpf-reforca-pedido-de-anulacao-de-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas-por-violacao-de-direitos">challenged</a> the environmental licensing and consultation process, alleging violations of Indigenous rights.</p><p>In Pará, Canadian mining company, Belo Sun, Volta Grande gold mine’s proposal, near the Xingu River, has faced years of legal challenges and opposition from Indigenous communities. The project entered Brazil’s strategic minerals <a href="https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/comite-interministerial-habilita-seis-novos-projetos-na-politica-pro-minerais-estrategicos">programme</a> in 2021, during Bolsonaro’s presidency, and remains on the federal government’s list.</p><p>In October 2026, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court restored the <a href="https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-mantem-suspensa-licenca-de-instalacao-do-projeto-volta-grande-de-mineracao-no-para/">suspension</a> of the mine’s installation licence, following concerns about environmental impacts and consultation with potentially affected Indigenous communities.</p><p>These disputes reveal the difficulties communities face when challenging major extraction projects, regardless of changes in political leadership.</p><p><strong>Bioeconomy</strong></p><p>Lula’s government has promoted the Amazon <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">bioeconomy</a> with the intention of generating income while conserving the rainforest. The approach has attracted investment from development banks, corporations and international financial institutions interested in biodiversity, carbon <a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/nov/05/carbon-credits-free-pass-polluters">markets</a> and forest products.</p><p>These arrangements can give outside investors considerable <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/sep/11/commodification-conservation">influence</a> over forest resources and traditional knowledge.</p><p>In some projects, Indigenous and traditional communities provide raw materials and expertise while companies and financial intermediaries retain greater <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/sep/21/amazon-does-not-need-new-masters">control</a> over processing, funding and international markets.</p><p>Oil, mining and <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/sep/07/money-does-grow-instead-trees">agribusiness</a> companies also contribute to conservation funds and restoration initiatives. These investments can improve corporate reputations while environmentally damaging activities continue elsewhere.</p><p>The growing evidence of forest degradation also raises concerns about whether conservation efforts should focus only on keeping trees standing, rather than protecting forest health and their ability to store carbon.</p><p><strong>Indigenous rights</strong></p><p>Bolsonaro’s administration weakened environmental institutions and protections for Indigenous peoples. His political movement remains a concern for environmental campaigners and Indigenous organisations.</p><p>Many Indigenous leaders supported Lula because they feared a return to his predecessor’s policies.</p><p>Political support, however, doesn’t amount to consent for individual development <a href="https://theecologist.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/A%20reckoning%20in%20the%20Amazon.pdf">projects</a>. Indigenous and traditional communities have the <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/sep/21/amazon-does-not-need-new-masters">right</a> to <a href="https://theecologist.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/A%20reckoning%20in%20the%20Amazon.pdf">challenge</a> mining, highways, industrial agriculture, cattle farming and oil and gas exploration affecting their territories, and to demand meaningful consultation before decisions are taken.</p><p><strong>The role of journalism</strong></p><p>International news coverage of Brazil has highlighted Lula’s environmental commitments, his speeches at climate conferences and the reduction in Amazon deforestation.</p><p>Environmental reporting should examine government decisions as closely as political promises. Improvement in forest protection deserve recognitions, but they should not overshadow policies that could undermine those achievements.</p><p>Falling deforestation shouldn’t be confused with the Amazon’s overall ecological health. Research on fires, degradation and carbon emissions demonstrates that forests can remain standing while losing biomass, biodiversity and their capacity to absorb carbon.</p><p>For decades, successive Brazilian governments have promised the roads, mining and agribusiness would bring prosperity to the Amazon. Today, similar promises are made through the language of sustainability, green investment and the bioeconomy.</p><p>Many of the same economic interests remain involved, while Indigenous peoples and traditional communities continue struggling for control over their territories and resources.</p><p>Journalists have the responsibility to investigate these interests, establish who benefits from development projects and report the consequences for affected communities.</p><p>Lula deserves recognition for reducing deforestation, but his administration must also be held accountable for its development policies and their consequences.</p><p>Protecting the Amazon requires more than encouraging deforestation statistics. It requires confronting forest degradation, fires, carbon emissions, alongside the economic activities threatening the rainforest.</p><p>It also requires independent journalism willing to scrutinise every government, including those that promise to defend it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a17b1eee0ebf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The West and the rest]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/the-west-and-the-rest-959eb0235858?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/959eb0235858</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 07:49:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-27T07:49:37.946Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qc5YSmtuTcCP0ga-Gyu8Hg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Featured image: Lithium fields in the Atacama Desert in Chile, South America. Source: FREEDOM_WANTED/Alamy.</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/colonialism-hijacks-energy-transition-70-minerals-renewables-lies-global-south"><strong>Rich</strong></a> <strong>countries want electric cars, renewable energy and net zero. But there is another race behind this promise: a race for the minerals, land and natural resources needed to make it happen. South America is at the centre of it, and once again, Indigenous, traditional and rural communities, along with the world’s most fragile ecosystems, are being asked to pay the price.</strong></p><p>The green transition offers hope. Europe wants electric cars and batteries, China is investing heavily in renewable technologies, and governments across the world have made commitments to cut carbon emissions from their economies.</p><p>But every battery, power network, wind turbine and electric vehicle needs huge amounts of minerals and other raw materials. Much of what the world’s richer economies want lies under the land of the Global South and that part of the story gets far less attention.</p><p>For more than five centuries, South America has supplied the outside world with its wealth. From silver and gold taken during the European colonisation, to sugar, rubber, timber, oil, gas, soy, beef and other commodities.</p><p>Now the world wants lithium, copper, <a href="https://www.mmg.com/investors/news-centre/mmg-presents-to-european-commission-on-brazil-nickel-acquisition/">nickel</a>, cobalt and other minerals <a href="https://isprs-archives.copernicus.org/articles/XLIX-B3-2026/371/2026/">labelled</a> as ‘critical’. The commodities and the countries <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/transition-minerals-tracker/">competing</a> for them may change, but the <a href="https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/2026_Transition_Minerals_Tracker_EN.pdf">pattern</a> of who extracts the resources and who bears the harm remains painfully <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/colonialism-hijacks-energy-transition-70-minerals-renewables-lies-global-south">familiar</a>.</p><p><strong>Green colonialism</strong></p><p>Researchers writing in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261251391002"><em>The Sociological Review</em></a> have a name for this: the “coloniality of green transformation”.</p><p>They argue that the green transition is intensifying old patterns of extraction. Raw materials leave poorer regions, which are left with much of the environmental damage, while richer countries enjoy the benefits. Now the same practices can be defended as climate action.</p><p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-026-08460-w">Losing</a> your land or water doesn’t hurt less because the lithium taken from it will go into an electric car. And when a forest becomes a carbon credit that a company can trade, it doesn’t stop being someone’s home, territory, history and source of life. Calling it an “offset” changes none of that.</p><p>The struggle for these resources now involves more powerful <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261251391002">players</a>. China has built a strong economic position in South America and is a major trading partners for countries including Brazil and Chile. The United States and the European Union are also trying to secure access to the region’s raw materials.</p><p>So ‘the West and the Rest’ is no longer quite the right division. But South America’s assigned role in the world economy has hardly changed: supply what the powerful need.</p><p>This cannot be <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261251391002">blamed</a> on one government or one political belief.</p><p>A 2026 research article <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-026-08460-w">published</a> in Springer Nature’s <em>Humanities and Social Sciences Communications</em> argues that green colonialism goes beyond mineral extraction.</p><p>Ioannis Rigkos-Zitthen, a postdoctoral researcher at Roskilde University in Denmark and author of the research, points to the inequalities embedded in the global organisation of production and consumption.</p><p>He argues that the real question is not whether the world should move away from fossil fuels, but who controls the resources needed for that transition. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Demand for critical minerals can create real development opportunities, but the crucial issue is who controls extraction, processing and investment; who captures value; and who bears environmental and social costs.</em></blockquote><p>For countries like Chile and Brazil, he says, earning money from exports is not enough. They must also have the power to determine how their resources are developed, and whether particular projects should go ahead at all. He explained:</p><blockquote><em>Governments and communities should have the capacity to determine the pace and terms of development, including when a proposed project is not acceptable.</em></blockquote><p>Governments of left, right and centre have kept extraction going, including those elected on promises of change. Some demand a bigger share for the state or promise to spread the profits more fairly. But the pressure to open land to mines, oil, gas, industrial farming and other forms of extraction remains.</p><p>Now they can say those resources are needed not just for growth, but to save the planet.</p><p><strong>Sacrifice</strong></p><p>Chile shows what this means on the ground. Its vast lithium and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13705-026-00573-z">copper</a> deposits are increasingly <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13705-026-00573-z">important</a> as demand grows for electric cars, batteries and renewable energy infrastructure.</p><p>According to the research, approximately 87 per cent of Chilean exports consist of raw materials with little or no processing, while mining has made up more than half of the country’s exports for decades.</p><p>Chile is the world’s biggest copper producer its second biggest lithium producer, holding some of the largest reserves of both minerals.</p><p>By 2040, Europe’s demand for lithium could be 14 times what it was in 2020, mainly because of batteries for electric cars and energy storage. For Chile, that means growing pressure from abroad to dig up more of the minerals other countries need to meet their climate targets.</p><p>Much of that mining happens in the Atacama Desert, one of the driest places on Earh. Here, mines compete for scarce water with farmers, communities and the living ecosystems.</p><p>Researchers have counted 758 mining tailing dumps created over time. This waste contains chemicals and heavy metals that pollute soil, water and air and eventually enter the food chain.</p><p>Some mining areas have been called “<a href="https://icmagazine.org/the-clean-energy-transitions-indigenous-sacrifice-zones/">sacrifice zones</a>”: places where people and nature are made to bear the damage so that economic life elsewhere can carry on.</p><p>Just think about those two words: sacrifice zones. Who decided these places could be sacrificed? And who gets the benefits?</p><p>An electric car on a European street may be cleaner where it is driven, but its story began long before anyone plugged it into a charging point. Its copper and lithium came from somewhere. The pressure on water, the pollution and the mining waste don’t vanish just because the driver cannot see them.</p><p>Rigkos-Zitthen warns that the way countries measure environmental progress can conceal these costs. A country may reduce pollution within its own borders while relying on imported products whose extraction and production have damaged environments elsewhere. He explained:</p><blockquote><em>Yes, environmental progress can be misrepresented if it is measured only through emissions and pollution generated inside national borders. Production-based measures remain useful, but consumption-based accounts reveal environmental pressures embodied in imported goods.</em></blockquote><p>Carbon emissions alone, he argues, tells only part of the story:</p><blockquote><em>Carbon accounting alone cannot capture the full consequences of mining, including water use, ecosystem disruption, waste and territorial change.</em></blockquote><p>According to figures <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261251391002">cited</a> by some researchers, copper mining uses around 35 per cent of Chile’s electricity and 20 per cent of its diesel fuel. The mining sector <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13705-026-00573-z">accounts</a> for about 21 per cent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.</p><p><strong>Indigenous lands on the frontline</strong></p><p>Indigenous, traditional and rural communities are especially exposed to this race for minerals.</p><p>A study in <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-022-00994-6"><em>Nature Sustainability</em></a> examined 5,097 projects involving minerals needed for the energy transition. It found that 54 per cent were on or near Indigenous lands. Include peasant lands and the figure rises to 69 per cent. For lithium reserves and resources, the overlap with Indigenous lands was 85 per cent.</p><p>The Business &amp; Human Rights Resource Centre’s 2026 Transition Minerals Tracker <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/briefings/tmt-2026-south-america/">shows</a> the human cost behind these figures. It recorded 447 allegations of abuse linked to transition-mineral extraction in South America since 2010, with 97 in 2025 alone. Of the allegations recorded in 2025, 64 concerned copper and ten lithium. Peru recorded 26 and Chile 25.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/briefings/tmt-2026-south-america/">reports</a> repeatedly raise problems with water and pollution, poor consultation, failures to secure free, prior and informed consent, attacks on people defending their land and violations of Indigenous rights.</p><p>These are allegations, not proof that every company named is responsible. But the figures reveal the scale of the concerns surrounding an industry promoted as essential to tackling climate change.</p><p>Colonialism was never only about occupying land. It was also about the power to decide that another people’s land, resources and work could be used to serve someone else’s idea of progress.</p><p>In Brazil, the scale is striking. An <a href="https://reporterbrasil.org.br/2026/04/minerais-criticos-boom-em-5-anos-e-cercam-278-terras-indigenas/">investigation</a> by <em>Repórter Brasil</em>, using data from the Observatório da Transição Energética, found 2,055 mining applications or processes that overlapped with, or lay within ten kilometres of, 278 Indigenous territories.</p><p>That amounted to 44 per cent of the country’s Indigenous lands covered in the study. Of the 29,213 applications and processes examined for 27 minerals, half were filed between 2021 and 2025.</p><p>These are not all working mines, but they show how Indigenous territories can become surrounded by mining interests long before digging starts.</p><p>For Rigkos-Zitthen, the urgency of tackling climate change cannot justify taking decisions away from the people whose land and livelihoods are at stake. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Climate urgency should not be interpreted as permission to suspend democratic rights or disregard territorial claims. Projects promoted as necessary for a global public good can impose concentrated costs on communities whose lands, water and livelihoods are directly affected.</em></blockquote><p>Nor can a project’s importance to the global economy automatically override community objections. He added:</p><blockquote><em>Decisions must respect applicable law and Indigenous rights, including free, prior and informed consent where required, and create real possibilities to alter, relocate or reject a project.</em></blockquote><p>The SIRGE Coalition has <a href="https://sirgecoalition.squarespace.com/statements/green-economy-vs-green-colonialism-respect-for-indigenous-peoples-rights-in-the-energy-transition">warned</a> that mining is being given a green name while the old disputes over Indigenous land and consent remain unresolved.</p><p>In the Amazon, a different promise of development has brought a similar fight over rights.</p><p>In Autazes, in the Brazilian state of Amazonas, Potássio do Brasil, a subsidiary of the Canadian company Brazil Potash, is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/brazil-amazon-potash-mining-canada-mura-madeira-2a4dee3774950fb1b11c4f4836c94519">developing</a> a potash project. It’s <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/27/lula-defende-br-319-zona-franca-e-potassio-no-amazonas-video.ghtml">promoted</a> as a way to make Brazil less <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/21/br-319-e-potassio-autazes-entram-em-discussao-entre-governo-do-am-e-embaixadores-da-uniao-europeia.ghtml">dependent</a> on imported fertilisers.</p><p>But Mura communities have opposed it for years, and the project has faced legal scrutiny over its effects on their land and lives.</p><p>Brazil’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) has <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/mpf-reforca-pedido-de-anulacao-de-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas-por-violacao-de-direitos">challenged</a> the environmental licences, saying Indigenous <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/alegacoes-finais_caso-postassio.pdf">rights</a>, the effects on territory and the duty to consult communities have not been properly respected.</p><p>In May 2026, the MPF again <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/mpf-reforca-pedido-de-anulacao-de-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas-por-violacao-de-direitos">asked</a> for the licences to be cancelled. The company says its consultation process and authorisations are valid and reported a favourable Supreme Court decision in August.</p><p>Chile also shows that these inequalities didn’t begin when a mine arrived. They have been built over generations.</p><p><a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2422774122">Research</a> in the municipality of Valdivia traces the unequal share of environmental benefits and dangers through settler colonialism, the displacement of Mapuche communities, the devastating 1960 earthquake and later neoliberal urban development.</p><p>Colonialism leaves its mark on the land: who owns it, who is pushed aside, who has green space and who lives with its risks.</p><p><strong>Selling the forest</strong></p><p>Mining is only part of the story. The Amazon is now <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261251391002">valuable</a> not only for what can be taken from it, but for the carbon the forest can hold.</p><p>Carbon markets put a price on the carbon stored by forests. Credits can then be bought and sold, so that pollution in one place is supposedly balanced, on paper at least, by protecting carbon in another.</p><p>The promise sounds good. Protect forests, support communities and tackle climate change at the same time.</p><p>But <a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/nov/05/carbon-credits-free-pass-polluters">studies</a> of REDD+ projects (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) in the Amazon, have <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666719326000312">found</a> serious <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261251391002">problems</a>. They include limits on traditional ways of using land, much smaller financial benefits than Indigenous and traditional communities had hoped for, and conflicts over who controls territory.</p><p>People who have done little to cause climate change may be told to change how they live on their own land, while companies and consumers elsewhere keep polluting and buy carbon credits to make up for it.</p><p>Researchers call this “carbon colonialism”.</p><p>These markets don’t arrive on empty land. They enter places where people fought over ownership for generations. Large areas of the Brazilian Amazon still have uncertain or contested land titles. Researchers warn that carbon credit projects can become caught up in land grabbing and speculation.</p><p>In 2024, Brazil’s Federal Police <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261251391002">investigated</a> a criminal organisation <a href="https://www.petersandpeters.com/case/operation-greenwashing-31-suspects-charged-in-largest-carbon-credit-fraud-in-brazil/">accused</a> of using carbon projects to help make the theft of around half a million hectares of public land appear legitimate.</p><p>This is not climate justice.</p><p><strong>Whose transition?</strong></p><p>Climate change is real, dangerous and already hitting many of the same communities at the centre of this story. Moving away from fossil fuel is essential. But a transition that <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-026-08460-w">continues</a> to take land and resources from poorer regions while denying communities a say in their future risks reproducing the inequalities it should be helping to overcome.</p><p>Researchers have proposed other ways to think about the transition: stop shifting environmental damage onto others, build stronger local economies, protect people’s ability to grow their own food, share wealth more fairly, keep ecosystems healthy and stop treating every part of nature as something to buy and sell.</p><p>Rigkos-Zitthen believes a genuinely fair transition must also challenge the assumption that economic growth is always the measure of progress. But he rejects the idea that everyone, everywhere, should be expected to consume less. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Wealthy societies have particular responsibilities to reduce ecologically excessive material consumption, while poorer societies must retain the capacity to expand access to housing, healthcare, energy, infrastructure and other essential needs.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The fundamental question is not simply how much economies grow, but what is produced, for whom, under whose control, and with what social and ecological consequences.