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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Aung M Htun  on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Aung M Htun  on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Haiti Crisis and its Lessons for Us]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/haiti-crisis-and-its-lessons-for-us-f943d3337a5b?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[haiti]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 21:50:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T21:50:22.767Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*teXQqRyGAUJF7rD_Ea_6IQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Credit — A demonstrator holds up an Haitian flag during protests demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Friday, March 1, 2024. Source — AP</figcaption></figure><p>When one examines the decades of political instability, authoritarian rule, armed violence and humanitarian crises in Haiti, I noticed an interesting point. The causes of Haiti’s armed conflicts are quite different from those of the armed conflicts in many other countries, including our own, Myanmar. The objectives, economic bases and modes of operation of the armed groups are quite different.</p><p>In some countries, armed groups are fighting for political ideology, ethnicity, religion, self-determination or territorial control. In some countries, armed conflicts continue to occur in order to control natural resources.</p><p>However, behind the armed violence in Haiti, there are complex political and economic relationships. The armed gangs, once used by politicians for their own interests, have since grown powerful enough to threaten the very authority of the state.</p><p>What is more interesting is that Haiti has not suddenly found itself in this crisis; it has been a few years in the making. Historical legacies, the weaknesses of political institutions, and international interventions, all dating back more than two hundred years, are interconnected and have led to the situation today.</p><p>Therefore, to understand what is happening in Haiti today, it is necessary to look back at its history.</p><p><strong>Contry’s Dependence Trade-offs</strong></p><p>Haiti is a country in the Caribbean Sea on the island of Hispaniola is situated. The Dominican Republic is located on the eastern side of the island. In other words, the two countries share a border on the same island.</p><p>After Christopher Columbus arrived in 1492, the Spanish colonised the island. At that time, the Taíno people who lived on the island were subjected to forced labour, violence and the diseases brought by Europeans. The native Taíno people suffered a massive population decline due to forced labour, violence, and infectious diseases brought by Europeans.</p><p>In 1697, Spain ceded the western part of the island to France. The French called the territory Saint-Domingue and greatly expanded the sugar and coffee plantations.</p><p>By the late 18th century, French-owned Saint-Domingue had become one of the most profitable colonies in the world. However, behind this wealth lay the labour and lives of countless people forcibly abducted from Africa and enslaved.</p><p>In other words, while vast profits were being made from sugar and coffee, the very people who created those profits remained trapped in slavery.</p><p>These conditions led to the start of a great revolution in 1791, led by the enslaved people. After many years of warfare, on 1 January 1804, the nation of Haiti gained its independence from French colonial rule.</p><p>Haiti became the first independent nation in world history to emerge from a successful slave revolution. In the context of the time, this was no ordinary achievement. It was an enormous challenge to the European imperial powers, which were growing powerful on the basis of slavery and colonies.</p><p>But Haiti’s story does not end there.</p><p>In 1825, France demanded a compensation of 150 million French francs to recognise Haiti’s independence. That indemnity was for French plantation owners who had lost their property during the French colonial era.</p><p>That property value included the value of the enslaved people.</p><p>Just imagine: the very people who rose up against their enslavement were now being forced to pay reparations for those who had enslaved them.</p><p>The Haitian government was forced to accept this demand after France sent warships and applied pressure. Although the compensation was later reduced to 90 million francs, Haiti had to take out loans to pay it, leaving the country burdened with debt for many years.</p><p>Therefore, when studying Haiti’s poverty, this history cannot be ignored. The answer to the question of why Haiti is poor today cannot be found solely in the poor management of its current governments. One must also take into account the economic inequalities that began in the colonial era, the debt problems following independence, and the state of international relations.</p><p>However, one cannot explain all of Haiti’s current problems by citing a single historical narrative alone. The domestic political developments that have occurred since are also important.</p><p><strong>Two neighbouring countries on the same island</strong></p><p>There is another interesting aspect to Haiti’s history: its relationship with its neighbour, the Dominican Republic.</p><p>From 1822 to 1844, Haiti also governed the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola. In 1844, the Dominican Republic declared its independence from Haitian rule.</p><p>To this day, historical tensions, border disputes, racial discrimination and issues concerning the rights of migrants persist between the two countries.</p><p>In 1937, in particular, the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo by order of the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, Haitians and people of Haitian descent living along the border were massacred. This event is recorded in history as the Parsley Massacre. The death toll varies by estimate, but it is believed that tens of thousands of people lost their lives.</p><p>These historical wounds do not simply heal over time.</p><p>In 2013, a decision by the Dominican Constitutional Court stripped many people of Haitian descent, who were born in the country, of their recognised citizenship. Although subsequent legislative amendments were made to address this issue, problems of statelessness and proof of nationality remain.</p><p>Today, as the security situation in Haiti deteriorates, there are also those who are migrating to the Dominican Republic. Meanwhile, the Dominican government has tightened its immigration rules and is deporting Haitians en masse.</p><p>In the year 2025 alone, over 270,000 people were forcibly repatriated to Haiti.</p><p>It is worth considering that Haitian nationals are fleeing insecurity in their own country They also face issues with citizenship, residency and migration in neighbouring countries.</p><p>This situation shows that a crisis in one country does not stop at its borders, but also affects neighbouring countries and regional politics.</p><p><strong>A political system that has remained unchanged, despite changing governments</strong></p><p>Haiti’s problems are not solely the result of its colonial history and pressure from foreign countries. A look at its post-independence domestic political history reveals a succession of dictatorships, military coups, and the violent suppression of political opponents.</p><p>In particular, François Duvalier, who came to power in 1957, and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, who succeeded him. They ruled Haiti with an authoritarian regime until 1986.</p><p>During this period, the dictatorial regime used not only state security forces but also special violent groups to suppress its political opponents. The notorious armed group known as the Tonton Macoutes was involved in the horrific political repression of that era.</p><p>When authoritarian leaders began to use armed groups to protect their power, The line between state security forces and armed groups used for political ends gradually became blurred.</p><p>This is an important historical background for understanding the later emergence of armed gangs in Haiti.</p><p>Even after the end of the dictatorship, democratic governments were not able to govern stably. Coups, foreign intervention, and political disputes continued to occur.</p><p>On the other hand, state institutions were not in a position to adequately provide for the rule of law, security, education, and healthcare services across the country.</p><p>The situation where the entire state administration has to be rebuilt from scratch every time a government changes can become a very significant long-term weakness for a country.</p><p>Therefore, when studying Haiti’s problems, explanations that it is simply due to bad leaders or widespread corruption are insufficient. One also needs to look at how state institutions were built and how much continuity they were able to maintain between changes of government.</p><p><strong>Weak state governance following a natural disaster</strong></p><p>Thus, Haiti, which was already facing political instability, was struck again by a powerful magnitude 7.0 earthquake on 12 January 2010.</p><p>The earthquake caused massive destruction in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and its surrounding areas. The presidential palace, government ministries, hospitals, schools and numerous homes were destroyed.</p><p>Estimates of the death toll remain varied, but hundreds of thousands of people are believed to have died, and over a million were left homeless.</p><p>The earthquake was not just a natural disaster but an event that severely damaged Haiti’s administrative capacity.</p><p>This was because when government buildings, ministries and infrastructure collapsed, it became difficult to continue with normal government functions.</p><p>The international community provided billions of dollars in aid to rebuild Haiti. But this raises an interesting problem.</p><p>That is the question of who managed and who implemented the international aid.</p><p>The post-earthquake relief effort involved numerous international organisations, foreign governments, NGOs and private contractors. However, only a very small portion of the humanitarian emergency assistance was delivered directly to the Haitian government.</p><p>From this situation, a question arises.</p><p>After a natural disaster strikes a country, international organisations can provide a great deal of aid, but if they cannot help to build the country’s own government institutions to become stronger in the long term, The question is how sustainable that aid can be.</p><p>On the other hand, there were concerns for international organisations to provide aid directly to the government due to corruption, poor governance, and a lack of public trust within the Haitian government.</p><p>Therefore, this problem is not solely the fault of international organisations, nor is it due to the weaknesses of the Haitian government alone. It is a complex relationship between the capacity of local organisations, the international aid system, and accountability.</p><p>Just a few months after the great earthquake, Haiti faced another major problem: a cholera outbreak that began in October 2010.</p><p>Investigations revealed that the pathogen originated from a camp associated with United Nations peacekeepers. The cholera outbreak killed more than nine thousand people and infected hundreds of thousands.</p><p>In 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon apologised to the people of Haiti for the UN’s inadequate response to the cholera outbreak.</p><p>These events demonstrate that while international aid and intervention can be beneficial, they can also have unintended negative consequences.</p><p><strong>The armed gangs spawned by politicians</strong></p><p>From here, let’s continue to look at the current armed violence in Haiti.</p><p>The presence of armed gangs in Haiti is not a recent phenomenon. For many years, there have been connections between political leaders, economic power brokers, and armed groups.</p><p>Especially when political competition becomes intense Some politicians have used armed gangs to threaten their rivals, intimidate voters and build influence in certain areas.</p><p>Initially, these gangs were heavily reliant on the support of politicians. They received weapons, money, political protection and the freedom to operate in certain areas.</p><p>However, over time, these armed groups were able to establish their own territory, income, armed strength and networks.</p><p>They have transformed from groups that relied on the support of politicians into groups that can now threaten them in return.</p><p>This is a rather interesting situation, because the very violent groups that were used to maintain political power have now reached a point where they can threaten that political power itself.</p><p>After 2018, Haiti’s political instability intensified. During this period, allegations of corruption emerged in connection with Venezuela’s PetroCaribe oil assistance programme.</p><p>Under this programme, Haiti was able to purchase oil from Venezuela on a concessional payment plan. The financial opportunities thus generated were intended to be used for national development projects.</p><p>However, subsequent audits uncovered issues of fund misappropriation, poor management and corruption. There was intense criticism of the fund management, which was linked to approximately two billion US dollars.</p><p>These circumstances led to public protests in the streets. Confidence in the government declined, and political tensions intensified.