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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mr. Dry Powder on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mr. Dry Powder on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mrdrypowder?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mr. Dry Powder on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mrdrypowder?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 22:33:47 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Growth Equity vs. Buyouts: Two Different Ways to Back a Company]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/growth-equity-vs-buyouts-two-different-ways-to-back-a-company-c0f9db79950e?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 15:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-21T15:31:01.550Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Not all private equity involves control or leverage. Growth equity sits between venture capital and the classic buyout.</h4><p>The phrase “private equity” usually calls to mind the leveraged buyout: a firm acquires control of a mature company, finances much of the price with debt, and works to improve the business before selling it. That is the largest part of the industry, but it is not the only model. Growth equity takes a different approach to a different kind of company.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Sources are listed at the end.</em></p><h3>The core differences</h3><p>Cambridge Associates, which advises institutional investors on private markets, places growth equity between late-stage venture capital and leveraged buyouts. The main distinctions:</p><ul><li><strong>Ownership.</strong> Buyout firms typically seek control. Growth equity investors usually take minority stakes, protected by negotiated rights such as approval over the business plan, acquisitions, and new debt or equity issuance.</li><li><strong>Leverage.</strong> Buyouts use debt to finance the purchase, and debt paydown is an expected source of return. Growth equity deals use little if any leverage at the time of investment.</li><li><strong>Company profile.</strong> Buyout targets tend to have stable earnings and may grow more slowly. Growth equity targets often have proven business models, strong organic revenue growth, and are profitable or close to it. Many are founder-owned and have not previously taken institutional capital.</li><li><strong>Use of proceeds.</strong> In a buyout, most of the money goes to selling shareholders. In growth equity, a meaningful share often goes into the company to fund expansion, though secondary sales by founders are also common.</li></ul><h3>How each makes money</h3><p><strong>Buyouts</strong> combine several levers: operational improvement, debt paydown funded by cash flow, add-on acquisitions, and sometimes a higher exit multiple. Leverage amplifies the equity return when the plan works.</p><p><strong>Growth equity</strong> depends mainly on revenue and earnings growth. Without much leverage, the return comes from the business becoming substantially larger and more valuable.</p><h3>Risk profile</h3><p>Cambridge Associates’ historical analysis found that growth equity showed a lower capital loss ratio and less dispersion of returns than venture capital, with return characteristics that compared favorably with buyouts over the period studied. The trade-off is influence: as a minority investor, a growth equity firm relies on its contractual protections and its relationship with management rather than on control.</p><h3>Choosing between them</h3><p>For a founder, the choice often comes down to control. A buyout typically means selling the company. Growth equity can provide capital and expertise while the founder keeps running and largely owning the business.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Buyouts take control and use leverage; growth equity typically takes minority stakes with little debt.</li><li>Growth equity targets fast-growing, often founder-led companies; buyouts favor stable cash generators.</li><li>Growth equity returns rely mostly on growth; buyout returns blend operations, leverage, and multiples.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>Cambridge Associates, “Growth Equity”: <a href="https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/insight/growth-equity/">https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/insight/growth-equity/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0f9db79950e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blackstone and Hilton, Part 2: How a $20 Billion Debt Load Was Restructured]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/blackstone-and-hilton-part-2-how-a-20-billion-debt-load-was-restructured-1c57d0d94e28?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[debt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hospitality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 01:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-21T01:01:02.635Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>In 2010, Blackstone put more money into a deal that had already lost most of its value on paper. The restructuring set up the most profitable buyout of its era.</h4><p>By early 2010, Hilton was carrying roughly $20 billion of debt from its 2007 take-private, and the hotel industry was emerging from a severe downturn. Many leveraged buyouts from the same period ended in bankruptcy or a handover to lenders. Hilton did not. The reason was a negotiated restructuring that reduced the debt, extended maturities, and kept Blackstone in control.