</em></blockquote><p>He also rejects the idea that ordinary people should carry the main responsibility for changing their lifestyles when more sustainable choices remain beyond their means:</p><blockquote><em>It’s deeply problematic to place primary responsibility for the ecological transition on ordinary people while the economic structures that shape their choices remain largely unchanged.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>We cannot simply blame households for not purchasing electric vehicles or accessing more sustainable food when these alternatives remain economically inaccessible to many.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>A just transition must transform the conditions to access, production and distribution rather than moralise individual consumption.</em></blockquote><p>The political consequences of ignoring these inequalities could be serious.</p><p>Rigkos-Zitthen warns that when climate policies are seen as unfair or imposed from above, the resulting anger can be exploited by far-right and authoritarian movements. But those same grievances can also drive demands for a fairer and more democratic transition. He explained:</p><blockquote><em>When climate policies are experienced as imposed from above, with their costs disproportionately affecting ordinary households and vulnerable communities, the resulting grievances can be exploited by far right and authoritarian movements.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>However, these grievances can also become the basis for democratic and progressive political mobilisation demanding greater social justice, redistribution and popular participation in the ecological transition.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The political challenge is not to dismiss such grievances, but to develop democratic institutions capable of addressing them.</em></blockquote><p>For him, a fairer transition means giving people genuine power over the decisions that shape their lives, rather than simply consulting them after the important choices have already been made. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Their lesson is not simply that local communities should be consulted more often; it is that democratic institutions must be capable of redistributing decision-making power.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>My broader argument is that grassroots initiatives, communing practices and solidarity economies need to develop relationships with public institutions, political organisations and coalitions operating across geographical scales if they are to transform the wider structures that shape their possibilities.</em></blockquote><p>Instead of asking how the Global South can produce enough for the North’s transition, we should be asking what a transition would look like if communities, their land and the limits of nature came first.</p><p>The climate crisis demands deep change. But if Indigenous, traditional and rural communities still have to defend their land from outsiders, if South America is still treated as a storehouse of raw materials, if distant powers still decide what forests and rivers are worth, and if some people still get to consume while others must sacrifice, then colonialism has not ended.</p><p>It has only been painted green.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=959eb0235858" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[When antibiotics stop working]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/when-antibiotics-stop-working-e7e6d948108b?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e7e6d948108b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[antimicrobial-resistance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[antibiotics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[one-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[superbugs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 09:58:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-08T09:58:14.994Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ThuwdujcLaaCDeUOTAn2Uw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Paper with word superbug and glasses.</em> <em>Credit: designer491/Alamy.</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Drug-resistant infections are already killing more than a million people directly each year. As intensive farming drives antibiotic use, environmental contamination and climate change are all adding pressures that help resistance spread. Meanwhile, some of the medicines we have come to depend on are losing their power.</strong></p><p>Most of us don’t give antibiotics much thought until we actually need them.</p><p>An infected wound, pneumonia, cancer treatment, an organ transplant or even a relatively straight-forward operation can make them essential. We take the medicine and expect to get better. That expectation is so embedded in modern medicine that the alternative can be difficult to contemplate.</p><p>But imagine going into hospital for surgery, developing a bacterial or fungal infection and then discovering that the drugs doctors would normally use simply don’t work.</p><p>Antimicrobial resistance, or <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance">AMR</a>, threatens not only our ability to treat infections caused by bacteria, fungi, viruses and parasites, but the safety of much of modern medicine, including surgery.</p><p>This isn’t a prediction about a distant future. In 2021, an <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)02724-0/fulltext">estimated</a> 4.95 million deaths worldwide were associated with bacterial antimicrobial resistance. Researchers estimate that in 2019 at least 1.27 million deaths were directly <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)02724-0/fulltext">caused</a> by it. Some projections suggest the number of deaths each year could <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/5/8/pgag273/8759074">rise</a> to 10 million by 2050.</p><p>The numbers are difficult to take in. But resistance is already being <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(26)00018-5/fulltext">found</a> in infections that are anything but unusual.</p><p>By 2023, approximately one in six bacterial infections <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance">confirmed</a> in laboratory causing common illnesses worldwide was resistant to antibiotic treatment.</p><p>Between 2018 and 2023, resistance <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance">increased</a> in more than 40 per cent of the pathogen-antibiotic combinations monitored by the World Health Organisation (WHO), with average annual increases of between five and 15 per cent.</p><p>These are not simply rare organisms we find in specialist hospital wards. They include bacteria responsible for illnesses people <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(26)00018-5/fulltext">develop</a> every day.</p><p>A major study <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(24)01867-1/fulltext">published</a> in <em>The Lancet</em> estimates that bacterial AMR could directly cause 39.1 million deaths between 2025 and 2050.</p><p>Then there’s the huge financial cost. The WHO <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance">estimates</a> that without stronger action, treating resistant bacterial infections could cost healthcare systems a staggering $ 412 billion a year up to 2035, with another $ 443 billion lost annually through reduced productivity.</p><p>Resistant infections also mean longer stays in hospital, additional tests and second or third-line medicines that may cost more and cause more serious side effects.</p><p><strong>We were warned</strong></p><p>There’s something particularly unsettling about this crisis because the warning came almost as soon as antibiotics themselves.</p><p>Alexander Fleming, the Scottish physician and microbiologist who discovered penicillin, was already warning about resistance in 1945. He understood what could happen if bacteria were exposed to inadequate amounts of the drug.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/the-issue/a-history-of-antibiotic-abuse/">warning</a> did little to stop antibiotics spreading far beyond the treatment of illnesses.</p><p>By the early 1950’s, they were being used in animal feed to make livestock grow faster. Europe eventually banned antibiotic growth promoters in 2006, but antibiotic use in farming remains an important part of the wider resistance story.</p><p>Antibiotics themselves are not the enemy. They are vital medicines, and sick animals, just like sick people, need treatment. The difficulty begins when their use becomes routine, excessive or unnecessary.</p><p>The WHO <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance">identifies</a> misuse and overuse of antimicrobials as major drivers of resistance.</p><p>When bacteria are repeatedly exposed to antibiotics, some are killed while resistant bacteria survive and multiply. Resistant genes can also move between bacteria. Gradually, a medicine that once worked well may become less effective or even stop working altogether.</p><p>That’s where <a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/the-issue/antibiotic-overuse-in-livestock-farming/">farming</a> becomes particularly important.</p><p><a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/">The Alliance to Save our Antibiotics</a> <a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/the-issue/antibiotic-overuse-in-livestock-farming/">estimates</a> that roughly 70 per cent of antibiotics globally are <a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/the-issue/antibiotic-overuse-in-livestock-farming/">used</a> in farm animals rather than people.</p><p>According to a recent <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/5/8/pgag273/8759074">study</a> published in <em>PNAS Nexus</em>, in some countries, up to 80 per cent of antibiotics are used in livestock to promote growth or as disease prevention, rather than using it for treatment of a sick animal.</p><p>What’s clear is that livestock account for a substantial share of global antibiotic consumption, and antibiotics have historically been used in groups of healthy animals, rather than reserved for animals that are ill.</p><p>Certain types of antibiotics used in animal farming have led to the <a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/the-science/">rise</a> and spread of livestock associated strains of MRSA (<em>staphylococcus aureu</em>s) and <em>Clostridioides difficile</em> (<em>C-diff</em>). Farm antibiotics have also contributed to a rise in an untreatable type of <em>E. coli</em> and infections such as <em>Salmonella</em> and <em>Campylobacter</em>.</p><p><strong>British farming</strong></p><p>Cóilín Nunan, policy and science manager of the Alliance to Save our Antibiotics, mentioned that the progress made by British farming over the past decade is significant, but argued there is still much further to go. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Farm antibiotic use in the UK has fallen by roughly 57 per cent, and use of the highest-priority critically important antibiotics has fallen by 84 per cent. Those are very significant reductions, and they have contributed to lower levels of antibiotic resistance in bacteria found in farm animals.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>But antibiotic use is still significantly higher than it should be. In countries such as Norway and Sweden, where standards of animal husbandry tend to be higher, there are fewer disease problems and less need for antibiotics.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>In the UK, antibiotic use in the pig industry is over four times higher per pig than in Sweden. When we look at organic pig farming, the difference can be even greater, with antibiotic use around 20 times lower than in conventional pig farming.</em></blockquote><p>Poultry presents a particular problem. While the use of medically important antibiotics has fallen substantially, intensive chicken production continues to rely heavily on ionophores, antibiotics that are not used in human medicine but are used to control coccidiosis.</p><p>Nunan explained that the conditions in which intensive chickens are raised help explain that reliance. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Coccidiosis is by far the biggest disease problem in intensive chicken farming, and it can only occur when chickens ingest faecal matter. The reality is that intensively farmed chickens are kept in conditions where consuming faecal matter is unavoidable. Without ionophores, many of those chickens would become ill.</em></blockquote><p>There is also growing concern about the assumption that antibiotics not used in human medicine pose little risk to human health. Research into co-selection suggests their use can contribute to resistance to medically important antibiotics.</p><p>The scale of ionophore use makes this particularly important. Nunan explained:</p><blockquote><em>The use of medically important antibiotics in poultry has fallen substantially. But the use of ionophores is enormous — around 17 times higher than the use of medically important antibiotics in poultry.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The latest science shows that these drugs can contribute, through co-selection, to resistance to medically important antibiotics.</em></blockquote><p>But resistance is not the only concern. Nunan also pointed to what happens to these drugs after they have been given to animals. Because ionophores are too toxic to be used in human medicine, he said their potential effects on animals and the wider environment, including soil and aquatic organisms, also need to be considered. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Most of these antibiotics are excreted by the animals, often still in an active form. So, we also must ask what happens when large quantities of these drugs enter the environment.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>There are concerns about their effects on soil and aquatic organisms, as well as growing evidence that they can contribute to resistance to medically important antibiotics.</em></blockquote><p>This is why AMR is increasingly <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43856-025-01090-4">approached</a> as a One Health <a href="https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/research/centres/amr/news/450111/silent-pandemic-tackling-amr-through-one-health-approach">problem</a>. Human health, animal health and the health of our environment are interconnected. Bacteria don’t recognise the boundaries between farms, people and the environment.</p><p><strong>Trade</strong></p><p>Trade can complicate the picture further. Reducing antibiotic use on British farms doesn’t necessarily address the risks associated with imported meat produced to different standards.</p><p>In 2026, the UK government <a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/news/press-release/uk-refuses-to-ban-brazilian-meat-imports-despite-antibiotic-resistance-concerns/">decided</a> to continue allowing Brazilian meat imports despite concerns about antibiotic use in Brazilian livestock production, while the EU and Norway moved to prohibit imports of animal products produced using antibiotics for growth promotion.</p><p>Brazil has banned some antibiotic growth promoters, but others remain permitted, and concerns have also been raised about access to critically important antibiotics and weaknesses in traceability.</p><p>This raises a difficult question for trade policy. If British farmers are required to meet increasingly strict standards on antibiotic use, should trade deals and import rules allow food produced under practices that would not be allowed here?</p><p>Nunan warned that the issue extends beyond competition between British farmers and overseas producers. He said:</p><blockquote><em>The UK is still importing meat from Brazil, even though the EU recently banned Brazilian meat imports because of Brazil’s use of antibiotic growth promoters. Brazil is now looking for other markets, so there is the potential for more Brazilian meat to come into the UK.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>That concerns British farmers, but there is a human-health concern too, because antibiotic-resistant bacteria can spread through the food chain</em></blockquote><p><strong>Then add a hotter world</strong></p><p>Climate change <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC13397693/">adds</a> another layer to an already difficult problem.</p><p>A scientific review <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC13397693/">found</a> several ways in which a changing climate could contribute to AMR in livestock systems.</p><p>Elevated temperatures can compromise animals’ immunity, increasing their susceptibility to disease and potentially driving greater antimicrobial use. Higher temperatures may also make it easier for resistance genes to move between bacteria.</p><p>Changes in rainfall and humidity can affect pathogen survival and movement of resistant bacterial and antimicrobial <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/jan/06/age-fungi">residues</a> from manure into soil and water.</p><p>Floods and droughts complicate matters even further. Floodwater can disperse resistant bacteria and resistance genes through the environment, while drought may concentrate them in shrinking water sources and other places where they can survive. This can create routes between livestock, wildlife, ecosystems and people.</p><p>There are still important gaps in the research, particularly when it comes to confirming in the real world what scientists have seen in laboratory studies. Even so, the evidence suggests that climate change and AMR cannot be looked at as separate problems.</p><p>For farmers, the connection is even more immediate. Heat-stressed animals can become more vulnerable to disease. More disease can create greater pressure to use antibiotics, particularly where large numbers of animals are kept together and infection can move quickly through a flock or herd. If that leads to greater antibiotic use, resistant bacteria have more opportunities to survive and spread.</p><p>Climate change isn’t creating antibiotic resistance from nowhere. What it can do is make some of the conditions in which resistance develops and spreads more favourable.</p><p>A study <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(26)00018-5/fulltext">published</a> in <em>The Lancet Planetary Health</em> suggests that climate change could be making antibiotic resistance worse, including in bacteria such as <em>Salmonella</em>, which can spread between animals and people.</p><p>Between 1940 and 2023, antibiotic resistance in <em>Salmonella</em> increased globally by 38%. The researchers found that climate change was linked to around a 10% increase in resistance, with increases seen in 82 of the 100 countries studied.</p><p>It’s not just bacteria. The increase in cases of <em>Candida auris</em>, a fungus resistant to multiple drugs associated with hospital-acquired infections, may be caused by higher temperatures resulting from climate change. This pathogen affects severely ill patients, including both adults and children in hospitals across the globe.</p><p>Joel Henrique Ellwanger, biologist and researcher at the department of genetics at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Brazil, <a href="https://theecologist.org/2024/feb/23/pathogen-pathway-next-pandemic">explained</a> how climate change may have played a role in the surge of <em>Candida auris</em>. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Climate change can influence the evolution of pathogens. Certain microorganisms, once unable to infect humans because they were accustomed to lower temperatures, are now adapting to warmer conditions that mimic the human body’s warmth.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>This adaptation creates the potential for these microorganisms, typically present in soil and similar settings, to infect humans and cause illnesses. This phenomenon is believed to have happened with </em>Candida auris<em>.</em></blockquote><p>Scientists are even examining another possible route: wildfire smoke. A paper in <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13280-026-02382-2"><em>Ambio</em></a> argues that fine particles released during fires could potentially carry resistant microorganisms and antimicrobial-resistance genes through the air.</p><p>Wildfire-related respiratory illness could also increase healthcare demand and, potentially, antimicrobial prescribing. But the evidence here is still developing.</p><p>But who suffers the most? AMR can affect anybody, but the WHO <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance">says</a> vulnerable populations and people in low-resource settings are more heavily affected.</p><p>Where access to clean water, sanitation, diagnostics, infection control and effective medicine is limited, preventing and treating resistant infections becomes much harder. Resistant organisms can cross borders and our ability to protect ourselves from them is unevenly distributed.</p><p><strong>It can be changed</strong></p><p>In the UK, sales of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/veterinary-antimicrobial-resistance-and-sales-surveillance-2023/uk-varss-2023-highlights">veterinary</a> antibiotics for food-producing animals, adjusted for the animal population, <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8141/">fell</a> 57 per cent between 2014 and 2024. However, there has been much less progress in reducing antibiotic use and drug-resistant infections in people. Between 2019 and 2024, antibiotic use <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8141/">fell</a> by only 2%, well short of the 15% reduction target. At the same time, the number of drug-resistant infections <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8141/">increased</a> by 13%.</p><p>New veterinary medicines <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/antimicrobial-resistance-clarification-of-new-elements-applied-from-the-vmr">regulations</a> came into force in Great Britain on 17 May 2024. They prohibit antibiotics from being used routinely or to compensate for poor hygiene, inadequate animal husbandry or poor farm management.</p><p>But preventative use is restricted rather than completely prohibited. A vet may prescribe antibiotics preventatively in exceptional circumstances, where the risk of infection is very high and the likely consequences are severe.</p><p>Nunan argues that changing the rules is only part of the answer if farming practices themselves do not change. He said:</p><blockquote><em>The EU and the UK have both nominally banned routine antibiotic use, and using antibiotics to compensate for poor hygiene or inadequate animal husbandry.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>But in practice, husbandry standards have not improved enough. In my view, the law has not been properly applied because antibiotics are still being used to compensate for problems created by the way animals are raised.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The EU has banned purely preventative group treatments where none of the animals has been diagnosed with disease. Group treatment is still allowed where disease is actually present and there is a risk of it spreading.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The UK has refused to introduce a similar rule and still permits prophylactic group treatments</em></blockquote><p>For Nunan, the differences between farming systems show how much further reductions could be achieved by changing the conditions in which animals are raised. He explained:</p><blockquote><em>We know that significantly improving animal husbandry and better hygiene standards can dramatically reduce antibiotic use.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Giving animals more space, raising them outdoors, using more resilient breeds and ending practices such as very early weaning and routine tail docking can all make a substantial difference.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>If we move towards higher welfare standards, we can achieve really significant reductions in farm antibiotic use</em></blockquote><p>The Alliance to Save our Antibiotics <a href="https://www.saveourantibiotics.org/the-issue/how-farm-antibiotic-use-can-be-reduced/">points</a> towards low antibiotic use in countries such as Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland and argues that practices including weaning, better diets and improved living conditions have helped reduce dependence on group treatments.