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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Morvan Lallouet on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Morvan Lallouet on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Morvan Lallouet on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Death of a Russian Neo-Nazi]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/death-of-a-russian-neo-nazi-82b8f35851f0?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nationalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:58:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-22T12:15:08.131Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Maxim Martsinkievich, aka Tesak, Russia’s best know neo-Nazi, died last week — a few thoughts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/604/1*FuWNOPDAD0yGAyS-sTv3yg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tesak during an interview, 2012 (Wikipedia)</figcaption></figure><p>In 2008, when I was only tangentially interested in Russian politics, I read an <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/06/09/souvent-impunis-les-crimes-racistes-se-multiplient-en-russie_1055651_3214.html">article</a> in the French daily <em>Le Monde</em>, about a double murder in Russia. It made such a strong effect on me that I talked about it with friends and thought about it for some time. It described how two men, one from Dagestan, the other from Tajikistan, were abducted by a neo-Nazi group and taken to an unknown forest. There, under a big Nazi flag, some neo-Nazis slaughtered one of them, and shot the other. They posted on the internet a video of their crime — I still remember seeing the picture of the two captives before their execution. Many years have passed since then, and many, including myself, had forgotten about a crime that was <a href="https://baza.io/posts/6d3d1f32-68f7-4bd7-a209-41647cc2adb6">lazily investigated</a>, never elucidated, the bodies never found.</p><p>Then, a few days ago, Tesak died. I had forgotten Tesak too, like many, especially outside Russia and Ukraine (his death wasn’t even mentioned by outlets such as <em>The Guardian </em>or <em>Le Monde</em>). Or rather, I didn’t forget about him, I just stopped paying attention, because you can’t really forget who Tesak was. In Russia, he needs no introduction, he was without a doubt the best-known neo-Nazi, at a time where such characters were no rarities. Even his name was unforgettable. Maxim Martsinkievich went by a nickname (one wants to say a brand) meaning ‘hatchet’ or ‘backsword’, from the verb <em>tesat’</em>, ‘to hew, to mow’.</p><p>Tesak died in a Chelyabinsk prison, and Russian authorities pronounced his death a suicide. In an <a href="https://www.kem.kp.ru/daily/217183/4289168">interview</a> for the <em>KP </em>tabloid, Svetlana Petrenko, the spokesperson of the Investigative Committee, declared he had a ‘very serious reason’ for killing himself. He had confessed to the 2007 ‘double murder of individuals of non-Slavic ethnicity’ (as one talks about this kind of people in Russian officialese). Since Svetlana Petrenko mentioned the well-known video of the murder, there could only be one crime she was alluding too. Petrenko surmised that he may have been overwhelmed by the ‘gravity and senselessness’ of his crimes. His family, his lawyers do not believe Tesak killed himself, or that if he did, it was with some help.</p><p>Did Tesak commit that crime? We may know soon, if the Investigative committee offers some proof — from Petrenko’s interview it’s not quite clear whether Tesak had told investigators where the bodies are buried or was just <em>ready </em>to show them. In any case, one would be happy to know who committed that atrocious crime, one would feel if only relief for the families of these two men.</p><p>Feeling pity for Tesak is near impossible. Born in 1984, he was an avowed neo-Nazi, the founder of a group named Format 18. Created in 2005, Format 18 was a group of loosely organised skinheads with the activities common to this kind of people, mainly beatings. All these actions (and many more) were then posted on successful social media feeds. Tesak, like other neo-Nazis before him (but better), had understood that violence, real or staged, <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2502629">filmed and posted</a> on the Internet was the most inspiring propaganda. Writing for <em>Kommersant</em>, Alexander Chernykh <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4493624">considers</a> Tesak the ‘first popular videoblogger’ of the country, collecting money online to support his action. Along his life, he would prove quite successful at<a href="https://zaborona.com/ru/tesak-i-ultrapravye/"> financing</a> his activities, from conferences, selling merch, or videos to journalists. Chernykh recalls seeing a video of Tesak beating and throwing an ‘Asian-looking’ man from a moving suburban train — ‘Tesak’s ‘studio’ had many similar videos, I think every teenager from the mid-2000s remember them.’</p><p>At the end of the 2000s, Tesak went to jail, on the basis of article 282 of the Criminal code (incitement to racial hatred): with other skinheads he had interrupted a debate in Moscow with some Nazi salutes and ‘Sieg Heil’. Oddly enough, it was not his very physical violence that <a href="https://republic.ru/posts/97835">sent him to jail</a>, and sent him alone, but a few Nazi salutes. He would again be sentenced to jail, on the same basis, this time for the staged execution of a ‘drug dealer’, complete with KKK robes.</p><p>Freed from jail at the beginning of the 2010s, Tesak came back to business, with one of the most disgusting political projects to see light in Russia — at a time where such projects were rife. ‘Occupy Paedophilia’ was devoted to hunting ‘paedophiles’. Using fake profiles on dating websites, Tesak and his friends or imitators would lure gay men to meetings. When found, they would humiliate them, if not outright beat and torture them — if you’re interested in the details, they are described in that <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/12/15/license-harm/violence-and-harassment-against-lgbt-people-and-activists-russia">HRW report.</a> Media speaking, Tesak was no ordinary neo-Nazi, ranting on some dark corner of the Internet. True, he had created his own dark corner on the Internet, but his actions were <a href="https://republic.ru/posts/l/965442">positively covered</a> by the wholly official Federal channels REN-TV and NTV. He was probably the most media-savvy Russian neo-Nazi, the ‘<a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2020/09/16/geteroseksualizm-i-russkiy-yazyk-chem-proslavilsya-maksim-martsinkevich-po-prozvischu-tesak-samyy-mediynyy-iz-rossiyskih-neonatsistov">most talented media-manipulator</a>’ in that subculture. He could count on the Russian medias’ vilest instincts, their not so latent xenophobia, homophobia, crave for scandal and all kind of trash. At the time, at the peak of state-sponsored homophobia, there was an energetic young man ready to take the matter seriously, and to shoot nice pictures.</p><p>If you follow Russian politics, even from afar, you’ll have certainly heard that Putin may be bad, evil even, but that there’s worse in that country: Nationalists of all sorts, Neo-Nazis, Chechen terrorists, whatever. It’s true, there’s absolute political evil in Russia, and Tesak certainly was among that sheer evil. It’s true, Putin and his people are lesser evil, compared to Tesak.</p><p>Surprisingly, when Tesak died, there were little conspiracy theories involving Putin or the Presidential administration. Tesak was already forgotten, and if we ever know what happened to him, it will most probably be that he was just crushed by the infamous Russian prison system (something quite many people far from Neo-Nazism mentioned) or by the prospect of spending the rest of his life in jail. Whether he died of his own hand or was beaten to death by some prison-guard does not really matter.</p><p>There weren’t either discussions about a potential protector in the Kremlin, that Tesak might have used when alive and well. Tesak did go to jail, and he was probably <a href="https://meduza.io/episodes/2020/09/17/istoriya-neonatsista-maksima-martsinkevicha-pri-zhizni-on-vnushal-uzhas-i-otvraschenie-no-posle-smerti-mnogie-vnezapno-stali-emu-sochuvstvovat">not protected </a>by the authorities. He could just count on their passivity, their complacency and tolerance for the most violent xenophobia and homophobia. Between his prison stays, Tesak could resume his bouts of organised and advertised violence. Someday, the lesser evil wakes up, and the absolute evil ends up crushed. This is what happened with most nationalist and neo-Nazi groups, from NSO-Sever (‘National-Socialist Society-North’ — <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1681380">27 deaths</a>) to BORN (‘Combat Organisation of the Russian Nationalists’ — <a href="https://zona.media/theme/born">11 deaths</a>). This is what happened to Tesak. We could find comfort in that, if only the lesser evil didn’t take so long to wake up. If you live long enough, you’ll see the Russian state’s monopoly on violence restored.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82b8f35851f0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Navalny without Navalny]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/navalny-without-navalny-ff691682caa7?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ff691682caa7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[navalny]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2020 13:13:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-19T08:47:23.506Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Charisma, authoritarianism and party-building</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KIXcGDIu-WQPV0qAoVSetA.jpeg" /></figure><p>When the life and limb of Navalny were under threat, many could not but ask: what will happen with what Navalny has built, if anything happens to him? In spite of all the talks about his talent, personality, leadership or charisma, Navalny has turned into something bigger than himself. Navalny has led a number of projects — some defunct — and he is now the leader of an organisation, the Foundation against Corruption (FBK), and the leader of a party that was never allowed to exist. But, without him, what would remain of these projects, in other words, what’s Navalny without Navalny?</p><p>The FBK was founded in 2012, as a way to round up several projects that Navalny had initiated in the years before. Rospil, was dedicated to embezzlement in public spending and tenders; Rosyama, to the dire situation of Russian roads; Rosvybory, to election monitoring. It is with that project that Navalny definitively stopped to be a ‘blogger’. It allowed for a change in dimension, in particular in terms of financing. Rospil had already showed that Navalny was able to raise money through fundraising, and the FBK managed to raise even more. When launched in 2012, Vladimir Ashurkov, a former banker and executive director of the FBK, <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/lyudi/81639-ya-ponimal-chto-sotrudnichestvo-s-navalnym-mozhet-predstavlyat-ugrozu-dlya-moei">estimated</a> its budget at $300,000 per year. That money was raised by public donations from several <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2012/05/30/16_druzej_navalnogo">business people and personalities</a>. In 2019, according to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-54119390">BBC Russian service</a>, the FBK managed to raise more than $1 million, mostly through small donations.</p><p>The money raised by the FBK has been put to efficient use. In comparison to the usually quite stale and anaemic agitprop put forward by other Russian parties, the FBK communication, videos, website, agitation material has a slick and professional outlook. In a <a href="https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/they-havent-killed-me-yet-which-is-unacceptable-for-a-real-opposition-politician-9062839ac5cf">previous piece</a>, I mentioned how Navalny’s FBK have been <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/15/75520">considered</a> to constitute a ‘media-empire’ present on all social media. If Navalny is indeed ‘the guy from the internet’, he’s not alone.</p><p>What is obvious from this success is that Navalny has been able to gather a team of young, dedicated and talented professionals, a ‘<a href="https://sobesednik.ru/dmitriy-bykov/20141203-aleksey-navalnyy-sudbu-strany-vsegda-reshaet-odin-procent">collective Navalny</a>’. Charisma can only go so far. The top-level of this team has proved relatively stable and has operated without loud scandals, scissions or crises. The poisoning revealed that the organisation was able to operate — if only for some time — without its leader. Ivan Zhdanov, the FBK director is in charge of the administration of the FBK. A 33 years-old lawyer, Zhdanov was the head of the legal department of the FBK until 2018 when he took over as director from Roman Rubanov, who had fled Russia to London.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/590/1*LPCJbB_9xf--g6xWzFeLQA.png" /><figcaption>Ivan Zhdanov (Instagram)</figcaption></figure><p>Leonid Volkov, 40, who has been working with Navalny since 2013, is in charge of the network of ‘Navalny headquarters’ in the regions, a business in which Navalny himself is not directly involved, <a href="https://youtu.be/XXhLim5EPjE">according to</a> Zhdanov. Lyubov Sobol, 33, is the producer of the ‘Navalny Live’ YouTube channel. Also a lawyer, Sobol is one of the longest-serving Navalny associates: she joined him in 2011, as the first lawyer of Rospil.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*fWoO-5KbWLmIWI_ptKQnmg.png" /><figcaption>Lyubov Sobol (Instagram)</figcaption></figure><p>The most prominent investigator among the team is Georgy Alburov, 30, who has been working with Navalny since 2012. In terms of internal organisation, the poisoning of Navalny led to a revelation. The FBK <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-54119390">does have</a> at least one secret staffer (something that Navalny <a href="https://youtu.be/ByN4rGHEOKc">denied</a>): Maria Pevchikh, who heads the investigation department, while living in London.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*VwNZFEKVYhgvpiGpfiuuVA.png" /><figcaption>Maria Pevchikh and Georgy Alburov</figcaption></figure><p>While Navalny and his team in general have had to bear their share of criticism, these have not touched the professionalism of his team. Cronies they are not.</p><h4>What is lacking to this construction? A party.