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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Moreno Colaiacovo on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Moreno Colaiacovo on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mygenomix?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Moreno Colaiacovo on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Failure of 23andMe: A Personal Reflection]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/the-failure-of-23andme-a-personal-reflection-c38aed1d0c3c?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[genetic-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[personal-genomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[23andme]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 29 Mar 2025 09:39:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-29T09:50:24.943Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="23andMe headquarters in Sunnyvale, California (CC BY-SA 4.0, author Coolcaesar)" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q_lqUhvTDybQqOrUz2AVvg.jpeg" /><figcaption>23andMe headquarters in Sunnyvale, California (CC BY-SA 4.0, author Coolcaesar)</figcaption></figure><p>Honestly, I’m somewhat saddened by the failure of <a href="https://www.23andme.com/">23andMe</a>. Giving people the opportunity to understand their DNA and helping them stay healthy was a noble mission, despite all the limitations of personal genomics. I bought my kit in 2010 and have no regrets. The service was divided into two areas: <strong>health</strong> and <strong>ancestry</strong>. The health section was incredibly comprehensive at the time: 23andMe provided information about drug metabolism, told you if you were a carrier of genetic diseases, and informed you about your risk of developing common conditions. Obviously, this is where most of the problems were concentrated: although the <strong>analytical validity</strong> was good (meaning the DNA was “read” correctly), the same couldn’t be said for <strong>clinical validity</strong> (how scientifically sound certain information is) and <strong>clinical utility</strong> (how useful it is to know this information).</p><p>The <strong>pharmacogenetic</strong> tests, for example, were potentially useful for specific therapies because they helped estimate the optimal drug dosage. The tests for <strong>genetic diseases</strong> could provide shocking results, but at least they made sense from a reproductive perspective. In the <strong>common diseases</strong> section, however, you could find a bit of everything: from very weak statistical associations based on few studies (indicated with one star, like online reviews) to well-established associations linked to diseases that were serious but unfortunately not preventable, like Alzheimer’s. In between, there were countless multi-factorial diseases of varying severity, with variable genetic bases that were difficult to interpret. The idea was that users could adjust their <strong>diet and lifestyle</strong> to prevent diseases for which they had above-average risk: how many actually did this? The enormous amount of health information and its variable quality, combined with the fact that the service was offered without a doctor’s involvement, forced 23andMe into lengthy discussions with the FDA, and eventually to significantly scale back the package of tests offered. Then there was the ancestry part, or <strong>genetic genealogy</strong>. Here too, shocking discoveries could be made (unconfirmed paternity, for example), but it was an exercise particularly useful for learning about one’s origins and distant American cousins (I myself managed to confirm a 3rd cousin).</p><p>23andMe tried to make its way in a difficult sector, filled with <strong>regulatory, statistical, and even ethical obstacles</strong>. For 19 years, it struggled to maintain a balance between business needs, customer satisfaction, and regulations, and in the end, it fell. What this company tried to do, however, is important. For just a few dozen euros, it gave everyone access to innovative technologies and, above all, allowed people to <strong>better know themselves</strong>. And the path to well-being can only start with knowledge, so thank you, 23andMe.</p><p>P.S.: If you’re a 23andMe customer, I recommend accessing your account and requesting the deletion of your data (from the Settings section). No one knows what will happen to the genetic data collected by the company; in case of doubt, it’s better to remove it. Of course, before doing so, you can always download a copy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c38aed1d0c3c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How a pandemic begins]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/how-a-pandemic-begins-49977b0d4caa?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/49977b0d4caa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sars-cov2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wuhan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid-19-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Dec 2024 21:10:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-08T21:10:57.544Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="Laos" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q1KZO3sRTgHsebxIi4f2AQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Rhinolophus malayanus</em> is a small bat from Southeast Asia. It lives inside limestone caves, feeds on insects, and holds an unfortunate record: a specimen of this species was found to harbor the closest known relative of SARS-CoV-2. Its name is <strong>BANAL-20–52</strong>, which was sampled in northern Laos in July 2020. Not only does its genome share a 96.8% identity with the pandemic virus, but the key region of the spike protein (the RBD domain) is practically identical to that of SARS-CoV-2. It is so similar, in fact, that just like its more famous relative, BANAL-20–52 can bind with high affinity to the human ACE2 receptor.</p><p>This Laotian virus is, in fact, only one representative of a pretty large family. We have other viruses from Laos, some of which are even more similar to SARS-CoV-2 in certain regions of their genome. Similar viruses were found in bats from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. Then we have the pangolin viruses, which are the sole outsiders in this bat-dominated list. And, of course, there are the relatives identified in Yunnan, China, the most famous of which is certainly RaTG13. For a long time, this virus attracted global attention, first because it was collected by researchers of the <strong>Wuhan Institute of Virology</strong>, located in the city where the pandemic began, and second, because it was the closest known relative of SARS-CoV-2 until the discovery of BANAL-20–52. The question haunted us for a long time: were the Wuhan researchers to be blamed for the COVID pandemic? Today, the spotlight on virologist Shi Zhengli’s lab is dimming, partly because the hotspot of this virus family appears to be in Southeast Asia, shifting attention away from RaTG13, and partly because other evidence clearly points elsewhere.</p><p>Michael Worobey and colleagues analysed the earliest known COVID cases, and found a strong geographic link to the <strong>Huanan seafood market</strong> — not just among those who reported direct contact with the market (which is unsurprising), but also among those who had no known connection to it (more surprising). The clustering of early cases in that area strongly suggests that the outbreak started there. For a long time, it was hypothesized that the market was not the origin but merely a key step in the epidemic — a super-spreading event that amplified infections. However, further data analysis (in this case, geolocation data from social media) highlighted that many other locations in Wuhan, such as shopping malls, places of worship, hospitals, and nursing homes, could have served as super-spreader sites due to their high number of visitors. Honestly, it would be an extraordinary coincidence if the first super-spreader event of a novel epidemic had occurred in the Huanan market, which was a relatively less crowded location, but had a key feature that has been historically associated with spillover events: the prolonged proximity between wildlife and humans. To be fair, another hypothesis has been proposed involving the Wuhan Center for Disease Control (WCDC), which was relocating to a new site just a few hundred meters from the market at that time. Since the new site was not yet fully operational and experiments were not being conducted there, it is hard to imagine that SARS-CoV-2 originated from this location. It is even less likely that it came from Shi Zhengli’s laboratory, over 30 kilometers away. Indeed, it doesn’t seem very realistic that an infected researcher could have sparked an epidemic in that area without leaving a trail of other infection clusters behind.</p><p>The clues, in any case, do not end here. Shortly after the market’s closure, teams of experts collected hundreds of samples from surfaces, drains, and animal carcasses. While the carcasses tested negative for SARS-CoV-2, those collected near the stalls of wildlife traders were particularly rich in positive samples. Similar to how the spatial analyses described above pointed to the market, the analyses conducted inside the market clearly indicated the area where <strong>wildlife</strong> was sold. The species for sale were many: foxes, minks, ermines, Himalayan marmots, hog badgers, hoary bamboo rats, Amur hedgehogs, Malayan porcupines, the infamous masked palm civets (from which SARS originated), as well as raccoon dogs, which are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. There is no proof that these animals were infected by the virus, but we know that some of them were unwell, as <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-03968-0">reported</a> by Angela Rasmussen at a recent conference in Japan: the samples showed traces of ongoing infection, evidenced by the activation of genes involved in immune response. We can also add the fact that both virus lineages (A and B) were present in the Huanan market, quite an unlikely coincidence if it had merely been a super-spreading event.</p><p>So what about Shi Zhengli and her lab, then? It is difficult to give a definitive answer, as the intermediate host animal is still unknown, and perhaps will never be identified. However, it is undeniable that all the available data points in one direction, and that direction does not lead to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Shi Zhengli has drawn doubts and suspicions for a long time due to her institute’s location and her history of experiments with bat coronaviruses. The initial opacity of Chinese authorities did not help, nor did the mysterious furin cleavage site that made SARS-CoV-2 so efficient. Nonetheless, one <strong>should reconsider his or her ideas</strong> in light of new data and evidence. Kristian Andersen and Edward Holmes did so very quickly. Within a few days, they shifted from suspecting the virus had been engineered to writing in Nature Medicine that any lab scenario was implausible. Michael Worobey, too, was unconvinced of a natural origin, and he even co-signed an appeal in Science calling for further investigation. And yet, it was one of his later publications that convinced me the simplest explanation for the origins of COVID was to be found in the wildlife trade.</p><p>Compared to four years ago, when I wrote my latest article on this topic, we now have much more information. Above all, we have discovered that SARS-CoV-2 is ultimately not that special. Southeast Asian bats are a reservoir of very similar viruses: just a few mutations and the right conditions could be enough for triggering an epidemic among our species. In other words, there’s no need to invoke complex and risky genetic engineering experiments; <strong>nature already has everything it needs</strong> to cause a pandemic. It is up to us, as humans, to learn from this experience and prevent it from happening again.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2024.08.010">Crits-Cristoph A. et al. “Genetic tracing of market wildlife and viruses at the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic”, Cell 2024</a></li><li><a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-virology-093022-013037">Holmes E.H. “The emergence and evolution of SARS-CoV-2”, Annual Review of Virology 2024</a></li><li><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-04532-4">Temmam S. et al. “Bat coronaviruses related to SARS-CoV-2 and infectious for human cells”, Nature 2021</a></li><li><a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abp8715">Worobey M. et al. “The Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan was the early epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic”, Science 2022</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=49977b0d4caa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The origin of SARS-CoV-2 is a riddle: meet the Twitter detectives who aim to solve it]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/the-origin-of-sars-cov-2-is-a-riddle-meet-the-twitter-detectives-who-aim-to-solve-it-5050216fd279?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5050216fd279</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sars-cov2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid-19-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wuhan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Dec 2020 20:39:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-05T08:53:25.330Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yXUfHE4JBedOoc4KDvL1nA.jpeg" /></figure><p>If you have read my previous <a href="https://mygenomix.medium.com/fearsome-viruses-and-where-to-find-them-4e6b0ac6e602">article</a>, you probably know already most of the mysteries that surround the origins of SARS-CoV-2. If you haven’t read it, then I strongly recommend to do so before reading on. In fact, the present article is a tribute to the people who helped unravelling those mysteries. You may have already heard about <a href="https://twitter.com/Ayjchan">Alina Chan</a>, but there are many other people, out of the spotlight, who deserve credit. They have been working tirelessly this year: reading academic papers, exploring barely known databases, sifting through Chinese media outlets. Their work place is Twitter. Some of them are professional scientists, others have different backgrounds, many use pseudonyms. They have a tendency to ask uncomfortable questions, and probably for this reason they are often blocked by other scientists and accused of promoting conspiracy theories. You may disagree with their unconvential approach, but the truth is that these people behave, to all intents and purposes, like a small scientific community: they search and analyze data, they share and discuss their findings and, more importantly, they make discoveries.</p><h3>Guess who?</h3><p>The first mystery that the Twitter detectives had to solve was the identification of RaTG13. This name appeared in the scientific literature for the first time in January, in a <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.01.22.914952v2">preprint</a> by scientists from Wuhan Institute of Virology, to indicate the bat coronavirus most similar to SARS-CoV-2. Later on, on 3rd February, the same article (with some not-so-minor modifications) was <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2012-7">published</a> on <em>Nature</em> (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2012-7">Zhou et al., 2020</a>). At that time we knew almost nothing about RaTG13, although this virus might have once been present in Chinese databases which were taken down, as later discovered by <a href="https://twitter.com/ydeigin/status/1259891518468427776">Yuri Deigin</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/BillyBostickson/status/1261861132194603010">@BillyBockstinson</a>. Anyway, two days later another <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2020.1725399">paper</a> was published by scientists from Wuhan University in the <em>Emerging Microbes and Infections</em> journal (<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2020.1725399">Chen et al., 2020</a>). The authors write:</p><blockquote>Phylogenetic analysis indicates that 2019-nCoV is close to coronaviruses (CoVs) circulating in Rhinolophus (Horseshoe bats), such as 98.7% nucleotide identity to partial RdRp gene of bat coronavirus strain BtCoV/4991 (GenBank KP876546, 370 nt sequence of RdRp and lack of other genome sequence) and 87.9% nucleotide identity to bat coronavirus strain bat-SL-CoVZC45 and bat-SL-CoVZXC21.