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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Monica Westin on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Monica Westin on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Monica Westin on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@monicawestin?source=rss-40287659f8b7------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sincerity, camp, and how big tech got so cute]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@monicawestin/sincerity-camp-and-how-big-tech-got-so-cute-144c4ea896dd?source=rss-40287659f8b7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[airbnb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Monica Westin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Mar 2016 15:12:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-19T17:18:06.805Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This column originally appeared in <a href="http://sfaq.us/2016/03/sincerity-camp-and-how-big-tech-got-so-cute/">SFAQ</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Xgu4dRDB7eFMA5QL8I61jQ.png" /></figure><p><em>illustration by Laura Szumowski</em></p><p>This October, communication between the world of VC-backed technology companies and the rest of the Bay Area reached a new low. A number of Airbnb ads posted on billboards and at bus stops around the city proposed different uses for the $12 million dollars in hotel taxes the company trumpeted that it had paid in the last year. Most of the suggestions were flippant and aggressively cute — “if you do spend all $12 million in one place, we suggest burritos” — but one of the bus stop ads in particular, addressed to the public library, largely drove the backlash that caused the company to issue an apology a few days later for its utter tone-deafness. The ads were quickly taken down.</p><p>The bus ad in question was formatted as a letter on a monochrome background of Airbnb’s signature coral pink. “Dear Public Library System,” the ad began, “We hope you use some of the $12 million in hotel taxes to keep the library open later.” There was even a valediction at the bottom: “Love, Airbnb.” San Francisco State professor Martha Kenney’s October 21st Facebook post of the ad went viral, as did her analysis that Airbnb’s taxes could, in fact, keep the libraries open only a few minutes later each day. Later that day, the company’s apology came.</p><p>To be clear: these ads bragging about Airbnb paying its taxes were so ill-conceived that many people (myself included) at first thought they were a joke. Since then, this marketing misfire has been read as a typically clueless and/or condescending and/or abrasive move by an insular and out-of-touch culture. But what this misfire brings to light is something deeper that this one particular failure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8nsiMiZ9SzVxxSS-XbXAMw.jpeg" /></figure><p>At heart, the Airbnb ads highlight the affective and aesthetic characteristics of contemporary tech culture: camp, cuteness, a particular flavor of sincerity, and an underlying messianism. This culture marks everything from the branding of the new multinational conglomerate that owns Google as “Alphabet” to the recent holiday commercial of Apple employees and Microsoft employees hugging each other. Because this aesthetic is usually deployed more successfully, it’s also more invisible in daily rhetoric than the failed letter-to-the-library ad.</p><p>Start with “Love, Airbnb.” The marketplace platform Airbnb can no more love the public library system than it can eat a burrito. This move can only be described as camp — as per Susan Sontag’s definition, an intentional and self-referential theatricality. To paraphrase Sontag, camp is a way of seeing everything in quotation marks, where it lives in the space between pure artifice and some kind of meaning. What makes camp interesting is the tension between its alleged innocence and its winking at itself, its utter failure at being serious.</p><p>Camp skates on the surface. Camp dethrones the serious and at its most successful creates conditions where taking things seriously is an embarrassment to those who would try to be serious. To be fair, a lot of advertisement relies on camp in order to operate. What is unique about this particular instance of camp is its attempt at sweetness, caring, cuteness — to create an effect of sincerity that is too playful to be held responsible.</p><p>The failed effect of sincerity of the Airbnb ads is deeply reminiscent of the “new sincerity” movement of the last 30 years in which a group of largely poets and musicians have taken an intentionally anti-cynical stance in their writing as an act of revolution against the irony of late capitalism. Critics of new sincerity point to its childishness; the poetry is often insistently, even aggressively simplistic. The new sincerity arguably reached its peak as a movement in the early 2000s. For historical context, think of David Foster Wallace’s exonerations about morality in his Kenyon College commencement address as a contemporaneous backdrop for the adoption of Google’s slogan “Don’t be evil” in the early 2000s. “Don’t be evil” is childishly sweet and points to a kind of sincere ethics, but it fails as a meaningful, serious standard for corporate behavior.