</h4><p>When Navalny started to acquire a national profile and audience, that is, in the years 2011–2012, he appeared sceptical of the idea of party-building. In June 2011, in an <a href="https://www.mk.ru/politics/2011/06/09/596335-blog-nakazhet.html">interview</a> for <em>MK</em>, he declared that:</p><blockquote>If you want to create a party, you need to raise $2 million per year to support it, and go the Ministry of Justice to register it. This is not struggle for power. It’s a senseless waste of time. I’m choosing another way. Weakening the legitimate support for United Russia — the fight against swindles and thieves — this is my political campaign, my struggle for power. It is many times more effective than any party.</blockquote><p>In 2015, when Navalny’s Progress Party conducted one of its congresses, some people were still wondering: why build a party when there’s already an organisation, the FBK? Leonid Volkov <a href="https://leonwolf.livejournal.com/558542.html">answered</a>:</p><blockquote>It’s exactly like the Sinn Fein and the IRA, as we usually joke. A political wing and a non-political one. The FBK is an NGO realising important public projects… A party is a political organisation, whose goal is the fight for power. A party is a mechanism ensuring the representation of a group of citizens, in the case of the Progress Party, those who support the European way for Russia.</blockquote><p>The idea of party-building come largely from Leonid Volkov himself, who became a proponent of ‘cloud democracy’ during the 2000s. An independent member of the Ekaterinburg Duma, Volkov was one of the founders of the PARNAS liberal party. While involved in this party project, he became interested in radical, tech-inspired ideas about party-building. Together with political scientist Fedor Krasheninnikov (also from Ekaterinburg), he published a book, <em>Cloud Democracy </em>that extolled the virtues IT could exert on parties. These ideas would find their first putative realisation in a party project based on an online voting platform: <em>Demokratiya2</em>. Volkov deplored the absence of a ‘normal’ party life in the regions, because of the ‘lamentable state of the political field’. There, ‘parties’ were mere emanations of Moscow-based leaders, who used party brands to further their mercantile interests. Volkov and Krasheninnikov imagined radically new, bottom-up party structures, with independent branches in the regions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*QaFv8yWCvyneNT7uD1STfA.png" /><figcaption>Leonid Volkov (Instagram)</figcaption></figure><p>In 2012, the stringent party legislation was liberalised, raising hopes that parties could again be built. Volkov <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2012/08/01/partiya_ashurkova">teamed up</a> with other members of Navalny’s growing team — Vladimir Ashurkov, Georgy Alburov, Vladislav Naganov — to create the ‘Popular Alliance’. Radical, ‘cloud democracy’ ideas quickly faded, and the party adopted a more traditional platform. From the start the party positioned itself as a ‘party of the opposition’, and, while refusing to use the term ‘liberal’, the centrality of ‘European democracy’, ‘civil society’, etc., in its platform make the party close to that orientation. In <a href="https://lenta.ru/articles/2012/08/06/electronicperformers/">interviews</a>, Volkov insisted on the opposition to ‘paternalism’: ‘the most important value is the individual (<em>chelovek</em>), his voice, his ability to decide’. Ashurkov — who from the start seemed more sceptical of the utopia of ‘electronic democracy’ — insisted on these classical liberal points: ‘restoration of democratic norms, free press, independent courts, real elections, increased efficiency in the work of the state’. He has called for the party occupy a sort of ‘centrist’ position: ‘we should be at the centre, and capture people’s mind to the maximum.’ The platform was devoid of any nationalistic points.</p><p>In September 2013, Navalny <a href="https://echo.msk.ru/programs/exit/1156476-echo">announced</a> his readiness to lead the party, and he would, unsurprisingly, be elected its chairman in November. The reasons he stated for changing his mind are unclear. He had said that his very name could bring trouble for the party, he did not explain why this was not the case anymore, apart from remarking that with or without him as a member, the party could not be registered anyway. Why Navalny ended up leading a party is most probably due to the centrality of parties in the Russian electoral system. I will not dwell here on the specifics of that system, the main point being that, without a registered party, it is extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, to participate in elections. At that time, Navalny had already turned into an electoral politician: he was a candidate for the Moscow mayoral elections, where he had gathered 27% of the vote. He could be a candidate to that election because he was endorsed by the old liberal party RPS-PARNAS (and because United Russia had allowed him to do so). But he needed his own brand, and could not be content with joining one of the other liberal parties, tainted as they were by their <a href="https://republic.ru/posts/l/992683">‘negative background’</a>.</p><p>Then, trouble ensued. It’s difficult to participate in elections without a party, it’s even more difficult to register a party. Far from being a declarative formality, registering a political party in Russia is a exhausting and costly bureaucratic process, riddled with arbitrary. Navalny and his team full of competent lawyers tried <em>nine times </em>— to <a href="https://meduza.io/news/2019/06/07/minyust-snova-otkazalsya-zaregistrirovat-partiyu-navalnogo-oppozitsioner-podaval-dokumenty-v-devyatyy-raz">no avail</a>. His dire predictions of 2011 came true. It is now well-know that Russian officials do not, as a rule, pronounce his name. A similar fate has doomed his party registration attempts. Only this time, the name of his party that was stolen. In 2013, Andrey Bogdanov, a political operative whose main business is, literally, to sell parties, renamed one of his party properties into ‘Popular Alliance’. When Navalny tried to register his party under the name ‘Progress Party’, Bogdanov, with the help of one disgruntled Navalny supporter, <a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2018/02/22/byvshiy-soratnik-alekseya-navalnogo-registriruet-partiyu-progressa-navalnyy-uveren-chto-u-nego-kradut-partiyu-tak-i-est">managed to</a> steal that name again. Last, in 2019, the name ‘Party of Russia’s Future’ was stolen by a spoiler party.</p><p>Navalny without Navalny is not nothing: a working organisation capable of implementing political projects and, first and foremost, investigation corruption. But Navalny remains without a political party, he created an IRA without its Sinn Fein. If the FBK can probably work without him, what it lacks is a institutional mechanism allowing for deliberation and decision-making without him. If such institution exists, it is not public, it is not a congress or a political council. As Ivan Zhdanov said: ‘We don’t have a plan in an envelope that we can open if something happens to Aleksey’. Navalny’s strategic decisions are never presented as the result of collective deliberation. Is Navalny to blame for that situation?</p><p>Navalny is frequently described as an ‘authoritarian’ leader, unable to withstand criticism, bent on acquiring power for himself, blocking the emergence of new leaders. These criticisms speak to both his personal failings and his political underachievements. It is true that Navalny has got himself in a number of political fights with opponents from the liberal opposition — Dmitry Gudkov, Maxim Kats, Ksenia Sobchak, to name a few. Should we care? I am not to judge: I’m not familiar enough with the specifics of these fights or with Navalny’s personality. But what I’m familiar with is that fights, especially within a specific space of the political field are the most banal thing in politics. In any country. Besides, I find the claim that Navalny is ‘blocking’ new leaders utterly bizarre: why should he give way to anyone? And if so, to whom? He is 44, and without doubt the most well-know opposition politician in Russia, why should he think about retirement?</p><p>Navalny may be an ‘authoritarian’ leader, in the sense that he commands ‘charismatic’ authority over his own political movement, that is he is irreplaceable. If he is ‘alone’, the Russian political regime is to blame. Navalny has struggled to become a normal politician, with a party, elections, and the like. He has devoted much resources and energy to creating, from scratch, a network of supporters in the regions. If these people were allowed to participate in elections, some of them would certainly be elected, and Navalny would seem less lonely. If his party was registered, it would likely have the discussions and congresses that are the stuff of party life. Navalny is considered a quite unusual politician, and he surely is. But he is a ‘normal’ politician, in the sense that he is in politics because he wants power, and power for himself. How strange it is that those who advocate for European-style democracy would blame him for wanting what any European politician wants. As Russian liberals and Navalny among them like to say (with some reasons), Russian is not a ‘normal’ country, by which they mean a European democracy. Russia is not a country where there is a space for a normal politician, with a normal party. It’s not Navalny’s authoritarianism that is to blame, but someone’s else.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ff691682caa7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[‘Putin did Navalny’]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/putin-did-navalny-486f2cad270d?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/486f2cad270d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[navalny]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2020 07:14:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-01T12:27:15.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Should we doubt it?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/420/1*zC-eoOhKIsKy-zdEpPuewQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Navalny is evacuated to a hospital. Omsk Airport, 20 August 2020</figcaption></figure><p>When anything bad happens in Russia, you’ll usually find there are two types of Russia-watchers: the ‘believers’ and the ‘sceptics’. The believers will immediately see the hand of Vladimir Putin, his direct, personal involvement, his orders. The sceptics will not rule out his involvement, but like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/25/alexei-navalny-putin-russian-activist-russia">Yana Gorokhovskaya</a>, they’ll argue that Russia is not ‘a highly centralised system that he controls manually’, that Putin is ‘certainly Russia’s most important decision-maker’, but ‘the political system is not his personal well-oiled machine’. There are many groups and individuals with political agency, operating without Putin’s knowledge, and sometimes against his own interests.</p><p>In many instances, including the poisoning of Aleksey Navalny, the sceptics will argue that Putin must bear political, even moral responsibility, because of the nature of his regime. But it is unlikely that he carries personal, criminal responsibility. For the sceptics, saying bluntly that ‘Putin did Navalny’, that he actually ordered the killing, is almost akin to saying that ‘Bush did 9/11’ in other circles, too naïve, too simple for a messy reality.</p><p>I consider myself a ‘sceptic’, and I believe that the sceptics’ characterisation of Vladimir Putin’s regime is correct. But I would like, for once, to shake the assumptions of that scepticism. Why is it so hard to believe Putin actually did it, that he ordered the killing of Aleksey Navalny?</p><p>Why do the ‘sceptics’ doubt Putin actually did it? First, literally no one believes he couldn’t do it. Second, few — if any — doubt that he wouldn’t do it for moral reasons: in Putin’s moral universe, the lives of some human beings almost certainly are expendable. There’s means, there’s opportunity, there’s the personality of the suspect, so all you can doubt is the motive. He didn’t do it because it would be ‘irrational’. It is not difficult to assign to Vladimir Putin cold-blooded rationality, to believe that his self-interested goal is to maximise his power, that in order to maximise his power, he uses all kinds of means in order to weaken opposition to his rule. He may of course have other goals, but like any other political leader, he wishes to stay in power. So by ‘irrational’, the sceptics mean that it would not be in Putin’s ‘interest’ to kill Navalny, that it would not, according to his calculations, serve that goal. We must imagine Putin sitting in his office and weighing the costs and benefits of a hit on Navalny.</p><p>Let’s start with the costs. <a href="https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82574">Tatyana Stanovaya</a> lists the most important of them: ‘that he becomes a hero if the authorities’ treatment of him looks obviously unjust’. This ‘martyr theory’ has many adepts, from <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/22/russias-murderous-adhocracy-a71219">Mark Galeotti</a> to … Navalny himself. A Tomsk activist who met Navalny just before his poisoning, told <a href="https://ru.reuters.com/article/idRUKBN25G2BD-ORUTP"><em>Reuters</em></a><em> </em>he was asked why he is still alive. Navalny answered: ‘it’s not in Putin’s interest. [I] will be turned into a hero. People will wear t-shirts stating ‘I’m / We’re Navalny’. There will be meetings and the like.’</p><p>Navalny could turn into a martyr, and trigger unseen protests. But another scenario is perhaps even more likely: that Navalny will be a martyr for a week, that a few thousands or dozens of thousands will show up in the streets with these ‘I’m Navalny’ t-shirts. And then, every year, on the anniversary of his killing, a ritual march will gather a few thousands in Moscow. And that’s it. Isn’t that a risk worth running? Isn’t it all the more worth running, when control over the media will allow the Kremlin to depict him as a pawn of the West and a traitor? As to the risk to Putin’s ‘image’, stressed by <a href="https://republic.ru/posts/97595">Ivan Davydov</a>, I’m sceptical as well. How much has Putin suffered from the murder of Boris Nemtsov? Whether in the West or in Russia, Putin’s track-record in terms of lives of journalists and opposition activists is low. He could think it’s not worth lowering it further, he could also think that his ‘image’ is already beyond repair, so why not take the risk?