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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nikolas Stephanatos on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nikolas Stephanatos on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Nikolas Stephanatos on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Arsenal can dominate the Premier League — but they need to evolve]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/thoughts-on-arsenals-transfer-window-upcoming-season-time-to-dominate-cf853514652b?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 12:49:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-20T13:01:04.158Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/0*AF20n4tBLDyGMXo5.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: Yahoo Sports</figcaption></figure><p>It has been an interesting summer so far for Arsenal. The jubilation and above all, relief of finally winning the Premier League has been followed up by a sense of urgency to go and do it again. While Arsenal were comfortably the best team in the country all season (and let’s not forget how close they were to winning the UCL), most fans feel there is a lot of room for improvement, which I cannot disagree with. Arsenal won last season largely due to their incredible defensive performance and of course their record-breaking set-piece prowess. However, their open play attacking numbers were lacklustre compared to most other PL champions in recent memory. It is undoubtedly the area to improve in, especially given the talent Arsenal possesses, as well as the burden of not winning a major trophy being lifted off his team.</p><p>Arsenal played a lot of conservative football in large parts of last season, especially compared to previous iterations of this team:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tw8lSwa2jOkTnZ3_QwP5fQ.png" /></figure><p>The data indicates Arsenal have over-time kept and passed the ball less, and have become more direct in their passing. It is fair to flag that the amount of passes has decreased more radically than the possession average, which likely correlates with more time spent on set-pieces and subsequently, less ball-in-play time (the data for which I have no access to as I am writing this). In terms of out of possession, Arsenal actually slightly improved their pressing intensity from 24/25 to 25/26 (PPDA), but these two seasons have seen a noticeable drop off from the first two title contending years under Arteta.</p><p>So let’s focus on the in-possession part (I still think Arsenal should be more aggressive out of possession, though it’s hard to argue with their defensive performance last season). Does the more direct style of play cause the decline in Arsenal’s open play creation numbers? I think it is pretty obvious. I would argue that Arsenal’s attack is not built to be a transition-dominant, physical and direct. While Arteta did add transitional attackers last season in Gyökeres &amp; Madueke (which perhaps foreshadowed the change to a more direct approach), his best attacking players thrive in congested areas, ball-to-feet and with time to unlock the defence. Ødegaard &amp; Saka namely, the most effective attacking duo during Arteta’s tenure, who both had down years last season, partly due to fitness issues, partly due to play-style in my eyes. I would also add Eze to this, who had a mixed first season at the club, but is another supremely technical player who scored almost all of his goals for the club in and around a crowded box.</p><p>Let’s solve it then. Arsenal came into this off-season with two core, principle-based needs:</p><ol><li>Improve open play possession &amp; creation</li><li>Solidify spine of the team, reduce over-reliance on key players (Rice &amp; Saliba mainly)</li></ol><p>From a positional POV, additions and replacements were needed throughout the zones of the pitch, in order to fulfil the above needs: a fourth midfielder alongside Rice, MLS, Zubimendi (replacing Nørgaard), a right sided defender to fill in for the injured Saliba and aleviate fitness concerns regarding Timber &amp; White. Finally, 2 or 3 forwards, adding quality and X-factor. With Trossard sold early-doors and Martinelli &amp; Jesus among active attackers who are expected to depart, Arsenal need to replace, but most importantly *improve*.</p><p>The biggest signing of the summer so far indeed massively improves Arsenal in both core tenets. <strong>Bruno Guimarães</strong> has long been one of the best possession and creative central midfielders in the Premier League, that also provides leadership and competent out of possession work. He is both a perfect Rice partner, as well as a decent alternative, in the quest to manage Declan’s minutes to a reasonable extent following a massive load in the last few seasons.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SB5NV7jLVTjxklW1M9V4tg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://footverse.sahilgdwn.workers.dev/">https://footverse.sahilgdwn.workers.dev/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Above all, what I love about Bruno is the constant forward intent he shows in his possession game. He loves passing through the middle, something which Arsenal have lacked in recent seasons. Bruno is someone that forces the issue and I think that mentality can transmit to the whole team. Most of Arsenal’s defenders and midfielders do not lack the quality to break lines and pass forward, they have just lacked the intent. Early returns from the Cumminty Shield were extremely promising:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*T0jgIVzLPZ4RFEG837hNgg.gif" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*OZcB2rRQEQrnlYs8NJli3A.gif" /></figure><p>Let’s not give all the credit to Bruno though, as Myles Lewis-Skelly is also someone that excels at these aspects. He was not given a fair shot the majority of last season and when he finally got his chance, he immediately added incisiveness and injected much needed forward intent to a midfield that was overworked and had developed conservative tendencies.</p><p>Despite me raving about Bruno and MLS, neither of them were the best Arsenal midfielder that game. That in fact was Martin Ødegaard, who is coming off two very disappointing seasons in a row, marked by injuries and underwhelming performance. I have been one of the people that shared the opinion that this team has evolved past its captain and should therefore get rid of him. While I still think there is merit to this view, perhaps a new approach can reverse this development.</p><p>Arsenal largely transitioned from a 4–3–3 to a 4–2–3–1 last season, with a double pivot and a second striker-ish attacking midfielder ahead of them, instead of a #6 being flanked by two high #8’s. Ødegaard definitely does not fit this new system, as well as the more direct style of play Arsenal have adopted. He is a player who excels with the ball to feet and the game being ran through him, but has an obvious lack of physicality and dynamism. A new approach with midfielders who can get him the ball in the areas he likes to receive, as well as more combination play with the ball on the ground: this is how Ødegaard can get back to his best. I would argue it is worth it. At his best, the Norwegian is one of the best midfielders in world football. He combines elite progression and ball retention from midfield, as well as a solid level of creativity and goal threat in the final third. Arsenal have not got that from him in the last two seasons.</p><p>But this change in approach matters not just for Ødegaard — it matters for everyone. I am of the opinion that Arsenal did not necessarily lack the players to create more in open play, they just did not get the ball enough to these forwards in the zones they can create more. And as mentioned earlier, Arsenal’s attack is not exactly built to be a long-ball team, Kai Havertz aside.</p><p>The common sentiment around Arsenal’s attack is that there is lack of quality and X-factor, which I agree with. However, I am also of the opinion that Arteta can get a lot more out of his current forwards. Arsenal last season did not get enough out of its most talented attacking players: Ødegaard, Saka, Eze, Havertz. Obviously injuries definitely contributed to that, but the style of play was also a likely cause.</p><p>The team’s set-piece goal-scoring has been rising through seasons, while open play creation has declined. Saka and Ødegaard specifically have had a drop off in their output as Arsenal have turned their style more direct, with last season being very low for both, albeit with fitness issues:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ge-2M-QY-NoR9gMoZGeLfQ.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal can be a far superior attacking team than last season just by getting these guys healthy and providing them with the ball in better conditions, without adding any superstar forward.</p><p>But, before we get into Arsenal’s attacking recruitment, let’s first take a quick detour to the backline, where as I was writing this, a deal was agreed with Aston Villa for <strong>Ezri Konsa</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O4B3Qg4BcOlZu7E3aXNhEQ.png" /></figure><p>While I have some slight concerns about Arsenal suddenly adding too many 28 year-olds (they already struggle to sell), Konsa makes sense, primarily for core tenet #1: reducing over-reliance on key players, namely William Saliba who happens to be out for at least a couple of months with a back injury. Konsa is not a very proactive defensively, but is an excellent covering defender, exactly what Arsenal lack with Saliba’s absence. He boasts the best ground duel winning % in the entire Premier League and is an excellent ball-playing defender by the numbers, which can help with core tenet #2: he is calm in possession, gets on the ball, slows down the game and then injects tempo with his passing and carrying decisions. Should definitely help the team to get back to a less direct and more incisive build-up game.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/932/1*RbzONgjHY6kCA8r3RHlNow.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://playerprint.streamlit.app/">https://playerprint.streamlit.app/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Back to the forward line:</p><p>So far, Arsenal have done 1 in — 1 out in their attack, replacing the ever-crucial Leandro Trossard with <strong>Christos Tzolis</strong>, a like-for-like replacement reportedly driven by their data team. Christos is a super interesting player. Despite the obvious caveats regarding league translation, his output was extremely impressive for Club Brugge in Belgium. He achieved that while lacking the high-end physical skills that are usually associated with productive wide players.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*87cTNdm_BaDliOzPhJ1S2Q.png" /></figure><p>The above stat profile only concerns his UCL performances, which should reflect his level a little better than his Belgian league numbers. It is evident that Christos does two things very well: he is very impactful in possession and creates *a lot* for his teammates. He takes a lot of hard shots and scores at a decent rate, but not elite in that regard. Similarly, his dribbling and duel numbers are nowhere near what you expect from high-end wingers. I would say a lot of the above is very reminiscent of certain little Belgian who we all love.</p><p>His pre-season performances at Arsenal have been very impressive, capped off with a near MOTM level outing vs Man City, putting two goals on the plate for his teammates and contributing in build-up effectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*LzMEh5mwsb0Nz-Ya8Ux_UA.gif" /></figure><p>You can read more about Tzolis in the always excellent Billy Carpenter’s piece about him: <a href="https://billycarpenter.substack.com/p/scouting-christos-tzolis">https://billycarpenter.substack.com/p/scouting-christos-tzolis</a>. But watching him vs City sent me on a rumination about the place passing wingers without high-end burst have in the elite level of the game and whether you can be a great winger without it. I won’t retype it here, but if you are interested in my thoughts on this, check out the thread I wrote couple of days ago, by clicking on the tweet below:</p><h3>NS on X (formerly Twitter): &quot;I have a take: I used to be very radical about bursty 1v1 dribbling being the most pivotal attribute for wingers, but over the past year I&#39;ve come around and now think that it is fairly overrated as a skill. Having it or not doesn&#39;t make or break a winger. / X&quot;</h3><p>I have a take: I used to be very radical about bursty 1v1 dribbling being the most pivotal attribute for wingers, but over the past year I&#39;ve come around and now think that it is fairly overrated as a skill. Having it or not doesn&#39;t make or break a winger.</p><p>Anyways, now it is time to talk about the hottest topic for Arsenal fans this window, the lack of elite forward recruitment so far, as sadly, Tzolis does not cover that (he projects to be a squad player). Following the club’s sensational, but ultimately failed pursuit of Vinicius Jr, they have been left empty handed and without obvious options to inject that elite level quality.</p><p>So what can they do? The next most obvious target at LW is <strong>Bradley Barcola</strong>, who I have always loved as a player, but I find PSG’s reported valuation of over £120m off-putting, to say the least. While he does not seem to be in Arsenal’s radar currently, he has been linked in the past and I think it’s worth looking a bit into him.</p><p>I think there is some obvious superstar potential there. He might not be the most demonic 1v1 player (which even though I just said it’s a rather overrated skill, Arsenal do need that in order to reach the next level), but he has elite pace and very high level of production. He achieves a lot of it due to his incredible off-ball movement. With Bruno G., MLS, Saka and a rejuvenated Ødegaard, Arsenal have quite a lot of passing to work with.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MfZrXXCI9Fv63fvFDrbVBA.png" /></figure><p>Barcola’s Ligue 1 production is out of this world, however it drops off a lot in the CL. Finishing can be streaky for anyone, but the decline in volume and quality of chances he gets is quite significant. This suggests that he is not *currently* quite the superstar his domestic production suggests, but he is only turning 24 in September and there is certainly a lot of room to improve, given his physical base. Profile wise, he is not far off what Arsenal need. He offers the elite pace and off-ball game that complements Saka quite well, and is also strong at things Tzolis is not great at, at LW. The price however is close to being unreasonable and the player is reportedly set on joining Liverpool. Still, the longer he remains a PSG player, I wouldn’t be surprised if Arsenal make a move towards the end of the window, given his availability and lack of alternatives.</p><p>Couple of other names Arsenal have been linked with in the past, but are said to not be available this summer are <strong>Kenan Yildiz</strong> and long-time target <strong>Nico Williams</strong>. I cannot comment much on the former as I’ve not watched him extensively. The stats look great, but from what I’ve been told he lacks the high-end burst Arsenal would want at their forward line, especially if Tzolis is the other option. The latter is a different case, as he is a player I absolutely love: Nico is rapid, an elite 1v1 dribbler, top class creator with bags of passing potential, enough goal threat to keep defenders honest. Unfortunately, he’s shown no indication he’d be willing to leave the Basque Country, otherwise I’m sure Arsenal would’ve already made a move.</p><p>I have a rather unpopular pick as a realistic option for the LW spot in <strong>Rafael Leão</strong>. His stock is at an all time low and he is reportedly available for a price that just cannot be ignored. I know most people are out on him, but he is one of the guys I just cannot quit. The talent is still there and the high moments are still outrageous, maybe not as often as in the past. He is coming off a poor season for AC Milan under Allegri, where he was mostly deployed as a striker in a 4–4–2, which caused a decline in his dribbling numbers. However, if you look at his last season on the wing (24/25), the numbers are still great. My take is he is worth a shot, especially given the lack of good alternatives.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kutVos2QLzyOoxrHuF4jxA.png" /></figure><p>The final hot topic for Arsenal this window is the #9 situation and specifically, whether or not they should look to replace Viktor Gyökeres. My take is that despite putting up a respectable goal return, I think his overall impact has not been good enough. Given his wages, age and still decent reputation, it might be the last good chance for the club to recoup most of the money they paid for him last summer.</p><p>When Arsenal signed him, I expected his goal output to drop from the ridiculous levels he produced in Portugal, however, I had decent expectations about his overall game, as he had shown to be a high touch forward with impressive dribbling and creativity numbers. Along with the shot production, this was the part of Gyökeres’ game that fell of a cliff upon transitioning to English football, and his goal return was not enough to make up for his poor performance in overall play:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6Uj7wu0S48l7bgHZPWjKfQ.png" /></figure><p>Couple of potential replacements that have been mentioned and I really like, for different reasons are <strong>Julián Alvarez</strong> and <strong>Victor Osimhen</strong>. If we ignore feasibility concerns, preference for any of the two comes down to style of play and system. Alvarez is a Jesus-esque profile, who is a fantastic creator, dribbler, with really good link-up play and would arguably fit best in this team as a second striker in a 4–2–3–1/4–2–4 playing off Havertz. Potentially a fit in a 4–3–3 as well, if you were to keep Martinelli and try to replicate 22/23 dynamics. Osimhen on the other hand is like Gyökeres, but better. A monster athlete, aggressive channel runner, hold up player, with elite ability to get shots off in the box. A better fit playing in front of passy-er 3 man midfield including Ødegaard &amp; Bruno G. I won’t dive much deeper on any of the two as neither looks likely as of right now, but perhaps we can revisit in the future.</p><p>Just like with LW, I want to give a more feasible outside shout for CF, that I am sure most readers will disagree with. In this case, the player would also help fulfil our yearly quota of at least one Chelsea signing, and of course that is <strong>Nicolas Jackson</strong>. Another channel running CF in the mould of Gyökeres, who offers superior hold-up play and technical ability. Obviously not the best finisher, but he gets chances at a very high rate in any league he has played at, and he is just someone who makes his teammates better. In his last PL season (24/25), he averaged 3.06 shots per 90, with 2.73 of them coming from inside the box and last season in the Bundesliga, 3.41 shots per 90, 2.69 inside the box. These are elite numbers. Sure to come at a reasonable price, I would not be opposed to him as a Havertz alternative at CF, as long as he came along with a high-end LW.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/756/1*6Z5QU7ounJ5YK_cOlwKzSA.png" /><figcaption>Nico Jackson 24/25 PL shot-map from fotmob.com</figcaption></figure><p>To conclude this piece, I would like to lay out a written list of things I would like to see from Arsenal this season. Before that, let’s talk competition a little bit: City have lost Pep and Rodri, Liverpool’s squad is extremely thin and rather incomplete, Chelsea lack goals and midfield depth, United look functional for the first time in ages, but for me lack the quality (especially in their backline) to achieve the 85 points it will likely need to compete for the title.