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Sources are listed at the end.</em></p><h3>The problem</h3><p>The 2007 deal was financed with about $20.6 billion of mortgage and mezzanine debt. When the financial crisis hit, travel demand fell, hotel earnings declined, and the value of the equity collapsed. Blackstone ultimately wrote the investment down by about 70%. With maturities approaching, the capital structure needed to be addressed.</p><h3>The restructuring</h3><p>The agreement with lenders, completed in April 2010, had several components:</p><ul><li><strong>Debt reduction of nearly $4 billion</strong> against a debt load of roughly $20 billion.</li><li><strong>New equity from Blackstone of about $800 million,</strong> used to repay a portion of the debt.</li><li><strong>Debt repurchases:</strong> about $1.8 billion of debt was purchased and retired.</li><li><strong>Conversion to preferred equity:</strong> about $2.1 billion of junior mezzanine debt was converted into preferred equity.</li><li><strong>Maturity extension:</strong> debt maturities were pushed out to November 2015.</li></ul><h3>Why lenders agreed</h3><p>Lenders faced a choice between taking control of a large hotel company in a weak market or accepting a negotiated outcome with fresh capital from the sponsor. A restructuring with new equity, lower leverage, and more time offered a better expected recovery than a forced sale at the bottom of the cycle. Converting junior debt to preferred equity also gave those lenders a continuing stake in any recovery.</p><h3>Why Blackstone put in more money</h3><p>Committing additional capital to an investment that has been written down is one of the hardest decisions a sponsor can make. It only makes sense if the investor believes the underlying business is sound and the problem is the capital structure, not the company. Blackstone’s thesis that Hilton’s brands could grow globally had not changed; what had changed was the market around it. The restructuring bought time for that thesis to play out.</p><h3>The outcome</h3><p>Hilton’s performance recovered as travel rebounded and the company expanded its management and franchise business. Blackstone took Hilton public again in December 2013 and sold its last shares in 2018. Its total profit on the investment came to about $14 billion, according to reporting at the time of the final sale.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Blackstone and Hilton’s lenders cut nearly $4 billion of debt in 2010 and extended maturities to 2015.</li><li>Blackstone contributed about $800 million of new equity; about $2.1 billion of junior debt became preferred equity.</li><li>Recommitting capital worked because the business was sound and the problem was the balance sheet and the cycle.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>International Business Times, “Blackstone to cut Hilton debt by almost $4 billion” (February 2010): <a href="https://www.ibtimes.com/blackstone-cut-hilton-debt-almost-4-billion-376755">https://www.ibtimes.com/blackstone-cut-hilton-debt-almost-4-billion-376755</a></li><li>Hotel-Online, Hilton Worldwide completes restructuring of existing debt (April 2010): <a href="https://www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2010_2nd/Apr10_HiltonDebt.html">https://www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2010_2nd/Apr10_HiltonDebt.html</a></li><li>The Real Deal, “Blackstone’s overall profit from Hilton deal: $14B” (2018): <a href="https://therealdeal.com/2018/05/18/blackstones-overall-profit-from-hilton-deal-14b/">https://therealdeal.com/2018/05/18/blackstones-overall-profit-from-hilton-deal-14b/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1c57d0d94e28" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[IRR vs. MOIC: Two Deals That Both Doubled Your Money, and Why One Was Far Better]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/irr-vs-moic-two-deals-that-both-doubled-your-money-and-why-one-was-far-better-6c3854cd063a?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6c3854cd063a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[asset-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T15:31:01.870Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Private equity reports two headline return metrics. Each answers a different question, and each can mislead on its own.</h4><p>Ask a private equity firm how a deal performed and you will usually get two numbers: a multiple and a percentage. The multiple is MOIC, the multiple on invested capital. The percentage is IRR, the internal rate of return. They are often quoted together because neither tells the whole story.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Figures are illustrative unless sourced.</em></p><h3>MOIC: how much</h3><p>MOIC divides the total value returned or held by the amount invested. Invest $100 million, receive $200 million, and the MOIC is 2.0x. It measures the absolute size of the gain.</p><p>As EQT notes in its explainer, MOIC is time-agnostic. It does not care whether the money took two years or ten to double.</p><h3>IRR: how fast</h3><p>IRR is the annualized rate of return that accounts for the timing of every cash flow: when capital went in and when it came out. It answers the question of how efficiently money compounded while it was invested.