</p><p>The idea behind this isn’t complicated: keep animals healthy enough that antibiotics are not routinely needed in the first place, rather than using the drugs to deal with disease afterwards.</p><p>But Nunan argues that there is a trade-off. Raising animals in less intensive systems can cost more, potentially challenging the expectation that meat should be available cheaply and in large quantities. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Making large improvements to animal husbandry can result in meat becoming more expensive.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>This, however, has the benefit of lowering the risk of antibiotic resistance, which is a major cost to medicine.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Also, when meat becomes more expensive people tend to eat less of it. So, there is a relationship between higher husbandry standards and lower meat consumption</em></blockquote><p>That raises a bigger question about whether reducing our dependence on antibiotics also means reconsidering the amount and type of meat we consume.</p><p>As Nunan puts it:</p><blockquote><em>We need to reconsider our diets as part of this discussion.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Moving towards less, but better, meat production is part of the solution to antibiotic resistance, as well as the wider environmental problems associated with industrial meat production.</em></blockquote><p>And we cannot simply assume science will keep producing replacements for the drugs that stop working. Developing new antibiotics is scientifically difficult and commercially challenging, while bacteria continue to evolve.</p><p>Preserving medicines that we already have matters just as much as finding new ones. That means reducing unnecessary use in people and animals, preventing infections, improving sanitation and vaccination, monitoring resistance, investing in new treatments and diagnostics and dealing the effects of a heating world.</p><p>We have lived with effective antibiotics for so long that it’s easy to treat their usefulness as permanent.</p><p>But the loss of antibiotics is unlikely to announce itself as a single catastrophe. A successful operation might be followed by an infection that’s difficult to treat. A familiar drug might stop working as well as it once did. Doctors try another antibiotic, then another.</p><p>Resistance accumulates quietly: bacterium by bacterium, patient by patient, farm by farm, prescription by prescription.</p><p>We still have time to protect these medicines. The question is how much more evidence we need before we decide to act.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e7e6d948108b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Amazon does not need new masters]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/the-amazon-does-not-need-new-masters-d3a8d989aa09?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d3a8d989aa09</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bioeconomy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-amazon-rainforest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indigenous-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ilo-169]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 09:26:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-18T09:26:26.145Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dr4uEGRlRrfyRrsUOhcCXw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Amazon rainforest, Amazon River, Brazil. Credit: Dennis Schmelz / Alamy</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The world has discovered a new way to make money from a living Amazon. But unless power moves with money, Indigenous peoples and traditional communities could find themselves serving another economy built around their forest, rather than shaping one of their own.</strong></p><p>Something rather strange has happened to the way we talk about the people of the Amazon.</p><p>Knowledge once seen as primitive, backward, even an obstacle to progress even, is now being considered a bioeconomy asset and part of the solution to the climate and biodiversity crises. They’re now being told that their knowledge may hold the key to the future.</p><p>Indigenous and traditional communities know what grows where, when fruit is safe, ripe and ready to be consumed, how a plant can be used and what happens when a river is disturbed upstream. Much of that knowledge has travelled through families and communities for many generations.</p><p>Now it has another name: innovation. And there’s plenty of money in it.</p><p>The Amazon bioeconomy is attracting many governments, banks, companies, environmental organisations, philanthropies and investors with a compelling proposition: economic development doesn’t have to come at the expense of the forest.</p><p>We really want that to be true. The Amazon desperately needs a future that doesn’t depend on its destruction.</p><p><strong>Value</strong></p><p>It gets quite interesting and less comfortable when you follow an Amazonian product from the forest to the consumer.</p><p>A community might possess generations of knowledge about a particular plant: where it grows, how it’s harvested without damaging future production and how it can be used. But once the plant enters a commercial chain, the balance changes completely.</p><p>Processing may happen elsewhere, along with research, product development, patenting, branding and distribution.</p><p>An ingredient bought for relatively little at its source can eventually sit inside an expensive cosmetic, food or pharmaceutical product sold in São Paulo, London, Paris, Berlin or New York.</p><p>Somewhere along that journey, value increases enormously. Those who provided the raw material and the knowledge that made the product possible may remain at the bottom of the chain.</p><p>This is why simply asking whether communities are making money from the bioeconomy tells us very little. They can earn much more and still have very little control over the business built around them.</p><p>A community may receive income from a project and still lose some autonomy over its territory, become dependent on a single buyer, or even alter its traditional practices to meet the demands of an external market.</p><p>And knowledge isn’t just another raw material.</p><p>How do you assign ownership to something developed collectively and passed between generations? What happens when knowledge and territory enter systems built around registration, intellectual property and commercial ownership?</p><p>The recognition of traditional knowledge should be celebrated, but it shouldn’t become an opportunity to appropriate it.</p><p><strong>Invited in</strong></p><p>There are plenty of photographs of Indigenous peoples at climate conferences these days. They appear in corporate sustainability reports, at international events and in presentations about forest conservation. They have also become politicians.</p><p>Visibility has improved significantly. But power is something completely different.</p><p>Many of the important decisions surrounding a project can be made years before a community is formally consulted.</p><p>Often, these communities appear in these projects as partners, beneficiaries, or guardians of the forest, while strategic decisions regarding funding, programme design, success criteria and resource distribution are made elsewhere.</p><p>Free, prior and informed consultation is meant to prevent precisely this. “Prior” cannot mean after the important decisions have already been made. “Informed” cannot mean handing communities documents they have had neither the time nor independent advice to properly assess.</p><p>There’s a huge imbalance when institutions spend years developing a project and communities are expected to reach decisions within weeks, or even days.</p><p>They need their own independent lawyers and advisers when necessary, and time to talk among themselves, including with elders and organisations they trust. They also need to know who stands to make money from a project, not simply what they themselves have been promised.</p><p>Above all, they need to be able to say no. Consent shouldn’t be a blank cheque signed at the start of a project.</p><p>Conditions may change; impacts may differ from those anticipated and new investors may come on board. The use of data or natural resources may also expand.</p><p>There should be formal review points throughout the project’s lifecycle, with clear mechanisms for renegotiation, complaints and reparation.</p><p><strong>Money arrives with conditions</strong></p><p>There’s no question that the Amazon needs investment. Anyone romanticising poverty in the name of forest protection is doing the people who live there no favours. Small businesses and cooperatives struggle to obtain support.</p><p>Blended finance has emerged partly in response to these problems. Public and philanthropic money can take on some of the risk that private investors are unwilling to carry, making projects more attractive to commercial capital.</p><p>But if public money makes the risk acceptable, while much of the return is private, we should know how the benefits are being divided. More importantly, we should look at what sort of projects the system favours.</p><p>Investors like things that can be measured, reproduced and scaled with a quick return. The forest is rather less tidy.</p><p>A community may have an exceptional way of managing a particular ecosystem, developed around local conditions and culture, but it may never become a model capable of expansion across thousands of hectares. A larger, standardised project with familiar metrics may be far easier to finance.</p><p>Slowly, the question can change. Instead of asking what kind of finance works for the Amazon, we start asking what kind of Amazon works for finance.</p><p><strong>What money cannot see</strong></p><p>Markets are particularly bad at seeing things that do not produce revenue.</p><p>There’s no obvious commercial value or return on allowing an endangered species to continue existing, cleaning mercury from a river, protecting a remote watershed or preserving an ecological relationship that scientists barely understand. These things may be essential without producing anything that can be sold.</p><p>Nature doesn’t operate on an investment fund’s calendar. A damaged ecosystem might need decades to recover.</p><p>Carbon offered an answer to part of this problem by creating something measurable that could be traded.</p><p>Money has flowed into forest projects as a result, including money that might otherwise never have reached conservation.</p><p>But voluntary carbon markets have also exposed the awkwardness of trying to fit a living forest into an accounting system.</p><p>For many forestry projects, credits depend on a projection of what would supposedly have happened to that forest had the project not existed. The higher the projected deforestation in this hypothetical scenario, the greater the potential volume of credits generated.</p><p>This creates a serious conflict of incentives. If you exaggerate the future risk of deforestation, you can potentially generate more credits. And those credits have financial value.</p><p>Furthermore, there are other issues, such as “leakage”: you protect a specific area, but the deforestation simply shifts elsewhere.</p><p>There is also the question of permanence. A forest that generated carbon credits today could burn down, become degraded, or be cleared a few years from now. Yet, those credits might have already been sold and used by a company to offset its emissions.</p><p>This highlights just how difficult it is to turn something as complex and dynamic as a forest into a perfectly measurable financial unit.</p><p>Perhaps the most concerning issue is this: a company can buy a credit and claim to have offset its emissions without necessarily reducing pollution at the source.</p><p>This can create a sort of moral licence to keep emitting: I keep burning fossil fuels here while paying someone to preserve a forest on the other side of the world. But one does not necessarily cancel out the other.</p><p>That’s why it’s dangerous to believe that the market alone will solve the climate crisis.</p><p>There’s a world of difference between paying people to protect a forest and paying people to protect a forest so that somebody else can claim to have cancelled pollution.</p><p><strong>Green credentials</strong></p><p>The new economy has created some very unusual alliances.</p><p>Companies involved in oil and gas, mining and agribusiness now appear alongside governments and environmental organisations in conservation initiatives. Some are financing restoration and biodiversity programmes.</p><p>That money can achieve something useful. Rejecting a restored forest because of the identity of the funder would make little sense.</p><p>What makes less sense is looking at the restoration without looking at the company.</p><p>If a corporation spends millions on conservation, how does that compare with what it spends expanding the activities responsible for its environmental footprint? What are its emissions?</p><p>What damage is associated with its operations? What remains unresolved? What’s the ratio between what it allocates to conservation and what it continues to allocate to the activities responsible for the problem?</p><p>These are not arguments against corporate environmental finance. They are basic questions of proportion.</p><p>Sustainability has become valuable to companies too. It affects their reputation, investor relationships and the social licence to operate. A corporation can now be associated with an environmental problem and finance part of the proposed solution at the same time.</p><p>Is conservation financing transforming these companies’ business models, or is it helping them continue operating without a proportional transformation of their business models?</p><p><strong>Old memories</strong></p><p>There is reason to be sceptical of large economic promises in this part of Brazil.</p><p>The Amazon has been repeatedly reorganised around things outsiders decided were valuable. Rubber had its moment, so did timber, gold, minerals and land. Wealth was made, often very far from the communities left living with the consequences.</p><p>Today, the valuable things have different names: carbon, biodiversity, genetic information and traditional knowledge.</p><p>Can this value be generated while the forest remains standing? If so, value can still leave the Amazon even when the trees don’t.</p><p>A genetic resource can become intellectual property elsewhere. A forest can generate a financial asset traded far from the territory. Traditional knowledge can help create a lucrative product while the people who developed that knowledge remain suppliers rather than owners.</p><p>We should be careful not to mistake a change in what is extracted for a change in who holds power.</p><p><strong>More than beneficiaries</strong></p><p>Public investment can support things that matter, even when they will never generate an attractive commercial return.</p><p>Most importantly, Indigenous peoples and traditional communities can be treated as political and economic actors with authority over their territories, not as beneficiaries attached to somebody else’s project.</p><p>For generations, these communities have protected much of what the rest of the world has suddenly discovered is valuable. They did so long before carbon had a price and biodiversity appeared in investment presentations, often while facing violence, land invasions and policies intended to push them aside.</p><p>Now everybody wants something from them and from the living forest.</p><p>Before we celebrate the amount of money flowing into the Amazon, we must ask:</p><p>What kind of Amazon do we want to leave behind once all this money has passed through it?</p><p>Because investments come and go. Governments come and go. Companies come and go. Politicians come and go. But the forest must remain.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d3a8d989aa09" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[When conservation becomes a commodity]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/when-conservation-becomes-a-commodity-7e91cac9f222?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7e91cac9f222</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[amazon-rainforest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[timber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[forest-concessions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[carbon-credits]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 10:12:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-01T21:17:27.840Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*naIemS94BqHmyhaSAErCDw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Moving tree trunks from forest to sawmill downstream using the current of the river, logging, Amazon rainforest, Brazil. Credit: Ricardo Beliel / BrazilPhotos / Alamy</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Brazil is betting that the Amazon can be protected by making its forests economically valuable, through timber, forest products and carbon credits. But as more public forest is opened to business, the challenge is to establish whether commercial use can stay within the forest’s ecological limits.</strong></p><p>The Amazon has always attracted people looking for something valuable. Since Brazil’s colonial times with the arrival of the Portuguese in 1500, natural resources, including wood, sugar, gold, diamonds, rubber, coffee, minerals, cattle and land have all brought waves of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ongoing-deforestation-is-rooted-in-colonialism-and-its-management-practices-257578">extraction</a> into the forest.</p><p>Today, public forests can provide oils, seeds, fruits, timber, environmental services and, under newer rules, carbon credits, while remaining officially protected and standing.</p><p>Brazil calls this <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/setores/Florestas">sustainable forest management</a>. The idea is that if a living forest has economic <a href="https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2023/lei/l14590.htm">value</a>, there’s less incentive to destroy it. Forest recovery, however, happens on a much longer timescale than commercial planning. Trees take decades, sometimes centuries, to grow. What matters is what remains after logging and whether commercially valuable trees have recovered before harvesting starts again.</p><p>A study <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378112721005296">published</a> in <em>Forest Ecology and Management</em> tested 27 different logging scenarios in the Brazilian Amazon to see whether commercial timber production could be maintained over repeated harvests.</p><p>Under conditions like those used in Brazilian forest concessions today, harvesting around 15–20 cubic metres of timber per hectare and returning after 35 years, timber production could be maintained for the first cycle, but not at the same level after that.</p><p>Plinio Sist, senior forest scientist at Forests and Societies Research Unit at CIRAD (the French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development) and lead author of the research, explained:</p><blockquote><em>The problem is not necessarily whether the forest remains standing after logging. Forest biomass and biodiversity can recover relatively well when logging is carefully controlled. The problem is the valuable timber trees. They recover much more slowly.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Under the current harvesting cycle, studies suggest that only around half of the original timber volume may have recovered by the time loggers return. So, a forest can look green and healthy from above while no longer containing enough commercial timber to support the same level of harvesting.</em></blockquote><p>The most sustainable scenario in the study involved harvesting 10 cubic metres per hectare every 60 years. CIRAD’s subsequent explanatory material describes the corresponding cutting cycle as 65 years. It also assumed that 90 per cent of potentially harvestable timber species would have commercial value, compared with around 20 per cent under current practices.</p><p>Sist argues that for genuinely sustainable timber production, the industry may have to accept taking considerably less from the forest and waiting much longer before returning. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Our simulations suggest that logging should be limited to around 10 cubic metres per hectare, that a wider range of timber species should be used, and that forests should be given around 60 years before being harvested again.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Under those conditions, timber harvesting could be sustainable over the long term. But there is an important trade-off: genuinely sustainable harvesting would produce much less timber than the market currently demands. We must recognise that the forest has ecological limits. We cannot simply ask it to keep producing the same amount indefinitely.</em></blockquote><p><strong>A forest becomes an investment</strong></p><p>Pau-Rosa is part of a much wider <a href="https://www.earthsight.org.uk/news/watch-your-step">expansion</a> of forest <a href="https://tede.ufam.edu.br/bitstream/tede/8683/14/Disserta%C3%A7%C3%A3o_CamilaTakakashi_PPGCTRA.pdf">concessions</a> across the Amazon. The <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Florestas-da-Amazonia-Pau-Rosa/424a412b-1bd1-11ec-bf1b-0242ac11002b">Pau-Rosa National Forest</a> covers around 828,000 hectares, and lies between the Madeira and Tapajós rivers, a region of immense ecological richness. Around 249,000 hectares are currently proposed for sustainable forest management concession. As of August 2026, the project had not yet been auctioned. Brazil’s development bank, BNDES, scheduled the tender notice for late 2026 and the auction for the first quarter of 2027.</p><p>Government project <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/export/sites/default/cms/anexos-livres/florestas/8_FactSheet_Pau_Rosa_NovaLogo.pdf">documents</a> say the concessions are intended to protect biodiversity and support sustainable development while allowing the forest to be used commercially. The same forest is expected to be both commercially productive and conserved.</p><p>Pau-Rosa is only one of several concession <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/nossos-projetos?setor=florestas&amp;setor=parques&amp;local=ac&amp;local=am&amp;local=ro&amp;local=rr&amp;local=to">projects</a> across the region. The <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Florestas-da-Amazonia-Gleba-Castanho/b09dafeb-1bd9-11ec-bf1b-0242ac11002b">Castanho Glebe Forest</a>, the <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Floresta-Amapa/17ca9853-08c4-11ef-9565-0242ac11002b">Amapá Forest</a>, the <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/export/sites/default/cms/anexos-livres/florestas/8_FactSheet_Jatuarana_NovaLogo.pdf">Jatuarana</a> (four Forest Management Units, FMUs), <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Florestas-da-Amazonia-Iquiri/a1a13d2e-8dd2-11ec-a8f9-0242ac11002b">Iquiri</a>, <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Floresta-Nacional-de-Anaua-RR/c9de3cb6-c965-11f0-891b-0242ac11002b">Anauá</a>, <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Floresta-Nacional-do-Bom-Futuro-RO-UMF1/2a8b92a7-2e99-11f1-aaf7-0242ac11002b">Bom</a> <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Floresta-Nacional-do-Bom-Futuro-RO-UMF2/b72356c0-149e-11f0-8fcc-0242ac11002b">Futuro</a> (two FMUs), and <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Florestas-da-Amazonia-Balata-Tufari/c92a3346-60c2-11eb-85be-0242ac11002b">Balata-Tufari National Forests</a> (<a href="https://www.gov.br/florestal/pt-br/assuntos/concessoes-e-monitoramento/editais-em-licitacao/floresta-nacional-de-balata-tufari">three FMUs</a>) are among the other Amazonian forests involved in concession projects, although the projects are at different stages, from studies and tender preparation to auction and contracted concessions.</p><p>These projects are coordinated by the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB) linked to Brazil’s Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, and <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/nossos-projetos?setor=florestas&amp;setor=parques&amp;local=ac&amp;local=am&amp;local=ro&amp;local=rr&amp;local=to">supported</a> in their structuring by Brazil’s development bank, BNDES.