<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by MPF on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by MPF on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mpf?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 09:26:49 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@mpf/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Warren Buffett’s Catastrophe Filter]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/warren-buffett-s-catastrophe-filter-36ac2be556e?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/36ac2be556e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:39:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-16T13:39:45.420Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In <em>The Snowball</em> Alice Schroeder uses Buffett’s investment in Mid-Continent Tab Card Company as a case study to demonstrate how Buffett analyzes an investment.</p><p>In the early 1950&#39;s IBM had a virtual monopoly on both mainframes and the tab cards they ran on. Because the cards were critical to a mainframe’s operation and their cost was trivial in comparison, IBM could mark their cards up. As a result, tab cards were IBM’s most profitable business, earning 50% margins.</p><p>In 1952 IBM settled an anti-trust suit with the Justice Department and agreed to divest their tab card division. Two of Warren’s friends saw this as an opportunity to compete. They told Warren that they could ship faster and provide better customer service than IBM. They asked, “Should we start this company and will you come in with us?” Buffett said, “No.”</p><p>Buffett said no because it failed his first investment filter. The first thing Buffett does when he looks at a new company is ask,</p><blockquote>“What are the odds that this business could be subject to any type of catastrophe risk — that could make the business fail?”</blockquote><p>If there is any chance that a significant portion of his capital would be subject to catastrophe risk (e.g. permanent loss) then he passes on the investment and moves on.</p><p>Most investors reseach a company with interesting prospects, comb through their financials, and only at the end of their analysis ask, “What could go wrong?” Buffett, however, inverts the situation right away and doesn’t waste time researching companies with significant risk.</p><p>In this case, Buffett, thinking like a horse handicapper, thought that the odds of competing successfully against IBM were small. Therefore he did not invest.</p><p>However, Buffett’s friends ignored his advice. Within a year they were selling 35 million tab cards a month and competing successfully with IBM. Their company was turning its capital over seven times per year and earning 40% margins. The company needed capital to grow, so the friends came back to ask Buffett to invest.</p><p>Now that the catastrophe risk was gone, Buffett decided to do some research. He determined that the company’s cost advantage would be the most critical component of their success. To understand their cost advantage better, he broke down the company’s data, quarter by quarter and plant by plant, and studied the information.</p><p>Buffett determined that they were netting 36% margins and growing 70% per year on $1 million of capital. His goal was to earn a 15% return on $2 million of capital. Thinking like a horse handicapper again, he said, “Yes, I can get that here,” and came in as an investor.</p><p>In making this investment, Buffett’s line of thinking was:</p><ol><li>Is there a risk of permanent loss of capital?</li><li>What is the most critical factor contributing to the company’s success?</li><li>Does this investment opportunity provide a substantial margin of safety above and beyond my minimum hurdle rate?</li></ol><p>Also noteworthy in this analysis is that Buffett never made a forecast about the future; all of the analysis used historical data.</p><p>What the historical data told him was that there was a good chance the current $1 million of sales, growing at 70% annually, would soon be at $2 million, even if growth was cut in half. Additionally, if margins on those sales were cut in half to 18%, he would still be exceeding his target return. Therefore, he saw a margin of safety that made getting his minimum 15% return on $2 million highly probable with little risk of permanent loss.</p><p>The investment turned out to be a home run. Buffett invested $60,000 initially and added another million over time. He owned his shares for 18 years until the company was bought by Dictograph. His investment compounded at a 33% annually over that period, turning his original $60,000 stake into $1.18 million.</p><p>You can read the whole case study <a href="http://csinvesting.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Buffett_Case-Study-on-Investment-Filters-Tabulating-Company.pdf">here</a> (page 3).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=36ac2be556e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Greenblatt on Spin-offs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/greenblatt-on-spin-offs-72cfcdbdd6d6?