</p><h3>The same multiple, very different outcomes</h3><p>Consider two deals, each turning $100 million into $200 million:</p><ul><li><strong>Deal A:</strong> exited after 3 years. MOIC 2.0x. IRR about <strong>26%</strong> a year.</li><li><strong>Deal B:</strong> exited after 7 years. MOIC 2.0x. IRR about <strong>10%</strong> a year.</li></ul><p>On a multiple basis they are identical. On a time-adjusted basis, Deal A was far better, because the investor had the capital back four years earlier to deploy elsewhere.</p><h3>Why IRR alone can mislead</h3><p><strong>Short holds can flatter it.</strong> A quick flip that returns 1.3x in one year produces a 30% IRR but a modest profit in dollars. Investors cannot spend a percentage.</p><p><strong>Timing can be managed.</strong> Delaying capital calls, for example by using subscription credit lines, or returning cash early through dividend recapitalizations, can lift IRR without changing the total gain.</p><p><strong>It assumes reinvestment.</strong> IRR implicitly treats returned cash as if it can be reinvested at the same rate, which is often unrealistic for very high IRRs.</p><h3>Why MOIC alone can mislead</h3><p>A 3.0x return sounds excellent, but if it took fifteen years, the annualized rate is roughly 7.6%, comparable to what an investor might have earned in public markets with daily liquidity.</p><h3>How professionals read them together</h3><p>Limited partners look at both, alongside cash-based measures such as DPI. A strong result generally combines a meaningful multiple with a competitive IRR over a reasonable holding period. EQT also notes that carried interest is typically measured on an IRR basis, while managers are ultimately judged on the total value they create.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>MOIC measures how much money was made; IRR measures how fast it was made.</li><li>Two deals with the same multiple can have very different IRRs depending on holding period.</li><li>Use both metrics together, alongside cash returned, to judge performance.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>EQT, “What does MOIC mean in private equity?”: <a href="https://eqtgroup.com/thinq/Education/what-does-moic-mean-in-private-equity">https://eqtgroup.com/thinq/Education/what-does-moic-mean-in-private-equity</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6c3854cd063a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Does Private Equity Ruin the Companies It Buys? What the Evidence Says]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/does-private-equity-ruin-the-companies-it-buys-what-the-evidence-says-2f7313ec6fe5?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 01:01:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T01:01:03.821Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The largest study of U.S. buyouts finds the answer depends heavily on the type of deal.</h4><p>Few topics in finance generate as much heat as the effect of private equity on the companies it owns. Critics point to bankruptcies and layoffs. Supporters point to growth and productivity. Both sides can find examples. The more useful question is what happens on average, and to which kinds of companies.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Sources are listed at the end.</em></p><h3>The study</h3><p>Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Josh Lerner, Ben Lipsius, and Javier Miranda analyzed roughly 9,800 private equity buyouts of U.S. firms from 1980 to 2013. Using U.S. Census Bureau data on firms and establishments, they compared buyout targets with similar companies that were not acquired. Their work, summarized by the National Bureau of Economic Research, is among the most comprehensive available.</p><h3>What they found</h3><p>Measured over the first two years after the buyout, relative to comparable firms:</p><ul><li><strong>Private-to-private buyouts:</strong> employment rose about 13%.</li><li><strong>Secondary buyouts</strong> (one PE firm selling to another): employment rose about 10%.</li><li><strong>Public-to-private buyouts:</strong> employment fell about 13%.</li><li><strong>Divisional buyouts</strong> (a corporate unit carved out): employment fell about 16%.</li></ul><p>Across buyouts overall, labor productivity rose about 8% relative to controls, while compensation per worker fell about 1.7%, largely eliminating the wage premium targets had paid before the deal.</p><h3>Why the deal type matters</h3><p><strong>Private companies</strong> are often capital-constrained or run by founders without professional systems. A private equity owner can provide capital, management practices, and acquisition capacity, which tends to support growth.</p><p><strong>Public companies and corporate divisions</strong> are more often bought with a restructuring thesis: cutting costs, exiting weak businesses, and reallocating resources. Those deals tend to carry heavier leverage, and the authors note other research linking public-to-private buyouts to higher bankruptcy risk.</p><p>The study also found that conditions matter. Buyouts completed when credit was easy showed smaller productivity gains, and adverse macroeconomic conditions after the deal reduced employment growth and curtailed productivity gains, particularly for public-to-private and divisional deals.