</p><p>Each concession has its own boundary and management plan, but across the region, more public forest is being expected to produce timber and other forms of income while remaining standing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NpyyAnk7abDVGb7L" /><figcaption>Image source: <a href="https://hubdeprojetos.bndes.gov.br/pt/projetos/Florestas-da-Amazonia-Balata-Tufari/c92a3346-60c2-11eb-85be-0242ac11002b">BNDES Project Hub</a></figcaption></figure><p>Some of these public forests and concession units lie within or are affected by the wider area influenced by transport infrastructure associated with the <a href="https://yourvoiz.org/2026/07/06/br-319-the-road-that-could-cost-the-amazon/">BR-319 highway</a> corridor.</p><p>Research and environmental assessments have repeatedly identified improved road access in this part of the Amazon as a driver of pressure on remote forests protected areas and Indigenous communities. Existing and planned roads can create <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/apr/18/reckoning-amazon">pathways</a> for illegal logging and mining, land grabbing, organised crime, and other illicit activities, while also increasing the risk of deforestation and degradation.</p><p><strong>Sustainable timber</strong></p><p>A management plan means little if the origin of the timber cannot be trusted.</p><p>A 2025 study <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332225002738">published</a> in <em>One Earth</em> examined timber records and satellite observations covering 2009–2019 in the Brazilian state of Pará and found significant gaps between what was recorded on paper and what could be observed in the forest. Although 96 per cent of the timber volume entering the formal supply chain could be linked to a logging permit by location, only 45 per cent of the logging detected by satellite matched areas with legal authorisation.</p><p>The researchers also found cases where the amount of timber reported as coming from an authorised area appeared inconsistent with the amount of logging actually visible there. According to the researchers, these inconsistencies create opportunities for logging permits to be used to launder timber illegally harvested elsewhere.</p><p>But the problem hasn’t disappeared, as recent enforcement operations and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/illegal-luxury-timber-brazils-cop-state-makes-its-way-us-europe-investigation-2025-04-03/">investigations</a> have continued to find evidence that fraudulent permits, forest credits and other documentation can be used to disguise the true origin of illegally harvested timber.</p><p>In 2025, an investigation by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) linked around 53,000 cubic metres of timber associated with sanctioned or irregular operations to supply chains reaching the United States and Europe.</p><p>Timber may appear traceable and legal in an official database without the paperwork proving that the wood really came from the forest stated in its records.</p><p>Much of the Amazon is remote, and logging beneath the canopy can be difficult to compare with what happens in official records. A management plan can set out how logging should happen but verifying that those rules are followed on the ground is much harder.</p><p><strong>A standing tree becomes a commodity</strong></p><p>Timber is no longer the only way a forest can generate money. In October 2025, Brazil’s Forest Service <a href="https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/decreto/d12679.htm">introduced</a> rules allowing forest management concessions already in force to add activities aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation, with a view to generating, certifying and commercialising carbon credits.</p><p>On 25 March 2026, Brazil held its first federal auction for a forest <a href="https://www.gov.br/florestal/pt-br/assuntos/concessoes-e-monitoramento/editais-em-licitacao/floresta-nacional-do-bom-futuro-ro">concession</a> focused on ecological restoration in the Bom Futuro National Forest in Rondônia. Re.green won the auction for a roughly 51,200-hectare management unit. The concession runs for 40 years and allows revenue to be generated through environmental assets, including carbon credits and products from native species silviculture.</p><p><a href="https://re.green/en/projects-partnerships-and-clients/">Re.green</a> was the 2025 Earthshot Prize <a href="https://earthshotprize.org/winners-finalists/re-green/">winner</a>. Their customers and partners include Microsoft, Nestlé, Vivo and Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk. Their investment and support come from asset manager <a href="https://www.dynamo.com.br/en/sobre-a-dynamo/">Dynamo</a>, private holding company of the Moreira Salles Group — <a href="https://www.bwgi.com.br/">Brasil Warrant</a> (BW), private equity and investment firm <a href="https://www.lanxcapital.com/?lang=en">Lanx Capital</a>, private equity firm <a href="https://principiacp.com/">Principia Capital</a> and <a href="https://www.gaveainvest.com.br/">Gávea Investimentos</a>.</p><p>The voluntary carbon <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/mpf-questiona-na-justica-projetos-de-carbono-no-amazonas-por-violacao-a-direitos-de-comunidades-tradicionais">market</a> adds another source of <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/meio-ambiente/noticia/2026/06/07/mpf-tenta-barrar-acordo-para-venda-de-credito-de-carbono-no-para-e-e-contestado-por-especialistas-e-indigenas.ghtml">revenue</a>. A standing tree can generate income through the carbon it stores. Its carbon is measured, calculated and turned into a credit that can be traded. For restoration projects, carbon credits can provide money to restore degraded land, but they also turn the forest’s natural ability to store carbon into something that can be bought and sold.</p><p>Dr Thales AP West, a tenured assistant professor at the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, spoke about the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-03313-z">carbon credit</a> market’s <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gcb.70527">safeguards</a>:</p><blockquote><em>If companies buy credits from forest projects, the forest must be there. If it disappears, the credits disappear too. The problem is that even certified and audited calculations may still lack credibility — certification alone doesn’t necessarily guarantee anything.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Most projects last only a few decades; once they expire, their credits could eventually expire too. Yet no one wants to talk about that because it’s inconvenient. The voluntary market has simply chosen to not take the issue of permanence seriously.”</em></blockquote><p>Timber volumes and tonnes of carbon describe only part of a forest’s value. Forests support soils, water, wildlife and relationships between species. For people who have lived in and depended on them for generations, they are also home, food and medicine.</p><p><a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/nov/05/carbon-credits-free-pass-polluters">Voluntary carbon markets</a> put a measurable, tradeable value on one function of a wider system, <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">carbon storage</a> and climate mitigation. Critics have a name for this: “green extractivism”, arguing that it can continue to define forests through the economic value they generate, even when the trees remain standing.</p><p>Sist argues that putting a price on a standing forest can help protect it, but only if conservation doesn’t become another justification for endless economic growth. He said:</p><blockquote><em>There is always a danger when we put a financial value on nature. At the same time, generating income from a standing forest can give people a strong reason to conserve it.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>I think the concept of bioeconomy is not very useful because it means a lot of things and everyone has their own definition and vision of what is bioeconomy. I think that the bioeconomy should be implemented within an economic system that advocates degrowth, rather than as a miracle solution within a capitalist system that cannot exist without growth.</em></blockquote><p><strong>An old relationship with a greener name</strong></p><p>For centuries, the Amazon rainforest has been exploited, viewed as a source of rubber, hardwoods, minerals, oil, cattle pasture and land. Today’s forest concessions operate under regulation and monitoring, with management rules intended to limit the damage associated with uncontrolled extraction.</p><p>Those rules do not, by themselves, make the model transparent or sustainable. A system that values forests mainly through timber, oils, carbon and other marketable products still risks overlooking ecological and social values that are harder to price.</p><p>Whether these concessions are sustainable will depend on what happens in the forest over time: the recovery of harvested trees, the condition of rivers and soils, the survival of wildlife, the influence local and Indigenous communities have over decisions, and how much of the wealth generated remains in the places where it is produced.</p><p>Together, they provide a more meaningful picture of the forest’s long-term condition than the value of a concession or the number of carbon credits it produces.</p><p>Brazil needs alternatives to illegal logging, land grabbing and forest clearing. Carefully managed concessions could perhaps reduce some of those pressures, but their long-term sustainability still depends on whether ecological recovery and effective oversight can be maintained across repeated harvest cycles.</p><p>Sist warned that concessions should not be treated as the single answer. He said:</p><blockquote><em>Brazil’s forest concession system is among the best in the tropical world, but the harvesting rules will have to change if it is to be sustainable over the long term. And concessions alone cannot provide all the timber the market demands.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Brazil needs a much broader approach: stopping illegal logging, allowing forest communities and small farmers to manage forests sustainably, and restoring the millions of hectares of degraded forest and land. We need to diversify not only where timber comes from, but also who is able to produce it.</em></blockquote><p>The real test begins after the contract is signed and logging starts. The effects cannot be judged only over the next financial year or even the life of a 40-year concession. They will become clearer over much longer timescales, in whether large timber trees continue to regenerate, rivers and forest ecosystems remain healthy, and the people who depend on the forest gain a meaningful role in decisions about its future.</p><p><em>Right of reply: The Brazilian Forest Service (SFB) was approached for interviews to discuss some of the questions raised in this article. At the time of publication, no response to the questions submitted to them had been received.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e91cac9f222" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The price of consensus]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/the-price-of-consensus-9a406a9c1b98?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9a406a9c1b98</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bioeconomy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regenerative-agriculture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[forest-restoration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[green-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 09:04:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-08T06:30:21.520Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hsid19vl30g158soaSlS_w.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Business and nature — consensus building concept. Credit: Malp/Alamy</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Brazil has become a global testing ground for green finance, regenerative agriculture and forest restoration. As governments, corporations and philanthropies increasingly align around the same solutions, the concentration of influence behind those initiatives deserves closer attention.</strong></p><p>Few countries face a challenge on Brazil’s scale. Home to around 60 per cent of the Amazon rainforest, one of the world’s most important carbon sinks, it’s also the world’s largest exporter of beef and one of its leading agricultural producers. Protecting forests without undermining an industry worth billions of dollars has become one of the defining tests of Brazilian environmental policy.</p><p>Rather than slowing agricultural expansion, Brazil has sought to reconcile production with conservation. Governments, multinational food companies, <a href="https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home">development banks</a>, philanthropic foundations and environmental organisations are <a href="https://brbfc.org/">investing</a> heavily in restoration, regenerative agriculture, digital cattle traceability, carbon markets and the bioeconomy. Together, they argue, these approaches can reduce emissions while allowing agricultural production to continue growing.</p><p>The partnerships are publicly documented, so are the funding arrangements, advisory boards and government appointments. Less attention has been paid to how often the same institutions, and sometimes the same individuals, reappear across them. Following these connections <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">offers</a> a clearer picture of who’s helping shape one of the world’s most influential environmental transitions.</p><p><strong>The beef industry</strong></p><p>Brazil has the world’s second-largest cattle herd, with around 239 million, and has led global beef exports for more than two decades. According to the Brazilian Beef Exporters Association (<a href="https://abiec.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Beef-Report-2025-ENG-WEB.pdf">ABIEC</a>), exports exceeded 2.8 million tonnes in 2024, generating around $12.8 billion. China remained the largest market, accounting for 46 per cent of Brazilian exports. Beef is central to Brazil’s trade surplus and rural economy, making livestock production politically and economically inseparable from environmental policy.</p><p>Three companies dominate the sector. <a href="https://sustainablefoodbusiness.com/jbs-abandons-net-zero-target/">JBS</a>, the world’s largest meat processor, reported <a href="https://www.beefcentral.com/news/jbs-delivers-record-net-revenue-of-us77b-in-strong-2024-full-year-result/">revenues</a> of around $77 billion in 2024. <a href="https://ojoioeotrigo.com.br/2025/08/maior-produtora-de-hamburgueres-do-mundo-capta-dinheiro-de-investidores-para-comprar-gado-do-desmatamento/">Marfrig</a>, following its merger with BRF, became part of MBRF Global Foods, with annual <a href="https://www.leadersleague.com/en/news/marfrig-brf-beefing-up">revenues</a> exceeding $29 billion. <a href="https://api.mziq.com/mzfilemanager/v2/d/7f2b381f-831b-4aed-b111-417a5585b53b/82514bfa-5b77-f9be-61b0-52fc67bb17e1?origin=2">Minerva Foods</a> exports to more than 100 countries and consolidated cattle slaughter of around 5.9 million in 2025. Together, the three companies exert enormous influence over the global beef trade and the debate around traceability, emissions and land use.</p><p>In 2026, JBS <a href="https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/news/environmental-groups-slam-jbs-for-abandoning-climate-goal/721179.article">announced</a> it was abandoning its target of reaching net zero emissions by 2040.</p><p>Gemma Hoskins, global climate lead for NGO Mighty Earth, <a href="https://www.edie.net/meat-giant-jbs-abandons-net-zero-by-2040-target/">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>Backtracking on measurable targets doesn’t diminish the scrutiny JBS will face for its climate and nature-wrecking record of pollution, deforestation, land-grabbing, human rights abuses and corruption.</em></blockquote><p>The non-profit Changing Markets Foundation <a href="https://changingmarkets.org/report/the-meat-agenda-agricultural-exceptionalism-and-greenwash-in-brazil/">estimated</a> that JBS alone generated around 241 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions in 2023, more than many industrialised nations.</p><p>In its <a href="https://changingmarkets.org/report/the-meat-agenda-agricultural-exceptionalism-and-greenwash-in-brazil/">report</a>, <em>The Meat Agenda</em>, the organisation writes:</p><blockquote><em>The reality is a far cry from the rhetoric: the industry is responsible for a range of well-documented crimes — from deforestation to exploitative practices, land grabbing, and pollution — which permeate the supply chains of global meat giants like </em><a href="https://www.jbs.com.br/imprensa/produtividade-da-pecuaria-familiar-na-amazonia-dispara-com-adocao-de-agricultura-regenerativa/"><em>JBS</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://ojoioeotrigo.com.br/2025/08/maior-produtora-de-hamburgueres-do-mundo-capta-dinheiro-de-investidores-para-comprar-gado-do-desmatamento/"><em>Marfrig</em></a><em>, and Minerva.</em></blockquote><p>While international attention has largely focused on the Amazon, the Cerrado has experienced extensive agricultural conversion. <a href="https://changingmarkets.org/report/the-meat-agenda-agricultural-exceptionalism-and-greenwash-in-brazil/">Research</a> by the Changing Markets Foundation estimated that one in every three cattle processed by Brazil’s three largest meat companies originated from land cleared there. Much of that conversion complied with Brazil’s Forest Code, highlighting the distinction between legal compliance and ecological sustainability.</p><p>Successive governments have responded without attempting to reduce production. Under the 2026/27 <a href="https://www.gov.br/agricultura/pt-br/assuntos/politica-agricola/plano-safra/2026-2027">Plano Safra</a>, Brasília <a href="https://anovademocracia.com.br/governo-latifundio-plano-safra/">allocated</a> around $103 billion in subsidised rural credit for commercial agriculture and approximately $16 billion through <a href="https://www.gov.br/mda/pt-br/noticias/2026/07/plano-safra-da-agricultura-familiar-2026-2027">Pronaf</a> for family farming. Credit lines under the ABC+ Programme support pasture restoration, integrated crop-livestock-forestry systems, low-carbon agriculture and precision farming. The aim is to produce from existing land rather than slow the expansion of Brazil’s livestock economy.</p><p>The meat industry now presents regenerative grazing, methane reduction, forest restoration and digital traceability not simply as environmental commitments, but as commercial necessities, reflecting growing pressure from international retailers and export markets. Productivity and sustainability are increasingly portrayed as complementary rather than competing objectives.</p><p>The shift extends well beyond livestock. As Brazil’s environmental agenda has expanded, professionals have moved between government, environmental organisations, philanthropic foundations and agribusiness, carrying expertise and influence with them. There’s nothing unusual about careers spanning across different sectors, but as environmental policy has broadened to include sustainable finance, agricultural reform and the <a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/aug/17/brazils-bioeconomy-hope-or-hype">bioeconomy</a>, those professional networks have become increasingly influential.</p><p><strong>The people</strong></p><p>The growing overlap between government, philanthropy, conservation organisations and agribusiness is reflected not only in institutional partnerships, but also in the careers of the people shaping Brazil’s environmental agenda.</p><p>Carina Pimenta is one <a href="https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/composicao/sbc/quem-e-quem/curriculo-padrao-mma-carina-pimenta.pdf">example</a>. Before becoming National Secretary for the Bioeconomy at the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, she co-founded <a href="https://www.conexsus.org/carina-pimenta-assume-a-secretaria-nacional-de-bioeconomia-a-convite-da-ministra-marina-silva/">Conexsus</a>, which supports community-based businesses and sustainable supply chains. Earlier, she worked at <a href="https://www.fundovale.org/en/our-impact/about-us/">Fundo Vale</a>, the non-profit created by mining giant Vale to promote forest conservation, restoration and the bioeconomy in the Amazon. Her career reflects a broader pattern in which experience gained in civil society and philanthropy organisations increasingly feeds directly into public policy.</p><p>Valmir Ortega has <a href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/profiles/valmir-ortega/">followed</a> a similar cross-sector path. He worked for the Ministry of the Environment, founded <a href="https://www.belterra.com.br/post/negocios-sustentaveis-na-amazonia">Belterra Agroflorestas</a> and co-founded <a href="https://www.conexsus.org/co-fundador-da-conexsus-e-apontado-como-empreendedor-social-da-ashoka/">Conexsus</a> and <a href="https://agfeed.com.br/esg/um-pe-no-acelerador-outro-no-freio-na-estrada-do-investimento-valmir-ortega-da-belterra-dirige-conforme-o-ritmo-do-mercado/">Rio Capim Agropastoril</a>, a company associated with regenerative livestock systems. He’s also a council member for FUNBIO and WRI Brasil. Belterra Agroflorestas itself was established in 2020 with <a href="https://agfeed.com.br/esg/um-pe-no-acelerador-outro-no-freio-na-estrada-do-investimento-valmir-ortega-da-belterra-dirige-conforme-o-ritmo-do-mercado/">support</a> from <a href="https://www.fundovale.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Caderno-Demonstracoes-Contabeis-2024.pdf">Fundo Vale</a>. Rather than remaining within government, business or civil society, Ortega’s experience spans all three.</p><p><a href="https://rswaack.com.br/">Roberto Waack</a> has spent decades leading organisations including FUNBIO and the Forest Stewardship Council, while serving on the boards of <a href="https://idbinvest.org/en/member/roberto-silva-waack">Marfrig</a>, <a href="https://idbinvest.org/en/member/roberto-silva-waack">WWF Brasil</a>, Wise Plásticos, Instituto Ethos, Instituto Ipê and <a href="https://arapyau.org.br/roberto-waack-assume-a-presidencia-do-conselho-do-instituto-arapyau/">Instituto Arapyaú</a>. He also sits at the governing bodies of Natura, Tupy and re.green. He’s also an associate fellow at <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-people/roberto-waack">Chatham House</a>.</p><p>Supporters argue that experience across these sectors helps bridge the gap between conservation and agribusiness. Critics, however, question whether institutions can remain fully independent while working so closely with the industries they seek to influence.</p><p>Scientists have become part of the same landscape. Carlos Nobre’s research on Amazon tipping points has shaped international understanding of tropical deforestation, and he has consistently argued that cattle ranching accounts for around 90 per cent of Amazon deforestation. In an interview with <em>Democracy Now!</em> in November 2025, he <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2025/11/20/carlos_nobre">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>90 per cent of the deforestation in the lowlands in the Amazon in Brazil is related to cattle ranches. And when we compute, Brazil is the only country in the world where 70 per cent of fossil fuel emissions, greenhouse gas emissions, come from land use change, about 70 per cent of emissions, 40 per cent deforestation. And about 20, 25 per cent of this comes from agriculture, but mostly for cattle ranches. Particularly, the cattle emit a lot of methane, so — all ruminants. So, we say 55 per cent of emissions in Brazil related to livestock, you know, the deforestation for cattle ranches and the cattle emitting methane.</em></blockquote><p>Alongside his academic work, Nobre <a href="https://fundojbsamazonia.org/quem-somos/governanca-e-transparencia/">serves</a> on the advisory board of the JBS Fund for the Amazon, a non-profit supported by meat company JBS that promotes sustainable development and the bioeconomy. He also sits on the advisory board for Conservation International Brasil (<a href="https://brasil.conservation.org/quem-somos/conselho-consultivo">CI-Brasil</a>), is a <a href="https://www.xprize.org/people/carlos-nobre">founding</a> member of WRI Brasil and has been one of the driving forces behind <a href="https://en.amazonia4.org/">Amazonia 4.0</a>, an initiative promoting a new socio-bioeconomy for the Amazon.