</p><p>In short, I will go out on a limb and say Arsenal *should* absolutely win the PL again this season, fairly comfortably. They have the best and deepest squad in the league and they are the only big contending team with any sort of continuity. That does not mean they should stop looking to adapt, evolve and improve. My take is that surely they can win the league by playing the exact same type of football they played last year, but by doing that, they lower their points ceiling and allow a window for another team to creep up on them and potentially catch them, just like City last season.</p><p><strong>Therefore, this is what I want from Arsenal this season:</strong></p><ol><li><strong>Improve open play creation and goal numbers</strong></li><li><strong>Win more games by a margin of more than 1 goal</strong></li><li><strong>Improve head to head record vs big 6</strong></li><li><strong>Recruit one high-end forward</strong></li><li><strong>Manage minutes of Rice, Saliba, Saka, Timber, Gabriel mainly</strong></li><li><strong>Improve on the 85 points from last season</strong></li></ol><p>We will revisit this list at the end of the 26/27 season to see how many items of the list were checked off. Thanks for reading!</p><p>P.S: I am not mentioning UCL at all in my outlook for next season since KO football is such a crapshoot. You can be an elite team and lose to the eventual winners in the round of 16, or be an above average team that makes the final due to kind draws and/or flukey upsets. I will be satisfied with a semi-final run, but will be annoyed if Arsenal lose again due to a lack of firepower and elite level attacking quality.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf853514652b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Profiling play-styles in the 25/26 Premier League based on performance data]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/profiling-play-styles-in-the-25-26-premier-league-based-on-performance-data-947490e941b5?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/947490e941b5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 16:37:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-27T16:37:15.204Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/905/1*MdJWxuYtz089hjKnJUX6Tg.jpeg" /><figcaption>[source: getty images]</figcaption></figure><p>We hear so much about “tiki-taka”, high pressing, counter attacking football as overarching labels for the way managers set up their teams to play football from fans and pundits alike, without a follow-up definition, explanation or slither of evidence as to why X team plays Y style of football. As I have been delving deeper and deeper on how data is incorporated in football analysis over the last couple of years in order to inform my opinions with evidence, I have been wanting to examine these themes around team play-styles. I decided to do it for the competition I am most familiar with, the Premier League.</p><p>A basic issue that arose as I was looking to conduct this study, was exactly what kind of variables I would use to come up with the playstyles. A lot of previous work I had read on teams, focused too much on output and results, instead of metrics that indicate style and intention (as much as possible) on a tactical level. So first, I had to set-up a tactical framework and a logically consistent methodology.</p><h4><strong>METHODOLOGY</strong></h4><p>Sample: First 25 Premier League match-weeks in 25/26 season, data accurate as of 10/02/26 — Data from Wyscout and Opta.</p><p><strong>Selection of variables</strong></p><p>Obvious first step  Separate which categories the teams will be judged on. While the conventional way to analyse footballs is through the 4 cyclical phases of in possession, defensive transition, out of possession, attacking transition, I decided to frame in just 2 dominant phases:</p><p>1. On the ball (including in possession, attacking transition)</p><p>2. Off the ball (including out of possession, defensive transition)</p><p>Logic behind that decision being that most of the raw data I had access to, indicated behaviours and outputs that are relevant in both settled and transitional phases. Furthermore, the playstyle labels that will be deducted based on the results need not to be more than 4 or 5 words each, for practicality reasons. Therefore, separating the data analysis in 4 different phases would result in long sentences and not labels that can be used in everyday discussion, whether between football club stakeholders, media or fans, alike.</p><p><strong>On the ball</strong></p><p>Phase where teams have the ball in their possession whether in settled or transitional situations was separated in 2 further categories, possession style (primary indicator) and shoot selection (secondary indicator). The former includes various metrics that indicate how patient or direct a team is when trying to progress its way up the pitch to create chances and the latter including metrics that indicate how aggressive a team is at getting shots off, to measure their approach in the final third in patience terms.</p><p><em>Possession style</em></p><p>· Pass completion %: the number of accurate passes compared to total passes</p><p>· Long pass %: the number long passes attempted compared to total passes</p><p>· Forward pass %: the number of forward passes attempted compared to total passes</p><p>· Direct speed: progress divided by sequence time (average speed of ball movement towards opponent goal line during sequence) [Opta definition]</p><p>· 10+ passes sequence: the number of total sequences completed with 10 or more consecutive passes, per game</p><p>· Passes per sequence: the number completed passes per possession sequence on average</p><p>· Sequence time: the amount of time a possession sequence lasts on average</p><p><em>Shot selection</em></p><p>· Possession-adjusted* shots: the number of shots a team attempts per game, relative to how much they have the ball in their possession, per game</p><p>· xG/shot: the average amount of expected goals a team averages per shot attempted (average shot quality)</p><p>Shots adjusted for possession on its own is arguably a good enough metric to showcase how trigger-happy a team is when they have the ball in and around the final third, however, combining it with xG/shot makes logical sense, as it indicates the average quality of the shots they take. A team that generates a high amount of shots in great locations near the goal can be described as very good creatively, as opposed to a team with lots of low xG shots from far out, who are indeed a better fit for the label ‘trigger-happy’.</p><p><strong>Off the ball</strong></p><p>Phase where teams do not have the ball in their possession whether in settled or transitional situations was separated in 2 further categories, defensive territory (primary indicator) and defensive aggressiveness (secondary indicator). The former includes metrics that indicate how high a team presses (or inversely, how low they block), the latter includes metrics that indicate how duel-happy and aggressive or passive a team is when defending.</p><p><em>Defensive territory</em></p><p>· PPDA: the number of opposition passes allowed outside of the pressing team’s own defensive third, divided by the number of defensive actions by the pressing team outside of their own defensive third (Opta definition)</p><p>· Possession-adjusted pressed sequences: number of opposition possession sequences are pressed by a team relative to how much they are out of possession, per game</p><p>· Start distance: The average distance (in metres) from their own goal that a team starts their open-play sequences (Opta definition)</p><p><em>Defensive aggressiveness</em></p><p>· Pass completion % against: how many accurate passes the opposition makes compared to their total passes</p><p>· Possession-adjusted defensive actions: number of defensive actions (sum of duels, interceptions, clearances, blocks) a team makes relative to how much they are out of possession, per game</p><p>· PPDA^: (see above)</p><p>· Passes per possession allowed: number of passes a team allows opposition team to complete in an average possession sequence</p><p>*Certain volume metrics were normalised for time spent in possession for on ball metrics and time spent out of possession for off the ball metrics, to reduce possession-driven bias (Possession-adjusted)</p><p>^Reasoning for inclusion of PPDA on both categories is that this metric can be interpreted as an indicator for both the defending territory behaviour of a team, as well as how aggressive they are when they are defending (outside their defensive 3rd)</p><p><strong>Data Analysis</strong></p><p>To enable comparison across variables with a range of different units and ranges, all metrics were converted to league-relative percentile on a 0–100 score. This method was preferred to simple 1–20 ranking of teams in order to better represent the true strength of teams in each phase-category compared to their opposition.</p><p>While in the majority of variables a higher percentile indicated a higher nominal metric value, some variables had their percentiles inverted, as a lower score aligned with the other metrics with a higher score in the same phase-category. For example, in the case of defensive aggressiveness, a lower PPDA indicates a team pressing with more intensity, as does a higher volume of defensive actions. <strong>In particular</strong>:</p><p>Inverted percentiles  PPDA, pass completion % against, passes per possession allowed, xG/shot, long pass %, forward pass %, direct speed</p><p>Composite scores for each phase of play were calculated by averaging the percentiles of the selected key performance indicators within that category. This produced a single league-normalised score (0–100) representing the strength of each stylistic construct.</p><p>Category scores were interpreted relative to the league distribution. Teams were classified as high or low when their composite score was at least 0.75 standard deviations above or below the league mean, respectively; all other teams were classified as mixed. This approach ensured that only teams with clearly distinctive stylistic orientations were identified as extremes, while those with more moderate or hybrid profiles remained in the central category. The directional nature of the composite scores meant that high and low classifications represented opposing tactical styles and behaviours, rather than differences in level of performance.</p><p>Final play-style classifications were selected empirically with the possession style and defensive territory scores as the primary indicators, while the shot selection and defensive aggressiveness were used to differentiate teams that shared similar primary indicator scores, in cases were outlier scores existed in those categories.</p><h4><strong>RESULTS</strong></h4><p><strong>On the ball</strong></p><p>Primary indicator: Possession style</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UNRoa1ON9ljVegnV2tOQSg.png" /></figure><p>High: patient build-up (5 teams)</p><p>Mixed: mixed play (10 teams)</p><p>Low: direct attack (5 teams)</p><p>Secondary indicator: Shot selection</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/896/1*argiToV0TwhDDULKJ5tATw.png" /></figure><p>High: aggressive shot selection (4 teams)</p><p>Mixed: mixed shot selection (14 teams)</p><p>Low: patient shot selection (2 teams)</p><p><strong><em>Classification</em></strong></p><p>Arsenal: patient build-up, mixed shot selection</p><p>Aston Villa: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p>Bournemouth: direct attack, mixed shot selection</p><p>Brentford: direct attack, patient shot selection</p><p>Brighton: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p>Burnley: direct attack, mixed shot selection</p><p>Chelsea: patient build-up, patient shot selection</p><p>Crystal Palace: direct attack, mixed shot selection</p><p>Everton: direct attack, aggressive shot selection</p><p>Fulham: patient build-up, mixed shot selection</p><p>Leeds: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p>Liverpool: patient build-up, aggressive shot selection</p><p>Manchester City: patient build-up, mixed shot selection</p><p>Manchester United: mixed play, aggressive shot selection</p><p>Newcastle United: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p>Nottingham Forest: mixed play, aggressive shot selection</p><p>Sunderland: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p>Tottenham: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p>West Ham United: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p>Wolves: mixed play, mixed shot selection</p><p><strong>Off the ball</strong></p><p>Primary indicator: Defensive territory</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pYiGMJWkoHp-MYzRwPc9yA.png" /></figure><p>High: high press (7 teams)</p><p>Mixed: mid-block (7 teams)</p><p>Low: low block (6 teams)</p><p>Secondary indicator: Defensive aggressiveness</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D4WvpYjfedQModQG1kHC9w.png" /></figure><p>High: aggressive defence (7 teams)</p><p>Mixed: mixed defensive aggressiveness (7 teams)</p><p>Low: passive defence (6 teams)</p><p><strong><em>Classification</em></strong></p><p>Arsenal: high press, aggressive defence</p><p>Aston Villa: mid-block, mixed defensive aggressiveness</p><p>Bournemouth: mid-block, aggressive defence</p><p>Brentford: mid-block, mixed defensive aggressiveness</p><p>Brighton: high press, aggressive defence</p><p>Burnley: low block, passive defence</p><p>Chelsea: high press, aggressive defence</p><p>Crystal Palace: low block, passive defence</p><p>Everton: mid-block, passive defence</p><p>Fulham: low block, mixed defensive aggressiveness</p><p>Leeds: mid-block, mixed defensive aggressiveness</p><p>Liverpool: high press, aggressive defence</p><p>Manchester City: high press, aggressive defence</p><p>Manchester United: high press, aggressive defence</p><p>Newcastle United: high press, mixed defensive aggressiveness</p><p>Nottingham Forest: mid-block, mixed defensive aggressiveness</p><p>Sunderland: low block, passive defence</p><p>Tottenham: mid-block, mixed defensive aggressiveness</p><p>West Ham United: low block, passive defence</p><p>Wolves: low block, passive defence</p><p><strong>Play-styles</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iS9NNcoOImEn5VbUD3x-UA.png" /></figure><h4>DISCUSSION</h4><blockquote>Number of play-styles:</blockquote><p>The final analysis resulted in 9 different play-styles, which is certainly more than I initially expected. My empirical guess as I was starting out this study was around 4 or 5. Had I not used the secondary indicators as differentiators, the number would have been 7, but the degree of detail of this study would have been diminished.</p><blockquote>Outliers based on secondary indicators:</blockquote><p>When observing most of the results, Liverpool belong in the control-ball play-style along with some of the other big-name teams, but Liverpool’s outlier shot selection score compared to Arsenal, Manchester City and Chelsea, as well noticing their much higher direct speed individual metric, meant they had to be placed in their own play-style. Their approach is far more aggressive in the final third, hence “<strong>trigger-happy control-ball</strong>”</p><p>Bournemouth were also placed in their own play-style despite being primarily a mid-block &amp; counter team, due to their outlier defensive aggressiveness (only non-high pressing team with high defensive aggressiveness score). The label “<strong>chaos-ball</strong>” is borrowed from Micheal Caley and Mike Goodman’s “The Double Pivot” podcast and makes a lot of sense for Bournemouth due to their very aggressive midfield contesting approach and direct attacks immediately when they win the ball.</p><blockquote>“Polar opposites” team:</blockquote><p>As I was calculating those scores, I was interested to see whether any teams would show up with polar opposite in and out of possession styles, without really expecting it. While no high pressing &amp; direct attacks team showed up, I was surprised to see Fulham come out as a low block team that has a similar build-up score to the likes of Arsenal and Liverpool, who are obvious high-pressing sides. Hence, “<strong>low block &amp; play out</strong>”.</p><blockquote>Play-style effectiveness:</blockquote><p>A question that naturally arises when reading these results is how effective is each play-style. Unfortunately, the sample size of teams is nowhere near big enough to make such conclusions. However, there are some trends based on team performance this season, according to xPoints on Understat.com:</p><p>- Control-ball teams, including Liverpool, make up 4 of the 5 performing teams in the league, as is expected perhaps. In the PL’s Pep-era, the best teams have always tended to be high possession, high territory sides that suffocate the opposition with their press. It is no different this season.</p><p>- If we widen the criteria and include all high-pressing sides, they make up 6 of the top 7, except from Brighton who are down at 11th. High pressing remains the dominant PL meta, though it is essential to keep in mind that those 6 sides make up 6 out of the 8 teams with the highest squad wage bill, as per Capology.com. The high press &amp; vertical build-up sides are overall not as high-performing as most of the control-ball teams, but they are still quite good.</p><p>- The mid-blocking teams make up most of the middle of the pack in the PL, with the exception of Forest who are 17th in xPts. There is no specific multi-team trend in regards to what the most effective possession strategy is when mid-blocking, but impressively, Bournemouth’s unique style has them breaking up the high pressing dominance in the top 7, ranking 6th in xPts, despite having the 4th lowest wage bill in the division, while losing multiple key players in the last two transfer windows and replacing them with less costly players.</p><p>- With the exception of Crystal Palace who feature solidly at 10th, the rest of the low-blocking teams are some of the worst-performing in the division, making up 5 of the bottom 6 in xPts.</p><p>In general the only meaningful trend we can observe in terms of play-style effectiveness is that the higher the defensive territory of a team, the better they tend to perform. However, their performance is as expected very correlated with their squad wages expenditure, which ultimately indicates that play-style is linked to wealth in the PL.</p><blockquote>Limitations:</blockquote><p>1. Sample size: not a full season worth of games skew metrics.</p><p>2. Play-style complexity: for practicality reasons, a limited amount of categories had to be taken into account. A greater amount of detail would be achievable had we considered separate categories for transitions. However, certain transition indicators were included within the two phase-categories, due to limited availability of metrics.</p><p>3. Cross-leagues comparison: in a hypothetical scenario where this process is replicated for another league, accumulation and cross-league comparison of play-styles would not be valid as the play-styles come up based on league-wide percentiles. Therefore, the play-styles are relative to the league the teams compete in. It is important to mention, that this methodology is 100% replicable on any league or level in world football, provided the metrics used are available for every team.</p><p>Thanks for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=947490e941b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is Liverpool’s plan?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/what-is-liverpools-plan-7b2bc2952a81?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b2bc2952a81</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liverpool-fc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2025 13:07:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-15T13:07:49.806Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NhUKajZ-P2zb_exZ6XthUA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Following a surprisingly smooth transition from all-time great coach Jurgen Klopp to Arne Slot and a somewhat unexpected Premier League title winning season, Liverpool FC are currently undergoing by far their most expensive transfer window ever, acquiring superstar talent in the process. Despite the inherent trust that a Michael Edwards-run club transmits, a lot of their transfer activity seems non-straightfoward from both a short-term and longer-term POV. Watching it all unfold from the outside, my curiosity rose rapidly and set me out on a journey to analyse and evaluate their recruitment strategy this window, implementing a variety of data, pre-season games, educated guesses and half-baked assumptions. Thus, with the start of their PL season being imminent and their transfer business still unfinished, I attempt to answer the question: what is their plan?