</p><h3>The balanced conclusion</h3><p>Private equity does not uniformly ruin companies, and it does not uniformly improve them. Outcomes vary by deal type, leverage, and timing. The authors conclude that buyouts should not be treated as a single category, which argues against one-size-fits-all views, in either direction, of what private equity does.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>A study of about 9,800 U.S. buyouts found employment rose after private-to-private deals and fell after public-to-private and divisional deals.</li><li>Productivity rose about 8% on average; pay per worker fell slightly.</li><li>Deal type, leverage, and credit conditions shape outcomes more than ownership label alone.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>NBER Digest, “The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts” (February 2020): <a href="https://www.nber.org/digest/feb20/economic-effects-private-equity-buyouts">https://www.nber.org/digest/feb20/economic-effects-private-equity-buyouts</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f7313ec6fe5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Operating Partners: The Private Equity Professionals Who Never Pick the Deal]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/operating-partners-the-private-equity-professionals-who-never-pick-the-deal-c3e8728bd399?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c3e8728bd399</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T15:31:01.986Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>As financial engineering has become a commodity, operational improvement has become a core part of how private equity firms compete.</h4><p>When people picture a private equity firm, they usually picture deal professionals: the people who find companies, negotiate prices, and arrange financing. Many firms now employ a second group who rarely lead a transaction but spend their time inside portfolio companies. They are operating partners, and their job is to help the business perform after the deal closes.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Sources are listed at the end.</em></p><h3>Who they are</h3><p>Operating partners are typically former executives: chief executives, chief financial officers, heads of operations, sales leaders, or functional specialists in areas such as procurement, pricing, technology, or human capital. Some are full-time employees of the private equity firm. Others work as senior advisers or are placed into portfolio companies as interim executives or board members.</p><p>Titles and models vary widely by firm. Some firms run large in-house operating teams; others rely on a small group of advisers and outside consultants.</p><h3>Why the role has grown</h3><p>In the early days of leveraged buyouts, a significant share of returns came from leverage, multiple expansion, and cost discipline. As the industry has matured, competition for deals has intensified and those levers have become more widely available. Firms increasingly differentiate on their ability to improve the companies they buy.</p><p>Research supports that emphasis. In a survey of 79 private equity investors managing more than $750 billion, Paul Gompers, Steven Kaplan, and Vladimir Mukharlyamov found that firms report placing heavy weight on growing revenue, improving incentives and governance, making add-on acquisitions, reducing costs, and replacing management where needed.</p><h3>What operating partners actually do</h3><ul><li><strong>Diligence.</strong> Assess a target’s operations before the deal, sharpening the value-creation plan and testing whether it is realistic.</li><li><strong>The first 100 days.</strong> Help management establish reporting, set priorities, and launch early initiatives after closing.</li><li><strong>Talent.</strong> Evaluate and recruit executives, a frequent and consequential intervention in portfolio companies.</li><li><strong>Functional improvement.</strong> Lead or support projects in pricing, procurement, sales effectiveness, digital, or working capital.</li><li><strong>Pattern recognition.</strong> Share what has worked across other portfolio companies.</li></ul><h3>Where it can go wrong</h3><p>Operating involvement is only valuable if it is welcomed and well-aimed. Management teams can view the private equity owner’s operators as interference, and generic playbooks applied without regard to a company’s specifics rarely deliver. The best operating partners act as advisers who earn influence rather than overseers who assume it.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Operating partners are typically former executives who work on portfolio company performance rather than on deal selection.</li><li>Their rise reflects a shift in private equity value creation toward operational and strategic improvement.</li><li>Their impact depends on fit, credibility, and a clear plan, not on a standard playbook.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice. Models vary by firm.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov, “What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?” summarized at the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/21/what-do-private-equity-firms-say-they-do">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/21/what-do-private-equity-firms-say-they-do</a></li><li>NBER Working Paper 21133: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w21133">https://www.nber.org/papers/w21133</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3e8728bd399" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Senior Debt vs. Mezzanine: Who Gets Paid First in a Buyout]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/senior-debt-vs-mezzanine-who-gets-paid-first-in-a-buyout-629e5b303ade?