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/72cfcdbdd6d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:24:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:24:34.081Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This weekend I re-read the poorly named but well written book <em>You Can Be a Stock Market Genius</em> by Joel Greenblatt. The book discusses special situations investing, which Greenblatt refers to as “value investing with a catalyst.” Here are my take aways from his chapter on spinoffs.</p><h4>Why be concerned with spinoffs?</h4><ul><li>Spinoffs, as a whole, outperform the market. A 1988 study at Penn State found spinoffs outperformed by 10% annually in their first three years and the parent companies outperformed by 6% annually.</li><li>The largest gains for spinoffs come in the second year after the transaction.</li></ul><h4>Why do spinoffs occur?</h4><ul><li>So that the separate businesses can be better appreciated by the market.</li><li>A desire to separate out a “bad” business so that an unfettered “good” business can show through to investors.</li><li>A way to get value to shareholders for a business that can’t be easily sold.</li><li>Tax considerations.</li><li>To solve a strategic, antitrust, or regulatory issue, paving the way for a takeover or merge. This tends to occur when a company spins off a division engaged in a highly regulated industry like broadcasting, insurance, or banking.</li></ul><h4>Why do spinoffs do so well?</h4><ul><li>Indiscriminate sellers — The spinoff is distributed to investors who may not want exposure to a new company or industry or who may not have an institutional mandate allowing them to invest there.</li><li>Better management incentives — When a business and its management are freed from a large corporate parent, pent-up entrepreneurial forces are unleashed. The combination of accountability, responsibility, and more direct incentives take their natural course. After a spinoff, stock options, whether issued by the spinoff company or the parent, can more directly compensate the managements of each business.</li><li>Increased shareholder value — Most of the time, if you examine the motivation behind a spinoff, it boils down to management and the board’s desire to increase shareholder value.</li></ul><h4>Characteristics of a Standout Spinoff Investment</h4><ul><li>Institutions don’t want it (and their reasons don’t involve the investment merits).</li><li>Insiders want it.</li><li>A previously hidden investment opportunity is created or revealed.</li></ul><h4>Researching Spinoffs</h4><ul><li>Financial press (WSJ, Fortune, Forbes, ect) for spinoff announcements</li><li>Value Line, for researching the industry and competitors</li><li>SEC filings: Form 10 is filed in cases where the new spinoff represents a small piece of the parent company. A proxy document is prepared when the spinoff represents a major portion of the parent’s assets so that shareholders can vote on the proposed transaction. The first few pages of any Form 10 or proxy document usually contain a detailed summary of the entire document.</li><li>Follow up on insiders to see how they are being compensated and whether they own a meaningful stake in the company relative to their salary and net worth.</li></ul><h4>Partial Spinoffs</h4><ul><li>In a partial spinoff transaction, a company decides to spinoff or sell only a portion of one of its divisions.</li><li>Companies may pursue a partial spinoff for several reasons: raising capital, to highlight a particular division’s true value to the marketplace, or to allow for incentive compensation directly tied to divisional performance.</li><li>The benefits of investigating partial spinoffs are twofold: (1) When the shares are distributed directly to the parent’s shareholders the spinoff should outperform for the same reasons as 100% spinoffs do. The opportunity is not as good when shares are sold directly to the public through an IPO. (2) The parent corporation can be more easily valued after the spinoff by subtracting out the retained portion of the spinoff.</li></ul><h4>Rights Offerings</h4><ul><li>A rights offering is most commonly used when a company seeks to raise additional capital.</li><li>Typically rights are distributed to existing shareholders and offer them the right, but not the obligation, to purchase newly issued shares so that their ownership interest is not diluted.</li><li>Rights offerings are obscure and confusing, which can make spending the time to dissect them a lucrative endeavor.</li><li>When a rights offering is used to effect a spinoff, the parent company does not have the obligation to seek the highest price for it since all shareholders have the opportunity to participate. When there are oversubscription privileges present, it can be a sign that management wants to buy into the spinoff at a discounted price.</li></ul><h4>Other Considerations</h4><ul><li>As a general rule, even if institutional investors are attracted to a parent company because an undesirable business is being spun off, they will wait until after the spinoff is completed before buying stock in the parent. Therefore, if the company appears to be an attractive investment, it is usually worthwhile to buy stock in the parent before the spinoff takes place.</li><li>If insiders own a large amount of stock or options, their interests are aligned with shareholders’ interests. Often, management’s incentive options use the opening trading price of a spinoff as their exercise price. Therefore, management may not promote the spinoff until after the transaction is complete.