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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Moresh Kokane on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Moresh Kokane on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@moresh?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Moresh Kokane on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@moresh?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Customers, users and loyalty in the web3 world]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/opendao/customers-users-and-loyalty-in-the-web3-world-495d2f710006?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/495d2f710006</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jun 2021 01:54:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-16T01:54:58.719Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In web2 platforms operate as closed silos. There is no composability and the platform owns your data. This means that a platform with significant size enjoys a massive advantage due to the datasets it owns. It has richer information that it can employ to outcompete other platforms, using it as a significant moat.</p><p>In the web3 world, users own their own data. Tokens are composable, there are either no walls to the garden or the walls are fairly easy to surmount if they exist. Users can take their business wherever they can extract the most amount of value without any sort of loyalty to the platform. The open source nature of the code also means that it is easy to replicate a service once it has done the hard yards to battle test its code and proven the product market fit. As Uniswap learned to its chagrin, users were happy to migrate to Sushiswap to make a few dollars more.</p><p>So how does a platform secure its long term future? The answer to this question is especially important to the long term success of the OPEN project.</p><p>Before we answer this question, lets first try to understand who the users of the platform are and who the customers are. The answer to this question will likely evolve as the platform itself evolves, but it is worth assessing the answer based on current circumstances.</p><p>At its very core the platform is a market place with various different players.</p><p>You have various partner projects whose tokens are used as collateral to mint USDO. It is in their best interest that holders of their tokens dont sell them and borrow a stable coin such as USDO so that they can use the cash as needed rather than selling it.</p><p>Then you have the token holders themselves, who can stake their tokens, and borrow USDO.</p><p>And finally you have those who own USDO, note that they can be a subset of the above (those who minted) as well as those who bought USDO from the market directly without necessarily minting it first.</p><p>Who among the above 3 are our customers?</p><p>The answer is those who mint USDO.</p><p>When they mint they are effectively paying a fee to do so as well as an ongoing interest while they continue to hold USDO.</p><blockquote>The Customer is the one who pays, so the borrowers/minters of USDO are the customer.</blockquote><p>However it should be noted that the borrowers will borrow only if there is some utility to USDO.</p><p>The USDO holders are the users and if they are deriving value from the usage of USDO then that is what will drive incentives for USDO borrowers as well.</p><p>An analogy with web2 would be the users of FB and the advertisers. The advertisers are the customers, but without users FB will not be able to attract them. They need an ecosystem of active and engaged users which they can monetize using their customers.</p><p>USDO needs to be usable in various applications such as swaps to other stables, trading, speculation, lending/borrowing etc. We are working on all these fronts and over time we will be able to chip away progressively creating the necessary utility.</p><p>However the success of a platform in the long run is a direct function of its “stickiness”.</p><blockquote>You need to have “accruing benefits” by staying in the platform and “mounting losses” if you leave the platform.</blockquote><p><a href="https://www.slideshare.net/greylockpartners/the-hierarchy-of-engagement/29-Accruing_BenefitsThe_more_you_use">Accruing Benefits The more you The Hierarchy of Engagement</a></p><p>When you are in a web3 world with open source code, this stickiness is hard to achieve as discussed earlier.</p><p>However stickiness can be achieved by giving utility to USDO in ways that are hard to replicate.</p><p>These are</p><ol><li>Onchain applications where USDO is used directly. This is defensible especially if it is your own application or your token needs to cross a certain threshold of credibility before it is adopted by others.</li><li>Offchain applications: If USDO is accepted as a mode of payment by offchain users that is extremely hard to displace over time. This is because the credibility barrier is even higher to replicate for a copy cat.</li><li>Building applications using USDO. This is more of an onchain use case, where USDO becomes the basis on top of which other projects build their applications. This can be incentivized by grants and direct funding.</li></ol><p>Our ultimate aim has to be to make USDO useful. Focus on delivering the best user experience, which will in turn make it useful for our customers and in turn solve for everything else as well.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=495d2f710006" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/opendao/customers-users-and-loyalty-in-the-web3-world-495d2f710006">Customers, users and loyalty in the web3 world</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/opendao">OpenDAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grant: A slippage free trading solution for the OPEN DAO stable coin suite]]></title>
            <link>https://moresh.medium.com/grant-a-slippage-free-trading-solution-for-the-open-dao-stable-coin-suite-c2d812264c9c?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2d812264c9c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 May 2021 11:32:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-09T11:32:55.036Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>USDO and other synthetic currencies can now be minted using a fork of Compound at omnicomp.ocp.finance</p><p>The design here is quite simple yet effective. USDO is minted via admin (And soon enough via DAO votes), but it enters circulation only when it is borrowed against at omnicomp.</p><p>This effectively separates USDO minting from the so called minter at omnicomp and allows us to have potentially many minters.</p><p>For instance once the boys at OCP have vetted our tech design in BSC we will bridge USDO to ETH and replicate the same tech design there to launch ETH version of USDO and other currencies.</p><p>This means that you can mint USDO on both ETH and BSC and potentially other networks as well in a native manner and also be able to port your minted tokens to other networks without the need for different token contracts.