</p><p><strong>DISCLAIMER</strong>: Before we get in the crux of things, I would like to offer my condolences to Diogo Jota’s family for his tragic and untimely death this July. He was a huge player for Liverpool and a part of their future plans, so obviously I have to talk about him in this piece, at times ignoring the elephant in the room. <strong>Rest in peace, Diogo</strong>.</p><h4><strong>#1) How are they getting away with it?</strong></h4><p>(<em>Note: All money figures courtesy of transfermarkt.com</em>)</p><p>Before we go into their squad building plan, I wanna tackle an issue for which people (especially jealous rival fans if we are being honest) have shown a lot of concern for: <strong>how are Liverpool allowed to spend so much money, without breaching PSR and/or FFP regulations</strong>? The short answer is rather simple and involves three main points:</p><ol><li>Unbalanced (and mostly low) year-to-year spending</li><li>An exceptional ability to sell players</li><li>Letting players on high wages walk at the right time, without offering them contract extensions that make them hard to offload</li></ol><p>By the first point (1.), I mean that Liverpool do not spend huge money every year and when they do, it tends to be preceded by a season or two of very little, if any spending. It’s not a linear trend, but the overall net transfer spend over the last decade or so is very low for a club like Liverpool with a massive global profile and extremely consistent UCL participation + revenues. It’s certainly a fair bit lower than the majority of their PL competitors, especially the likes of Man United, City, Arsenal, Chelsea.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K0BmRkf7dNxfUpn0Vh3gww.png" /></figure><p>The second point (2.) is self-explanatory. Liverpool are extremely good at selling players at the right time. This includes a) selling prime or late-prime aged players right before their value drops off a cliff and b) selling youngsters and/or academy products while they are still young and have a “potential tax” added on to their price tag, before they have actually played enough to showcase that they are actually not that great.</p><p>The first category of players has certainly been aided by the emergence of the Saudi Pro League as a keen buyer of older and/or high wage players with reputable names and declining production: Jordan Henderson, Fabinho and more recently the no-longer wanted Darwin Núñez. Even without Saudi Arabia, Liverpool have still done extremely well to sell prime or late prime aged players to European clubs: Sadio Mané, Takumi Minamino, Dejan Lovren, Danny Ings, Danny Ward, Mamadou Sakho, Christian Benteke, Joe Allen, Luis Díaz, Philippe Coutinho (record sale for a PL team) <strong>were all sales of over €10m each</strong> and it’s fair to say Liverpool have regretted none of them, thus far. The second category has also been crucial, as this is where Liverpool have generated the most pure profit in PSR terms: Jarell Quansah, Tyler Morton, Caoimhín Kelleher, Sepp ven den Berg, Fabio Carvalho, Neco Williams, Taiwo Awoniyi, Ryan Kent, Dominic Solanke, Rhian Brewster, Jordon Ibe, Trent Alexander-Arnold <strong>all generated at least €5 mil each</strong>. It’s fair to say they haven’t lost any sleep over any of these academy/young player sales either, apart from the obvious exception of TAA, which was obviously forced on them due to the player’s unwillingness to extend his contract.</p><p>The third point (3.) is also very important, as a key reason why other big teams struggle to offload players is untimely contract extensions to high wage players in order to “preserve their value” (looking at you, Arsenal). Liverpool almost never do it. Roberto Firmino, Naby Keïta, Georginho Wijnaldum, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, Adam Lallana, Nathaniel Clyne, Alberto Moreno, Daniel Sturridge are all players who were on high-ish wages and had previously been key players at the club, but were let go for free at the end of their contracts. Once again, no regrets.</p><h4>#2) State of things entering this summer</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fajkKHTqebds9mos" /><figcaption>[liverpoolfc.com]</figcaption></figure><p>My guess is that the internal feeling at Liverpool last summer was not that they would dominate the PL like they did in Slot’s first season. Following a 4 year run of spending that was fairly significant for their standards, Liverpool had a squad that proved to not need any real additions or spending to mount a proper title challenge. After all, they were not that far off the season before, as they led the PL for large parts of 23/24 before falling off late on, still picking up a very respectable total of 82 points. Based on reporting, Liverpool only had one major target last summer, Basque DM Martín Zubimendi, who briefly agreed terms with the club, before pulling out of the deal in the last moment in favour of staying at Real Sociedad for one more year (and a move to Arsenal this summer, as we learned later). Liverpool under Michael Edwards have always been a club that would rather not spend when they miss out on their main targets, instead of pivoting to other equally expensive, but non-optimal options. Hence, they decided not to pursue any alternative to Zubimendi, rely on their existing options and keep their powder dry. Instead, their only real incoming business for that season was a cheap deal for Federico Chiesa as a 6th choice forward, who proved to be inconsequential to their PL season.</p><p>Fast forward a year later, Liverpool are operating at a position of extreme strength compared to their competitors. Not only did they enter the transfer window with the most PSR room to spend, they did it on the heels of winning the PL title, which under my assumption relieves them of the short-term pressure to win now, that a team like Arsenal is facing this season. Still, Liverpool’s squad was not perfect, so they still had a lot of business to do:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/896/1*Cm-c2p0QlTW7e3Y0DCNqMQ.png" /><figcaption>(In parenthesis: players set to be sold or already sold)</figcaption></figure><p>Broadly, this is what Liverpool needed this summer:</p><ol><li>A RB to replace TAA and compete with Conor Bradley</li><li>A LB to start over Robertson, with Tsimikas due to be sold</li><li>A CB to replace Jarell Quansah and provide primary depth for both CB spots</li><li>A true AM to compete with or start over Szoboszlai</li><li>Two CF’s to replace Darwin and Jota</li><li>A LW to replace Diaz</li></ol><h4>#3) What they have done so far:</h4><p>Let’s now examine their business and see how they have done so far, in comparison to the players they already had and/or the ones that departed.</p><p>[<em>All data used is courtesy of fbref.com, transfermarkt.com, sofascore.com</em>]</p><p><strong>Florian Wirtz, Attacking Midfielder, €125m, 22 y/o, Bayer Leverkusen</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jGp1r79nPMPE-DU5DcRL0Q.png" /></figure><p>Best way to describe Florian Wirtz is… fake. Yeah, he is that good. Liverpool paid a fee that amounts to a British transfer record (add-ons included) and it is hard to argue that they overpaid any meaningful amount. The fact that they manage to snatch arguably Germany’s best player from the hands of Bayern tells you how significant this transfer is for them.</p><p>Wirtz is good at pretty much everything. He is an elite dribbler, a great ball progressor, an excellent creator, he gets on the ball a ton for an attacking midfielder, provides good goal threat and if all that was not enough, he has been a fantastic finisher throughout his career, consistently outperforming xG. He is a classic #10, but is comfortable operating across the pitch, having played as an inside forward, wingfielder, #8 and even false #9.</p><p>Wirtz comes in to take a spot that was primarily occupied by Dominik Szoboszlai, who is more of a CM/AM hybrid. He had a solid season for Liverpool, but his production does not stand out for someone that played for a top attacking team. He got on the ball a fair bit, but did not provide a lot of value in possession, created at a solid rate, though offered no real goal threat. A lot of his value comes from his play out of possession, as he is an intense runner and a diligent presser who wins his duels at a good rate. Can Wirtz replicate that? I am not sure. As a German AM, he is obviously a guy who takes his OOP work seriously, but does not offer the running intensity that Szoboszlai does. Will be interesting to see how it works out. The two can definitely play together in the front 4, so that will be one to watch.</p><p><strong>Milos Kerkez, Left Back, €46.9m, 21 y/o, Bournemouth</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0WnkaflQY8-WxtGfBi2aVQ.png" /></figure><p>Kerkez feels like a safe bet for Liverpool to take, despite his statistical profile not jumping out of the page. He was one of the better LB’s in England last season, doing that a young age at a very solid defensive team, though playing in a more attacking role than will likely be asked from him at Liverpool:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/830/1*jV30BCwr_gzDZ47j5VSrbQ.png" /><figcaption>Kerkez’s 24/25 PL Heatmap [sofascore.com]</figcaption></figure><p>If we compare his statistical profile to Robertson, they are quite similar, with the caveat that the Scot had almost 20 more touches per 90 than him, playing for a team that averaged 9.2% more possession. Both can progress the ball through carrying or passing and had similar production in the final third (solid, not outstanding). Kerkez had a much higher volume of defensive actions, though that could definitely be interpreted as a byproduct of their respective teams. Still, he won duels at a much better rate than Robertson last season.</p><p>Kerkez will have to adapt to a more conservative role in possession, as mentioned earlier. His touch profile from last season is similar to Robertson’s, but the main difference exists in the % of touches in the middle third and final third respectively:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KhiKl1jmpc9C7lIcd8XVUw.png" /><figcaption>Touches per 90 in each third of the pitch (% rate of total touches)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Jeremie Frimpong, Right Back, €40m, 24 y/o, Bayer Leverkusen</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wZJMhvHBKvKWlxysE4Edww.png" /></figure><p>Being brutally honest, Frimpong (as the de facto replacement for TAA) was in my eyes a baffling piece of business. Main reason for that is the fact that he has not really been a RB for a few years, as is reflected in his data chart. He has played primarily as a RWB in a 3 back system across the last 3 seasons under Xabi Alonso, in a role that looks more like a RW.</p><p>Compared to FB’s, he provides a ton of value in the final third, as is expected. He creates and scores a lot of goals, gets on the ball a ton in the final third and inside the box. He provides no value at all as a passer in the build-up and commits very few defensive actions.</p><p>Even though, TAA is known as an attacking RB by the mainstream, his role for Liverpool was nothing like Frimpong’s. He got on the ball almost twice as much as Frimpong and is one of the best and most progressive passers in world football, period. The possession value he provides is second to none when it comes to FB’s. He is an elite creator and achieves that while achieving only 29% of his touches in the final third, compared to a staggering 56.1% (!) for Frimpong. It is quite clear that Liverpool do not expect the Dutchman to replace TAA’s impact on the team.</p><p>Perhaps the more apt comparison for Frimpong is Conor Bradley, who he is expected to compete with for the RB spot. Even then, Bradley’s statistical profile is much closer to TAA’s, than Frimpong’s is.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1F9Skg6JGETNpPDJqR8uSA.png" /></figure><p>Their participation and value in build-up is night and day, as is the volume of their defensive actions. Bradley, like Frimpong, is a very willing off-ball runner and gets in the box at a massive rate, especially for a back 4 RB, offering decent goal threat, though his finishing meant he failed to score in the league last season. Let’s continue this discussion later on in the piece.</p><p><strong>Hugo Ekitike, Center Forward, €80m, 23 y/o, Eintracht Frankfurt</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XfwqKPDUmXzCT9nkBEOpnw.png" /></figure><p>Ekitike is a very raw CF that already manages a very high level of production. That is the perfect mix, if you are shopping in the non-elite-already market (which in most cases, everyone does). He blows the statistical profile of every CF Liverpool had last year out of the water, with only Jota coming anywhere close. Liverpool paid a price that reflected that, with achievable add-ons that will take it close to €100m.</p><p>Ekitike generates a ton of shots (did it at a shot-happy team, nonetheless), which resulted in the very high 0.6 npxG per 90 mark he achieved. He had a very poor finishing season, underperfoming his npxG by 4.3 in Bundesliga and Europa League play, which is certainly a concern. However, Hugo had been an above average finisher in his career before that season (albeit in a fairly limited sample size), so that number will likely regress closer to the mean. Eye-test wise, he looks like a very accomplished shooter. His debut goal finish in the Community Shield was quite frankly, nasty:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*cGaVn8v3XyIfSUCD.gif" /></figure><p>Perhaps the most exciting part of his game is the value he provides as a playmaker and creator. He is an elite dribbler and carrier for his possession, he creates loads of chances and in general is a high touch forward that is very adept at linking up the play in tight spaces or in transition.</p><p>Perhaps the only real concern to be had over the translation of his production to Liverpool is the fact that he played at a Frankfurt side that loves attacking in transition, which traditionally has caused a high level of inflation in the production of the wide variety of forwards they have sold for big money in recent years (Jovic, Haller, Marmoush, Andre Silva etc.). Still, Liverpool are a team that creates lots of artificial transitions + the fact that he will be playing next to creators like Wirtz and Salah make me confident he will be just fine.</p><h4>#4) How it came together in their first competitive match (and some chat about their overall midfield make-up):</h4><p>Time for a brief tactical analysis of their Community shield loss on penalties to Crystal Palace last Sunday, mainly focusing on the roles of the 4 new players, all of whom started:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yyBnvXXtu2tiZqXvdJ2AGg.png" /></figure><p>Only thing of note in the starting XI for Liverpool was in their midfield, where they started without the 2 double pivot starters from last season. Gravenberch (perhaps their only DM) was suspended, with Curtis Jones stepping in for him, while Szoboszlai started at the slightly more advanced role of the left pivot, in place of Mac Allister, who struggled with an injury in pre-season. <strong>I want to take some time to talk about their double pivot as I want to showcase how important the two absentees from the starting XI are for this team, in the context of their future as well:</strong></p><p>Ryan Gravenberch started 37/38 league games for Liverpool last season at the more defensive right pivot role in Slots 4–2–3–1/4–2–4. Previously in his career he was considered an extremely talented #8/#10 hybrid with more hype than good performances, impressing as a youngster at Ajax but failing to make his mark at Bayern and during his first season in Merseyside under Klopp. After missing out on Zubimendi, Slot decided to convert Gravenberch into a #6, which proved to be a superb decision. He is a technically gifted player, who is a safe and low volume passer, but provides value in the build-up through his carrying, dribbling and overall ability to keep the ball under pressure. He also finally put it together out of possession, using his long limbs to intercept a lot of balls and win the majority of his duels, without being a high volume tackler though.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/834/1*0PMspjU1Hhe-m48us0q7Vw.png" /><figcaption>Ryan Gravenberch’s 24/25 season [fbref.com]</figcaption></figure><p>Curtis Jones who played in this role fits the on-ball profile of Gravenberch as someone who is great at keeping the ball under pressure in tight spaces, though his tendency to over-dribble and not release the ball in time leads to him losing the ball more than one would expect. He also lacks the physical profile to replicate Gravenberch’s OOP work. Jones split his minutes last season between the left pivot and the #10 spot, and these roles certainly suit him more than right pivot/DM. Wataru Endo is only other DM in the squad. He provides a lot of ball-winning value, but his limitations on the ball meant that Slot only trusts him for game-management minutes off the bench. Liverpool rely on Gravenberch a lot and this is something that will have to be addressed in the transfer market, perhaps next year.</p><p>Alexis Mac Allister is also a massive player for this team and a great fit for the more advanced left pivot role, in which he splits his time as a second DM next to the right pivot and as a second AM next to the #10. He provides elite final third production for a deeper-lying midfielder and progresses the ball at a solid rate through his passing. Perhaps the most overlooked part of his game is his tackling ability, he makes a ton of tackles, which complements Gravenberch’s intercepting ability.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UOhcTFkEgacaxwcd5SgDyw.png" /></figure><p>Szoboszlai is a solid fit for this role as he works hard OOP and brings final third output, but lacks some key on-ball attributes to be a deep receiver in the build-up in tight spaces. Jones does a little bit of everything in that role, but lacks Mac Allister’s high-end strengths to be a week in-week out starter. All in all, Liverpool have more than enough sufficient cover for the left pivot role, but Mac Allister is still by far the best option and his absence from the starting XI against Palace was a big miss. <strong>Back to the game:</strong></p><p>Liverpool built-up in a lop-sided 3–3–1–3. Kerkez on the left-side of the back 3 next to the CB’s and Frimpong at the same horizontal zone as the double pivot, but completely withdrawn from them, in a more traditional wide RB role. Wirtz had a free role like a classic #10, with freedom to move all over the place:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/892/1*c0TzYMRX2aCDLW3kXtE27Q.png" /></figure><p>Liverpool attempted to build centrally, as they like to do under Slot, packing the middle with their double pivot positioned close together for the wall pass and Wirtz dropping in to receive the progressive pass and connect the play to the frontline. Their back 3 is quite narrow as well, to aid with quick circulation and potential progression on the second stage of the move. Frimpong is serving as a wide outlet, uninvolved in the build-up. In the sequence below, the double pivot lack the cuteness in tight spaces that Gravenberch x Mac Allister have and the ball does not find Wirtz. You get the idea though.