</li><li>No matter how the transaction is effected, figuring out what’s in it for insiders is the most important key to making a good spinoff investment.</li></ul><h4>Summary</h4><ol><li>Spinoffs, in general, beat the market.</li><li>Picking your spots within the spinoff universe can result in even better results than the average spinoff.</li><li>Certain characteristics point to an exceptional spinoff opportunity: a. Institutions don’t want the spinoff (and not because of the investment merits). b. Insiders want the spinoff. c. A previously hidden investment opportunity is uncovered by the spinoff transaction (e.g. a cheap stock, a great business, a leveraged risk/reward situation).</li><li>You can locate and analyze new spinoff prospects by reading the business press and following up with SEC filings.</li><li>Paying attention to “parents” can pay of handsomely.</li><li>Partial spinoffs and rights offerings create unique investment opportunities.</li><li>Keep and eye on insiders.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=72cfcdbdd6d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Walter Schloss’ Investment Checklist]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/walter-schloss-investment-checklist-52f37643219f?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52f37643219f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:22:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:22:50.518Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Focus on cheap stocks. This means not worrying about earnings at the moment, only asset protection. When you do this, you have three favorable possible outcomes:</p><ol><li>Earnings turn around and the stock appreciates.</li><li>Someone buys out the company.</li><li>The company begins buying its own stock.</li></ol><p>Walter Schloss looked for companies that were depressed and then asked these questions:</p><ul><li>Why is the company’s stock price depressed?</li><li>Is the company selling for below book value?</li><li>Is there goodwill included in book value?</li><li>What has been the stocks high and low over the past 10 years?</li><li>Does the company have any cash flow?</li><li>Does the company have any net income?</li><li>How has the company done over the past 10 years?</li><li>How much debt does the company have?</li><li>What is the company’s profit margins?</li><li>How are the company’s competitors doing?</li><li>Is this company doing poorly compared to its competitors?</li><li>What appears to be the risk on the downside versus upside potential?</li><li>How much stock do insiders own?</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52f37643219f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lou Simpson’s Five Investing Principles]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/lou-simpson-s-five-investing-principles-e46417b2d985?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e46417b2d985</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:22:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:22:16.779Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a rare <a href="http://www.berichcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/lou-simpson-1987-profile.pdf">1987 interview with the Washington Post</a>, Lou Simpson laid out his five investment principles.</p><p><strong>1. Think independently.</strong> We try to be skeptical of conventional wisdom and try to avoid the waves of irrational behavior and emotion that periodically engulf Wall Street. We don’t ignore unpopular companies. On the contrary, such situations often present the greatest opportunities.</p><p><strong>2. Invest in high-return businesses run for the shareholders.</strong> Over the long run appreciation in share prices is most directly related to the return the company earns on its shareholders’ investment. Cash flow, which is more difficult to manipulate than reported earnings, is a useful additional yardstick. We ask the following questions in evaluating management:</p><ul><li>Does management have a substantial stake in the stock of the company?</li><li>Is management straightforward in dealings with the owners?</li><li>Is management willing to divest unprofitable operations?</li><li>Does management use excess cash to repurchase shares?</li></ul><p>The last may be the most important. Managers who run a profitable business often use excess cash to expand into less profitable endeavors. Repurchase of shares is in many cases a much more advantageous use of surplus resources.</p><p><strong>3. Pay only a reasonable price, even for an excellent business.</strong> We try to be disciplined in the price we pay for ownership even in a demonstrably superior business. Even the world’s greatest business is not a good investment if the price is too high. The ratio of price to earnings and its inverse, the earnings yield, are useful guages in valuing a company, as is the ratio of price to free cash flow. A helpful comparison is the earnings yield of a company versus the return on a risk-free long-term United States Government obilgation.</p><p><strong>4. Invest for the long term.