</p><p>Navalny’s ‘martyrdom potential’ is why Tatyana Stanovaya <a href="https://t.me/rpolitik/87">argued</a> that his murder ‘was seen in the Kremlin as a kind of nightmare scenario’. If this was such a nightmare scenario, the least I can say is that it didn’t seem to keep the Kremlin awake at night. For years now, opposition activists and journalists are constantly harassed and followed by all kinds of thugs, pro-Kremlin ‘journalists’ and ‘activists’. Navalny was several time attacked in broad daylight, his daughter’s WhatsApp account was hacked and published. Many of his closest associates have suffered the same treatment, others opposition activists have likely been poisoned. The TV hammers day in day out that they’re foreign agents of the West, traitors and the like, all with the help of the Russian security services. The Kremlin must surely know where this all ends. Putin has known it for at least five years, when Boris Nemtsov was gunned down by the Kremlin walls. Allow me to doubt that the murder of an opposition leader is such a ‘nightmare’ to him.</p><p>Let’s keep delving in Putin’s cost and benefits analysis. The risks of killing him have to weighed against the benefits of keeping him alive. It is argued that he is ‘useful to the Kremlin’ — I mean, alive. How so? RT journalist Bryan MacDonald <a href="https://twitter.com/27khv/status/1296555979249782796">argues</a> that: ‘He’s the perfect opposition figure because a) he’s not very popular b) has effectively taken over the liberal movement &amp; c) his presence has effectively blocked new liberal opposition leaders from appearing’. We’ve heard before that it was useless to kill an opponent because he’s ‘unpopular’: when Nemtsov was assassinated. We were told he was too old, too involved in the Yeltsin regime, too lonely. Now, it’s Navalny’s turn not to be popular enough. In Russia, opposition leaders are never popular or even good enough to deserve assassination. We’re regularly told that their unpopularity makes them useful in the Kremlin’s grand scheme of things. I suspect that these talks from ‘sources close to the Kremlin’ could also be plain bravado and propaganda. After all, haven’t pro-Kremlin media tried to depict Navalny as a Kremlin ‘project’, a ‘tool’ of some Kremlin clan, as shown by a recent ‘Proekt media’ <a href="https://www.proekt.media/en/narrative-en/kremlin-vs-navalny/">investigation</a>? He’s so useful to us, so if anything happens to him, look the other way! And now, we have even heard the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Duma claim that killing Navalny is not in ‘Russia’s interest’ — it’s rather, in the interest of ‘Western European powers’. Should we trust them?</p><p>Those who doubt the motive behind the killing because of the ‘unpopularity’ argument, should be careful with it: it can be used both ways. Yes, if he is so unpopular, then there is little benefit in killing him, and no real rational motive. But, if he is so unpopular then the cost of killing him is low. If Putin believes that Navalny is a cult-like figure that fanatised a bunch of teenagers, that there’s nothing but his charisma (and some Western, oligarch money) behind him, then the costs of killing him look pretty negligible. Who will care anyway? We should be careful not to judge that ‘popularity’ by our own, supposedly objective standards. Navalny certainly is not popular to the point where a majority of Russians supports him. But he surely is popular enough to deserve repression? After all, it’s not like all kind of obscure groupuscules and personalities have been heavily repressed — some of them even had to be invented in order to be repressed. If there’s a ‘rational’ case for repression, I don’t know why there shouldn’t be a rational case for the supreme measure of repression: assassination.</p><p>Let’s now turn to the benefits of killing Navalny. I have a hard time believing Navalny is an ‘ideal’ opposition politician for Putin. True, his liberal, pro-Western views are only held by a minority in Russia. But who can deny that within that part of the political spectrum, he has been among the most active, talented, and charismatic. Who else has, in the last ten years tried to build a national network of headquarters and activists? Who has shown such success? The answer is no one. The ‘martyr scenario’ has probably been too much discussed, and I suggest we come back to a plain fact: a dead, or comatose, or exiled man can do less than a live one. A well-known, charismatic personality is not something that is created out of thin air — it took more than a decade for Navalny to build that status. There might not be that many ‘charismatic leaders’ around, and many political movements never manage to find one. Navalny has tried hard to institutionalise his movement, to create a party, to participate normally in the political life of his country. The regime has effectively repressed his efforts: he does not have a party, not a single elected official. Even though there are talented politicians around him, none of them come close in terms of ‘charisma’ or nationwide profile, a fact acknowledged by his closest associates. In these conditions, it is perfectly rational to think that killing (or at least incapacitating) him would deal a severe blow to his ‘movement’ and to the opposition in general. It could also have the obvious added benefit of terrorising any potential opponent. If Putin believes Navalny is too popular (we don’t know how much popularity is too much for him), then the benefit of killing him becomes obvious.</p><p>If we sum up the view from Putin’s office, we have a manageable risk, that of turning Navalny in a martyr, and a clear benefit in sight: to decapitate a movement led by a charismatic personality. There is rationality in taking this decision.</p><p>What are the counter-arguments to the ‘Putin did Navalny’ thesis, what can the defence argue? First, as shown again by the Proekt investigation, the Kremlin has always stopped short of full-blown repression with him. The authorities have micro-managed all sorts of repressive measures, by state and non-state agents, in order to stifle Navalny’s activities. We have no guarantee whatsoever that they have not changed their minds, that now, enough is enough, and that, as many have said in Russia, this poisoning might augur some terrible changes. Second, some, like <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/22/russias-murderous-adhocracy-a71219">Mark Galeotti</a>, argue that the reaction of the authorities was quite confused and incoherent, that they looked ‘caught off guard’. But in the sceptics’ own logic, Russia is not a well-run totalitarian state, where Putin would have set the plan for the hit with the services, the medical plan with the Ministry of Health, and the media plan with the heads of TV. As to the medical plan, I suppose you can just let the doctors work on Navalny, and then a few phone calls from Moscow to the chief doctor will straighten things up. As to the media plan, there is no need for coherence or plausibility, you can supply these people with scripts along the way, or better still, let them on autopilot. They know the drill, and they’ve shown it: Navalny got hammered on moonshine! He’s a cocaine-addict! He’s on a diet and should have had a <em>Raffaelo </em>in his purse! Navalny wasn’t poisoned, but if he was, Merkel did it! Muddle the waters and move on.</p><p>As Mark Galeotti writes, ‘a state that kills is a terrible thing … But a state that permits a whole range of actors and interests to kill with impunity is an even more uncomfortable thing’. Unfortunately, we don’t know that the two do not exclude each other: we can have the worst of both worlds. There might be some comfort in thinking that Putin isn’t a mad dog. Nobody has any trouble in believing murderous thugs operate in Russia, on the payroll of some businessman, but again, there might be some comfort in the idea that Putin is a fairly rational arbiter between them. Sceptics ask: what if he isn’t anymore? What if, worse, the assassination of an opposition leader falls within the boundaries of his rationality?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=486f2cad270d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[‘They haven’t killed me yet, which is unacceptable for a real opposition politician’]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/they-havent-killed-me-yet-which-is-unacceptable-for-a-real-opposition-politician-9062839ac5cf?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9062839ac5cf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[navalny]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2020 16:43:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-24T13:39:48.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A few thoughts on Navalny as the ‘leader of the opposition’</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*AaAhsKpxpY7qYcQLUCZCJw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Navalny in 2018, Facebook personal page</figcaption></figure><p>I first heard the name of Navalny some ten years ago and I’ve been following quite closely his activity for four years — he became the topic of my PhD. These are a few thoughts on what Navalny means — as I struggle not to use the past tense and as he is now being treated in Germany.</p><p>During this decade, he was a fixture of Russian politics, a most familiar character. The journalist Oleg Kashin notes rightly that there was an element of stability, of ‘structure’ in Navalny’s position as the ‘leader of the opposition’. He would be harassed by all kind of thugs, prosecutors, his children’s WhatsApp would be hacked and published on some junk press outlets, he would be accused of being a CIA agent or a <a href="https://twitter.com/m_lallouet/status/1296784198301356033">cokehead</a>. But he would beat on. New investigations, new electoral strategies, new programmes would come out like clockwork from him, his team and his anti-corruption foundation: the ‘collective Navalny’. In Kashin’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/21/opinion/navalny-russia-poison.html">words</a> for the <em>New York Times</em>:</p><blockquote>In recent years, Mr. Navalny’s undeniable leadership of the Russian opposition has also become a kind of sign of Vladimir Putin’s stability. The unchanging leader of the regime is Vladimir Putin; the unchanging leader of the opposition is Aleksey Navalny. It was hard to imagine him being arrested or killed. But everything changes.</blockquote><p>He was the systemic in the non-systemic, so to speak. As so many asked: why was he allowed to thread on? The question was sometimes a genuine puzzle, sometimes a vaguely hidden accusation. Surely, if he is alive, there must be something shady going on between him and the FSB, some oligarch, some Kremlin clan, Putin himself, who knows? In any case, those who knew stayed silent, and those who didn’t know, chattered. After his ‘authoritarianism’, his ‘nationalism’, another criticism ran, and Navalny bitterly joked about it:</p><h3></h3><p>Про биткойны. Про авторитаризм. Про то, что я агент ФСБ. Про то, что меня ещё не убили и это неприемлемо для настоящего оппозиционера.</p><blockquote>‘They haven’t killed me yet, which is unacceptable for a real opposition politician.’</blockquote><p>But now that he is in a coma, finally transferred to a Berlin hospital, then what? Well, the joke doesn’t sound that funny — if it ever did. His poisoning will hardly end any of these discussions. We’ll read people saying that he was killed by his own, a <a href="https://t.me/tanya_f/2815">‘sacrificial victim’</a> of the Russian opposition. We’ve been there before, and only fools bet against the house and count on the truth being established. Of course, the Russian political field is now rife with all kind of speculations and conspiracy theories, that I will leave ‘specialists’ to debate.</p><p>It’s hard not to be taken by a feeling of impending doom. Because political violence has hit precisely him, at that unique position in the ‘system’. The phrase ‘leader of the opposition’ — either in the singular or as ‘one of the leaders’ — is tired, applied to all kind of personalities. But it suits Navalny better than most. Boris Nemtsov (shot dead in 2015) was surely ‘one of them’. But his assassination was different. For everything one could respect — admire even — in Nemtsov, he was already an old man; a man from the past — the Yeltsin years; one among others. Navalny is young — 44 — and he’s one of his kind. Vladimir Kara-Murza (poisoned in 2015), Piotr Verzilov (poisoned in 2018) are both deeply courageous and respectable opposition politicians, but no one would call them leaders in that sense, and no one would compare their status to that of Navalny. Ben Noble, for <em>The Conversation</em> offers interesting <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-suspected-poisoning-why-opposition-figure-stands-out-in-russian-politics-144836">facts and insights</a> as to the status of ‘leader of the opposition’ so often applied to Navalny. He is not ‘the singular opposition leader in Russia’, unknown (and hated) as he is to many Russians. He does not lead a party — as the authorities have always refused to let him do so. Even if we could agree on what exactly he is ‘leading’, he is contested, and ‘political opposition forces in Russia are fragmented.’</p><p>But he is unique. In contemporary Russia, no other politician has managed to acquire such a unique position as both a politician and the head of a ‘media-empire’. A politician, because, as many forget, the start of his career was as a political operative, in a party. He has built his leadership on his ability to relentlessly put forward new political projects — and abandon many of them on the way. He is, at the same time, one of Russia’s chief investigation journalist, the head of a genuine investigation title: the Foundation Against Corruption, available round the clock on all imaginable internet media from Twitter to YouTube. All of this happened as the Russian TV was literally destroyed, and countless newspapers were brought into submission — <em>Lenta</em>, <em>Kommersant</em>, <em>RBK</em>, <em>Vedomosti</em>, etc. There is still plenty of excellent journalism in Russia, but no other politician<em> </em>has built his own, to such success. And no other opposition politician has managed to create a style: straightforward, blunt, ironic, funny, acerbic, full of internet memes and pop culture, and at the same time uncovering all matters of dirty secrets. Here’s how Leonid Volkov, one of his closest and oldest associates <a href="https://leonwolf.livejournal.com/284373.html">described</a> this style as it was in the making, in 2011: ‘a correct, much needed style. Not an endless reflection about who was right in 1993, or about the merits of some person in 1989, not a foaming at the mouth denunciation of the bloody regime, but applied politics: setting concrete problems, proposing concrete alternatives, a meaningful criticism with figures in hand’. And it was fun.