</p><p>Taken individually, none of these careers is unusual. Together, they reveal how expertise, <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">influence</a> and decision-making circulate through a relatively interconnected group of public institutions, conservation organisations, philanthropic foundations and agribusiness. The same pattern becomes even clearer when the flow of funding is examined.</p><p><strong>The money</strong></p><p>Money has become as <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">important</a> as legislation in shaping Brazil’s environmental agenda. Over the past decade, development banks, philanthropic foundations, multinational corporations and environmental organisations have channelled billions of dollars into forest restoration, regenerative agriculture, sustainable finance and the <a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/aug/17/brazils-bioeconomy-hope-or-hype">bioeconomy</a>. Although these initiatives are managed independently, they often support similar models of rural development.</p><p>Restaura Amazônia is one <a href="https://agencia.petrobras.com.br/w/sustentabilidade/petrobras-e-bndes-fazem-nova-parceria-para-restauracao-ecologica-na-amazonia">example</a>. Managed by the Brazilian Development Bank, <a href="https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/onde-atuamos/meio-ambiente/restaura-amazonia">BNDES</a>, through the <a href="https://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/search-page/?q=Restaura+Amazonia">Amazon Fund</a>, the programme plans to restore 15,000 hectares across Indigenous Lands (TI), Conservation Units (UC), agrarian reform settlements and small rural properties within the so-called Restoration Arc, a region covering 256 municipalities where most Amazon deforestation occurs.</p><p>Rather than being delivered directly by the state, the programme is coordinated by three organisations: the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (<a href="https://www.ibam.org.br/ibam-participa-da-celebracao-dos-18-anos-do-fundo-amazonia-e-reforca-parceria-estrategica-com-o-bndes/">Ibam</a>), the Brazilian Foundation for Sustainable Development (<a href="https://restaura-amazonia.fbds.org.br/">FBDS</a>) and Conservation International Brasil (<a href="https://brasil.conservation.org/iniciativas-atuais/restaura-amazonia">CI-Brasil</a>), each responsible for part of the Legal Amazon.</p><p>Funding comes from around $ 87 million from the Amazon Fund, alongside an additional $ 9.7 million from <a href="https://agencia.petrobras.com.br/w/sustentabilidade/petrobras-e-bndes-fazem-nova-parceria-para-restauracao-ecologica-na-amazonia">Petrobras</a>, making Brazil’s state-controlled oil company one of the programme’s main backers.</p><p>Supporters argue that the project will restore degraded forests while creating jobs, strengthening local economies and helping Brazil meet its climate commitments. But it also highlights a striking contradiction.</p><p><a href="https://www.plataforma9p9.com/post/como-patroc%C3%ADnios-ambientais-da-petrobras-compram-o-sil%C3%AAncio?appSectionParams=%7B%22startDate%22%3A%222026-08-01%22%2C%22planName%22%3A%22Investiga%C3%A7%C3%A3o%3A+Patroc%C3%ADnios+da+Petrobras%22%7D">Petrobras</a>, whose business is built on oil and gas production, is helping fund one of Brazil’s forest restoration programmes. The company presents the investment as part of its commitment to nature-based climate solutions. At the same time, its involvement illustrates how the world’s largest emitters and extractive industries are becoming influential participants in environmental policy.</p><p>A recent <a href="https://www.plataforma9p9.com/post/como-patroc%C3%ADnios-ambientais-da-petrobras-compram-o-sil%C3%AAncio?appSectionParams=%7B%22startDate%22%3A%222026-08-01%22%2C%22planName%22%3A%22Investiga%C3%A7%C3%A3o%3A+Patroc%C3%ADnios+da+Petrobras%22%7D">investigation</a> by journalist Mirna Wabi-Sabi, added another dimension to that debate. Examining funding records, partnerships and public statements, the investigation concluded that Petrobras has spent hundreds of millions on environmental sponsorships that extend beyond conservation projects, helping strengthen the company’s public reputation. It found that several organisations receiving Petrobras funding have remained largely silent on the company’s plans to expand oil exploration, including in environmentally sensitive Equatorial Margin.</p><p>The findings raise uncomfortable questions about whether environmental sponsorship has become a powerful reputational tool, blurring the line between genuine conservation and corporate influence.</p><p>The same mix of public policy and private finance is visible elsewhere. The <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/bezos-earth-fund_the-very-same-technology-that-opens-a-hotel-activity-7475940363535515650-g-19">Bezos Earth Fund</a> is <a href="https://www.bezosearthfund.org/news-and-insights/illegal-deforestation-para-brazil-cattle-traceability">supporting</a> the government of Pará and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) in developing a digital cattle traceability system expected to cover more than 26 million animals. The aim is to improve transparency across the beef supply chain, reduce deforestation risks and strengthen access to international markets.</p><p>Research organisations have adopted similar approaches. The Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) <a href="https://ipam.org.br/programa-impulsiona-pecuaria-sustentavel-no-para/">promotes</a> sustainable livestock systems in the state of Pará, home to Brazil’s second-largest cattle herd. WRI Brasil, Conexsus and the Brazil Restoration &amp; Bioeconomy Finance Coalition (BRBFC) are developing financial mechanisms designed to attract investment into restoration, low-carbon agriculture and community enterprises.</p><p>Collectively, these actors reveal an increasingly interconnected system. Many rely on the same technical expertise, attract similar funding and involve many of the same institutions. Environmental policy is becoming shaped by a dense web of public and private organisations working towards a shared model.</p><p><strong>The implications</strong></p><p>Brazil’s environmental strategy now rests on a broad consensus. Forest restoration, <a href="https://yourvoiz.org/2026/08/03/the-reinvention-of-cattle/">regenerative livestock</a>, digital traceability, sustainable finance and the <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">bioeconomy</a> are no longer <a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/aug/17/brazils-bioeconomy-hope-or-hype">presented</a> as alternatives to agricultural growth, but as how that growth can continue while reducing its environmental impact.</p><p>That consensus has brought governments, corporations, philanthropies and environmental organisations into closer alignment than at any point in the past. They frequently finance the same projects, advise the same institutions and promote similar policy frameworks. In doing so they also influence which ideas attract political backing, scientific authority and investment.</p><p>As a result, environmental policy is <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">influenced</a> by a relatively small network of organisations whose priorities help define the terms of the debate.</p><p>Brazil is unlikely to be unique. Across the world, climate policy is moving towards blended finance, public-private partnerships and voluntary sustainability initiatives. As these models expand, understanding the relationships that connect governments, corporations, researchers and philanthropies may become as important as evaluating the projects themselves.</p><p>Many of these partnerships have delivered important environmental gains, but when the same organisations fund projects, advise governments, produce research and help shape policy, scrutiny becomes as important as cooperation.</p><p>The question is whether a system built on broad agreements remains open to challenge, accountability and competing ideas. As consensus grows, understanding who shapes it may become just as important as measuring the outcomes it delivers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a406a9c1b98" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The reinvention of cattle]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/the-reinvention-of-cattle-02165048ff1e?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/02165048ff1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[livestock]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cattle-ranching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amazon-rainforest]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 06:55:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-03T07:57:49.904Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n54RX7XHxUIia3iXOj11LQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>A cow with a traceability ear tag is pictured in a ranch in Sao Joao do Araguaia, Para state, Brazil, 12 September 2025. Credit: Zhou Yongsui/Xinhua/Alamy Live News</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Can the world’s largest beef industry become sustainable — or is sustainability itself being redefined?</strong></p><p>For decades, cattle have symbolised the destruction of the Brazilian Amazon and the Cerrado. Ancient rainforest has given way to vast pasture, replacing some of the planet’s richest ecosystems with grazing land. But the industry’s impact extends far beyond deforestation. It has reshaped land ownership, concentrated wealth, altered political power and become deeply embedded in Brazil’s economic development.</p><p>Forests were not lost through chainsaws and fire alone. Behind every cleared hectare lay an economic model that rewarded converting living forest into private wealth. Roads opened remote regions, timber financed the first wave of clearing, fire consumed what remained, and cattle turned deforested land into an asset that could be bought, sold, mortgaged and defended. Within that system, a standing forest held little financial value.</p><p>Today, cattle are being reframed. As governments, investors and agribusiness seek ways to reduce agricultural emissions, livestock is no longer presented solely as a driver of environmental decline. It’s now being promoted as part of the climate solution through “regenerative” ranching, “low-carbon” beef, digital traceability and green finance.</p><p>This shift extends beyond farming practices. It reflects changes in environmental governance, where climate policy, financial markets and conservation are becoming more closely interconnected. The question is no longer simply how to reduce the environmental cost of cattle production, but whether the industry can continue expanding while claiming to operate within ecological limits.</p><p>How is this shift taking place, who’s driving it and what does it mean for the future of the Amazon? Does the reinvention of cattle represent a genuine environmental transition or a financial model that allows one of Brazil’s most powerful industries keep growing under the language of sustainability?</p><p><strong>Cattle, deforestation and a changing narrative</strong></p><p>Around 80 per cent of cleared land in the <a href="https://theecologist.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/A%20reckoning%20in%20the%20Amazon.pdf">Amazon</a> has been converted to pasture. In the neighbouring <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/feb/12/hidden-cost-beef">Cerrado</a>, one of the world’s most biodiverse biomes, cattle ranching and large-scale commodity agriculture have replaced native ecosystems across an immense area.</p><p>Decades of satellite monitoring, scientific research and government investigations reach the same conclusion: pasture is the dominant land use established after Amazon <a href="https://mightyearth.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/RapidResponse7_Eng.pdf">deforestation</a>, and cattle ranching remains its main direct driver. Not every hectare was cleared solely for beef production. Cattle have also served to occupy disputed land, consolidate speculative claims and prepare properties for resale or conversion to other agricultural uses.</p><p>The consequences extend well beyond forest loss. Clearing and burning release carbon accumulated over decades or centuries. Cattle emit methane through digestion, while manure and pasture management generate additional greenhouse gases. Replacing forests and native savannahs with pasture also degrades soils, alters river systems, fragments habitats and accelerates biodiversity loss.</p><p>Across parts of the Amazon, cattle expansion has remained closely linked to land grabbing, fraudulent property claims and the illegal occupation of public, protected and Indigenous land. Prosecutors, journalists and human rights organisations have repeatedly documented ranches associated with <a href="https://reporterbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/ReporterBrasil-SlaveLabor-CattleIndustry.pdf">forced labour</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/10/15/tainted/jbs-and-the-eus-exposure-to-human-rights-violations-and-illegal">intimidation</a> and <a href="https://cri.org/reports/chainsaws-smoke-and-silence/">violence</a> against Indigenous peoples, traditional communities and smallholders. These abuses do not characterise every producer, but they remain a persistent and well-documented feature of the industry’s history.</p><p>Data from Brazil’s Ministry of Labour and Employment, <a href="https://reporterbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/ReporterBrasil-SlaveLabor-CattleIndustry.pdf">compiled</a> by <em>Repórter Brasil</em>, revealed that 65,600 workers were rescued from slavery-like conditions between 1995 and 2024. More than 17,300 worked in livestock farming, making it the sector with the highest number of recorded cases. As one rescued worker <a href="https://reporterbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/ReporterBrasil-SlaveLabor-CattleIndustry.pdf">observed</a>: “Here, cattle are treated better than workers”.</p><p>For years, international debate framed livestock expansion and forest conservation as opposing forces. The challenge was to limit the environmental damage caused by an industry whose growth had become inseparable from the advance of the agricultural frontier.</p><p>Over the past decade, that debate has <a href="https://ipam.org.br/programa-impulsiona-pecuaria-sustentavel-no-para/">shifted</a>. Governments, researchers, development agencies, environmental organisations, banks, philanthropies and meat companies have moved from asking whether cattle production should change to asking how it can be aligned with climate policy.</p><p>The change began with language. <a href="https://medium.com/Reports">Reports</a> once centred on deforestation now <a href="https://medium.com/speak">promote</a> “low-carbon beef”, “regenerative’ ranching, “nature-positive” and “sustainable” production. Practices such as restoring degraded pasture, improving animal nutrition, reducing slaughter age and increasing productivity are <a href="https://amazonia2030.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/AMZ2030-SI%CC%81NTESE-PECUARIA-EN-20251015.pdf">presented</a> alongside climate finance, satellite monitoring, digital traceability and environmental investment.</p><p>Many of these proposals offer genuine environmental benefits. Restoring degraded pasture is preferable to clearing new forest. Effective traceability can expose abuses that have long remained hidden within supply chains. Stronger environmental agencies, reliable land registries and better technical support could all strengthen responsible producers while excluding those who profit from illegal deforestation.</p><p>Greater efficiency, however, doesn’t necessarily reduce environmental impact. Producing beef with fewer emissions per kilogram does not automatically reduce total emissions, land use or ecological pressure. Animals may reach slaughter weight sooner, lowering methane intensity, while overall emissions continue to rise if herd sizes and production keep expanding.</p><p>That distinction matters in a country with around 238 million <a href="https://exame.com/en/brazil-has-more-cows-than-inhabitants-and-sets-record-in-egg-production/">cattle</a>, more than its human population, and the world’s largest beef export industry. Brazil is pursuing two ambitions at once: presenting livestock as part of its climate strategy while expanding the scale and competitiveness of its beef sector.</p><p>Behind the reports, investment funds and institutional partnerships, another story begins to emerge. The reinvention of cattle is no longer only about forests, pasture or methane. It also concerns credit, environmental data, financial products and the rapidly expanding market for investments described as green, climate-aligned or nature-positive.</p><p>The organisations involved do not all share the same objectives, nor does this diminish the work of scientists, public officials and practitioners who have spent decades protecting forests and improving rural livelihoods. The more important question is whether sustainable cattle represent a genuine transformation of livestock production, or a financial and technological model that allows the industry to continue expanding.</p><p><strong>Rewriting the language of sustainability</strong></p><p>The transformation of Brazil’s cattle industry did not begin on ranches. It began with a change in language.</p><p>For decades, debate about Brazilian livestock centred on deforestation, biodiversity loss, greenhouse-gas emissions, illegal land occupation and labour abuses embedded in beef supply chains. The objective, even if politically difficult, was clear: reduce the environmental damage caused by one of the world’s largest cattle industries. But that’s no longer the dominant conversation.</p><p>Rather than questioning whether livestock production should continue expanding, policy now largely assumes that cattle will remain central to Brazil’s economy. The challenge has become making the industry more productive, more transparent, more technologically sophisticated and more attractive to climate-conscious investors.</p><p>The distinction is subtle but significant. If the problem is the scale of the cattle industry, policy responses might include limiting production in ecologically vulnerable regions, discouraging frontier expansion and reducing pressure for continued growth. If the problem is inefficiency, the solutions become better genetics, restored pasture, <a href="https://feedfood.com.br/robotica-dados-e-integracao-redesenham-a-producao-no-campo/">digital</a> monitoring, faster animal growth and new forms of rural credit.</p><p>Language matters because it shapes policy. It influences what governments measure, where financial institutions invest and what counts as environmental progress. Terms such as “low-carbon” beef, “regenerative” ranching, “nature-positive” and “sustainable” production do more than describe farming practices; they redefine the problem itself.</p><p>That shift is <a href="https://amazonia2030.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/AMZ2030-SI%CC%81NTESE-PECUARIA-EN-20251015.pdf">reflected</a> in research <a href="https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/transforming-brazilian-cattle-ranching-enhancing-productivity-and-mitigating-methane-emissions/">produced</a> through the <a href="https://amazonia2030.org.br/project/">Amazônia 2030</a>, a collaboration between the Amazon Institute of Man and Environment (Imazon) and the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). Its work recognises the role extensive ranching, degraded pasture and deforestation have played in transforming the Amazon, while arguing that future investment should focus on existing production areas rather than new agricultural frontiers.</p><p>The recommendations are practical: redirect rural credit towards measurable productivity gains, expand technical assistance, restore degraded pasture, strengthen georeferenced monitoring and clarify the legal status of public forests vulnerable to speculative occupation. The underlying argument is that Brazil can produce more beef on land that has already been cleared, reducing the incentive to destroy additional forest.</p><p>The logic is persuasive. If degraded pasture supports only a small number of cattle, restoring it should increase production without requiring new land. In theory, higher productivity could spare land for conservation or ecological restoration. Whether that happens depends less on productivity than on governance.</p><p>Higher yields reduce pressure on forests only when environmental protections prevent expansion and restored land is genuinely conserved. Where enforcement is weak, greater efficiency can have the opposite effect, making cattle production more profitable, attracting new investment and increasing pressure to expand.</p><p>History offers no simple answer. Agricultural intensification has reduced pressure on land in some regions while accelerating expansion in others. Outcomes depend on demand, infrastructure, credit, law enforcement and whether higher profits are channelled into restoring existing land or acquiring new properties.</p><p>One statistic illustrates the point. Research <a href="https://amazonia2030.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/AMZ2030-EXPANSAO-PECUARIA-EN-20250814.pdf">cited</a> by Amazônia 2030 suggests that every hectare of restored pasture between 2000 and 2023 coincided with approximately 2.35 hectares of new deforestation. The figure describes a historical association rather than proving that restoration caused forest loss, but it challenges the assumption that productivity gains automatically displace frontier expansion.</p><p>The central question, then, is not whether pasture can be made more productive. It can. The question is whether those gains are accompanied by safeguards that prevent higher profits from financing further deforestation.</p><p>The same tension runs through the broader language of “low carbon” livestock.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/IDH">IDH</a>, the Sustainable Trade Initiative, <a href="https://idh.org/resources/decade-of-convening-landscape-initiatives-promoting-sustainable-cattle-ranching-in-the-amazon">promotes</a> <a href="https://idh.org/resources/transforming-markets-in-brazil">programmes</a> that combine pasture restoration, technical assistance, finance and market access to support lower-emission cattle production. Its partnerships in Brazil bring together environmental organisations, agribusiness, financial institutions and development agencies around a common objective: transforming livestock through investment rather than contraction.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/0*rlZFp_w-eL6TuQZa" /><figcaption><em>IDH’s strategic partners in Brazil. Source:</em> <a href="https://idh.org/contact/brazil"><em>https://idh.org/contact/brazil</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>A similar approach appears in the <a href="https://medium.com/World%20Resources%20Institute">World Resources Institute</a>’s <a href="https://www.wri.org/research/new-economy-brazil-amazon">New Economy for the Brazilian Amazon</a>, where <a href="https://www.wribrasil.org.br/noticias/um-caminho-para-apoiar-brasil-e-china-no-comercio-de-soja-e-carne-livre-de-desmatamento">livestock</a> reform <a href="https://www.wri.org/research/new-economy-brazil-amazon">forms</a> part of a broader programme linking universities, NGOs, businesses and policy organisations around climate-compatible economic development.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/0*KjLNmzmm6F6Fux9J" /><figcaption><em>The New Economy for the Brazilian Amazon leadership. Source:</em> <a href="https://www.wri.org/research/new-economy-brazil-amazon"><em>https://www.wri.org/research/new-economy-brazil-amazon</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Other initiatives follow the same <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">pattern</a>. The Brazil Restoration and Bioeconomy Finance Coalition (<a href="https://brbfc.org/">BRBFC</a>) brings <a href="https://brbfc.org/resource/brb-finance-coalition-secures-4-5b-for-brazils-forests-bioeconomy-ahead-of-cop30/">together</a> commercial banks, development institutions, philanthropic foundations and environmental organisations to support large-scale investment in restoration and nature-based enterprises.