</p><p>Separating the mint from the minters also drastically cuts down the chances of any hacks. The chances of a rug pull still exist but that is where we want to hand over the mint to the DAO as soon as possible.</p><p>USDO peg is established via interest rate adjustments and redemptions against the collateral via the liquidations module.</p><p>But beyond that we need to create utility for all these currencies.</p><p>To that effect we have established partnerships with property developers, accountants and more in the real world who are willing to accept our synths in lieu of payment for their products and services.</p><p>In addition we also need to revv up onchain demand.</p><p>Speculation and trading is probably the most popular use case. We need a trading platform like Synthetix or Mirror etc where these synths can be traded. An AMM based solution that uses Uniswap or other forks like pancake wont work because these are price maker solutions. Not price takers.</p><p>We need an exchange that works off Oracles which means it is a price taker solution.</p><p>In due course limit orders can be introduced. But a price taker solution also will help establish the peg for our currencies.</p><p>For this we are dusting off our old cashbox v0 code, launched way back in Sep 2020 (sounds positively ancient now).</p><p>It is a simple exchange solution for 2 tokens.</p><p>Consider 2 tokens A and B</p><p>Their rate is 1:1</p><p>Tom has 100 A and Jerry has 100 B. They dont know each other, but Tom wants 100 B and Jerry wants 100 A.</p><p>Tom puts 100 A in a smart contract and gets issued 100 claim tokens.</p><p>Jerry puts 100 B in the contract and retrieves the 100 A sitting in there.</p><p>Tom can now deposit his 100 Claim tokens and get the 100 B deposited by Jerry.</p><p>Very simple!</p><p>This contract can be used by many different people as long as they want to swap A and B tokens.</p><p>Which means if Tom has 50 A, Harry has 50 A and Jerry has 100 B it can still work in the same manner as before.</p><p>While upgraded versions of this contract exist, the lowest version allows claim tokens for only one side.</p><p>This means that if Jerry has 100 B tokens and wants A tokens but no one has deposited them yet, he just has to wait till such deposits arrive. There is no mechanism for claim tokens on both sides in v0 and v1 contracts. V2 solves for this issue but we are intentionally choosing v0 because we want to keep the UX simpler.</p><p>The contract also supports price updates.</p><p>The design is a bit like a fund, so let’s use a slightly different terminology.</p><p>Instead of token A we will say cash.</p><p>Token B will be shares.</p><p>Rate will be price (expressed as cash per share or simply dollars)</p><p>Claim tokens can be called as units.</p><p>Let’s say the starting price is 1 or 1 cash per share.</p><p>Tom puts 100 cash in the fund, he gets 100 units.</p><p>This 100 cash is now claimed by someone who puts in 100 shares.</p><p>The contract now has 100 shares and the 100 units have a claim to 1 share each.</p><p>Now there is a price update and the price of each share is 2. Or 2 cash per share.</p><p>The market value of the contract is 100 shares or 100*2 = 200 cash eq.</p><p>If now Jerry comes and puts 100 cash in the contract, the contract will have a market value of 100 shares (200 cash) + 100 = 300 cash.</p><p>Jerry will get 50 units for his 100 cash. There will now be 150 units in circulation.</p><p>If either Tom and Jerry decide to redeem their units, say 50 of them, then they will first get 50 shares for them.</p><p>The next 50 units will also get 50 shares (there were 100 shares in the contract).</p><p>The next 50 units will however redeem 100 cash.</p><p>If Harry tries to sell shares to the contract, the contract first checks if there is enough cash sitting there.</p><p>For instance if the price of each share is 2 cash, and Harry tries to sell 50 shares, then he will get the 100 cash which is sitting there.</p><p>However if Harry tries to sell 100 shares the order cannot be filled and the message should be please lower your sell order to 50 shares (Cash in the contract/price).</p><p>From an implementation perspective for establishing a trading pair between EURO and USDO, two contracts of the above nature will be setup.</p><p>One allows you to sell Euro for USDo and the other allows you to sell USDO for EURO.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9AL0bb33NLY0s6eW" /></figure><p>The reason why 2 contracts are needed is because it keeps the user interface simpler.</p><p>We do not want to hassle the end user with having to deal with unit tokens etc.</p><p>They simply rock up to the trading platform, place an order and if liquidity exists the order gets filled and if not then it does not.</p><p>On the other side we will setup 2 bots which act as counterparty and deal with all the unit or claim tokens etc.</p><p>You can deposit funds in these bots and get a token representing your position.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4b2HKkpKvKIrp0tY" /></figure><p>Those who want to provide liquidity can do so by depositing USDO or EURO in either bot.</p><p>They would get bot1 and bot2 tokens respectively.</p><p>The bots would deploy to the individual swap contracts and serve as the counterparty to those who seek to swap.</p><p>Note that this entire solution is a price taker, not a price maker and is designed specifically so as to serve as a mechanism to help the peg for the currency synths we have developed.</p><p>If someone wanted to sell USDO and buy EURO, they would be served up a UI that will redirect their transaction to either of the swap contracts based on what they wanted to do.</p><p>If EURO to USDO was trading 1:1.25 then selling EURO on Box 1 would get you 1.24 USDO and buying EURO would cost you 1.26 USD. The spread goes to the counterparty bots.</p><p>Note that anyone else is also free to be a counterparty alongside the bots we setup.</p><p>Separately there would also be a scaled BNB fee which would vary based on the size of the order. If someone tried to drain the entire liquidity by frontrunning the oracles they would be slapped with a significant amount of fee that would effectively negate the benefits of doing so.</p><p>This fee can be done in an exponential manner, so that the fee is small at amounts that are small portions of available liquidity but increase exponentially if the entire liquidity is attempted to be drained.</p><p>Those who provide liquidity would earn fees via the spread.</p><p>The bot would also trade between the boxes.</p><p>For instance if you deployed to a USDO bot, it would deploy to the USDO seller contract, but once it receives EURO, it would then go ahead and deploy all the EURO to the EURO seller contract. It would continue to do so by periodically monitoring its positions.</p><p>The bot itself would then own a bunch of CB1 and CB2 tokens based on where the funds are deployed at any specific time.</p><p>When someone wants to redeem their bot tokens, they would get their prorated CB1 and CB2 back. This can be then redeemed for USDO and EURO respectively. And the user can then go back to a specific currency using the swaps himself.