</p><p>So what is sincerity without seriousness? Almost by definition, it’s cuteness itself. Cute, as Sianne Ngai expresses it, is a response to the diminutive, the weak, and the subordinate.1 Cute relaxes us. But it’s also a political aesthetic. For Ngai, an affect of cuteness is formed by a relationship that is predicated on an encounter where one subject has more power than another. The object that’s cute is usually in the position of less power: helpless, pitiful, in need of our care and protection. For a tech company to present itself as cute is to ask us to see it as less powerful than it actually is.</p><p>Cuteness also does something violent to language. The small, simple, soft, pliant thing (a logo that’s a coral-pink heart, a pastel blue bird, an apple with a bite out of it) slackens the language available to talk about it, a process which Ngai articulates as “weakening or even dissolving syntax . . . alter[ing] the speech of the subject attempting to manage that difference.”2 Imposing cuteness on an object weakens it. Imposing cuteness on oneself pushes off critique as powerfully as camp, and the two effects combined can seemingly shut down criticism completely. For an example of how insidious this practice is, consider the inverse case of Uber. Part of the reason Uber is largely painted as “evil” (again, that hollow term) is because the company refuses to play the cuteness or the camp game. They cop to their implacable drive to be dominant in the market, and so they bear an arguably disproportionate amount of flak. (This is not to say that Uber is an ethical company in its abuse of the so-called sharing economy; the point is that the general <em>feeling </em>we have about Uber in part shows how well its peers, many of whom also mistreat their low-level employees, have managed to stave off a lot of these emotions through their detached-cuteness work.)</p><p>When exactly did tech get so cute and anti-critical? My hypothesis here is that the mid-2000s was a turning point, when “new sincerity” was strongest in the air during the recovery from the first dot-com boost. Of course there are many more concrete, practical factors for this aesthetic as well. As just one example, the outward-facing rhetoric of many of these companies is based on design thinking, characterized by user-first simplicity and empathy. But there is a strong relationship between cuteness, anti-criticality, and anti-elitism by the most elite companies in the world that demands careful scrutiny.</p><p>Camp, cuteness and sincerity come together at the root in tech rhetoric with a messianistic impulse. Much has been written about how we tend to see tech heroes like Jobs and Gates as messiahs; tech’s visionaries are worshiped for their prophetic, future-oriented thinking, which taps deep into our need for contemporary shamans who can tell us what will become of us. But the industry itself runs on the logic of messianism, and the cute affect aids and abets this drive. For Jason Morris, messianism promises the coming of something: “Something that will do good, something that will heal, something that will reverse wrongs.”3 This promise takes the structure of a venture capital pitch, and is made to us by every app that vows to simplify, to streamline, and to instantly gratify. Or take my friend Trevor Strunk’s recent explanation over email: “The defining characteristic then is that messianism promises the total resolution of contradictions in a far future that is perpetually put off in an effort to keep the messianic movement relevant and pressing.”</p><p>This is the deepest rhetoric of tech: we are just around the corner from simpler and better. That the most ruthless companies in tech are able to further their messianistic agenda while appealing to the weak, minor, even childish aesthetics of cuteness and camp is one of the most bizarre and uncanny aspects of contemporary culture; but given the power of these minor aesthetics to insulate from criticism makes the hearts and cartoon birds and twee Google Doodles some of the most hard-working symbols in the new culture wars. Airbnb’s only mistake was trying to anchor this abstraction in the economic logic and concrete language that the rest of us operate in.</p><p>1) Sianne Ngai, <em>Our Aesthetic Categories. </em>Harvard University Press.<br>2) Ngai, <em>Our Aesthetic Categories</em>, p. 88.<br>3) Jason Morris, <em>The Time Between Time: Messianism &amp; the Promise of a “New Sincerity” </em>, Jacket 35 (2008).