</p><p>These organisations differ in governance, priorities and political outlook, and they should not be viewed as a single coordinated project. But their programmes share a strikingly similar vocabulary: productivity, resilience, restoration, traceability, measurable impact, environmental services and blended finance.</p><p>Taken together, these initiatives reveal a broader shift in environmental governance. Livestock is no longer framed simply as an environmental liability requiring tighter regulation. It’s also presented as an opportunity for climate investment, environmental data and participation in emerging markets for carbon, biodiversity and ecosystem services.</p><p>The implications extend beyond cattle ranching. Forests, biodiversity and restored landscapes are treated as measurable economic assets. Financial institutions are developing products that reward environmental performance, while digital technologies generate the data needed to verify and trade those assets.</p><p>Brazil sits at the centre of this shift. It contains the world’s largest tropical rainforest, the vast Cerrado and millions of hectares of degraded pasture that could be restored or intensified. That combination makes the country not only an environmental priority but also one of the world’s largest potential markets for climate investment.</p><p>Because cattle occupy so much of Brazil’s land, they lie at the heart of that opportunity. Pasture can simultaneously be presented as a climate problem, a restoration opportunity and a financial asset awaiting more productive use.</p><p>The reinvention of cattle, then, is about far more than reducing methane emissions. It’s about repositioning one of Brazil’s largest economic sectors within a rapidly expanding market for climate finance.</p><p>Whether that ultimately places ecological limits ahead of economic expansion remains the defining question.</p><p>Brazil’s forest restoration <a href="https://orbitas.finance/room-to-grow-the-economic-case-for-forest-restoration-in-brazil-2/">market</a> could deliver $141 billion <a href="https://orbitas.finance/a-low-carbon-future-financial-pathways-for-brazilian-soy-and-cattle/">opportunity</a> for companies and investors, according to an Orbitas <a href="https://orbitas.finance/press-release-brazils-forest-restoration-market-poised-to-deliver-141-billion-opportunity-for-companies-and-investors/">report</a>.</p><p><strong>Following the money</strong></p><p>The reinvention of cattle is not being driven by environmental policy alone. It’s also shaped by a growing financial architecture that links climate targets, agricultural production and global investment.</p><p>Programmes promoting low-carbon livestock rarely operate in isolation. Instead, they emerge from partnerships between governments, development agencies, philanthropic foundations, commercial banks, investment managers, meat companies and environmental organisations.</p><p>Together, these actors are redefining not only how sustainability is financed but also how it is measured.</p><p>Such cooperation is neither unusual nor inherently problematic. Restoring degraded pasture, improving supply chains and supporting responsible producers require long-term investment that public finance alone is unlikely to provide. The more significant question is how these partnerships <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">influence</a> the definition of sustainability itself.</p><p>When environmental programmes are designed around the expectations of financial markets, success tends to be measured through investment returns, risk reduction, scalability and quantifiable outcomes. Values that resist simple measurement like cultural survival, territorial rights, biodiversity or the intrinsic value of forests, can become harder to accommodate.</p><p><a href="https://idh.org/">IDH</a>, the Sustainable Trade Initiative, illustrates this changing landscape. Established in 2008 through collaboration between the Dutch government, civil society and the private sector, IDH works across global commodity <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yq32juxPtY4">supply chains</a>, including cocoa, coffee, cotton, palm oil, soy and beef. In Brazil, it supports pasture restoration, technical assistance and financial mechanisms designed to accelerate lower-carbon livestock production.</p><p>IDH’s funding reflects the breadth of today’s sustainability economy. Alongside support from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), strategic funding has come from Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA), Norway’s Ministry of Environment (NORAD), the European Union, the Bill &amp; Melinda Gates Foundation, the Laudes Foundation, the Mastercard Foundation, the IKEA Foundation and the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).</p><p>This illustrates a broader change in environmental governance. Policy is no longer shaped solely by governments and regulators. It increasingly emerges through partnerships in which public institutions, philanthropy, financial organisations and commercial interests work together to influence environmental outcomes.</p><p>One of the clearest <a href="https://idh.org/news/what-we-took-away-from-london-climate-action-week-2026">examples</a> is <a href="https://idh.org/news/what-we-took-away-from-london-climate-action-week-2026">IDH</a>’s <a href="https://idh.org/resources/cria-fund">Cria Fund</a>. <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/652d86e4bbfb70043443c9de/68e6bf8fb10bcbd5c783abd4_df2024.pdf">Developed</a> with investment manager <a href="https://www.violet.earth/about-us">Violet</a>, part of the <a href="https://onedrive.live.com/?id=FFB918399A197204%21sce1efd25c6d0492eb26d541866a0ffc9&amp;cid=FFB918399A197204&amp;redeem=aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL2IvYy9mZmI5MTgzOTlhMTk3MjA0L0VTWDlIczdReGk1SnNtMVVHR2FnXzhrQmQzeXdUeGZlY25ZZ2pnUE1feTBkNEE%5FZT1IM3BQU2I&amp;parId=FFB918399A197204%21s774a13f0e8c448c9a31ae04d64d30d06&amp;o=OneUp">VERT Group</a>, the <a href="https://onedrive.live.com/?id=FFB918399A197204%21sce1efd25c6d0492eb26d541866a0ffc9&amp;cid=FFB918399A197204&amp;redeem=aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL2IvYy9mZmI5MTgzOTlhMTk3MjA0L0VTWDlIczdReGk1SnNtMVVHR2FnXzhrQmQzeXdUeGZlY25ZZ2pnUE1feTBkNEE%5FZT1IM3BQU2I&amp;parId=FFB918399A197204%21s774a13f0e8c448c9a31ae04d64d30d06&amp;o=OneUp">fund</a> aims to expand access to finance for small and medium-sized cattle producers across the Brazilian Amazon. It combines rural credit with digital technical assistance and market access, bringing together land, data and capital.</p><p>By 2030, the fund aims to mobilise US$50 million, support 1,000 producers and cover 150,000 hectares under practices classified as sustainable. An initial US$10 million investment is intended to reach 250 farmers managing approximately 12,000 hectares.</p><p>For many producers, access to affordable finance remains a genuine barrier. Restoring pasture, purchasing equipment and adopting new production systems all require capital that conventional rural credit often fails to provide.</p><p>The <a href="https://idh.org/resources/cria-fund">Cria Fund</a> also illustrates a broader shift. Environmental performance is becoming inseparable from participation in financial systems. Lending decisions increasingly depend on production data, geospatial monitoring and digital technical assistance. Access to capital is linked not only to farming practices but also to the ability to generate and verify environmental information.</p><p>For producers, this could improve access to premium markets while rewarding better environmental performance. It also raises important questions. Who owns the data generated through these programmes? How might that information influence future lending decisions? Who determines which production systems qualify as regenerative? And what happens to producers who cannot afford the required technology or whose land documentation remains unresolved?</p><p>These are not arguments against environmental data or rural credit. Rather, they show how financial inclusion can create new forms of dependence alongside new opportunities.</p><p>The choice of Violet as the fund’s investment partner highlights another significant trend. Companies specialising in structured finance and capital markets are becoming central players in environmental policy. Issues once addressed primarily through agricultural extension services and public regulation are increasingly managed through blended finance, private investment and financial products designed to attract institutional capital.</p><p>That evolution was <a href="https://londonclimateactionweek.org/event/scaling-finance-for-food-security/">evident</a> during <a href="https://idh.org/news/what-we-took-away-from-london-climate-action-week-2026">London Climate Action Week 2026</a>, where IDH, CPI, representatives of the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), investors and financial institutions focused less on forests themselves than on the financial mechanisms needed to make regenerative livestock commercially viable.</p><p>The same logic extends beyond cattle. <a href="https://g20land.org/brazil-restoration-bioeconomy-finance-coalition-launched-at-g20-summit/">Launched</a> during the G20 Summit in 2024, the Brazil Restoration and Bioeconomy Finance Coalition (<a href="https://brbfc.org/about-us/">BRBFC</a>) <a href="https://brbfc.org/resource/investimentos-bioeconomia-comunitaria/">brings</a> together public banks, private financial institutions, conservation organisations and international development agencies with the goal of mobilising at least US$10 billion for restoration and bioeconomy projects by 2030.</p><p>Its membership <a href="https://brbfc.org/resource/investimento-bioeconomia-e-restauracao-brasil/">includes</a> Banco do Brasil, BNDES, BTG Pactual, Conservation International, IDB Invest, <a href="https://coalizaobr.com.br/doadores/">Instituto</a> <a href="https://coalizaobr.com.br/">Arapyaú</a>, Instituto Clima e Sociedade, Mombak, <a href="https://cop.dol.com.br/amazonia/parceria-impulsiona-pecuaria-sustentavel-na-amazonia/6884/">The Nature Conservancy</a> (<a href="https://www.tnc.org.br/conecte-se/comunicacao/noticias/marque-o-rebanho-proteja-a-amazonia/">TNC</a>), re.green, WWF Brasil, the World Bank Group, the World Economic Forum, among others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/0*vkvNzvUYrQaggnOj" /><figcaption><em>BRB list of members. Source:</em> <a href="https://brbfc.org/about-us/"><em>https://brbfc.org/about-us/</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>By July 2025, coalition members <a href="https://esgnews.com/brazil-bioeconomy-coalition-commits-2-6-billion-to-forests-and-indigenous-led-projects/">reported</a> commitments of US$2.6 billion. They also aim to restore or protect five million hectares while directing US$500 million towards projects involving Indigenous peoples and local communities.</p><p>The ambition is to replace the frontier economy with one that generates value through restoration rather than deforestation. Forests become investable assets rather than obstacles to economic growth.</p><p>That vision holds genuine promise. Long-term restoration requires long-term capital, and Indigenous organisations and community groups have often <a href="https://changingmarkets.org/report/the-meat-agenda-agricultural-exceptionalism-and-greenwash-in-brazil/">struggled</a> to access conventional finance.</p><p>But restoration and the <a href="https://yourvoiz.org/2026/04/07/the-new-economy-of-the-amazon/">bioeconomy</a> remain broad concepts. They may support the recovery of native ecosystems, but they can also include commercial forestry, carbon markets and agricultural systems with very different ecological and social outcomes.</p><p>Although BRBFC is not a livestock programme, it operates within a landscape dominated by cattle. Decisions about restoring, intensifying or repurposing pasture inevitably shape the future of Brazil’s largest agricultural sector.</p><p>Taken together, these initiatives point to something larger than individual projects. Environmental governance is becoming more integrated with global finance. Forests, biodiversity, pasture and ecosystem services are being translated into assets that can be measured, valued and incorporated into investment strategies.</p><p>Across most of the programmes examined, the future being proposed does not involve producing less beef. Instead, it’s about producing beef more efficiently, monitoring it more closely and connecting it to new flows of capital.</p><p>In this vision, sustainability does not replace growth. It becomes the mechanism through which growth is expected to continue.</p><p><strong>Can traceability deliver?</strong></p><p>If one idea has become central to the promise of sustainable cattle production, it’s traceability. Policy papers, corporate sustainability reports and investment strategies <a href="https://coalizaobr.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/240319_Proposal-National-Policy-of-Traceability.pdf">present</a> it as the solution to one of the livestock industry’s oldest problems: knowing where an animal has spent its life.</p><p>In theory, every animal would be identified from birth, every movement between farms recorded, and every property checked against satellite imagery, environmental embargoes, Indigenous territories and labour violations. Regulators, investors and consumers could then verify whether beef sold in São Paulo, Brussels or Shanghai came from a lawful and deforestation-free supply chain.</p><p>Without reliable traceability, however, claims of low-carbon or <a href="https://mightyearth.org/article/delay-to-cattle-traceability-in-brazils-para-state-poses-major-threat-to-amazon/">deforestation-free</a> beef remain difficult to <a href="https://changingmarkets.org/report/the-meat-agenda-agricultural-exceptionalism-and-greenwash-in-brazil/">verify</a>. Brazil has made significant progress in monitoring livestock production, yet the systems on which traceability depends remain <a href="https://reporterbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/ReporterBrasil-SlaveLabor-CattleIndustry.pdf">fragmented</a>, unevenly implemented and, in some cases, vulnerable to manipulation.</p><p>Three mechanisms form the current <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800925000072">framework</a>: the Rural Environmental Registry (<a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2407357121">CAR</a>), the Animal Transit Guide (GTA) and <a href="https://trase.earth/insights/brazilian-beef-exports-and-deforestation-2025">agreements</a> between federal prosecutors and slaughterhouses known as the Meat Industry Conduct Adjustment Agreement (Meat TAC). Together they mark an important advance in transparency, but they also expose the weaknesses that continue to limit effective oversight.</p><p>Created under Brazil’s Forest Code, CAR is a digital register in which landholders declare property boundaries, areas of native vegetation, legal reserves and agricultural land. Those declarations can be compared with satellite imagery, protected areas and environmental embargoes, making CAR an essential tool for environmental governance. Its main weakness is that the information is initially self-declared and becomes reliable only after verification by state environmental authorities. That process has progressed slowly, leaving a backlog with millions of registrations awaiting validation.</p><p>The consequences extend well beyond environmental regulation. Banks consult CAR before approving rural credit, meat companies use it to screen suppliers and investors rely on it to assess environmental risk. If the underlying information is incomplete or inaccurate, every decision built upon it becomes less reliable.</p><p>Research by the Centre for Climate Crime Analysis, <a href="https://reporterbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/ReporterBrasil-SlaveLabor-CattleIndustry.pdf">reported</a> by <em>Repórter Brasil</em>, highlights the problem. Between 2019 and 2024, 14,223 properties in the Legal Amazon altered their CAR registrations in ways that removed environmentally restricted areas. Across those changes, around 4.9 million hectares disappeared from declared property boundaries. Such alterations do not in themselves prove wrongdoing, but the scale of the changes, and the removal, in some cases, of environmental embargoes and overlaps with Indigenous territories, raises serious concerns about the integrity of the system.</p><p>Tracking land is only part of the challenge. Reconstructing the life of an individual animal is more complex because Brazil’s beef industry operates across multiple farms. One property may breed calves; another raises them and a third prepare them for slaughter. The Animal Transit Guide records those movements, but it was <a href="https://cri.org/reports/before-its-too-late/">designed</a> primarily to control livestock disease rather than reconstruct an animal’s environmental history.</p><p>That distinction has important consequences. Slaughterhouses have traditionally monitored only their direct suppliers, the farms selling animals immediately before slaughter, while earlier stages of the production chain often remain outside the system. An animal may therefore spend much of its life on illegally cleared land before being transferred to a compliant property shortly before slaughter. The final transaction appears lawful even though much of the animal’s environmental history remains hidden.</p><p>The practice, commonly described as cattle laundering, doesn’t necessarily rely on forged documents. Instead, it exploits the gaps between systems that record different stages of the supply chain without communicating effectively with one another. The farm supplying the slaughterhouse may satisfy environmental checks while properties where the animal previously lived remain effectively invisible.</p><p>Electronic identification, integrated databases, satellite monitoring and automated risk analysis could help close part of that gap by making it far more difficult to erase an animal’s history. These technologies represent genuine advances over the fragmented systems currently in place, but they cannot substitute for effective governance. Electronic <a href="https://mightyearth.org/article/delay-to-cattle-traceability-in-brazils-para-state-poses-major-threat-to-amazon/">tags</a> cannot resolve fraudulent land claims, satellite imagery cannot enforce environmental law, and digital platforms cannot verify inaccurate property declarations or compensate for weak institutions and inadequate enforcement.</p><p>Ultimately, traceability is less a <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/bezos-earth-fund_the-very-same-technology-that-opens-a-hotel-activity-7475940363535515650-g-19">technological</a> challenge than a question of governance. Its credibility depends on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/26/delay-on-tracing-cattle-endangers-brazils-amazon">reliable</a> public registries, independent verification, transparent information, effective regulators and meaningful consequences for those who breach environmental law.</p><p>Brazil’s monitoring systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated, but sophistication shouldn’t be mistaken for certainty. Until cattle can be tracked reliably from birth to slaughter, and every stage of the supply chain is subject to effective oversight, claims that beef is deforestation-free will remain only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.</p><p><strong>Who defines sustainable cattle?</strong></p><p>That question runs through every stage of the debate.</p><p>The term “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/sustainable-agriculture">sustainable</a>” cattle appear throughout government strategies, investment prospectuses and corporate reports. Beef is described as “low carbon”, ranching becomes “regenerative”, and supply chains are labelled “nature positive”. The language suggests a settled conclusion, but the meaning of sustainability remains contested.</p><p>There is no single scientific definition that determines whether industrial cattle production in the Amazon and Cerrado can be considered sustainable. A farm may satisfy one standard because it hasn’t cleared forest recently while failing another because its animals originated from unmonitored suppliers. It may reduce emissions per kilogram of beef while increasing overall production and it may restore one area while its supply chain expands into another.</p><p>Much of the argument for “low carbon” livestock rests on the distinction between emissions intensity and absolute emissions. Better pasture management, improved nutrition, selective breeding and earlier slaughter can reduce greenhouse-gas emissions per kilogram of beef by shortening the time cattle spend emitting methane. These gains are meaningful, but the atmosphere responds to total emissions rather than production efficiency.</p><p>If emissions per kilogram fall while herd sizes remain stable or decline, overall emissions can decrease. If productivity improves while cattle numbers and beef production continue to grow, total emissions may remain unchanged or even increase. For a country with the world’s largest commercial cattle herd, that distinction is fundamental.</p><p>Methane makes the issue particularly significant. Enteric fermentation remains the largest source of agricultural methane worldwide. Although methane persists in the atmosphere for a shorter period than carbon dioxide, its warming effect is especially powerful during the decades immediately after it is released. Reducing methane emissions can therefore slow near-term warming, yet doing so remains politically challenging because cattle are central to one of Brazil’s most important export industries.</p><p>The debate over methane accounting illustrates how contested these questions have become. Some researchers and industry groups support alternative metrics, including Global Warming Potential Star (GWP*), arguing that conventional accounting overstates the long-term warming effect of stable livestock herds by treating methane like long-lived greenhouse gases. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), however, continues to advise <a href="https://medium.com/against">against</a> using GWP* for national emissions accounting because it does not fully capture the warming contribution of each methane emission. The debate is technical, but its implications are political because they influence how livestock emissions are interpreted and, ultimately, how sustainability itself is measured.</p><p>Technology occupies a similarly prominent place in the reinvention of cattle. Satellite systems detect deforestation, electronic tags follow animal movements, artificial intelligence analyses supply-chain risks and digital platforms integrate environmental, financial and production data. Together, these tools have transformed the ability to monitor livestock production across a country the size of Brazil, providing information that would have been unimaginable only a generation ago.</p><p>Technology, however, cannot resolve the political questions at the heart of the debate. Satellite imagery can reveal where forests have been cleared, but it cannot prosecute those responsible. Digital registries can identify overlaps with Indigenous territories, but they cannot guarantee that authorities will intervene. Financial platforms can measure compliance with selected indicators, but they cannot determine whether continued expansion of cattle production is compatible with ecological limits.</p><p>A broader pattern emerges. Political and social challenges are repeatedly reframed as technical ones, illegal occupation becomes a problem of data quality, weak law enforcement becomes a question of monitoring, and ecological limits become issues of efficiency and optimisation. Better technology undoubtedly improves oversight, but it cannot replace effective governance.</p><p>The same pattern helps explain why finance has become so closely intertwined with environmental policy. Before sustainability can be rewarded by investors, it must first be translated into measurable data. Once quantified, environmental performance can be verified, priced and incorporated into financial decisions. In that process, sustainability becomes not only an ecological objective but also a financial category.</p><p>None of this diminishes the value of restoring degraded pasture, improving traceability or supporting producers who want to adopt better practices. Nor does it suggest that the organisations discussed here share identical motivations. Public development banks, environmental organisations, producers and investment funds often participate in the same initiatives for very different reasons.</p><p>The evidence does suggest, however, that the authority to define sustainability is gradually shifting. Ecologists may judge cattle production by its impact on forests, biodiversity and climate. Indigenous peoples may judge it by whether their territories, cultures and rights remain intact. Farmers may judge it by whether they can maintain viable livelihoods without losing control of their land or becoming dependent on new financial and technological systems. Investors, by contrast, tend to prioritise measurable indicators, standardised reporting and quantifiable risk.</p><p>The question is not whether one perspective is inherently more legitimate than another. It’s who ultimately has the authority to decide which definition shapes policy.</p><p>That matters because language guides regulation, regulation directs investment and investment reshapes landscapes. Success cannot be measured simply by the number of cattle fitted with electronic tags, hectares restored or billions of dollars committed to green finance.</p><p>The more meaningful test is whether forests remain standing, methane emissions fall in absolute terms, Indigenous peoples retain control of their territories and rural prosperity no longer depends on pushing the agricultural frontier further into natural ecosystems.</p><p>Whether the reinvention of cattle proves to be a genuine environmental transition or a more sophisticated justification for business as usual will ultimately be judged not by the language of sustainability, but by those outcomes.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=02165048ff1e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[BR-319: The road that could cost the Amazon]]></title>