</p><p>At a time when public confidence in the political system was declining, armed groups also continued to expand their power.</p><p><strong>After a President was assassinated</strong></p><p>On 7 July 2021, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated at his home.</p><p>Subsequent investigations found that the incident involved former Colombian soldiers and was linked to individuals and business networks based in the United States.</p><p>According to a May 2026 statement from the US Department of Justice, a Miami jury found four individuals involved in organising the assassination guilty.</p><p>According to US government charges, the assassination was motivated by a desire to create a political change of government and profit from its economic contracts.</p><p>Indeed, the involvement of foreign individuals, ex-military personnel and business interests in the assassination of a nation’s president is a rather chilling affair.</p><p>However, although court verdicts have been delivered, it cannot be said that all the political questions surrounding this assassination have been answered.</p><p>Following the president’s assassination, disputes over the succession to political power and administrative problems worsened.</p><p>At that time, Haiti no longer had a functioning parliament. Elected institutions had been weakened, and the legitimacy and administrative foundations necessary to make political decisions were also undermined.</p><p>This raises an interesting question.</p><p>When a government’s legitimate authority is no longer accepted by the people, and state institutions can no longer function normally, the question is: who will actually exercise power within that country?</p><p>In Haiti, it was the armed gangs that were able to seize that opportunity.</p><p>Armed gangs that came to control the highways, the ports and the markets.</p><p>This brings us to one of the most remarkable features of Haiti’s armed conflicts.</p><p>In Myanmar, when an armed group takes control of an area, what kind of administrative system do they establish there? We see issues such as how they collect taxes, and how they deliver judicial, education and health services.</p><p>In Haiti, however, the main focus of many armed gangs is on controlling territories for income generation, rather than on establishing a system of governance.</p><p>For example, controlling a major road allows them to extort money from the lorries, passenger vehicles and businesses that pass through it.</p><p>If you can control a port, you can charge for goods to be moved in and out of it. Blocking fuel depots and trade routes can also put pressure on the state’s economic activities.</p><p>It’s no longer just simple armed violence. It has become a system of using violence to gain economic advantage.</p><p>In Haiti, controlling these routes to extort money, threatening businesses, Kidnapping for ransom and illicit trade have become key financial pillars for the armed gangs.</p><p>In some areas, these gangs have even come to control the daily movements of the public. Armed groups now decide which roads can be used, when they can be used, and who must pay.</p><p>In this situation, the public find themselves having to pay not only taxes to the government but also money to the armed gangs. However, these levies are not intended to be used for public services, as a legitimate tax system would be. For the most part, they are revenue-generating schemes based on violence and intimidation.</p><p>This is where we can see that territorial control and governance are not always the same thing.</p><p>One can control a territory by armed force, but that does not mean one is providing the administrative services for the people who live in that territory.</p><p>This is an important distinction for understanding the situation in Haiti.</p><p>On the other hand, it is not that these gangs are simply criminals with no political connection whatsoever. They have links with politicians, and some of the leaders themselves have said they want to participate in the political arena.</p><p>So in Haiti, we see a pattern where crime, economic interests and political power are interconnected.</p><p><strong>When armed gangs can even topple the government</strong></p><p>In 2023, attempts at collaboration emerged between Haiti’s two powerful armed gang alliances, G9 and G-Pèp. This alliance was called Viv Ansanm and was reactivated in February 2024.</p><p>Viv Ansanm is a Haitian Creole phrase meaning “living together”. Despite its name, the alliance’s activities were quite violent.</p><p>In late February 2024, these armed gangs launched a coordinated attack on police stations, government buildings, the airport, and prisons. Prisons were stormed, leading to the escape of thousands of inmates.</p><p>At the time, Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry was on a trip abroad. The deteriorating security situation made it difficult for him to return to the country, and he ultimately resigned from his post in April 2024.</p><p>In other words, the coordinated attacks by armed groups have become so powerful that they can even bring about a change of government in a country.</p><p>This incident shows that the administrative authority of the state is not enough if it is held solely by government leaders. When a state can no longer maintain security, enforce the law, and protect its citizens on the ground, its legitimate authority can gradually weaken.</p><p>On the other hand, while armed gangs may grow powerful enough to pressure the government, they do not evolve into institutions capable of running a country.</p><p>Ousting a government and governing in its place are two completely different matters.</p><p>In Haiti, that distinction is becoming quite apparent.</p><p>Foreign Weapons, Domestic Armed Groups and International Operations</p><p>Another interesting factor in the rise of Haiti’s armed gangs is the source of their weapons.</p><p>Haiti is not a country that can produce a large number of weapons domestically. However, the armed gangs possess a vast quantity of modern firearms and ammunition.</p><p>UN investigations have found that weapons and ammunition illegally transported from the United States are UN investigations have found that illicit arms and ammunition from the United States play a significant role in Haiti’s black market for weapons. On the other hand, there are also weapons that have been diverted from other countries and from domestic stockpiles.</p><p>These illicit weapons are brought into Haiti via international trade routes, transport systems and smuggling networks.</p><p>Therefore, armed violence in Haiti is no longer solely a domestic political problem. It is linked to international arms trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking and transnational criminal networks.</p><p>The government has sought international security assistance as it has sought to crack down on the armed groups.</p><p>In June 2024, the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission began arriving in Haiti. However, due to insufficient funding, personnel, and military equipment, it has been unable to fully achieve its intended security outcomes.</p><p>In September 2025, the UN Security Council approved a new armed gang suppression force, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This force is not a conventional United Nations peacekeeping force, but a multinational security force operating under the authorisation and support of the United Nations.</p><p>As of October 2026, the GSF had approximately 1,563 personnel. This is still far below the 5,550 personnel authorised by the UN Security Council.</p><p>Meanwhile, Haitian security forces, with the help of private military contractors, have also begun using drone strikes.</p><p>However, operations to suppress the armed groups have also resulted in civilian casualties. The UN’s third-quarter 2026 report also documented casualties caused by ground and air operations by security forces.</p><p>These circumstances raise questions about the extent to which international military assistance can help rebuild Haiti’s security.</p><p>Even if the armed gangs can be militarily suppressed, it will still be necessary to rebuild the rule of law, governance, and public services in those areas.</p><p><strong>The people of Haiti amidst armed violence</strong></p><p>While these political and security issues are being discussed, it is the ordinary people of Haiti who are truly bearing the greatest consequences.</p><p>The United Nations’ 2026 According to a UN statement on 11 November 2026, between July and September alone, at least 1,167 people were killed and 459 injured as a result of violence and security operations.</p><p>Kidnappings, sexual violence, the forced recruitment of children into armed groups, and the intimidation of civilians also continue to occur.</p><p>According to figures from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in August 2026, there are over 1.49 million internally displaced people in Haiti. This is about 13 per cent of the country’s population.</p><p>Some families are leaving their homes due to attacks by armed gangs. Others are being displaced because they can no longer access food, clean water and healthcare services.</p><p>The right to education for children is also being severely affected. Schools are closed, school buildings are being used as shelters for displaced people, and children are unable to attend school due to security risks.</p><p>In this situation, the very question of what a family will eat the next day becomes a critical challenge.</p><p>Meanwhile, armed groups are recruiting and using young people and children. Poverty, a lack of job opportunities, the loss of family protection and threats of violence are the reasons some young people end up in armed gangs.</p><p>This situation gives rise to a further problem.</p><p>Simply suppressing armed groups will not eliminate the reasons why young people continue to join them.</p><p>As long as there is a lack of employment opportunities, education, social protection and the rule of law, armed gangs will continue to be able to recruit young people.</p><p>Therefore, Haiti’s security problem is, in a sense, also an economic and social one.</p><p><strong>Can an election solve Haiti’s problems?</strong></p><p>Haiti has not held regular national elections since 2016.</p><p>Political crises have meant that elected bodies have been unable to function, and the country has had to rely on transitional governments and interim administrative arrangements.</p><p>An election was scheduled for 13 December 2026 but was postponed due to security conditions. According to the latest published election timetable, the first election is scheduled to be held on 18 July 2027.</p><p>However, it remains uncertain whether this election will actually be held.</p><p>Holding an election is not just about opening polling stations. Voters need to be able to vote safely and securely, political parties must be free to campaign, voter lists must be accurate, and there must be institutions in place to accept and implement the election results.</p><p>In Haiti, many of those conditions are still lacking.</p><p>Therefore, it cannot be automatically assumed that political stability will be restored simply by holding an election.</p><p>An election can be an important process for rebuilding political legitimacy. However, alongside the election, it is necessary to rebuild the rule of law, the administration, and public trust.</p><p>Why has the international community been unable to save Haiti?</p><p>When studying the problems of Haiti, the role of the international community must also be taken into consideration.</p><p>Haiti is a country that is geographically quite close to the United States. Therefore, Haiti’s security issues are also linked to the migration, security, and political interests of the United States and Caribbean nations.</p><p>However, Haiti is not a country of major importance in the global economic and geopolitical competition among the great powers.</p><p>On the other hand, the United States, Canada, European countries and the United Nations have provided humanitarian, financial and security assistance to Haiti. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to say that the international community has completely ignored Haiti.</p><p>The real question is why international aid has not yet reached the point of providing a long-term solution to Haiti’s crisis.</p><p>International intervention in Haiti has a history of over a century. From the American military occupation and UN peacekeeping missions to post-disaster Looking at the reconstruction aid and the deployment of current security forces, it is clear that various forms of foreign assistance have been received.</p><p>However, it is a question mark to what extent these interventions have been able to build state institutions to become stronger in the long term.</p><p>International organisations can provide assistance in emergencies. They can deploy security forces. They can also provide financial support.</p><p>However, it is extremely difficult for foreign countries to build a government that the people can trust, a system of the rule of law, and sustainable political institutions.</p><p>The emergence of such organisations requires domestic political consensus, public participation, organisational capacity, and accountability.</p><p>In Haiti, amidst the crises, local community organisations, religious groups, community networks and volunteers are trying to help the people. Therefore, the people of Haiti cannot be seen as simply waiting for international aid.