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*wVSahMXdscBmB0Vr.gif" /></figure><p>A common positional rotation that occured was with Szoboszlai dropping into the LB zone and Kerkez stepping up and inverting into midfield. It is not something that worked particularly well, with Kerkez struggling to operate in central zones, he did not look comfortable shifting the ball onto his right and working on the inside angle. Let’s wait and see how this works out going forward, it is early to judge both process and outcome of this tactic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*knIzf7_9B70UIccCwXSLeQ.png" /></figure><p>Wirtz served the connecting role between the double pivot and the front 3 throughout the game. His ability to receive the ball at any angle and combine before the pressure gets to him is second to none. He regularly dropped in to receive and aid with progression, either with short passing combinations or with his carrying. Liverpool lacked that skillset before his acquisition. My assumption is that this is one of the ways with which Slot will try to recreate Trent’s impact in the aggregate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*bX041y3FlZd0y6Ba.gif" /></figure><p>His play is also extremely effective in the final third as a floating playmaker, obviously. This sequence of his which starts with a backheel to connect the play centrally and ends with a big chance supplied to Ekitike is simply filthy:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*sdxVmQgV0YSSQ7OT.gif" /></figure><p>Speaking of Ekitike, he served a role in which he had a quite a bit of freedom and was not restricted into pinning the CB’s. In some of the clips above, you can see him dropping into midfield and wide pockets, without receiving the ball. Apart from his goal, he had a few nice moments, linking up well and looking like a great fit next to the rest of Liverpool’s attacking players. The transitional combinations this team can achieve are scary:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*opAFijha40LXRNlk.gif" /></figure><p>The two wingers, Gakpo &amp; Salah, stayed high and wide and served the role of wide outlets, not having much involvement in the build-up. Salah had some opportunity to come inside, as Frimpong was given freedom to bomb into the final third and threaten from wide. His goal looked rather flukey, but it speaks to how Slot intends to use him, in a far different role than TAA ever played.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*DywrY-g2U6_gKnVC.gif" /></figure><p>Without sugarcoating things, Liverpool face a big ball progression issue with TAA off the team and replaced by Frimpong, who provides almost 0 passing progression. My assumption based off this game, as well as their overall recruitment strategy is that they will rely more on the forward players to make the ball stick and link-up in both tight and open spaces to get their team up the pitch, without Trent finding them anywhere on the pitch with his eyes closed. Wirtz and Ekitike certainly provide a huge upgrade in that regard compared to the likes of Szoboszlai and Darwin. That said, the availability of Gravenberch and Mac Allister in midfield is absolutely crucial, as they will need at least a couple of players who can progress the ball through the thirds without Wirtz having to make the impossible possible. Long-term they will need to buy a couple more too.</p><h4>#5) What is left to do:</h4><p><strong>Center Forward</strong></p><p>Right, let’s get this out of the way first. Isak has long been my favourite CF. He is exceptional, he is clearly elite level and paying a British transfer record of him is far from unreasonable. However, if there is one player who has the upside to become equivalent to Isak, that is Hugo Ekitike. Are Liverpool actually signing both in one summer? They are very similar players and the data backs it up:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9JJHg04It-8fNL6oATR2uQ.png" /></figure><p>Ekitike creates more (albeit at a team that creates more, at a weaker league) and is better in the air. Isak adds more progressive value through his passing, but his main advantage right now over Hugo is that he scores a lot more, due to his lethal finishing ability. They are both so well-rounded that playing them together is certainly an option, however, that makes a lot less sense when we take into account their current set-up and personnel. <strong>We will discuss how it can be done later on.</strong></p><p>Yes, Isak on top of Ekitike is definitely overkill. However, the reality of the situation is that <strong>Liverpool absolutely need another CF</strong>. They do not have any other senior CF options in their squad. Last season Slot split their CF minutes between three players, with Núñez, Jota and Luis Díaz each playing around 1/3 of the minutes in that role. None of them are still at the club, Ekitike alone is not enough.</p><p>If you need a CF and have the opportunity + the money to add a player like Isak, I guess you just do it. He is reportedly refusing to play another game for Newcastle and is trying to force a move to Liverpool. Can you really say no?</p><p><strong>Center Back(s)</strong></p><p>Liverpool also clearly needed a CB, after selling Jarell Quansah to Leverkusen earlier this summer. Joe Gomez is still good, but his persistent injury issues mean he cannot be trusted as primary back-up for VVD and Konaté (who is sneakily injury-prone himself too). They left it quite late, but are now on the verge of completing a €35m move for 18 y/o Italian Giovanni Leoni from Parma. I will be honest: <strong>I know nothing about the player</strong> and the recency of the news meant I had no time to do any research on him. His stats are not good, but that is no reason for concern for a CB playing for a bad Serie A team in his age 17 season. For what it’s worth, trustworthy people that have watched him like the deal a lot for Liverpool.</p><h3>Fabrizio Romano on X (formerly Twitter): &quot;🚨🔴 BREAKING: Giovanni Leoni to Liverpool, here we go! Deal agreed with Parma for Italian 18yo centre back.No loan, never discussed... Leoni joins #LFC now as part of Arne Slot plans.Fee around €35m with sell-on clause.No convincing ever needed as Leoni wanted Liverpool. pic.twitter.com/27rb2DXbw3 / X&quot;</h3><p>🚨🔴 BREAKING: Giovanni Leoni to Liverpool, here we go! Deal agreed with Parma for Italian 18yo centre back.No loan, never discussed... Leoni joins #LFC now as part of Arne Slot plans.Fee around €35m with sell-on clause.No convincing ever needed as Leoni wanted Liverpool. pic.twitter.com/27rb2DXbw3</p><p>Simultaneously, Liverpool are also working on a deal for Crystal Palace’s captain Marc Guehi, which makes me assume that Leoni is a signing for the future. Guehi is an established PL performer close to a prime age (25 y/o), who will reportedly come for very cheap as well (around €40m), as he only has a year left in his contract. He is a perfect third CB, as he is a right footer who has primarily played at LCB in recent seasons, thus he could cover for both of the starting CB’s. If those two moves capitalise, Liverpool are solidifying their CB core, which did not look promising long-term, given VVD is at the tale-end of his prime and Konaté has been persistently linked with a move to Real Madrid, with only a year left in his contract.</p><p><strong>Left Wing</strong></p><p>I find Liverpool’s LW situation to be under-discussed, with the potential Isak move getting all the hype right now. The LW minutes were shared last year between Luis Díaz and Cody Gakpo. The former had a very productive and underrated 24/25 season, however, Bayern made an offer for him that Liverpool couldn’t refuse, €70m for a 28 y/o player with non-elite production and who was demanding a big pay rise. He offered high goal threat, had a good finishing season and is a great dribbler, with low possession value and average creativity. A pure outlet. Gakpo is similar, with the main difference being that he is far worse dribbler (less burst and agility), but provides elite finishing with high volume shooting. He is far from perfect, but is a good fit next to the high-level creators Liverpool have in their frontline and attacking midfield.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*op9gjw9uEwhJRj3WzVyZ-g.png" /></figure><p>The problem arises with the fact that Liverpool have not replaced Luis Díaz at all and don’t look likely to do so. Bradley Barcola (elite talent) has been mentioned as a dream target for them if Isak does not happen, but the probability of a move for him materialising this window seems close to 0. Federico Chiesa is still under contract at the club and could be an option on the LW, but just like Endo, he played so little last season that I can’t think of him as an option for real minutes moving forward. I guess if he can stay healthy (big if), the situation could change.</p><p>I know exactly what most Liverpool fans have been thinking while reading this section. I am ignoring <strong>Rio Ngumoha</strong>, I know, but he is 16 after all and has 0 pro minutes in his career so far. He was however extremely impressive in pre-season friendlies with the first team playing off the left. I have not watched him much, but heard great things about him. I asked my mate <a href="https://medium.com/u/8e064b7d1b15">Half Turn</a> (go follow him on Twitter: @half_turn, he is excellent) to give me the rundown on him:</p><p>“<em>Rio Ngumoha’s physical makeup jumps out the screen whenever you watch him. His twitchiness (quick, light feet with explosiveness) along with his dueling strength makes him already one of the most dangerous 1v1 wingers in the Premier League. And, Rio knows that he is truly elite in this regard, thus always fancies himself to take on a defender, and he can go in and out on the left flank which makes him quite unpredictable.</em></p><p><em>But, what impresses me the most is his mental and cerebral level. He is always composed and in control even when he is in the middle of a chaotic sequence. Always calculated with his touches. And, the variety in his tools is also lovely, early balls into the box, switches to the opposite flank, cutting in and shooting, getting to touchline and cutting the ball back, etc.</em></p><p><em>He’ll get more and more minutes as the left winger with time in my opinion. He offers Arne Slot a different profile, a real winger profile on the left flank. But, I expect it to be a gradual process as he is still 16, so caution is a must. Cup minutes, and some 20 minute cameos in the league in won matches for this season is my prediction. But, I really think he’ll be a part of the top 15 players in the squad by the 27/28 season at the latest</em>.”</p><p>So you heard the man, as exciting as Rio is, we should not be expecting him to play meaningful matches for Liverpool’s first team this season.</p><p>There are some other makeshift options for the LW spot, including Wirtz and Ekitike (if Isak joins), however that would require changes in the set-up and once again, I tell you to be patient<strong> </strong>as<strong> we’ll discuss in the section coming up</strong>.</p><h4>#6) What is the long-term plan?</h4><p>Finally, after nearly 5k words worth of waffling, we can now get into the big question that inspired me to write this piece: <strong>Can</strong> <strong>a team with Isak and Ekitike and Salah and Wirtz work long-term?</strong></p><p>My short answer: no. Let me explain.</p><p><strong>Current options:</strong></p><p>First off, let’s talk about Mo Salah who I’ve barely mentioned so far, arguably the best attacker in England for almost a decade now. His long-term status at Liverpool recently came under scrutiny, as he delayed signing a new contract until a couple of months before his old one expired. Ultimately he penned only a 2-year extension until 2027 (keep this in mind), a sensible move for the club as he is entering his age 33 season. Salah is still extremely productive and will deservedly win the PFA PL Player of the Year in a few days, after breaking the single season PL record for G+A with 47 in 24/25. He is still very much in his prime. His possession involvement + dribbling is not where it once was, but his final third output is better than ever. To question his status as a guaranteed starter for Liverpool would be insane.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CdiODF4pbo8k_J1lubgkBQ.png" /></figure><p>My question when it comes to Salah is whether you could start him on the RW next to two CF’s like Ekitike &amp; Isak. And then how does Wirtz also figure into this?</p><p>In theory, these are the two options Slot could pick from:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a5HR9yA6BGjJkNU0gtbZPg.png" /><figcaption>In-possession structures</figcaption></figure><p>On paper, the frontline for both options works quite well. Both Wirtz &amp; Ekitike can operate off the inside left, but would not suit a touchline role, thus, Kerkez is instructed to play high &amp; wide in possession, like Andy Robertson used to do next to Sadio Mané under Klopp. Kerkez played a similarly attacking role at Bournemouth and is very well suited for it. Ekitike is versatile enough to operate in any inside zone, as is Isak. The rotations could be unstoppable with Wirtz floating around them and Salah off the right.</p><p>However, <strong>obvious problems arise when you look at the 5 behind the frontline</strong>. Frimpong on the right side of a back 3 sticks out at like a sore thumb, it is pretty much the opposite of how you’d wanna use him. Conor Bradley is not a much better fit at that role either. You could instruct the RB to join the frontline and overlap Salah, but the balance in build-up + rest defence would be completely shot, as Kerkez is also up there and not in the backline, like he was in the Community Shield. And as we said, Kerkez has to be high &amp; wide to accomodate whoever the LW is. Furthermore, VVD has been traditionally used in a more central role, with Konaté tasked with defending the wide areas to cover the RB. With Kerkez in the frontline, VVD shifts to LCB and Konaté to CCB which is just not a great fit for either of them given their current skillsets. Again, it is the opposite of how you’d want them used. If Guehi comes in, he could take Konaté’s place in the line-up and shift VVD to RCB/CCB, but that is far from a certainty right now.</p><p>These are just the in possession issues. Out of possession there would be questions too. In Slot’s 4–4–2, the first option would have two CF’s who are decent pressers but neither of them will track back and help out the midfield like Szoboszlai did. In the second option, Ekitike defending on the left side of a midfield 4 is not something he is used to and would require a big adjustment to the OOP habits he’s built playing as a CF throughout his career.</p><p>The real answer is that Ekitike and Isak would likely not start too many games together. The former is still very young and I assume could potentially accept a reduced role for his first season (at most). Furthermore, the obvious elephant in the room is Isak’s injury record, which doesn’t look super pretty. The Swede has averaged 24.82 league 90’s ever since he became a full-time starter at Real Sociedad in 20/21, which is about 7–8 less than you’d want. Ekitike would definitely find playing time at CF, should this unfortunate pattern continue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l42e5vjFaHpy496g8dZ5NA.png" /><figcaption>Isak’s recent injury record [transfermarkt.com]</figcaption></figure><p><strong>A glimpse into a post-Salah future:</strong></p><p>My current assumption is that Michael Edwards and FSG found the chance to assemble the post-Salah attack a year or two early, and took it quite aggressively. The Egyptian has been persistently linked with a Saudi move in recent years and the fact that he only signed a 2 year contract suggests that his long-term future is not in Merseyside. Could we perhaps see him make that move next summer with a year left on his deal, with Liverpool recouping some of the money (and the wages of course) they gave out this summer to rebuild their frontline? This is a theory that resonates with me.</p><p>Again, this is only an assumption, but let’s ride with it: does an Ekitike + Isak team make more sense without Salah? 100% yes.</p><p>Let’s go back to Liverpool’s defensive signings: Frimpong is clearly more of a WB than a FB. Kerkez has played in a back 4, but is more of a flying FB than an inverted one in possession. They are also adding a couple of new CB’s, probably. What I am thinking is obvious: <strong>a</strong> <strong>back 3</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/826/1*XEdOsl9zuzJpeO0ViTaW6A.png" /></figure><p>That’s more like it. This makes a lot of sense. Coincidentally, it is not just Frimpong who is back to the role he played at Leverkusen under Alonso, it is also Wirtz. The front 3 looks near unstoppable and its structure also suits the likes of Gakpo, Ngumoha and Harvey Elliot very well at the inside forward spots, as rotational options. The back 3 makes a not-super defensively-oriented midfield more secure. A quarterbacking CCB role for an ageing VVD looks absolutely perfect for him to transition into for his last few seasons at this level.</p><p>Liverpool would still need some reinforcement at the back (especially if Konaté leaves) and another DM as we mentioned in the paragraph about Gravenberch. But the hard part for most teams at this level is acquiring those elite-level attackers that are so hard to find and Liverpool are very close to accomplishing that in spectacular fashion.</p><h4>#7) Closing thoughts:</h4><p>Will my back 3 no-Salah theory come true in the future? Honestly, I doubt it. It will likely be far less binary. Arne Slot has shown to be a quite flexible manager during his time at Liverpool. While the base formation has remained pretty much the same, we have seen him adapt and tweak things on a game-to-game basis. It is not hard to imagine him tweaking the system long-term, especially with the type of players Michael Edwards is signing. He is targeting superstar talent over systemic fit, which is strategy that reminds me of NBA teams, or other American sports franchises. Liverpool under FSG have been one of the more innovative teams in Europe, building a dynasty over the last decade while relying on data analysis and unique tactics that were notpopular in English football before. They have been real trend setters. I highly recommend you to read “How to win the Premier League” by Ian Graham (Director of Research at LFC, 2012–23) if you want more insight on how this philosophy works. It was a very inspiring book that resonated with me a lot, in terms of my long-term aspirations. <strong>I will definitely be keeping a close eye to how this Liverpool team evolves within the next few years</strong>.</p><p>That’s it. Oof, that was long. In fact, I think it rivals my uni dissertation from my first degree in length. I know 100% for which one I put more effort in. Thanks for reading if you got this far, I am eagerly awaiting your feedback and/or questions. It is my first time writing a football piece this long and also the first time I have incorporated performance data so much, as opposed to pure tactical analysis and hot takes. I hope you found this helpful and/or enjoyable to read. I look forward to creating more content like this in the future.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b2bc2952a81" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tactical analysis: Euro 2024 Final]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/tactical-analysis-euro-2024-final-b775e5ae2dad?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b775e5ae2dad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[england]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[euro2024]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 20 Jul 2024 11:04:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-20T11:04:55.710Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cPQ5DgrQZ_4JuGg8" /></figure><p>Sunday’s game was a fascinating affair between two teams that while at the same stage of the competition, the conversation around them could not be more different.</p><p>Spain lauded by worldwide fans and media alike for their high quality yet entertaining performances, with head coach de la Fuente praised for creating a team where every player that stepped on the pitch thrived within the set-up, regardless of their perceived status and quality.</p><p>On the opposite end, yet also in the Final, Gareth Southgate’s England had come under heavy criticism throughout the tournament for underwhelming performances, uninspiring attacking play and over-reliance on luck, despite their star-studded roster.