            <link>https://monicapiccinini.medium.com/br-319-the-road-that-could-cost-the-amazon-7a3884528c28?source=rss-b4492c05e65d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7a3884528c28</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[br-319-highway]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amazon-rainforest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YourVoiz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 08:07:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-06T08:07:06.621Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_eDuIahuXGrsCUWKBYJY8Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Smoke from fires and deforestation seen on the BR-319, on the edge of the municipality of Tapauá, Amazonas, Brazil, on 18 August 2021. Credit: Sandro Pereira/Fotoarena/Sipa USA.</figcaption></figure><p>The Amazon has learned to distrust political promises. Every administration arrives with its own language of progress, development and national integration, but the forest measures governments differently. It remembers roads more vividly than speeches. It remembers the sound of chainsaws following freshly cut asphalt, the smoke rising from newly occupied land, the rivers clouded by mining, and the Indigenous territories transformed into frontiers of <a href="https://theecologist.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/A%20reckoning%20in%20the%20Amazon.pdf">speculation</a>.</p><p>In the Amazon, infrastructure has rarely remained confined to engineering. It has become the starting point for profound ecological, political and social change. That history explains why President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s announcement on 27 May that the BR-319 highway “will be built” echoed so powerfully across Brazil. He <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/26/lula-diz-que-reconstrucao-da-br-319-tera-maior-cuidado-ambiental-e-deve-visitar-trecho-da-rodovia-no-amazonas.ghtml">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>It may be the most environmentally conscious road built in any country in the world. It will be a model road for quality and environmental preservation.</em></blockquote><p>For many, it represented a long-awaited promise fulfilled, but for others, it marked the moment when one of the world’s most celebrated environmental commitments collided with one of its most controversial infrastructure projects.</p><p><strong>The promises and the reality</strong></p><p>Lula returned to office in January 2023 under extraordinary expectations. After years during which environmental protections had been weakened and deforestation reached alarming levels under Jair Bolsonaro’s administration, Lula pledged to restore Brazil’s environmental credibility.</p><p>During his inaugural speech at the National Congress on 1 January 2023, he promised zero deforestation in the Amazon, respect for Indigenous peoples, renewed climate leadership and an economic model capable of generating prosperity without destroying the rainforest. He <a href="https://medium.com/Indigenous%20peoples%20need%20to%20have%20their%20lands%20demarcated%20and%20free%20from%20the%20threats%20of%20illegal%20and%20predatory%20economic%20activities.%20They%20need%20to%20have%20their%20culture%20preserved,%20their%20dignity%20respected,%20and%20their%20sustainability%20guaranteed.%20%20They%20are%20not%20obstacles%20to%20development%20%E2%80%93%20they%20are%20guardians%20of%20our%20rivers%20and%20forests,%20and%20a%20fundamental%20part%20of%20our%20greatness%20as%20a%20nation.">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>Our goal is to achieve zero deforestation in the Amazon and zero greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity grid, in addition to encouraging the reuse of degraded pastures. Brazil does not need to deforest to maintain and expand its strategic agricultural frontier.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Indigenous peoples need to have their lands demarcated and free from the threats of illegal and predatory economic activities. They need to have their culture preserved, their dignity respected, and their sustainability guaranteed. They are not obstacles to development — ​​they are guardians of our rivers and forests, and a fundamental part of our greatness as a nation.</em></blockquote><p>Internationally, the message was warmly received. Brazil appeared ready to reclaim its position as a global environmental leader. Scientists, Indigenous organisations and environmental groups cautiously welcomed what appeared to be a decisive break from recent years.</p><p>Three years later, the landscape looks far more complicated. While the federal government celebrates declining rates of illegal deforestation in some regions and has strengthened environmental enforcement across key areas, it’s simultaneously advancing the reconstruction of the BR-319 highway.</p><p>Lula insists the highway can become a global model of environmentally responsible infrastructure, protected by sophisticated monitoring systems, satellite surveillance and modern <a href="https://amazoniareal.com.br/desastre-ambiental-na-amazonia-e-violacao-de-direitos-indigenas-facilitados-por-projetos-de-governanca-na-br-319/">governance</a>. But for many researchers who have spent decades studying Amazonian development, the central question remains painfully simple: can a road through one of the planet’s last great intact rainforests ever remain just a road?</p><p><strong>The road into the unknown</strong></p><p>Supporters of the BR-319 often describe the project in practical terms. Stretching approximately 885 kilometres between the capital of Amazonas, Manaus, and Porto Velho, it represents the only potential land connection linking Amazonas to the rest of Brazil. Residents speak of isolation, expensive food, unreliable transport and the difficulties of depending almost entirely on rivers whose navigability is becoming increasingly unpredictable as droughts intensify. Local businesses argue that logistics costs are among the highest in the country, discouraging investment and slowing economic growth. For many families living in Amazonas, the debate is about access to hospitals, schools, employment and basic services. Their frustrations are genuine and deserve recognition.</p><p>But the geography of the <a href="https://theecologist.org/2024/dec/18/were-road-nowhere">BR-319</a> transforms what might otherwise have been a conventional transport project into one of global environmental significance. Unlike highways built through already fragmented landscapes, the central section crosses one of the most well-preserved portions of the Amazon rainforest remaining anywhere on Earth. Its area of influence includes 42 conservation units, 69 Indigenous territories, 18,000 Indigenous peoples and some of the largest continuous blocks of tropical forest still functioning as a single ecological system. These forests regulate rainfall across South America, store immense quantities of carbon and shelter extraordinary biodiversity, much of which remains scientifically undocumented.</p><p>The concern expressed by scientists is therefore not limited to the strip of land occupied by the highway itself. Roads in the Amazon have repeatedly <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373976874_Amazon_deforestation_simulated_impact_of_Brazil&#39;s_proposed_BR-319_highway_project">demonstrated</a> that their greatest <a href="https://theconversation.com/indigenous-defenders-stand-between-illegal-roads-and-survival-of-the-amazon-rainforest-brazils-election-could-be-a-turning-point-190550">impacts</a> occur far beyond the asphalt. They create access and access changes economic calculations. Land that was previously too remote to exploit suddenly becomes profitable. Illegal logging, mining, cattle ranching, oil and gas expansion and speculative land occupation rarely arrive years later. They often emerge almost immediately, advancing through networks of unofficial roads branching away from the main highway. Once these processes begin, they acquire a level of momentum that governments have historically struggled to contain. The experience of highways <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/6429009_Brazil&#39;s_Cuiaba-_Santarem_BR-163_Highway_The_Environmental_Cost_of_Paving_a_Soybean_Corridor_Through_the_Amazon">BR-163</a> and the <a href="https://thedarkatlas.com/posts/trans-amazonian-highway-br-230">Trans-Amazonian Highway</a> demonstrates how promises of sustainable development were followed by accelerated forest loss and land-use change.</p><p>This is precisely why so many environmental researchers <a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/apr/07/paved-good-intentions">reject</a> the idea that the BR-319 can be analysed simply as an engineering project. They see it instead as a catalyst capable of reshaping vast areas of the central Amazon, opening ecological frontiers that have remained comparatively intact for generations.</p><p><strong>The science that refuses to disappear</strong></p><p>Every generation of Amazonian infrastructure has been accompanied by promises that modern planning would avoid the mistakes of the past. The language changes, the technology improves and governments become increasingly confident that better <a href="https://amazoniareal.com.br/desastre-ambiental-na-amazonia-e-violacao-de-direitos-indigenas-facilitados-por-projetos-de-governanca-na-br-319/">governance</a> can reconcile economic development with environmental protection. But the scientific evidence accumulated over decades paints a remarkably consistent picture. Roads rarely remain isolated transport corridors. They become vectors of occupation, facilitating processes that extend far beyond the original construction footprint.</p><p>Philip Fearnside, a senior researcher at Brazil’s National Institute of Amazonian Research (INPA), <a href="https://theecologist.org/2024/dec/18/were-road-nowhere">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>Repaving the BR-319 highway would link the relatively undisturbed central Amazon to the AMACRO region — a </em><a href="https://ovaradouro.com.br/fronteiras-da-devastacao/"><em>deforestation hotspot</em></a><em> named after the states of Amazonas, Acre, and Rondônia. Although AMACRO is promoted as a sustainable development zone (ZDS), it has become a major driver of deforestation in the Amazon rainforest.</em></blockquote><p>Environmental <a href="https://www.gov.br/dnit/pt-br/assuntos/portais-tematicos/br-319-am-ro/audiencias-publicas/rima/br-319-rima.pdf">studies</a> prepared for the BR-319 itself acknowledge many of these risks. They identify the likelihood of accelerated deforestation, illegal settlements, biodiversity loss, land speculation, increased forest fires and growing pressure on Indigenous territories. Critics of the project argue that the problem isn’t a lack of scientific information but rather a failure to fully incorporate that knowledge into political decision-making. Many of the studies supporting the project were prepared years ago, before the rapid changes that have since transformed large parts of the surrounding region. Since then, deforestation has intensified, land grabbing has expanded and new economic interests have emerged, fundamentally altering the context in which those original assessments were written.</p><p>Perhaps the most revealing statistic is that deforestation around the BR-319 corridor <a href="https://climainfo.org.br/2023/02/28/asfaltamento-puxa-alta-de-mais-de-110-no-desmatamento-no-entorno-da-br-319/">increased</a> by approximately <a href="https://oeco.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/PR-Plano-do-governo-Lula-para-BR-319-1.pdf">122 per cent</a> between 2020 and 2022, even though paving had not resumed. The expectation that reconstruction would eventually move forward was enough to change behaviour on the ground. Land speculators, illegal occupiers and organised criminal networks rarely wait for governments to complete infrastructure. They position themselves in advance, anticipating economic opportunities that roads almost inevitably create. In that sense, political announcements become environmental events in their own right.</p><p>On 9 April, Senator for Amazonas, Eduardo Braga, <a href="https://x.com/EduardoBraga_AM/status/2042293050647486792">said</a> in one of his Instagram posts:</p><blockquote><em>I support the use of drones to bolster surveillance along the borders and combat deforestation on the BR-319. Technology in service of the Amazon and our sovereignty.</em></blockquote><p>Supporters frequently respond that today’s Brazil possesses technologies unavailable decades ago. Satellite monitoring, drones, artificial intelligence and integrated enforcement systems, they argue, will prevent the destructive dynamics observed elsewhere in the Amazon. But technology alone cannot replace institutions. A satellite can detect illegal deforestation, but it cannot remove land grabbers, prosecute organised crime, restore Indigenous territories or reverse the political pressures that often accompany frontier expansion. The challenge has never been about detecting environmental crime but about preventing it.</p><p>It’s also important to consider the challenges and potential problems of any type of monitoring. How would possible failures in the construction and maintenance of the highway be addressed regarding safety, technological or operational? Is there a risk that the monitoring would be irregular, inefficient, or even manipulated? How to guarantee transparency, continuity of operations and accountability in case of omissions or abuses? Who will bear the costs of monitoring and maintaining the highway? These questions go to the heart of whether the BR-19 can be governed at all.</p><p><strong>The contradiction at the heart of Brazil’s climate ambitions</strong></p><p>For President Lula, the BR-319 has become more than simply a highway. It has evolved into one of the defining contradictions of his third administration. Internationally, Brazil has worked hard to rebuild its environmental reputation, presenting itself once again as a country committed to climate leadership, rainforest protection and Indigenous rights. Those efforts have restored diplomatic credibility and reopened conversations that had stalled in previous years. But every declaration about protecting the Amazon now faces the same uncomfortable question: how can one of the world’s most ambitious environmental narratives coexist with a project that so many scientists describe as one of the greatest current threats to the integrity of the Amazon?</p><p>The answer offered by the government is that this time <a href="https://amazoniareal.com.br/desastre-ambiental-na-amazonia-e-violacao-de-direitos-indigenas-facilitados-por-projetos-de-governanca-na-br-319/">governance</a> will prevail over history. Many scientists, however, offer a different response: history has an extraordinary habit of repeating itself because the forces unleashed by roads extend well beyond the intentions of those who build them. Once access exists, economic pressure multiplies, new industries emerge, land values increase and political influence shifts. Forests that once seemed permanently protected begin to experience the cumulative effects of hundreds of seemingly separate decisions, each rational in isolation, yet collectively capable of transforming entire landscapes.</p><p><strong>The next pandemic may begin here</strong></p><p>If the warnings surrounding the BR-319 stopped at deforestation, the debate would already be among the most consequential in modern Brazilian history. But scientists increasingly argue that focusing solely on the loss of trees obscures another danger unfolding beneath the forest canopy. Roads don’t simply fragment ecosystems; they dismantle natural barriers that have separated humans from wildlife for millennia. In doing so, they create <a href="https://theecologist.org/2024/feb/23/pathogen-pathway-next-pandemic">conditions</a> under in which entirely new public health crises can <a href="https://theecologist.org/2024/feb/23/pathogen-pathway-next-pandemic">emerge</a>.</p><p>That warning was delivered with unusual force in May by Professor Emeritus Renato Cordeiro of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), one of Brazil’s most respected public health institutions. Writing in <a href="https://theconversation.com/na-pista-da-br-319-a-fratura-na-floresta-e-o-prenuncio-de-novas-crises-sanitarias-281954">The Conversation Brasil</a>, Cordeiro argued that paving the 405-kilometre central section of the BR-319 could increase the likelihood of future zoonotic diseases emerging from the Amazon. His concern centred on viral spillover, the process through which pathogens circulating among wild animals cross into human populations. Scientific understanding of this phenomenon has advanced rapidly since the Covid-19 pandemic, leaving little doubt that deforestation, habitat fragmentation and expanding human occupation significantly increase opportunities for such transmission. Cordeiro <a href="https://theconversation.com/na-pista-da-br-319-a-fratura-na-floresta-e-o-prenuncio-de-novas-crises-sanitarias-281954">wrote</a>:</p><blockquote><em>We cannot ignore this legacy of pain. After all, progress that silences science, ignores biology, and disregards humanism does not integrate territories; it only paves the way for the next predictable catastrophe</em></blockquote><p>The Amazon is home to an extraordinary diversity of viruses, fungi and bacteria, many of which remain completely unknown to science. While much international attention has focused on pathogens potentially released by melting Arctic permafrost, Cordeiro argues that tropical forests represent a far more immediate frontier of biological uncertainty. Every new road extending into intact rainforest increases contact between people, domestic animals and wildlife reservoirs carrying microorganisms that have evolved in relative isolation for thousands of years.</p><p>The consequences go beyond the emergence of entirely new diseases. Deforestation alters water systems, changes humidity, creates stagnant pools and disrupts ecological balances that naturally regulate insects carrying malaria, dengue, leishmaniasis and Oropouche fever. Public health, ecology and infrastructure are inseparable. Yet discussions surrounding the BR-319 continue to treat them largely as independent subjects.</p><p>For Indigenous peoples, the risks are amplified further. The highway’s area of influence includes 69 Indigenous territories and 18,000 Indigenous peoples whose immunological histories differ profoundly from those of Brazil’s urban population. Throughout Amazonian history, roads have repeatedly become corridors not only for economic expansion, but also for epidemics that devastated Indigenous societies long before environmental destruction itself became visible.</p><p>Joel Henrique Ellwanger, biologist and researcher at the department of genetics at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), <a href="https://theecologist.org/2024/feb/23/pathogen-pathway-next-pandemic">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>The preservation of the Amazon isn’t just about protecting nature — it’s about safeguarding our own health. Let’s commit to conserving this vital ecosystem to ensure that the threats of potential pathogens stay confined to the wild, far from endangering human lives. After all, the health of the Amazon means the health of us all.</em></blockquote><p><strong>The legal battle</strong></p><p>While scientists warn about ecological thresholds, another struggle is unfolding far from the rainforest itself. Courtrooms across Brazil have become the latest battleground over the BR-319, where <a href="https://apublica.org/2026/07/desembargador-flavio-jardim-como-um-juiz-do-trf-1-tem-decidido-o-futuro-da-amazonia/">judges</a>, prosecutors and environmental lawyers are increasingly being asked to determine whether political urgency has overtaken environmental law.</p><p>For nearly two decades, successive governments have announced plans to reconstruct the highway, only for legal challenges to repeatedly interrupt the process. Each administration has inherited the same dilemma: how to reconcile one of Brazil’s most ambitious infrastructure projects with legislation specifically designed to prevent irreversible environmental damage in the Amazon.</p><p>The dispute intensified after Jair Bolsonaro’s administration <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264837721002829">granted</a> a Preliminary Licence in 2022. Environmental organisations immediately questioned both the scientific basis of the licence and the governance mechanisms proposed to manage the project’s indirect impacts. Their argument was never confined to the asphalt itself. Roads, they argued, cannot be assessed only by their physical footprint. Their real impacts emerge through secondary roads, illegal occupation, speculative land markets and expanding extractive industries that extend hundreds of kilometres beyond the official corridor.</p><p>In 2024, NGO Climate Observatory (Observatório do Clima) filed a Public Civil Action seeking to annul the licence, arguing that the environmental assessment failed to adequately address these cumulative <a href="https://www.ihu.unisinos.br/categorias/665550-10-perguntas-para-entender-porque-a-pavimentacao-da-br-319-sem-licenciamento-e-mau-negocio">risks</a>. Central to the challenge was the absence of an effective environmental governance framework capable of controlling the explosion of deforestation that researchers believe would almost certainly accompany reconstruction.</p><p>Importantly, the organisation has repeatedly <a href="https://www.ihu.unisinos.br/categorias/665550-10-perguntas-para-entender-porque-a-pavimentacao-da-br-319-sem-licenciamento-e-mau-negocio">clarified</a> that it’s not opposed to the BR-319 itself. Its position is that paving should proceed only after environmental licensing is completed, <a href="https://www.thecanary.co/long-read/2024/09/10/br-319-brazil-amazon-gbmf/">governance mechanisms</a> are <a href="https://amazoniareal.com.br/desastre-ambiental-na-amazonia-e-violacao-de-direitos-indigenas-facilitados-por-projetos-de-governanca-na-br-319/">strengthened</a>, land-use planning is implemented, and effective measures exist to contain illegal deforestation and land grabbing. In other words, the dispute isn’t about whether Amazonas deserves better infrastructure. It’s about whether Brazil possesses the institutional capacity to manage the consequences of opening one of the Amazon’s last great intact forest frontiers.