</p><p>All of this can be automated as part of the UI UX.</p><p>It is necessary to have 2 bots because it becomes impossible to track who owns which Cashbox tokens otherwise.</p><p>50000 OPEN tokens would be allocated to any team that develops the above solution.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2d812264c9c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OPEN DAO ROADMAP (Update)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/opendao/open-dao-roadmap-update-41a7f1960f8c?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/41a7f1960f8c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 May 2021 09:42:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-05T09:42:58.455Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The OPEN project is focused on connecting real world assets to DEFI.</p><p>At a technical level, our key product offering (USDO) looks like Maker’s DAI. However we not only do USD, but also other currencies such as EUR, AUD, INR, MYR, JPY, SGD etc.</p><p>Separate to that, we will have a trading platform where all these currencies can be traded in a low slippage, highly capital efficient manner.</p><p>Our objective going forward is mainly to increase the adoption of these currencies.</p><p>We intend to do this by increasing the utility. The trading platform is just the start where these can be used. We also are working on ways in which these currencies can be used in the real world.</p><p>We already have Australian property developers committed to use AUDO, when it launches. This effectively means you can stake Cake, and buy real estate in Australia!</p><p>More applications that accept our currencies in the real world are in the works. We are going to follow the Tesla model of doing the expensive, big ticket items first before going mass scale. So expect to buy a super car using USDO before you can use it to buy milk in your grocery store.</p><p>The next focus is to build off ramps and pegs.</p><p>We are working with exchanges to facilitate the conversion of USDO, AUDO etc to fiat in a seamless manner. The conversion to other stables such as USDC USDT etc will also be incentivised.</p><p>This is all on the demand side of these currencies.</p><p>On the supply end, we will continuously add new collateral and collateral types for minting the currencies. The start is of course onchain assets, which we already have, the next step is progressively off chain.</p><p>On this front our approach remains as before, we focus on liquid off chain assets first such as stocks, commodities etc and then progressively to illiquid assets such as receivables and real estate.</p><p>On this end we have precedent from Maker which recently on boarded tokenised real estate as collateral as well as Binance which is now allowing tokenised stock trading.</p><p>This makes our path forward much easier due to the increased acceptance from the community.</p><p>A lot of the technology is ready already, so going forward our role will be fine tuning, optimising, getting the word out, building partnerships and building ancillary tech that is synergetic.</p><p>Where possible we will use existing solutions, brought together in novel ways, or give grants to other teams to speed up the development process. OPEN effectively becomes a protocol/ecosystem of uses cases and applications to connect real world applications with DEFI and the DAO role will be taking decisions on which applications to build by offering incentives.</p><p>More on this to follow in the coming months as we commence the handover of governance to the DAO.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=41a7f1960f8c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/opendao/open-dao-roadmap-update-41a7f1960f8c">OPEN DAO ROADMAP (Update)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/opendao">OpenDAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A hard peg for USDO]]></title>
            <link>https://moresh.medium.com/a-hard-peg-for-usdo-f5f6d9eee46a?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f5f6d9eee46a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Apr 2021 06:40:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-23T06:40:15.615Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://medium.com/opendao/how-usdo-works-b3bd6880941c">How USDO Works</a></p><p>This article is a continuation of the How USDO works article referenced above.</p><p>While the above article describes some of the mechanics of how the peg will be achieved for USDO, there is an inherently simple mechanism by which a hard peg will be established.</p><p>But first a primer on stable coins. While there are a variety of them we will for our purposes only review 2: sUSD (Synthetix) and DAI.</p><p>These are both synthetics, you lock in one asset and mint a new token that traces the price of something else (in this case the US Dollar).</p><p>The minted token is essentially a debt, and each minter is creating a Collateralized Debt Position.</p><p>The difference between DAI and sUSD is that the Debt position for DAI is distinct per minter while for sUSD it is a common debt pool.</p><p>There are several reasons why sUSD does a common debt pool. But one of the side effects it has is that it allows for a very hard peg (in theory superior to DAI).</p><p>If person A mints DAI by locking ETH and then onsells it to person B, then B cannot claim $1 worth of collateral. The CDP is owned by A and only A can unlock the collateral (while he remains overcollateralized).</p><p>On the other hand if A mints sUSD and sends it to B. B can redeem sUSD for $1 worth of SNX collateral.</p><p>This means that sUSD can be redeemed on demand, while DAI cannot, thus making sUSD a simpler and more effective solution.</p><p>DAI however historically has more volumes and often a better peg. There are operational reasons for this discrepancy which are beyond the scope of this article.</p><p>But at a very high level if your stable coin can always be redeemed for $1 worth of some other liquid asset, you have a very hard peg.</p><p>The USDO model is a bit similar to Maker with separate CDPs per user.</p><p>But there is still a way to achieve a hard peg.</p><p>On the minter module of OCP, USDO always is priced at $1. Regardless of what the market going rate may be.</p><p>At any given point in time, there is generally always a substantial amount of positions that are underwater.</p><p>This means you can acquire the collateral backing them by paying back the USDO. And you need not be the person who created the CDP.</p><p>So a simple bot that always buys USDO when it is below peg and liquidates underwater positions using it would be very profitable and always bring back the peg to where it should be.</p><p>This would lead to a hard peg.</p><p>It is plausible that there are no underwater positions and the peg is off. In that case the interest rates can be adjusted to bring it in sync.</p><p>But invariably there will always enough opportunities there to buy cheaper on market USDO and redeem it for $1 worth of collateral and thus pushing the peg to where it should be.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f5f6d9eee46a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The case against BNB]]></title>