<br><em>Chen et al., 2020 Emerging Microbes and Infections</em></blockquote><p>When they wrote the manuscript, the most similar bat viruses were in fact ZC45 and ZXC21. They didn’t mention RaTG13 because that name was unknown back then, however they did notice a very strong similarity (99% identity) with a partial RdRp gene of coronavirus BtCoV/4991, which was present in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/KP876546">Genbank</a> and linked to a publication from 2016 (<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12250-016-3713-9">Ge et al., 2016</a>).</p><p><em>Emerging Microbes and Infections</em> is a minor journal and this paper was somehow eclipsed by the <em>Nature</em> article, in fact I guess that few people noticed it. One of them was for sure Rossana Segreto (Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/Rossana38510044">@Rossana38510044</a>), biologist at the University of Inssbruck, who wrote a <a href="https://www.virology.ws/2020/02/20/pangolins-and-the-origin-of-sars-cov-2-coronavirus/#comment-55702">comment</a> on <em>Virology Blog</em> on 16th March. Probably other people had read both papers and tried to align the BtCoV/4991 sequence from Chen et al. with RaTG13 from Zhou et al., but Rossana’s comment is the first public statement that I found suggesting the connection between the two names:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KFPoHNQxTkqmJIWSQGRFkw.png" /><figcaption>Comment by Rossana Segreto on Virology blog, 16th March 2020</figcaption></figure><p>The “same-virus theory” was confirmed on 9th May by Peter Daszak, close collaborator of Wuhan scientist Shi Zhengli. Daszak <a href="https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak/status/1259111768217063424">replied</a> this way to a Twitter user who had asked him about this connection:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/1*Cjs8KS1ZSSrOB6OKB_H6aw.png" /><figcaption>Tweet by Peter Daszak, 9th May 2020</figcaption></figure><p>That Twitter user was <a href="https://twitter.com/schnufi666">@schnufi666</a>, who had just <a href="https://twitter.com/schnufi666/status/1259035090811846661">discovered</a> that in a Chinese <a href="http://www.mgc.ac.cn/DBatVir/">database</a> specialized in bat viruses, the entry of BtCoV/4991 had been <a href="http://archive.is/mUcS0">modified</a> on 7th March, to include a reference to RaTG13. Later on, it was Shi Zhengli herself who confirmed the link between those names in an <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/Shi%20Zhengli%20Q%26A.pdf">interview</a> to <em>Science</em> published in July. Finally, after tweets, interviews and editing of little known Chinese databases, WIV scientists <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/MN996532?report=girevhist">updated</a> the RaTG13 entry on Genbank, adding the sentence <em>“former lab designation: Bat coronavirus Ra4991”</em>. They have done this on 24th November, but hey, better late than never.</p><h3>Treasure hunt</h3><p>Back in April, almost everybody in this small Twitter community was convinced that RaTG13 was in fact BtCoV/4991, although the connection was not stated explicitely in any paper. People began to wonder then, why the authors of the <em>Nature</em> paper didn’t cite their own paper from 2016, where RaTG13 was first described with a different name. Were they hiding something? To answer this question, the Twitter detectives started exploring the internet to find any relevant information about a mineshaft in Mojiang county (Yunnan), that is the place where RaTG13 was sampled in 2013, as <a href="https://twitter.com/ydeigin/status/1254372070584172544">noticed</a> by Yuri Deigin (Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/ydeigin">@ydeigin</a>). At that time, the discussions were often led by <a href="https://twitter.com/luigi_warren">@luigi_warren</a>, who used to summarize the main discoveries in clear threads such as <a href="https://twitter.com/luigi_warren/status/1259826618442235909">this one</a>.</p><p>The first clue for the investigation was in the 2016 paper itself. On 15th May, <a href="http://twitter.com/_coltseavers">@_coltseavers</a> noticed a <a href="https://twitter.com/_coltseavers/status/1261413201712828417">sentence</a> citing an earlier paper (<a href="https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/6/13-1022_article">Wu et al., 2014</a>): apparently, the same mineshaft had been sampled in 2012, in search of <em>henipaviruses</em> (another genus of viruses that includes Nipah and Hendra). Reading the 2014 paper, it was immediately clear why that mineshaft was so interesting for the Chinese virus hunters.</p><blockquote>In June 2012, in Mojiang Hani Autonomous County, Yunnan Province, China, severe pneumonia without a known cause was diagnosed in 3 persons who had been working in an abandoned mine; all 3 patients died. Half a year later, we investigated the presence of novel zoonotic pathogens in natural hosts in this cave. For the investigation, we collected anal swab samples from 20 bats (Rhinolophus ferrumequinum), 9 rats (R. flavipectus), and 5 musk shrews (Crocidura dracula) from the mine for virome analysis.<br><em>Wu et al., 2014 Emerging Infectious Diseases</em></blockquote><p>So, the bat virus most similar to SARS-CoV-2 had been sampled in 2013 in a mineshaft where three people had died of severe pneumonia with unknown cause, the year before. Quite interesting, no? In fact, the news was reported in other websites. Roland Baker (Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/RolandBakerIII">@RolandBakerIII</a>) <a href="https://twitter.com/RolandBakerIII/status/1259623784782327810">found</a> an article in Chinese, describing the incident (<em>“In June 2012, three men removing slag from a derelict copper mine in southwestern China fell ill with severe pneumonia and died.”</em>). He also <a href="https://twitter.com/RolandBakerIII/status/1259625285697191936">found</a> a <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/03/new-killer-virus-china">news</a> in <em>Science</em>, where scientists explained that the cause of those deaths was yet to be discovered. Interestingly, <em>Scientific American</em> also mentions those events in a recent <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1/">interview</a> to Shi Zhengli, as <a href="https://twitter.com/luigi_warren/status/1259834973814550528">noted</a> by <a href="https://twitter.com/luigi_warren">@luigi_warren</a>. Oddly enough, this article blames a fungus for the pneumonia, which was quite surprising because, according to the papers, the Chinese scientists were searching for a virus.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/618/1*FVbyZMIzHpHGHJlbk32hRQ.png" /><figcaption>Excerpt from “How China’s ‘Bat Woman’ Hunted Down Viruses from SARS to the New Coronavirus”, Scientific American 2020</figcaption></figure><p>At that point, the exact location of the mineshaft was still unknown, although Antonio Duarte (Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/AntGDuarte">@AntGDuarte</a>) had <a href="https://twitter.com/AntGDuarte/status/1259882565877432322">noticed</a> on 11th May that the red dot in a blind map included in Ge et al. 2016, was very close to Tongguanzhen, which is the administrative town of Tongguan township: maybe that’s where RaTG13 got its “TG” from!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/709/1*RUmXXElJ_qwPFsVbDKuTmg.png" /><figcaption>Tweet by Antonio Duarte, 11th May 2020</figcaption></figure><p>Interestingly, while all these things were happening on Twitter, an Indian microbiologist reached independently the same conclusion: her name was Monali Rahalkar (Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/MonaRahalkar">@MonaRahalkar</a>), and her <a href="https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202005.0322/v2">preprint</a> was the first attempt to share the mineshaft story to a broader audience. Then, on 18th May, the plot twist. <a href="https://twitter.com/TheSeeker268">@TheSeeker268</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/TheSeeker268/status/1262459039297961989">found</a> a <a href="http://eng.oversea.cnki.net/Kcms/detail/detail.aspx?filename=1013327523.nh&amp;dbcode=CMFD&amp;dbname=CMFD2014">Master thesis</a> dealing with the pneumonia outbreak: <em>“The Analysis of 6 Patients with Severe Pneumonia Caused by Unknown Viruses”</em> (by Li Xu, supervisor Prof. Qian Chuan Yun, published in 2014). And a few days later, on 29th May, the same Twitter user <a href="https://twitter.com/TheSeeker268/status/1266142181208870912">posted</a> a <a href="https://t.co/R9aTtOpsdA?amp=1">PhD thesis</a> on the same topic: <em>“Novel Virus Discovery in Bat and the Exploration of Receptor of Bat Coronavirus HKU9”</em> (by Canping Huang, supervisor <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_F._Gao">Gao Fu</a>, published in 2018). The two documents, mentioned in a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340924249_Is_considering_a_genetic-manipulation_origin_for_SARS-CoV-2_a_conspiracy_theory_that_must_be_censored">preprint</a> posted by Segreto and Deigin, held a bonanza of information about the Tongguan mineshaft and the pneumonia cases. For instance, the two theses precisely describe the six patients as well as their symptoms, which were impressively similar to those of COVID-19, as reported by Monali Rahalkar in a paper published in <em>Frontiers in Public Health</em> (<a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.581569/">Rahalkar and Bahulikar, 2020</a>).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VPdtqpRCVz4d8OrDMrltVQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Summary of the six pneuomina patients (Rahalkar and Bahulikar, 2020)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/556/1*1GifSQ-N8PptmM3SZNXAaA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Common features observed in the six pneumonia patients and COVID-19 (Rahalkar and Bahulikar, 2020)</figcaption></figure><p>An important part of the work was carried out by <a href="https://twitter.com/franciscodeasis">@franciscodeasis</a>, who did the first good translation of parts of the <a href="https://twitter.com/franciscodeasis/status/1267846807138304000">Master</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/franciscodeasis/status/1268337394970918914">PhD</a> theses. The PhD thesis was particularly important because it revealed the GPS coordinates of the mineshaft, as noted by its discoverer The Seeker: 23°10&#39;36.00&#39;’N, 101°21&#39;28.00&#39;’E. Actually, those were the coordinates of a village named Danaoshan. The mineshaft itself may be quite close: <a href="https://twitter.com/franciscodeasis/status/1301112346417549315">according</a> to Franscico De Asis, it is located at about 1.4km, in an area accessible by dirt road from Danaoshan.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JawC3MDC4_el6CRkTdVAUA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Probable location of the Mojiang mineshaft where six people fell sick in 2012, according to Francisco De Asis (snapshot from Google Earh, 2011)</figcaption></figure><p>Our Twitter detectives got it right. On 17th November, Zhou et al. published an <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2951-z">addendum</a> to their original paper, that confirmed the mineshaft story: in 2012 the Wuhan Institute of Virology had analyzed serum samples from 4 patients with pneumonia, who fell sick after visiting a mine cave in Tongguan town. For that reason, the Chinese scientists made 1–2 trips each year to the mine, looking for SARS-related viruses that might explain the disease. Some of the details in the addendum do not fully match with the Master and PhD theses, but it’s still impressive how a group of Twitter users managed to bring to surface facts and events that otherwise would have remained probably hidden to the scientific community. In this regard, Rossana Segreto must be credited in particular, for her relentless pressing with the <em>Nature</em> editors, but likely several other scientists asked explanations to the journal.</p><h3>The final riddle</h3><p>Consider the information available in January: the closest relative of SARS-CoV-2 was a bat coronavirus, sampled in Yunnan in 2013, that we knew nothing about. Thanks to the research of tireless Twitter users, we now know that SARS-CoV-2 may be linked to an old story of unexplained pneumonia, a story that scientists in Wuhan, apparently, were not eager to share with the world. We also know that RaTG13 was sequenced in 2018, not after the COVID outbreak, as is stated in the <em>Nature</em> paper. It was Francisco De Asis who first <a href="https://twitter.com/franciscodeasis/status/1273959625327550465">noticed</a> the dates in the names of sequences uploaded to NCBI in May, a finding later confirmed by Shi Zhengli in her <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/Shi%20Zhengli%20Q%26A.pdf">answers</a> to <em>Science</em>. But the quest is not over!</p><p>The addendum recently published on <em>Nature</em> revealed, in fact, that WIV had found other 8 SARS-related coronaviruses in the Tongguan mine, besides RaTG13. What do we know about those viruses? Basically nothing: the article doesn’t even mention their names, let alone their genomic sequences. But they may be somewhere, buried in minor papers or less known databases: this is the final riddle that the Twitter detectives have to solve. For months, Francisco De Asis has been tracking all the information available on this topic: in his huge Excel files he annotates publications, sequence entries, even time and location of the sampling expeditions. He <a href="https://twitter.com/franciscodeasis/status/1329057812815765504">believes</a> the 8 viruses might belong to the so-called “7896 clade”, a group of novel viruses that recently appeared in a paper published on <em>Nature</em> (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17687-3">Latinne et al., 2020</a>).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/681/1*Utdc7Wi9KUxes7maqMazzA.png" /><figcaption>Tweet by Francisco De Asis, 18th November 2020</figcaption></figure><p>Actually, these viruses are never mentioned in the paper, but the Genbank IDs are reported in the <a href="https://static-content.springer.com/esm/art%3A10.1038%2Fs41467-020-17687-3/MediaObjects/41467_2020_17687_MOESM1_ESM.pdf">Supplementary PDF</a>, and their RdRp sequence (which is the only public sequence currently available) looks quite similar to those of SARS-CoV-2 and its closest cousins RaTG13 and RmYN02 (see this <a href="http://babarlelephant.free-hoster.net/tree/rdrp_sarsbecovirus_newick_tree_raxml.html">tree</a> by <a href="https://twitter.com/babarlelephant">@babarlelephant</a>). Moreover, some of the RaTG13 sequences uploaded in May have a mysterious <a href="https://twitter.com/franciscodeasis/status/1281364285399224320">“7896” label</a>. Will the detectives get it right also this time, like they did before? To find out, just follow them on Twitter: here’s a <a href="https://twitter.com/i/lists/1333817850352578561">list</a> with the most active users. You will probably come across tons of tweets by <a href="https://twitter.com/BillyBostickson">@billybostickson</a>, who has been the aggregator and motivator of this group since the very beginning of this pandemic: just to get an idea of his amazing work, have a look at his <em>“260 questions for scientists and the WHO on the origin of SARS-CoV-2”</em> (<a href="https://archive.is/JVLjO">Part 1</a>, <a href="https://archive.is/bEpKy">2</a>, <a href="https://archive.is/pJaCZ">3</a>).