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=144c4ea896dd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[5 Hypotheses about the Future of the Humanities]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@monicawestin/5-hypotheses-about-the-future-of-the-humanities-9efdb2fc77db?source=rss-40287659f8b7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humanity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Monica Westin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2015 02:09:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-01T06:41:02.530Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Some stray thoughts predicting where the Humanities will go.</p><p>1.<br><strong>Disciplines will become clustered around subject areas rather than methods for creating knowledge.</strong></p><p>Fun fact: in November 2013, the president of the long-standing American Philological Association announced that the APA would be permanently changing its name to the “Society for Classical Studies.” This decision reflects the fact that while the APA was founded in 1869 by scholars studying many ancient and modern languages — ancient Greek, middle English, contemporary German — other academic disciplines gradually splintered off, forming new bodies like the Modern Language Association (1883), the biggest association for English departments, and the Linguistic Society of America (1924). The Society for Classical Studies is composed of experts in Greek, Latin, and the material history of the ancient Mediterranean; their research is explicitly interdisciplinary in approach.</p><p>This change, while seemingly minor, points out a growing trend in the Humanities: instead of departments being organized by their strategies and methods for creating knowledge, they will cluster around loose subject areas with more popular appeal.</p><p>2.<br><strong>Humanities disciplines will orient toward solving problems instead of uncovering them</strong></p><p>When I started graduate school, I was told by a professor that while acts of interpretation — which English departments train students rigorously to do through different theoretical lenses — happens everywhere,</p><blockquote>“academia is the only place where people are paid<br>to create problems through interpretation.”</blockquote><p>Because of the changing commitments of universities and both internal and external market pressures (which have been written and debated about at such length that I won’t repeat here), this model of the Humanities department as a protected place (insulating scholars from the demands of time) to uncover and tease out nonobvious problems is simply not sustainable. Instead, the Humanities will have to prove their value to the university through their ability to point to solutions.</p><p>3.<br><strong>The Humanities will lose even more clout within universities.</strong></p><p>For years now, the Humanities have been shifting away from being “talent” in the corporate university model. This trend will continue, and disciplines will go from not just being thought of as low-level teaching bodies, but to actually being the “support” for other disciplines. For example, some disciplines will become resource-builders for more highly valued disciplines. (See below.)</p><p>4.<br><strong>Disciplines will be less critically-oriented.</strong></p><p>While the following is a fine-art discipline example rather than a Humanities one, the recent “USC 7” story offers an illustration of what I mean by critical vs. non-critical orientation.</p><blockquote>Last spring, all 7 MFA students dropped out of USC’s Masters in Fine Arts program in visual art.</blockquote><p>The new dean of the program was clearly leaching support out of this critically-oriented program in order to devote resources to a new art, technology, and business program co-founded by Dr. Dre and an entrepreneur.</p><p>Yes, this is an example of the private sector taking over particular disciplines that are seen as partly profitable — but that’s not the interesting part, which is what drops out when you leave the traditional MFA training behind. While both these programs focus on creativity and aesthetics, only one values the outlook that trains students to question and challenge their own education — not to mention the teaching apparatus itself.</p><p>We’re going to see a lot more of this displacement of traditional Humanities departments focused on critical thinking with new programs that cherry-pick certain concepts and repackage them in a watered-down entrepreneurial message.</p><p>5.<br><strong>The Humanities will be seen as a historical movement with a historical ending: both as a field of knowledge and as a profession.</strong></p><p>When the Humanities are no longer offered protection from market pressures, they will not survive in any recognizable form. The modes of knowledge produced by the Humanities will be preserved, but without a professional home for future Humanities work.</p><blockquote>They will become historical archives.