</p><p>Strengthening the capacity of these local organisations is also a vital part of the long-term reconstruction.</p><p><strong>What lessons can we learn from Haiti?</strong></p><p>When we look at the history and current situation of Haiti, we see that there are many lessons for conflict-ridden countries, including Myanmar.</p><p>The first thing that comes to mind is the importance of state institutions.</p><p>The mere existence of a government in a country does not mean that the country can be governed effectively. A state needs institutions that can deliver security, the rule of law, tax collection, education, healthcare and basic services.</p><p>When those institutions weaken, simply changing the government will not solve the problems.</p><p>The second point is that it is necessary to understand the economic bases of armed organisations.</p><p>Armed conflicts cannot be explained by political causes alone. We also need to study what financial resources these armed groups rely on and what interests they have in maintaining control over those resources.</p><p>An armed conflict may have started for a political reason, but over time, organisations and networks that can profit from the conflict can emerge.</p><p>In that situation, ending the conflict may no longer be enough to simply reach a political agreement. It may also be necessary to address the economic interests that sustain the conflict.</p><p>Thirdly, territorial control and good governance are not the same thing.</p><p>An armed group can militarily control a territory. But whether it can protect the security of the people in that territory, establish a system of justice, and provide basic services are separate questions.</p><p>The fourth point is the limitations of international aid.</p><p>International aid can address immediate humanitarian needs, but building the state’s administrative capacity and the trust of its people over the long term is more complex.</p><p>Therefore, reconstruction is not just about rebuilding buildings, repairing roads, and providing funds. It involves rebuilding state institutions, increasing public participation, and creating a system of governance that is accountable and responsible.</p><p>The final point is that the outcome of a conflict should not be measured by military success alone.</p><p>Even if the armed groups were militarily suppressed, there are still no job opportunities in Haiti, If young people are still denied an education, if the rule of law remains weak, and if there is no public trust in the government, the conditions for a resurgence of violence will still be present.</p><p>These lessons are not just for Haiti. These are important questions for all countries considering post-conflict state-building, governance reform and peace-building efforts.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Looking back at the history of Haiti, a nation that gained its independence from the successful revolution of its enslaved people, for over two hundred years after its independence It continues to face political instability, poverty, natural disasters and armed violence.</p><p>Looking at these circumstances, I wonder why Haiti continues to face such a succession of problems.</p><p>Is it because the Haitian people lack the capacity to govern? Or is it due to a lack of international aid? Is it because of historical weaknesses? Or is it because political power and economic interests have created a system where violence is mutually reinforcing?</p><p>What I see is that these questions cannot be explained by a single answer.</p><p>Haiti’s crisis is a historical It is a problem where inequalities, the weakness of political institutions, corruption, armed violence, illicit economic interests and international intervention are all interconnected.</p><p>The armed groups once used by politicians eventually began to threaten political power itself. Despite substantial international aid, there have remained difficulties in building state institutions for the long term. While efforts are being made to hold elections, there is not yet a political environment in which the public can participate safely and securely.</p><p>Therefore, Haiti’s crisis is not simply a matter of having a government, It serves as a reminder that political stability and peace are not automatically achieved simply by holding an election or by the military suppression of armed groups.</p><p>The conflicts in Myanmar differ from those in Haiti in their causes, political objectives, and the nature of the armed groups. However, we can learn from Haiti about the extent to which the weakening of state institutions can affect the security and daily lives of the population.</p><p>Particularly in the aftermath of a conflict, it is not just a question of who will seize power, but also how that power will be exercised. questions of for whom and how that power is exercised, and what accountability exists, become more important. Ultimately, a nation’s stability and peace cannot be built on military force alone. We need political institutions that the people can trust, the rule of law, and governance systems that can protect the security, livelihoods, and rights of the people.</p><p>Haiti’s ongoing crises serve as a historical lesson for us all, a reminder of just how crucial these factors are.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f943d3337a5b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Resource Curse and Pro-longed War]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/resource-curse-and-pro-longed-war-e4b5642fbf4f?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e4b5642fbf4f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:58:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-11T17:58:47.366Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/689/1*djn8jGewl4_zGOBGJ5i5vg.png" /><figcaption>Photo — East Asia Forum</figcaption></figure><p>Myanmar is often listed among the Asian countries with the richest natural resources in the world. At the same time, it also stands among the Asian countries that have experienced the longest-running civil wars. Furthermore, Myanmar is also counted among the poorest countries in Asia.</p><p>This raises an important question: why does a country with such abundant natural resources remain one of the poorest and least developed? Could it be due to the prolonged civil war and the emergence of a war economy, in which various armed groups have adopted strategies of extracting natural resources to finance conflict?</p><p>In academic literature, scholars often refer to this phenomenon as the “Resource Curse.” In international political economy research, countries that possess abundant natural resources but continue to suffer from poverty, instability, and conflict are described as experiencing a <em>resource curse</em>.</p><p>Myanmar is frequently cited by international research communities as one of the most prominent examples of this phenomenon. Resources such as jade, natural gas, forests, and minerals — rather than improving the livelihoods of the population — have instead become fuel for war.</p><p>So, what exactly is the Resource Curse? The concept was introduced in 1993 by economist Richard Auty, who argued that countries rich in natural resources often experience lower levels of economic development and higher levels of repression, factional politics, and conflict.</p><p>According to a report by Progressive Voice, Myanmar is rich in natural resources such as jade, gold, coal, oil, and natural gas. However, the management of these resources has been so poor that it has deepened poverty and negatively affected the lives of more than 50 million people and the country’s political relations for many years. In a survey conducted by the Revenue Watch Institute, Myanmar ranked as the country with the worst resource governance among 58 countries studied.</p><p>According to a report by the Counterterrorism Group, Myanmar produces about 70% of the world’s jade, with an estimated total value of $31 billion. The jade industry has become a major source of income for the Myanmar military and various armed militias.</p><p>A 2015 Global Witness report revealed that the jade industry — worth $31 billion in 2014 — was secretly controlled by top military leaders, drug traffickers, and their business associates.</p><p>In Hpakant Township in Kachin State, companies connected to the military have destroyed entire mountains to extract jade. Local residents are often only allowed to search through leftover debris piles, while valuable jade deposits are confiscated by soldiers. These activities have also caused severe environmental destruction, landslides, and increased drug use.</p><p>Environmental damage has intensified over time. In a 2020 landslide, more than 175 miners died, and in 2023 another landslide killed 32 people with more than 10 missing, according to news reports. Despite these repeated disasters, military-controlled companies continue their mining operations without stopping.</p><p>The Myanmar Mining Watch Network (MMWN) warned in a 2023 statement that if mining continues at the current rate and methods, local communities in Kachin State could rapidly lose their livelihoods, health, forests, and water resources.</p><p>Research by Myanmar Resource Watch has also found that rare earth mining in Shan and Kachin States uses dangerous chemicals such as sulfuric acid, nitric acid, and hydrochloric acid illegally. These chemicals contaminate soil and rivers with toxic substances such as arsenic and mercury, causing severe environmental pollution.</p><p>The environmental impact does not remain within Myanmar. Research by LSE Southeast Asia found that chemical pollutants from rare earth mining in Kachin State have contaminated rivers in Shan State and spread downstream as far as the Moei River on the Thai border.</p><p>These mining activities have also increased health risks for local populations. A 2024 study found that exposure to rare earth elements and contaminated water can cause skin diseases, respiratory illnesses, neurological disorders, cardiovascular problems, reproductive health issues, and weakened immune systems.</p><p>In Thabeikkyin Township in Mandalay Region, a health survey in small-scale gold mining areas (ASGM) found that miners had significantly higher mercury levels in their hair compared to non-miners (p=0.01). Nine out of eighteen miners exceeded warning levels, and three showed neurological symptoms consistent with chronic mercury poisoning.</p><p>Exposure to mercury vapor can damage the lungs and kidneys and harm the nervous system. Myanmar’s gold miners may also suffer from chronic lung diseases such as silicosis, lung cancer, and pneumoconiosis.</p><p>Soil samples collected from three gold mines in Banmauk Township, Sagaing Region, showed high levels of arsenic, cadmium, mercury, and lead. A research report found that 79% of miners work without any personal protective equipment (PPE).</p><p>Additionally, about 300,000 laborers have reportedly migrated to jade mining areas, and nearly half are estimated to use drugs. Drug trafficking has become widespread, and many workers struggle to escape cycles of addiction.</p><p>This vicious circle links the jade industry closely to Myanmar’s civil war. According to Global Witness, armed actors including the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) compete to control jade extraction, further fueling conflict.</p><p>At the same time, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that Myanmar’s opium economy is worth between $660 million and $2 billion. Since the 2021 military coup, these figures are believed to have increased.</p><p>According to UNODC’s 2022 survey, Myanmar had 40,100 hectares of opium cultivation, representing a 33% increase compared to 2021. Due to war and economic collapse, opium farming has become a survival strategy for many rural communities.</p><p>Research by Kevin M. Woods (2018) of the East-West Center shows that conflicts over resource-rich territories in Myanmar date back to the colonial era. Although many ethnic armed organizations signed ceasefire agreements in the late 1980s, these agreements did not address resource revenue sharing and therefore failed to resolve the conflict.</p><p>Research by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) also shows that armed groups in Myanmar finance their conflicts through revenues from jade, timber, drugs, agricultural products, taxation, and trade.</p><p>To address these problems, Anders Engvall of the Stockholm School of Economics suggests that legislation for resource revenue sharing and decentralization of power from the central government to regional authorities could help resolve Myanmar’s ethnic armed conflicts that have lasted for more than 70 years. However, without a viable political dialogue, such reforms remain far from reality.</p><p>An analysis by The Strategist notes that today, large amounts of illicit money from narcotics and gemstone industries are increasingly laundered through investments in real estate in cities such as Yangon and property markets in Thailand.</p><p>Nevertheless, international researchers argue that Myanmar’s resource curse is not an unsolvable problem. Recommendations from organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Global Witness emphasize three key solutions:</p><ol><li>Fair distribution of resource revenues to regions under a federal system</li><li>Transparency and accountability through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)</li><li>Recognition of local community rights over natural resources</li></ol><p>These issues must be incorporated into peace negotiations to address the root causes of Myanmar’s more than 70 years of conflict.