            <link>https://moresh.medium.com/the-case-against-bnb-f52b34db09c7?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f52b34db09c7</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2021 04:19:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-08T23:48:32.074Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article should be seen as a continuation of my previous post in which I laid down the case for ETH.</p><p><a href="https://moresh.medium.com/why-you-should-buy-eth-even-if-you-do-not-completely-understand-crypto-9ed74904349b">Why you should buy ETH even if you do not completely understand crypto</a></p><p>While I covered the gas issues with ETH then, they were largely waved off. There was also an example laid down which compared cities and how building infrastructure and network effects takes time and how this would work in favor of ETH.</p><p>Chains are like super markets, you want to go to the one which has the most amount of shops, most choices. You do not want to go to one mall to buy one thing and another to do other stuff. Some people enjoy spending time doing shopping and in other cases the value proposition might be so high that it is justified going through the hassle. But those are the exceptions rather than the rule.</p><p>The chain with the biggest community, which in turn is a function of the most options in terms of dapps built on it wins.</p><blockquote><strong>What was not obvious before (although it is now in hindsight) is how easy it is to fork and build replica dapps on a different chain.</strong></blockquote><p>This is especially true if it is an EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) compatible chain.</p><p>Given that the code to all dapps is typically open source, creating a fork and deploying it is extremely easy.</p><blockquote><strong>Going from 0 to 1 is hard, but going from 1 to n is not as much</strong></blockquote><p>The question then becomes where will the users come from?</p><p>And the answer is a well resourced sponsor such as a centralized exchange like Binance or HECO can direct a large amount of traffic to your replica app on that chain.</p><p>Fees on Ethereum were always non trivial, but of late the fees have become absolutely crazy. A typical Uniswap transaction will set you back by about $20–30 and if you interact with money markets such as compound you would spend hundreds for setting up a vault and so on.</p><p>Some of this fee rise is linked to the increase in Eth prices, but most of it is the network reaching the limits of its throughput capacity and demand being more.</p><p>A comparable swap on Pancakeswap is 100x cheaper and 100x faster. This leads to greater transaction volumes, greater liquidity and more user adoption.</p><p>No wonder BSC has been gaining traction.</p><p>The key question we need to assess is will this continue in the long run and whether BSC will supplant Ethereum.</p><p>My position is No, it is quite unlikely.</p><p>Let me explain why.</p><p>Blockchain has a trilemma where speed, cost and decentralization come at the cost of each other.</p><p>You cannot be fast and decentralized, and cheap. Something has to give.</p><p>The bet BSC is making is that people dont care about decentralization as much as they care about speed, costs and being quasi permissionless.</p><p>USDT is the biggest stable coin in the world. There is hardly anyone in the DEFI space who does not know about the concerns the industry has about USDT.</p><p>Yet almost everyone uses USDT. It has the most number of offramps and a large number of OTC providers support it.</p><blockquote><strong>This is evidence enough that the perception of being permissionless trumps actual mathematically provable permissionless.</strong></blockquote><p>A similar phenomenon is going on with BSC.</p><p>Almost everyone understands that BSC is not decentralized. But the day to day interaction shows no direct evidence of manipulation by the validators.</p><p>And users have super fast speeds and extremely low costs relative to Eth.</p><p>On the flip side, Eth costs are on an increasing trajectory. And even still some of the composability in Ethereum is about to break down due to Uniswap v3 using NFTs and the L2 solutions being largely not interoperable.</p><p>So is BNB, the native token of BSC a sure bet?</p><p>One should understand that there is no real innovation in BSC.</p><p>This is not a moral judgement call, but a statement of fact. This matters because Ethereum has the potential to solve its problems.</p><p>There are a few different solutions that are being worked on that promise to relieve the gas costs problem</p><ol><li>ETH2 and move to Proof of Stake</li><li>Sharding</li><li>Layer 2 roll ups such as Optimistic, ZkSync, ZkStarks etc</li></ol><p>On the other hand BSC has no such publicly known plans. This is because gas costs are not a problem on BSC in the first place.</p><blockquote><strong>However the lack of decentralization will come to bite BSC, it is a question of When and not If.</strong></blockquote><p>When you have too much power, it is tempting not to use it. And more importantly even if CZ was a sage or an automaton who cannot be tempted, a small number of validators that are closely related to each other present a single (or small number) point of failure.</p><p>It is way too tempting for a state actor to decide one day enough is enough and use leverage on the validators and bring everything to a grinding halt.</p><p>Or the Russian mafia to kidnap a bunch of people and take control.</p><p>The possibilities of failure here are endless and only limited by your imagination.</p><p>We have seen this story before with EOS.</p><p>However users will keep on patronizing BSC till Eth gets its house in order or some other chain that solves for decentralization and speed together comes to fore.</p><p>BSC claims it is working on increasing the number of validators and increasing decentralization. But this is not in their own best interest and the reality is Ethereum is likely to solve for the speed and decentralization problem before BSC.</p><p>Innovation happens better when there are more heads working on a problem and they are operating in an unfettered manner.</p><blockquote>And as BSC gains more adoption, it will run into the same problems that Eth has. This is especially true if BNB goes higher in value. Its higher price translates to an increase in gas costs on BSC, which in turn destroys the value proposition BSC currently has.</blockquote><p>The only way for BSC to solve for this without innovating is by reducing the number of validators even further.</p><p>However not all is doom and gloom about BSC. They do not have just Eth refugees, they have also widened the pool by giving brand new users their first taste of pretend Defi.</p><p>These users will eventually realize why decentralization matters and make rational choices to protect their wealth long term.