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9efdb2fc77db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Tale of Two Gift Economies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@monicawestin/a-tale-of-two-gift-economies-8ee08e461fb5?source=rss-40287659f8b7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gift-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Monica Westin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2015 02:10:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-20T02:10:38.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/563/0*nyZRTVZ_ZwIkSSR-.png" /></figure><p>Why doesn’t tech patronize the arts? The question has echoed throughout a wide range of discussions I’ve heard since long before moving here, from who’s buying what at art fairs to discussions of projects bringing the arts into the peninsula — and, of course, tech’s role in driving art out of the city via increasing real estate prices. (The first show I reviewed in San Francisco was at Rena Bransten Gallery. Soon after filing it, I received a query from my editor as to why the show’s end date was suddenly much earlier than anticipated as the gallery had to abruptly leave their location at 77 Geary due to their eviction after 27 years.)</p><p>Contrary to, say, finance executives, the richest tech workers don’t <em>seem </em>to be buying up high-end contemporary art or donating proportionally to art institutions and foundations. (However, it should be mentioned that there are ways of lending support to communities outside of philanthropy.) Whether or not the question is entirely accurate or fair, the fact that it’s a running theme makes it worth pursuing. Issues of class, culture, and deep values are at play. At heart, I’ll argue, are questions of how we understand creative work, giving, and community building.</p><blockquote>In some ways, tech workers <em>already </em>see themselves as giving back to creative communities in their day-to-day work.</blockquote><p>Just as entities like Google’s DevArt program (which is currently being aggressively pushed to engineers) try to convince tech workers that they’re artists, these workers already see themselves as contributing to what might accurately be called “gift economies” through open-source models. In the seemingly endless art vs. tech debate, one of many ways to mediate the problem might involve bringing their respective models of gift economies together. And one way of thinking about how these different gift economies operate and see themselves could begin with the story of the two Hyde brothers.</p><p>In 1983, thirty-seven-year-old poet (and sometimes electrician, carpenter, and alcohol counselor) Lewis Hyde published <em>The Gift</em>.<em> </em>Its then-subtitle, “Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property,”<em> </em>captures the major distinction between “rational” market wealth and “erotic” gift wealth that underlies the book’s central claim. Anthropologists like Marcel Mauss had long been studying societies founded on relationships of reciprocity and gift exchange rather than markets. Hyde freely admitted that much of his book draws from Mauss’s 1950 essay, also called <em>The Gift</em>.</p><blockquote>Hyde’s radical move was to argue that the model of the gift economy applies to the work that artists do, <em>even in almost purely capitalistic societies.</em></blockquote><p>While the myth of the starving artist is ancient, <em>The Gift </em>explicitly argues that the artist’s labor has a particular social role, one that establishes a “feeling-bond” between people, that continues to “<em>give </em>increase” (his emphasis, as opposed to add value) to society as a whole over time. This relationship can preserve what he calls “true community” in a mass society.</p><p>At its best and most generous, <em>The Gift </em>defends the value of artistic labor that doesn’t translate into monetary commodity; at worst, it can be interpreted (and used) as a set of excuses for not paying artists. And at its heart is the assumption that there is some kind of inherent conflict or tension between gift exchange and the market that can only occasionally be truly overcome. For Hyde’s art-as-gift model to be sustainable, he himself admits that it ultimately needs influxes of patronage from the outside — or non-gift-based — world. (In the new afterword to the book, Hyde cites foundations like Creative Time, which Hyde says he was involved in founding, as one solution.)</p><blockquote>The rest is history. <em>The Gift </em>touched a nerve.</blockquote><p>Hyde predicted and inspired the late-century shift in artistic aspersion and the Gen-X mourning of the “sell-out.” As for his paean to gift culture, Lewis Hyde got a job teaching creative writing at Harvard and then Kenyon, a MacArthur Fellowship, and other accolades from the most selective corners of the culture industry.