</p><p>Otherwise, natural resources — rather than making citizens prosperous — will continue to fuel war, prolong conflict, and deepen the resource curse.</p><p>Source</p><p><a href="https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/.../the-shifting.../">https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/.../the-shifting.../</a></p><p><a href="https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/.../how-jade-trade">https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/.../how-jade-trade</a><a href="https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/post/how-jade-trade-between-myanmar-and-china-funds-violence?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExbHFVTUVkeXRFQkpzMUxvWnNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR47PffbfM8HbHtl5_h2pGVkmhzx6odwtLBLVatGosC6VSRuljWd5_Md4yc7jw_aem__b-_d-urTfygLJc9e323Nw">...</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-02171-9">https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-02171-9</a></p><p><a href="https://undark.org/.../01/myanmar-critical-minerals-mining/">https://undark.org/.../01/myanmar-critical-minerals-mining/</a></p><p><a href="https://globalwitness.org/en/regions/asia-pacific/myanmar/">https://globalwitness.org/en/regions/asia-pacific/myanmar/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/.../myanmar-militarys-lucrative">https://www.aljazeera.com/.../myanmar-militarys-lucrative</a>...</p><p><a href="https://www.npr.org/.../opium-farming-surges-in-myanmar">https://www.npr.org/.../opium-farming-surges-in-myanmar</a><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/26/1151622133/opium-farming-surges-in-myanmar-since-the-military-coup-the-u-n-says?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExbHFVTUVkeXRFQkpzMUxvWnNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR6x6-fRICSvgRLbLipnY-h4ARF2Y_xpEyLc69xk7RBnBHtM9Dbis2NcG-35ng_aem_GLZo3YT7EsZlJx7mq9_hsA">...</a></p><p><a href="https://www.eastwestcenter.org/.../in-myanmar-conflicts">https://www.eastwestcenter.org/.../in-myanmar-conflicts</a><a href="https://www.eastwestcenter.org/news/east-west-wire/in-myanmar-conflicts-over-land-and-natural-resources-block-the-peace?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExbHFVTUVkeXRFQkpzMUxvWnNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR4lX_RraO3jPfa9R7lksJGi9MvLPgdjJ-YVEJkXmP0ZecCNkDL7FfxGd8EP8w_aem_hj_UQx2-uJEhEC6bAVHFhQ">...</a></p><p><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/myanmars-desperate.../">https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/myanmars-desperate.../</a></p><p><a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/.../hoping-for-riches-jade">https://www.irrawaddy.com/.../hoping-for-riches-jade</a><a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/hoping-for-riches-jade-miners-instead-find-addiction.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExbHFVTUVkeXRFQkpzMUxvWnNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR4K5XDZblM2cVvUfChoTdXMB_7OitW5VD0ZE3y4mGxOdLKFUkSJgz6eCiVuJw_aem_RxRZrKX7voAdsbKJ4ncMrQ">...</a></p><p><a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/.../extracting-rare-earths.../">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/.../extracting-rare-earths.../</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e4b5642fbf4f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ နှင့် မလှပ သော ကိန်းဂဏန်းများ”]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%AC%E1%80%94%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%84%E1%80%B6-%E1%80%94%E1%80%BE%E1%80%84%E1%80%B7%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%99%E1%80%9C%E1%80%BE%E1%80%95-%E1%80%9E%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC-%E1%80%80%E1%80%AD%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%82%E1%80%8F%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%99%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8-77506880002e?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/77506880002e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2026 23:18:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-09T23:18:13.120Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1008/1*w989bxE--QcN6_WS84fE0A.png" /></figure><p><em>အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အချက်အလက်များသည် UNDP, World Bank နှင့် UNICEF တို့၏ အစီရင်ခံစာများကို အခြေခံသည်။</em></p><p>ပြီးခဲ့သည့် ၁၀ နှစ်တာကာလ နောက်ပိုင်း အာရှ-ပစိဖိတ်ဒေသ၏ အမြန်ဆုံးဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်နေသော စီးပွားရေးနိုင်ငံများထဲမှ တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ထင်ရှားခဲ့သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ ယခုအခါ ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှု၊ နိုင်ငံရေး မတည်မငြိမ်မှု၊ ရှည်ကြာသော ပြည်တွင်းစစ်ပွဲ နှင့် အဘက်ဘက်မှ ခက်ခဲကြပ်တည်းနေသော ပြည်သူများ၏ အခြေအနေကို မြင်နေရ၊ ကြားနေရသည်။</p><p>UNDP ၏ ၂၀၂၅ ခုနှစ် အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို “Polycrisis” — စီးပွားရေး၊ စစ်ဘေး၊ ရာသီဥတုဒဏ်၊ သဘာဝဘေးများ တပြိုင်နက်တည်း ဘေးဒဏ်များခံစားရကာ အကြပ်အတည်းများ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသော နိုင်ငံဟု ဖော်ပြထားသည်။</p><p>UNDP ၏ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် “Poverty and the Household Economy of Myanmar” အစီရင်ခံစာအရ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှုနှုန်းသည် ၂၀၁၇ ခုနှစ်က ၂၄.၈ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းမှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်တွင် ၄၉.၇ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသို့ — တစ်နှစ်တစ်နှစ် နီးပါး နှစ်ဆတိုး မြင့်တက်သွားခဲ့သည်။ ဆိုလိုသည်မှာ ပြည်သူ ၅ ဦးတွင် ၂ ဦးကျော်သည် တစ်နေ့ ဒေါ်လာ ၀.၇၆ ထက် နည်းသောငွေဖြင့် အသက်ရှင်နေကြရသည်။</p><p>ယခင်က လူဦးရေ၏ ၇၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းခန့်ဟာ အခြေခံလူတန်းစားများဖြစ်ကြပြီး ယခုအခါတွင် ၇၆ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသို့ တိုးမြှင့်လာခဲ့ပြီး ဒီအချက်သည်လူတန်းစား ကွာဟ မှုကို ကြုံတွေ့နေရကြောင်းထင်ရှားပါတယ်။</p><p>၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်မှ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း GDP သည် ၉ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ကျဆင်းသွားပြီး COVID မတိုင်မီနှင့် နှိုင်းယှဉ်လျှင် ဆင်းရဲသူ ၇ သန်း ပိုတိုးသွားကြောင်း ကမ္ဘာ့ဘဏ်က ခန့်မှန်းသည်။ ပြီးခဲ့သည့် ၁၀နှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာ့စီးပွားရေး တိုးတက်မှုကို သိသိသာသာ မြှင့်တက်စေခဲ့သည့် “အလယ်လတ်တန်းလူတန်းစား” သည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်မှ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း ၅၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ကျဆင်းသွားကြောင်း UNDP က ဖော်ပြသည်။</p><p>စီးပွားရေးတွင်လည်း မြန်မာ့ကျပ်ငွေသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်က ဒေါ်လာတစ်ဒေါ်လာလျှင် ၁,၃၃၀ ကျပ်မှ ၂၀၂၅ ခုနှစ်တွင် ၄,၅၂၀ ကျပ်သို့ ၃ ဆကျော် ကျဆင်းသွားသည်။ ဤငွေကြေးတန်ဖိုးကျဆင်းမှုကြောင့် တင်သွင်းကုန်များ ဈေးနှုန်းမြင့်မားကာ ပြည်ပသွင်းကုန်များဖြစ်သည့် ကင်ဆာဆေး၊ ဆီးချိုဆေးများပင် ပြည်သူများ စျေးကြီးပေးဝယ်ရခြင်း နှင့် တချို့သော ဒေသများတွင် ဆေးဝါးများကို အလွယ်တကူ မရနိုင်သောအခြေအနေဖြင့် ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့နေသည်။</p><p>ငွေကြေးဖောင်းပွမှုသည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဒုတိယသုံးလပတ်တွင် ၃၅ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသို့ တိုးမြှင့်လာခဲ့ရာ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် ၂၅.၄ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ဆက်လက်ကျန်ရှိနေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၁၉-၂၀ ခုနှစ်က ဒေါ်လာ ၅ ဘီလီယံကျော် ရှိခဲ့သော နိုင်ငံခြားတိုက်ရိုက်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုသည် ကုမ္ပဏီများထွက်ခွာမှုတို့ကြောင့် ၂၀၂၃-၂၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် ဒေါ်လာ ၆၆၂ သန်းသာ ကျန်တော့သည်။ ထို့အပြင် စစ်ဘောင်ပိုကျယ်လာခြင်း ကြောင့် ကုန်းလမ်းကြောင်း ကုန်သွယ်ရေးနှောင့်နှေးခြင်း၊ လမ်းပိတ်ခြင်းနှင့် ထိခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် ကျဆင်းကာ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ပထမဝက်တွင် ပို့ကုန်ပမာဏ ၁၃ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း နှင့် သွင်းကုန်ပမာဏ ၂၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ကျဆင်းသွားခဲ့သည်ဟု ကမ္ဘာ့ဘဏ်က ဖော်ပြသည်။</p><p>UNDP စစ်တမ်းအရ မိသားစုများ၏ ၇၅ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် ဒုတိယဝင်ငွေရင်းမြစ် ဆုံးရှုံးနေရဆဲဖြစ်ကာ လူအများစုသည် “negative coping mechanisms” များ ဥပမာ လိုအပ်သည့်ဆေးဝါးဝယ်ယူခြင်းထက် တရက်စာ စားဝတ်နေရေးကို ဦးစားပေးသုံးစွဲရခြင်း၊ လက်ဝယ်ထားရှိသော ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပစ္စည်းများကို ရောင်းချရခြင်း အစရှိသည့် နည်းလမ်းများကို လုပ်နေကြရတယ်။</p><p>ကျေးလက်ကဒေသများတွင် စစ်ပွဲကြောင့် လယ်ယာမြေများ ထွန်ယက် စိုက်ပျိုးခြင်း နှင့် လယ်ယာစိုက်ပျိုးရေး လုပ်ငန်းများ ကို မပြုလုပ်နိုင်တော့ပဲ တကိုယ်ရည် တကာယာ ဝမ်းစာ အတွက် အစာရေစာပင် ရှားပါးမှုနှင့် ကြုံတွေ့နေကြရသည်။ ဥပမာ စစ်ပွဲပြင်းထန်သောဒေသများဖြစ်သည့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ကယားပြည်နယ်နှင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီးတို့တွင် ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှု ပိုမိုနက်ရှိုင်းကြောင်း UNDP ၏ စစ်တမ်းများက ဖော်ပြသည်။</p><p>ကမ္ဘာ့ဘဏ်အစီရင်ခံစာအရ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ကနဦးပိုင်းတွင် ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှုနှုန်းသည် ၃၂ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီး ထပ်မံ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ပြည်သူများသည် “economically insecure” (စီးပွားရေးမတည်မငြိမ်) အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ခံနေကြရသည်။ ဆိုလိုသည်မှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်သူ ၂-၃ ဦးတို့သည်ငွေကြေးဖိစီးမှုနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေကြရကြောင်း ဖြစ်သည်။</p><p>ပညာရေးဘက်ကိုကြည့်မယ်ဆိုရင်လည်း UNICEF ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် အစီရင်ခံစာအရ ကျောင်းသင့်အရွယ် ကလေးများ၏ ၃၃ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် ကျောင်းများ ပိတ်ထားခြင်း၊ စစ်ဘေးများကြောင့် ကျောင်းမတက်နိုင်ဘဲ ရှိနေသေးသည်။ ၂၀၁၉-၂၀ ပညာသင်နှစ်တွင် ၉.၇ သန်းကျော် ကျောင်းသားဦးရေ မှတ်ပုံတင်ထားနိုင်ခဲ့ရာမှ ၂၀၂၅-၂၆ ပညာသင်နှစ်တွင် ၆.၁ သန်းသာ ကျန်ရှိတော့ကြောင်း မြန်မာ့ပညာရေးဆိုင်ရာ သုတေသနအဖွဲ့ ISP-Myanmar က ဖော်ပြထားတာလည်း တွေ့ရသည်။</p><p>ဤပညာရေးပြဿနာကို ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားစေသည်မှာ ဆရာ ဆရာမ များ၏ ၃၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) တွင် ပါဝင်ကာ ၎င်းတို့နေရာ ဖြည့်ဆည်းရန် ၀န်ထမ်းကျွမ်းကျင်မှု မလုံလောက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။</p><p>ထို့အပြင် စစ်ရေးပစ်မှတ်အဖြစ် ကျောင်းများ ကို တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများသည်လည်းရှိခဲ့ပြီး ၂၀၂၃-၂၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် ကျောင်း ၂၁၇ သည် တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရကာ ကျောင်း ၁၄၁ ကျောင်းကို စစ်ရေးအသုံးချနေကြောင်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အစီရင်ခံစာများက ဖော်ပြထားသည်။</p><p>UNDP ၏ စစ်တမ်းများအရ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဆင်းရဲသော မိသားစုများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ ဝင်ငွေ ၂ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသာ ပညာရေးအတွက် ကုန်ကျမည်ဟု ပင်ငြင်းနေကြပြီး ကလေးများ ကျောင်းမှ ထွက်ကာ မိသားစုဝင်ငွေ ကူညီသောအခြေအနေ ပိုများလာသည်ကို ကမ္ဘာ့ကလေးစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအဖွဲ့ UNICEF ကလည်း အတည်ပြုထားသည်။</p><p>UNICEF ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် အစီရင်ခံစာအရ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ပြည်တွင်းနေရပ်စွန့်ခွာသူ (IDP) ဦးရေသည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်ကတည်းမှ ၃၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကျော် တိုးမြင့်ကာ ၃.၅ သန်းကျော်သို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ဤ IDP များ၏ ၄၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် ကလေးများ ဖြစ်ကြသည်။ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် ကလေး ၆၅၀ ကျော်သည် စစ်ပွဲဒဏ်ကြောင့် ကွယ်လွန် သို့မဟုတ် ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးမှုခံနေကြရကြောင်း ဖော်ပြထားသည်။</p><p>စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၌ IDPs ၁.၆ သန်းကျော် ရှိနေပြီး အရှေ့တောင်ပိုင်း ကယားပြည်နယ်၊ ကရင်ပြည်နယ်များတွင်လည်း IDPs ၁ သန်းကျော် ရှိနေသည်။ ၎င်းနေရပ်စွန့်ခွာသူများသည် ကျောင်းပညာ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုနှင့် ၀မ်းစာ ဝင်ငွေများ ဆုံးရှုံးကာ IDP စခန်းများတွင် ရောဂါများ ပြန့်ပွားနိုင်ခြေ ပိုများသောအခြေအနေတွင် နေထိုင်ကြရသည်။</p><p>ပိုဆိုးတာက လူငယ်တွေမှာလည်း ဒီအကြပ်အတည်းဒဏ်တွေကို ခံစားနေရပြီး ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်တပ်မှ အတင်းအကြပ် စစ်မှုထမ်းဥပဒေ ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီး အသက် ၁၈ မှ ၃၅ နှစ်ကြား အမျိုးသားများနှင့် ၁၈ မှ ၂၇ နှစ်ကြား အမျိုးသမီးများ စစ်မှုထမ်းရမည်ဟု ဆိုသည်။ ကျန်းမာရေး၊ အင်ဂျင်နီယာ၊ နည်းပညာကျွမ်းကျင်သူများသည် ၄၅ နှစ်အထိ စစ်မှုထမ်းနိုင်သည်ဟုလည်း ပါဝင်သည်။ စစ်မှုထမ်းခြင်းမှ တိမ်းရှောင်သောသူများသည် ၃ မှ ၅ နှစ်ကြား ထောင်ဒဏ် ကျခံရမည်ဟု ဆိုသည်။ Burma Affairs &amp; Conflict Study အဖွဲ့ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ စစ်တမ်းအရ ကြေညာချက်ထွက်ပြီး ၂ လတာကာလအတွင်း အနည်းဆုံး လူငယ်ကျား ၁ သိန်းသည် စစ်မှုထမ်းခြင်းကို တိမ်းရှောင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြသည်။</p><p>ILO (နိုင်ငံတကာ အလုပ်သမားအဖွဲ့) ၏ ခန့်မှန်းချက်အရ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီမှ ယနေ့အထိ ထောင်နှင့်ချီသော လူငယ်များသည် စစ်မှုထမ်းခြင်းကို ရှောင်ရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ ထွက်ပြေးခဲ့ကြသည်။ ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံ ကုန်သွယ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန ၂၀၂၄ ဇူလိုင်လ ကောက်ကိန်းအရ မှတ်ပုံတင်ထားသော မြန်မာ အလုပ်သွားရောက်သူ ၂.