</p><p>The key question that remains is when will an inflection point come, when does the trend of users leaving Eth for BSC reverse or at a minimum some other chain that solves for decentralization emerge.</p><p>We will address that in a future piece.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f52b34db09c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Arbitrage opportunities on the Ocean O dollar and maintenance of the peg]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/opendao/arbitrage-opportunities-on-the-ocean-o-dollar-and-maintenance-of-the-peg-3cfca498a76e?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3cfca498a76e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Apr 2021 01:16:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-04T01:16:16.512Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Ocean O is a 12 month yield dollar launched by OPEN DAO and built on the UMA protocol.</p><p>It allows Ocean holders to lock their Ocean tokens and mint Ocean O synths which trace the price of USD.</p><p>From time to time the Ocean O will trade either above or below the peg.</p><p>However it always locks $1 worth of Ocean in collateral, which means its inherent value is $1.</p><p>Market forces should then account for this and bring the price of Ocean O back to $1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZHo_HQ72YkTIwtut" /></figure><p>This leads to some interesting arbitrage opportunities.</p><p>Suppose the O dollar trades at 80c. This was seen very early in the launch, where Ocean holders minted Ocean O and sold them off for USDC.</p><p>This skewed the demand and pushed the price of Ocean O down.</p><p>This gives an arbitrageur the opportunity to buy them at below inherent value and hold them to expiry when they have a contractual claim for $1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Pg0WEpw9Ro9uLX8t" /></figure><p>It is in effect a 20% guaranteed profit.</p><p>A caveat needs to be added that this is contingent upon Ocean tokens still being worth a non zero amount and the collateral buffers which are sitting at a healthy 3x atm.</p><p>On the flip side if Ocean O is trading above $1, then you can lock more Ocean and mint more Ocean O and sell them for USDC. At expiry you can buy them at a lower price and unlock your collateral to tidy a neat profit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Z5ldozWVKkGamsSv" /></figure><p>The reality is you will most likely not need to hold till maturity as the peg is likely to achieved faster.</p><p>Given the strong UMA rewards offered to LP, you can buy Ocean O on market (if it is below peg) and supply LP to earn strong rewards.</p><p>If it is above peg then the rewards in effect pay you to be a borrower!</p><p>Being a LP is a no brainer as well. Given Ocean O is designed as a stable coin, a LP would have no impermanent loss, enjoy UMA rewards and transaction fees. Soon they will also be eligible for BAL rewards. The return currently sits well above 3 digits APR.</p><p>If you know of a better return on stable coins with no impermanent loss please write to me.</p><p>These market forces and contractual design combined with UMA rewards would always push the Ocean O closer to $1 and progressively increase liquidity making for a smooth experience for Ocean token holders to borrow against them and go long on Ocean.</p><p>Ocean O is just the start of OPEN DAO stable coin suite and we will be launching many more in the coming days.</p><p>Stay tuned.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3cfca498a76e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/opendao/arbitrage-opportunities-on-the-ocean-o-dollar-and-maintenance-of-the-peg-3cfca498a76e">Arbitrage opportunities on the Ocean O dollar and maintenance of the peg</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/opendao">OpenDAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Optimistic Oracles for real world events]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/opendao/optimistic-oracles-for-real-world-events-ec13b1dbf85?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec13b1dbf85</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Mar 2021 06:10:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-30T06:10:27.398Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The key problem with bridging real world assets to DeFi is the bridge. To enunciate it boils down to 2 key problems:</p><ol><li>How do you determine an event has happened in the real world, and then trigger some conditions associated with a smart contract based on that?</li><li>How do you conduct enforcement in the real world in a seamless manner if a default occurs?</li></ol><p>Till date we have focused on the second aspect, which arguably is the more difficult bit.</p><p>However the first issue of how do you read real world events is also a difficult one.</p><p>Sure Oracles exist that can read stock prices etc. But often times the conditions associated with a real world project are more nuanced than that.</p><p>For instance when you are dealing with a real world property development project, the loan is often made in tranches. A Quantity Surveyor goes and inspects and determines if the conditions associated with the next tranche release are met or not.</p><p>In other scenarios the conditions tend to be a bit more fuzzier, especially if it is a niche asset. Oracles from standardized service providers may not even exist in such scenarios.</p><p>For instance an Oracle price feed may exist for real estate in San Fransisco. But the price of a specific house while close to the median, can deviate quite a bit. Houses are the classical example of a Non fungible asset. They conform to a class but one house is not the same as other. And prices within a specific class can deviate based on the quality of fixtures, layouts, streets, internal developments and so on.</p><p>Doing a specialised price feed for each of these would become an overkill.</p><p>A solution for non fungible real world assets can be created by using an “Optimistic” process.</p><p>A liquidator can liquidate a loan and claim the underlying collateral by claiming that either the underlying collateral has fallen in value or the repayments have piled to such an extent that the loan now needs to be liquidated.</p><p>The piling of repayments is an objective matter and can be easily validated in a mathematical manner and would typically be beyond contestation.</p><p>However the valuation of the asset can and is generally a subjective matter.</p><p>In such an event if the borrower disagrees with the liquidation, he can invoke a dispute with the Oracle service which would work very similar to UMA Data Verification Mechanism.</p><blockquote>UMA relies on the principle of Cost of Corruption &gt; Profit from Corruption.</blockquote><p>A community vote would then be invoked to determine if the liquidation was valid. The community being comprised of human actors would be able to handle fuzzy grey areas and come up with a subjective assessment about what the valuation should be.</p><p>Below I am largely paraphrasing Vitalik Buterin with some adaptations.