</p><p>Navalny, as <em>Novaya Gazeta </em>put it in <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/15/75520-chelovek-iz-interneta">an excellent investigation</a> of his ‘media-empire’, is ‘the person from the internet’. His career, his very style are impossible to imagine without the internet. He has lift up from <em>LiveJournal</em>, where he opened a blog in 2006 to <em>all </em>social media, where any of his videos gather many millions of views. His investigation of Dmitry Medvedev’s wealth stands at 36 million views. Barred from appearing on TV, he has now his now his own weekly TV show (on Youtube): Navalny Live. This style has made him embody a new generation of Russian opposition politics, neither intelligentsia — a point <a href="https://nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-only/what-is-navalny/">well-made by Keith Gessen</a> — nor technocrat. There are elements of these two types in Navalny: the insistence on truth and morals from the intelligentsia, the attempts at presenting detailed, informed political programmes from the technocrats. But he is neither. In this, there was always an element of future in what he did and embodied.</p><p>If he is such a leader, who exactly was he trying to lead, and where? Here again, that future-oriented quality stood out. Since he was expelled from the liberal party Yabloko in 2007, Navalny has relentlessly tried to move beyond established political cleavages. That project took at first a direction I would — if I were Russian — probably disapprove of. He tried to move Russian liberals out of their ‘culturally left-wing’ ghetto, by which he meant their refusal to embrace a ‘healthy’ dose of nationalism. He stood for gun rights and against immigration from Central Asia. Almost simultaneously he renewed, politicized and made a trademark out of the struggle against corruption. Even though he could use tropes from previous anti-corruption fighters, he used his lawyer’s skills, his communication talents to turn the theme into something new again, something concrete and graphic, something political. He was hated — especially by old-school, principled democrats — because he was never shy in collaborating tactically (some would say, cynically) with other opposition forces, be they communists or nationalists. And again, he could make his strategy and his ideas graphic, concrete and catchy. For reasons that still remain mysterious to me, he then moved back to the centre of Russian liberalism, opposed the annexation of Crimea, abandoned nationalism, stopped peddling anti-Caucasian racism. In his latter ideological move, he tried to move to the left on socio-economic issues, once again to lift Russian liberalism out of its niche, out of its ‘cannibalistic’ free-market ditch. He has succeeded, but not in the sense that he has ‘united’ everyone against Putin around him — he hasn’t. He has succeeded in the sense that those against the Putin regime have to position themselves with regards to his projects, his agenda. Whether liberal, left-wing, or nationalist.</p><p>It’s hard, of course, to do justice to a political career spanning close to twenty years. But what remains is the energy, the will to devise new strategies, new ideas, new slogans. It would never again be 2003, the year when liberals were ousted from parliament, and entered a never-ending decline. Navalny brought, better than anyone, a future-oriented, innovative outlook to Russian politics. No wonder his (aborted and repressed) party was called the Party of Russia’s Future. He constantly repeated that this future would be ‘beautiful’, that Russia was not doomed to despair. We all know that the future is not written, and that the future he offers Russia can fail. But in his doggedness to bring forward this idea, he succeeded. Precisely for that, whether one agrees with him or not, he was a leader, and one of his kind. In Russia — as everywhere — they say ‘don’t speak ill of the dead’, and of the poisoned and comatose, too, I suppose. I could list endlessly what he was criticised for, rightly or wrongly. I’ll leave the last word to <a href="https://republic.ru/posts/97575">Oleg Kashin</a> — who was never shy in criticising him:</p><blockquote>‘In any case, a Russia without Navalny will be worse than a Russia with Navalny.’</blockquote><p>Nothing but health for him.</p><p>This piece was written on 21 August 2020, and updated on 24 August.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9062839ac5cf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Etranges liaisons. Mélenchon, Chikirou et la vie privée “à la française”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/etranges-liaisons-m%C3%A9lenchon-chikirou-et-la-vie-priv%C3%A9e-%C3%A0-la-fran%C3%A7aise-7505a1fa453b?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7505a1fa453b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mélenchon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[france]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politique]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Oct 2018 13:02:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-23T07:58:52.298Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Etranges liaisons. Mélenchon, Chikirou et la vie privée « à la française »</h3><p>C’est donc acquis, <a href="https://www.arretsurimages.net/articles/melenchon-chikirou-mediapart-balance-les-confreres-embarasses">« tout le monde »</a> savait que Jean-Luc Mélenchon entretenait une liaison avec Sophia Chikirou. « Tout le monde », ou le « milieu de la France Insoumise » ou, comme il est d’usage en ces circonstances, « le tout Paris ». Je l’ignorais. Et ce n’est pas faute de lire la presse « politique » française. C’est donc acquis, cette relation relève de la vie privée et ne saurait en rien intéresser le débat public. Ou bien, à la limite, et selon les termes de <em>Médiapart</em>, elle ne s’aurait l’intéresser qu’« à la lueur des investigations judiciaires. » C’est-à-dire que le fait que la même personne cumule les casquettes de commanditaire du chef, de prestataire du chef, et de « compagne » du chef ne présente aucune espèce d’intérêt politique. Pour ma part, je n’en crois rien, et ce, même s’il devait s’avérer que ni Jean-Luc Mélenchon, ni Sophia Chikirou n’ont rien commis d’« illégal. » Il ne s’agit pas de remettre en cause la compétence professionnelle de Sophia Chikirou lors de la campagne présidentielle — j’exclus l’épisode du « Média. » Les comparaisons avec l’affaire Fillon sont donc hors de propos. Mais le cumul de ces relations ne peut que faire planer le soupçon de conflit d’intérêt. Il ne peut que faire planer le doute que les relations entre la direction de la communication d’une campagne, la réalisation de ses prestations, la direction d’un « média » — et d’ailleurs, la gestion d’une violente crise en son sein — sont dictées par des considérations autres que politiques. On m’objectera que rien ne prouve que cela a été effectivement le cas, ce qui n’est pas le propos, car la notion de conflit d’intérêt est bâtie sur l’idée que ce qu’il s’agit de prévenir c’est l’apparence et le soupçon du conflit dans les intérêts dont il est question.</p><p>Un certain nombre de responsables ou soutiens de la FI se sont placés sur le terrain d’une étrange confusion. Après tout, le fait que Sophia Chikirou et Jean-Luc Mélenchon aient des relations « extra-professionnelles », lire, comportant une dimension sexuelle, ne serait en rien différent des relations amicales qui existent dans tout milieu politique. Que le militantisme engendre des relations personnelles fortes, irréductibles à des relations « professionnelles » est une évidence. Mais il me semble particulièrement hasardeux de mettre sur le même plan relations « amicales » et autres. Par ailleurs, je constate que les personnalités politiques ne se privent jamais de se décrire en termes « amicaux », ce genre d’« amitié » ne constituant donc pas des relations à protéger au nom de la vie privée. Je passerai sur l’extraordinaire hypocrisie de certains « insoumis » qui s’égosillent à dénoncer par <em>outing </em>interposé les connivences de la « caste » tout en réclamant la protection de la vie privée du chef.</p><p>Sans rentrer dans des considérations psychologiques sur les différences entre « sexe », « amitié » et « amour », le point crucial ici me semble être qu’il est question de soupçons d’enrichissement personnel, et que les relations « amoureuses » ont <em>potentiellement et fréquemment </em>des conséquences économiques ou patrimoniales. Ce qui n’est qu’exceptionnellement le cas des relations amicales. Dès lors, on ne peut que s’interroger sur la défense étroitement juridique de Jean-Luc Mélenchon : « <em>En toute hypothèse, à l’état civil et aux impôts je suis célibataire.</em> » Comme si, dans notre société, ces relations n’avaient d’effets que lorsqu’elles sont formalisées par la loi.</p><p>Bref, le fait que Sophia Chikirou et Jean-Luc Mélenchon entretiennent une « liaison » constituait une information d’intérêt public à partir du moment où Sophia Chikirou a commencé à occuper des fonctions politique à la FI. Que « tout le monde » l’ait su sans avoir jugé bon de le faire savoir publiquement ne constitue qu’un exemple de plus d’un journalisme de connivence attaché à la protection d’une vie privée « à la française » et dont l’une des fonctions n’est autre que la <a href="http://imagesociale.fr/856">« protection des élites »</a>, une élite à laquelle Jean-Luc Mélenchon appartient sans conteste. De Mazarine Pingeot à Dominique Strauss-Kahn en passant par la relation entre François Hollande et Ségolène Royal lors de sa campagne présidentielle de 2007, ce journalisme-là ne cesse de nous convaincre qu’en termes d’information il y a les <em>happy few</em>, et les autres, toujours destinés à apprendre trop tard.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7505a1fa453b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[In Russia, liberals must live long]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/in-russia-liberals-must-live-long-e7135d7ac585?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e7135d7ac585</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2018 16:18:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-05T11:15:37.041Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A few thoughts on Sobchak and Gudkov’s new party, and Navalny’s strategy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ovHJeV-abutRbKIMwjYUdw.jpeg" /><figcaption>From left to right, Ilya Yashin, Aleksey Navalny, unknown, Elizaveta Osetinskaya, Dmitri Gudkov. Photography by <a href="http://navalny.feldman.photo/events/89/">Evgeny Feldman</a></figcaption></figure><p>In an earlier post, I commented a bit the presidential elections’ results, and the reactions of the liberal opposition to them. I concluded that ‘The future of Russian liberalism is obscure’. While it certainly hasn’t gotten clearer in the last few days, I will try to analyse a bit further the creation of the strategical perspectives of Russian liberals. I will look into the creation of the ‘Party of changes’ by Ksenya Sobchak and Dmitri Gudkov, and reflect on Navalny’s strategy.</p><p>What is at stake here?</p><p>The struggle for power. If not to say, the struggle for life. Dmitri Gudkov accurately used a biological metaphor, saying that:</p><blockquote>‘this struggle is fiercest of all <em>within a species</em>’</blockquote><p>Liberals make no exception.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/425/1*eP3GxRYtbfLwIu50aKg_aw.png" /><figcaption>Dmitri Gudkov</figcaption></figure><p>In this case, the struggle is not determined by ideological considerations. In two lengthy interviews, to <a href="https://www.znak.com/2018-03-21/dmitriy_gudkov_o_dogovorennostyah_s_sobchak_otnosheniyah_s_yavlinskim_i_povestke_buduchego."><em>Znak </em></a>and <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/03/21/75886-ya-privyk-lyudyam-verit"><em>Novaya Gazeta</em></a>, Dmitry Gudkov has elaborated a bit where he believes his new party should stand, and this is clearly to the right of the liberal field: pro-market but not libertarian, peppered with tech enthusiasm and ‘pragmatism’.</p><p>But, breaking with the habit of disguising the clash of ambitions under ideological disagreements, Gudkov has barely tried to the argue that the party will fill an ideological void or compete with other liberal parties on ‘issues’. The party is designed to be a vehicle for Gudkov and Sobchak’s ambitions — and hopefully other people from their ‘generation’. It is meant to carry weight against other liberal organizations, and more especially, Yabloko. Sobchak has been less talkative about the party, this is why I will concentrate on what transpires from Gudkov’s declarations.</p><p>Gudkov has apparently accumulated a number of grievances against Yabloko and Yavlinsky in particular. These grievances seem to revolve around the perspective of the Moscow mayoral elections — a position he covets, though with a healthy measure of denial. He has listed manifestations of insufficient consideration from the Yavlinsky campaign. He added:</p><blockquote>Yavlinsky didn’t want even to meet with me in order to discuss the Yabloko primaries for the Moscow mayoral elections. And he constantly appeared with the slogan “Yavlinsky for president, Mitrokhin for Mayor [of Moscow]”. I received enough signals that Yabloko didn’t need me.</blockquote><p>He concluded that what he received from Yavlinsky was:</p><blockquote>Total refusal and ghosting [polnyi otkaz i ignor]</blockquote><p>In other words, Gudkov believed that Yabloko was leaving him in a position inferior to what he believes to deserve. He is wary that Yavlinsky will support Sergey Mitrokhin’s run in the Moscow mayoral elections. Following the <a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2017/09/11/uspeh-ob-edinennyh-demokratov-i-yabloka-v-moskve-kak-im-eto-udalos.">good results</a> of ‘liberal candidates’ in the 2017 municipal elections in Moscow, both Gudkov and Mitrokhin have announced that they plan to be candidates in the next Moscow mayoral elections, scheduled in September 2018. Sergey Mitrokhin had already balloted in 2013, and got rather unimpressive results: with 81 493 votes, 3,51 % he was squarely defeated by Navalny and his 27%. Gudkov also has ideas opinions about how the ‘primaries’ should be organized:</p><blockquote>To get results, we need a single candidate. I propose this plan: there must primaries but organized in such way that all players will have an interest in participating. First: presentation of programs, then presentation of teams, strategies, tactics, and then debates. The decision would be taken in two rounds. First, the Moscow independent deputies would vote. It’s logical since we’re electing the mayor of Moscow. Then, second round: a round table where Yabloko, the Party of Changes, Parnas, Navalny <em>[and his team]</em> and Open Russia <em>[the foundation of Mikhail Khodorkovsky] </em>must be represented.