</p><p>Meanwhile, as Lewis Hyde rocketed into the MFA world, his brother Ben Hyde worked as a professor of computer science at Carnegie Mellon hacking away at a little-known web server called Apache, which was licensed in a way that became a foundation for a new mode of creative participation. The HTTP Apache Server and subsequent Apache Foundation (a code-donation foundation that now operates in part as a check on Microsoft’s potential chokeholds), while now somewhat passé and thus squirm-inducing, offers another model of gift economies. Like the ideas presented by <em>The Gift</em>, this open-sourced model of creation structures the ethos of many software engineers as one endless collaboration in a community of makers. Whether or not we believe that collaborative creativity is the most salient or prominent aspect of what tech workers do, it’s impossible to understand their ideological commitments without understanding this aspect of tech culture.</p><blockquote>The story of the Hyde brothers offers up two archetypes of gift economies.</blockquote><p>One stresses the individual gift of the artist, which may or may not be valued by the market (and so, by extension, requires patrons of various forms — or grant funding offered by organizations like Creative Time — to survive). The other offers a collaborative model of making in which gift giving and capitalistic production are so fluid and interwoven as to be at times indistinguishable.</p><p>Most people outside tech have a sense that software developers are working in creative communities, but it can be surprising to hear how strong this rhetoric is and how profoundly it affects both the ideologies and daily working conditions of tech workers. A modern software developer spends most of his day socializing with other developers. Like most people, he checks his email and reads the latest chatter on mailing lists. Still more, when he’s trying to solve a tricky problem, he’ll search Stack Overflow — a website which lets you ask programming questions and grants you reputation points when you provide good answers — or he’ll search for further examples online. Failing that, he might go straight to the code on sites like GitHub, a web-based service which houses your code and provides you with tools for sharing, commenting, requesting, and mixing. The vast majority of these interactions are reading, but sometimes writing helpful notes and answers to questions, or just sending “me too” or flagging issues to help nudge a topic along to get more attention.</p><p>A developer on a team will start work by fetching the latest code changes from his teammates. He’ll read about what has changed, tweak some code, add a message about what he did, and then issue a “pull request” to GitHub. This is a formal request of the other developers to accept his changes and merge them into the shared project. This workflow (grab code, talk about it, change it, submit it for acceptance, repeat) is the basic rhythm of how modern software gets built. Many developers spend as much time reviewing the work of others for acceptance as they do actually writing code. But these all occur in decidedly <em>social, </em>collaborative, donation-based contexts.</p><p>What does this socializing “code chatter,” from the world of Ben Hyde, have to do with the gift-giving theories of his brother Lewis?</p><blockquote>The communities of social coding are laced with the rhetoric of gifts.</blockquote><p>You give when you answer a question. You give by convincing your boss to share an internal tool with the public. You give by contributing fixes and enhancements to an existing open-source project. And this “giving” provides both the rhetorical framework for social engagements (please, thank you, you’re welcome), as well as the operative social norms. People expect good stewardship of open-source projects. Companies acquire reputations for how they maintain their projects, for interacting with the community, for past public efforts (or failings) to integrate with other tools and communities. People are proud to participate in some, but not other, projects. When a company selects a license for their project, it reveals their stance toward the community. (Deep in the bowels of software philosophy, there’s a careful distinction made between the flavors of “free software/speech” vs. “free beer.” One is a person’s right, the other is a person’s value. Much digital ink has been spilt hashing out the ought’s and how’s of this stuff — it continues today.)</p><p>Beyond the explicit “giving,” software communities (like most trade communities) trigger a meaning-making shift in the competing narratives of interaction. Conventionally, a market interaction is a sale of a product. The typical developer interaction is the solving of a problem. A conventional salesperson’s inner dialogue might go something like, “an opportunity: crush it, bliss, swagger,” which acts as feedback into the next one. A software developer’s inner dialogue might look more like “grumble, grumble, breakthrough! bliss, share, swagger,” feedback into the next one. This shift from selling to solving builds communities in the eyes of big tech. And, at the risk of repetition, this process is seen as a form of giving to something bigger.</p><blockquote>But where Lewis urged pure gift giving, software’s gifting communities are definitively hybrid — a roiling admixture of business markets and socializing gifts.