</p><p>One common response to suggestions to use any form of human intervention is the idea that this solution goes back to “trusting people”, and so is a betrayal of the values of the blockchain and cryptocurrency industry. While I understand why one may think this at first glance, I would argue that this criticism stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of what crypto should be about.</p><h3>A well designed human intervention mechanism is not betrayal, but rather an expression, of “crypto values”</h3><p>The goal of crypto was never to remove the need for <em>all</em> trust. <strong>Rather, the goal of crypto is to give people access to cryptographic and economic building blocks that give people more <em>choice</em> in whom to trust, and furthermore allow people to build more <em>constrained</em> forms of trust</strong>: giving someone the power to do some things on your behalf without giving them the power to do everything.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec13b1dbf85" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/opendao/optimistic-oracles-for-real-world-events-ec13b1dbf85">Optimistic Oracles for real world events</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/opendao">OpenDAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OPEN options using UMA]]></title>
            <link>https://moresh.medium.com/open-options-using-uma-1b14627ac6c4?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b14627ac6c4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Mar 2021 03:26:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-26T03:44:00.360Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>UMA recently launched <a href="https://medium.com/uma-project/call-options-on-uma-the-2x4-lego-3b63e0d489f3">call options primitives</a></p><p>OPEN DAO plans to utilize them to launch CALL options for OPEN tokens. But instead of doing it via treasury we want to do it in a manner that incentivizes the community.</p><p>Consider you have a stack of OPEN tokens. You can lock them in UMA EMP contracts and mint a synthetic that works like a CALL option (redeemable only on expiry).</p><p>You can set a target price of $3 by June 30, 2021. If the target price is hit the option holders can redeem their options to claim the OPEN tokens.</p><p>If the price is not reached the option is worth nothing. But if it does reach the price then you would have bought the tokens at a low price (option price).</p><p>Why would current holders write the options? They write the option and provide LP against it, which means they make fees from the trading of the option which can be quite healthy.</p><p>The option writer does have a risk that he loses his collateral if the strike price is reached. But a holder would probably not lock all of his tokens in the option contract (unless he does not believe the price is likely to be reached at all). If the price is reached then the appreciation in the token price for the rest of his holdings would more than cover any losses.</p><p>In addition we will be proposing that these synths be whitelisted for UMA liquidity mining. If that is signed off on then the rewards from minting would be very attractive to option writers.</p><p>This process takes OPEN tokens out of circulation, putting an upward price pressure. It also adds up as TVL which in turn would be an bull signal for OPEN token price as well as UMA token price (given that it uses UMA contracts underneath).</p><p>Assuming this experiment works, this mechanism can be used for other assets such as tokenized gold, silver, and other commodities. Where people can write options and be incentivized for doing so.</p><p>The option model works quite well for tokens that do not necessarily have significant (or even any) liquidity as well. The options are covered and there is no need to run liquidation bots etc making them a very simple mechanism.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b14627ac6c4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grant: Multi Collateral Stable coin suite based on beta money market code]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/opendao/grant-multi-collateral-stable-coin-suite-based-on-beta-money-market-code-8b59c5986420?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8b59c5986420</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2021 01:16:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-22T01:16:02.999Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We are offering 50000 OPEN to any team that builds a multi collateral multi currency system based on the beta money market code from Open DAO.</p><p>Our long term goal is to build a suite of stable coins denominated in various currencies backed by a range of collateral including onchain and offchain real world assets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3pdZrx8c7tRfE7sH" /></figure><p>A multi collateral multi denominated stable coin architecture.</p><p>What we have right now is the Y Dollar built on top of the UMA protocol. It has a single collateral model and it expires in a fixed period of time.</p><p>We are working on a model with UMA to build a single collateral perpetual contract that would allow us to launch a range of stable coins.</p><p>However to get to our multi collateral model we would need to do development beyond what UMA already offers. Having a single USD token would lead to greater liquidity than having a fragmented set of multiple tokens each with their own set of collaterals.</p><p>The single collateral model does lead to risk isolation but that can be addressed via suitable collateralization buffers.</p><p>First a recap, we started with a money market which was a fork of Compound.</p><p>A money market like Compound has lenders on one side and borrowers on the other side. It is a double sided marketplace. You need the lenders before the borrowers can be serviced. A double sided marketplace is significantly harder to pull off than a single sided one.</p><p>A stable coin minter like Maker or Synthetix is about locking assets and creating a synth dollar and hoping that the market will accept it as an equivalent to existing stables. This can be done by creating incentivized LP positions.</p><p>However Compound can be repurposed as a multi collateral stable coin minter. Instead of having lenders on one side, you can simply mint a stable coin when anytime supplies collateral and triggers the borrow function.</p><p>This stable coin is effectively backed by the supplied collateral and using the admin module we can add any new collateral we want in almost real time. We can ensure the peg is met by adjusting interest rates. Monetization is already possible by sending the interest to the token holders claim wallet. Given that we have already forked the OPM adding the mint function is relatively straightforward.</p><p>This will allow us to jump straight to the Multicollateral model.</p><p>Better still we can easily add more currency denominations quite easily and continue to use the UMA oracle.</p><p>A USD stable coin is a synth, and creating other synths to trace other currencies using the same architecture is as simple as giving the option to mint another token. Interest rates for each of the synths can be adjusted independently to allow control of the peg.