</blockquote><p>How is this mechanism supposed to work is obscure — even to Gudkov, who admits he hasn’t thought it out yet. But, by giving the first call to ‘independent Moscow deputies’, this system would almost certainly favour Gudkov himself, since they were elected with his support.</p><p>Gudkov’s disenchantment with Yabloko is understandable. Mitrokhin is not an extremely convincing candidate. Yavlinsky’s campaign has been an unmitigated disaster — and one in want of an analysis. He doesn’t appear anywhere near retirement. He still seems to command a position of authority in the party apparat — and perhaps, the hearts and minds of the party’s activists. His support to Slabunova allowed her to take the party over Shlosberg who was, on paper, a more popular and attractive figure. Gudkov would certainly not be the first young, ambitious politician to be disillusioned with Yabloko. <a href="https://daily.afisha.ru/archive/gorod/archive/new-politics-navalny/">Interviewed in 2012 by <em>Afisha</em></a>, Ilya Yashin, once the leader of the youth branch of the party, noted:</p><blockquote>The moment you start pretending to actually influence politics in that party, your career is over. You’re either expelled or pressured into leaving.</blockquote><p>Ksenya Sobchak doesn’t seem extremely disappointed by her score and is keen to build on the ‘momentum’ of her campaign — for lack of a better word. She’s rich, well-know — though with very high negative ratings — and has the appropriate connections that allowed her to be a candidate in the first place. Her personal history allows her to be a bridge between different generations of liberals.</p><p>These connections or ‘administrative resources’ can allow her and Gudkov to occupy a niche in electoral politics. Since it is unclear whether Navalny — or anyone associated with him — will be allowed again on the ballot, it’s rational for them to think that some political space is up for grabs. The party in the name of which she has been candidate, the ‘Civic initiative’ has a party license — a precious thing in Russian liberalism today, one thing that was constantly denied to Navalny. Only two other noticeable liberal parties have that license: Yabloko and RPR-PARNAS. I have covered the subject of the former. The latter is in limbo, since its former and extremely unpopular leader Mikhail Kasyanov has stepped down the brutal revelations of a sex-scandal by state television.</p><p>As I was writing earlier, Navalny has clearly refused to join Sobchak and Gudkov. He believes that they’re only part of a ‘Kremlin project’ to legitimize the presidential elections. While we do not know whether this was the case, Sobchak’s participation in the presidential elections is unthinkable without, at the very least, a nod from the presidential administration. Besides, Navalny’s brother still sits in jail, he and his associates are subject to constant harassment by the authorities, so it is understandable he does not rejoice at the perspective of joining such an alliance.</p><p>In a recent and terribly biting <a href="https://navalny.com/p/5824/">post</a>, Navalny has given a thorough analysis of the performance of liberal candidates in the last elections. This analysis helps to explain why he is not ready for any such alliance. It also sheds light on the disaster. <a href="https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/why-i-lost-and-what-conclusions-we-should-draw-e11cf0f47de9">I translated it in full and enjoin you to read it</a>. I will only concentrate on the most interesting points.</p><p>First, of course, the scale of the disaster is unprecedented — even for notoriously unsuccessful liberals:</p><blockquote>Because, however lazy, cowardly, and useless these three candidates may be, they still had to manage to get 3,49% together. Less than Khakamada alone in 2004 [Irina Khakamada balloted as an independent and was the only liberal on the ballot.] She received 3,84%. By the way, Yabloko then called for the boycott of the elections.</blockquote><blockquote>The funniest and most ridiculous presidential candidate ever, Zhirinovsky’s bodyguard, Malyshkin got once 2,02% [in 2004].</blockquote><p>Second, liberal campaigns are still as bad as they were ever:</p><blockquote>I thought Yavlinsky would mobilize the liberal electorate with some sharp statements. I thought that Sobchak would tap into the provincial electorate with her notoriety and the stars she would invite at the last moment. And I thought that Titov would come up with some oligarchs/businessmen, and would get one and half percent from blockheads hypnotized by the opinion of ‘successful people from the Forbes list’.</blockquote><blockquote>That was the most obvious. They couldn’t do more — that’s what I thought. They got teams, money. Of course, some of that money would be stolen by crooks from their teams, but they couldn’t fail to get that bare minimum.</blockquote><blockquote>It turns out, they could. Yavlinsky released an ad, whose substance was distinctly abstract.</blockquote><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FCE93nc3OuyU%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DCE93nc3OuyU&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FCE93nc3OuyU%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/930981d280580f22a7d38d8a1a428d4d/href">https://medium.com/media/930981d280580f22a7d38d8a1a428d4d/href</a></iframe><p>[This very cute ad has the following message: ‘10% of angora wool in your sweater won’t unleash economic growth. 10% for Yavlinsky will’.]</p><blockquote>Even though people who know anything about politics know perfectly well that neither Yavlinsky, nor Yabloko NEVER got 10% in their whole existence. And those who don’t know much about politics didn’t understand what’s this and what is it about.</blockquote><blockquote>The ‘last trick’ of the Yabloko campaign was that whole, wild business with the distribution of 30 million newspapers in the last three weeks of the campaign. Or 80 million. That is: a huge quantity of pulp literature <em>[or recycling paper?]</em> in the last days of the campaign, when each and every mail box in the country is crammed with precisely that same literature. I was just amazed at how people who believe themselves to be very intelligent can turn into idiots.</blockquote><blockquote>We have distributed 10 million newspapers.</blockquote><blockquote>We have distributed 20 million newspapers. Hurray, results are near.</blockquote><blockquote>In other words, the number of distributed newspapers became the goal of the campaign. In the newspaper it was written that Yavlinsky could have saved the Soviet Union. At the ‘Avtozavodskaya’ metro station, you could see hefty bundles of these newspapers in every bin. No doubt were they included in these triumphant statistics.</blockquote><blockquote>Sobchak’s team was of course the most disastrous. It was clear that Malashenko [her campaign manager] had been side-lined. The campaign was led by somebody else — and it’s interesting even the daily <em>Vedomosti</em> with its powerful politics staff couldn’t find who it was.</blockquote><blockquote>The main campaign events were organized by the Presidential administration and Sobyanin <em>[the Mayor of Moscow]</em> . . .</blockquote><blockquote>Not a single more or less famous person has supported Sobchak publicly. I can only remember Ulitskaya <em>[a famous writer, associated with ‘liberals]</em>, but she’s not the kind of celebrity Sobchak needed. No business figure, no musician, no socialite, no sport star. Apparently, it was shameful to participate in this. Even at a concert organized at the height of the campaign only the Surganova band showed up.</blockquote><blockquote>I understand that much hope was placed on the surprising move of Dmitry Gudkov who supported Yavlinsky all the way . . . only to say three days before the vote, that he supports Sobchak, and to talk at her concert. It’s possible that this really took some votes from Yavlinsky and added some for Sobchak, but only a handful. Even those who are critical of Yavlinsky could simply not like that move. As to Titov, the only thing that can be said is the joke ‘What’s Titov?’ <em>[one of his campaign ads asked precisely that question, </em>and that question only<em>]</em>. Stupid spin doctors and political advisors came up with a stupid idea, and where happy that people are laughing at it on the internet. See, the notoriety of Titov’s name is on the rise!</blockquote><blockquote>I hoped that there would be an original sequel to the ad. “That’s Titov!” But there wasn’t enough creativity around to do that.</blockquote><p>This analysis speaks for itself, but I will add one point. Liberals still display the same inability to communicate what they stand for. The case of Sobchak is telling. When she announced her candidacy, she promised to run as a fire-brand ‘populist’ under the slogan ‘Sobchak against all’. Whatever one thinks of the slogan, it is at least well-known since it used to be possible to vote ‘against all’ candidates in Russian elections. Unexpectedly, she ended up running on a rather tame and mainstream liberal ‘For truth, for freedom, for Sobchak’ platform.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/1*I_P02CmlVPw3biIzxpopnw.png" /></figure><p>Yavlinsky’s campaign was equally undetermined, unclear, and unfocused. I could not help but think about this analysis of his <em>1995 </em>presidential campaign:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/608/1*J0ZymSa9iTdWndhZ3Kemwg.png" /><figcaption>Steven Fish, The Predicament of Russian Liberalism: Evidence from the December 1995 Parliamentary Elections. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, №2 (Mar., 1997)</figcaption></figure><p>By the way, all those interested in Russian liberalism or Russian politics as a whole should read this <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/153984">fascinating take on so many clichés</a> obscuring the study of Russian politics.</p><p>Navalny concluded his piece by calling for the ‘creation of an opposition’.</p><blockquote>Political scientists scribble op-eds, discuss perspectives.</blockquote><blockquote>The possibility of coalitions, common action and the ‘unification of the opposition’ are endlessly discussed.</blockquote><blockquote>Three percent forty-nine for all, my friends. There’s no future for this in 2018, in 2012, in 2024 or in 2666. There are some administrative resources (party licenses), but it’s not worth a penny, if there’s no support from people.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>We should not discuss the ‘unification of the opposition’ but the creation of an opposition.</strong></blockquote><blockquote>First, ideologically, and then in terms of organization. In 2018, we can’t consider ‘opposition’ something that dates back from 1996. We’re once again stuck with Yabloko and SPS. We shouldn’t, it’s not interesting, it’s not viable, and voters can’t understand this.</blockquote><blockquote>The task of democratic- and opposition-minded voters is to help the creation of an opposition, and not to convince themselves that it’s necessary to revive something that was born dead.</blockquote><blockquote>We must discuss the fight for 60%, and not for 10% or 5,5% or 3,49%.</blockquote><p>Democratically oriented Russians are given a stark choice. Either they follow Sobchak or Gudkov (or, of course, Yabloko) in trying to work their way through the small cracks of the system. This strategy, dubbed the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/the-symbolic-meaning-of-the-presidential-elections">‘liberal ghetto’</a> by Russian political scientist Alexander Kynev, can perhaps wield some results in terms of seats and a sense of marginal representation — at least in big cities. Or they can choose to follow Navalny in his attempts to create a ‘new majority’ that will perhaps, some day, overthrow the whole system. His position can have the appeal of the ‘moral high ground’ — but one can ask whether many will find it appealing. They can choose to fight some skirmishes, or to prepare for a great battle. For the moment, none of these options has yielded results, and it remains to be seen whether they will in the future. In Russia, you must live long, as they say.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e7135d7ac585" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Navalny: ‘Why I lost. And What Conclusions We Should Draw’]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/why-i-lost-and-what-conclusions-we-should-draw-e11cf0f47de9?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e11cf0f47de9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2018 16:16:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-26T21:21:41.325Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*058Gp3TgRsvkPAlmFeSWJA.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="http://navalny.feldman.photo/events/89/">Evgeny Feldman</a></figcaption></figure><p>Translation of <a href="https://navalny.com/p/5824/">Aleksey Navalny’s post,</a> 25 march 2018</p><p>Even before Volkov and Pivovarov were arrested, we sat and drank coffee, all four of us: Yashin, Pivovarov, Volkov and me. We discussed the elections and the perspectives of those who call themselves the ‘democratic opposition’. Or the liberal opposition, whatever. Yavlinksy, Sobchak, Titov.</p><p>A bit less of a month remained before the elections.</p><p>There was different prognostics, and we decided to have a bet. Each of us gave his prognostic and we wrote them down on a napkin. Here it is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/591/1*wXYBVBJBRvRjRex-WtoD9w.png" /></figure><p>Yesterday, Volkov was released in Moscow, and Pivovarov in Moscow, so we can see the results:</p><p>Aleksey Navalny:</p><p>Yavlinsky: 2,2%; Sobchak: 2,4%; Titov: 1,5%</p><p>Andrey Pivovarov:</p><p>Yavlinsky: 1,5%; Sobchak: 1,2%; Titov: 1,1%</p><p>Ilya Yashin:</p><p>Yavlinsky: 1,5%; Sobchak: 2%; Titov: 1%</p><p>Leonid Volkov:</p><p>Yavlinsky: 2%; Sobchak: 1%; Titov: 1,5%</p><p>The results:</p><p>Yavlinsky: 1,05%; Sobchak: 1,68%; Titov: 0,76%</p><p>3,49 all together. The horror.</p><p>The sum of the difference between prognostics and results is:</p><p>Navalny: 2,61</p><p>Volkov: 2,37</p><p>Pivovarov: 1,27</p><p>Yashin: 1,01</p><p>Yashin comes first, second, Pivovarov, then Volkov, and, well, me. I was completely licked.</p><p>I am now sitting and thinking, why? Because, however lazy, cowardly, and useless these three candidates may be, they still had to manage to stoop to 3,49% together. Less than Khakamada alone in 2004 [Irina Khakamada balloted as an independent and was the only liberal on the ballot.] She received 3,84%. By the way, Yabloko then called for the boycott of the elections.