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/629e5b303ade</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[debt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 01:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T01:01:02.232Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The capital structure of a leveraged buyout is a ranking. Where you sit determines your risk, your return, and what you recover if things go wrong.</h4><p>A leveraged buyout is rarely financed with a single loan. It is built from layers of capital, each with a different claim on the company. Senior lenders sit at the top. Equity sits at the bottom. In between, depending on the deal, there may be second lien loans, high-yield bonds, or mezzanine debt. The order matters most when a company struggles.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Figures are illustrative unless sourced.</em></p><h3>The ranking, from safest to riskiest</h3><p><strong>Senior secured loans.</strong> Usually secured by a first lien on the company’s assets and repaid first. Because they carry the least risk, they carry the lowest interest rates, typically floating, set as a spread over a benchmark rate such as SOFR. Many large loans today are covenant-lite, meaning fewer ongoing financial tests than in the past.</p><p><strong>Second lien loans.</strong> Secured by the same assets, but only after first-lien lenders are repaid. They pay more to compensate for that position.</p><p><strong>High-yield bonds.</strong> Usually unsecured, often fixed-rate, and junior to secured debt. They typically carry incurrence covenants, which only apply when the company takes a specific action, such as raising more debt.</p><p><strong>Mezzanine debt.</strong> Subordinated to the layers above and senior only to equity. Mezzanine lenders target higher returns, often in the range of 10% to 20% on a blended basis, and frequently combine cash interest with payment-in-kind (PIK) interest that accrues to principal. Many mezzanine instruments also include an equity kicker, such as warrants.</p><p><strong>Equity.</strong> The sponsor’s investment. It is paid last and absorbs losses first, but it captures the upside once every lender is repaid.</p><h3>An illustrative structure</h3><p>Imagine a $1 billion buyout:</p><ul><li>$450 million senior secured term loan</li><li>$150 million mezzanine debt</li><li>$400 million sponsor equity</li></ul><p>If the company is later sold for $1.4 billion, lenders are repaid and equity captures the remaining gain. If it is sold for $500 million, senior lenders are repaid in full, mezzanine recovers only $50 million, and equity is wiped out.</p><h3>Why sponsors use multiple layers</h3><ul><li><strong>Cost of capital.</strong> Cheaper senior debt funds as much of the price as lenders allow; more expensive junior capital fills the gap that would otherwise require more equity.</li><li><strong>Flexibility.</strong> Mezzanine and PIK features can reduce cash interest in the early years, preserving cash for the business plan.</li><li><strong>Return math.</strong> Less equity per deal means a larger multiple on that equity if the plan works.</li></ul><p>The trade-off is fragility. More layers and more total debt mean less room for error if earnings fall.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Buyout financing is a hierarchy: senior secured debt, then junior debt such as second lien, high-yield or mezzanine, then equity.</li><li>Seniority determines both pricing and recovery in a downturn.</li><li>Junior capital raises potential equity returns but reduces the cushion against losses.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>Wall Street Prep, “The Ultimate Guide to Debt and Leveraged Finance”: <a href="https://www.wallstreetprep.com/knowledge/ultimate-guide-to-debt-leveraged-finance/">https://www.wallstreetprep.com/knowledge/ultimate-guide-to-debt-leveraged-finance/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=629e5b303ade" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[EBITDA: The Number Behind Almost Every Buyout Price]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/ebitda-the-number-behind-almost-every-buyout-price-43b716bae204?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43b716bae204</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[valuation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accounting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T15:31:01.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Why private equity prices companies on it, how it is built, and where it misleads.</h4><p>If you sit in on a private equity pricing discussion, one acronym will come up more than any other: EBITDA. Purchase prices, debt capacity, covenants, and management incentives are all routinely expressed in terms of it. Understanding what EBITDA captures, and what it leaves out, is basic literacy for anyone who wants to follow a buyout.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Figures are illustrative.