</p><p>If social media is not your thing and you prefer traditional scientific articles, no worries. Below there’s a list of works authored by people mentioned above, as well as others that I didn’t mention: for instance, you will find the first peer-reviewed paper speculating on the lab origin of SARS-CoV-2, by Dan Sirotkin (Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/Harvard2H">@Harvard2H</a>) and his father Karl, who designed dbSNP; the fascinating Bayesian analysis by <a href="https://twitter.com/gdemaneuf">Gilles Demaneuf</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/RdeMaistre">Rodolphe de Maistre</a>; the preprint by Daoyu Zhang (Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/flavinkins">@flavinkins</a>), who first questioned the data on pangolin coronaviruses; the lab leak hypothesis proposed by Anon, which perfectly fits with this detective saga; last but not least, the memorable Medium article by <a href="https://twitter.com/ydeigin">Yuri Deigin</a> on the gain-of-function experiments that were carried out in Wuhan. So many people were involved, as you may see, but this should not come as a surprise: science is a collective enterprise, even when you do it on Twitter.</p><h4>Peer-reviewed papers</h4><ul><li><a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.581569/full">Rahalkar &amp; Bahulikar “Lethal Pneumonia Cases in Mojiang Miners (2012) and the Mineshaft Could Provide Important Clues to the Origin of SARS-CoV-2” Frontiers in Public Health 2020, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2020.581569</a></li><li><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bies.202000240">Segreto &amp; Deigin “The genetic structure of SARS‐CoV‐2 does not rule out a laboratory origin” BioEssays 2020, https://doi.org/10.1002/bies.202000240</a></li><li><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/bies.202000091">Sirotkin &amp; Sirotkin “Might SARS‐CoV‐2 Have Arisen via Serial Passage through an Animal Host or Cell Culture?” BioEssays 2020, 42, 2000091</a></li></ul><h4>Preprints</h4><ul><li><a href="https://zenodo.org/record/4063813#.X8fPkmhKg2x">Anon “Proposed SARS-CoV-2 Spillover During 2019 Review of Samples from a Mineshaft in Mojiang, Yunnan Province, China” Zenodo preprint, 14 September 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.07.07.184374v2.article-info">Chan &amp; Zhan “Single source of pangolin CoVs with a near identical Spike RBD to SARS-CoV-2” BioRxiv preprint, 7 July 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.00627">Deigin &amp; Segreto “The bat coronavirus RmYN02 is characterized by a 6-nucleotide deletion at the S1/S2 junction, and its claimed PAA insertion is highly doubtful” aRxiv preprint, 1 December 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://zenodo.org/record/4067919#.X8fyeWhKg2w">Demaneuf &amp; De Maistre “Outlines of a probabilistic evaluation of possible SARS-CoV-2 origins” Zenodo preprint, 26 September 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202005.0322/v2">Rahalkar &amp; Bahulikar “Understanding the Origin of ‘BatCoVRaTG13’, a Virus Closest to SARS-CoV-2” Preprints, 19 May 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.12567">Sallard et al “Tracing the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in coronavirus phylogenies” arXiv preprint, 25 November 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340924249_Is_considering_a_genetic-manipulation_origin_for_SARS-CoV-2_a_conspiracy_theory_that_must_be_censored">Segreto &amp; Deigin “Is considering a genetic-manipulation origin for SARS-CoV-2 a conspiracy theory that must be censored?” Research Gate preprint, April 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.05.01.073262v1">Zhan et al “SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans. What does this mean for re-emergence?” BioRxiv preprint, 2 May 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://zenodo.org/record/3957778#.X8fUYmhKg2z">Zhang “The Pan-SL-CoV/GD sequences may be from contamination” Zenodo preprint, 8 June 2020</a></li></ul><h4>Medium articles and blog posts</h4><ul><li><a href="https://yurideigin.medium.com/lab-made-cov2-genealogy-through-the-lens-of-gain-of-function-research-f96dd7413748">Deigin “Lab-Made? SARS-CoV-2 Genealogy Through the Lens of Gain-of-Function Research” Medium, 22 April 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://gillesdemaneuf.medium.com/wiv-ecohealth-the-mojiang-miners-cases-and-a-bat-sampling-trip-in-april-2012-74be5c2e0a0a">Demaneuf “WIV, EcoHealth, the Mojiang ‘miners’ cases and a bat sampling trip in April 2012” Medium, 25 September 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://thebulletin.org/2020/06/did-the-sars-cov-2-virus-arise-from-a-bat-coronavirus-research-program-in-a-chinese-laboratory-very-possibly/">Leitenberg “Did the SARS-CoV-2 virus arise from a bat coronavirus research program in a Chinese laboratory? Very possibly.” Bullettin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 June 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://harvardtothebighouse.com/2020/01/31/logistical-and-technical-analysis-of-the-origins-of-the-wuhan-coronavirus-2019-ncov/">Sirotkin D “Logistical and Technical Exploration into the Origins of the Wuhan Strain of Coronavirus (COVID-19)” 31 January 2020</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5050216fd279" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fearsome viruses and where to find them]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/fearsome-viruses-and-where-to-find-them-4e6b0ac6e602?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4e6b0ac6e602</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[wuhan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sars-cov2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid-19-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2020 13:00:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-01T09:44:41.693Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/1*6a4i52KizQclAJpl8UMMIQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Almost a year has passed since the outbreak of COVID-19. The coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 started its journey in the city of Wuhan, China, and since then it infected over 50 million people worldwide, killing 2.5% of them (<a href="https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6">Johns Hopkins</a> data). Scientists are largely convinced it has a natural origin, but there are many things we still do not know. Genetic analyses clearly tell us that the ancestor of SARS-CoV-2 was a <strong>bat virus</strong>, most likely originating in southern China: both its closest relatives (RaTG13 and RmYN02), have been identified in Yunnan province, as well as many other SARS viruses discovered in bats so far. It is still not clear, however, how exactly this virus has traveled the 1000 km that separate Yunnan from the city of Wuhan, home of the famous <a href="http://english.whiov.cas.cn/">Institute of Virology</a> that has been studying bat coronaviruses for years. On this specific point, opinions differ, even within the scientific community itself.</p><p>Most scientists believe the virus has passed to humans through an <strong>intermediate host</strong>, for example an animal sold at a wet market, one of those places where humans and wildlife come into closer contact. After all, this had already happened with the first SARS, which had made the “jump” from civets to humans, and with MERS, which had passed through camels. But this time, the intermediate host is yet to be found. Initially, everybody blamed the <strong>Huanan fish market</strong>, but Chinese scientists found the virus only on <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-26/Official-Wuhan-seafood-market-may-be-the-victim-of-the-coronavirus--QNVxtMlFbW/index.html">surfaces </a>and not in animals for sale. They also sampled farmed animals throughout the Hubei province, but again <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/Shi%20Zhengli%20Q%26A.pdf">without success</a>.</p><p>With the first SARS virus, things went <a href="https://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_07_04/en/">differently</a>. The first case appeared in Guangdong in November 2002, the pathogen was identified in April 2003 and already in May we had discovered an almost identical virus in palm civets sold in markets (<a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/302/5643/276.abstract">Guan et al., 2003</a>). Somehow, it was the opposite situation compared to the current one: at that time we didn’t know yet the role of bats as animal reservoirs, but it took only six months to find the intermediate host.</p><p>Given the difficulties that we are facing this time, scientists are also considering another remote hypothesis, which is quite hard to demonstrate: the virus could have jumped directly from bats, and then <strong>evolved slowly</strong> among humans, adapting more and more to the new host over time. In this case, one would expect to find traces of the virus also in other regions of China, before last December: sporadic cases of atypical pneumonia caused by a similar virus, for example. But if such pneumonia had occurred, as far as we know the Chinese health authorities have not detected them.</p><p>A third, disturbing, possibility remains, one that only a few scientists consider seriously: that SARS-CoV-2 has accidentally leaked from a laboratory, and may even be the result of <strong>genetic manipulation</strong>. This hypothesis would also be compatible with the fact that the virus seemed already well adapted to humans when it appeared in Wuhan, as suggested by a <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.05.01.073262v1.article-info">preprint </a>published in May and now <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-convened-global-study-of-the-origins-of-sars-cov-2">confirmed </a>by the WHO, which anyway supports the natural origin hypothesis. Scientists who deem this a realistic scenario are very few, or at least very few of them have taken this stance publicly: I recall the biologist <a href="https://twitter.com/r_h_ebright/status/1268551363782488065">Richard Ebright</a>, the immunologist <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06199">Nikolai Petrovskj</a>, the virologist <a href="https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/la-question-de-lorigine-du-sars-cov-2-se-pose-serieusement">Étienne Decroly</a>, the microbiologist <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2020/11/03/2021133117">David Relman</a> and, of course, the researcher <a href="https://twitter.com/Ayjchan/status/1323611909078265858">Alina Chan</a> of Broad Institute, now a star on Twitter, who has always maintained that with current evidence no scenario could be ruled out. The fact is that any discussion on the origins of the virus inevitably clashes with <strong>political issues</strong>. From the very beginning, Donald Trump accused China of creating SARS-CoV-2 in one of their laboratories, and my feeling is that these political pressures are corrupting the debate within the scientific community. It’s tempting to politically label anyone who even remotely considers the “lab hypothesis”, and these days very few scientists want to look like Trump supporters (by the way, how can you blame them?). In my view, the natural origin scenario has been pushed not only by the evidence, but also (and maybe more) by a feeling of aversion towards the outgoing US president, and the fear of fuelling his narrative.</p><p>In these months I have followed this issue very closely, I have read a lot and discovered really surprising things. After a long time, I’ve decided to share with you everything I learned, providing you with all the references and links that you may need to evaluate the correctness of my words. I will not dwell on improbable <strong>conspiracy theories</strong> like Li-Meng Yan’s (others have already written about them), I will instead focus on data and peer-reviewed scientific papers, and I assure you it will be an interesting story. At the end of this very long article, you will know (almost) everything there is to know about the origins of this virus, but most of all everything we don’t know yet.</p><h3><strong>Lego bricks and ferrets with the flu</strong></h3><p>In order to seriously evaluate the lab origin scenario, the first question we should answer is: with the scientific and technological knowledge that is currently available, is it possible to build a virus in a laboratory? It’s an obvious requirement, but it is good to discuss it, to clarify from the beginning what can be done and what can’t be done. <strong>Genetic engineering</strong> has made enormous improvements in recent years, just look at the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/2020/summary/">Nobel Prize</a> received a few weeks ago by Emmanuelle Charpentier and Jennifer Doudna, who co-invented the genome editing technique known as CRISPR/Cas9. We are now able to modify the genomes of bacteria, plants and animals (humans, even) with great precision, by inserting pieces of DNA from other species, as we have done for years with GMOs, or even by replacing individual “letters” of the genome.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/459/1*9eD5sfBN8wxVCvT7h0BDbQ.png" /></figure><p>From this point of view, viruses are no different: in fact, with their small sizes, viral genomes can be reshaped and assembled almost like Lego bricks. As we will see, this Lego technique has evolved and refined too in recent times, but we refer anyway to molecular biology methods that have been around at least since the 90s: Ralph Baric, probably the world’s top coronavirus expert, had already built in 2002 a synthetic “clone” of a murine hepatitis virus which was able to infect hamster cells (<a href="https://jvi.asm.org/content/76/21/11065">Young et al., 2002</a>). And a few months ago, scientists at the University of Bern could recreate the SARS-CoV-2 virus within a week, by assembling fragments of the viral genome that they ordered from a company specialized in DNA and protein synthesis (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2294-9">Thao et al., 2020</a>). With current techniques and knowledge, therefore, it would be possible, in principle, to <strong>synthesize a virus</strong> (or better said, a viral clone) that is able to replicate just like a natural virus, once transferred into appropriate cells. Interestingly, it is also possible to recombine pieces of different viruses, thus creating the so-called “chimeras”. It is called “reverse genetics” and as we have seen, it is not even necessary to physically own the original viruses that you plan to recombine; you just need to know the DNA sequence and order its synthesis from a company.</p><p>There is another, less sophisticated way to generate new viruses in the lab. If you grow a completely natural virus in cell cultures, somehow you may direct its evolution, by selecting for mutations that allow the virus to replicate more effectively in that specific cell type. In this case, it’s not genetic engineering, strictly speaking: here we are witnessing evolutionary mechanisms that could easily occur in nature, with the difference that in the lab we can provide the right conditions, and speed up these natural processes. Already in 1997, a paper published in the <em>Journal of Virology</em> explained how it was possible (of course with a lot of patience) to mutate by 2% the spike protein of a mouse coronavirus, simply by passaging infected cells 600 times (<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC230256/">Schickli et al., 1997</a>). The same technique can be used not only on cells, but on <strong>laboratory animals</strong> as well: everybody knows the 2012 experiment by Ron Fouchier, who took the lethal avian influenza virus H5N1 and made it transmissible between ferrets by air, through few passages of infection on the animals (<a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/336/6088/1534.full">Herfst et al., 2012</a>).