၃ သန်းကျော် ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံတွင် ရှိနေပြီး မှတ်ပုံမတင်ထားသောသူ နှစ်သန်းကျော်ရှိနေသေးသည်ဟု ဆိုသည်။</p><p>UNDP ၏ Myanmar Youth Survey 2024 တွင် လူငယ် ၇,၁၈၇ ဦးကို စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခဲ့ပြီး ၄၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းနီးပါးသည် နိုင်ငံမှ ထွက်ခွာလိုကြောင်း ဖော်ပြသည်။ ထွက်ခွာလိုသောအကြောင်းရင်းများမှာ အလုပ်အကိုင် မရှိမှုနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးချို့တဲ့မှု (၇၄%)၊ စစ်ပွဲ (၂၂%)၊ အခွင့်အရေးမရှိမှု (၁၂%) တို့ ဖြစ်ကြသည်။ ပညာရည် မြင့်မားသော လူငယ် ၅၃ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် ပြည်ပသို့ ကူးပြောင်းသွားနိုင်ခြေ ပိုများကြောင်း UNDP ၏ အစီအရင်ခံစာအရ သိရသည်။</p><p>တဖက်တွင်လည်း စိတ်ကျန်းမာရေး ပြသနာဟာလည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအဖို့ ကြုံတွေ့ရတဲ့ ထပ်တိုးကိစ္စတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ UNDP ၏ “A Generation on Edge” (2025) အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် မြန်မာ့လူငယ် ၇ ဦးတွင် ၁ ဦး — ၂.၅ သန်းနီးပါး — သည် မိမိ၏ ကိုယ်ရေးလုံခြုံမှုကို နေ့ရက်တိုင်း ကြောက်ရွံ့ကာ နေထိုင်ကြရကြောင်း ဖော်ပြသည်။ ၄ ဦးတွင် ၁ ဦးကျော် (၆ သန်းကျော်) သည် ညဘက်တစ်ယောက်တည်း လမ်းမလျှောက်ရဲဘဲ ရှိနေကြသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် ကယားပြည်နယ်တွင် ၄၀ မှ ၆၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကြားသော လူငယ်များသည် မကြာခဏ စိတ်ပူပန်မှုနှင့် ဒဏ်ရာဆိုင်ရာ နာကျင်မှုများ ခံစားနေကြရကြောင်း ဖော်ပြသည်။</p><p>ဒေါက်တာ Zay Yar Swe (Burnet Institute Myanmar) ၏ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် နိုင်ငံတကာ ကျန်းမာရေးစနစ် သုတေသန ဆွေးနွေးပွဲတင်ဆက်မှုအရ “လူငယ် ၁၀၀ ဦးတွင် ၉၀ ဦးသည် မိသားစုဆိုင်ရာ ဖိစီးမှုကြောင့် စိတ်ဖိစီးနာကျင်မှု သို့မဟုတ် စိတ်ကျနေကြောင်း” လေ့လာဖတ်ရှုရတယ်။ စိတ်ကျန်းမာရေး ဆေးကုမှု မရရှိနိုင်သောကြောင့် မူးယစ်ဆေးဝါး၊ အရက်နှင့် ကိုယ်ကိုကိုယ် ထိခိုက်မှုများ ပိုများလာနေကြောင်းလည်း ထိုအစီရင်ခံစာ ဖော်ပြသည်။</p><p>PMC ဆေးပညာဂျာနယ်တွင် ထုတ်ဝေသော စစ်တမ်းတစ်ခုအရ ၂၀၂၃-၂၄ စစ်တမ်းကာလ မြန်မာ့ဆယ်ကျော်သက် မိန်းကလေးနှင့် အမျိုးသမီးငယ် ၉၄.၄ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် စိတ်ကျရောဂါ လက္ခဏာ အနည်းဆုံး တစ်ခုကို ခံစားနေကြောင်း ဖော်ပြသည်။ ၇၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းနီးပါးသည် ညဘက် အိပ်မပျော်နိုင်ဘဲ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးနေကြောင်းလည်း ဖော်ပြသည်။</p><p>ကမ္ဘာ့ဘဏ်အဆိုအရ ပညာရေး နှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးဆိုင်ရာ များတွင် ဆက်တိုက် ပြိုလဲပျက်စီးမှုများနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှပ်နှံမှု အားနည်းခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် နောက်လာမည့် ၅-၁၀ နှစ်အတွင်း လူသားအရင်းအမြစ် ကို ပိုမိုထိခိုက်လာနိုင်ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြထားတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။</p><p>အစီအရင်ခံစာအရ ကိန်းဂဏန်းများကို အခြေခံထားသော်လည်း တကယ်တမ်းတွင် မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းမှာရှိတဲ့ ပြည်သူတွေရဲ့ အခက်အခဲများဟာ ထိုအစီအရင်ခံစာများထက်ပင် ပိုဆိုးနိုင်ပါတယ်။</p><p>Source</p><p><a href="https://www.undp.org/.../poverty-and-household-economy">https://www.undp.org/.../poverty-and-household-economy</a>...</p><p><a href="https://www.undp.org/.../myanmars-enduring-polycrisis">https://www.undp.org/.../myanmars-enduring-polycrisis</a>...</p><p><a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/.../MEM-JUNE-2024">https://thedocs.worldbank.org/.../MEM-JUNE-2024</a>...</p><p><a href="https://ispmyanmar.com/sb-002/">https://ispmyanmar.com/sb-002/</a></p><p><a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12082879/">https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12082879/</a></p><p><a href="https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/.../myanmars-youth-at">https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/.../myanmars-youth-at</a><a href="https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2025/01/31/myanmars-youth-at-risk-the-juntas-intensified-forced-conscription-campaign?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExNHRzbWxJcHJsdWhzSUxGM3NydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR6d0ZiEe8O_15q3gKwOY3uyh1_Hv5mUo8JgPPDYiDVrGiwqgz8ZNvdi44kExA_aem_7gky0bfGzG52nL1HR6359Q">...</a></p><p>Photo — UNDP</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=77506880002e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Myth of the “ASEAN Way”]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/the-myth-of-the-asean-way-557e3721c0eb?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/557e3721c0eb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asean]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 23:14:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-09T23:14:10.181Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Ghost of Bangkok, 1967</h3><p>To understand why Southeast Asia failed Myanmar in 2021, we must go back to a golf course in Bangkok in 1967.</p><p>The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was not born out of a desire for human rights, democracy, or economic integration. It was born out of fear. Five men — the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand — gathered in a secluded resort to sign the Bangkok Declaration. Outside, the Vietnam War was raging. Communist insurgencies were bubbling in the jungles of Malaya and Thailand. The Cultural Revolution was convulsing China.</p><p>These five nations were young, fragile, and terrified. They had just emerged from colonialism and were deeply suspicious of one another. Indonesia had recently ended a low-level war (<em>Konfrontasi</em>) against Malaysia. The Philippines laid claim to parts of Malaysian Borneo. Singapore had been unceremoniously kicked out of Malaysia just two years prior.</p><p>They needed a shield. They needed a way to stop fighting each other so they could focus on fighting communism and building their economies. And so, they invented a diplomatic protocol that would become their greatest strength and, fifty-four years later, their fatal weakness: <strong>The ASEAN Way.</strong></p><p>The core tenets were simple: <em>Musyawarah</em> (consultation) and <em>Mufakat</em> (consensus). No decisions would be made by voting; everyone had to agree. And above all, the golden rule: <strong>Non-Interference</strong>. What happens inside your borders is your business. You can be a democracy, a military junta, a sultanate, or a communist state (eventually) — as long as you don’t invade your neighbor, you are welcome at the table.</p><p>For decades, this “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy worked. It kept the peace. It allowed the “Asian Tigers” to roar economically without political baggage. But when the tanks rolled into Naypyidaw on February 1, 2021, the ASEAN Way stopped being a shield and became a cage. The tool designed to prevent conflict between states was useless against a conflict <em>within</em> a state.</p><h3>The Architecture of Silence: Non-Interference as a Shield</h3><p>The “ASEAN Way” is often romanticized by regional diplomats as a uniquely “Asian” form of conflict resolution — subtle, face-saving, and quiet. In reality, it is a cartel of sovereignty.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*orl2AUCaGyY_9FqM" /></figure><p>Look at the map. The disparity is staggering. You have Indonesia (a boisterous G20 democracy), Vietnam (a rigid communist one-party state), Thailand (a monarchy with a history of coups), and Brunei (an absolute Islamic sultanate). The only way to keep these countries in the same room is to agree to never talk about politics.</p><p>For Myanmar, this was the perfect cover.</p><p>When Myanmar was admitted to ASEAN in 1997, despite heavy Western protests, the argument was “Constructive Engagement.” The logic went: <em>If we hug them close, trade with them, and invite their generals to golf retreats, they will eventually soften. Isolation makes them harder; integration will make them liberal.</em></p><p>It was a seductive theory. It was also completely wrong.</p><p>The military junta (then the SPDC) didn’t see ASEAN membership as a path to reform; they saw it as a path to legitimacy. They used ASEAN meetings to shake hands with world leaders who would otherwise shun them. They used the bloc as a diplomatic shield against UN resolutions. Whenever the West threatened sanctions, Myanmar could hide behind ASEAN’s skirt, claiming that “regional solutions” were superior to “Western interference.”</p><p>The ASEAN Way became a license for impunity. It allowed the Tatmadaw to burn villages in the morning and attend a state banquet in the evening, secure in the knowledge that their neighbors were contractually obligated to smile and say nothing.</p><h3>The Consensus Trap: The Veto of the One</h3><p>The most paralyzing feature of the ASEAN Way is the consensus model. In the European Union or the United Nations, decisions can be made by majority vote. If Hungary disagrees with the EU, the other 26 members can often proceed (with some exceptions).</p><p>In ASEAN, it is 10 all or nothing.</p><p>This means that the country committing the crime has a veto over the punishment. Imagine a court where the murderer is on the jury. That is ASEAN.</p><p>When the 2021 coup happened, the limitations of this model were exposed in humiliating fashion.</p><ul><li><strong>Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore</strong> immediately issued strong statements condemning the violence and calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.</li><li><strong>Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam</strong> called it an “internal matter.”</li></ul><p>Because of the consensus rule, ASEAN could not issue a joint statement condemning the coup. They could not suspend Myanmar’s membership. They could not impose sanctions. Any strong action required the signature of the Myanmar representative — who was now appointed by the very general who launched the coup.</p><p>This reduced ASEAN to the lowest common denominator. The statements that did emerge were watered-down masterpieces of diplomatic gibberish, calling for “restraint on all sides” — a phrase that infuriated the Myanmar public, who were being shot by snipers while unarmed.</p><h3>Case Study: The Cyclone Nargis Precedent</h3><p>To understand why the world expected more from ASEAN in 2021, we have to look at the one time the bloc actually worked: Cyclone Nargis in 2008.</p><p>When the cyclone struck the Irrawaddy Delta, killing 140,000 people, the then-junta (under General Than Shwe) blocked international aid. They feared that US and French warships carrying relief supplies were a prelude to an invasion. People were dying of exposure and disease while food sat on the tarmac in Bangkok.</p><p>ASEAN stepped in. Led by the charismatic Surin Pitsuwan (then Secretary-General), ASEAN framed the intervention not as “political interference” but as “humanitarian assistance.” They convinced the paranoid generals that accepting aid via ASEAN — an “Asian” face — was safe. The “Tripartite Core Group” (ASEAN, UN, Myanmar Government) was formed, and the aid flowed.</p><p>This success created a false hope. Diplomats and researchers convinced themselves that ASEAN had evolved; that it could now handle complex crises.</p><p>But Nargis was a natural disaster. The 2021 coup was a man-made disaster. In 2008, the enemy was the wind and the rain. In 2021, the enemy was the state itself. The “ASEAN Way” could handle a hurricane; it could not handle a general who was willing to burn down his own country to stay in power.</p><h3>The Credibility Cliff: Irrelevance in the Indo-Pacific</h3><p>The tragedy of the ASEAN Way is that it is destroying the very thing ASEAN craves most: <strong>Centrality</strong>.</p><p>For decades, ASEAN has positioned itself as the driver’s seat of the Indo-Pacific. It hosts the big summits (the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum) where the US President, the Chinese Premier, and the Russian President all show up. The unspoken deal is: <em>ASEAN provides the neutral venue, and the superpowers agree not to force us to choose sides.</em></p><p>But neutrality requires competence. If you claim to be the driver, you have to keep the car on the road.</p><p>The Myanmar crisis proved that ASEAN is not driving; it is merely a passenger in its own vehicle. As the civil war escalated, the US and China began bypassing ASEAN entirely. Washington imposed its own sanctions. Beijing opened its own backchannels to the ethnic armies. Russia started shipping arms directly to Naypyidaw.</p><p>The “ASEAN Centrality” slogan began to sound like a bad joke. How could a bloc that couldn’t even manage a conflict in its own backyard hope to manage the rivalry between Washington and Beijing?</p><h3>The Shield Becomes a Shroud</h3><p>By mid-2021, the “ASEAN Way” had become a grim euphemism for inaction. While diplomats in Jakarta debated the wording of statements, bodies were piling up in the morgues of Yangon.</p><p>The organization faced an existential choice. It could stick to its founding principles and watch Myanmar become a failed state, dragging the region’s reputation down with it. Or, it could break its own rules, intervene, and try to force a solution.</p><p>They tried to find a middle path. They called it the “Five-Point Consensus.” It was meant to be a breakthrough. It turned out to be a trap.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=557e3721c0eb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ကမ္ဘာ့လူဦးရေအများဆုံး တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတ နိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်တည်လာဖို့ ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သူ သမိုင်းထဲက…]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/%E1%80%80%E1%80%99%E1%80%B9%E1%80%98%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B7%E1%80%9C%E1%80%B0%E1%80%A6%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9B%E1%80%B1%E1%80%A1%E1%80%99%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%86%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B6%E1%80%B8-%E1%80%90%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AF%E1%80%90%E1%80%BA%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9E%E1%80%B0%E1%80%B7%E1%80%9E%E1%80%99%E1%80%B9%E1%80%99%E1%80%90-%E1%80%94%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%84%E1%80%B6-%E1%80%96%E1%80%BC%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AC%E1%80%96%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%80%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%99%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%81%E1%80%B2%E1%80%B7%E1%80%9E%E1%80%B0-%E1%80%9E%E1%80%99%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%91%E1%80%B2%E1%80%80-f03b6e62ec9a?