</em></p><h3>The definition</h3><p>EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. It is a measure of operating profit before the effects of financing decisions, tax jurisdiction, and non-cash charges related to past investment.</p><h3>Building it from net income</h3><p>Consider an illustrative company:</p><ul><li>Net income: $20 million</li><li>Plus interest expense: $10 million</li><li>Plus income taxes: $8 million</li><li>Plus depreciation and amortization: $12 million</li><li><strong>EBITDA: $50 million</strong></li></ul><p>At a valuation multiple of 10x, that company would carry an enterprise value of $500 million.</p><h3>Why private equity relies on it</h3><p><strong>It is capital-structure neutral.</strong> A buyer is going to replace the existing financing, so the seller’s interest expense is not relevant to what the business is worth.</p><p><strong>It is tax-neutral.</strong> Tax outcomes depend partly on structure and jurisdiction, which the buyer will also change.</p><p><strong>It approximates debt capacity.</strong> Lenders size leveraged loans as a multiple of EBITDA, and covenants are frequently written in the same terms. A company with $50 million of EBITDA might support a certain multiple of debt depending on its sector, stability, and the credit market.</p><p><strong>It enables comparison.</strong> EV-to-EBITDA multiples let buyers compare companies of different sizes and capital structures on a common basis.</p><h3>The limitations</h3><p>EBITDA is not cash flow. Three costs it ignores are very real:</p><ul><li><strong>Capital expenditure.</strong> A business that must constantly replace equipment, stores, or software can have healthy EBITDA and weak cash generation.</li><li><strong>Working capital.</strong> Growth often ties up cash in inventory and receivables.</li><li><strong>Interest and taxes.</strong> Excluded from the metric, but still paid in cash after the buyout, often at higher levels because of the new debt.</li></ul><p>This is why experienced investors look at measures such as EBITDA minus capex, or free cash flow, alongside EBITDA itself.</p><h3>The “adjusted” problem</h3><p>Sellers commonly present adjusted EBITDA, adding back costs they describe as one-time or non-recurring. Some adjustments are legitimate, such as a one-off legal settlement. Others are aggressive, such as projected savings that have not yet been achieved. Every dollar of add-backs, multiplied by the purchase multiple, can move the price materially, which is why quality-of-earnings work during due diligence examines them line by line.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>EBITDA is operating profit before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.</li><li>Private equity uses it because it is neutral to financing and tax, and it anchors both valuation and debt capacity.</li><li>It is not cash flow, and adjusted EBITDA deserves close scrutiny.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43b716bae204" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blackstone and Hilton, Part 1: The $26 Billion Bet at the Top of the Market]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/blackstone-and-hilton-part-1-the-26-billion-bet-at-the-top-of-the-market-4695d7ee3e04?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4695d7ee3e04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hospitality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 01:01:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T01:01:03.049Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>In 2007, Blackstone agreed to buy Hilton with roughly 80% borrowed money. Within two years, the deal looked like a disaster.</h4><p>The Blackstone acquisition of Hilton is now remembered as one of the most profitable leveraged buyouts in history. It did not look that way at the start. The deal was signed at the peak of the 2000s buyout boom, financed overwhelmingly with debt, and hit almost immediately by the worst downturn the hotel industry had seen in decades.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Sources are listed at the end.</em></p><h3>The deal</h3><p>Blackstone agreed to take Hilton Hotels Corporation private in 2007. Shareholders received $47.50 per share in cash, and the transaction was valued at about $26 billion including debt.</p><p>The financing tells the story of the era:</p><ul><li><strong>About $20.6 billion of debt,</strong> in the form of mortgage and mezzanine loans incurred by Hilton subsidiaries and secured by substantially all of the company’s assets.</li><li><strong>About $5.7 billion of equity</strong> from investment funds affiliated with Blackstone.</li></ul><p>That is roughly 80% debt. The structure was common in 2006 and 2007, when credit was cheap and lenders were competing to finance large buyouts. The deal closed in October 2007.</p><h3>The thesis</h3><p>Blackstone’s view was that Hilton owned a portfolio of powerful brands that could grow far faster than they had as a public company. The opportunity was less about owning hotel buildings and more about expanding the brands globally, increasingly through management and franchise agreements that require less capital than owning property.</p><p>That is a classic private equity argument: a good business, under-managed for growth, that a new owner with a long horizon and aligned incentives could push harder.</p><h3>Why the timing was dangerous</h3><p>High leverage magnifies outcomes in both directions. When revenue grows, a small equity check captures most of the gain. When revenue falls, the fixed obligation to service debt does not shrink with it.