</p><p>The funniest and most ridiculous presidential candidate ever, Zhirinovsky’s bodyguard, Malyshkin got once 2,02% [in 2004].</p><p>My main mistake was that I proceeded from the fact that democrats are in a unique position: for the first time in many years, they’re not hammered on TV [их не мочат по телевизору] The criticisms were focused on Grudinin [the communist candidate], and the coverage of Yavlinsky, Sobchak and Titov was complimentary or neutral in any case. Sobchak was constantly praised, hellish talk-shows changed their format to show her alone in the studio, without the aggressive, yelling audience.</p><p>This is why I expected a better score than what they got. I thought Yavlinsky would mobilize the liberal electorate with some sharp statements. I thought that Sobchak would tap into the provincial electorate with her notoriety and the stars she would invite at the last moment. And I thought that Titov would come up with some oligarchs/businessmen, and would get one and half percent from blockheads hypnotized by the opinion of ‘successful people from the Forbes list’</p><p>That was the most obvious. They couldn’t do more — that’s what I thought. They got teams, money. Of course, some of that money would be stolen by crooks from their teams, but they couldn’t fail to get that bare minimum.</p><p>It turns out, they could. Yavlinsky released an ad, whose substance was distinctly abstract.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FCE93nc3OuyU%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DCE93nc3OuyU&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FCE93nc3OuyU%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/930981d280580f22a7d38d8a1a428d4d/href">https://medium.com/media/930981d280580f22a7d38d8a1a428d4d/href</a></iframe><p>[This very cute ad has the following message. 10% of angora wool in your sweater won’t unleash economic growth. 10% for Yavlinsky will.]</p><p>Even though people who know anything about politics know perfectly well that neither Yavlinsky, nor Yabloko NEVER got 10% in their whole existence. And those who don’t know much about politics didn’t understand what’s this and what is it about.</p><p>The ‘last trick’ of the Yabloko campaign was that whole, wild business with the distribution of 30 million newspapers in the last three weeks of the campaign. Or 80 million. That is: a huge quantity of pulp literature [or recycling paper?] in the last days of the campaign, when each and every mail box in the country is crammed with precisely that same literature. I was just amazed at how people who believe themselves to be very intelligent can turn into idiots.</p><p>- We have distributed 10 million newspapers.</p><p>- We have distributed 20 million newspapers. Hurray, results are near.</p><p>In other words, the number of distributed newspapers became the goal of the campaign. In the newspaper it was written that Yavlinsky could have saved the Soviet Union. At the ‘Avtozavodskaya’ metro station, you could see hefty bundles of these newspapers in every bin. No doubt were they included in these triumphant statistics.</p><p>Sobchak’s team was of course the most disastrous. It was clear that Malashenko [her campaign manager] had been side-lined. The campaign was led by somebody else — and it’s interesting even the daily <em>Vedomosti</em> with its powerful politics staff couldn’t find who it was.</p><p>The main campaign events were organized by the Presidential administration and Sobyanin [the Mayor of Moscow] . . .</p><p>Not a single more or less famous person has supported Sobchak publicly. I can only remember Ulitskaya [a famous Russian writer, associated with ‘liberals’], but she’s not the kind of celebrity Sobchak needed. No business figure, no musician, no socialite, no sport star. Apparently, it was shameful to participate in this. Even at a concert organized at the height of the campaign only the Surganova band showed up.</p><p>I understand that much hope was placed on the surprising move of Dmitry Gudkov who supported Yavlinsky all the way . . . only to say three days before the vote, that he supports Sobchak, and to talk at her concert. It’s possible that this really took some votes from Yavlinsky and added some for Sobchak, but only a handful. Even those who are critical of Yavlinsky could simply not like that move. As to Titov, the only thing that can be said is the joke ‘What’s Titov?’ [one of his campaign ads asked precisely that question, <em>and that question only</em>]. Stupid spin doctors and political advisors came up with a stupid idea, and where happy that people are laughing at it on the internet. See, the notoriety of Titov’s name is on the rise!</p><p>I hoped that there’d be an original sequel to the ad. ‘That’s Titov!’ But there wasn’t enough creativity around to do that.</p><p>What conclusions can we draw from all this?</p><p>That we should stop doing what I have just done: to waste so many words on these ‘politicians’</p><p>3,49% all together. Even in Moscow, they all lost to Zhirinovsky. It’s unprecedented. But in the discussion of the results of the ‘elections’ and future work, they take 40%, trailing only Putin. Wherever you go, you get questions about first Sobchak and then Yavlinsky.</p><p>Political scientists scribble op-eds, discuss perspectives.</p><p>The possibility of coalitions, common action and the ‘unification of the opposition’ are endlessly discussed.</p><p>Three percent forty-nine for all, my friends. There’s no future for this in 2018, in 2012, in 2024 or in 2666. There’s some administrative resources (party licenses), but it’s not worth a penny, if there’s no support from people.</p><p><strong>We should not discuss the ‘unification of the opposition’ but the creation of an opposition.</strong></p><p>First, ideologically, and then in terms of organization. In 2018, we can’t consider ‘opposition’ something that dates back from 1996. We’re once again stuck with Yabloko and SPS. We shouldn’t, it’s not interesting, it’s not viable, and voters can’t understand this.</p><p>The task of democratic- and opposition-minded voters is to help the creation of an opposition, and not to convince themselves that it’s necessary to revive something that was born dead.</p><p>We must discuss the fight for 60%, and not for 10% or 5,5% or 3,49%.</p><p><strong>Why I lost. And what conclusions we should draw</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e11cf0f47de9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Russian Liberal Opposition: ‘Nothing Has Worked’]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/the-liberal-opposition-nothing-has-worked-4ab125f251e9?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ab125f251e9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:53:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-22T15:01:48.541Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-L2MqymMgHHkrgcI1x_Hvw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aleksey Navalny debating with Ksenya Sobchak on election night. Evgeny Feldman, <a href="http://navalny.feldman.photo/">http://navalny.feldman.photo/</a></figcaption></figure><p>‘Democratically oriented’ Russians had basically three strategies left to them in these elections. To vote for one of the two liberal candidates: Ksenya Sobchak or Grigori Yavlinsky. To boycott the elections. To rally around the main opposition candidate, the communist Pavel Grudinin. The results are in and Max Katz, a political organizer and consultant — known in Russia as a ‘<em>politechnologist</em>’ — has nailed it: <a href="https://maxkatz.livejournal.com/687581.html">‘Nothing has worked’</a>:</p><blockquote>The opponents of Putin have put forward many strategies. And none of them has worked. The boycott hasn’t worked: the turnout is very high and — it seems — will not be artificially propped. The calls to spoil bulletins haven’t worked — there is few of them. Voting for Sobchak hasn’t worked: her score is very low. Voting for Grudinin hasn’t worked . . . his score is lower than Zyuganov’s [the leader of the Communist party] in the last presidential elections. And our calls to vote for Yavlinsky haven’t worked either.</blockquote><p>Max Katz was supporting — and working for — Grigori Yavlinsky, from the ‘Yabloko’ party. Twice a presidential candidate — in 1996 and 2000 — the leader of Yabloko, Grigori Iavlinski, is a well-known figure in Russian politics — perhaps even too well known. With more than 99% votes counted, his result is disastrous:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/191/1*6yrLMyjO1YHUQoIlI6Tkhg.png" /></figure><p>For the record, he received 7.34% of the vote in 1996 — that’s more than 7 times more votes — and 5.8% in 2000 — more than 5 times more votes. In 2004 he called all Russian democrats to boycott the presidential elections, а ‘farce’, an ‘imitation of democratic procedures’ — something many Russian liberals were keen to remind him this time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*RnD7QZ29uhZ4CpKyn1SzsQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2004/02/21/yabloko/">Lenta</a></figcaption></figure><p>His main competitor for the ‘liberal electorate’, Ksenya Sobchak, fared only slightly ‘better’ — for lack of a more adequate word:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/190/1*YZyNV0zZr2yFge9RzZXS8A.png" /></figure><p>Ksenia Sobchak is the daughter of Vladimir Putin’s mentor — the late mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoli Sobchak — who started her career as a socialite and TV star before turning to opposition politics and journalism.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/242/1*pvSENhKw77p2P-1j6VdyqQ.png" /><figcaption>Aleksey Navalny ‘I won’t vote’</figcaption></figure><p>Aleksey Navalny was denied participation in the elections and decided to call for a boycott — or ‘Voters’ strike’. The result is equally disappointing. Participation is at quite high levels, even surpassing participation at the 2012 presidential elections (65%). As could be expected, there was many rows over the amount of ‘falsifications’. Graphs of elections results show the traditional ‘spikes’ indicating that the Putin vote and the turn-out were propped:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/923/1*V9O7BVfWJpJgxi1I_4IOsg.png" /></figure><p>However, as <a href="https://kobak.livejournal.com/111535.html">the author of these graphs pointed</a>:</p><blockquote>These graphs should *NOT* be used to determine ‘non-falsificated results’. Such a precise determination can only be made through the accurate measurement region by region. As an approximation, we can say that the ‘real’ turnout and Putin vote is to be found around the mode [the value that appears most often] of this histogram, that is somewhere around 61–62% for the turnout, and 74–75% for the Putin vote. The official figures are: 68% for the turnout, and 77% for the Putin vote. Navalny’s team has estimated the ‘real’ turnout to be 55%, and this figure seems strongly underestimated to me.</blockquote><p>Whatever the ‘real’ turnout and Putin vote will be, we should not lose sight of the big picture: the ‘integrity’ of the electoral process in Russia goes well beyond ‘electoral engineering’, and ‘falsifications’ in a narrow sense. All the system of political domination in Russia is in question.</p><p>It is unlikely that fraud worked to lower much the results of the ‘opposition candidates’. <a href="https://www.facebook.com/navalny/posts/1864215090264232">Navalny congratulated his ‘sociological office’</a> for somewhat accurately predicting the landslide:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/469/1*0YpdJggfWCAqSfgomWyUQA.png" /></figure><p>Blue is for a poll conducted on 16–22 February, red for one conducted on 5–7 March, and 12–14 March. ‘1000 thousands Russian citizens over 18 were asked by telephone’. 80% of them indicated they would ‘possibly’ participate in the elections. Top-Below are: Putin, Grudinin, Jirinovsky, Sobchak, Yavlinsky, Titov, other. Again, the dismal results of the ‘opposition candidates’ must be explained by other factors than ‘electoral falsification’ in a narrow sense.</p><p>Last, the results in Moscow are equally disastrous. Max Katz entitled a <a href="https://maxkatz.livejournal.com/688091.html">blog post ‘Putinist Moscow’</a>, which is accurate. The results are surprising because candidates from Yabloko and the ‘United Democrats’ fared well in September, at the Moscow Duma elections. These relatively good results have been wiped out:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*wx9jLQGLxnG28i54by48eA.png" /></figure><p>Blue is 2012, orange, 2018.</p><p>From left to right: the Putin vote; the ‘liberal’ Prokhorov (‘liberal’ presidential candidate in 2012) vote <em>vs </em>the added scores of Sobchak and Yavlinsky; the turnout.</p><p>The turnout is even better this year, while it appears the Moscow vote has been <a href="https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=ms.c.eJxFlNeNZTEMQztaKIf~_G1uM~_Mz7e0BR0dZK78mMaBXp~%3BKc~%3BsOpd7U1QUPgD5VB8AIoiaD2QQ1AXYkIwI~_E~_8cAgJBgyeYpmHSsARlAHqghgWs~_0RAGUIA6wsJK5tEaFog6lQjEgTYL~_66V6HzA7hTRBQSEEc6Bo6gnAtD7RsrsEIafIIkDpX2GBbpXdpl1IfABZgqaFecgHbsi2LL1Qx1dY24GkovtChvMYA2C3E5dWjQAhvLFaBWCWrcvCk6pdgGfacs3lBsFt3zig1kubYwQCxQfutJMn1QbTpqlhHjz~_djT31WEoTAj8ziHznUMHmuNJdSBt0DTiz2M4wsbmkpvrvGWbDMHtZTixLjQnbK5gWjT9e4Syw1vvhkfSYxASDJkGoOnKAWdze93GPjBydWgZwR3M2K~%3BbVXwoypmO3mnHFIEBBMGtQTmxsftygn~%3BQYJXRnwKlcx7jtwb11~_3KKdp~_ihW5Xmz2ARRmr7AVfFv2vq2Vupnme8greB75nsdK70jYjD8wfoqg6SRAPLAwdZpun8db5arc~%3B6EzBHmK7P~_Zoi37.bps.a.1653785434710086.1073741834.100002359376948&amp;type=1&amp;pnref=story">relatively ‘clean’</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/932/1*Ton5yzOSZ9XKFk1m21yxLA.png" /></figure><p>If there was ever one place where Navalny’s call for boycott should have been heard, it’s Moscow. The results speak for themselves. By the way, the ‘cleanness’ of the results in Moscow shows that the authorities have learned from their mistakes. One of the factors in the 2011–2012 protests was certainly the absurd results in the 2011 Duma elections in Moscow. Not a man to give up easily, Navalny struck an optimistic tone, saying in substance that ‘you’ should be happy that ‘you’ didn’t participate in this scam. Max Katz was more pessimistic and bitter. His pessimism appears to be warranted.</p><p>The liberal opposition is stuck with the same dilemma: to participate and be ridiculed — legitimizing the process in the meantime; or to boycott and not be heard — being drowned in the ‘apathetic minority’ in the meantime. The 2018 presidential elections show that a way out is nowhere to be found.</p><p>It seems extremely difficult to believe that Sobchak has built any legitimacy in these elections. She does believe so, and has announced that she will be teaming with Dmitri Gudkov to form a new party: the ‘Party of Changes’. Since the history of Russian liberalism is a cemetery of failed parties — or, rather, groupuscules — this attempt can only be regarded with a good measure of scepticism.</p><p>Navalny appears less scathed. Aleksey Venediktov, editor-in-chief of the Echo of Moscow radio station <a href="https://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/2167214-echo/">made an interesting point</a>:</p><blockquote>As I understand, Navalny’s tactic didn’t have an anti-Putin goal. He needed to destroy [razbit’] his potential opponents [in the liberal wing], to show their insignificance without him. And he has succeeded. He won. The first winner is Putin . . . The second winner is Navalny who has achieved its goals, but not in the sense of a boycott of Putin. On the contrary, Putin’s results have soared . . . Yavlinsky and Sobchak . . . have received, if I remember well, around 250,000 votes in Moscow, whereas Prokhorov received 800,000, and Navalny, 600,000.</blockquote><p>Navalny <a href="https://navalny.com/p/5820/">has rejected this kind of analysis</a> bombarding that he considers himself in a completely different league than his ‘liberal competitors’:</p><blockquote>Some are writing that a secondary result of [our boycott] the elections is the low results of Yavlinsky and Sobchak. Like, we kept their voters at home. But, my friends, they don’t have voters, and this is why they were allowed to participate . . . Under no circumstance would Sobchak, Yavlinsky, Titov would have received more than what they got. They don’t have a substantial amount of supporters. If a couple of months ago, I called to vote for them, the result would have been the same, but a <em>couple of million people</em> would have thought that ‘Navalny is an idiot’. <em>[emphasis mine.]</em></blockquote><p>Incidently, the ‘couple of million’ figure may be just a way of saying, or it could be a slip, indicating the number of supporters Navalny believes he has across the country. He has anyway been definite in his answer to the question: ‘has the boycott been successful?’: YES.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*muENoY5X_FlgDAouAKs54g.png" /></figure><p>What allows him to believe that? According to him, the main success of the boycott lies in the fact that the campaign revolved around him — which is partly true:</p><blockquote>It was a forced step. We wanted to participate in the elections, we got prepared, and we were the only ones — apart from Putin — who participated in the campaign.</blockquote><blockquote>Everything is simple about the strike. Why was it successful?</blockquote><blockquote>We said: if you don’t let us participate in the elections, we will call for a boycott, and discredit the turn-out so much that you’ll have to do again mass falsifications, like in 2011. And everybody will see: Putin was elected in fraudulent elections.</blockquote><blockquote>And Putin answered: I don’t care, I will chase people with administrative ressources so much, that the turnout will be higher than in 2012.</blockquote><blockquote>That’s it. From that moment, all these ‘elections’ turned into a confrontation between the strike’s headquarters and the Kremlin headquarters to chase turnout. It was a political process. We relied on honest and brave people. They relied on administrative and security resources.</blockquote><p>Navalny then went on with a very strange argument, one that was practically unheard before: that the authorities decreased the number of <em>registered </em>voters in order to boost the turnout: ‘2012: about 110 million <em>registered</em> voters. The reunification of Crimea added 1,8 million <em>registered</em> voters. According to documents by the Internal Affairs Ministry, 600,000 immigrants were given citizenship.’ According to Navalny we should add to this the demographic growth ‘about which Putin speaks in all his big speeches’. But, it turns out, only 109 million people were registered to vote in the 2018 presidential elections. If you add the falsifications to this ‘registration fraud’, then turnout in 2018 is lower than in 2012.</p><p>The problem with this line of reasoning is that Navalny — in good faith or not, we don’t know — is confusing the growth of the population with the growth of the population over 18. As <a href="https://kobak.livejournal.com/111721.html">pointed by a statistician</a> — and an avowed supporter of Navalny:</p><blockquote>Between 2012 and 2018, according to the demographic data, 7,8 million Russian citizens have turned 18. In the same time, 11,4 people have died. Which makes: 7,8–11,4 = -3,6 That is, <em>exactly </em>the number Navalny has found.</blockquote><blockquote>He talks about the growth of the population, and there is really a growth of the population, but in the meantime, the number of <em>registered voters</em> is decreasing, because of the collapse in natality in the 90’s. This collapse explains why on the 2012–2018 period, the number of people turning 18 is decreasing. Judging by the age pyramid, the number of registered voters will continue to decrease in the next 10 years.</blockquote><p>It’s therefore difficult to argue that boycott wasn’t a failure, if only in terms of turnout in big cities. They could aslso be <a href="https://republic.ru/posts/90066">impossible to assess altogether</a>, as argued by Oleg Kashin, or, by the way, as shown involuntarily by the very <a href="https://mmironov.livejournal.com/40136.html">convoluted arguments </a>some of his supporters are making.</p><p>But what if he had participated? One of his allies, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/yashin.ilya/posts/1668622019858103">Ilya Yashin, tried to reassure</a> his supporters, arguing that when real opposition candidates are allowed on the ballot, they can indeed get good results, citing Navalny’s 27% in the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections, Evgueny Royzman’s victory in Ekaterinburg, and less impressive ‘victories’. But will these candidates be ever allowed on the ballot again? A partial answer came in a day after this question was raised. <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3578818"><em>Kommersant Ural </em>announced</a> that the Ural regional legislature will consider a bill replacing the direct election of the mayor of Ekaterinburg with an indirect election.</p><p>Judging from last night debates, Navalny’s next moves are unknown. He is navigating relentlessly between anti-corruption whistleblowing, electoral politics in the traditional sense, and the politics of elections: election monitoring and attempts at delegitimizing them altogether in the eyes of the Russian public. His ubiquity his one of his main forces — but without results, how long can it last? He has flatly rejected any alliance with Sobchak and Gudkov, so the holy grail of Russian liberals — unity — is nowhere in sight, for good or for ill. The future of Russian liberalism is obscure indeed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ab125f251e9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Les sources du poutinisme]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/les-sources-du-poutinisme-776bf70111d1?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/776bf70111d1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russie]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politique]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jul 2017 11:17:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-02T18:47:55.155Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*b_uHsHCD9yYOUT5zuEvP_g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Boris Eltsine, lors de l’investiture de Vladimir Poutine (Vladimir Vyatkin, RIA Novosti)</figcaption></figure><p>Traduction d’un article de fond de l’économiste russe Vladislav Inozemtsev, paru dans <a href="https://snob.ru/selected/entry/115098"><em>Snob</em>,</a> le 18 octobre 2016.</p><p>Chaque fois que se rassemblent des démocrates ou des libéraux de Russie, la discussion tourne autour de cette éternelle question russe : « que faire ? » Hélas, la réponse est introuvable : ni jouer avec le mécontentement social, ni inventer des slogans attractifs, ni coordonner l’opposition n’a fonctionné. Le pays sombre plus profondément chaque année dans l’isolement et l’obscurantisme, s’imprègne de militarisme et de mentalité impériale. Dans le même temps, les démocrates ne se posent que rarement une question non moins traditionnelle en Russie : « qui est coupable ? » Pour une raison très simple : la réponse est évidente. Vladimir Poutine et sa « clique criminelle » sont les coupables qui ont accaparé le pays, zombifié le peuple, à coup de sales pétrodollars. Cette explication ne prend pas en compte un point important : la Russie que Poutine a, de fait, transformé en sa propriété personnelle, n’a pas été conquise aux autorités démocratiques. Vladimir Poutine lui-même a été formé au sein de l’équipe de l’incorruptible tribun du peuple Anatoly Sobtchak, l’un des leaders reconnus du mouvement démocratique en Russie. Il a été pris par la main jusqu’au Kremlin par le père de la nouvelle Russie : Boris Eltsine. Ses pouvoirs ont été fixés par les normes de la constitution, soi-disant « la plus démocratique » (adoptée en 1993, NDT). Dès lors, les vétérans de la « Russie libre » qui se plaignent de la vie sous Poutine alors qu’eux-mêmes l’ont créé et mis entre ses mains un pouvoir illimité, ne peuvent s’en prendre qu’à eux-mêmes.</p><p>Ce sont eux qui ont rendu leur retour au pouvoir impossible. Leurs réformes ont conduit à ce que l’économie s’effondre d’un tiers et que la moitié de la population se retrouve sous le seuil de pauvreté. Ils ont tiré au clair les relations avec le parlement légalement élu avec des moyens militaires. Leur gestion des finances publiques a mené au défaut de paiement et à la dévaluation de 1998. L’arrivée au pouvoir de Vladimir Poutine et l’instauration consécutive d’un pouvoir corporatiste et autoritaire n’est en rien un hasard. Les sources du poutinisme remontent aux origines de la nouvelle Russie post-soviétique.</p><p>En premier lieu, ce qui est tenu pour principal mérite des autorités des années 1990, la privatisation, a consisté à transférer les grandes entreprises en des mains privées pratiquement pour rien, et à dessein. Le gouvernement a ainsi instauré un système dans lequel les oligarques nationaux disposent d’une supériorité sur n’importe quel nouveau concurrent. Cette situation a conduit à l’absence de demande pour les nouvelles technologies et la « dépendance aux matières premières. » Les démocrates des années 1990 n’ont pas utilisé les initiatives des investisseurs dans un but de développement : l’entreprise privée a été un instrument de transformation sociale et non économique. Elle a redistribué la richesse publique mais n’a pas assuré sa croissance, qui a été la conséquence de la hausse des prix du pétrole dans les années 2000. La Russie est restée un pays dans lequel la richesse provient de la distribution des actifs. Dans la mesure où le levier principal de celle-ci est l’État, le style de gouvernement de Poutine était conditionné dès l’origine.</p><p>En deuxième lieu, les démocrates russes des années 1990 ne se sont pas montrés si démocrates. Après avoir remporté des élections libres à l’époque soviétique, ils ont fait tout ce qui était possible pour consolider leur pouvoir. Les évènements de 1993 et les élections de 1996 ont constitué les moments critiques de cette consolidation. En 1993, les démocrates ont déclenché une guerre civile locale (en attaquant le parlement élu, dit « Soviet suprême », NDT) et ont lancé des réformes irréversibles des services de sécurité (…). Lors des élections présidentielles de 1996 seules l’unité totale des élites politiques et financières et les intrigues de palais — sur fond d’annonces de paix en Tchétchénie et d’union avec la Biélorussie — ont permis la victoire de Boris Eltsine au second tour. Les années 1993–1996 ont marqué l’achèvement de la perversion de la démocratie. D’une part, l’adoption de la constitution « super-présidentielle » a donné au chef de l’État des pouvoirs d’exception. L’indépendance des procureurs et de la cour constitutionnelle a été liquidée. Une oligarchie bureaucratico-financière unifiée s’est constituée, travaillant à la conservation des autorités existantes. D’autre part, sur le plan de la rhétorique idéologique, la liberté comme valeur a été remplacée par « l’absence d’alternatives » (dont l’équivalent actuel est la « stabilité »), l’affirmation de la souveraineté, la puissance de l’État, la recherche d’une « idée nationale. » La Russie a cessé de se considérer comme une nation tournée vers l’avenir, et a commencé à restaurer les symboles de l’Empire tsariste (la Cathédrale du Christ Saint-Sauveur, l’enterrement des restes de la famille impériale), et a même remboursé une partie des dettes du gouvernement tsariste. À partir de là, l’apologie du soviétisme par Vladimir Poutine était simple : aucun idéal n’était recherché dans l’avenir.</p><p>En troisième lieu, la « démocratisation » de la Russie n’a nullement fait disparaître ses commencements « impériaux. » En dépit de l’effondrement de l’URSS, la Russie a de facto reconnu sans conditions l’indépendance des seuls pays Baltes. « L’instabilité organisée » qui est aujourd’hui appliquée en Ukraine a été utilisée dans d’autres États post-soviétiques. La Russie a participé directement au conflit en Moldavie, au cours duquel la Transnistrie est apparue. Elle a ouvertement soutenu le séparatisme de l’Adjarie, de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud vis-à-vis de la Géorgie. Boris Eltsine a montré que la Russie entendait peser sur toutes les décisions géopolitiques prises dans l’espace post-soviétique. L’annexion de la Crimée aurait été impossible si l’élite du pays n’avait installé dans l’esprit des Russes l’impression que l’intégration de la Crimée en Ukraine était une erreur et une injustice. La Russie a soutenu le régime autoritaire et nationaliste de Slobodan Milošević en Yougoslavie. La guerre en Tchétchénie, si importante à cette époque, menée sous la bannière de l’unité du pays, a fortement contribué à créer la demande d’une « main de fer. » La Russie n’a pas rompu avec son passé impérial, et n’a pas fait grand-chose pour construire une société européenne.