</p><p>As we have seen, there are several techniques — more or less sophisticated — that we can use to modify and recombine viruses in the lab. What today is still very difficult to do, however, is to generate a <strong>brand new virus</strong>: inventing from scratch a novel sequence that can become a working virus is still out of our reach. In recent years we have gained of course a lot of knowledge about the molecular mechanisms that drive viral infection. Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology wrote a review last year, where they listed the precise amino acids that allow SARS-like coronaviruses to bind to the human receptor ACE2 (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41579-018-0118-9">Cui et al., 2019</a>). Moreover, thanks to computer simulations, we can test the effect of a new mutation even before inserting it into the genome of a virus. In every case, however, we just replicate <strong>solutions already seen in nature</strong>. Whether we are changing a single letter in the genome of a known virus, or assembling a new one by mixing different viral sequences, the starting point is always the genome (or parts of a genome) of viruses already existing in nature. Another thing that is very difficult to do is to predict what will happen to the virus once released into the environment: one thing is to reshape the spike protein of a coronavirus so that it can better bind to the human receptor, but a completely different thing is to finely control the symptoms that this mutated virus will trigger in real life conditions, as well as the mode and speed of transmission. That’s why it seems unlikely that a secret military lab designed the features that make SARS-CoV-2 so effective.</p><p>After this technological introduction, it is now time to go deeper into the SARS-CoV-2 origin subject. We will look at the experiments that were conducted by the laboratories in Wuhan, the city in central China where it all began. In principle, building a synthetic virus is within the reach of many labs, but were these activities actually carried out in Wuhan? If so, for what reason? Let’s find out.</p><h3>Bats and chimeras</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cVFbUnLB8uUVmV45xQx0Kw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Since the SARS emergency in 2002, the Wuhan Institute of Virology has been one of the leading research centers in <strong>epidemic prevention</strong>. The scientific mission of the institute, in fact, was to search for coronaviruses in the wild that were potentially able to spill over to humans and possibly trigger a pandemic. The research activities were led by the virologist Shi Zhengli, and were also funded with US money: in recent years, the NIH granted substantial funding to the NGO <a href="https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/">EcoHealth Alliance</a>, which is led by one of the closest Shi Zhengli’s collaborators, namely the British zoologist Peter Daszak (see NIH grants: <a href="https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_details.cfm?aid=8674931&amp;icde=0">1R01AI110964–01</a>, <a href="https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_details.cfm?aid=9819304&amp;icde=0">2R01AI110964–06</a>).</p><p>Professor Shi’s first studies focused on the <strong>spike protein</strong>, i.e. the molecular harpoon that allows SARS-like coronaviruses to attach to the ACE2 receptors on the surface of our cells. By testing various combinations of amino acids with the Lego brick technique described above, Chinese scientists discovered a key spot in the spike, that allowed bat coronaviruses to infect human cells, when properly mutated (<a href="https://jvi.asm.org/content/82/4/1899">Ren et al., 2008</a>). In the following years, Shi Zhengli set out in search of SARS ancestors, exploring the rural areas in <strong>Southern China</strong>, known to be inhabited by several bat species. In 2013 she published in <em>Nature</em> the discovery of two bat viruses very similar to SARS; in particular, one of the two (renamed WIV1) was able to grow in mammalian cells and to bind our ACE2 receptor (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12711">Ge et al., 2013</a>). Since the capabilities of the second virus (SHC014) were less clear, the researchers turned to the American scientist Ralph Baric, one of the world’s leading experts in the construction of synthetic viruses. The aim of this collaboration was to understand whether the spike of SHC014 already had what it takes to infect humans. To find out, Shi and Baric <strong>built a chimera</strong>: the spike of the bat virus was attached to a mouse-adapted SARS virus (called MA1 virus), obtained by Baric some years earlier (<a href="https://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/article?id=10.1371/journal.ppat.0030005">Roberts et al., 2007</a>). Tested on human cells, the chimera showed effects similar to those of SARS, thus demonstrating that this spike too could potentially attack humans. It did not have to adapt to the human receptor, it only needed the right genomic context, which in this case was provided by the MA1 virus already adapted to mice (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985">Menachery et al., 2015</a>).</p><p>Shi Zhengli, now known as the “Bat Woman”, didn’t stop. In 2016 she announced the discovery of a SARS coronavirus in an <strong>abandoned mineshaft</strong> in the Yunnan province (<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12250-016-3713-9">Ge et al., 2016</a>), while the following year she published the sequences of 11 new SARS-like coronaviruses identified in Yunnan between 2011 and 2015. The <em>PLoS Pathogens</em> study made the news, because the SARS virus was apparently the result of a recombination between these viruses. Interestingly, in this work they built <strong>8 different chimeras</strong>, by adding the spike of these new bat viruses to the genome of WIV1, i.e. the first virus isolated by the institute in 2013. Two chimeras were able to infect human cells, thus showing once again that bats carried coronaviruses ready to spill over (<a href="https://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/article?id=10.1371/journal.ppat.1006698">Hu et al., 2017</a>). This hypothesis was further confirmed by a study published in 2018: after a serological survey conducted in 2015 among Yunnan inhabitants living close to bat caves, researchers found anti-SARS antibodies in 6 out of 218 people, revealing that spillovers from bats to humans may actually occur, albeit sporadically (<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12250-018-0012-7">Wang et al., 2018</a>). Thanks to Bat Woman’s research we have learned many things about coronaviruses and spillovers: we know the geographical areas to be monitored (such as Yunnan), the bat species carrying the most dangerous viruses and even the amino acids of the spike protein that need to be mutated to allow the jump to our species (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S156713481830902X">Yu et al., 2019</a>; <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/11/3/210">Fan et al., 2019</a>; <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41579-018-0118-9">Cui et al., 2019</a>).</p><p>Shi Zhengli’s work — you may have noticed — was essentially made up of two parts: first, <strong>field research</strong>, with explorations of caves in southern China and the collection of bat samples; second, <strong>lab research</strong>, with infection experiments to assess the pandemic potential of the viruses that they found in the wild. In this second part of the work, genetic engineering techniques were also used, in particular they built chimeras, essentially to test the spikes of the bat viruses. We now have one fundamental question left: if Wuhan scientists had built SARS-CoV-2, for example through the recombination of bat viruses, would we notice it? In other words: if this were a man-made virus, would we see it?</p><h3>Backbones and scars</h3><p>You might have heard or read statements like this: “SARS-CoV-2 is not a product of genetic engineering, because if it were, <strong>we would notice scars</strong> in the genome”. But what exactly are these scars? To answer that, we need to talk again about the Lego brick technique. As I wrote above, for several years virologists have been able to make synthetic viruses by combining together different pieces of DNA. Since the genome of a virus is often too large to be synthesized in its entirety, you generally obtain different DNA fragments separately, and then assemble such fragments to build the complete genome.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*KBCGeHerGXBxhGBPSbCnTA.png" /></figure><p>Each fragment is inserted inside a plasmid, i.e. a circular DNA molecule that acts as a support; with the help of special enzymes, researchers detach the fragment of interest and connect it to the other pieces. The “scars” that we mentioned above originate during this step: since the enzymes recognize specific cutting sites, when the fragments are finally assembled, traces of these signal sequences remain in the junctions between one fragment and another. Well, this happened some time ago actually. In recent years, in fact, <strong>more sophisticated assembly techniques</strong> have been developed, which no longer leave scars. They are called <a href="https://international.neb.com/applications/cloning-and-synthetic-biology/seamless-cloning">seamless techniques</a>, there are many of them (e.g. Golden Gate Assembly, Gibson assembly) and they are commonly sold in commercial kits available online. Of course we would see those scars, but only if the virus had been built many years ago. Ralph Baric himself, who is an expert in viral engineering and certainly does not support the lab-leak hypothesis, told <a href="https://t.co/m3AH1R5FAY?amp=1">Presa diretta</a> that if you use any of the assembly methods recently developed, you could build a virus that is completely <strong>indistinguishable from a natural one</strong>. If we can’t rely on scars anymore, how can we recognize an engineered virus, then?</p><p>Another reason that is often mentioned to disprove the genetic engineering scenario is also cited in the famous paper <em>“The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2”</em>, and deals with the lack of a <strong>known viral backbone</strong> (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9">Andersen et al., 2020</a>). This statement is based on a correct assumption: as I wrote above, in order to make a new virus you have to start from a virus found in nature. Imagine, for instance, that I built a chimera by combining a segment of the influenza virus genome and a segment of the SARS-CoV-2 genome. Now, if someone found it and analyzed its genome, he or she would surely be able to recognize the two starting viruses, and would start wondering if this recombination could happen in nature or if, instead, it could be a product of genetic engineering. If you put it this way, it makes perfect sense. But the motivation of the known backbone relies also on another, wrong, assumption: the idea that <strong>all known viruses are public</strong>. Of course, there are public databases where scientists upload sequences of the viruses they are studying, but it’s not compulsory. Perhaps someone will raise his eyebrows at this statement, but I assure you that this is not a conspiracist reasoning, and the evidence is right in front of us. A few months ago, the Wuhan Institute of Virology published the genome sequence of RaTG13, which among all known viruses is the most similar to SARS-CoV-2. By Shi Zhengli’s own <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/Shi%20Zhengli%20Q%26A.pdf">admission</a>, however, they knew this genome already in 2018, and the RNA sample had been sitting in their lab since 2013. Prof. Shi swears they never did any other experiment on RaTG13 besides sequencing, but if they had done so and the virus had leaked, would anyone have noticed its artificial origin, or would they have labeled it “natural” because there was no known backbone? I am not claiming that SARS-CoV-2 leaked from a laboratory, I have no idea and there is no evidence that this happened. What I mean is that the genomic analysis alone won’t give us the answers that we are looking for: there are no obvious signs of genetic engineering, true, but the absence of evidence is not <strong>evidence of absence</strong>. So if genetic manipulations leave no traces, how can we find out the truth? We are left with two options: either we find more convincing evidence for the natural origin scenario (e.g., the long-awaited intermediate animal host, paving a path between the bats in South China and the late 2019 outbreak in Wuhan), or we try to prove that Wuhan researchers have always acted transparently and it is therefore foolish to doubt their good faith. This would not prove anything in a definitive way, but at least it would remove many of the suspicions that hover over those laboratories.</p><h3>Mineshafts and databases</h3><p>To put it mildly, the Chinese researchers were not <strong>champions of transparency</strong> this year, and it may be precisely this lack of transparency the reason why even today conspiracy theories abound. Most suspicions concern <strong>RaTG13</strong>, the closest SARS-CoV-2 cousin among the currently known bat viruses. Shi Zhengli’s team found it in 2013 in an abandoned copper mineshaft in Mojiang County, Yunnan.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/479/1*SmMQc0tKp_5x1BOcZWDQVQ.png" /></figure><p>The Chinese researchers were called to investigate about six people who had entered the mine, which was populated by various bat species, and had contracted <strong>atypical pneumonia</strong>, showing symptoms very similar to those of COVID-19 (<a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.581569/full">Rahalkar et al, 2020</a>). They collected hundreds of samples of bat faeces, and they extracted and analyzed RNA, looking for SARS-like viruses that could explain the pneumonia (three of the patients had died). As described in a paper published three years later, they partially sequenced the RdRp gene and found a total of 152 different coronaviruses. Out of these 152, two were betacoronaviruses, and <strong>only one was of the SARS type</strong> (<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12250-016-3713-9">Ge et al., 2016</a>). It was found in a horseshoe bat of the species <em>Rhinolophus affinis</em>, and was called RaBtCov/4991. From a genetic point of view, it was different from other SARS coronaviruses known until then, and it was even considered a <strong>new strain</strong>. In fact, the authors write:</p><blockquote>In the phylogenetic tree, RaBtCoV/4991 showed more divergence from human SARS-CoV than other bat SL-CoVs and could be considered as a new strain of this virus lineage.<br><em>Ge et al., 2016 Virologica Sinica</em></blockquote><p>Earlier this year, researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology published a paper on <em>Nature</em>, announcing the discovery of a bat virus with a 96% identity compared to the genome of the new coronavirus (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2012-7">Zhou et al., 2020</a>). Its name is RaTG13, and was found — so they write — in Yunnan province. No other details are given about this virus, which is in fact a <strong>new entry</strong> in the scientific literature. Furthermore, the authors don’t explain clearly when RaTG13 was actually sequenced, suggesting that this happened at the beginning of 2020 or at the end of 2019 (in any case after the Covid outbreak). In this version of events, Shi and colleagues compared the RdRp gene of RaTG13 with the corresponding gene of SARS-CoV-2, they noticed a strong similarity and for this reason they decided to sequence the whole genome of the bat virus.