</strong> Attempting to guess short-term swings in individual stocks, the stock market, or the economy is not likely to produce consistently good results. Short-term developments are too unpredictable. On the other hand, shares of quality companies run for the shareholders stand an excellent chance of providing above-average returns to investors over the long term. Furthermore, moving in and out of stocks frequently has two major disadvantages that will substantially diminish results: transaction costs and taxes. Capital will grow more rapidly if earnings compound with as few interruptions for commissions and tax bites as possible.</p><p><strong>5. Do not diversify excessively.</strong> An investor is not likely to obtain superior results by buying a broad cross-section of the market. The more diversification, the more performance is likely to be average, at best. We concentrate our holdings in a few companies that meet our investment criteria. Good investment ideas–that is, companies that meet our criteria–are difficult to find. When we think we have found one, we make a large commitment. The five largest holdings at GEICO account for more than 50 percent of the stock portfolio.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e46417b2d985" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[16 Factors Needed to Make Money in the Stock Market]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/16-factors-needed-to-make-money-in-the-stock-market-b4557c3106f8?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b4557c3106f8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:21:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:21:41.994Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Walter Schloss returned 20% annualized for 47 years (15.3% net to investors) versus the S&amp;P 500&#39;s 7% return over that period. He used Value Line to find cheap companies and read their SEC filings to decide if he should invest. Schloss got his start working for Ben Graham alongside Warren Buffett. When Graham closed his firm, Schloss began managing money solo. Eventually his son Edwin joined him. The two never had any employees, despite eventually managing 9 figures. The pair once made $19 million with total annual operating expenses of $11,000. He summed up his investment approach as “we buy cheap stocks.”</p><p>In a 1994 <a href="http://www.grahamanddoddsville.net/wordpress/Files/Gurus/Walter%20Schloss/Factors%2520needed%2520to%2520make%2520money%2520in%2520stocks%2520-%2520Schloss.pdf">note</a>, Schloss laid out what it takes to make money in the stock market.</p><ol><li>Price is the most important factor to use in relation to value.</li><li>Try to establish the value of the company. Remember that a share of stock represents a part of a business and is not just a piece of paper.</li><li>Use book value as a starting point to try and establish the value of the enterprise. Be sure that debt does not equal 100% of the equity. (Capital and surplus for the common stock).</li><li>Have patience. Stocks don’t go up immediately.</li><li>Don’t buy on tips or for a quick move. Let the professionals do that, if they can. Don’t sell on bad news.</li><li>Don’t be afraid to be a loner but be sure that you are correct in your judgement. You can’t be 100% certain by try to look for weaknesses in your thinking. Buy on a scale down and sell on a scale up.</li><li>Have the courage of your convictions once you have made a decision.</li><li>Have a philosophy of investment and try to follow it. The above is a way that I’ve found successful.</li><li>Don’t be in too much of a hurry to sell. If the stock reaches a price that you think is a fair one, then you can sell but often because a stock goes up 50%, people say sell it and button up your profit. Before selling try to reevaluate the company again and see where the stock sells in relation to its book value. Be aware of the level of the stock market. Are yields low and P/E rations high? Is the stock market historically high? Are people very optimistic? etc…</li><li>When buying a stock, I find it helpful to buy near the low of the past few years. A stock may go as high as 125 and then decline to 60 and you think it attractive. 3 years before the stock sold at 20, which shows that there is some vulnerability in it.</li><li>Try to buy assets at a discount than to buy earnings. Earnings can change dramatically in a short time. Usually assets change slowly. One has to know much more about a company if one buys earnings.</li><li>Listen to suggestions from people you respect. This doesn’t mean you have to accept them. Remember it’s your money and generally it is harder to keep money than to make it. Once you lose a lot of money it is hard to make it back.</li><li>Try not to let your emotions affect your judgment. Fear and greed are probably the worst emotions to have in connection with the purchase and sale of stocks.</li><li>Remember the work of compounding. For example, if you can make 12% a year and reinvest the money back, you will double your money in 6 years, taxes excluded. Remember the rule of 72. Your rate of return into 72 will tell you the number of years to double your money.</li><li>Prefer stocks over bonds. Bonds will limit your gains and inflation will reduce your purchasing power.</li><li>Be careful of leverage. It can go against you.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b4557c3106f8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Dhandho Investment Framework]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/the-dhandho-investment-framework-640690908219?