</p><p>While the final result proved the narratives right, I set out to examine whether the performance of the two teams in the Final were as far apart as mainstream discourse suggests. Let’s dive deeper:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*S5SoNUAJhsZdXA_v.png" /><figcaption>Starting lineups</figcaption></figure><p><strong>FIRST HALF</strong></p><p>England started off the game with an intent to press Spain’s build-up early on, especially from goal kicks. They positioned in a lopsided 4–2–3–1 structure with man orientation in midfield. The nominal LW Bellingham started level with CF Harry Kane, while RW Saka was level with England’s midfield.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4jiwlPfuk8Fk99gt.png" /></figure><p>When Spain built towards the right, Bellingham would jump with a curved run on RCB le Normand forcing the ball to RB Carvajal, and then shifting laterally to cover him. As already mentioned, England approached Spain’s midfield 3 with man-to-man coverage, AM Foden on DM Rodri and the double pivot players on Spain’s interiors, who had differing roles in possession:</p><ul><li>RCM Olmo: between the lines level with Spain’s front 3, dropping in to receive progressive passes → covered and chased by Declan Rice</li><li>LCM Fabian Ruiz: lower as a secondary deep midfielder in the build-up → covered by Mainoo</li></ul><p>England’s out-of-possession approach following the opening seconds became far more passive, opting to block space in the middle third, instead of commiting to pressing Spain’s rear build-up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-5Qk5xvVQPhjevcW.png" /><figcaption>England’s 4–4–2 mid-block</figcaption></figure><p>In settled possession, Spain spread the pitch with their 4–1–5 shape against England’s 4–4–2 mid-block, with wide full-backs and the interiors operating high in the half-spaces. England continued with their man-to-man coverage of the interiors, but defended zonally with their front 2, conceding the 3v2 in the base of Spain’s shape.</p><p>By keeping their FB’s wide instead of inverting them, Spain vacated the central channels, in order to use their CB’s to play the ball into the front 5 players between the lines, with space to arrive into. Their CF Morata performed dropping “false 9” movements to overload England’s double pivot and create a free player.</p><p>This was able to work for two reasons, or rather two faults in England’s out-of-possession approach:</p><ul><li>With England’s FB’s pinned by Spain’s wingers sitting high &amp; wide, the onus was on the CB’s, for one of them to step and follow Morata into midfield to even the numbers. However, Stones &amp; Guehi were consistently slow to react, at time looking unsure on which one of the two should step out.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*A_HTluC9CzYm9EHG.png" /></figure><p>Below, Morata receives between England’s double pivot without a CB following him, attracts Rice’s attention which frees up Olmo on his blind-side:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HR871DG_KFpGwG58.png" /></figure><ul><li>Second reason was the lack of quantity and quality of ball pressure from England’s front 2 (Foden &amp; Kane). Quantity in the sense that they were not able to press and impede Spain’s CB’s on the ball enough and quality in the sense that they were repeatedly slow to shuffle across and close down the ball when it shifted from CB to CB.</li></ul><p>A characteristic example below, as a simple flat switch to LCB Laporte from Rodri (who was momentarily in the RCB zone) and the former Man City defender is able to carry the ball tens of yards down the pitch and into the heart of England’s midfield, before playing LW Nico Williams in to run at the backline with momentum:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yz_-HJ07pUY_dUH4.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*RGwb14--giNeYcLa.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oocE2aFHQPbwt3gE.png" /></figure><p>Let’s examine Spain’s attacking dynamics in the wide areas more closely, which is what they aimed to combat England’s low block, in which they frequently dropped into in the first half. Young wingers Nico Williams (LW) &amp; Lamine Yamal (RW) were instrumental tactical pieces for their national team throughout the tournament and that was also the case in the final. Spain were eager to get them touches on the ball, whether isolated in wide areas or in the inside channels.</p><p>Center backs carrying the ball into midfield was their usual mode of initiation for wide attacks, as expected. Spain in the first half were successful in getting the ball to Nico Williams in the final third using various rotational movements. An example was the previous sequence visually examined, with Cucurella making an underlapping run to attract Walker and free up Williams wide.</p><p>In addition, Chelsea’s left back made overlapping runs on occasion to allow Williams to receive inside with a clearer angle towards goal:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/475/0*3SEUxj4UVG69t3cz.gif" /></figure><p>To combat Williams’ inversions, England had Mainoo drop into the backline to be the 5th defender, situationally:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZdvIxF7kszHvXVRM.png" /></figure><p>A common feature of Spain’s left sided attacks was their willingness to overload the left inside channel by having Olmo rotate over, in order to open up space and create advantages on the right side of the pitch, with Yamal hovering on the inside channel and Carvajal occupying the touchline, to then switch the ball over:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*o9fR0ZFsph2_4d-2.png" /></figure><p>Spain’s right sided attacks proved less threatening, as they were unable to create dynamic positional advantages. England tasked Shaw with tracking Yamal in the half-space and Bellingham being disciplined to drop in as the fifth defender and cover Carvajal wide. Rice was also diligent in his man-marking duties of Olmo who frequently migrated between central and inside-right channel:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8xALOwfU9ZoLIj_3.png" /></figure><p>Looking at the heat maps of where Spain’s wingers got touches of the ball, we can observe the difference in tactical role of the two, but also how Spain were able to get Williams the ball far higher up the pitch, whereas Yamal had to drop far deeper to receive, resulting in lack of threat to England’s backline:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/664/1*z5dUiz0OMlKRtpNbxlHJhg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/1*UhCXrgwHSZ3hvxyyO846vg.png" /><figcaption>Nico Williams (left), Lamine Yamal (right) [Source: whoscored.com]</figcaption></figure><p>In general, England in the first half, despite conceding territory and allowing 69% possession, were very successful in defending their box and limited Spain to only 0.29 xGoals, 5 shots and 0 big chances. However, they posed even less threat to Spain’s goal themselves (0.15 xG, 3 shots, 0 big chances).</p><p>Their conservative out of possession approach, coupled with the lack of counter attacking outlets in their lineup led to a lot of unsuccessful direct play. Logically, the inclusion of almost exclusively ball-to-feet type attackers (Foden, Bellingham, Kane) should have lined up with a more territorial and high-possession style.</p><p>Throughout the 90, 25 out of the 36 passes goalkeeper Jordan Pickford attempted were long balls with only 9 of them being successful, according to sofascore.com.</p><p>They preferred long balls into the wide areas instead of short build-up, aiming for Saka on the right and Bellingham/Shaw on the left, with their midfield in position to collect second balls and drive the team forward into Spain territory:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*r8shambFzWPtyEan.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cnluH4Z2RWPuxadO.png" /></figure><p>When England were able to secure possession in Spain’s half, they looked to be quick and purposeful. Their main attacking route was looking for the quick switch to Bukayo Saka, who was identified to have a favorable 1v1 matchup with Cucurella. When nearby Spaniards brought help, Saka would look for the overlap from Walker or inside movements from Mainoo, Foden, Kane:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/336/0*x6NwkAnE7H71GO_d.gif" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gdWn5xpjCg_5SvZi.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_aQraCC89e0D4eN3.png" /></figure><p>Similarly, with initial possession on the right side, they looked for the quick switch to Luke Shaw, as the nominal LW Bellingham, operated almost exclusively on inside channels in possession. However, a constant problem England faced in occasions where they broke into Spain’s defensive third was that they were not able to get enough numbers in the box to make a cross or cut-back threatening, an issue they faced throughout the whole tournament.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cTvn7ZONcQsibd8x.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FjT01DC-AeFmrW-L.png" /></figure><p>Spain were comfortable when they retreated in their 4–4–2 block and faced close to zero threat in the first half, with England struggling to create openings between Spain’s lines:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gRDlzHBIHr3-wxBe.png" /></figure><p><strong>SECOND HALF</strong></p><p>The second half was a much different affair from the first and that was mainly due to the forced half-time change that de la Fuente made. With his #6 Rodri out injured, he brought on Martin Zubimendi and opted make a significant switch in midfield, dropping Fabian Ruiz back to form a double pivot with the newly introduced Real Sociedad midfielder. Olmo operated as the nominal #10, with greater freedom of movement across inside channels.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Yo13eHLlyS4VectS.png" /></figure><p>Minutes into the second half, Spain benefited from the tactical change and opened the scoring, in large part due to the new structure. With the double pivot, England did not change their man-marking approach in midfield and Spain exploited just that.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*b49rFjrl2poqpXF1.png" /></figure><p>England switched to a passive 4–1–4–1 structure out of possession, with Mainoo pushing up to man mark the double pivot along with Foden leaving Rice as the only midfielder between the lines. This opened up the inside pockets:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MgJfoNNvY-MSVSCc.png" /></figure><p>Given the above, let’s examine Spain’s opening goal. As they are building from left to right, Olmo has drifted into the left half-space, attracting England’s midfield and making the vacated pocket on the right even bigger:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ahkqNax4ovRnDu0z.png" /></figure><p>As the ball reaches Carvajal on the right touchline, he flicks it on into the right pocket, where Yamal has moved into from wide, unobstructed:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xrHeifZZ5C3NMXi_.png" /></figure><p>Yamal receives, dribbles infield and plays a ball into Nico Williams who is moving free from the opposite flank, following Olmo’s smart run to pin Walker. Athletic Bilbao’s wide-man scores to make it 1–0:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*t0S6P89Tix3f9ejV.png" /></figure><p>The opening goal created a game-state that signalled England to become more aggressive out of possession, especially in the frequency of their high press. As they pressed high, their structure became more stretched, playing into Spain’s hands.</p><p>They started going more direct with Unai Simon’s superb distribution skills and using the openings that were created between the lines due to the nature of England’s 4–1–4–1, aiming for Morata:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/336/0*GLtGqBrpvm8NiKj0.gif" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/336/0*zV1SIgJtcRSRJ0kW.gif" /></figure><p>England’s problems at covering in the inside channels due to tha man-marking in midfield, persisted even when Spain had settled possession in the middle of the pitch. In the instance below, one can clearly see three England players pointing at Yamal in the pocket and being unsure on who should step out to obstruct him:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*S7ydjne5dKSMeHZR.png" /></figure><p>Yamal receives on the half-turn from le Normand and plays a superb backline-splitting ball in-behind that sends Morata 1v1 with Pickford:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yu7H9XKyEHRXyuNe.png" /></figure><p>In possession, Southgate responded by initially pushing Mainoo between the lines next to Foden &amp; Bellingham to create a 3–1–5–1 shape and overload Spain’s double pivot:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FnvMpHBcYcU0HfgM.png" /></figure><p>From minutes 60–70, he proceeded to make two personnel changes to suit his new set-up, by bringing on Ollie Watkins for Kane up front in order to stretch Spain’s backline vertically with his athleticism and movement in-behind, as well as Cole Palmer for Mainoo for a more natural attacking midfield option between the lines.</p><p>To accommodate his new set-up, Bellingham took on a new role in midfield. He still operated mainly in the final third channels, but had new secondary midfielder responsibilities, to help out the isolated Declan Rice in the build-up, as well as defending in the double pivot out of possession, with Foden moving left and Palmer in the front two next to Watkins:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-VSzE2S-Ira0nZOC.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*w9bFFXe8O4u-suZZ.png" /></figure><p>Palmer had a big impact on the game, with his direct nature on the ball, dropping in to receive and setting up Saka for more 1v1 opportunities, which had gone extinct early in the second half. England’s goal comes from this exact pattern:</p><p>Following the equaliser, England were once again content to sit deep and block space. Spain pushed their FB’s forward and England responded by dropping Saka as the fifth defender for better lateral coverage:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1lGSl-MKLDZKn7-z.png" /></figure><p>England attempted to attack on the break on occasion, however, given their overall conservative approach after the equaliser, their counter attacks created a structural problem that led to Spain’s winner.</p><p>Following an unsuccessful direct counter and a Spain throw-in, England’s attackers have pushed up but the rest of the team has not. Spain plays vertically through the England set-up with virtually 0 pressure. Ruiz to Olmo and then Oyarzabal (who had come on for Morata at CF without change in the tactical role), out to Cucurella on the overlap and then back into the box:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*m9itfD7gePz1HoEU.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XPs6uEtWojJs3yla.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FsOv2VV202dlISYf764%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExaGoxNzRidzI1cW9lb256cmx5azIwanQ5bmR6NWh0aDV6YzdncGhwdCZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2FsOv2VV202dlISYf764%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExb3RjN2QxOWtrMWNyMWY1c29qYm0zcWp3a21zaGVubGdrend1dXlnbSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2FsOv2VV202dlISYf764%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="231" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/210ee69ae460c30df8405643dbb7f065/href">https://medium.com/media/210ee69ae460c30df8405643dbb7f065/href</a></iframe><p>England brought on another CF in Ivan Toney for Phil Foden and attempted to respond to Spain’s goal in the final few minutes by pumping the ball long into their forwards in a loaded box.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>The overall image of the game seems to have justified the narratives surrounding the two teams. England produced a reactive performance, lacking incisiveness and threat, failing to produce any big opportunities in open play. If anything, the scoreline was flattering for them. Spain on the other hand, played arguably the best football in the whole tournament and were deserving winners. Lacking much of the superstar quality of the England side, they displayed cohesion, tactical intelligence and ruthlessness when it mattered.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b775e5ae2dad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tactical analysis: Manchester City 1–1 (P) Arsenal, Community Shield 2023]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/tactical-analysis-manchester-city-1-1-p-arsenal-community-shield-2023-aed780a1fa88?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aed780a1fa88</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-city]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2023 17:26:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-08T17:26:31.230Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Some tactical observations and analysis of the Community shield between Pep’s Man City and Arteta’s Arsenal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SKPxIBWytHbFQg5K7phINQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Scorers:</strong> 1–0 Palmer (76&#39;), 1–1 Trossard (90&#39;+11&#39;)</p><p><strong>Starting lineups:</strong></p><p>Pep opted for a 4–2–4 with Kovacić &amp; Rodri in midfield and the tandem of Haaland &amp; Alvarez up front, while Arteta went with his classic 4–3–3, with all 3 new signings featuring in slightly unconventional positions, Rice at left #8, Timber at LB and Havertz up front.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wM-3YWXCjeHfUss_v3gjSw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Subs:</strong></p><p>Man City: Foden (Grealish) 58&#39;, Palmer (Haaland) 64&#39;, De Bruyne (Kovacić) 64&#39;</p><p>Arsenal: Trossard (Martinelli) 75&#39;, Tierney (Timber) 76&#39;, Nketiah (Rice) ’81, Smith Rowe (Gabriel) 87&#39;, Vieira (Havertz) 87&#39;</p><p><strong>City’s build-up vs Arsenal out of possession:</strong></p><p>City used the 4–2–4 build up structure that Roberto de Zerbi has popularised in the Premier League with Brighton. This approach requires players very comfortable with possession in deep areas, that will hold on to the ball and attempt to “bait” their opponents into overcommitting with their press. This could result into combinations where the double pivot will play “wall passes” back to the CB’s and in turn they can progress the ball through central corridors into the dropping strikers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gIt_Sxg7dS_u8iOGSmFAmw.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal countered that in two ways:</p><ol><li>Structurally, they set up in an expansive 4–1–4–1 press with Rice &amp; Ødegaard matching up with City’s double pivot and trying to mark them out of the build-up. Havertz had the most important job in the press, essentially facing 3 men, but without the responsibility of robbing the ball of them. His job was purely to direct them towards the left side, reason for that being the right-footedness of LCB Dias &amp; LB Akanji who struggled to progress the ball down the left under pressure.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sqzsD7mHlWHsXjlR91FlCg.png" /></figure><p>Once the ball went to the left, Saka who hovered in a more withdrawn half-space cover, would jump towards Akanji &amp; Dias, with the rest of the team led by Ødegaard following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LyIJ5Crh8yj0DOVgcyuhHQ.png" /></figure><p>When City were able to get the ball towards Stones and the right side, Arsenal would follow suit, but even more aggressively this time, due to the added threat of progression. This ties in nicely with the second key to Arsenal’s out of possession plan:</p><p>2) Outnumbering the advanced central zone 3v2 by using Thomas Partey as the third man in a zonal cover, while the two CB’s mark City’s two strikers</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/572/1*6-I9Q9m8PR1ZCBLgwydQgg.png" /></figure><p>In the instance below, City are caged in on the right side and John Stones tries a vertical ball to the dropping Alvarez, who is followed by Gabriel:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xV2613UGJ2pG_89fovDyVg.png" /></figure><p>As Alvarez receives the ball he struggles to get it under control due to Gabriel’s physical marking. The key as to why Gabriel is comfortable to engage the striker so aggressively by leaving his backline is Partey being the third man in the centre, which means that the second CB Saliba is not left on an island with Haaland:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DfLGjbLsSdZA6trLL4Y9vw.