</p><p>The authors do not mention their own 2016 paper, but it turns out that the RdRp gene of the “new” RaTG13 is identical to that of the “old” RaBtCov/4991 discovered in the Yunnan mine. The two names refer in fact to <strong>the same virus</strong>, as was later confirmed by Shi Zhengli herself, in one of the <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/Shi%20Zhengli%20Q%26A.pdf">answers</a> given this summer to <em>Science</em> journal. There is nothing outrageous in renaming viruses if you have good reasons to do so, but the missing citation of the 2016 study is certainly weird: in scientific articles there is always a tendency to add an extra citation, rather than one less, especially if you are citing one of your papers. The fact that it didn’t happen this time is a bit suspicious: without that link, in fact, it became more difficult for other readers to make a connection with the story of miners’ pneumonia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/473/1*ddbmr-1wA2rTlyqeM60S5Q.png" /></figure><p>Officially, the deadly pathogen of the mineshaft was never identified, although Prof. Shi <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1/">told</a> <em>Scientific American</em> that the culprit was a fungus. Actually, a <a href="http://eng.oversea.cnki.net/Kcms/detail/detail.aspx?filename=1013327523.nh&amp;dbcode=CMFD&amp;dbname=CMFD2014">Master thesis</a> found by a Twitter user (<a href="http://twitter.com/TheSeeker">@TheSeeker</a>) describes many of the investigations and the analyses performed at that time, and concludes that a <strong>SARS-like coronavirus</strong> was the likely culprit. The document states that this was suggested by epidemiologist and pulmonologist Dr. Zhong Nanshan, probably the most respected Chinese physician worldwide. In light of all this information, it is reasonable to assume that Wuhan researchers omitted that citation in the <em>Nature</em> paper, in order to hide the connection to an <strong>uncomfortable story</strong>. Maybe they simply feared to be accused of missing the ancestor of SARS-CoV-2, which was perhaps also present in that mine, together with RaTG13. After all, preventing epidemics was Shi Zhengli’s task: revealing that story to the world would have been like admitting her failure. Those omissions, however, led some to conceive even worse scenarios: maybe the ancestor of SARS-CoV-2 was really in the mineshaft; scientists found it, brought it back to their lab in Wuhan and from there it <strong>accidentally leaked</strong>, perhaps after experiments and genetic modifications that leave no traces (as we have seen). These are just speculations of course, there is no evidence it really happened. This lack of transparency, however, does not help, also because the oddities in the RaTG13 story do not end here.</p><p>Until May, in fact, we were all convinced that Wuhan scientists had sequenced the RaTG13 genome only after the Covid outbreak. After all, this was suggested in the paper. On May 19th, however, they uploaded to the NCBI portal a number of <a href="https://trace.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Traces/sra/?run=SRR11806578">RaTG13 sequences</a> and — surprise! — they were <strong>dated 2017/2018</strong>. These sequences had been produced with Sanger sequencing, and cover most of the genome, including the spike protein gene. The timing of the sequencing experiments was later <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/Shi%20Zhengli%20Q%26A.pdf">confirmed</a> to Science by Shi Zhengli herself:</p><blockquote>We detected the virus by pan-coronavirus RT-PCR in a bat fecal sample collected from Tongguan town, Mojiang county in Yunnan province in 2013, and obtained its partial RdRp sequence. Because the low similarity of this virus to SARS-CoV, we did not pay special attention to this sequence. In 2018, as the NGS sequencing technology and capability in our lab was improved, we did further sequencing of the virus using our remaining samples, and obtained the full-length genome sequence of RaTG13 except the 15 nucleotides at the 5’ end. As the sample was used many times for the purpose of viral nucleic acid extraction, there was no more sample after we finished genome sequencing, and we did not do virus isolation and other studies on it. Among all the bat samples we collected, the RaTG13 virus was detected in only one single sample. In 2020, we compared the sequence of SARS-CoV-2 and our unpublished bat coronavirus sequences and found it shared a 96.2% identity with RaTG13. RaTG13 has never been isolated or cultured.<br><em>Shi Zhengli, Science interview</em></blockquote><p>With these words, Shi Zhengli proposes a different version of events, compared to the one reported in the <em>Nature</em> paper. RaTG13 was not sequenced after comparing its RdRp gene with that of SARS-CoV-2, as we were told, but a couple of years earlier. What the Wuhan scientists did this year — says Prof. Shi — was to compare the entire genome of the new coronavirus with the <strong>unpublished bat coronavirus genomes</strong> in their private archives. We also discover that the RaTG13 genome is missing 15 nucleotides at the beginning of the sequence, and that the original sample collected in the mine has now been entirely consumed by the sequencing experiments. The mysterious RaTG13 story should therefore end here, as there is no more material to do other analyses or experiments. Yet, on October 13th here is another plot twist! The genome loaded on NCBI is suddenly <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/MN996532.1?report=girevhist">updated</a> without any explanation: finally the 15 missing nucleotides appear, and 6 nucleotides are changed. Had the virus been sequenced again? Had they found old sequences that they initially discarded for some reason? We don’t know, because the Wuhan researchers haven’t published the details of their analysis pipeline, nor explained why they decided to update the genome.</p><p>Needless to say, conspiracists thrive in this endless game of half-truths, omissions and subtext. Yes, SARS-CoV-2 is unlikely to be the result of experiments done on RaTG13: after all, the two genomes differ by <strong>1200 nucleotides</strong>, which is a genetic distance quite hard to fill even taking into account the faster evolution rates in a lab environment. But after what we have learnt, it doesn’t seem so crazy to wonder, for example, if there were <strong>other coronaviruses</strong> in that mineshaft, maybe more similar to SARS-CoV-2. To me, this doubt seems legitimate, also because Shi Zhengli and colleagues are hiding a <strong>very rich database</strong> specialized in bat viruses: the <em>Wildlife-borne Viral Pathogen Database</em>. It contained sequences of about 20,000 samples collected over the years, some of which were unpublished. The dataset has been removed from the web: there’s only one <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200507214437/http://www.csdata.org/p/308/2/#">page</a> left, but we can reach it only through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine.</p><p><strong>Update 17/11/20:</strong> Big news about RaTG13 and the miners story! The Wuhan researchers who last February described the cousin of SARS-CoV-2, without providing details about its discovery, has published today an <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2951-z"><em>addendum</em></a> to the original article. In this brief communication, the authors admit they were involved in the investigation of the mysterious pneumonia at the Tongguan mine in Mojiang County. They had analyzed serum samples from four patients, they write, but were unable to identify the cause of the disease. Assuming it was a new virus, they visited the mine once or twice a year from 2012 to 2015, collecting a total of 1322 samples. In these samples they identified 293 different coronaviruses, of which 9 beta-coronaviruses (all SARS-related); one of these is RaTG13, whose genome was fully sequenced in 2018, except for the two ends. This <em>addendum</em> therefore confirms the timing of the sequencing that Shi Zhengli <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/Shi%20Zhengli%20Q%26A.pdf">provided</a> to <em>Science</em>, clearly contradicting what was written in her own <em>Nature</em> paper. In order to demonstrate that those people were not infected by SARS-CoV-2, they recently reanalyzed the serum samples looking for SARS-CoV-2 proteins; this is quite a strange choice, given that in serum you hardly find viral RNA.</p><p>The scientific community will be happy about this late manifestation of transparency, but many questions still remain. For example: how did they add the 15 missing nucleotides at the end of the RaTG13 genome a few weeks ago, if there was no more sample available? Why did Shi Zhengli <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1/">say</a> to <em>Scientific American</em> that those pneumonia had been caused by a fungus? Were the patients really negative for anti-SARS antibodies, as written in the addendum, or were they positive, as claimed in the <a href="http://eng.oversea.cnki.net/Kcms/detail/detail.aspx?filename=1013327523.nh&amp;dbcode=CMFD&amp;dbname=CMFD2014">Master thesis</a> and also in another <a href="http://eng.oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CDFD&amp;QueryID=11&amp;CurRec=1&amp;dbname=CDFDLAST2018&amp;filename=1017118517.nh&amp;UID=WEEvREcwSlJHSldTTEYzWEpEZktmRXB3Sm9JeHRKZExVOG5ySkJjK0xHMD0%3d%249A4hF_YAuvQ5obgVAqNKPCYcEjKensW4IQMovwHtwkF4VYPoHbKxJw!!&amp;autoLogin=0">PhD thesis</a>? But most of all: why did they wait 9 months before revealing to the world that the finding of RaTG13 was linked to mysterious (and lethal) pneumonia caused by an unknown virus? Will they finally share with the scientific community the samples and sequences of these 8 novel SARS-related coronaviruses, in addition to the old serum samples of the sick miners?</p><h3>Furin and pangolins</h3><p>What about the evidence for the natural origin scenario? Many papers were published in these months, aiming to show that the unique features of this coronavirus are not so special as they seem. No study, however, could identify the intermediate host. Between March and April, four articles were published that seemed to suggest a possible <strong>role of pangolins</strong> (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2169-0">Lam et al., 2020</a>; <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2313-x">Xiao et al., 2020</a>; <a href="https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(20)30360-2">Zhang et al., 2020</a>; <a href="https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008421">Liu et al., 2020</a>). At that time, there were pangolin papers popping up seemingly every day in the news, leading lots of people to believe that we had finally found the intermediate host.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/551/1*IBBRNTXNXZb1xorPdX2RQQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>In reality, however, it <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.07.07.184374v2">turned out</a> that all those studies analyzed data from the <strong>same samples</strong>, namely a group of sick pangolins intercepted by the Anti-smuggling Customs Bureau in March 2019 in Guangdong, and described for the first time in October 2019 (<a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/11/11/979/htm">Liu et al., 2019</a>). On the other hand, an <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.06.19.158717v1">analysis</a> of over 300 pangolins confiscated in Malaysia from 2009 to 2019 couldn’t find a single animal carrying coronaviruses, so it is possible that the unfortunate Guangdong specimens were just an exception to the rule. Furthermore, the aforementioned pangolin papers apparently suffer <strong>issues dealing with missing data</strong>, samples reanalyzed with different names, shared co-authorship and the weird fact that all manuscripts except one were preprinted the very same day. But don’t worry: the journals that published the papers are investigating! The matter is so serious that <em>Nature</em> and <em>PLoS Pathogens</em>, which published two of the pangolin papers, have started <a href="https://usrtk.org/biohazards-blog/nature-and-plos-pathogens-probe-scientific-veracity-of-key-studies-linking-pangolin-coronaviruses-to-origin-of-sars-cov-2/">investigations</a> with the authors, in order to address the concerns that have been raised. In the meantime, a rather eloquent disclaimer has already appeared on the <em>Nature</em> <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2313-x">paper</a> by Xiao et al:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tlZ6DB29-iqgR92IpHdL5Q.png" /></figure><p>The pangolin story is interesting though, because the coronavirus found in those animals is the only one, among all known viruses, sharing with SARS-CoV-2 a small but very important part of the spike protein: the <strong>receptor binding domain</strong> (RBD), that is the region that physically binds to the human receptor. In fact, initially it was speculated that SARS-CoV-2 might have originated from the <strong>recombination</strong> of a virus similar to RaTG13 with one from pangolins, either in the lab (<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bies.202000240">Segreto &amp; Deigin, 2020</a>) or in nature, following the co-infection of the same animal by the two viruses (<a href="https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/6/27/eabb9153">Li et al., 2020</a>). Other analyses, instead, seem to suggest that this recombination did not really happen: the pangolin RBD was not “acquired” by SARS-CoV-2, it was RaTG13 that lost it (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41564-020-0771-4">Boni et al., 2020</a>). So many hypotheses on the table, but still few certainties.</p><p>Another key moment is the publication of the study describing the <strong>RmYN02 bat virus</strong>, the other cousin of SARS-CoV-2, also found in Yunnan (<a href="https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(20)30662-X?_returnURL=https%3A%2F%2Flinkinghub.elsevier.com%2Fretrieve%2Fpii%2FS096098222030662X%3Fshowall%3Dtrue">Zhou et al., 2020</a>). This discovery is important as it brought new elements to the debate about the peculiar <strong>furin cleavage site</strong> found in SARS-CoV-2. Furin is a human enzyme that normally cuts other human proteins, in order to activate them and make them functional, but some viruses have learned to exploit it to their advantage: the cleavage by furin, in fact, allows them to enter more easily into certain types of cells. Not every virus has the signal sequence recognized by this enzyme, and SARS-CoV-2 is the only SARS-like coronavirus to have it (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166354220300528?via%3Dihub">Coutard et al., 2020</a>); in this specific case, it seems to help the virus to infect lung cells (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1097276520302641">Hoffman et al., 2020</a>). Given the rarity of this cleavage site, some speculated that it could have been inserted in the lab, as it was done with other viruses in the past (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0042682206000900">Follis et al., 2006</a>; <a href="https://jvi.asm.org/content/89/17/9119">Yang et al., 2015</a>). The discovery of RmYN02, however, suggested that these insertions can occur naturally: apparently, in fact, this virus has an insertion in the spike gene in the exact same position as SARS-CoV-2, although not everyone is convinced (<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bies.202000240">Segreto &amp; Deigin, 2020</a>). If real, this insertion did not create in any case a furin cleavage site, as it happened with the more famous cousin.