</p><p>Hotels are among the most cyclical businesses there are. Room rates and occupancy can move quickly when the economy turns. Within a year of closing, the financial crisis was underway, travel demand fell sharply, and Hilton’s earnings came under pressure while its debt load stayed the same.</p><p>Blackstone eventually wrote the investment down by about 70% during the crisis. For many observers, it became a textbook example of a boom-era deal gone wrong.</p><h3>What comes next</h3><p>The outcome turned on what happened after the crash: a renegotiation with lenders, a recommitment of capital, and a long holding period. Part 2 covers how the debt was restructured in 2010, and later posts cover how the investment ultimately returned about $14 billion in profit.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Blackstone took Hilton private in 2007 at $47.50 per share, about $26 billion including debt.</li><li>The deal was roughly 80% debt-financed, typical of the pre-crisis buyout boom.</li><li>High leverage on a cyclical business left little cushion when the financial crisis hit.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>GlobeSt, “Hilton, Blackstone Close $26B Merger” (2007): <a href="https://globest.com/2007/10/24/hilton-blackstone-close-26b-merger">https://globest.com/2007/10/24/hilton-blackstone-close-26b-merger</a></li><li>The Real Deal, “Blackstone’s overall profit from Hilton deal: $14B” (2018): <a href="https://therealdeal.com/2018/05/18/blackstones-overall-profit-from-hilton-deal-14b/">https://therealdeal.com/2018/05/18/blackstones-overall-profit-from-hilton-deal-14b/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4695d7ee3e04" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Vintage Years: Why the Year a Private Equity Fund Starts Matters So Much]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/vintage-years-why-the-year-a-private-equity-fund-starts-matters-so-much-8f686682501b?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8f686682501b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[institutional-investor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asset-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-17T15:31:01.629Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Like wine, private equity funds are labeled by year. Unlike wine, the label tells you about the market, not the maker.</h4><p>Every private equity fund carries a vintage year. It sounds like a formality, but it is one of the most important pieces of context in judging a fund’s results. Two funds run by equally capable managers can post very different returns simply because one started investing at a better moment.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Sources are listed at the end.</em></p><h3>What a vintage year is</h3><p>MSCI, one of the major providers of private market benchmarks, defines a fund’s vintage year as the year it first calls capital from investors. Other conventions exist, such as the year of first close or first investment, so it is worth checking which definition a benchmark uses.</p><p>The vintage matters because a fund deploys most of its capital over the first few years of its life. The prices it pays, the financing it can raise, and the economy its companies operate in are all shaped by when that window falls.</p><h3>Why entry timing drives returns</h3><p><strong>Entry valuations.</strong> Funds that invest when multiples are high have less room for multiple expansion and more risk of compression. Funds that invest after a correction often buy at lower prices.</p><p><strong>Financing conditions.</strong> Credit availability and interest rates affect how much leverage a buyer can use and what it costs.</p><p><strong>The exit window.</strong> Most investments are sold several years after purchase. A fund whose companies mature into a strong M&amp;A or IPO market can realize gains more easily than one whose exits land in a downturn.</p><p>MSCI illustrates the point with a buyout fund that started investing in 2006, just before the financial crisis, compared with one that started in 2010 during the early recovery. Even with the same manager and sector focus, the return profiles would likely differ substantially.</p><h3>How investors use vintage years</h3><ol><li><strong>Fair comparisons.</strong> A fund’s performance is benchmarked against peers of the same vintage and strategy. Comparing a 2009 fund with a 2021 fund tells you more about the market than about either manager.</li><li><strong>Quartile rankings.</strong> When a manager says a fund is “top quartile,” the claim only means something relative to a stated vintage and a stated benchmark.</li><li><strong>Vintage diversification.</strong> Because no one can reliably time the market, many institutions commit to new funds every year. Spreading commitments across vintages smooths the effect of any single year’s conditions.</li></ol><h3>A note of caution</h3><p>Recent vintages are hard to judge. Their portfolios are still largely unrealized, so reported returns rest heavily on valuations rather than cash returned. Mature vintages, where most companies have been sold, give a far more reliable picture.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>A fund’s vintage year is commonly the year it first calls capital.</li><li>Entry valuations, financing conditions, and the exit environment make vintage a major driver of returns.</li><li>Investors compare funds within the same vintage and spread commitments across years.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>MSCI, “Understanding Private-Market Benchmarks: A Practical Guide”: <a href="https://www.msci.com/research-and-insights/blog-post/understanding-private-market-benchmarks-a-practical-guide">https://www.msci.com/research-and-insights/blog-post/understanding-private-market-benchmarks-a-practical-guide</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8f686682501b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Enterprise Value vs. Equity Value: Buying the Company, Not Just the Stock]]></title>