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal’s press was more conservative than usual, ensuring that they are not getting baited by City’s possession in the first line. Directing the build-up to the areas they want, and then being aggressive when the trigger calls for it was the main outline of the plan. City enjoyed large spells of unchallenged possession between their backline and deep midfielders, but presenting 0 attacking threat to the disciplined Arsenal side.</p><p>Part of the reason for City’s ineffective possession was qualitative. Their frontline evidently lacked dynamism in possession. While Haaland &amp; Alvarez will terrorise any backline with their threat in-behind, they are weak when it comes to receiving the ball between the lines in tight spaces. Furthermore, their wingers Jack Grealish &amp; Bernardo Silva, while ball retention &amp; progression masters, lack the 1v1 threat when standing up the opposing FB that will force Arsenal to retreat and avoid such situations. Jurriën Timber &amp; Ben White enjoyed a mostly quiet day when it came to their 1v1 duels against City’s wingers.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, Arsenal were conservative with the press which at times allowed to City to get up to the middle third, without generating quick transitions. The few times they managed to create these transitions was when their FB’s where able to break unchallenged in behind beyond Arsenal’s wingers, like Akanji did in the instance below, getting on the end of this Rodri long ball, after Grealish pinned Ben White centrally:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*frEI1aXu8POgml90kPgDKA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FoVEqp9vQ1fdu-1HV9s0Tg.png" /></figure><p>This was a result of Arsenal’s wingers operating in withdrawn areas out of possession, so they can help out centrally when needed, as the two #8’s pressed high up the pitch. However, due to the lack of quality attacking attributes from City’s FB’s, they were more than happy to take the risk of letting them have the ball in attacking areas. Pep clearly wanted his FB’s to break forward by design, however, I am of the opinion that he will need to use more traditional attacking FB’s (João Cancelo, anyone??) for his new 4–2–4 system to work effectively against the best defensive teams.</p><p>When City got to the middle third, Arsenal would retreat, but also aggressively block the central lanes when City tried to progress play through them. Kovacić is a specialist player, that excels in this sort of central carrying situation, but Arsenal’s midfielders were well prepared in order to close down the lanes and force him backwards:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wR2zO2KmpH7x4CDLrDV4Qg.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal were also comfortable in sitting in their deep block. They would morph into a situational 5–3–2 of sorts, as Saka retreated into the backline to mark Akanji who joined City’s frontline. Meanwhile, Martinelli joined Partey &amp; Rice in the midfield, with the latter having the license to jump and engage when one of the City midfielders bypassed the first line of Havertz &amp; Ødegaard:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-VjJ622S-SlmWEP5wmm8Sg.png" /></figure><p>City attempted to overload the pockets between Arsenal’s 5 &amp; 3, with Grealish tucking in alongside Alvarez &amp; Haaland, while Bernardo would also drift infield in situations when City pushed a 6th man in the frontline, Stones or Walker from the right. Arsenal’s block was very disciplined and limited City to fruitless attacks from wide. Any attempt to penetrate the central pocket was snuffed out.</p><p><strong>Arsenal in possession:</strong></p><p>Arsenal were also very cautious in possession for the first 20–25 minutes of the half, avoiding to take risks, going long when pressed. City were extremely effective in their counter-press and forced Arsenal into constant turnovers when they attempted to play through the pressure.</p><p>Arsenal were prepared to go long to their CF, which is the reason I suspect that Arteta opted to go with Kai Havertz up front who is very good aerially, instead of Nketiah or Trossard. In the instance below, City squeeze Arsenal in their own third after a turnover. Arsenal manage to circulate the ball from left to right to Saliba, who has no other option but to hoof it long to Havertz, who in many instances did very well at holding up the ball and bringing others into play:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NcDxTuDJDaN_YBWAAwCzpw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0zwLTELTm81GdducnVIn1A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wEIngKT55illJUg6JNTuuw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a1IOY9dkW-Wr4fab2fIUYA.png" /></figure><p>In settled build-up, when not going long Arsenal tried to play out of the press through the left, with Rice dropping into the LB zone, creating a 2v1 with Timber against Bernardo Silva and allowing the Dutch FB to utilise his dribbling proficiency and escape the pressure infield:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kiFzU4x8G0T3no153nmthw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VdgkoyCCcR8UzFLnlrzZeQ.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal grew into the game following City’s monopoly of possession in the opening 20 minutes. The first time Arsenal had a chance to flex their creative muscles in the middle third, they created the first big chance of the game, down their dangerous right hand side.</p><p>It was a result of expert coordinated movement. As the phase of play begins with Saliba on the ball at the halfway line, we see that Akanji is marking Saka, Kovacić is on Ødegaard and Grealish is on Ben White. As Saliba starts carrying forward, he gets Kovacic to jump towards him. At the same time, Ødegaard drops deep and takes Grealish with him, while Saka takes up Ødegaard’s initial possession unmarked, which forces Dias to jump from the backline. Ben White makes the darting run down the touchline with Akanji caught in between two players and Saliba slips a through ball towards Arsenal’s RB. Ben White quickly dribbles in field, on the space Dias vacated at the LCB zone, and cuts it back to Havertz who has a big chance saved by Ortega:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MAlA7X-UrGfcNJZRT01Hvg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dXOJi9iHCT3QrNI0ngkvEw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5qN8ID7-1A0Gw39k64cu0Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xqpZsWZJ53M3ZBhFCcyy6w.png" /></figure><p>Another huge chance for Arsenal down the right, this time through the individual brilliance of Martin Ødegaard who slips Saka in behind City’s backline. Another cut back to Havertz, but once again Ortega keeps the score level with a huge save:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O00aHZNHYo3oEI_SYrNw9Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7tvcAppKvEfOLNIdDlxL1A.png" /></figure><p><strong>Second half alterations:</strong></p><p>City showed a different face in the second half and were far more threatening, especially following the set of three changes they made inside minutes 58–64. Phil Foden replaced Grealish on the LW, while Cole Palmer replace Kovacic and played on the RW, with Bernardo taking up the Croat’s position next to Rodri. Finally, Kevin De Bruyne replaced Haaland, operating behind Alvarez in a more traditional 4–2–3–1.</p><p>Pep instructed his FB’s to push further forwards, now being the primary width-holders on each touchline, in an attempt to overload the pockets between the lines with more quality technicians, in the newly introduced Foden, De Bruyne &amp; Palmer. Foden especially had a lot of freedom to move around, finding himself in very central areas, with De Bruyne operating in the left half-space zone:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IgvNtGLzHMWAtwcrQbnP6w.png" /></figure><p>The game became far more transitional, with City especially upping the tempo and attempting to move quickly between the thirds, as opposed to the slow and deliberate possession of the first half.</p><p>Foden’s freedom and individual brilliance was evident in the phase of play that led to City’s goal. He dropped very deep to receive from the backline, getting Partey to follow him, before burning by him on the half-turn. He carries the ball upfield and plays it towards the right side. After a ricochet, the ball ends up with Cole Palmer, who beautifully curls it in the top corner past Ramsdale:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M98BR0aFJ2rllfOhoD3voQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p7WMlcC1OshX9i_YH0lsQQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PUpEBI_4CiDgoNnEZM5ZtA.png" /></figure><p>Following the goal, Arteta made his own flurry of incremental changes, resulting in a completely different shape. Rice &amp; Havertz were replaced by Fabio Vieira &amp; Eddie Nketiah, Gabriel by Emile Smith Rowe and Timber by Kieran Tierney. As you can see during his introduction, Vieira makes the signal for the 3–4–3:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*KqiJRXl0fRpOyIcYdTzD-Q.gif" /></figure><p>Tierney-Saliba-White form the back 3, with two outside defenders (esp. Tierney) having license to overlap, at times leaving Saliba as the only man back. Partey &amp; Ødegaard played deeper in midfield, while the likes of Trossard, ESR, Nketiah, Vieira &amp; Saka (constantly interchanging) overloading the spaces between the lines:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7HOgKklxUxjOfvMz-g65qg.png" /></figure><p>Trossard’s equaliser came through a piece of great fortune, however Arsenal’s shape in the final 15 minutes (including additional time) was very effective in pinning City in their own third.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WFjMqNP03XWb-nvZu3bR-Q.png" /></figure><p>I do not have any analysis of my own for the penalty shoot-out, however my good friend James released this excellent piece of analysis on the psychological aspect of the shoot-out, check it out:</p><h3>James. on Twitter: &quot;Why patience was the most important factor as to why Arsenal beat Man City at penalties in the Community Shield.A brief thread: pic.twitter.com/IQsFx1A6A1 / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>Why patience was the most important factor as to why Arsenal beat Man City at penalties in the Community Shield.A brief thread: pic.twitter.com/IQsFx1A6A1</p><p>Thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aed780a1fa88" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grading every single one of Arsenal’s signings under Mikel Arteta]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/grading-every-single-one-of-arsenals-signings-under-mikel-arteta-ffed91037313?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ffed91037313</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transfer-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mikel-arteta]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Mar 2023 15:13:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-22T15:13:24.454Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LFAZwEoK5Y7LEhO2MxVamA.png" /></figure><h4>Criteria:</h4><ul><li>On-the-pitch performance relative to the transfer fee and wages that were/are reportedly being paid is the main (subjective) metric that will be considered in order to grade the signings on a scale from A+ to F.</li><li>Availability will also play a part, as well as re-sale value if applicable.</li><li>For clarification, an A+ rating is reserved for players that have, in my opinion, far overperformed their valuation and have shown a good availability record.</li><li>For certain singings, especially the most recent ones, the grade should be taken with a pinch of salt as for some of them the sample size is way too small to accurately grade.</li><li>All transfer fees are according to transfermarkt.com, while the salaries according to capology.com via fbref.com.</li></ul><h3>Pablo Marí</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XgRVRSABi0mrH5FlmNBSzw.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: January 2020 on loan, summer 2020 permanent</li><li>Age on arrival: 25</li><li>Fee: £7,010,000 loan fee, £5,260,000 transfer fee</li><li>Contract: 4.5 years, £4,420,000 annually</li></ul><p>Pablo Marí was Arteta’s first signing, with the Spaniard arriving on an initial 6 month loan deal from Flamengo, due to Arsenal’s desperate need for a left footed center back. He started 2 Premier League games in his first season, before suffering a severe ankle injury post COVID break and missing the remainder of that season.</p><p>He had a solid second season at the club upon his permanent signing, filling in for Gabriel Magalhães when needed, starting 16 games in all competitions. In his third season however, things went downhill, since Arteta opted for a more expansive style which saw Pablo struggle in the high line due to his athletic limitations. After being man-handled by Romelu Lukaku in the second game of the season, he never started another league game for the club.</p><p>He departed on a dry loan to Udinese for the second half of the 21/22 season, before ultimately leaving the club in the summer of ’22 for Monza on a season-long loan with obligation of a £5.9 million purchase should the club remain in the division (they are well on course of achieving that). Mari was not particularly bad during his Arsenal tenure, however the fact that he was deemed surplus to requirements less than 2 years after arriving, plus the fact that the club will incure a loss of more than 50% for his sale makes this signing a D+.</p><p>Grade: <strong>D+</strong></p><h3>Cédric Soares</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*58urVTdDyYsucVhDddW-fA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: January 2020 on loan, summer 2020 permanent</li><li>Age on arrival: 27</li><li>Fee: free</li><li>Contract: 4.5 years, £3,900,000 annually</li></ul><p>Cédric was Arteta’s second signing, arriving shortly after Marí on an initial 6 month loan deal from Southampton. At the time it was unclear why the player was signed, given Hector Bellerin and Ainsley Maitland-Niles’ good form at right back. He appeared in only 5 games in his first season, starting 3.</p><p>However, I feel like Cedric was largely solid and underrated during his time at Arsenal. He played 24 mostly decent games in 20/21, a season where Arsenal used 4 right backs due to the lack of a clear no. 1, and I would argue that Cedric was the most consistent of the lot, even filling in at left back during Kieran Tierney’s absences. In his third season (21/22), he fell behind new RB signing Takehiro Tomiyasu in the pecking order and barely featured initially. However, during Tomiyasu’s lengthy injury issues in 2022, Cédric held down the position effectively in periods where Arsenal enjoyed really good runs of form.</p><p>For the 22/23 season, Arteta converted Ben White into a RB and Cédric fell to third choice in the position. He played only 32 total minutes in all competitions, before departing to Fulham on loan in January. I grade this signing at a (slightly controversial) C+, due to the solid but not outstanding impact he had and the fact he was a free signing. He will return to Arsenal in the summer for the final year of his contract, and if the club can manage to get a transfer fee for him, my grade could rise.</p><p>Grade: <strong>C+</strong></p><h3>Willian</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9DY7bVSDo9dY_9z4oxHLEA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2020</li><li>Age on arrival: 31</li><li>Fee: free</li><li>Contract: 3 years, £7,200,000 anually</li></ul><p>Arteta’s first attacking singing at the club, Willian arrived in the summer of 2020 after a very good season with London rivals Chelsea. Definitely a controversial signing at the time, given the lucrative contract for a player over 30. It’s fair to say that the signing fell below the expectations of even the most pessimistic Arsenal fans, as Willian departed a year after his arrival, following a mutual contract termination.</p><p>Willian appeared in 36 games (21 starts) in his lone season at the club, with mostly disappointing performances. In fairness, I think he had a decent second half of the season, with notable cameos against Manchester United, Benfica and Leicester City. However, he arrived at pre-season of 21/22 in noticeably bad shape before his contract was terminated. He did reportedly leave some money on the table, so that makes this signing a D- for me instead of an F.</p><p>Grade: <strong>D-</strong></p><h3>Dani Ceballos</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/615/1*kBktXfiM00zgbtJQaev3Dg.jpeg" /></figure><p>(Note: Dani’s first loan spell was not taken into account as it was an Unai Emery signing)</p><ul><li>Joined: summer 2020</li><li>Age on arrival: 23</li><li>Fee: dry loan</li><li>Contract: 1 year, salary N/A</li></ul><p>Dani Ceballos arrived from Real Madrid for his second loan spell at Arsenal in August of 2020, following a great end to the previous season and his key involvement in the FA Cup winning run.</p><p>However, his second spell at the club proved nowhere near as fruitful as the first. Dani appeared in 40 games in all competitions (starting 25), but his performances were noticeably worse, including a horror run in the Europa League knockouts with multiple errors leading to goal and a red card. He returned to Real Madrid in July 2021 with Arteta having no interest to further extend his loan or make it permanent. Due to his good availability record and very low cost, I cannot grade this lower than a C-.</p><p>Grade: <strong>C-</strong></p><h3>Gabriel Magalhães</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ofypHhRltdmUkSd5PDsOvA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2020</li><li>Age on arrival: 22</li><li>Fee: £22,880,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £2,600,000 annually</li></ul><p>The gigantic left footed center back Gabriel Magalhães was Arteta’s first proper big signing, beating out competition from Manchester United and Everton to secure his arrival in August 2020. From the get go he was one of the first names on the team-sheet, enjoying a great run of form to start life in England. However, as the New Year rolled around, some availability issues and inconsistencies in form meant he had to compete with Pablo Marí for the starting place in the second half of 20/21.</p><p>In his second season, after missing the first month with knee issues, he returned in September partnering up with new signing Ben White and enjoyed a great campaign. He started each of the 35 remaining PL games he was available for and established himself as one of the better defenders in the division. He still left himself with space for improvement, especially in the ball playing department.</p><p>In his third season, he has found himself with yet another new partner at the back in William Saliba. The season started weirdly for Gabriel, as he committed multiple calamitous errors leading to opposition goals in the first couple of months. However, after signing a new contract in October, his form turned around and has been one of the dominant center backs in world football ever since. He hasn’t played in only 1 game this season in all competitions and has also greatly improved on the ball.</p><p>Gabriel has been a clear A+ signing, having significantly outperformed his transfer fee and shown great availability. I considered bumping his grade down to an A due to some of the errors he’s made (including a couple of red cards) that have cost Arsenal points, however it felt too harsh and meaningless in the grand scheme of things.