</p><p>We have already commenced the work on this effort and the stages are likely to look as follows</p><ol><li>Fork OPM and mint a bunch of stable coins in advance. This will be the maximum number of coins in circulation and will effectively act as a debt ceiling. This is pretty much a replica of compounds code with some UI changes and would allow us to go to market fairly quickly. We are working on this at present, and will be using xBTC (BTC wrapped to XDAI using pNetwork) as collateral as our first asset. Once we know the system is behaving as expected we can mint some more tokens to increase the debt ceiling. This is a quick and dirty model to get to the market fast. We intend to do all our experimentation on XDAI first in light of the ongoing gas issues with Ethereum. Other assets can be added as collateral in quick succession.</li><li>Add the ondemand minting functionality, still have debt ceiling in place via an admin parameter. Also governance based control of interest rates.</li><li>Dynamic interest rates to have better control of pegs</li><li>Removal of debt ceilings</li><li>Add other currency denominations (EUR, AUD, INR, CNY etc)</li></ol><p>These steps might be tweaked a bit, and debt ceilings might be put in for individual assets as collateral to ensure the system is relatively safe while audits are requested.</p><p>UMA DVM can be still used with our own contracts.</p><p>We’re working with a fork of Uniswap on XDAI which would serve as a trading platform for those who want to arbitrage the synth currencies.</p><p>Assuming everything goes per plan the same steps can be repeated on other EVM chains such as Ethereum, BSC, and other chains that support EVM compatibility.</p><p>The Compound based model allows us to leverage our existing expertise and go to a Multi Collateral stable coin suite fast.</p><p>Get in touch with us if you wish to claim this grant.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8b59c5986420" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/opendao/grant-multi-collateral-stable-coin-suite-based-on-beta-money-market-code-8b59c5986420">Grant: Multi Collateral Stable coin suite based on beta money market code</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/opendao">OpenDAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Securities and other regulations in context of DEFI]]></title>
            <link>https://moresh.medium.com/securities-and-other-regulations-in-context-of-defi-f3c2768e97c1?source=rss-586a48080e68------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f3c2768e97c1</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moresh Kokane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Mar 2021 04:46:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-05T01:03:20.317Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article is not legal advice. I am not a securities lawyer and please do not take this post as the primary basis of your operations. I absolutely intend to do significant generalizations, which may or may not be applicable to your specific situation, so make sure to validate if what I say here applies to you.</p><p>I do however have a significant amount of experience in the securities space and have authored several disclosure documents including full retail prospectuses, PDS as well accredited only IMs etc. I am involved in the DEFI space and get asked about the intersection of DEFI and securities regulation in particular a lot.</p><p>To that effect, this post is an effort to put my thoughts in one place and share it with the community who can decide for themselves what they are worth. These are my personal thoughts alone and in the context of this article, I am not speaking on behalf of any of the entities I am involved in.</p><p>There are a few key regulatory matters in DEFI space:</p><ol><li>Securities regulation, are the DEFI products floating around securities /financial products</li><li>Issues around AML KYC CTF</li></ol><p>Lets start with the first one.</p><p><strong>Securities Regulation</strong></p><p>While securities regulation varies by country, the underlying principles are quite consistent across jurisdictions, especially in the western world.</p><p>The primary objective is to protect retail investors. The definition of retail investors is based off exclusion but it generally boils down to mom and pop types who do not have a lot of money, nor a lot of experience in dealing with financial matters.</p><p>This is important because securities and financial products are generally virtual assets. Their worth is often based on the value of other assets and even intangibles such as efforts of a specific person or group of persons.</p><p>This means valuing them is often fraught and not so simple. Things can and often do go terribly wrong. So an investment in a stock has the potential to make you a millionaire, but also can lead to losing all of your investment.</p><p>This means there is significant hazard for those who play with it. And while there is something to be said about personal responsibility, state actors have decided that they have a role in protecting smaller investors who may be especially susceptible.</p><p>Most regulators try to protect small investors by offering a 2 prong defense:</p><p>a. Disclosure</p><p>b. Audits</p><p>Disclosure pertains to ensuring that small investors are provided enough information about what they are about to get in. It usually translates to 50 pages of “How you can lose money” warnings alongside the details of the business. There are specific standards on the type and amount of information that is being provided.</p><p>Audits are an after the fact process. These are done to ensure that the entity that is invested in is actually spending the money on what they claimed they are going to spend on. And if they are not, the investors are atleast aware of what is happening.</p><blockquote>However there is a bigger preliminary question here, is something that is being offered a security/financial product or not?</blockquote><p>Let us take some examples to elaborate.</p><p><strong>Example 1</strong></p><p>John sells farm land to investors.</p><p><strong>Example 2</strong></p><p>John sells farm lands and offers a JV to investors where he will farm the land and split the proceeds from the sale of the produce.</p><p><strong>Example 3</strong></p><p>Ali is a taxi driver, he does a revenue split with the owner of a car Jack where the car driver provides him with the car, and Ali puts in the effort and they split the proceeds.</p><p><strong>Example 4</strong></p><p>Jack buys a fully automated driving Tesla and sets it on auto mode where it goes and works for a taxi for hire when he is not using it, thus generating passive income for Jack.</p><p><strong>Example 5</strong></p><p>Real estate agent Jim sells an investment property house.</p><p><strong>Example 6</strong></p><p>Real estate agent Jim sells an investment property house and also acts as a property manager who collects rent.