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f03b6e62ec9a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[histoty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:25:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-15T19:25:16.212Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SZJfBYX4-enxVKTT" /><figcaption>Kublai Khan. (Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><h3>ကမ္ဘာ့လူဦးရေအများဆုံး တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတ နိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်တည်လာဖို့ ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သူ သမိုင်းထဲက တရုတ်ခေါင်းဆောင် (၅) ဦး</h3><p>၁။ ချင်းရှီဟွမ် (၂၂၁–၂၁၀ ဘီစီ)<br>ဘီစီ ၂၂၁ တွင် Qin လူမျိုးများသည် အနောက်ဘက်မှ ထွက်လာကာ ပြိုင်ဘက်ပြည်ထောင်စုများအား စစ်ရေးအားဖြင့် အနိုင်ယူပြီး တရုတ်နိုင်ငံကို ပေါင်းစည်းခဲ့သည်။ သူတို့၏ ခေါင်းဆောင်သည် ကိုယ်တိုင်ကို ချင်းရှီဟွမ် (Qin နိုင်ငံ ပထမဆုံး မင်း) ဟု ကြေညာကာ၊ မြေရှင်ပဒေသရဇ်များ၏ မြေယာများကို သိမ်းယူကာ ပြင်းထန်သော ဗဟိုပြုအစိုးရတစ်ခုကို တည်ထောင်ခဲ့သည်။ သူသည် အလေးချိန်နှင့် တိုင်းတာမှုများ၊ ငွေကြေးနှင့် စာရေးပုံစံများကို စံချိန်စံညွှန်းသတ်မှတ်ကာ နန်းတော်များစွာ၊ ပြည်နယ်များနှင့် မြို့တော်ကို ချိတ်ဆက်သည့် မိုင်ထောင်ချီ လမ်းများနှင့် ထင်ရှားသော တရုတ်မဟာ တံတားကြီးဖြစ်သည့် The Great Wall ကို စတင်ရန် ပထမဆုံး ဦးဆောင်သူလည်းဖြစ်သည်။</p><p>ချင်းရှီဟွမ် အနေဖြင့် လူသားများသည် သဘာဝအားဖြင့် မကောင်းကြ၍ စည်းကမ်းမရှိကြောင်း ယုံကြည်သည့် ဥပဒေဝါဒကို ယုံကြည်သူဖြစ်သောကြောင့် သူ၏ အမြင်များကို ဆန့်ကျင်ထင်မြင်ချက်များကို လက်မခံခဲ့ပေ။</p><p>ဘီစီ ၂၁၃ တွင် Daoist၊ ကွန်ဖြူးရှားနှင့် အခြား တရားဝင်မဟုတ်သော စာအုပ်များအားလုံးကို မီးရှို့ခဲ့ပြီး နောက်နှစ်အနည်းငယ်အကြာ တရားဝင်ခန့်အပ်ထားခြင်းမဟုတ်သော ပညာရှင်ပေါင်း ၄၆၀ ခန့်ကို အရှင်လတ်လတ် မြေမြှုပ် ခဲ့သည်။ ချင်းရှီဟွမ်သည် ဘီစီ ၂၁၀ ခန့်တွင် ကွယ်လွန်ခဲ့ပြီး သူ့ကို အသက်ရှည်စေမည်ဟု မှားယွင်းယုံကြည်သဖြင့် ပြဒါးရည်များ အလွန်ကျွံသောက်ခဲ့ပြီး သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။</p><p>သူသေသောအခါ သူနှင့်အတူတူ လူအရွယ်အစားတူ စစ်သားပုံစံများ သန်းပေါင်းများစွာနှင့်အတူ သင်္ဂြိုဟ်ထဲတွင် မြုပ်နှံခံခဲ့ပြီး၊ ထိုပုံစံများကို ၁၉၇၀ ပြည့်နှစ်များအထိ မတွေ့ရှိခဲ့ပါ။ တစ်ဖက်တွင်တော့ ချင်းမင်းဆက်သည် ချင်းရှီဟွမ်သေဆုံးပြီး ၄ နှစ်အကြာတွင် ပြိုလဲကာ ကွန်ဖြူးရှပ်စ် ဝါဒ ကို ထောက်ခံသည့် ဟန်မင်းဆက် တက်လာခဲ့သည်။</p><p>၂။ ကူဘလိုင်ခမ်း (၁၂၇၉-၁၂၉၄)</p><p>မွန်ဂိုခေါင်းဆောင် ဂျင်ဂစ်ခန်သည် ၁၂၀၆ ခုနှစ်တွင် မွန်ဂိုလီးယားကုန်းပြင်မြင့်ရှိ လှည့်လည်သွားလာနေထိုင်သော လူမျိုးစုများကို စုစည်းပြီးသည်နှင့် ချက်ချင်းဆိုသလိုပင် ယနေ့ခေတ် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသို့ ဝင်ရောက်စီးနင်းမှုများ စတင်ခဲ့သည်။ သူ၏မြေးဖြစ်သူ ကူဘလိုင်ခမ်း သည် ၁၂၇၉ ခုနှစ်တွင် အောင်ပွဲကို အပြီးသတ်ခဲ့ပြီး တရုတ်နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းကို ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်အဖြစ် နိုင်ငံခြားအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအောက်သို့ ပို့ဆောင်ခဲ့သည်။ ယွမ်မင်းဆက်ကို တည်ထောင်ခဲ့သော ကူဘလိုင်သည် တရုတ်လူမျိုးများကို တရားဝင်အားဖြင့် နိမ့်ကျသည်ဟု ယူဆပြီး ဗင်းနစ်ကုန်သည် မာကိုပိုလိုကဲ့သို့သော ပြင်ပလူများကို စုဆောင်းကာ နိုင်ငံတော်ကို အုပ်ချုပ်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>သို့သော် ကူဘလိုင်သည် လူထု၏ ထောက်ခံမှုကို ရရှိရန်၊ စစ်ပွဲ၏ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို ပြုပြင်ရန်၊ သူ၏ရှေ့မှောက်တော်၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော ပြစ်ဒဏ်ဥပဒေကို ဖြေလျှော့ရန်၊ အနုပညာကို မြှင့်တင်ရန်နှင့် ထိရောက်သော မွန်ဂိုလီးယား စာတိုက်စနစ်ကို တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသို့ တိုးချဲ့ရန်လည်း ကြိုးစားခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အပြင် သူသည် ကွယ်လွန်ပြီးနောက် သူ၏ဘိုးဘေးများအား တရုတ်အမည်များ ပေးခဲ့ပြီး ယခု ပေကျင်းဟုခေါ်သောနေရာတွင် တရုတ်ပုံစံ ဧကရာဇ်မြို့တော်ကို တည်ဆောက်ခဲ့သည်။ စိတ်ကျရောဂါနှင့် ဂေါက်ရောဂါ၊ အဝလွန်ရောဂါ ခံစားနေရသော်လည်း ကူဘလိုင်သည် ၁၂၉၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် ကွယ်လွန်သည်အထိ အာဏာကို ခိုင်မာစွာ ဆုပ်ကိုင်ထားခဲ့သည်။ မွန်ဂိုအင်ပါယာသည် မကြာမီ ပြိုကွဲလာပြီး ၁၃၆၈ ခုနှစ်တွင် ယွမ်မင်းဆက်ကို ဖြုတ်ချခဲ့သည်။</p><p>၃။ ဆွန်ယက်ဆင် (၁၉၁၂)</p><p>တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသည် ၁၉ ရာစုတွင် စစ်ပွဲများစွာ ရှုံးနိမ့်ခဲ့ပြီး ဗြိတိန်၊ ရုရှားနှင့် ဂျပန်တို့အား နယ်မြေပိုင်ဆိုင်မှု လိုက်လျောမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ရသည်။ ဤအရှက်ရမှုများနှင့်အတူ ၎င်းတို့၏နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှု၏ တစ်ဝက်တစ်ပျက် အရှိန်အဟုန်ကြောင့် ဆွန်ယက်ဆင်အမည်ရှိ ဆရာဝန်တစ်ဦးသည် လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးကို စတင်ကြံစည်ခဲ့သည်။ ဆွန်သည် အုပ်ချုပ်နေသော ချင်းမင်းဆက်ကို အမျိုးသားရေးဝါဒ၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် လူမှုရေးကောင်းကျိုးချမ်းသာမှုဆိုင်ရာ မူများအပေါ် အခြေခံသည့် အစိုးရဖြင့် အစားထိုးရန် မျှော်လင့်ခဲ့သည်။ ၁၈၉၅ ခုနှစ်တွင် သူ၏ ပထမဆုံးအုံကြွမှု မအောင်မြင်သောအခါ ငွေရှာရန်နှင့် ထောက်ခံသူများကို ရရှိရန် ပြည်ပသို့ ထွက်ပြေးခဲ့သည်။ နောက်ထပ်အုံကြွမှုများစွာ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပြီး၊ နောက်ဆုံးအုံကြွမှုမှာ ၁၉၁၂ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် တရုတ်သမ္မတနိုင်ငံကို တည်ထောင်ခဲ့ပြီး ဆွန်အား ယာယီသမ္မတအဖြစ် ခန့်အပ်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>သို့သော် တော်လှန်ရေးသမားများသည် စစ်ရေးအရ အားနည်းနေသောကြောင့် ဆွန်သည် တရုတ်ဧကရာဇ်၏ နန်းစွန့်မှုအတွက် နောက်လတွင် ရာထူးမှ နုတ်ထွက်ရန် သဘောတူခဲ့သည်။ နှစ်ပေါင်း ၂၀၀၀ ကျော် အင်ပါယာအုပ်ချုပ်မှုကို အဆုံးသတ်စေသည့် သဘောတူညီချက်၏ တစ်စိတ်တစ်ပိုင်းအနေဖြင့် ချင်းစစ်ဦးစီးချုပ်ဟောင်း ယွမ်ရှီကိုင်သည် သမ္မတဖြစ်လာခဲ့သည်။ ထို့နောက် ယွမ်သည် ရီပတ်ဘလီကန်ဝါဒကို သစ္စာဖောက်ကာ အကန့်အသတ်မရှိ အာဏာကို ဆုပ်ကိုင်ကာ စစ်ဘုရင်များ လွှမ်းမိုးသော ခေတ်တစ်ခုကို ဖွင့်လှစ်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ဆွန်သည် လက်မလျှော့ဘဲ ၎င်း၏ ထောက်ခံသူများကို အမျိုးသားရေးပါတီအလံအောက်တွင် စုစည်းပြီး နောက်ပိုင်းတွင် ဆိုဗီယက်ယူနီယံနှင့် မဟာမိတ်ဖွဲ့ခဲ့သော်လည်း ၁၉၂၅ ခုနှစ်တွင် သူ၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်ကို အကောင်အထည်မပေါ်ဘဲ ကွယ်လွန်သွားခဲ့သည်။</p><p>၄။ မော်စီတုန်း (၁၉၄၉-၁၉၇၆)<br>တရုတ်ကွန်မြူနစ်ပါတီ၏ တည်ထောင်သူအဖွဲ့ဝင်တစ်ဦးဖြစ်သည့် မော်စီတုန်းသည် စက်မှုလုပ်သားများအပေါ် မှီခိုမည့်အစား လယ်သမားများ၏ “တပ်နီတော်” ကို တည်ဆောက်ခြင်းဖြင့် မာ့က်စ်-လီနင်ဝါဒအတွေးအခေါ်ကို ချိုးဖျက်ခဲ့သည်။ ၁၉၂၇ ခုနှစ်တွင် ကွန်မြူနစ်များနှင့် အမျိုးသားရေးဝါဒီများအကြား ပြည်တွင်းစစ်ဖြစ်ပွားပြီးနောက် ကျေးလက်ဒေသမှ ပြောက်ကျားစစ်ဆင်ရေးတစ်ခုကို တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ပြီး မိုင် ၆၀၀၀ ခန့်ကို စနစ်တကျဆုတ်ခွာရန် ဦးဆောင်ခဲ့ခြင်းအတွက် ကျော်ကြားမှုနှင့် ပါတီအပေါ် ဦးဆောင်မှုကို ရရှိခဲ့သည်။ ၁၉၃၀ ပြည့်လွန်နှစ်များနှောင်းပိုင်းတွင် ဂျပန်တပ်ဖွဲ့များကို ကျူးကျော်ရန် နှစ်ဖက်ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သော်လည်း ဒုတိယကမ္ဘာစစ်အပြီးတွင် ၎င်းတို့သည် မတူညီသည့် အယူအဆများကြောင့် နောက်ဆုံးတွင် ၁၉၄၉ ခုနှစ်တွင် အမျိုးသားရေးဝါဒီများသည် ထိုင်ဝမ်သို့ ဆုတ်ခွာခဲ့ပြီး မော်စီတုန်းသည် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံကို ကြေငြာခဲ့သည်။</p><p>ချက်ချင်းပင် မော်စီတုန်းသည် တန်ပြန်တော်လှန်ရေးသမား သိန်းနှင့်ချီကို ဖယ်ရှားခဲ့ပြီး လယ်သမားများထံ မြေယာပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေပေးခဲ့ပြီး တိဘက်ကို တောင်းဆိုခဲ့ပြီး ကိုရီးယားတွင် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုကို တိုက်ခိုက်ရန် တပ်ဖွဲ့များကို ကတိပြုခဲ့သည်။ ထို့နောက် သူသည် စိုက်ပျိုးရေးနှင့် စက်မှုထွက်ကုန်များ တိုးမြှင့်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုတွင် ရွာသားများကို ကွန်မြူနတီများသို့ အတင်းအကျပ်ပြောင်းရွှေ့စေသည့် မဟာဗျူဟာ အစီအစဉ်ကို ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခဲ့သည်။ ထိုမဟာဗျူဟာမှာ မအောင်မြင်ခဲ့သဖြင့် ၁၉၅၈ မှ ၁၉၆၂ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း လူပေါင်း ၄၅ သန်းအထိ သေဆုံးခဲ့သော အစာရေစာငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးမှု ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သည်။ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုတော်လှန်ရေး (၁၉၆၆-၁၉၇၆) ကာလအတွင်း နောက်ထပ် ၁.၅ သန်းခန့် သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး Red Guards ဟုခေါ်သော လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့များသည် ပညာတတ်များနှင့် အခြားအစိုးရ၏ ရန်သူများဟု ယူဆရသူများကို လိုက်လံရှာဖွေခဲ့ကြသည်။ မော်သည် ၁၉၇၆ ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာလတွင် ကွယ်လွန်သည်အထိ ခေါင်းဆောင်အဖြစ် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>၅။ တိန့်ရှောင်ဖိန် (၁၉၇၈-၁၉၈၉)<br>တိန့်ရှောင်ဖိန် သည် ၁၉၅၀ ပြည့်လွန်နှစ်များတွင် မော်၏ အတွင်းလူအဖွဲ့သို့ ဝင်ရောက်ခဲ့ပြီး ယဉ်ကျေးမှုတော်လှန်ရေးအတွင်း နှင်ထုတ်ခံခဲ့ရပြီး ထွန်စက်ပြင်ရုံတွင် အလုပ်ခိုင်းစေခံခဲ့ရသည်။ သူ၏ ပထမဆုံး နိုင်ငံရေးပြန်လာမှုသည် မော် ကွယ်လွန်ချိန်မတိုင်မီတွင် အဆုံးသတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ရာထူးမှ ထပ်မံဖယ်ရှားခံခဲ့ရသည်။ သို့သော် ဒုတိယအကြိမ် နိုင်ငံရေးပြန်လာမှုသည် ၁၉၇၈ ခုနှစ်တွင် မော်ရွေးချယ်ထားသော ဆက်ခံသူကို ပရိယာယ်ထက်ကျော်လွန်၍ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ “အထွတ်အထိပ်” ခေါင်းဆောင်ဖြစ်လာသောအခါ ပိုမိုကြာရှည်ခံကြောင်း သက်သေပြခဲ့သည်။</p><p>အာဏာရပြီးသည်နှင့် တိန့်သည် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုနှင့် ဆက်ဆံရေးကို ပုံမှန်ဖြစ်အောင် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး ဗြိတိသျှထံမှ ဟောင်ကောင်ကို ပြန်လည်ရယူရန် ညှိနှိုင်းခဲ့ပြီး လွတ်လပ်သောဈေးကွက်ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများစွာကို မိတ်ဆက်ခဲ့သည်။ ဥပမာအားဖြင့် သူသည် စိုက်ပျိုးရေးသမဝါယမများကို ဖျက်သိမ်းခဲ့ပြီး နိုင်ငံခြားရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုကို အားပေးခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော် စီးပွားရေးနှင့် ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ရေးလွတ်လပ်ခွင့်များ တိုးလာမှုသည် နိုင်ငံရေးနယ်ပယ်သို့ မရောက်ရှိခဲ့ပေ။ ၁၉၈၉ ခုနှစ် ဇွန်လတွင် တိန့်သည် ပေကျင်းရှိ တီယန်နန်မင်ရင်ပြင်တွင် စုဝေးနေသော ဒီမိုကရေစီလိုလားသူ ဆန္ဒပြသူထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာကို ပစ်ခတ်ရန် တပ်များကို အမိန့်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ထိုနှစ်နှောင်းပိုင်းတွင် တရားဝင်အငြိမ်းစားယူခဲ့သော်လည်း ၁၉၉၇ ခုနှစ်တွင် ကွယ်လွန်ချိန်အထိ ၎င်းသည် နောင်နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ ဩဇာအရှိဆုံး နိုင်ငံသားအဖြစ် ရှိနေခဲ့သည်။</p><p>Kublai Khan. (Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f03b6e62ec9a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[မဟတ္တမ ဂန္ဒီ လုပ်ကြံခံရခြင်း]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/%E1%80%99%E1%80%9F%E1%80%90%E1%80%B9%E1%80%90%E1%80%99-%E1%80%82%E1%80%94%E1%80%B9%E1%80%92%E1%80%AE-%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AF%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80%E1%80%BC%E1%80%B6%E1%80%81%E1%80%B6%E1%80%9B%E1%80%81%E1%80%BC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8-3f14743e38dd?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3f14743e38dd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gandhi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 17:18:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-13T17:18:57.041Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*77a_i1M2xuCTGrZ_" /><figcaption>Photo — ARUN SANKAR/AFP via Getty Images</figcaption></figure><p>မိုဟန်ဒတ်စ် ကာရမ်ချန့် ဂန္ဒီသည် “အိန္ဒိယ၏ ကြီးမြတ်သော ဝိညာဉ်” ဟု လူသိများသော စိတ်ဓာတ်ခေါင်းဆောင်နှင့် အိန္ဒိယလွတ်လပ်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှု၏ ဦးဆောင်သူတစ်ဦးဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီ ၃၀ ရက်တွင် အသက် ၇၈ နှစ်အရွယ်ရှိစဉ် သတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရသည်။ ဟိန္ဒူ အကြမ်းဖက်သမား နာသူရမ် ဂေါဒ်ဆေးက နယူးဒယ်လီမြို့၌ ဆုတောင်းပွဲတစ်ခုအတွင်း ပစ်ခတ်သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး၊ ဂန္ဒီ၏ အကြမ်းမဖက် အာဏာဆန့်ကျင်ရေးနည်းဗျူဟာများသည် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များအား လှုံ့ဆော်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>၁၈၆၉ ခုနှစ် အောက်တိုဘာ ၂ ရက်နေ့တွင် မွေးဖွားခဲ့ပြီး သက္ကတဘာသာစကားဖြင့် “မဟာတမ” (“ကြီးမားသော စိတ်ဓာတ်”) ဟု ခေါ်ဆိုခံရသော ဂန္ဒီသည် ၅၀ နှစ်ခန့်ကြာ ဗြိတိသျှအင်္ဂလန်မှ အိန္ဒိယလွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်သူ့ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးဆန္ဒပြပွဲများ (အစာငတ်ခံခြင်း၊ ကုန်ပစ္စည်းများအားပေးခြင်းကို သပိတ်မှောက်ခြင်း နှင့် အကြမ်းမဖက်ဆန္ဒပြခြင်းများ) ကို လက်တွေ့ကျင့်သုံးခဲ့သည်။</p><p>သူသည် satyagraha (“အမှန်တရားစွမ်းအား”) ကို လက်ခံကျင့်သုံးသူဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ၎င်းကို “အင်အားအကောင်းဆုံးသော လက်နက်ဖြစ်ကာ မည်သည့်ပုံစံမဆို အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကို အသုံးပြုဘဲ ဆန့်ကျင်နိုင်သည်” ဟု သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>သူ၏ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများကြောင့် အကြိမ်ကြိမ် ဖမ်းဆီးထောင်ချခံခဲ့ရသော်လည်း၊ ဂန္ဒီသည် ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်တွင် ဗြိတိသျှတို့က အိန္ဒိယကို လွတ်လပ်သော နိုင်ငံနှစ်ခုဖြစ်သည့် အိန္ဒိယနှင့် ပါကစ္စတန်သို့ ခွဲထုတ်ပေးခဲ့ခြင်းကို ကြိုဆိုခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော် ထိုခွဲထွက်မှုကြောင့် ဟိန္ဒူးနှင့် မူဆလင်တို့အကြား အကြမ်းဖက်ဘာသာရေးစစ်ပွဲဖြစ်ပွားကာ လူဦးရေ ၁၅ သန်းကျော် အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်ပြီး လူပေါင်း ၂ သန်းခန့် သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။</p><p>ဟိန္ဒူ နှင့် မူဆလင်တို့အကြား ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတောင်းဆိုရန် ဂန္ဒီသည် နယူးဒယ်လီသို့ ခရီးထွက်ကာ အစာငတ်ခံ ဆန္ဒပြခြင်း နှင့် ဆုတောင်းအစည်းအဝေးများတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုနေရာ၌ ဂေါဒ်ဆေးက ဂန္ဒီအား ဝမ်းနှင့် ရင်ဘတ်ပေါ်တွင် အနီးကပ်ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ပြီး၊ ဂန္ဒီ၏ “လမ်းလျှောက်တံများ” ဟု ခေါ်ဆိုကြသည့် သမီးမြေးများသည် သူ့ဘေးတွင် ရပ်နေခဲ့ကြသည်။ မကြာမီတွင် သူသည် သေဆုံးကြောင်း ကြေညာခဲ့ရသည်။</p><p>Gandhi Research Foundation အဆိုအရ ခန့်မှန်း ၂၀ ဦးခန့်ရှိသော ရိုးရိုးဝတ်စုံဝတ်ရဲများအပါအဝင် လူစုလူဝေးတစ်စုသည် ခေါင်းဆောင်နှင့်အတူ ဆုတောင်းပွဲတွင် ပါဝင်ရန် စုပေါင်းခဲ့ကြသည်။</p><p>“တတိယပစ်ခတ်မှုကျရောက်ချိန်တွင် ဂန္ဒီသည် မျက်နှာချင်းဆိုင် ဆုတောင်းလက်နှစ်ဖက်ကို ဆက်လက်ကိုင်ထား ရပ်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ‘ဟာ ရမ်၊ ဟာ ရမ်’ (‘အို ဘုရား၊ အို ဘုရား’) ဟု အသက်ရှူခက်ခဲစွာ ပြောကြားသံကို ကြားရသည်” ဟု အဖွဲ့အစည်းက ရေးသားထားသည်။ ထို့နောက် သူသည် နောက်ဆုံးအဖြစ် အဟင်ဆာ (ahimsa) ၏ အဓိကသဘောတရားကို ပြသသလို လက်နှစ်ဖက်ကို ဆက်လက်ပေါင်းထားကာ တဖြည်းဖြည်း မြေပြင်ပေါ်သို့ ကျသွားသည်။ မီးခိုးများက လေထဲကို ပြည့်နှက်ကာ ရှုပ်ထွေးမှုနှင့် ကြောက်ရွံ့မှုများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့သည်။ မဟာတမသည် မြေပြင်ပေါ်တွင် ခေါင်းကို မိန်းကလေးနှစ်ဦး၏ ပေါင်ပေါ်တွင် ထားကာ ကျသွားခဲ့သည်။ သူ၏ မျက်နှာမှာ ဖြူလျော့သွားကာ ဩစတြေးလျမွှေးဖြင့် ပြုလုပ်ထားသော ဖြူသော ခေါင်းပေါင်းက သွေးကြောင့် နီရောင်ပြောင်းသွားသည်။ စက္ကန့်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း မဟာတမ ဂန္ဒီ သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး အချိန်မှာ ညနေ ၅:၁၇ ဖြစ်သည်။</p><p>Godse ကို လူအုပ်က အလျင်အမြန် ဖမ်းဆီးပြီး ထိန်းသိမ်းခဲ့သည်။ “လောလောဆယ် ကျွန်ုပ် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် အရာအတွက် တစ်စုံတစ်ခုမှ ဝမ်းနည်းခြင်း မရှိပါ၊ ကျန်ရှိသည့် အကြောင်းများကို တရားရုံးတွင် ရှင်းပြပါမည်” ဟု Godse က သတင်းထောက်အား ပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သောဆယ့်ရက်ကျော်တုန်းကလည်း Godse နှင့် သူ၏ ညီ Gopal Godse တို့နှင့် အခြား ပူးပေါင်းကြံစည်သူများက ဗုံးဖြင့်တိုက်ခိုက်၍ Gandhi ကို သတ်ဖြတ်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည်။</p><p>တရားစွဲဆိုမှုတွင် ဂေါဒ်ဆေးသည် စာလုံး ၃၀,၀၀၀ ကျော်ပါဝင်သည့် ကြေညာချက်နှင့် ဝန်ခံချက်ကို ဖတ်ပြရန် ငါးနာရီကျော် အချိန်ယူကာ၊ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုကို “လုံးဝနှင့် တစ်ကိုယ်တည်း နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ” ဟု ခေါ်ဆိုပြီး “ဂန္ဒီသည် ပါကစ္စတန်၏ ဖခင်ကြီးဖြစ်ကြောင်း သက်သေပြခဲ့ပြီး ဟိန္ဒူလူမျိုးများ၏ ဒုက္ခများအတွက် တာဝန်ရှိသူဖြစ်ကြောင်း” ကြေညာခဲ့သည်။ “ကျွန်ုပ် ပစ်ခတ်ခင်ကတော့ သူ့အတွက် ကောင်းကျိုးများဖြစ်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းကာ ဂုဏ်ပြု၍ ခေါင်းညွှန့်ခဲ့သည်” ဟုလည်း ဆိုသည်။ သူက တစ်ယောက်တည်း လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြောင်း ထွက်ဆိုခဲ့သည်။</p><p>သေနတ်သမား ဂေါ့ဒ်ဆေးဆိုသူမှာ ၁၉၁၀ ခုနှစ် မေ ၁၉ ရက်နေ့တွင် စာတိုက်ဝန်ထမ်းဖခင်နှင့် အိမ်ရှင်မိခင်တို့မှ မွေးဖွားခဲ့ပြီး၊ ကျောင်းထွက်ခဲ့သော ဂေါဒ်ဆေးသည် သစ်သားလုပ်သမား၊ အပ်ချုပ်သမားနှင့် အသီးရောင်းသမားအဖြစ် အလုပ်လုပ်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>ဂေါဒ်ဆေးသည် ဟိန္ဒူအမျိုးသားရေး အခြေခံဝါဒီပါတီတစ်ခုဖြစ်သည့် Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) မှ ထောက်ခံသည့် ညာဘက်အခြေခံဝါဒီ နိုင်ငံရေးအယူဝါဒတစ်ခုဖြစ်သည့် “ဟိန္ဒုတဝါ” ၏ လိုက်နာသူတစ်ဦး ဖြစ်လာခဲ့သည်။ နောက်ပိုင်းတွင် ညာဘက်ဝါဒဟိန္ဒူ မဟာဆဘဟ် နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီတွင် ပူးပေါင်းကာ နာရာယန် ဒတာထရာယာ အပ်တေးနှင့်အတူ မာရသီ ပရိုပဂန်ဒါ သတင်းစာ Agrani ကို တည်ထောင်ခဲ့ပြီး နောက်တွင် Hindu Rashtra ဟု အမည်ပြောင်းကာ အယ်ဒီတာအဖြစ် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>Godse သည် အသက် ၃၉ နှစ်အရွယ်တွင်၊ Apte နှင့်အတူ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံရပြီး ၁၉၄၉ ခုနှစ် နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၁၅ ရက်နေ့တွင် အမ်ဘာလာ အကျဉ်းထောင်၌ ချုပ်ခံခဲ့ရသည်။ တရားစွဲခံရသူ အခြား ၆ ဦးကို ထောင်ဒဏ်တစ်သက်ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည်။</p><p>နောက်ပိုင်းတွင် ဂိုပယ် ဂေါဒ်ဆေးသည် သူ၏အစ်ကိုပြောခဲ့သည့်အတိုင်း ဂန္ဒီ၏ အကြမ်းမဖက်လှုပ်ရှားမှုသည် “ဟိန္ဒူများကို မူဆလင်များက သတ်ဖြတ်ခွင့်ပြုရန် ရည်ရွယ်ထားသည့် စီမံကိန်းတစ်ခု၏ အစိတ်အပိုင်း” ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထပ်မံပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။</p><p>Sources</p><p>‘The assassination of Mohandas Gandhi,’ UPI.</p><p>‘‘Jan. 30, 1948 | Mahatma Gandhi Assassinated,” The New York Times Learning Network.</p><p>“Nathuram Godse: The mystery surrounding Mahatma Gandhi’s killer,” BBC.</p><p>“Mohandas K. Gandhi: The Indian Leader at Home and Abroad,” _The New York Times.</p><p>_”The last hours of Mahatma Gandhi,” Gandhi Research Foundation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f14743e38dd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Graduate Students’ Mental Health Issues are not “Joking”]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/graduate-students-mental-health-issues-are-not-joking-982889e3c4bf?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/982889e3c4bf</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2025 01:06:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-10T01:06:25.757Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*EOyHFxcr3baW2ny-Fpc0vw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>In particular, imposter syndrome – where individuals feel less capable than their peers – feelings of falling behind, isolation, financial stress, anxieties related to relationships with advisors, and concerns about the job market are key factors contributing to mental strain among graduate students.</p><p>For those studying abroad, separation from family, limited social circles, and frequent solitude further exacerbate these stressors.</p><p>In truth, research and data on graduate students’ mental health remain limited, while studies focusing on undergraduates’ mental health are far more prevalent.</p><p>According to one research team’s findings, rates of depression and anxiety among graduate students vary by program: depression from 15% to 30%, and anxiety from 12% to 30%. These figures are markedly higher than those in the general population.</p><p>For instance, in economics PhD programs, 18% of students report moderate to severe depression or anxiety – a rate comparable to that seen in incarcerated populations.</p><p>Isolation poses an especially large problem for women and international students.</p><p>Environmental factors impacting mental health include the dynamics between students and advisors, cultural differences, peer pressure, and more, all of which have substantial effects. Additionally, lacking close friends or the ability to openly share personal feelings worsens mental health outcomes.</p><p>Another critical aspect for graduate students is the advisor relationship, which is immensely important. A poor advisor can lead to numerous hurdles in thesis work, and the inability to candidly discuss personal challenges or circumstances with them heightens stress levels, as noted in readings. Thus, when a graduate student’s advisor dynamic falters, the absence of alternative outlets for venting or advice becomes a pressing concern.</p><p>In essence, graduate students’ mental health demands substantial focus. The notion that student life is carefree – merely involving studies, with plenty of ease and lightness – should not be held by parents, surroundings, or society at large. It’s crucial to recognize that mental health issues disproportionately affect graduate students.</p><p>Recent data from 2024–2025 highlights both persistent challenges and emerging positive trends in graduate student mental health. For example, global surveys indicate that around 40% of graduate students experience symptoms of anxiety or depression – roughly six times higher than the general adult population – often amplified by program pressures like harsh criticism, unreasonable expectations, and the unpredictability of research outcomes. A 2025 study in Nature emphasizes how research demands exacerbate mental health issues more than teaching duties, with factors like advisor feedback playing a pivotal role in worsening burnout and self-doubt. Similarly, a Swedish analysis of PhD students found that doctoral programs do indeed harm mental health through increased prescriptions for antidepressants and specialist visits, though the impact is somewhat less severe than previously feared, suggesting that targeted interventions could mitigate risks.</p><p>On a brighter note, there’s evidence of improvement: A 2024 Healthy Minds Study reported a decline in severe depressive symptoms among college students (including graduates) from 23% in 2022 to 19% in 2024, attributed to better access to support services. Moreover, 73% of students believe mental health resources increase their likelihood of graduating, underscoring the value of campus programs. Digital mental health interventions, such as app-based therapy or online cognitive behavioral tools, have shown effectiveness in reducing anxiety and depression symptoms among university students, offering scalable solutions for busy grad programs.</p><p>To address these issues more proactively, universities can adopt strategies like those suggested by nonprofits focused on academic mental health: establishing peer support networks, providing mental health literacy training for faculty and students, forming department-level wellness committees, combating stigma through open dialogues, and offering skills workshops on resilience and time management. For international students, culturally sensitive programs – such as virtual family connection events or multilingual counseling – could reduce isolation. Additionally, integrating work-life balance into curricula, like mandatory wellness breaks or flexible deadlines, might prevent burnout. Institutions like Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) provide a model, where 45% of students report “flourishing” mental health (higher than national averages), thanks to strong community support and inclusive environments. Finally, post-COVID transitions have heightened distress, with first-year grad students seeing psychological issues rise from 35% in 2016 to 55% in 2020, but ongoing efforts in stigma reduction and resource accessibility are key to long-term progress. Overall, shifting academic culture from competition to collaboration could transform graduate education into a healthier, more sustainable pursuit.</p><p>https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/12/06/new-research-graduate-student-mental-well-being-says-departments-have-important</p><p>https://developmentdaily.wordpress.com/2018/10/12/heres-how-academic-departments-professors-and-grad-students-can-work-to-support-mental-health/</p><p>https://x.com/dragonflymh/status/1314701362593136642?s=46</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=982889e3c4bf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Fall of Ukraine, Threat to European]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/the-fall-of-ukraine-threat-to-european-8ed3691498c3?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ed3691498c3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Mar 2025 02:51:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-02T02:51:18.429Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zJeASGDp2IMfqKpbFeGBpw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Since 2022, Russia has launched a war to invade Ukraine without any justification. This has sparked intense conflicts between the two countries, resulting in widespread destruction and a rising death toll.</p><p>Three years later, the question arises: “Would there be any threats if Ukraine were to fall in this war?”</p><p>To answer this question, I believe there are several factors that could pose a threat to the EU if Ukraine were to collapse.</p><p>First and foremost, there is a clear geographical concern for the eastern European countries. Ukraine lies on the border between Europe and Russia, serving as a crucial buffer zone. If Ukraine were to fall, Russia might be more inclined to intervene in neighboring countries like Moldova and Georgia. This could further heighten military tensions along Europe’s eastern borders and pose a significant threat to NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic states.</p><p>The second concern is the worsening refugee crisis. The war in Ukraine has already displaced over 10 million people, with Europe bearing the brunt of the influx. If Ukraine were to collapse, the number of refugees could rise even further, potentially destabilizing the social, economic, and political landscape of European countries. For instance, the challenge of integrating refugees could strain European unity and contribute to the rise of far-right extremist movements.</p><p>Third, there are growing concerns about the economy and food security. Ukraine is a key exporter of essential agricultural products, such as wheat and sunflower oil, to the global market. The war’s impact on agricultural production could drive up food prices across Europe, further exacerbating food security challenges.</p><p>Fourth, there are concerns about nuclear disarmament and the potential for increased nuclear testing. In 1992, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia signed a treaty guaranteeing Ukraine’s security, alongside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, as Ukraine faces ongoing Russian aggression, it has come to deeply regret giving up its nuclear arsenal. This could raise serious concerns among European countries, as the idea of nuclear weapons becoming essential for national security may gain traction.</p><p>Fifth, the significance of democracy and international law will also come into question. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion can be seen as a symbol of the fight to protect democratic and sovereign values. If Ukraine were to fall, it could serve as a catalyst for the spread of authoritarianism and further territorial expansion in other regions. Additionally, it could weaken Europe’s diplomatic policies, which are rooted in democracy and human rights.</p><p>The final concern is the potential withdrawal of the U.S. from NATO and the weakening of trust among EU countries. Such a development could work in Russia’s favor. Without strong European support for Ukraine, doubts may arise about NATO’s credibility and the unity of the European Union (EU). Eastern European countries, in particular, may grow increasingly worried about their own security and lose confidence in the international alliance system.