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A+</strong></p><h3>Rúnar Alex Rúnarsson</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*Pf3FxFQ-I2iYoVntf0EOEA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2020</li><li>Age on arrival: 25</li><li>Fee: £1,760,00</li><li>Contract: 4 years, £780,000 annually</li></ul><p>Arsenal found themselves in a precarious position in the goalkeeping department following Emi Martinez’s departure to Aston Villa in September 2020, as well as the failed pursuit of Brentford’s David Raya. With a significant amount of the budget tied up in potential midfield reinforcements, the club had to turn to a cheaper option, which ended up being the then Dijon keeper Alex Rúnarrson, to be the #2 goalie.</p><p>Immediately, it became obvious that Alex was not up to the required level, with Arteta not even trusting him enough to start in Carabao Cup or Europa League group stage games early on. Eventually, he was started in the last 4 EL group games, as well as the 1–4 thrashing by Manchester City in the Carabao Cup, in which Rúnarsson had a truly disastrous performance. He was swiftly replaced by Mathew Ryan less than a month later.</p><p>His last minutes for Arsenal came in a brief cameo at the end of a PL game against Wolves in which Bernd Leno was sent off. Since then, Rúnarsson has spent the last two seasons out on loan, with the club not being able to find a suitor to take him on a permanent deal. Clear F signing.</p><p>Grade:<strong> F</strong></p><h3>Thomas Partey</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*McrMGNnezQngWTQDMDzKdg.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2020</li><li>Age on arrival: 27</li><li>Fee: £43,990,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £10,400,00 annually</li></ul><p>Thomas Partey arrived from Atletico Madrid on deadline day of the 2020 summer window, after Arsenal triggered his release clause. Arteta’s first big money splash and the club’s first high profile midfield signing since Granit Xhaka in 2016.</p><p>From the get go, it was clear that Arteta had a world class talent in his hands. When he was on the pitch, Arsenal transformed into a different team with him in the base of midfield. However, his lingering injury issues prevented him from being on the pitch a whole lot, starting in only 41 of the possible 76 Premier League games in his first two seasons at the club.</p><p>In his third season (2022/23), his availability issues have reduced to a satisfactory level, only missing 5 out of the 28 PL games so far. His performance on the pitch has been truly sensational and I would argue he is the single most important cog in Arteta’s well oiled machine that is leading the Premier League so far.</p><p>Though he has been a clear A+ signing on the pitch, his availability issues have been so severe that I have decided to bump his grade down to an A-.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A-</strong></p><h3>Mathew Ryan</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kPdqQtmixu7gIY-JHYg-Hg.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: January 2021</li><li>Age on arrival: 28</li><li>Fee: dry loan</li><li>Contract: 6 months, £910,000 for half a year</li></ul><p>Australian keeper Mathew Ryan arrived on a 6 month loan deal from Brighton &amp; Hove Albion in January 2021 to replace the struggling Rúnarrson as Arsenal’s #2 goalkeeper. Ryan appeared in 3 games for the club, all in the Premier League and was pretty much flawless.</p><p>His stay was not extended when his loan expired in the summer, as Arsenal opted to go for a younger keeper who could challenge Leno for the #1 spot. As mentioned earlier, Ryan was very good when he played, however the sample size is too small to reward this signing with a grade higher than a B.</p><p>Grade: <strong>B</strong></p><h3>Martin Ødegaard</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tUYVeS6IkcGokrwyvXMtHw.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: 6 month loan in January 2021, permanent in summer 2021</li><li>Age on arrival: 21</li><li>Fee: £1,760,000 loan fee, £30,660,000 transfer fee</li><li>Contract: 6 months and £2,055,00 during loan, 5 years and £5,980,000 annually after permanent</li></ul><p>Martin Ødegaard arrived on loan from Real Madrid in January of 2021, to fill Arsenal’s big hole at the #10 position and replace the departing Mesut Özil. His loan spell started very well, but was affected by an ankle injury and inconsistent form towards the end of that season.</p><p>When Real Madrid made Martin available for sale in the following summer, Arsenal pounced quickly and secured the Norwegian playmaker for a very low fee compared to other talents of his ilk. His permanent stay got off to a rocky start, losing his place to Alex Lacazette a month after signing. However, once he won back his place in the starting line-up in late November, he never relinquished it once until the end of the season and proved he was a top signing.</p><p>He was rewarded with the club captaincy in the summer of 2022 following the departure of Lacazette and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang. In the 2022/23 season, his play has transcended into a bona-fide world class level, cementing himself as one of the best players in the world in his position.</p><p>Club captain and arguably Arsenal’s best player at 25 years old, all for a mere £30.66 million. Obvious A+ signing.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A+</strong></p><h3>Albert Sambi Lokonga</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7Y1eK1A7RGL9wGjTSUdrnA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2021</li><li>Age on arrival: 21</li><li>Fee: £15,330,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £2,600,000 annually</li></ul><p>Lokonga arrived as a young prodigy from Belgian side Anderlecht, to bolster Arsenal’s midfield depth and potentially challenge for a starting place once he reaches his potential. His stay in North London got off to a great start, starting the majority of Premier League games from August until December 2021, filling in for the injured Thomas Partey at first and Granit Xhaka next.</p><p>Following Xhaka’s return to the side, things took a turn for the worse for the young Belgian, only starting one PL game from December until April. He came back to the side in early April due to Thomas Partey’s season ending injury and started 2 games in a row in which Arsenal suffered poor losses to Brighton and Southampton. He did not start another game that season.</p><p>In the 22/23 season, Lokonga stayed at the club, but only started 2 Premier League games. He did get significant minutes in cup competitions and Europa League, however he failed to impress and was sent out on loan to Crystal Palace on deadline day of January 2023, following the signing of Jorginho.</p><p>I will grade this signing a C-, as despite his promising start, he failed to provide Arsenal with reliable minutes in the league and was pretty much replaced 18 months after his arrival. Furthermore, I do not project Arsenal making a profit on him, which further downgrades this signing.</p><p>Grade: <strong>C-</strong></p><h3>Nuno Tavares</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yXCk3APEhqGWNWToeq0HeA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2021</li><li>Age on arrival: 21</li><li>Fee: £7,010,000</li><li>Contract: 4 years, £1,404,000 annually</li></ul><p>Nuno Tavares arrived from Portuguese giants Benfica in the summer of 2021, to fill Arsenal’s big hole at back up left back. Nuno had a great start at the club, filling in for the injured Kieran Tierney and eventually keeping his position for 6 league games in a row, performing at a very high level.</p><p>However, the turning point of his Arsenal career was an FA Cup game away to Nottingham Forest in January of 2022. Following a calamitous 35 minutes he was subbed off in the first half, an event which did little good for his confidence and likely strained his relationship with Arteta. He didn’t start another game until April, when Tierney got ruled out for the rest of the season due to a knee injury. Nuno did start a further 7 league games, but this time his performances were unrecognisable (in a bad way) to his stint in the first half of the season.</p><p>Nuno was eventually replaced in the summer of ’22 by Alex Zinchenko and departed on a season-long loan to French outfit Marseille, where he has enjoyed a largely positive loan spell. His future at Arsenal is unclear and could depend on Kieran Tierney’s status in the team, who might be sold in the summer. I can also foresee Arsenal making a healthy profit on Tavares if they choose to sell him after his loan. For that reason I give the signing a C+, a grade I understand might be seen as a little too high by other fans.</p><p>Grade: <strong>C+</strong></p><h3>Benjamin White</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jgFbdHQh5naugGSIsY30JQ.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2021</li><li>Age on arrival: 23</li><li>Fee: £51,250,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £6,240,000 annually</li></ul><p>Following a rapid ascension through the ranks of English football, versatile defender Ben White joined Arsenal from Brighton &amp; Hove Albion for a fee in excess of £50 million in July of 2021. It still remains the club’s most expensive signing under Mikel Arteta.</p><p>Despite a rough debut in the 2–0 loss at Brentford in the opening day of the season, White enjoyed a fine first campaign for Arsenal, playing primarily at right center back, partnering up with Gabriel Magalhães. Ben started in all 32 Premier League games he was fit for.</p><p>In his second season at the club, upon William Saliba’s introduction to the first team squad, Arteta decided to shift Ben White across to right back. Many (including me) thought this was a temporary solution due to Tomiyasu’s injury problems, however White has appeared in all 28 games of the PL season in that position and has been one of the better RB’s in the division.</p><p>Standing out for his technical ability and mental poise, Ben White has been a truly outstanding signing for Arsenal and has arguably been the club’s most consistent performer this season. Thought it feels harsh, I have graded this signing as an A. Reason it is not an A+ is the staggering fee Arsenal paid for him, which Ben has been worth every single penny off, but it’s tough to say he has overperformed it.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A</strong></p><h3>Aaron Ramsdale</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*gQtqpqY0wQzEZLSybRflPQ.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2021</li><li>Age on arrival: 23</li><li>Fee: £24,530,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £3,120,000 annually</li></ul><p>Young English goalkeeper Aaron Ramsdale arrived on August of 2021 following back to back relegations from the Premier League with Sheffield United and Bournemouth. At the time, he was the most controversial signing of the Arteta era due to the fee that was paid for a very unproven performer.</p><p>Ramsdale came to initially be the no. 2 keeper, with a view of challenging Bernd Leno for the #1 spot. Following Arsenal’s disastrous start to the 2021/22 season, Ramsdale took Leno’s spot only 5 games into the season and never relinquished it. He quickly became a fan favourite, standing out for his sensational play in the first half of the season and outgoing personality. He did however end the season in a slightly dissapointing manner, struggling for form in the latter stages of the campaign. Inconsistencies can definitely be expected and excused for such a young keeper.</p><p>In his second season at the club, Ramsdale has cemented himself as one of the best keepers in the division, leading the league in clean sheets with 12 in 28 appearances. A very obvious A+ signing, as Arsenal look to have found their #1 for the next decade or so.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A+</strong></p><h3>Takehiro Tomiyasu</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2i1ClL0Tawu52Y2E7Vmf8A.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2021</li><li>Age on arrival: 22</li><li>Fee: £16,290,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £2,860,000 annually</li></ul><p>The versatile Japanese defender Takehiro Tomiyasu arrived at Arsenal from Bologna in deadline day of summer 2021 as the club’s final signing of the window, to replace the departing Hector Bellerin and solve the club’s longstanding issues at the right back position.</p><p>Tomiyasu had a very bright start to life in North London, enjoying a very solid first half of the season and earning plaudits along the way. However, as the New Year rolled around, injuries plagued Takehiro and was forced to miss almost the entirety of the second half of the campaign, appearing in only the final 4 games.</p><p>One more injury in pre-season of 2022/23 cost Tomiyasu his starting place to Ben White who was converted to RB. Since then, he has kept mostly fit appearing as an impact sub in the league and starting in Europa League and cup competitions. He did have a good stint of 4 consecutive league starts at left back filling in for the injured Zinchenko, including a highlight performance in the 3–2 home win against Liverpool.</p><p>Tomiyasu has undoubtedly been a superb value signing for Arsenal, as a two-footed, physically imposing defender that can fill in comfortably in all positions across the backline, for a very low cost. However, his poor availability record has been the main story during his time at the club, with the latest knee injury suffered against Sporting threatening to keep him out for the rest of the season. B+ signing so far.</p><p>Grade: <strong>B+</strong></p><h3>Auston Trusty</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jvcOsH-H86ZqXINhSVcEcA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: January 2022</li><li>Age on arrival: 23</li><li>Fee: £1,580,000</li><li>Contract: N/A</li></ul><p>Young USA center back Auston Trusty was Arsenal’s sole signing in the January 2022 window, but was not a recruit for the first team in the immediate term. Trusty remained on loan for the rest of the season with MLS side Colorado Rapids, where he was signed from. Upon returning to the club, he was sent on a season long loan to Championship side Birmingham City, where he’s enjoyed a fine spell, starting in all but one of the 38 league games this campaign.</p><p>Trusty has never appeared in an Arsenal game, while it is also hard to picture him having a future at the club given the current surplus at the left center back position. Due to sample size, I am unable of grading this signing.</p><p>Grade: N/A</p><h3>Marquinhos</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gaAxDL3owtdsXrlNYKbK7w.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2022</li><li>Age on arrival: 19</li><li>Fee: £3,070,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £1,560,000 annually</li></ul><p>Young Brazilian winger Marquinhos arrived at Arsenal from São Paulo in June 2022 as the club’s first signing of the summer. Despite being a purchase primarily for the future, Marquinhos was kept at the club for the first half of the 22/23 season, enjoying a dream debut away at Zürich in the Europa League scoring 1 and assisting another one. He appeared in 6 games across all competitions, starting 3 in total in Europa League and Carabao Cup play.</p><p>In January 2023, he was loaned out to Championship side Norwich City, where he’s had a fine start to his spell there. His sample size of performance at Arsenal has been incredibly small and his future at the club after his loan ends remains unclear, thus rendering me unable of grading this singing.</p><p>Grade: N/A</p><h3>Matt Turner</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KZuf4coZPgF7NWVE8cK5VA.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2022</li><li>Age on arrival: 27</li><li>Fee: £5,570,000</li><li>Contract: 3 years, £1,820,000 annually</li></ul><p>USA international goalkeeper Matt Turner arrived from MLS side New England Revolution to replace the departing Bernd Leno as Arsenal’s no. 2 keeper in June 2022.</p><p>Matt has started in 7 games for the club, across Europa League and FA Cup and has done a largely great job as the back up keeper. I will grade this signing as a B so far for certain reasons: First of all, very limited sample size of performance so far. Second, though it might seem a little harsh for a back-up GK, I think there is very limited upside in terms of him ever challenging Aaron Ramdale for the #1 spot.</p><p>Grade: <strong>B</strong></p><h3>Gabriel Jesus</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*264byEH62SThALV_HkU8bQ.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2022</li><li>Age at arrival: 25</li><li>Fee: £45,730,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £13,780,000 annually</li></ul><p>Perhaps the biggest name Arsenal have recruited under Mikel Arteta, Brazilian star forward Gabriel Jesus arrived from Manchester City in July 2022, after winning 4 Premier League titles in the last 5 years. Taking the #9 shirt, Jesus was brought in to fill the big hole the departures of Alex Lacazette and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang had left in the center forward position.</p><p>The 25 year-old enjoyed a sensational start to life in North London, scoring 5 and assisting 5 goals in 14 league games, firing the Gunners to the top spot of the Premier League at the World Cup break. However, a major knee injury sustained with the Brazilian national team in the World Cup, meant he had to undergo surgery that kept him out for the following 4 months.</p><p>Having recently returned to action, Gabriel Jesus presents a big boost to Arsenal’s Premier League title hopes and has undoubtedly been a great value signing for them. Due to the long term injury he sustained, I have decided to (perhaps harshly) bump down his grade to an A. However, if he remains healthy and performs to a similar level as he has so far until the end of the season, his grade will definitely be upgraded to an A+.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A</strong></p><h3>Fabio Vieira</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/615/1*pCMclBWR3p0eKW9OvEJreQ.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2022</li><li>Age on arrival: 22</li><li>Fee: £30,066,000</li><li>Contract: 5 years, £2,340,000 annually</li></ul><p>Young Portuguese playmaker Fabio Vieira was signed from Porto in July of 2022, after a very impressive season in the Primeira Liga. He was recruited mainly for his potential and incredible raw attributes, as well as provide competition for starting interiors Granit Xhaka and Martin Ødegaard in the short term.</p><p>Fabio has appeared in 28 games in all competitions for Arsenal, starting 13 of them. While he has struggled to significantly impact games over the course of 90 minutes, he has been racking up impressive numbers along the way, with 8 goals/assists in 14.7 90’s. His advanced output metrics are also extremely high, proving his undeniable quality in the final third.</p><p>In recent weeks, Fabio’s performances have improved noticeably and now looks more ready contribute in the Gunners’ title charge. Arteta has trusted him a lot more lately, even starting him in a Premier League game against Bournemouth over Granit Xhaka, as well as both knockout legs against Sporting in the Europa League.</p><p>It is impossible to grade this signing accurately at this point, given the fact he was signed for his raw tools and potential, rather than short term impact. However, Arsenal did pay a large fee for him, which factors into the equation. Due to the upwards trend in his performances lately, I will grade the signing as a B so far, but with obvious upside of improvement within the next few months.</p><p>Grade: <strong>B</strong></p><h3>Oleksandr Zinchenko</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wX3SBwLn0smGOGTLSk6Gtg.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: summer 2022</li><li>Age on arrival: 25</li><li>Fee: £30,660,000</li><li>Contract: 4 years, £7,800,000 annually</li></ul><p>Ukrainian midfielder-turned-left back Alex Zinchenko followed Gabriel Jesus’ route from Manchester City to Arsenal in July of 2022. He replaced the departing Nuno Tavares, but with a view of taking Kieran Tierney’s place as the starting left back straight away.