</p><p><strong>Example 7</strong></p><p>Ali opens up a shop, his brother in law Mike gives him some money and they go into business together. Ali takes the onus of running the shop and Mike gets a share of the profits as a passive investor.</p><p><strong>Example 8</strong></p><p>Ali sells Mike a vending machine. The vending machine is setup on a strip mall and dispenses bottled water and snacks. Ali periodically replenishes the stock and collects the cash which he then hands over to Mike for a fixed fee for his efforts.</p><p>Before we jump in the analysis of each of the above examples, it is worth reading through the SEC guidance.</p><p><a href="https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets">Framework for &quot;Investment Contract&quot; Analysis of Digital Assets</a></p><p>The key portion of the above guidance is:</p><p><em>When a promoter, sponsor, or other third party (or affiliated group of third parties) (each, an “Active Participant” or “AP”) provides essential managerial efforts that affect the success of the enterprise, and investors reasonably expect to derive profit from those efforts, then this prong of the test is met.</em></p><p><em>The inquiry into whether a purchaser is relying on the efforts of others focuses on two key issues:</em></p><ul><li><em>Does the purchaser reasonably expect to rely on the efforts of an AP?</em></li><li><strong><em>Are those efforts “the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise,” as opposed to efforts that are more ministerial in nature?</em></strong></li></ul><p>While there are other parameters as well, the above criteria is the clinching one. And this is true in not just digital assets but also real world, run of the mill assets. This is also why before we jump into the analysis of whether certain digital assets are securities, it is worth analyzing the fundamental reasoning first.</p><p>Using the above criteria, whether there is a reliance on someone to provide essential managerial efforts or the reliance is more of administrative nature let us review our examples.</p><ol><li>This is clearly a sale of a physical asset only.</li><li>The investors are reliant on Johns effort to generate a profit. Security.</li><li>This is a grey area. Does a taxi driver make more money if he does a better job? Or is he simply reliant on demand of his services at the location and time? I tend to lean towards the latter assuming all taxi drivers conform to a certain standard. However since Ali’s outcomes are dependent on the maximum revenue he makes rather than a fixed fee model he is motivated to perform more (how he will do that, I dont know but Taxi drivers will often exhibit a disregard for safe driving procedures to get to the next pick up and make more money in the same period of time). Ali is not an automaton. He will react to incentives and hence this falls in securities territory because Jacks additional returns are now dependent on Ali’s efforts.</li><li>The guys at Tesla are responsible for the performance of the automated taxi. But they dont get compensated (directly) more based on its revenues. Its performance is fire and forget. Neither is there a day to day reliance on Tesla employees for the performance of the taxi. While this asset generates money it is still property and not a security or financial product.</li><li>Property, not security. Same reasons as above.</li><li>Still property not security. Whether it is Jim or someone else rent is unlikely to change. Jim&#39;s actions are administrative and there is no reliance on Jim to make more money from the property. Jim could do a bad job and hence lose money for the owner, but doing an above any beyond job is unlikely to make more money for the owner. Note that there are circumstances where Jim tries to convince the owner to turn it to an AirBnB and offers a profit share for running it in a optimal manner, this could change it to a security offering.</li><li>There is a reliance on Ali to make a profit. Security.</li><li>There is no reliance on Ali. Same reasons as #6. It is a property not a security.</li></ol><p>Note that there is a lot of nuance around common enterprise which I have skipped over.</p><p>Having established the fundamental premise on which to judge if something is a security or not, lets try to analyze whether Defi offerings are securities or not.</p><p>The idea here is not to judge whether specific tokens are securities or not, but rather the dapps and protocols themselves are.</p><p>Most project tokens with centralized teams driving their adoption would tend to be securities, albeit some disclaimers can be applied to this statement.</p><p>However most dapps are not securities/financial products based on the active participant reliance criteria.</p><p>Consider money markets, yield farms, LP positions or automated vaults etc. All of them run off predefined code and well defined set of preconditions which trigger themselves based on various circumstances and scenarios. There is no real time operational reliance on the team or the developer who coded them. The lack of control or influence once something is set out in the wild means there is no real issuer of the product.</p><p>The closest analogy is that of the self driving Tesla or the vending machine. There is no reliance on an active participant for a profit outcome. Sure, projects from some founders like Andre Cronje have greater adoption but that would be akin to saying that more people trust Tesla to make better self driving cars than say Volkswagen.</p><p>Once you buy the self driving Tesla, it goes and does its own thing.</p><p>The same logic applies for synthetic assets such as those from Synthetix, it traces a dollar but the lack of a real issuer and real time intervention by the team means it is more similar to an automated car or a vending machine than it is to shares of Apple.</p><p>Even if the synths were tracing Apple or other shares, it makes no difference. There is no reliance on an active participant to ensure that the peg is met. Hence it cannot be classed as a security/financial product.</p><p>However where there is active involvement from the core teams in the day to day operations to influence outcomes things start to change. And this is where the push to decentralized governance by various teams actually works against them. The minute you input human arbitrariness, things start getting haywire. The only other defense then remains is that of decentralization. Most projects are not in the same league as that of Ethereum or Bitcoin. Active governance, even if it is under the fig leaf of community has the danger of leading it to being classed as a security.</p><p>Uniswap excels in this regard. It is perfectly permissionless. Any one can add any token pair and start trading. No one needs Uniswap team to approve of anything. The team can continue on its core efforts of building a superior product. The UNI token does confuse things a bit though.</p><p>We will address AML KYC CTF in a part 2 of this article.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f3c2768e97c1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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