</p><p>En quatrième lieu, l’idée d’intégration avec l’Occident, la création de la fameuse « Europe de Lisbonne à Vladivostok » qui, dans les dernières années au pouvoir de Gorbatchev, fut élevée au rang de quasi idéologie d’État, a rapidement disparu de la nouvelle Russie. Le gouvernement n’a pas essayé de faire acte de candidature à l’entrée dans l’Union européenne ou l’OTAN. L’accord de partenariat et de coopération entre l’UE et la Russie ne mentionne pas cette éventualité. L’analyse des déclarations des hommes politiques russes des années 1990 montre qu’entre 1993 et 1996 l’idée d’intégration dans le monde occidental a été remplacée par celles de « partenariat », de « coopération. » Elles correspondent à la vision des élites russes qui fondent leur domination politique et économique sur la souveraineté.</p><p>La Russie n’a eu qu’une brève opportunité de former une classe politique responsable, guidée par les valeurs et les pratiques européennes, la séparation des pouvoirs, la distinction entre administration et oligarchie. Elle a duré du moment où les démocrates étaient au pouvoir en URSS à la fin de 1993. De 1993 à 1997, les autorités ont pris conscience de la nécessité de se débarrasser de partisans convaincus de la démocratie pour se maintenir au pouvoir (…) À partir de 1997–1998, la nouvelle idéologie d’État consiste à s’adresser au peuple comme à un troupeau (…) ; à fondre la haute fonction publique et l’oligarchie ; à rechercher l’idéal dans le passé ; à « redresser la Russie », mais seulement dans l’imaginaire. L’idéologie était formée, et il ne restait plus qu’aux nouveaux leaders à l’appliquer. L’absence d’alternative au pouvoir, l’empressement à recourir à la force contre les opposants, la collusion de l’argent et de la bureaucratie, l’apologie du passé : tous ces fondements du style de gouvernement de Vladimir Poutine n’étaient pas forcément saillants, mais tous étaient présents dès les années les plus « démocratiques » de la nouvelle histoire russe : les années 1990.</p><p>Voilà pourquoi, bien que je puisse critiquer Vladimir Poutine et sa politique, je rejette les analyses qui en font un criminel, ou celles qui prétendent qu’il aurait ruiné la trajectoire de développement de la Russie contemporaine. Vladimir Poutine a bien plutôt capté et renforcé les tendances consciemment créées par ceux pour qui, en 1999, il fallait des « hommes comme Poutine. » De la même manière qu’il existe nombre de liens historiques, idéologiques et pratiques entre l’époque de Staline et celle de Lénine, il existe un lien indissoluble entre l’époque de Eltsine et celle de Poutine. Dès lors, les hommes politiques et les militants qui ont prospéré dans les années 1990 et essaient aujourd’hui de se faire passer pour des opposants ne sont pas dignes du soutien des partisans de l’État de droit et de la liberté en Russie. En installant les conditions politiques et mentales du poutinisme, en laissant le pays à sa direction actuelle, ils ont perdu toute justification éthique les autorisant à retourner au pouvoir. La nouvelle Russie sera construite sans ceux qui l’ont dirigée dans les années 1990 et 2000. Comme l’exemple d’autres régimes autoritaires le montre, cela prendra des années. Mais cela ne signifie pas que les principes de gouvernement construits dans les années 1990 et mis à l’épreuve dans les années 2000 règneront en Russie pour toujours.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=776bf70111d1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[La fin de « Pour votre liberté et pour la nôtre. »]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@morvanlallouet/la-fin-de-pour-votre-libert%C3%A9-et-pour-la-n%C3%B4tre-d38a5362b196?source=rss-1629d62454ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d38a5362b196</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russie]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politique]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Morvan Lallouet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jun 2017 08:07:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-29T13:08:29.674Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QJWYYU4O4Q0ZS0d-lv2ODA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Olga Tochyonaya, brandissant le livre de Cécile Vaissié “Pour votre liberté et pour la nôtre”, Makhatchkala, 12 juin 2017</figcaption></figure><h3>Pourquoi les libéraux ont cessé de s’enthousiasmer pour l’Ukraine.</h3><p>Traduction d’un <a href="https://republic.ru/posts/83012">article</a> d’Oleg Kashin, paru dans <em>Republic</em>, le 18 mai 2017.</p><p>La décision des autorités ukrainiennes de bloquer les réseaux sociaux (<em>Vkontakte </em>et <em>Odnoklassniki </em>NDT) et les services en ligne (<em>Yandex </em>NDT) russes les plus populaires est le premier rebondissement depuis longtemps dans cette série manifestement fatiguée : « quoi de neuf chez les Ukrainiens ? » Comme lors de la terrible année 2014, les nouvelles d’Ukraine deviennent à nouveau les plus débattues et les plus populaires en Russie. Mais ce qui saute aux yeux cette saison, en comparaison avec la précédente, c’est l’absence de ces voix russes qui s’exprimeraient dans le sens de : « les Ukrainiens ont complètement raison, chez eux, c’est la guerre, la Russie est l’agresseur, etc. » À l’exception des commentateurs les plus excentriques, du niveau de Konstantin Borovoï ou de citoyens russes partis depuis longtemps pour l’Ukraine, et comme souvent, devenus plus radicalement ukrainiens que les habitants natifs de ce pays, personne, semble-t-il, n’approuve le blocage des sites russes. Et c’est pour le moment, le plus bas étiage de soutien aux autorités officielles de Kiev de la part des secteurs de l’opinion publique russe critiques envers le Kremlin.</p><p>Pour atteindre ce point, il a fallu a peine trois ans. Au printemps 2014, tout en allait autrement. Le renversement de Viktor Yanoukovitch, vu par un citoyen russe mécontent de Poutine, apparaissait comme un rêve inatteignable : les manifestations de 2011–2012 victorieuses. Le peuple descend dans la rue et force un usurpateur éhonté à quitter le pouvoir et le pays. Naturellement, la joie de la victoire a été assombrie par les dizaines de morts dans les rues de Kiev. Néanmoins, imaginons que quelqu’un ait demandé, par exemple sur l’antenne de <em>Dozhd </em>(télévision libérale d’opposition <em>NDT</em>), s’il fallait sauver le pouvoir de Yanouvitch pour que personne ne meure dans les rues de Kiev. Une telle question aurait parue trop blasphématoire, et personne ne l’a posée.</p><p>En suite, ce fut la Crimée et le Donbass, et à l’automne la Marche pour la paix sur les boulevards de Moscou, ou plutôt une manifestation traditionnelle de l’après 2011–2012, sur le même parcours. Seulement, cette fois, les manifestants — les mêmes qu’aux précédentes manifestations et aux suivantes — brandissaient des pancartes contre la guerre et des drapeaux ukrainiens. Cela semblait plus que naturel : dans tout l’attirail de l’intelligentsia libérale de Russie, le slogan « Pour notre liberté et pour la vôtre », occupe une place des plus importantes, même si tout le monde ne s’en souvient pas littéralement.</p><p>Le slogan du temps des soulèvements polonais (du 19e siècle <em>NDT</em>) est devenu à la mode antisoviétique soviétique au moment des évènements tchécoslovaques de 1968, et de la manifestation des sept sur la Place rouge à la suite de l’entrée des chars dans Prague. « Pour <em>votre </em>liberté, et pour la nôtre » — précisément dans ce sens, inversé, figurait sur l’un des panneaux, et — en même temps que cette manifestation — est devenu l’un des symboles de la résistance antisoviétique dans l’URSS tardive. À la fin de la perestroïka, quand un scénario du type de celui de Prague, avec tanks et parachutistes, se reproduira dans le Caucase et dans les pays baltes, « votre liberté et la nôtre » reviendra plus d’une fois dans les manifestations moscovites.</p><p>Sans vouloir le moins du monde sous-estimer les mérites du mouvement dissident, et de la génération des années soixante modérément loyale, il ne faut pas les considérer comme le stade suprême du développement de notre pensée politique et sociale. À l’époque brejnévienne, l’intelligentsia soviétique critique envers le régime n’était dans l’écrasante majorité des cas incapable de dépasser son « état soviétique » (<em>sovetskost’</em>). L’accès réduit à l’information ; l’absence de science historique et, plus encore, de science politique non-idéologiques ; la censure totale dans la presse et l’édition ; et d’autres limites inimaginables aujourd’hui n’ont pas permis aux réfractaires soviétiques de construire leur système de valeurs autrement qu’à l’aide du matériau historique disponible en URSS. De là découle la popularité paradoxale de la série de livres « Ardents révolutionnaires (<em>Plammenye Revolutsionery</em>) », dans lesquels des écrivains des années 1960 à la mode, d’Aksenov à Trifonov, racontaient un combat idéal contre le régime, sur l’exemple des populistes, des vieux bolcheviks. De là découle aussi la mode pour les Décabristes et le populisme révolutionnaire, et même la quête naïve des « idéaux léninistes », enfouis sous les ruines du stalinisme. « Votre liberté et la nôtre » provient de là, d’un système d’images se reflétant : des révolutionnaires démocrates russes, puis Engels et Lénine écrivent sur les soulèvements polonais, ensuite des écrivains des années 60 modérément antisoviétiques, paraphrasent Engels et Lénine. Dans des livres franchissant la censure, ils mettent l’accent de telle sorte que le lecteur malin se dit : « Il parle de la Tchécoslovaquie ! » Cette présomption du bon droit absolu d’un État sur lequel un empire fait rouler les chenilles de ses chars provenait sans doute aussi de l’internationalisme prolétarien du jeune État soviétique, des slogans du « Rot-Front », des vers sur Grenade, et dans l’ensemble, des recherches naïves et curieuses de bons soviétiques, qui comprenaient que la « doctrine Brejnev » n’était pas bonne — sans très bien savoir expliquer en quoi.</p><p>Le slogan a survécu sous une forme inchangée à l’effondrement de l’URSS. À son propos, on peut débattre de tout, mais pas du fait que pour les Russes ultra démocrates de l’époque, il ne s’agit pas d’une « catastrophe géopolitique » (expression de Vladimir Poutine, <em>NDT</em>). Même les plus graves cas d’expulsions de Russes du Caucase ou des villes d’Asie centrale en 1991 et après n’ont pas trouvé d’écho massif dans la Russie de ces années. La première guerre de Tchétchénie est arrivé au moment du pic de consensus sur « votre liberté et la nôtre ». Une part importante de la presse russe et de l’intelligentsia, au moins au cours de la première année de la guerre, était plus loyale à la partie tchétchène qu’au centre fédéral. Ainsi, la citation d’Okoudjava sur le monument qui, un jour serait érigé à Chamil Bassaev est resté jusqu’à aujourd’hui populaire chez les essayistes patriotiques, qui aiment à chercher les preuves de la tendance à la trahison dans l’intelligentsia libérale. Au cours de la guerre, lorsque les attentats de Boudionnovsk et de Kizliar ont démontré que les Tchétchènes étaient prêts à se battre contre des civils russes, et quand la journaliste pro-tchétchène Elena Masiouk fut faite prisonnière par des Тchétchènes, ce sentiment de « votre liberté et la nôtre » a commencé à s’éteindre. La seconde guerre de Tchétchénie, sous des slogans inarticulés de revanche, donne le coup d’envoi de l’époque qu’on désormais qualifier de poutinienne. Mais le slogan ne fut alors révisé par personne. Au cours des années poutiniennes, on trouvait toujours un sujet plus important : de la prise de contrôle de la chaîne de télévision NTV aux manifestations de 2011–2012 — et à ces dernières années de réaction. Le slogan ne prenait la poussière dans la conscience collective de l’intelligentsia libérale que pour refleurir sous la forme de drapeaux ukrainiens lors des manifestations de 2014.</p><p>Tout paraissait régulier : les « gens respectueux » en Crimée (surnom donné aux soldats russes ayant pris le contrôle de la région, <em>NDT</em>), les séparatistes pro-Russes dans le Donbass suscitaient des associations avec tous les précédents épisodes d’impérialisme russo-soviétique maudits par les générations précédentes de l’intelligentsia russe. Le slogan apparaissait tellement évident qu’il a permis aux milieux libéraux moscovites de ne pas remarquer les épisodes controversés du Maïdan, les événements tragiques d’Odessa, et « l’opération anti-terroriste » elle-même (nom donné par les autorités ukrainiennes aux opérations militaires dans le Donbass, <em>NDT</em>), qui parodiait, sur le plan de la rhétorique, les campagnes russes en Tchétchénie. En outre, plus la propagande russe officielle maudissait les nouvelles autorités ukrainiennes, plus le public russe anti-Poutine devenait résolu envers elles, habitué qu’il était à ne pas croire un seul mot venant de la télévision. Il a fallu trois ans et quelques milliers de cadavres pour que l’expression « les deux côtés sont coupables » ne cesse de résonner comme une blague, pour que la confiance que milieu russe anti-Poutine voue à la propagande ukrainienne chute au de celle qu’ils vouent à la propagande russe, et pour que les Russes anti-Poutine cesse de considérer l’Ukraine post-Maïdan comme le pays de leurs rêves démocratiques. Aujourd’hui, même la levée du régime des visas avec l’Union européenne — inestimable du point de vue des autorités ukrainiennes — n’est pas accueillie avec enthousiasme à Moscou, et les discours ultra patriotiques sur les « nouveaux Ukrainiens » sont combattus par les plus libéraux de leurs amis moscovites.</p><p>Bien qu’il reste probable que nous n’assistions qu’à une réaction conjoncturelle à des évènements précis en Ukraine, on aimerait croire que cette déception est profonde, et que la génération actuelle de l’intelligentsia russe libérale, même sans y réfléchir comme il se doit, révise enfin la conception soviétique, remontant aux années 1960, de « votre liberté et la nôtre » Qu’elle comprenne que « notre liberté » et « la vôtre » ne sont liées en rien, et que seule la nôtre ne peut nous intéresser et nous émouvoir. La liberté d’autrui, mérite peut-être qu’on s’y intéresse, mais seulement dans la mesure où elle influe sur la vie de nos compatriotes, qui se trouvent sous son empire. Cette révision a fait défaut en 1991 quand des Russes ont été chassés du Caucase et d’Asie centrale, quand en 1994, Boris Eltsine a jeté le Caucase dans le gouffre d’une guerre inutile. La conception « votre liberté et la nôtre » s’est révélée impuissante quand Poutine a réuni la Crimée à la Russie, et a provoqué la création des Républiques auto-proclamées du Donbass. Aujourd’hui, alors que la décision d’interdire des sites russes en Ukraine apparaît insensée y compris aux plus conséquents critiques de Poutine en Russie, on peut espérer que cette révision ait lieu. Il n’y a pas de « votre liberté et la nôtre », seulement la nôtre — pour laquelle il nous faut nous battre.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d38a5362b196" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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