</p><p>In a press release published by the Climate Observatory on 28 April, their public policy coordinator, Suely Araújo, <a href="https://oc.eco.br/justica-suspende-editais-do-dnit-para-pavimentacao-da-br-319/">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>We are not against the road, we are against the deforestation it will cause if it is not carried out in accordance with the law. The government needs to find a balance between the construction and the protection of the forest, through a proper licensing process, which is not happening at the moment.</em></blockquote><p><strong>The licensing controversy</strong></p><p>The legal confrontation escalated dramatically in April when the National Department of Transport Infrastructure (DNIT) <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/04/30/licitacoes-da-br-319-serao-retomadas-apos-decisao-da-justica-federal-e-editais-serao-relancados-diz-dnit.ghtml">launched</a> four tenders covering approximately 339 kilometres of the highway’s middle section. Environmental organisations immediately returned to court, arguing that the government was attempting to advance construction by exploiting provisions contained within Brazil’s new general environmental licensing law (<a href="https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/lei/l15190.htm">15.190/2025</a>), the so-called “<a href="https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/2025/lei-15190-8-agosto-2025-797833-publicacaooriginal-176089-pl.html">Devastation Bill</a>”.</p><p>At the centre of the <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/05/dnit-reabre-prazo-para-editais-de-licitacao-de-obras-na-br-319-apos-justica-derrubar-suspensoes.ghtml">dispute</a> lies a legal distinction carrying enormous practical consequences. Federal authorities classify reconstruction of the central section as an improvement or maintenance project. Under the new legislation, certain maintenance works may proceed through simplified licensing procedures or, in some circumstances, without licensing requirements that previously applied.</p><p>Critics reject that interpretation entirely. Approximately 405 kilometres remain unpaved, cutting through one of the most environmentally sensitive landscapes in South America. Describing the transformation of this section as routine maintenance, they argue, stretches legal definitions beyond recognition.</p><p>The resulting legal battle unfolded with extraordinary speed. A federal judge initially suspended the bidding process following legal action by the Climate Observatory. Hours later, the Federal Regional Court overturned the injunction. DNIT subsequently <a href="https://oc.eco.br/justica-suspende-editais-do-dnit-para-pavimentacao-da-br-319/">suspended</a> parts of the bidding itself before later resuming it, creating a sequence of reversals that left even experienced legal observers struggling to determine the project’s actual status.</p><p>Behind these procedural <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/meio-ambiente/noticia/2026/05/26/br-319-empresa-investigada-por-corrupcao-ganha-aval-do-governo-lula-para-pavimentar-via-que-corta-o-coracao-da-amazonia.ghtml">disputes</a> lies a much larger constitutional question. Can environmental licensing laws be interpreted in ways that effectively bypass the very safeguards they were designed to provide? The answer may shape not only the future of the BR-319, but also the legal framework governing infrastructure throughout the Brazilian Amazon.</p><p><strong>Indigenous rights and Convention 169</strong></p><p>Running through every legal challenge is another question that reaches far beyond environmental licensing. It concerns the rights of Indigenous peoples whose territories surround the BR-319 and whose futures may be permanently altered by decisions taken hundreds of kilometres away in Brasilia.</p><p>Brazil <a href="https://portal.antt.gov.br/conven%C3%A7cao-n-169-da-oit-povos-indigenas-e-tribais">ratified</a> Convention 169 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) more than two decades ago. The treaty establishes a simple but fundamental principle: Indigenous peoples have the right to free, prior and informed consultation before projects capable of affecting their territories, cultures or livelihoods receive authorisation.</p><p>The Climate Observatory argues that these <a href="https://observatoriobr319.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Inicial-ACP-BR-319-consulta-previa.pdf">obligations</a> haven’t been fulfilled. According to its legal action, meaningful consultation failed to occur before key administrative decisions were made. Federal prosecutors have raised remarkably similar concerns regarding a mining project in Autazes, where <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/21/mpf-aponta-irregularidades-e-reforca-pedido-contra-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas.ghtml">consultations</a> with the Mura people allegedly took place only after crucial licences had already been issued.</p><p>For many Indigenous leaders, this pattern has become painfully <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/27/lula-defende-br-319-zona-franca-e-potassio-no-amazonas-video.ghtml">familiar</a>. Consultation increasingly risks becoming an administrative formality undertaken after political decisions have effectively already been made. But consultation was never intended as a bureaucratic exercise. It exists because roads, mines, fossil fuel and industrial projects can permanently destroy territories whose cultural, spiritual and ecological significance cannot be measured simply in <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">economic indicators</a>.</p><p>As pressure surrounding the BR-319 continues to intensify, the debate is becoming less about engineering than about governance itself. Whether Brazil chooses to honour its legal commitments to Indigenous peoples may ultimately become as important as any decision concerning the highway’s construction.</p><p><strong>Extraction</strong></p><p>By the time the debate reaches the BR-319 itself, the wider picture often disappears. The road is discussed as though it exists in isolation, as if it were simply an engineering project whose impacts begin and end with the movement of people and goods between Manaus and Porto Velho. Yet viewed alongside the growing number of industrial projects emerging across central Amazonas, a different picture begins to take shape. The highway increasingly resembles the backbone of a much larger transformation, one that reaches far beyond transport.</p><p>Across the region, mining companies, fossil fuel operators, logistics firms and agribusiness interests are positioning themselves for a new phase of <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/apr/18/reckoning-amazon">expansion</a>. Individually, each project has its own justification. Together, they reveal an unmistakable pattern. Infrastructure isn’t merely responding to economic development, it’s helping to make that development possible. Roads reduce costs, attract investment and fundamentally alter the commercial viability of territories that previously remained economically inaccessible.</p><p>Whether this represents long-overdue regional development or the beginning of a new extractive frontier depends largely on perspective. But it’s impossible to ignore how many of the largest industrial projects now planned for the central Amazon become significantly easier to develop once reliable year-round road access exists.</p><p><strong>Mining and the Mura people</strong></p><p>Few projects illustrate these competing visions more clearly than the proposed <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/21/mpf-aponta-irregularidades-e-reforca-pedido-contra-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas.ghtml">potash mine</a> in Autazes. Promoted by the Canadian company <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/27/lula-defende-br-319-zona-franca-e-potassio-no-amazonas-video.ghtml">Potássio do Brasil</a> as a strategic <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/21/br-319-e-potassio-autazes-entram-em-discussao-entre-governo-do-am-e-embaixadores-da-uniao-europeia.ghtml">response</a> to Brazil’s dependence on imported fertiliser; the mine has received enthusiastic political support. President Lula has repeatedly <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/27/lula-defende-br-319-zona-franca-e-potassio-no-amazonas-video.ghtml">argued</a> that Brazil should reduce its dependence on imported potassium and develop domestic production, provided environmental safeguards are respected. During his Manaus visit last May, he <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/27/lula-defende-br-319-zona-franca-e-potassio-no-amazonas-video.ghtml">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>Brazil needs the potassium that we have, and we need to know how to exploit it without causing damage to the environment.</em></blockquote><p>Federal prosecutors, however, <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/mpf-reforca-pedido-de-anulacao-de-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas-por-violacao-de-direitos">paint</a> a very different picture. Their legal filings argue that the licensing process contains serious irregularities, including territorial violations, inadequate consultation with Indigenous communities and threats to the rights of the Mura people, whose traditional territory lies only a short distance from the project. According to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, meetings with affected Indigenous communities occurred only after licences had already been granted, undermining the principle of free, prior and informed consent guaranteed under ILO Convention 169.</p><blockquote><em>There were reports of fraud, co-opting by the company, threats, and even the offering of bribes (money) to some leaders of the Mura people to violate their own protocol, </em><a href="https://infoamazonia.org/2024/05/17/mina-de-potassio-comeca-a-ser-construida-em-territorio-mura-e-mpf-entra-com-acao-judicial/"><em>stated</em></a><em> the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in 2024.</em></blockquote><p>Court documents also <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/alegacoes-finais_caso-postassio.pdf">describe</a> allegations of pressure being exerted within villages to secure community agreement. Prosecutors <a href="https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/pr-am/noticias/mpf-reforca-pedido-de-anulacao-de-licenciamento-do-projeto-potassio-autazes-no-amazonas-por-violacao-de-direitos">argue</a> that the project should have been licensed at the federal level through the environmental agency, Ibama, rather than by Amazonas state authorities because of its direct impacts on Indigenous lands.</p><p>A report by Folha de S.Paulo, later published by <a href="https://infoamazonia.org/2023/11/29/mineradora-canadense-e-acusada-de-subornar-indigenas-para-desistirem-da-demarcacao-do-territorio-e-explorar-potassio-na-area/">InfoAmazonia</a> , revealed that Potássio do Brasil had offered an area of ​​5,000 hectares to the Mura people in exchange for their consent to the mining project. Adriano Espeschit, former president of Potássio do Brasil, <a href="https://infoamazonia.org/2023/11/29/mineradora-canadense-e-acusada-de-subornar-indigenas-para-desistirem-da-demarcacao-do-territorio-e-explorar-potassio-na-area/">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>From the moment the mining stops, that land can become indigenous land; your right is acquired, there’s no problem at all, it’s just a postponement. It will continue to be possible after the company finishes.</em></blockquote><p>Although the mining project and the BR-319 are legally distinct, they are geographically and economically interconnected. Reliable road access would transform logistics for transporting equipment, workers and future production. The highway therefore becomes much more than transport infrastructure; it becomes the enabling infrastructure upon which broader industrial expansion depends.</p><p><strong>Petrobras returns to the Amazon</strong></p><p>The mining industry isn’t alone in reassessing the economic geography of the region. Almost simultaneously with renewed political momentum behind the BR-319, Petrobras <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/petrobras-targets-500-million-gas-production-boost-for-brazil-s-amazon/2-1-1995538">announced</a> a major return to one of Brazil’s most significant onshore gas projects.</p><p>The state-owned company plans to invest approximately $495 million in revitalising production at the Urucu gas hub in the <a href="https://www.epe.gov.br/sites-pt/publicacoes-dados-abertos/publicacoes/PublishingImages/Paginas/Forms/Publicaes/EAAS%20Solim%C3%B5es%20-%20vers%C3%A3o%20completa.pdf">Solimões Basin</a>. The programme includes new drilling, expanded production capacity and around 40 kilometres of new pipelines. Only a few years earlier, Petrobras had planned to <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/finance/petrobras-in-huge-natural-gas-divestment-in-the-heart-of-brazils-amazon/2-1-834637">leave</a> several of these assets altogether as part of a broader divestment strategy. Those plans have now been abandoned.</p><p>Petrobras argues that the investment will strengthen national energy security and supports electricity generation across Amazonas. But for many climate scientists, the timing is striking. As Brazil presents itself internationally as leader in climate diplomacy, significant new investment is simultaneously flowing into fossil fuel production deep within one of the planet’s most important climate-regulating ecosystems.</p><p>The coincidence is difficult to ignore. One project improves regional access, and another dramatically expands industrial activity. Neither exists entirely independently of the other.</p><p><strong>The Solimões Basin</strong></p><p>Government energy planning <a href="https://www.epe.gov.br/pt/publicacoes-dados-abertos/publicacoes/estudo-ambiental-de-area-sedimentar-do-solimoes">documents</a> have long identified the <a href="https://www.epe.gov.br/sites-pt/publicacoes-dados-abertos/publicacoes/PublishingImages/Paginas/Forms/Publicaes/EAAS%20Solim%C3%B5es%20-%20vers%C3%A3o%20completa.pdf">Solimões Basin</a>, a pristine area larger than the state of California, as one of Brazil’s most promising hydrocarbon provinces. The resources themselves are not new. What changes over time is the infrastructure required to make their <a href="https://www.gov.br/anp/pt-br/rodadas-anp/oferta-permanente/opc/arquivos/da/bacias-terrestres/pareceres-ipaam-2019-oficio-0717.pdf">exploitation</a> commercially attractive.</p><p>For years, researchers have highlighted the potential benefits that improved regional infrastructure could provide for oil and gas companies operating in the western Amazon. Among the most prominent examples has been the Russian state-owned energy giant Rosneft.</p><p>In 2015, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340845454_Oil_and_gas_project_threatens_Brazil&#39;s_last_great_block_of_Amazon_forest_commentary">Rosneft</a> acquired exploration rights in several oil and gas blocks within the Solimões Basin, west of the BR-319 and near the Purus River. The company’s presence generated concern among scientists and Indigenous organisations which feared that expanded transportation infrastructure could facilitate future exploration activities.</p><p>Once the BR-319 is paved, several planned highways would also automatically go ahead, including the AM-366, which would run from the BR-319 to the municipality of Tapauá, crossing the Purus River and connecting areas associated with fossil fuel exploration in the Solimões Sedimentary Basin. Fearnside <a href="https://yourvoiz.org/2023/11/08/br-319-highway-amazons-trojan-horse/">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>AM-366, classified as a state road, offers a relatively simpler licensing process. Plans in the area around this road include the </em><a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2020/03/oil-and-gas-project-threatens-brazils-last-great-block-of-amazon-forest-commentary/"><em>oil and gas </em></a><em>drilling blocks granted to the </em><a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2022/05/putins-financial-interest-in-brazils-amazon-highways-commentary/"><em>Russian oil company Rosneft </em></a><em>in the planned “Solimões Sedimentary Area” project. AM-366 would also give access to a large area of “undesignated public land”, which is the most attractive for land grabbers, squatters, loggers and others. This situation could result in extensive deforestation, posing a catastrophic threat not only to Brazil but also to the global environment.</em></blockquote><p>Whether Rosneft ultimately benefits from the BR-319 isn’t the central issue. The broader concern is that transport infrastructure creates opportunities that didn’t previously exist. Infrastructure that initially appears to serve local populations can rapidly become an essential component of much larger industrial systems.</p><p>Researchers have long argued that the BR-319 should therefore be understood not simply by its own footprint but through the cumulative impacts of projects likely to follow. Many scientists insist that the highway cannot be evaluated independently from mining, fossil fuel and agribusiness expansion, or from the future state highways planned throughout the region.</p><p><strong>Europe’s uncomfortable contradiction</strong></p><p>The international dimension of the BR-319 debate became increasingly visible in May when ambassadors representing 17 European Union member states <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/21/br-319-e-potassio-autazes-entram-em-discussao-entre-governo-do-am-e-embaixadores-da-uniao-europeia.ghtml">travelled</a> to Manaus to discuss strategic investment opportunities with the Amazonas government. As reported by <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/21/br-319-e-potassio-autazes-entram-em-discussao-entre-governo-do-am-e-embaixadores-da-uniao-europeia.ghtml">G1</a>, among the projects presented were the BR-319, the Potássio do Brasil mine project in Autazes and Eneva’s Azulão gas field in Silves. The European Union Ambassador to Brazil, Marian Schuegraf, <a href="https://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2026/05/21/br-319-e-potassio-autazes-entram-em-discussao-entre-governo-do-am-e-embaixadores-da-uniao-europeia.ghtml">said</a>:</p><blockquote><em>The European Union wants to engage in the full spectrum of investments and cooperation. This could be in the </em><a href="https://theecologist.org/2025/aug/17/brazils-bioeconomy-hope-or-hype"><em>bioeconomy</em></a><em> with traditional products, but it could also be cooperation to establish digital connectivity in remote areas of the Amazon.</em></blockquote><p>Publicly, European governments consistently portray themselves as champions of rainforest conservation, Indigenous rights and global climate action. However, these meetings revealed a more complicated reality, one which infrastructure, mining, natural gas and <a href="https://theecologist.org/2026/may/05/new-economy-amazon">bioeconomy</a> initiatives were discussed together as components of future investment.</p><p>No contradiction was openly acknowledged, but the optics were difficult to ignore. Projects criticised by scientists for potentially accelerating industrial expansion into one of the world’s most sensitive ecosystems were simultaneously presented to international partners seeking deeper economic cooperation with the state of Amazonas.</p><p>This episode illustrates how the future of the BR-319 is no longer solely a Brazilian question. Decisions taken in Brazil’s capital, Brasilia, increasingly intersect with international investments, diplomatic priorities and global demand for minerals, energy and agricultural commodities.</p><p><strong>Corruption, contracts and public money</strong></p><p>As construction moves closer, another debate has begun unfolding almost unnoticed. It concerns not the environmental consequences of the BR-319, but the integrity of the public institutions responsible for delivering it.</p><p>As <a href="https://oconvergente.com.br/2026/06/05/br-319-volta-ao-centro-de-polemica-apos-ia-apontar-possivel-sobrepreco-milionario/">reported</a> by several news outlets, Brazil’s Comptroller General of the Union (CGU), using its artificial intelligence auditing platform ALICE, identified indications of possible overpricing in contracts associated with the highway. Previous procurement processes linked to the BR-319 has also attracted judicial scrutiny, including rulings requiring the repayment of public funds following overbilling in earlier contracts.</p><p>More recently, attention has focused on construction companies selected through the new <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/meio-ambiente/noticia/2026/05/26/br-319-empresa-investigada-por-corrupcao-ganha-aval-do-governo-lula-para-pavimentar-via-que-corta-o-coracao-da-amazonia.ghtml">bidding process</a>. One successful bidder, Etam Ltda., had previously featured in a major federal police investigation into alleged corruption and bid-rigging. Another company, <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/noticia/2026/03/02/campea-do-asfalto-empresa-deu-salto-em-obras-no-governo-lula-enquanto-pf-apura-suspeitas-de-irregularidades.ghtml">LCM</a> Construção e Comércio, became known nationally after rapidly emerging as one of the largest recipients of federal highway contracts during Lula’s current administration. LCM has been described as the “<a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/noticia/2026/03/02/campea-do-asfalto-empresa-deu-salto-em-obras-no-governo-lula-enquanto-pf-apura-suspeitas-de-irregularidades.ghtml">champion of asphalt</a>” after signing 128 contracts with DNIT across 22 states. The total value of these contracts amounted to approximately $1.6 billion, exceeding the value of comparable contracts under the Bolsonaro administration and raising questions about concentration, political access and procurement oversight.</p><p>Neither circumstance proves wrongdoing regarding the BR-319 itself. Both companies deny any irregularities, while DNIT insists that its procurement processes have complied fully with Brazilian law. Nevertheless, the controversies raise unavoidable questions about transparency and oversight in one of the country’s most politically sensitive infrastructure projects.</p><p>If governance mechanisms already face significant challenges before reconstruction begins, critics ask how they will cope once hundreds of kilometres of highway, secondary roads and expanding industrial activity require continuous environmental monitoring.</p><p><strong>The road history may remember</strong></p><p>Supporters continue to describe the BR-319 as a highway connecting Manaus to the rest of Brazil. Its critics increasingly see something different: a decision capable of reshaping the future of the central Amazon for generations.</p><p>History rarely remembers infrastructure because it was well engineered. It remembers the landscapes that followed, the forests that disappeared, the rivers that changed course, the communities that were displaced and opportunities that were either seized or wasted. Whether the BR-319 ultimately becomes a symbol of sustainable development or one of the defining environmental contradictions of the 21st century will depend not on speeches or political slogans, but on what happens after the asphalt ends.</p><p>President Lula once <a href="https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/932450-leia-o-discurso-do-presidente-lula-na-integra/">declared</a> that Brazil does not need to destroy its forests to prosper. Few projects will test that promise more profoundly than the BR-319. If the warnings of scientists, Indigenous leaders and prosecutors prove correct, the highway may eventually be remembered not as the road that connected the Amazon to the rest of the country, but the road that opened one of the last great intact rainforests on Earth to forces that no government was ultimately able to control.</p><p>As it happens, the consequences will not affect only Brazil, they will extend far beyond its borders, shaping global climate stability, biodiversity and public health in ways that may take generations to fully understand.</p><p>History has not yet written the final chapter, but the decisions being taken today will determine who gets to write it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7a3884528c28" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>