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/640690908219</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:20:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:20:41.156Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In <em>The Dhandho Investor</em> Monish Pabrai lays out the investment framework he uses.</p><ol><li>Focus on buying an existing business.</li><li>Buy simple businesses in industries with an ultra-slow rate of change.</li><li>Buy distressed businesses in distressed industries.</li><li>Buy businesses with a durable competitive advantage — a moat.</li><li>Bet heavily when the odds are overwhelmingly in your favor.</li><li>Focus on arbitrage.</li><li>Buy businesses at big discounts to their underlying intrinsic value.</li><li>Look for low-risk, high-uncertainty businesses.</li><li>It’s better to be a copycat than an innovator.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=640690908219" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Investment Process at Graham-Newman Corporation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/the-investment-process-at-graham-newman-corporation-b85c745219d7?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b85c745219d7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:19:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:19:37.031Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In <em>The Snowball</em> Alice Schroeder writes:</p><blockquote><em>[Warren Buffett] and Walter [Schloss] collected numbers from the Moody’s manuals and filled out hundreds of the simple forms that Graham-Newman used to make decisions. Warren wanted to know all the basic information about every company. Once he had looked over the field, he narrowed it down to a handful of stocks worth even more careful study, then concentrated his money on what he considered the best stocks.</em></blockquote><p>This investment process is simple, but not easy. It involves a lot of tedious and time consuming work. But it is precisely this difficultly that makes it effective; that few people are willing to do it is why it offers an edge.</p><p>The first step in this investment process is to learn all of the basic information about every company. You cannot select the best investment opportunities until you are aware of the entire opportunity set. The Moody’s manuals Buffett relied on are no longer in print, but a good substitute is the Value Line Investment Survey.</p><p>The second step is to filter the companies to determine which deserve more research. Graham-Newman used a checklist to accomplish this. Depending on your particular style of investing, your checklist may focus more on price relative to assets or companies earning high returns.</p><p>After doing more research and filtering your list of stocks further, the third step is to take concentrated positions in the best opportunities. This allows good ideas to have a meaningful impact on your portfolio’s returns.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b85c745219d7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Richard Pzena’s Investment Philosophy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/richard-pzena-s-investment-philosophy-a86f577b3c29?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a86f577b3c29</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:18:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:18:59.597Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Simple: We buy good businesses when they go on sale. We require five characteristics before we invest:</p><ol><li>Current earnings below normal.</li><li>A low price relative to normalized earnings.</li><li>Management has a sound plan for an earning’s recovery.</li><li>The business has a history of earning attractive long-term returns.</li><li>There is tangible downside protection.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a86f577b3c29" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Sam Zell’s 13 Fundamentals]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/sam-zell-s-13-fundamentals-b5da6ef1dbac?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b5da6ef1dbac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2015 00:18:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T00:18:13.250Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ol><li>Operate on the condition of no surprises</li><li>Everyday that you’re not selling an asset in your portfolio, you’re choosing to buy it</li><li>Ensure management’s interests are aligned with shareholders</li><li>Look for good companies with bad balance sheets</li><li>Nothing should stand between a company and its fiduciary responsibility to shareholders</li><li>Look for opportunities in markets with pent-up demand</li><li>The definition of a partner is someone who shares your level of risk</li><li>Liquidity = value</li><li>Sentimentality about an investments leads to lack of discipline</li><li>Take meaningful positions so you can influence your own destiny</li><li>When everyone is going right, look left</li><li>Understand the downside</li><li>It all comes down to Econ 101 — supply and demand</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b5da6ef1dbac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Portrait of a Disciplined Investor]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mpf/a-portrait-of-a-disciplined-investor-f61e68e4af5?source=rss-e617679f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f61e68e4af5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MPF]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2015 18:43:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-30T18:43:13.140Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Lou Simpson is perhaps the greatest investor you have never heard of.