            <link>https://mrdrypowder.medium.com/enterprise-value-vs-equity-value-buying-the-company-not-just-the-stock-60f3affea178?source=rss-744f6b04b8ff------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/60f3affea178</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mergers-and-acquisitions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[valuation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Dry Powder]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 01:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-17T01:01:01.913Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Every buyout price starts with enterprise value. What the sellers receive is something else.</h4><p>When a private equity firm announces it is buying a company “for $1 billion,” it is almost always describing enterprise value. The amount that actually goes to the selling shareholders can be very different. Understanding the gap between the two is one of the most important skills in deal work.</p><p><em>This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy. Figures are illustrative.</em></p><h3>Two definitions</h3><p><strong>Enterprise value (EV)</strong> is the value of the operating business regardless of how it is financed. It represents what the whole company is worth to all capital providers, lenders and owners alike.</p><p><strong>Equity value</strong> is the portion attributable to shareholders. For a public company, it is the share price multiplied by the diluted share count.</p><p>The bridge between them is net debt:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Enterprise value = Equity value + Net debt</em></strong><em><br></em><strong><em>Equity value = Enterprise value − Net debt</em></strong></blockquote><p>Net debt is, in its simplest form, total debt minus cash. In practice the bridge can include other debt-like items, such as leases, pension deficits, or minority interests, and the definitions are often negotiated line by line.</p><h3>Why private equity prices on EV</h3><p>Private equity firms value companies on enterprise value, usually as a multiple of EBITDA, because EV is capital-structure neutral. Two identical businesses should be worth the same regardless of how much debt each happens to carry. Pricing on EV lets the buyer compare targets cleanly and then layer on its own financing.</p><h3>An illustrative example</h3><p>A company generates $50 million of EBITDA. A buyer agrees to 10x, an enterprise value of $500 million.</p><ul><li>The company carries $200 million of debt and holds $20 million of cash. Net debt: $180 million.</li><li>Equity value to the sellers: $500 million − $180 million = <strong>$320 million.</strong></li></ul><p>At closing, the existing debt is typically repaid or refinanced. The buyer funds the $500 million with a mix of new debt and its own equity.</p><h3>Where negotiations focus</h3><p>Because the sellers receive equity value, every item that moves from “operating” to “debt-like” changes their proceeds dollar for dollar. That is why purchase agreements spend so much effort on:</p><ul><li><strong>Cash-free, debt-free terms,</strong> which define what counts as cash and debt;</li><li><strong>Normalized working capital,</strong> so the seller doesn’t drain inventory or receivables before closing;</li><li><strong>Debt-like items,</strong> such as deferred revenue, accrued bonuses, or unpaid taxes.</li></ul><p>A headline price can hold steady while the equity check shrinks by tens of millions as these definitions are settled.</p><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Enterprise value is the value of the business; equity value is what belongs to shareholders.</li><li>Net debt and other debt-like items bridge the two.</li><li>Private equity prices on EV but pays sellers equity value, which is why the definitions of debt and cash are heavily negotiated.</li></ul><p><em>Educational content only. Not investment advice.</em></p><p><em>The 60-second version is on </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mrdrypowder/"><em>Instagram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/@MrDryPowder"><em>YouTube</em></a><em> at @mrdrypowder. Follow for two new breakdowns a day.</em></p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li>Financial Edge, “Equity and Enterprise Value Bridge”: <a href="https://www.fe.training/free-resources/valuation/equity-and-enterprise-value-bridge/">https://www.fe.training/free-resources/valuation/equity-and-enterprise-value-bridge/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=60f3affea178" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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