</p><h3>Future perspectives</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/1*qDo3YDEZ5qsLjY24_8Nwyw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The contradictory behaviour of Wuhan scientists inevitably raises many questions. As I already said, there is no evidence that Chinese researchers have anything to do with the origins of SARS-CoV-2, but all the anomalies found in recent months do warrant a <strong>serious and independent investigation</strong> that will finally help us to give a clear answer to the question everyone is asking: where does this virus come from? The WHO is looking for this answer together with Chinese scientists, although with some difficulties, as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/world/who-china-coronavirus.html">New York Times</a> reports. The <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-convened-global-study-of-the-origins-of-sars-cov-2">plan</a> agreed with China was published on November 5th, and includes, among others: interviews with Wuhan early cases; mapping of the animals and products sold at the Huanan market; reviews of old hospital records; evaluation of trends in pneumonia and influenza syndromes in months before the outbreak; testing of sewage and blood samples collected before December 2019. The WHO team will do most of the work remotely, consulting the results and documents provided by the Chinese counterpart, but a visit to China “at the appropriate time” is also planned. The Wuhan Institute of Virology, in any case, is not even mentioned in the document.</p><p>Just like a large part of the scientific community, the WHO therefore believes that SARS-CoV-2 is the unfortunate result of a <strong>zoonosis</strong>, i.e. the jump of a virus from an animal to humans. Scientists who are convinced of the natural origin base their belief on <strong>Occam’s razor</strong>: epidemics from the past have shown that these things do happen in nature, so the simplest explanation is that it happened this time too. In my personal opinion, however, this is a questionable stance, because the <strong>accidental leak of a virus</strong> from a lab is a <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/05/the-non-paranoid-persons-guide-to-viruses-escaping-from-labs/">rare</a>, but not impossible event. Moreover, the presence of a world leading research center specialized in coronavirus research, right in the city where SARS-CoV-2 appeared, is a fact that can’t be ignored, or dismissed as a curious coincidence. At least, not before checking which viruses were collected and later studied in Wuhan. Discovering the origins of SARS-CoV-2 is too important to be content with speculations and subjective probabilities: we must keep on searching. And maybe, we will find something.</p><p>For example, we could find a virus very similar to SARS-CoV-2 in some farmed animals or animals trafficked by smugglers, as it happened with the pangolins. Some clues for this search might come from those animals that so far have shown to be susceptible to infection: cats, hamsters, ferrets, minks. Or maybe we will discover the ancestor of SARS-CoV-2 in frozen samples stored in some Chinese hospital, thus revealing that the virus had been circulating unnoticed for months. Or — however unlikely this scenario may be — we will find SARS-CoV-2 experimentation records in the labs of the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Unfortunately, there is one last possibility left, a very concrete one: we will not discover any of this, and our question will remain forever without an answer.</p><p>—</p><p><em>Thank you Alina Chan for peer-reviewing this article.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e6b0ac6e602" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Elezioni 2018, torna Dibattito Scienza]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/elezioni-2018-torna-dibattito-scienza-9fb17a937cc6?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9fb17a937cc6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dibattito-scienza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elezioni]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politica]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2018 22:31:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-28T13:37:58.454Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>La lista “W la fisica” non è riuscita a raccogliere le firme e quindi non sarà presente alle elezioni, ma gli scienziati non si arrendono. Dalle pagine di <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-02223-7">Nature</a>, denunciano il pessimo stato della ricerca italiana e chiedono alla politica di intervenire, da un lato aumentando i fondi, dall’altro valorizzando maggiormente il lavoro degli scienziati e l’importanza del metodo scientifico. Vorrei tranquillizzare l’ingegnere Mattia Butta, che con la sua lista voleva “portare il metodo scientifico in Parlamento”, e gli scienziati che si sono rivolti a Nature per lanciare il proprio appello: non siete soli! Dal 2012, infatti, coordino il progetto <a href="http://www.dibattitoscienza.com/">Dibattito Scienza</a>, un’iniziativa nata proprio con lo scopo di portare la scienza nel dibattito politico. In occasione delle elezioni, il nostro <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/dibattitoscienza/">gruppo Facebook</a> (che oggi conta più di cinquemila iscritti) interroga i partiti e i movimenti che si candidano a governare il Paese, invitandoli a pronunciarsi su temi come ricerca, istruzione, salute, ambiente e politiche energetiche. Temi importanti, anzi fondamentali per la crescita di una nazione e il benessere dei suoi abitanti, ma troppo spesso trascurati in campagna elettorale. Sollecitando i politici a rivelare le loro idee e i loro progetti su queste tematiche, crediamo quindi di offrire — nell’immediato — un servizio utile agli elettori, che in questo modo potranno esprimere un voto maggiormente informato, e sul lungo termine (speriamo!) anche alla politica stessa.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*4K0EpP3fwbRN2YnJ." /></figure><p>In vista delle elezioni del 4 marzo, Dibattito Scienza ha rivolto <a href="http://www.dibattitoscienza.com/elezioni-politiche-2018-risposte/">dieci domande</a> a tutte le liste candidate. Le domande sono state inizialmente proposte dal gruppo Facebook e sono state infine selezionate tramite un sondaggio sul nostro sito. I partiti avevano sei settimane di tempo per consegnare le loro risposte, ma nonostante numerosi solleciti via mail, social network e contatti diretti, alla scadenza del 16 febbraio avevano risposto solo cinque liste. Tra queste figurava anche il Movimento Cinque Stelle, unica tra le forze politiche maggiori a partecipare all’iniziativa nei tempi stabiliti: hanno risposto solo a tre quesiti su dieci, ma almeno sono stati puntuali. Il Partito Democratico è arrivato con qualche giorno di ritardo, insieme alla lista Liberi e Uguali. Manca all’appello tutto il centrodestra, nonostante Forza Italia avesse promesso di inviarci le risposte (purtroppo mai arrivate). Dalle prime reazioni nel gruppo, sembra che le risposte più apprezzate siano state quelle della lista +Europa con Emma Bonino e quelle dei giovani startupper di 10 volte meglio. Vediamo nel dettaglio cosa hanno risposto.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*zMvJtQPmZzXJO5d5." /></figure><p><strong>Scienza e razionalità</strong> — La prima domanda, quella sulle politiche basate sulla scienza, è forse la più importante, perché rivela l’approccio dei partiti nei confronti dei dati e delle evidenze scientifiche. Come atteso, tutte le liste si dichiarano grandi amiche della scienza e dei suoi metodi. Nella maggior parte dei casi ritengono che la scienza debba “informare il processo legislativo”, come dice +Europa, mentre la lista 10 volte meglio si spinge a dire che per elaborare politiche di governo efficaci dovremmo analizzare i dati raccolti negli ultimi 70 anni con algoritmi di intelligenza artificiale. Il Partito Democratico gioca subito la carta delle vaccinazioni obbligatorie, per dimostrare che loro, la scienza, la ascoltano per davvero. La risposta più curiosa, però, arriva dal Partito Repubblicano, il quale, dopo aver ricordato come la scienza sia a tutti gli effetti parte del suo DNA, essendo nato dall’Illuminismo francese, sostiene però che la politica non dovrebbe fondare le sue dottrine su di essa. Per i Repubblicani, quindi, la scienza serve alla crescita culturale dei popoli, ma non all’elaborazione di proposte politiche. A proposito di cultura scientifica, anche qui le liste sono tutte concordi nell’indicare la scuola e l’istruzione come le principali questioni da affrontare. Cambiano ovviamente le soluzioni proposte: +Europa sottolinea il valore del merito, sia a livello individuale (borse di studio per i meritevoli) sia a livello di istituti (le università migliori dovrebbero ricevere più fondi); il PD punta il dito contro la dispersione scolastica e pensa a misure specifiche per recuperare le aree geografiche più a rischio; per Liberi e Uguali la gratuità dell’istruzione è la priorità, anche a livello universitario; 10 volte meglio, infine, pensa che la soluzione sia riformare i programmi scolastici, introducendo il bilinguismo obbligatorio, filosofia e programmazione.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*tEp-wNqYGjnQdfdi." /></figure><p><strong>Ricerca e innovazione</strong> — Secondo gli ultimi dati Eurostat, l’Italia investe in ricerca e sviluppo l’1,29% del PIL, contro una media europea del 2,03%. Abbiamo chiesto alle liste candidate quale impegno pensano di potersi assumere da questo punto di vista, e naturalmente tutte hanno dichiarato di voler aumentare gli investimenti. I più ambiziosi sono +Europa e 10 volte meglio, che puntano al 3%, mentre PD e Liberi e Uguali si “accontentano” di raggiungere la media UE. Particolarmente interessante è la posizione di +Europa, che, coerentemente con la sua spiccata vocazione europeista, immagina un continente europeo in cui si faccia ricerca utilizzando per un terzo fondi federali, contro il 4% attuale. Si fa notare anche 10 volte meglio, che prevede di intervenire sul sistema della ricerca italiana con una serie di misure dai costi contenuti e con rapidi effetti espansionistici sull’economia; colpiscono il livello di dettaglio della risposta e i continui riferimenti a esperienze di successo di altri Paesi, come i “Jeunes decteurs” francesi. Tutti vogliono investire, quindi, ma con quali coperture finanziarie? Qui le risposte, quando ci sono, sono piuttosto vaghe: Liberi e Uguali e il Partito Comunista taglierebbero le spese militari e riformerebbero il fisco, il Partito Repubblicano snellirebbe la burocrazia, mentre il PD dice che “le risorse vanno trovate in ogni caso”. Per quanto riguarda la ricerca e l’innovazione delle nostre imprese private, invece, +Europa pensa sia necessario proseguire con Industria 4.0 e accelerare su Competence Center e Digital Innovation Hub, mentre 10 volte meglio e Partito Repubblicano puntano sulle defiscalizzazioni. Il Partito Democratico parla di un’Agenzia nazionale per la ricerca e l’innovazione, e annuncia l’intenzione di creare nel Sud Italia un polo scientifico-tecnologico sulla falsariga dello Human Technopole. Sorprendente (ma forse non troppo, visto l’autore) è la risposta del Partito Comunista, per il quale, molto semplicemente, il problema non si pone: la ricerca deve essere fatta solo con soldi pubblici! C’è poi una questione delicata, un tema che regolarmente appare nelle domande di Dibattito Scienza e che in un certo senso ha a che fare sia con la ricerca sia con l’innovazione: gli OGM. La sfida tra favorevoli e contrari finisce in parità: tra i primi +Europa, 10 volte meglio e Partito Repubblicano, tra i secondi il Movimento 5 Stelle, Liberi e Uguali e il Partito Comunista. Le motivazioni dei contrari sono simili, e hanno a che fare principalmente con il problema dei brevetti e della proprietà intellettuale. Il PD si arrampica sugli specchi, esibendosi in quella che tecnicamente dicesi “supercazzola”, e di fatto non risponde alla domanda.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*4rA21_Jq5AvkCE8y." /></figure><p><strong>Medicina e salute</strong> — In questa sezione il piatto forte erano ovviamente i vaccini. Nessuno, fortunatamente, ha detto che sono pericolosi, ma non sono comunque mancate le critiche al decreto Lorenzin. Il Movimento 5 Stelle non lo ha votato perché basato su un obbligo incentrato sull’esclusione scolastica: i pentastellati non sono d’accordo e preferirebbero invece un approccio basato sulla raccomandazione attiva. Anche Liberi e Uguali nutre dei dubbi sulla strategia della vaccinazione obbligatoria legata all’accesso scolastico, mentre 10 volte meglio contesta le scadenze troppo brevi e il fatto che la legge sia stata imposta senza la consulenza di un gruppo di esperti indipendenti. Quasi tutti concordano nel ritenere essenziale la diffusione di informazioni corrette sul tema. Sempre parlando di salute, abbiamo chiesto ai partiti se il nostro Sistema Sanitario sia tenuto a offrire ai cittadini anche terapie prive di fondamento scientifico. A parte il Partito Repubblicano, che non si esprime chiaramente, la risposta è unanime, ed è negativa. Più morbido è l’approccio verso i prodotti omeopatici: tutte le liste sono disposte infatti ad accettare che siano venduti nelle farmacie, ad eccezione della lista 10 volte meglio, per la quale questi prodotti dovrebbero addirittura essere banditi alla vendita nel caso fossero commercializzati con una dicitura che li assimilasse a un farmaco. Colpisce la posizione di Liberi e Uguali, secondo cui i prodotti omeopatici dovrebbero essere assunti sotto controllo medico.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*pU3IOdDH8f5cbeqZ." /></figure><p><strong>Ambiente ed energia</strong> — La domanda sullo smog ha messo un po’ tutti d’accordo, ad eccezione del Partito Repubblicano, che sostiene di non essersi mai espresso sul tema. Le altre risposte sono tutte molto simili: mobilità elettrica, trasporto pubblico, ferrovie. Si distingue 10 volte meglio, che propone di investire in tecnologie per la cattura delle polveri sottili, mentre +Europa e Liberi e Uguali convergono su <em>carbon tax</em> ed eliminazione dei sussidi dannosi per l’ambiente. Quanto al consumo di suolo, si tratta evidentemente di una priorità per tutte le liste, esclusi i Repubblicani che dicono di non conoscere la materia. Il Partito Democratico, in particolare, dice di voler proseguire con il piano Casa Italia per la messa in sicurezza di tutto il territorio nazionale, mentre il Partito Comunista propone l’esproprio degli immobili sfitti per risolvere l’emergenza case senza ulteriore consumo di suolo. L’ultima domanda, infine, era quella sulle politiche energetiche: mentre il Partito Repubblicano ricorda, quasi con nostalgia, l’occasione perduta del nucleare, le altre liste si dichiarano pronte a investire sulle energie pulite e rinnovabili. Si fa notare Liberi e Uguali, l’unica lista a parlare di autoproduzione e “democrazia energetica”.</p><p>Dopo le primarie del centrosinistra del 2012, le politiche del 2013 e le europee del 2014, si chiude quindi un nuovo capitolo per Dibattito Scienza. Ancora una volta il centrodestra non ci ha risposto, dimostrando di avere evidentemente altre priorità in questa campagna elettorale che ormai volge al termine. È un vero peccato, perché, al di là delle convinzioni di ciascuno, stiamo parlando di una forza politica che rappresenta più di un terzo degli elettori, e — sondaggi alla mano — l’unica potenzialmente in grado di governare da sola dopo le elezioni del 4 marzo. Ma come ha detto qualcuno, anche una non risposta è, a suo modo, una risposta. Buon voto a tutti!</p><p>UPDATE: il 27 febbraio sono arrivate anche le risposte della lista Potere al Popolo. Per rilanciare la ricerca pubblica italiana, PaP propone da un lato di tagliare le spese militari e i costi delle grandi opere, dall’altro di recuperare risorse dall’evasione fiscale. Anche questa lista difende il metodo scientifico e la medicina evidence-based, ma non risponde sui vaccini e scivola clamorosamente sugli OGM (che “producono frutti senza semi”). Per quanto riguarda le politiche energetiche, Potere al Popolo punta sulle rinnovabili e offre il suo sostegno ai gruppi no TRIV e no TAP.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://mygenomix.wordpress.com/2018/02/23/elezioni-2018-torna-dibattito-scienza/"><em>mygenomix.wordpress.com</em></a><em> on February 23, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9fb17a937cc6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hard disk a DNA]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/hard-disk-a-dna-82b0dd573106?