</blockquote><p>Company executives have their own reasons for sharing their code: it offloads their maintenance costs, it demonstrates commitment to the product, it animates their employees, and it attracts stronger recruits. But software developers have their own mixed motives beyond gift giving. An open-source project makes a resume shine. It’s an instance of software you can talk about with future employers (versus some obscure internal company tool). It shows the actual code you wrote — the quality of code in popular open-source tools far exceeds that in most private codebases. And it shows how you work with other people. But it’s also a political tell.</p><p>Contributing to open-source software is perceived as a kind of “giving back to the community.” Companies can harness this perception rhetorically and financially; increasingly, an aspect of compensation to software engineers is the feeling that they’re contributing to an open-source economy. You can pay engineers less if they feel they’re part of something bigger. Of course, they’ll still get paid a lot more than most artists who went to graduate school and live off of their work. And software engineers are almost never asked to work for free (or “for exposure,” or any of the other euphemisms that those of us in the arts live with daily.) But — crucially — to come to common ground, if we want that, it’s important to see that how tech participates in community as part of the job. It also dictates the way the scene frames giving, collaborating, and making.</p><blockquote>Tech has a mostly closed-gift system.</blockquote><p>It gives back to itself constantly both in terms of giving and, of course, in financial investments, with the understanding that what’s being given eventually returns to the giver. They circle where the gift is circulating, to keep it from dissipating. As it’s structured now, the art world simply can’t work this way without patrons: Those who will pay for artistic production, either directly or indirectly, through foundations and grants. Those who will maintain and support cultural and educational institutions, where many artists have day jobs.</p><p>So to summarize:</p><ol><li>software developers are self-understood as a fairly enclosed creative community that is thriving on a hybrid model of market motives and gift giving.</li><li>Wealthy software developers may feel disinclined to contribute to the conventional arts because they see their everyday work as scratching this creative itch, as well as participating in cultural gifting.</li></ol><p>So what? Does knowing this get us anywhere? The point here isn’t necessarily that artists and software engineers should come together to make a bunch of open-source art together (there are lots and lots of individual projects and collaborations for different kinds of making); it’s that a start to mending the ever-widening cultural rift might be to help all of us understand the different kinds of gift economies in which we operate, and to see how they might come together.</p><p>For example: Can tech be persuaded that it needs to look outside itself to support a truly rich ecology of creative work? Can we invent practices and institutions that can explore and highlight the kinds of massive collaboration undertaken every day in the arts — and get tech involved or see itself as working in similar ways? Can these practices be folded together structurally and not just on individual levels? Should they be? I’m not sure what the right next questions to ask are, but I know other people know. And they should be talking to each other.</p><blockquote>Finally, the gift economy as a whole might just be an outdated model from which to start thinking about this problem in the new economy.</blockquote><p>The Hyde brothers perhaps represent a bygone period in ‘80s and ‘90s America, before the hierarchies and leveling of the playing field that came when the Internet changed the topography of what creative work means and how it comes into the world. It might be useful to think of ways to define the new kinds of economic, philanthropic texturing that have emerged in the form of the new venture capitalists, the new crowdsourcing models. The fact that so much vocabulary is being produced to describe the economics of the tech industry suggests as much.</p><p>Ultimately, no work should operate primarily in a gift economy. Everyone should be paid for their work and nobody should be told that they should donate their talent and labor for free. And it is only people who are being paid well that can join gift economies in the first place. But if we begin to understand each other’s ideologies on giving, it’s perhaps a start.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://sfaq.us/2014/06/a-tale-of-two-gift-economies/"><em>sfaq.us</em></a><em> on June 6, 2014.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ee08e461fb5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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