</p><p>In conclusion, Ukraine is not only a source of concern for Europe’s security and stability at this moment, but also a battlefield defending democracy and freedom. If Ukraine were to fall, it could lead to a series of problems for Europe, significantly threatening its security.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ed3691498c3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“China’s Strategic Play: Economic Interests and Myanmar’s Sham Elections”]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/chinas-strategic-play-economic-interests-and-myanmar-s-sham-elections-06c20fe417ef?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/06c20fe417ef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[one-belt-one-road]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2025 17:01:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-23T17:01:55.464Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tfVuJL1Lp1sEjgNoAs52Mw.png" /></figure><p>Myanmar enter its fourth revolutionary journey after the post-coup in coming days. Remarkably, February 1 is the unforgettable date that the military staged a coup. During these years, Myanmar’s Spring Revolution has been complicated with a complex political and socio-economic landscape shaped by various stakeholders.</p><p>However, this Spring Revolution has been through four distinct stages since the coup. The first and foremost stage was peaceful demonstrations and significant international attention in a couple of months. Then, it quickly changed to the second stage that saw the formation of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the establishment of the National Unity Government (NUG). Then, the third stage marked the initiation of the local People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the chain-of-command of the NUG and some LPDFs in the conflict areas such as Chin, Mon, Sagaing, Magway, Karen, Kachin, and Shan, with the support from the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). The fourth stage is the current situation is shaped by intense armed conflicts in those above-mentioned regions and heightened China’s involvement due to its core interest to protect its economic zones and BRI project pathways, particularly in Mandalay, Rakhine and Shan.</p><p>In fact, Chinese’s government involvement in Myanmar politics is not the very first time. It has been rooted for many years since the Cold War, whereas it begins with the support of communist insurgencies in 1980s. Later on, China shifted its approach to the military junta for the increase of accessing natural resources, secure economic interest, using a direct rout to Indian’s Ocean which is strategically important for China’s exports and imports.</p><p>To be able to access critical maritime routes and balance economic interests, the mainstay of China in supporting the military junta is pragmatically aligned to its Belt and Road Initiatives (BRIs), Kyauk Phyu Deep-Port project in Rakhine, and China- Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).</p><p>However, China’s trust issue on the Myanmar military leaders still remains paradox in the current context because of the vast majority loss in armed conflicts in the whole country, especially in the lower regions of Myanmar such as Sagaing, Bago, Mandalay and Magway, and in the ethnic areas such as Karen, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. With a victory of the Arakan Army (AA), the military junta lost its control in big major cities in Rakhine State. In Rakhine, there is a mega project existing called “ Kyauk Phyu Deep-Port project is crucial for China’s geopolitical route. Some political experts say that the Chinese government is back of the Arakan Army (AA). So, China is playing game behind the scene due to lack of trust on Myanmar military leaders.</p><p>In addition, last year, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Brotherhood_Alliance">Three Brotherhood Alliances</a>, includes the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Myanmar National Democratic Alliances Army (MNDAA) launched <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/tnla-announces-readiness-for-peace-talks-with-myanmar-junta.html">Operation 1027</a> in late October in northern Shan State — successfully controlled of Kokang Self Administrative Zone in the following of Battle of Laukkai, and later on the consecutive operations such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_1107">1107</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_1111">1111</a> in Kayah State, and other operations in Chin and Sagaing. Due to loads of the multiple operations, China may aware of the reality of Myanmar military junta’s power which is gradually falling apart. When the operations continued to clash one the biggest cities of Myanmar ‘ Mandalay’, it gradually entered the Chinese government chess game to bargain its economic interest and then China warned both TNLA and MNDAA to stop immediately the operation and they released the statement to talk peace dialogue with the military junta.</p><p>Behind the curtain, China is playing a chess game in Myanmar’s political context to bargain its economic interests by dealing or negotiating with the military junta holding the de facto power of the country. There are a lot of questions raised. What was the repay of the military junta to China? Of course, Myanmar military leaders ruled the country over 70 years, never ever care about of the people of country.</p><p>A few days ago, China issued a statement announcing that the MNDAA would withdraw from Lashio following a ceasefire agreement brokered by the Chinese government. In this context, China appears to be assisting the military junta in reclaiming key cities lost over the past three years to facilitate a sham election scheduled for December 2025. Without control of major cities, conducting such an election would be far more challenging and even harder to legitimize.</p><p>In conclusion, China’ s influence in Myanmar political landscape is perplex because it has been rooted over many years. Of course, it is obvious that China’s power game play will be somehow a turning around of Myanmar current situation. However, the question remains: Can China act as a genuine mediator, bringing all armed organizations to the negotiating table?</p><p>#Myanmar #China #TNLA #MNDAA #AA #BRI #CMEC</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=06c20fe417ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Rohingya: Lingering Victims of Genocide and the Targets of Conscription Law”]]></title>
            <link>https://mynnthantu.medium.com/rohingya-lingering-victims-of-genocide-and-the-new-targets-of-conscription-law-7e6c3d64410c?source=rss-10c5c6ac3189------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7e6c3d64410c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[conscription]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rohingya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aung M Htun ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2024 12:22:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-12T12:44:28.671Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*uZLQ3FdHtc1NBchk.jpg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.malaysiakini.com%2Fnews%2F500523&amp;psig=AOvVaw00Fh-kUGejlFrWf9q6YBc4&amp;ust=1710332310452000&amp;source=images&amp;cd=vfe&amp;opi=89978449&amp;ved=0CBUQjhxqFwoTCLim0MXa7oQDFQAAAAAdAAAAABAI">Rohingya in Malaysia warn against fleeing from Bangladesh</a> — Fortify Rights</figcaption></figure><blockquote>One of my colleagues, Zarni Soe, a Rohingya young person and advocate for human rights and the founder of the Arakan teenager Peace Network, acknowledges that his organization has encountered substantial obstacles in the past several weeks.</blockquote><p>It is now over 7 years of Rohingya crisis in Myanmar; a million of Rohingya people fleeing their homes to <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained/#:~:text=In%20August%202017%2C%20armed%20attacks,to%20reach%20safety%20in%20Bangladesh.">Bangladesh with a majority living in the Cox Bazar’s region — home to the world’s largest refugee camp.</a></p><p>Before the Rohingya crisis, most percentage of Rohingya resided in Northern part of Myanmar, Rakhine State. They became the victims of genocide with the reason of military clearance has done by Tatmadaw (Myanmar Military) in 2017. Before that, it’s been a long time that they have been discriminated ethnically and religiously without getting a citizenship in Myanmar. Furthermore, the ethnic minority faced institutionalized discrimination, which manifested in various forms such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/22/all-you-can-do-pray/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims">limitations on marriage, family planning, economic opportunities</a>, education, religious autonomy, and freedom of mobility.</p><p>A lot of criticisms said that it has full of discriminatory terms in providing citizenship for minority within minorities. That is why, Rohingya people become stateless due to <a href="https://burmacampaign.org.uk/media/Myanmar%E2%80%99s-1982-Citizenship-Law-and-Rohingya.pdf">1982 citizenship law</a> that has flaws in accessing citizenship inclusively. The 1982 Citizenship Law of Myanmar has faced extensive and justified criticism for establishing a citizenship system that is discriminatory and leads to statelessness. There is a suggestion that it deliberately practiced discrimination and is a component of a <a href="https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d3e586/">genocidal strategy aimed at the Muslims residing in northern Rakhine State,</a> a significant number of whom identify themselves as Rohingya.</p><p>Denial citizenship of Rohingya may become the benefits for the military groups who adopted the conscription law which also referred to “<a href="https://www.gnlm.com.mm/peoples-military-service-system-supposed-as-mandatory-military-service-system/">The People’s Military Service Law”. </a>The Myanmar’s People Military Service Law, initiated in 2010 but implemented in February 2024, stipulates that individuals between the ages of 18 and 45 (for men) and 18 and 35 (for women) can be conscripted into the military for a duration of two years. Individuals in specific occupations, such as medical practitioners, are required to fulfil a service period of three years. In the event of a national emergency, the duration of military service could be prolonged to a maximum of five years.</p><p>As the result of announcement of the Conscription Law, young individuals who are not officially recognized as ethnicities in Myanmar are also targeted by the military. This is also compulsory and adopted by-force by the military regime and continual things happen like road checkpoints in and out of each city and also set some criteria on internal air travel within country.</p><p>Ko Zarni Soe said that,</p><blockquote>Since 2023 November, Rohingya people who are the victims of military targeted in Rohingya Crisis are already vulnerable since the neglect of citizenship under the military regime since 70 years ago. Rohingya who are already vulnerable so unable to go to one place to another place and it’s very very difficult for them to survive as well so as the Junta blocked all the humanitarian assistant entering to the Rakhine State, Northern part of Myanmar. In addition, I just received some from the authentic sources that in every village at least 40 person Rohingya who have been facing with the breaks of starvation, for example, many people from a village so they are really unable to to survive even they are having one time males in a day. Now, at the same time, the Junta enacted the law refers to the conscription law, they strictly targeted the Rohingya, the most prosecuted community and the most vulnerable community in the world.</blockquote><p>It became another stressful constrain for those who are unrecognized minority within minorities when it comes to in and out of road checkpoints. Undocumented young people may be brought to somewhere else without consent or inform to their home. On 19 February, the military regime apprehended over <a href="https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2024/03/04/conscription-catastrophe/">600 individuals </a>who had arrived from Yangon at Sittwe and Kyaukphyu Airports. On the following day, the military regime apprehended a group of 100 young individuals from the Rakhine ethnic group who were travelling by bus from Yangon to Rakhine State. The regime is currently detaining them incommunicado in Hlaing Tharyar Township in Yangon.</p><p>Minority within minorities, including Rohingya young people, become concern about their uncertainty and security due to the taking-advantage under Conscription law due to the reason of undocumented situation. Obviously, the Rohingya people are both the victims of military clearance during its crisis and then now the target groups of Myanmar military under this Conscription Law.</p><p>In this situation, the international community should push to Myanmar military to abolish this law not be compulsory and protect ethnic minorities including Rohingya. And the local community should also consider the effective way of communication with minority within minorities to be able to protect them and escape from being target groups by the Myanmar military under the Conscription Law.</p><p>#Politics #Myanmar #Rohingya #Conscription_Law</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e6c3d64410c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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