</p><p>But don’t take my word for it; listen to Warren Buffett: “Lou has made me a lot of money. Under today’s circumstances, he is the best I know. He has done a lot better than I have done in the last few years. He has seen opportunities I have missed.”</p><p>In his 2010 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders Buffet added: “Lou has never been one to advertise his talents. But I will: Simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats.”</p><p>That you have never heard of him is no accident. Simpson lives a simple life, keeps a low profile, and never discusses his investments.</p><p>But his investment record speaks loud and clear. From 1980 to 2004, the last time his investment results were broken out from Berkshire Hathaway’s, his investments had compounded annually at 20.3%. That is 6.8% better per year than the S&amp;P 500. For comparison, one dollar invested with Lou in 1980 had become $101.25 by 2004. One dollar invested in the S&amp;P 500 had become $25.33.</p><p>Warren Buffett hired Simpson in 1979 to invest GEICO’s insurance float. He was given carte blanche to make investments. Lou was the only one outside of Buffett allowed to make investment decisions at Berkshire Hathaway.</p><p>Simpson retired in 2010 and started SQ Advisors with his wife. The firm offers separately managed accounts to friends, family, and charities and charges a flat 1% management fee. As of June 30, 2015 SQ Advisors managed over $3 billion.</p><p>One of Simpson’s distinguishing traits is that, “He sticks to his principles,” says Warren Buffett. “Most people on Wall Street don’t have principles to begin with. And if they have them, they don’t stick to them.”</p><p>Below are some of Lou Simpson’s principles.</p><h4>1. Think independently.</h4><p>“I pondered for eight years what makes Lou knock the cover off the ball,” Jack Byrne said. “Lou is very bright, with an economics background from Princeton. But the woods are filled with bright guys. It has more to do with his personality. He is very, very sure of his own judgments. He ignores everybody else.”</p><p>Charlie Munger, vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, shares Byrne’s sentiment. “I would argue that good stock-picking records are held by people who are a little cranky and are willing to bet against the herd. Lou just has that mindset and thats what impressed us.”</p><p>In his own words, Lou says: “We try to be skeptical of conventional wisdom and try to avoid the waves of irrational behavior and emotion that periodically engulf Wall Street. We don’t ignore unpopular companies. On the contrary, such situations often present the greatest opportunities.”</p><h4>2. Invest in high return businesses.</h4><p>“Over the long run appreciation in share prices is most directly related to the return the company earns on its shareholders’ investment. Cash flow, which is more difficult to manipulate than reported earnings, is a useful additional yardstick.”</p><p>When he was asked what the most important quantitative aspect of company is. He responded:</p><blockquote><em>Return on capital. That really tells you a lot. One of the basic problems is that there is so much noise around earnings that you really have to rip apart the financials to understand what the real numbers are. Its really the basic returns on equity capital [that are] important, but sometimes there’re not obvious. Even so, I think you have to look at a lot of things. You have to figure out what the earnings growth rate of the company will be over an extended period of time, and then apply a discount rate to it so you can come up with the best valuation. It’s easy in principle but its extremely difficult in practice.</em></blockquote><p>“One of the things I have learned over the years is how important management is in building or subtracting from value. We will try to see a senior person and prefer to visit a company at their office, almost like kicking the tires. You can have all the written information in the world, but I think it is important to figure out how senior people in a company think.”</p><p>These are the questions Simpson asks when he is evaluating management:</p><blockquote><em>“Does management have a substantial stake in the stock of the company? Is management straightforward in dealings with the owners? Is management willing to divest unprofitable operations? Does management use excess cash to repurchase shares The last may be the most important. Managers who run a profitable business often use excess cash to expand into less profitable endeavors. Repurchase of shares is in many cases a much more advantageous use of surplus resources.”</em></blockquote><h4>4. Pay only a reasonable price, even for an excellent business.</h4><p>“We try to be disciplined in the price we pay for ownership even in a demonstrably superior business. Even the world’s greatest business is not a good investment if the price is too high.”