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/82b0dd573106</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hard-disk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dna]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[codice-binario]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Nov 2017 08:25:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-03T08:25:10.058Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*GPnP8zHEO90-iEHb.jpg" /></figure><p>Gli studenti di biologia lo sanno bene: il DNA non è solo una molecola, è anche <em>informazione</em>. Sfruttando le regole semplici ma efficaci del codice genetico, gli esseri viventi hanno evoluto un sistema formidabile di memorizzazione di informazioni, salvate in un archivio incredibilmente compatto che può essere scritto, modificato, letto e copiato. Stiamo parlando di informazioni particolari, informazioni utili alle nostre cellule: quando e in che tessuto accendere o spegnere un gene, quali aminoacidi occorrono per costruire una proteina e in che ordine devono essere assemblati. Affascinante, certo, ma la cosa davvero interessante è che, in linea teorica, il DNA potrebbe essere usato per <strong>archiviare dati di qualsiasi tipo</strong>. Tutto quello che dobbiamo fare è trasformare questi dati in lunghe serie di A, C, G e T, e sintetizzare le corrispondenti molecole di DNA. Facile a dirsi, difficile a farsi. I costi sono elevati e i problemi tecnici da affrontare sono molti. Ciononostante, alcuni gruppi di ricerca sparsi nel mondo ci stanno lavorando seriamente, e le pubblicazioni sull’argomento sono sempre più frequenti.</p><p>Il motivo del crescente interesse della comunità scientifica risiede nell’<strong>elevatissima densità di informazione</strong> che il DNA sarebbe in grado di raggiungere, se potessimo utilizzarlo come sistema di archiviazione. Pensate agli hard disk portatili che usiamo per fare i backup dei nostri dati: quelli più capienti consentono di salvare pochi Terabytes di dati, e hanno le dimensioni di un libro. Di contro, una molecola di DNA potrebbe archiviare fino a 700 Tera in un millimetro cubico! Proprio quest’anno, un gruppo di ricerca dell’Università di Washington ha <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/early/2017/03/07/114553">battuto il record</a> di dati memorizzati in un archivio genetico: 200 Megabyte, salvati in 13 milioni di frammenti di DNA. Stiano comunque sereni i produttori di materiale informatico: codificare dati in molecole di DNA non è esattamente una passeggiata. Tanto per cominciare, si tratta di una <strong>procedura molto costosa</strong>. Non tanto in fase di lettura: i costi per sequenziare molecole di DNA (e leggerne quindi il contenuto) sono ormai molto bassi. Il grosso limite sta nella fase di scrittura: aggiungere al nostro archivio genetico un singolo nucleotide (cioè una sola lettera di DNA) costa al momento quasi 10 centesimi di dollaro. Ancora troppo per mandare in pensione hard disk e DVD.</p><p>C’è poi un altro importante aspetto che deve essere tenuto in considerazione: qual è il <strong>sistema di codifica</strong> migliore per convertire i nostri dati nel linguaggio del DNA? Dobbiamo sfruttare al meglio le quattro lettere che la biologia ci mette a disposizione, cercando di racchiudere il maggior numero di informazioni possibili nella minore quantità di DNA. Ipotizzando di dover convertire un semplice file di testo, ad esempio, potremo pensare di associare a ciascuna lettera dell’alfabeto una particolare tripletta di nucleotidi, proprio come fa il codice genetico. In totale, avremmo a disposizione 64 differenti triplette, più che sufficienti a codificare le lettere dell’alfabeto inglese, i numeri, gli spazi e i segni di punteggiatura. Potremmo anche adottare un codice ancora più sintetico, sfruttando solo 3 dei quattro nucleotidi disponibili: in questo caso riusciremmo a codificare le lettere e gli spazi. Perderemmo la punteggiatura, ma l’Ulisse di Joyce dimostra che in fondo potremmo anche farne a meno.</p><p>Il vero problema di questo sistema di codifica è che consente di memorizzare solo file di testo. Come fare quindi a salvare i nostri film e le nostre canzoni preferite? In questo caso occorre partire dal <strong>codice binario</strong> in cui questi dati sono scritti, e convertire quest’ultimo in sequenze di DNA. Questa volta le 4 lettere a nostra disposizione sono più che sufficienti per tradurre i nostri dati, che ora sono diventati una lunghissima serie di 0 e 1. Siamo in una situazione fortunata, perché l’alfabeto di destinazione (quello del DNA) possiede più valori di quanti ne contenga l’alfabeto di partenza (quello del codice binario); questa abbondanza ci offre più opzioni per la nostra codifica, ma anche in questo caso la scelta da compiere è delicata. Ad esempio, possiamo cercare di <strong>compattare il più possibile l’informazione</strong>, associando a ciascuna lettera del DNA una coppia di bit (A = 00, C = 01, G = 10, T = 11): in questo modo riusciamo a dimezzare la lunghezza delle nostre sequenze, e possiamo quindi codificare più dati nello stesso segmento di DNA. Sembra decisamente la soluzione migliore, e in effetti lo sarebbe davvero se il DNA fosse semplicemente una lunga serie di lettere stampate sulle pagine di un libro. Purtroppo, non è questo il caso: per leggere una sequenza di DNA è necessario sequenziarlo, e le macchine progettate per questo compito (i sequenziatori) non riescono a leggere facilmente i tratti di DNA molto ripetitivi. Questo significa che la sequenza CCCCCCCC (che nel nostro esempio codifica la stringa 0101010101010101) potrebbe essere letta per errore con una C in più o con una C in meno, rendendo di fatto illeggibile l’informazione originaria. Un hard disk molto capiente ma illeggibile non è oggettivamente molto utile, quindi forse potremmo rinunciare alla compattezza estrema per salvaguardare l’<strong>integrità dei dati</strong>. Per fare questo, basterebbe ragionare per singoli bit, associando lo 0 a due diversi nucleotidi (ad es. A e T), e l’1 agli altri due. In questo modo, abbiamo un codice ridondante che ci consente una certa flessibilità: in presenza di lunghe serie di 0, ad esempio, potremmo alternare a piacere le A e le T, così che il risultato finale (ad es. TATTAAAT) possa essere letto con più facilità dai sequenziatori. Ci stiamo avvicinando alla meta, finalmente! Usando quotidianamente hard disk e chiavette USB, però, sappiamo benissimo che i file possono corrompersi, e un sistema basato sul DNA non farebbe comunque eccezione. Ecco perché alcuni ricercatori hanno pensato di implementare, anche per le memorie “genetiche”, delle <strong>tecniche di correzione degli errori</strong> sviluppate in altri ambiti, come il codice di Reed-Solomon usato nei CD e nei DVD.</p><p>Supponiamo ora di essere finalmente riusciti a memorizzare in una lunga molecola di DNA i greatest hits del nostro gruppo musicale preferito, e supponiamo di avere a disposizione un fantastico stereo con sequenziatore di DNA incorporato (non cercate su Amazon, non esiste). Abbiamo risolto tutti i nostri problemi? Purtroppo no. I sistemi di archiviazione tradizionali hanno una caratteristica fondamentale, che al nostro DNA non può mancare: è la capacità di <strong>accedere ai dati in modo diretto</strong>. Se voglio ascoltare l’ultima canzone del greatest hits, non devo necessariamente sorbirmi anche tutti i pezzi precedenti, ma posso accedere direttamente al brano che mi interessa. Questo, almeno, con i classici CD. E con il DNA? Anche per questo abbiamo una soluzione. L’ha <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4585656/">proposta</a> un paio di anni fa un gruppo di ricerca dell’Università dell’Illinois, guidato dalla prof.ssa Olgica Milenkovic, e consiste nella sintesi di particolari coppie di sequenze da aggiungere ai lati di un segmento di DNA di interesse, ad esempio quello che contiene la nostra canzone preferita. Siccome ogni segmento di DNA è associato a una coppia di sequenze differente, è possibile sfruttarle come <strong>indirizzi molecolari</strong> e accedere in modo selettivo solo a questo o a quel pezzo di DNA. Per farlo, basta amplificare il segmento che ci interessa con una comune reazione di PCR: l’importante è usare i primer corretti, quelli corrispondenti agli indirizzi molecolari che stiamo cercando. È un po’ come entrare in una biblioteca e mettersi alla ricerca di un libro usando la mappa degli scaffali: ora che abbiamo trovato il nostro libro, possiamo cominciare a leggere. Ci manca solo il sequenziatore: quello in vendita su Amazon lo avete già ordinato, vero?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82b0dd573106" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tumori, il ruolo del caso e l’importanza della prevenzione]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/tumori-il-ruolo-del-caso-e-limportanza-della-prevenzione-b202070991aa?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b202070991aa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tumori]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cancro]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dna]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Jun 2017 13:02:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-22T13:02:42.941Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Il cancro è una malattia del DNA. Sono le mutazioni genetiche che si accumulano nelle nostre cellule, infatti, a scatenare il processo che le trasforma in cellule tumorali. Stiamo parlando in particolare di alcune mutazioni, le <strong><em>driver mutations</em></strong>, che, colpendo geni chiave legati al ciclo cellulare, compromettono i meccanismi che regolano la proliferazione e inducono le nostre cellule a moltiplicarsi in modo incontrollato.</p><p>Se questo è un fatto ormai noto e consolidato all’interno della comunità scientifica, più complicato è stabilire l’origine di queste mutazioni. L’argomento è ancora oggetto di dibattito, come dimostrano le polemiche delle ultime settimane. Ad accendere la discussione è stato un articolo pubblicato recentemente su <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/355/6331/1330">Science</a> e firmato dal matematico Cristian <strong>Tomasetti</strong>, professore presso la prestigiosa Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, insieme ai colleghi Lu Li e Bert Vogelstein.</p><p>Tomasetti aveva destato scalpore già nel 2015, quando annunciò, sempre dalle pagine di Science, che gran parte delle mutazioni responsabili del cancro hanno in realtà un’origine casuale. Le conclusioni del suo lavoro non furono accolte benissimo dalla comunità scientifica, e se ne comprende il motivo: con il suo studio, Tomasetti aveva messo in crisi il concetto stesso di <strong>prevenzione</strong>, lasciando intendere che il cancro fosse un prodotto del caso e che quindi non fosse possibile prevenirlo. La pubblicazione che aveva fatto saltare sulla sedia migliaia di medici e ricercatori in tutto il mondo, però, aveva dei difetti, non ultimo quelle di essere basata esclusivamente su dati relativi alla popolazione americana.</p><p>Quest’anno il team di Tomasetti è tornato all’attacco, allargando lo sguardo a 69 Paesi e a diversi tipo di cancro. Le conclusioni del primo articolo reggono ancora: <strong>due mutazioni su tre sono dovute al caso</strong>. Prima di allarmarsi, però, è bene fare un passo indietro e capire che cosa esattamente hanno fatto gli autori dello studio, e in che modo sono arrivati a calcolare quel rapporto.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*F-lwqJKM5-y6nx_E.jpg" /></figure><p>Nel DNA le mutazioni possono dipendere da tre fattori: l’ambiente, l’ereditarietà e il caso. Tutti i discorsi sulla prevenzione si basano sull’identificazione dei <strong>fattori ambientali</strong> che aumentano il rischio di cancro, come il fumo di sigaretta per il cancro al polmone o i raggi ultravioletti per il melanoma. Anche la seconda componente, l’<strong>ereditarietà</strong>, è molto studiata, basti pensare alle mutazioni nei geni BRCA che predispongono al tumore al seno.</p><p>Forse se ne parla meno, ma la <strong>componente casuale</strong> è anch’essa molto importante. Ogni volta che una cellula si divide, si verificano mediamente 3 mutazioni, non a causa di qualche fattore esterno, ma semplicemente perché il macchinario molecolare deputato alla replicazione del DNA, pur essendo molto efficiente, non è perfetto, e qualche volta sbaglia. Intendiamoci, 3 errori in un testo di 6,5 miliardi di caratteri (tali sono le dimensioni del genoma umano, considerando sia il corredo paterno sia il corredo materno) sono davvero molto pochi; quando le divisioni cellulari sono parecchie, però, la statistica gioca contro, e anche una performance eccellente come questa può lasciare dietro di sé un numero considerevole di mutazioni. A soffrire di più, da questo punto di vista, sono ovviamente i tessuti dove le divisioni cellulari sono più frequenti.</p><p>A seconda della propria origine, una mutazione può quindi essere assegnata a una delle tre categorie sopra indicate: mutazioni indotte da fattori ambientali, mutazioni ereditate dai genitori, mutazioni introdotte casualmente durante la replicazione del DNA. Per quantificare l’importanza relativa di ciascuna tipologia nella genesi del cancro, il team di Tomasetti ha utilizzato i <a href="http://ci5.iarc.fr/CI5-X/Pages/download.aspx">dati IARC</a> relativi alle incidenze dei tumori nei 69 Paesi considerati, insieme ai dati sulle cellule staminali, disponibili per 17 tessuti diversi. Quest’ultima informazione serve proprio a stimare l’impatto del caso sull’incidenza dei tumori nella popolazione, poiché le staminali sono le cellule che, dividendosi, producono le mutazioni del terzo tipo descritte in precedenza. La <strong>correlazione tra il numero di divisioni cellulari in un tessuto e il rischio di cancro</strong> varia leggermente da Paese a Paese, ma nella quasi totalità dei casi si rivela essere superiore al 70%. Si tratta di un risultato molto forte e statisticamente significativo, che suggerisce un impatto rilevante della componente casuale nell’insorgenza dei tumori.</p><p>Analizzando i dati epidemiologici e le mutazioni rilevate nei tumori con il sequenziamento del genoma, Tomasetti e colleghi giungono alla conclusione che, mediamente, soltanto il 29% delle mutazioni driver sono indotte da fattori ambientali, il 5% sono ereditate, mentre il restante <strong>66%</strong> sono legate alla replicazione cellulare. In altre parole, sono dovute al caso. Ovviamente, stiamo parlando di valori medi: di fatto, come illustrato nell’istogramma seguente, <strong>ogni tumore fa storia a sé</strong>. Per ognuno dei 27 tumori riportati nel database del <a href="https://www.cancerresearchuk.org/">Cancer Research UK</a>, i ricercatori hanno calcolato la quota di mutazioni attribuibili a fattori ambientali o ereditari, assegnando al caso la quota rimanente.</p><p>Le mutazioni dell’osteosarcoma, nella parte sinistra del grafico, sono per la quasi totalità errori casuali introdotti durante la replicazione del DNA, così come quelle dei tumori ai testicoli e al cervello. Ovviamente, come sempre accade nella scienza, si tratta di stime basate sulle <strong>conoscenze disponibili attualmente</strong>: poiché la quota di mutazioni “casuali” è assegnata semplicemente per differenza, essa sarà necessariamente rivista al ribasso qualora emergessero nuovi fattori ambientali rilevanti per questi tumori. A destra troviamo invece quei tumori in cui il caso ha un ruolo minoritario, come il melanoma o il cancro ai polmoni: in questi casi i fattori ambientali sono più che sufficienti a spiegare la maggior parte delle mutazioni. Al centro del grafico, i tumori con caratteristiche intermedie.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sNiCVAdm-zT1bFgn.jpg" /></figure><p>Gli autori dell’articolo pubblicato su Science sono perfettamente consapevoli del peso delle loro affermazioni, e memori delle reazioni suscitate con il primo lavoro del 2015 sottolineano più volte una cosa molto importante: dire che il 66% delle mutazioni nel cancro sono imputabili al caso <strong>non significa sostenere che il 66% dei casi di tumore sia dovuto al caso</strong>. Le due cose sono ben diverse! Per esplicitare meglio questa distinzione, Tomasetti e colleghi ricorrono a un espediente suggestivo e un po’ fantascientifico.