</p><h4>5. Do not diversify excessively.</h4><p>“An investor is not likely to obtain superior results by buying a broad cross-section of the market. The more diversification, the more performance is likely to be average, at best. We concentrate our holdings in a few companies that meet our investment criteria. Good investment ideas-that is, companies that meet our criteria-are difficult to find. When we think we have found one, we make a large commitment.”</p><p>“If we could find 15 positions that we really had confidence in, we’d be in 15 positions. We’ll never be in 100 positions because we’re never going to know 100 companies that well. I think the merits of a concentrated portfolio are: ‘You live by the sword, you die by the sword.’ If you’re right, your going to add value. If you’re going to add value, you’re going to have to look different than the market. That means either being concentrated or, if you’re not concentrated in a number of issues, you’re concentrated in types of businesses or industries.”</p><p>“He gets one or two really strong ideas a year and then likes to swing very hard,” Byrne said.</p><h4>6. Read voraciously.</h4><p>“I’d say I try to read at least 5–8 hours per day,” Simpson said. “I read a lot of different things, including a variety of filings, annual reports, industry reports, and business magazines.”</p><p>In spring when many companies publish their annual reports, he will read 15 to 20 per day.</p><p>A former GEICO director said: “The most important attribute in that job once you have the basic training is to read, and keep reading and reading until you come up with ideas. In this modern world, everybody would rather talk on the phone than do the basic work. Lou does the basic work. He doesn’t talk to that many people.”</p><h4>7. Speak honestly.</h4><p>When Lou reads an annual report he starts with the management’s letter to shareholders. He likes when management addresses their triumphs and shortcoming objectively, in plain, simply language. Not surprisingly, he holds himself to this same standard.</p><p>In 1993 the Washington Post awarded Simpson their “Straight-talker” award, saying: “When Simpson does well, he tells you. And when he does poorly, he also tells you.”</p><p>In 2007 the New York Times described Simpson as “disarmingly honest about investments that have not worked out.”</p><h4>8. Do not discuss investments.</h4><p>“So many people broadcast what they buy or sell and it works against them. I’m in favor of people not knowing what we’re doing until the last possible time.”</p><p>“I have always felt I could do a better job in adding value by being somewhat removed from the circus and parimutuel atmosphere of the market.”</p><h4>9. Make fewer decisions.</h4><p>Lou has gone out of his way to design a lifestyle and workplace that maximizes his time to think about the truly important questions that have the biggest payoffs.</p><p>“The more people you have, the more difficult it is to do well,” he said. “You have to satisfy everybody. If you have a limited number of decision makers, they are more likely to agree.”</p><p>Simpson does not confuse with activity with results: “We do a lot of thinking and not a lot of acting. A lot of investors do a lot of acting, and not a lot of thinking. Sometimes the best thing to do is to do nothing. The hardest thing to do is to sit with cash. It is very boring.”</p><h4>10. Study your mistakes.</h4><p>“When we make mistakes, we always try to do postmortems. I think its very important to look at your mistakes and determine why you made them.”</p><p>In short, Glenn Greenberg summed up Lou’s investment approach:</p><blockquote><em>He tries to find businesses with few competitors, pricing that’s not volatile, steady demand for the product and low capital needs so that most of the earnings can be reinvested in the business or paid out to shareholders or used for acquisitions.</em></blockquote><h4>Bibliography</h4><p>Buffett, Warren. “1986 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report.” Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders. 1986. MS. Omaha, NE.</p><p>Buffett, Warren. “2004 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report.” Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders. 2004. MS. Omaha, NE.</p><p>Buffett, Warren. “2010 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report.” Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders. 2010. MS. Omaha, NE.</p><p>Fabrikant, Geraldine. “A Maestro of Investments in the Style of Buffett.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 22 Apr. 2007. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.</p><p>Griffen, Tren. “A Dozen Things I’ve Learned from Lou Simpson About Investing and Business.” 25iq. N.p., 04 Apr. 2015. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.</p><p>Harris, Melissa. “Lou Simpson Retiring from Geico.” Tribunedigital-chicagotribune. Chicago Tribune, 22 Aug. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.</p><p>Vise, David A. “Geico’s Top Market Strategist Churning Out Profits; Lou Simpson’s Stock Rises on His Successful Ideas.” The Washington Post. N.p., 11 May 1987. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f61e68e4af5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>