</p><p>Immaginiamo di prendere un gruppo di persone con un DNA “perfetto”, privo di qualunque mutazione associata al cancro, e di trasferirle su un altro pianeta, dove anche l’ambiente è perfettamente sano. Niente fumo, niente inquinamento, niente raggi UV che favoriscono l’insorgenza di mutazioni. In un contesto del genere, tutte le mutazioni sono dovute a errori nella replicazione del DNA, cioè sono attribuibili al caso. Supponiamo ora che ad un certo punto appaia sul pianeta un potentissimo <strong>agente mutageno</strong> che aumenta drasticamente il rischio di cancro: in questa nuova situazione, il 90% dei casi di tumore sono ora direttamente legati all’introduzione del mutageno, e sarebbe possibile prevenirli semplicemente evitando l’esposizione ad esso. Tuttavia, se si contano le mutazioni da esso provocate, si scopre che la percentuale sul totale delle mutazioni è molto più bassa del 90%. Nell’esempio della figura qui sotto (pannello A), è pari al 60% (sono i pallini in grigio).</p><p>Questa discrepanza è dovuta al fatto che <strong>un tumore, per manifestarsi, necessita di più mutazioni</strong>: alcune saranno di origine ambientale, altre di origine casuale. In questo scenario, il 40% delle mutazioni sono dovute al caso (pallini in giallo), ma sono solo due i pazienti dove i pallini sono tutti gialli: significa che in tutti gli altri casi (il 90% dei pazienti, come si diceva più sopra) è possibile prevenire il cancro evitando l’esposizione all’agente mutageno. Lo scenario di fantasia illustrato non è molto lontano da quello che accade nella realtà con alcuni tipi di tumore con una forte componente ambientale e una componente ereditaria trascurabile, come l’adenocarcinoma del polmone (pannello B della figura): studi epidemiologici hanno dimostrato che il 90% dei tumori si può prevenire, e che il fumo è il fattore di rischio principale per questo tipo di cancro. Ogni tumore è un caso a parte, come abbiamo visto, ma il principio resta valido: <strong>pure nel caso estremo in cui la maggior parte delle mutazioni sia dovuta al caso, questo non implica necessariamente che la prevenzione sia inutile</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dus5zxXqRN27v16x.jpg" /></figure><p>Il caso gioca un ruolo importante nelle nostre vite, a volte determina persino il lavoro che faremo, la persona che sposeremo o le malattie di cui ci ammaleremo. La casualità è sotto i nostri occhi in ogni momento delle nostre giornate, anche se non ce ne rendiamo conto. Quando la notiamo, poi, le diamo significati che non ha: parliamo di cattiva sorte, di destino, a volte ci ritroviamo a pensare che in fondo è già tutto scritto. Curiosamente, nella comunità scientifica spesso si riscontra l’atteggiamento opposto, quello di chi cerca una spiegazione meccanicistica a qualunque fenomeno, e si ribella con forza davanti ad articoli come quello di Tomasetti. Sono entrambi approcci sbagliati, a mio parere: accettare l’esistenza del caso non significa rassegnarsi al fatalismo, anzi, rappresenta il primo passo per conoscerlo, capire in che modo influenza la nostra vita e infine tentare di contrastarlo. Tornando al tema dell’articolo, questo discorso si traduce in una strategia duplice: da un lato, adottare uno stile di vita sano per evitare i tumori con una forte componente ambientale; dall’altro, sfuggire ai tumori con una forte componente casuale attraverso la diagnosi precoce. Non so se fare i conti con la casualità sia il modo migliore per affrontare la vita, di sicuro sembra essere un modo efficace per prendersi cura della propria salute.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b202070991aa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[La meningite in Toscana (e perché non viene dall’Africa)]]></title>
            <link>https://mygenomix.medium.com/la-meningite-in-toscana-e-perch%C3%A9-non-viene-dallafrica-fa9d9f0e8c3e?source=rss-56cbaa131bdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa9d9f0e8c3e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[migranti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[toscana]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[meningite]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Moreno Colaiacovo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2017 14:13:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-11T09:03:31.070Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Chi ha portato la meningite in Toscana? Nelle ultime settimane se ne è parlato moltissimo sui social network. A volte in modo pacato, altre volte con toni molto accesi, in ogni caso non sempre con la necessaria precisione. Se avete seguito il dibattito, è possibile che vi siate già fatti la vostra idea sull’argomento, ma forse alcuni di voi sono ancora confusi. Chi ha un minimo di dimestichezza con i social sa che le discussioni online sono spesso difficili da seguire, e in mezzo al caotico inseguirsi dei commenti e dei “mi piace” capita che alla fine non si riesca più a distinguere i fatti dalle opinioni. Lo scopo di questo post è cercare di rispondere, dati alla mano, alla domanda di partenza, evidenziando alcuni aspetti che nei dibattiti di questi giorni sono stati trascurati. Se avrete la pazienza di leggere fino in fondo, forse imparerete anche voi, come me, qualcosa di nuovo e interessante (anche nel caso in cui una risposta ce l’abbiate già).</p><p>La <strong>meningite</strong> è un’infiammazione delle meningi, cioè le membrane che rivestono e proteggono il cervello e il midollo spinale. Ne esistono forme lievi, come quelle di origine virale, e forme più gravi e addirittura letali, perlopiù batteriche. Sono diversi i batteri in grado di causare la meningite. I principali sono <em>Neisseria meningitis</em> (meningococco), <em>Streptococcus pneumoniae</em> (pneumococco) e <em>Haemophilus influenzae</em> (emofilo) di tipo B. Fino agli anni 90, era quest’ultimo a causare la maggior parte dei casi di meningite nei bambini con meno di cinque anni, ma in seguito all’introduzione del vaccino esavalente i numeri si sono notevolmente ridotti. Al giorno d’oggi, la maggior parte delle meningiti in Italia sono da pneumococco, mentre le meningiti da meningocco sono più rare. I casi di meningite riscontrati in Toscana negli ultimi due anni appartengono a quest’ultima categoria, e destano particolare preoccupazione perché si stanno presentando in numero più alto rispetto ai casi registrati in questa regione negli anni precedenti. Al fine di sgombrare subito il campo da ogni dubbio, <strong>in Italia non esiste nessuna epidemia</strong> di meningite: a livello nazionale, infatti, i numeri sono in linea con quelli rilevati in passato (1479 nel 2014, 1815 nel 2015, 1376 nel 2016). L’anomalia riguarda esclusivamente la regione Toscana, per la quale si può parlare, tecnicamente, di <strong>focolai epidemici</strong>. La peculiare situazione toscana è ben illustrata da questa figura, che riporta l’incidenza del meningococco come numero di casi su 100000 abitanti (figura estratta da <a href="http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=21423">Stefanelli et al, 2016</a>). Nello specifico, il batterio coinvolto in questo caso è un meningococco di tipo C.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*f8GCDqownCUa4wtx." /></figure><p>Il meningococco <em>Neisseria meningitis</em>, infatti, può essere classificato in diversi <strong>sierogruppi</strong>, a seconda delle molecole (antigeni) che il batterio presenta sulla sua capsula polisaccaridica, cioè il rivestimento esterno protettivo che è considerato il suo maggiore fattore di virulenza. L’identificazione degli antigeni presenti sulla capsula del batterio può essere fatta con tecniche standard di microbiologia come i saggi di agglutinazione, dove si usano vari anticorpi per “sondare” la superficie della cellula batterica, oppure tramite PCR, in cui si sequenziano direttamente i geni della capsula. I sierogruppi in grado di causare epidemie sono A, B, C, X, Y, W. Ognuno di questi ha una diffusione geografica caratteristica: in Italia, ad esempio, prevalgono il tipo B e il tipo C. Lo evidenzia molto bene la tabella seguente, estratta dagli ultimi <a href="http://www.iss.it/binary/mabi/cont/Report_MBI_20161116_v11.pdf">dati di sorveglianza</a> sulle malattie batteriche invasive (aggiornati a novembre 2016). Si nota, tra l’altro, il sorpasso del sierogruppo C sul B, avvenuto nel 2015 in concomitanza con l’anomalia toscana.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*YPyXPM1O-VQmWELh." /></figure><p>L’identificazione del sierogruppo è sicuramente un passaggio fondamentale, utilissimo ad esempio per capire quale vaccino utilizzare per arrestare eventuali epidemie. Possiamo però fare molto di più: un ceppo di meningococco, infatti, può anche essere classificato in modo più preciso grazie a una tecnica molto usata in microbiologia, il sequenziamento <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilocus_sequence_typing">MLST</a> (Multi Locus Sequence Typing). In pratica, si vanno a sequenziare delle piccole porzioni di <a href="http://pubmlst.org/neisseria/">sette diversi geni</a>, che nell’insieme forniscono una sorta di identikit del ceppo batterico. Una classificazione così fine permette di monitorare in modo molto preciso la diffusione di un patogeno, e in alcuni casi di ipotizzarne la sua origine geografica. Proprio grazie alla tecnica MLST è stato possibile identificare con precisione il ceppo responsabile dei casi di meningite in Toscana: si tratta di <strong>ST-11</strong>, un ceppo batterico che circola in Europa ormai da diversi anni.</p><p>Sembrerà incredibile, ma le discussioni che in questi giorni hanno infiammato i social network ruotavano attorno a questo concetto molto tecnico dei ceppi batterici. Una questione per addetti ai lavori, si direbbe, ma che in questa circostanza ha provocato accesi dibattiti e che alla fine si è allargata, commento dopo commento, fino a trasformarsi nell’eterna domanda: la scienza è democratica? Tranquilli, non parlerò di questo argomento, altri più competenti di me lo hanno già fatto e rischierei solo di annoiarvi. Quello che mi preme sottolineare è il vero motivo per cui <strong>gli immigrati africani non possono essere ritenuti in alcun modo responsabili dei casi di meningite che si sono verificati in Toscana</strong>, una tesi che è circolata per diversi giorni in rete, ma — come vedremo — priva di ogni fondamento. Alcuni esperti, tra cui il noto medico Roberto Burioni, hanno tentato subito di smontare questa teoria, affermando sostanzialmente che gli immigrati non c’entrano nulla con questa storia perché il sierogruppo C (responsabile dei casi in Toscana) non è fra quelli diffusi in Africa. Per molti queste parole hanno chiuso definitivamente la questione, e la verità unanimemente accettata da giornali e TV è diventata questa: il meningococco C in Africa non esiste. Il problema è che, forse per esigenze di semplificazione, gli esperti avevano omesso un’informazione importante, che essendo reperibile in rete su siti affidabili come quello dell’OMS è venuta inevitabilmente a galla senza timore di essere smentita: il meningococco C, in Africa, esiste eccome. In particolare, secondo un <a href="http://www.who.int/wer/2016/wer9116.pdf">bollettino dell’OMS</a>, <strong>il meningococco di tipo C è stato, nel 2015, la prima causa di meningite batterica nella cosiddetta “meningitis belt”</strong>, ossia la fascia di Paesi subsahariani che va dal Senegal all’Etiopia. Fino a qualche anno fa, come dimostra il grafico seguente (preso dal <a href="http://who.int/immunization/research/meetings_workshops/Bita_Lingani_Ronveaux_MVPconf16.pdf?ua=1">sito</a> dell’OMS), il meningococco A era il sierogruppo dominante nell’Africa subsahariana, mentre il tipo C era praticamente inesistente, esattamente come si diceva all’inizio. Nel 2010, però, è partita una vaccinazione di massa per il meningococco A che ha modificato radicalmente il panorama della meningite in Africa: il meningococco A (in rosso) è progressivamente scomparso (sì, perché i vaccini funzionano!), lasciando il posto ad altri sierogruppi come il W (in blu), o alle meningiti da pneumococco (in verde). L’anomalia del 2015 è dovuta essenzialmente a grandi <strong>epidemie avvenute in Niger e in Nigeria</strong>, che hanno fatto salire alle stelle le statistiche del meningococco C (nel grafico in azzurro).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*aorDGF5MfXyQDyxs." /></figure><p>I numeri sono inequivocabili, comprensibile quindi che a molti sia venuto il dubbio: ma siamo proprio sicuri che i migranti non c’entrino nulla? Ebbene, la risposta ancora una volta è sì: <strong>i migranti non c’entrano nulla</strong>. E non perché il tipo C in Africa non esista, ma perché il meningococco C africano è completamente diverso da quello toscano. La risposta che cerchiamo, infatti, ce la fornisce la <strong>classificazione fine</strong>, quella ottenuta con la tecnica MLST: mentre il ceppo toscano è denominato <strong>ST-11</strong>, il ceppo responsabile delle grandi epidemie africane del 2015 è stato chiamato <strong>ST-10217</strong> ed è un ceppo completamente nuovo, mai rilevato in precedenza. Stiamo parlando quindi sempre di meningite, e sempre da meningococco di tipo C; quando si va a guardare l’identikit più preciso, però, risulta evidente che siamo di fronte a due ceppi batterici differenti. Questi casi di meningite, meglio ripeterlo ancora una volta, non hanno nessuna relazione con le epidemie africane.</p><p>L’epidemiologia è una faccenda complicata. I batteri si spostano insieme a noi: salgono sui barconi dei migranti e sugli aerei dei turisti, si moltiplicano sui treni del mattino affollati di pendolari, e a volte — come nel caso del meningococco — viaggiano in incognito, trasportati da inconsapevoli portatori sani. Come spesso accade, per conoscere la verità tocca andare in fondo alle questioni. È un <strong>processo faticoso</strong> che a volte ti porta ad affrontare questioni tecniche molto complesse e ti costringe a mettere in discussione i tuoi preconcetti, ma alla fine ne vale la pena.</p><p>Ringrazio Roberta Villa, Riccardo Gallina e il professor Pier Luigi Lopalco per i preziosi suggerimenti, le informazioni e i link che hanno condiviso con me.</p><p><em>Informazioni generali sulla meningite:</em></p><ul><li><a href="http://www.epicentro.iss.it/problemi/meningiti/meningite.asp"><em>Malattie batteriche invasive (sepsi e meningiti), Epicentro ISS</em></a></li><li><a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs141/en/"><em>Meningoccal meningits factsheet, WHO.</em></a></li></ul><p><em>Risorse utili sulla situazione italiana:</em></p><ul><li><a href="http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_1_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&amp;menu=notizie&amp;p=dalministero&amp;id=2788"><em>Meningite, il punto della situazione in Italia, Ministero della Salute</em></a></li><li><a href="http://www.iss.it/binary/mabi/cont/Report_MBI_20161116_v11.pdf"><em>Dati di sorveglianza delle malattie batteriche invasive aggiornati al 16 novembre 2016, Istituto Superiore di Sanità</em></a></li><li><a href="http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=21423"><em>Stefanelli et al: “Increased incidence of invasive meningococcal disease of serogroup C / clonal complex 11, Tuscany, Italy, 2015 to 2016”</em></a></li></ul><p><em>Risorse utili sulla situazione africana:</em></p><ul><li><a href="http://www.who.int/wer/2016/wer9116.pdf"><em>Weekly Epidemiological Record, WHO, 22 april 2016</em></a></li><li><a href="http://who.int/immunization/research/meetings_workshops/Bita_Lingani_Ronveaux_MVPconf16.pdf?ua=1"><em>Bita et al: “Meningitis surveillance in the African meningitis belt”</em></a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa9d9f0e8c3e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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