</p><p>Alex has had an undeniably great impact on this Arsenal side. His supreme technical ability and leadership skills have given the team a new dimension, fulfilling Arteta’s vision of a left back that inverts and becomes an extra midfielder. Injury issues caused him to miss 7 out of the first 12 league games, however since then he’s kept fit and hasn’t missed a single game in the PL.</p><p>Zinchenko has been one of Arsenal’s best players this season and has outperformed the fee paid for him, in my opinion. Just like with Gabriel Jesus, due to some availability issues I will bump down this signing to an A, a grade which can easily be upgraded to A+ if he keeps healthy for the remainder of the season.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A</strong></p><h3>Leandro Trossard</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*L4wUkDRLjw94wYj4C_BNAg.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: January 2023</li><li>Age on arrival: 28</li><li>Fee: £21,030,000</li><li>Contract: 3.5 years, £4,680,000 annually</li></ul><p>Belgian forward Leandro Trossard arrived from Brighton &amp; Hove Albion in January 2023 to bolster Arsenal’s attacking depth, following the failed pursuit of Mykhaylo Mudryk who ended up at Chelsea.</p><p>Leandro has had an immediate impact in North London, winning numerous points for Arsenal so far in the Premier League. His goal off the bench against Brentford earned the Gunners a point, while his run as a center forward following Eddie Nketiah’s injury has been amazing, recording 6 assists in his 5 league starts in that position.</p><p>It is still early days, but Trossard’s signing has been a masterstroke from Arsenal so far. His output has been tremendous and his versatility to perform both out wide and centrally is key for the team. Very low fee as well, clear A+ signing.</p><p>Grade: <strong>A+</strong></p><h3>Jakub Kiwior</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qy66LSA-vam3fODvLbhH7w.png" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: January 2023</li><li>Age on arrival: 22</li><li>Fee: £21,900,000</li><li>Contract: 5.5 years, £3,016,000 annually</li></ul><p>Young Polish international Jakub Kiwior arrived from Italian side Spezia in January 2023 to fill Arsenal’s hole at back-up left center back behind starter Gabriel Magalhães.</p><p>Due to Gabriel’s tremendous availability record, Kiwior has only managed 78 minutes for the club so far, starting in the Europa League against Sporting and coming off the bench against Crystal Palace for his Premier League debut. The sample size is clearly too small to grade this signing.</p><p>Grade: N/A</p><h3>Jorginho</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2Djw6pl46Ade3ggIyZWnBg.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>Joined: January 2023</li><li>Age on arrival: 31</li><li>Fee: £9,900,000</li><li>Contract: 1.5 year, £5,720,000 annually</li></ul><p>Experienced Italian international Jorginho arrived from rivals Chelsea on deadline day of the January 2023 window, following Arsenal’s failed pursuit of Brighton’s Moisés Caicedo. He was brought in to be Thomas Partey’s back-up in the base of midfield, after Mohamed Elneny’s season-ending knee surgery left the squad vulnerable in that position.</p><p>Due to a minor injury sustained by Partey early on, he has already started multiple Premier &amp; Europa League games for the team. His impact so far has been a mixed bag. Some really tidy games against Manchester City and Leicester City, as well as his sensational last minute winner away to Aston Villa, have been followed up by very shaky performances against Everton at home and Sporting in the Europa League knockouts.</p><p>Personally, I really like the fee and the short contract length that Arsenal managed to negotiate on this signing. So far, I grade this signing at a C+, however I definitely anticipate it to change by the end of the season. Whether the grade will be higher or lower is currently unknown.</p><p>Grade: <strong>C+</strong></p><h4>Final numbers:</h4><ul><li>Total numbers of players signed: 23</li><li>Positions: 4 goalkeepers, 4 center backs, 5 full backs, 6 midfielders, 3 wingers, 1 center forward</li><li>Total amount spent on transfer fees: £396,642,000</li><li>Average age: 24.39 years old</li><li>Average transfer fee: £18.89 million</li><li>Average yearly salary: £4.43 million</li><li>Average contract length: 4.07 years</li><li>Average grade: B</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ffed91037313" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tactical analysis: Chelsea 0–1 Arsenal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/tactical-analysis-chelsea-0-1-arsenal-63e1c304e4ad?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63e1c304e4ad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Nov 2022 21:16:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-11T21:16:17.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3Z9vzn5LDnOcMqbe_AjOGw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Arsenal managed to climb back on the top of the Premier League table, as well as extend their winning streak at Stamford Bridge to three, following a dominant display and comfortable 0–1 win over Graham Potter’s Chelsea. In this piece I will break down my interpretation of Mikel Arteta’s tactical plan for the game, how it translated on the pitch and Chelsea’s unsuccessful efforts to nullify it.</p><p>ARSENAL IN POSSESSION:</p><p>With trusted left back Alex Zinchenko returning from injury and straight back into the starting line-up, Arteta opted for a lopsided 2–3–2–3 structure in the build-up, with the two FB’s flanking Thomas Partey at the base of midfield. Zinchenko would stay very narrow forming a double pivot with Partey, while Ben White stayed wider in the traditional RB zone:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q_9ajAiOtmU6IOSvLHl5pQ.png" /></figure><p>Chelsea were reserved with their press, more often than not opting not to engage Arsenal immediately from goal kicks and allowing them to progress the ball closer to the middle third, where an aggressive press would start. They set out to defend in a 4–2–3–1 shape, aiming to match up with the opposition players across the pitch, with the exception of Gabriel Magalhães who was the free man at LCB.</p><p>In turn, Arsenal directed most of their build-up opportunities through the left side. With Zinchenko’s narrow positioning, Chelsea’s RW Raheem Sterling was pulled inside to mark him and thus, the left flank was open for Arsenal to progress the ball through:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7_G7lm6kaZCz2hfGfcf7zQ.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal would then look to exploit this open space through a variety of patterns and positional rotations with players arriving into that space to free up runners in behind.</p><p>Obviously the first option would be for Gabriel to dribble into the open space. The sequence below showcases how well Zinchenko’s positioning worked for that regard.</p><p>Saliba plays the ball around Aubameyang to Gabriel, who is completely free to receive and carry forwards:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PYCfOUZQMmWUjJ1dmZOE4Q.png" /></figure><p>Gabriel has now bypassed Chelsea’s first line of the press and plays it to Martinelli down the line to attack the opposing RB 1v1:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ds8x-wQyVzexFwlef1Ckfw.png" /></figure><p>Back to the positional rotations, a common pattern Arsenal used was instructing their center forward Gabriel Jesus to drop into midfield to create numerical overloads and/or pull out his marker.</p><p>In the instance below, Jesus has ventured into his team’s half, which has forced the RCB Chalobah to follow him up there, leaving a lot of open space in behind. Since Jesus is essentially in Zinchenko’s space, it triggers the left back to drift out wide in Martinelli’s space, and in turn the left winger goes inside in the space vacated by Jesus. It works like a chain reaction:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y4dMVdxd2Q6U6HEDyJiKlQ.png" /></figure><p>Confusion in Chelsea’s defensive structure ensues, as Chalobah finds himself on Xhaka, while behind him the RB Azpilicueta faces a 1v2 against Martinelli &amp; Zinchenko, as Sterling has lost track of the overlapping run of the Arsenal LB. Gabriel passes the ball to Xhaka breaking the first line of the press:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HsxAn8q-Sg0VLIheug-fvQ.png" /></figure><p>Xhaka then plays it on to Zinchenko who finds himself in position for a cutback or cross to multiple runners attacking the box:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eRNDTXRQGtpwClyYbMPZgw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_lmnLA5hMjBjQr-sfjnQAw.png" /></figure><p>Same pattern here, but this time Gabriel goes directly to Zinchenko in behind, as once again Sterling does not track the LB’s run:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kiJn3hnZIHazvCOqwVbfMA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LUN30eDv9R709mWtaTteEw.png" /></figure><p>When building-up from the right side of the pitch, Arsenal used a different set of patterns to progress the ball. Essentially Arsenal’s 10 outfielders where split in the middle into two 5-man units in the build-up. From the left side we saw the axis of Gabriel/Zinchenko/Xhaka/Martinelli/Jesus, while from the right side it was the axis of Saliba/White/Partey/Ødegaard/Saka that combined.</p><p>Chelsea’s pressing scheme included Aubameyang (CF) on Saliba (RCB), Havertz (AM) shadowing Partey (DM), Mount (LW) tight on White (RB), Jorginho (LCM) on Ødegaard (RCM) and Cucurella (LB) tracking Saka (RW).</p><p>Arteta again decided to manipulate Chelsea’s shape through mainly the positioning of the full back, along with further movement and positional rotations.</p><p>Unlike Zinchenko who tucked in midfield, White was instructed to take up a wider position to pull Mount wider and open the half-space for Partey to access it. Saka would act as the connecting valve from backline to midfield, dropping deep to receive and circulate the ball. Ødegaard would hover around Jorginho’s back in the quest to find space to receive teh ball between the lines. In the instance below, White passes it to Saka who finds Partey first time in the half-space, as Havertz is late to engage:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BQyCFidV0CxRnGIwG0qjxg.png" /></figure><p>Partey spots Ødegaard who has managed to escape Jorginho’s shadow cover and fires a pass into him:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fYei7H9jYAKsyckRi1Blsw.png" /></figure><p>As Ødegaard receives and looks to run infield with the ball, Ruben Loftus-Cheek (RCM) has no choice than to jump on the Norwegian, leaving a chunk of space empty in the middle of the park, where Xhaka has moved into. Ødegaard passes to him:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZPYaRabCZ2exMXIuULEXRQ.png" /></figure><p>Xhaka plays it out to Martinelli who can again attack the RB 1v1 with runners:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z6y8MeLLRKNPpN5LhVx9xQ.png" /></figure><p>With both White and Saka holding width, there was vacated space inside when Partey occupied the DM zone. Hence, another tool Arsenal used to break Chelsea’s press out of the right side was a White-Saka one-two, where the RB would drift infield towards the empty space to receive the second pass and carry the ball forwards:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Xd1NQegkKpLgRXwiLnhSZg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JxrWjRa5cCZY0B9KSfgDIA.png" /></figure><p>In the second half, Potter adjusted Chelsea’s press by instructing his players to take up more aggressive positions. Mount now moved infield marking Partey, while Havertz was on Zinchenko. Sterling was pushed forwards to engage Gabriel, creating a 4v4 in the central vertical lane:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O8uKQDSut_vb6FbvwHDW4g.png" /></figure><p>This adjustment made it more difficult for Arsenal to play out of the back short, however it meant that this time Ben White was the free man. Aaron Ramsdale is especially good at the clipped pass towards the right flank, and would routinely use it for his team to break the press:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I9CzAFrNc8GgrUs90BsD2w.png" /></figure><p>Once the ball got to White, the only player that could jump to engage the RB was Jorginho, leaving free space for Ødegaard to receive the second pass. Normally, it should be Cucurella jumping on White, however he was pinned deep to defend Saka, as Thiago Silva was not trusted to go 1v1 with the wideman:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ZRnnA0O7vPobUjC3rnWPg.png" /><figcaption>(In the instance above, Jesus is the RW as he had rotated with Saka for that phase of play)</figcaption></figure><p>CHELSEA IN POSSESSION:</p><p>Chelsea set out playing with the ball in a 4–2–4 structure with Havertz joining Aubameyang as the second striker in the frontline. Arsenal were extremely aggressive with their press. While their 4–1–4–1 shape did leave a free man in the build up for Chelsea (either LB Cucurella or LCB Thiago Silva), the aggressiveness and height of the Arsenal lines meant that consistently playing out of the back against them was not an option. Thus, Chelsea went long regularly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l4Onv18Kak_43-yu65ptZg.png" /></figure><p>In particular they tried to hit the channels and get in behind the Arsenal full backs, as they are instructed to be pretty aggressive in the press and can leave gaps behind them. Chelsea went about doing this with positional rotations and by baiting Arsenal players to jump into pressing triggers to leave space in behind. They especially targeted the right side (Arsenal’s left), where Zinchenko is by far the weakest full back defensively out of the two.</p><p>In the instance below, Mendy goes direct to the flanks. Havertz is hovering unmarked in the right half-space. Partey had not tracked him, as Arteta does not adopt a strict man-to-man approach when it comes to the #6. Perhaps wrongly, Zinchenko jumps to pick up Havertz, leaving Sterling unmarked out wide. It would have been better if Zinchenko had stayed on his man and let Gabriel engage Havertz, so there is no free man. Mendy hits Sterling with a long ball:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OBIoscHGNHvXFOr1aYfZHQ.png" /></figure><p>Sterling carries the ball forwards and forces Gabriel to track him out wide, leaving the channel open for Havertz to attack, who is too fast for Zinchenko to catch. Sterling finds Havertz in behind, but his cross is poor and finds no one:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fD-89mvq_ArbkiKL3MBygg.png" /></figure><p>Different situation, same principles in this Chelsea transition: a long ball from Mendy finds Havertz who is tracked correctly by Gabriel this time. However, Zinchenko is late to come back following the Arsenal attack and Sterling runs in behind unmarked. Havertz knocks it down to Jorginho, who plays it first time to Sterling:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r6H5f2UhOuijRhULMSNtZA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lIUIaB6J67_VDX72zmDvSw.png" /></figure><p>Upon receiving, Sterling plays it to Havertz in the channel, who this time is not tracked properly by Thomas Partey. Haverz once again messes up the final action after Saliba closes him down effectively:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dnp9JulH1vHQdP1MIbIcow.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fJtmK5MWFChFJlntLp8oxg.png" /></figure><p>Aside from these few instances from the right side, Arsenal’s press was extremely effective, funnelling the Chelsea build-up towards the left, mainly due to Jesus’ great pressing work. The Brazilian striker would start from the RCB Chalobah and then curve his run towards the left, closing down any passing option towards the right side.</p><p>Arsenal wanted to funnel Chelsea’s build up towards the left, because unlike on the right, Chelsea had no players to attack the width of the pitch effectively, since LB Cucurella started deep, while LW Mason Mount had the tendency to drift infield and also deeper, as a natural midfielder.</p><p>In the instance below, Jesus forces Mendy to pass left to Thiago Silva, who has no other choice than to go wide to Cucurella, as Jorginho is closed down by Ødegaard. The moment Silva looks to pass to Cucurella, Saka starts rushing the LB to close him down:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f0L2ck_1BpfW4uHx7MJL2Q.png" /></figure><p>Mount drops deep to assist Cucurella, who has zero passing options around him. However, Mount has been followed and marked by Ben White, which forces Cucurella to just hit a hopeless long ball forwards that is picked up easily by Saliba before Aubameyang gets there:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GlcGvlYeCA5RL6hd5t7q_Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Oe_9LvCZzxIS_SZt0HS6tA.png" /></figure><p>Similarly, from the left side Arsenal are even more aggressive, with Martinelli closing down the RCB Chalobah who is forced to play it out to Azplicueta, who is the free man out wide. Zinchenko is very proactive and jumps into Chelsea’s third to close down Azpilicueta, who is forced to go long:</p><p>With a 0–1 lead and less than 15 minutes remaining on the clock, Arsenal retreated into their trusted 4–4–2 mid-block where Ødegaard joins Jesus in the frontline.</p><p>Chelsea looked utterly toothless, providing no real threat to Arsenal’s mid-block. The main problem with Chelsea’s attack was that, rather inexplicably, even against a settled block there was no attacker giving width on the left side. Once again, Cucurella was staying deep and Mount was too comfortable sitting inside:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*57qEEhGaAxo35ChrRroYqA.png" /></figure><p>CONCLUSION:</p><p>Arsenal managed to record a statement win against one of their biggest rivals, in an event in which they established authority and dominance. The mere image of the players and coaching stuff celebrating with the away fans after the final whistle has made plenty of doubters reconsider their opinion that Arsenal are not true title contenders. They certainly look like they are right now. Their quality on the pitch combined with the near faultless tactical plan made this Sunday afternoon one to remember.</p><p>On the other hand, Graham Potter has a lot of work do on this Chelsea side. It’s still early days, but their image right now is appalling: a side poor structurally with many high-profile players that are a struggling to make any difference on the pitch. It certainly seems like they have a long way to go before they can compete with the likes of Arsenal and Manchester City.</p><p>Thanks for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63e1c304e4ad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tactical analysis: Arsenal 3–2 Liverpool]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/tactical-analysis-arsenal-3-2-liverpool-3ce369a381de?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ce369a381de</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 17:38:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-11T17:38:27.708Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Highlighting the key tactical areas and battles where the game was won for Arsenal:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0PWLHr8sqCY5bA6KAGMFEw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Arsenal utilised the same aggressive 3–4–1–2 pressing structure they used against Liverpool last season:</p><p>The aim with the 1–2 up-top was to press the CB’s man-to-man, while also be compact enough to block central progression routes through Liverpool’s double pivot.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_2MKicBzYEBbQ1DUrqp2lA.png" /></figure><p>The middle line of 4 was slightly lop-sided, with Martinelli on the left having a comparatively higher starting possession than White on the right.</p><p>Xhaka was tasked with tracking Jota who played as a #10 between-the-lines, while the two CB’s took turns tracking Nunez’s runs.</p><p>Due to the lopsided nature of Arsenal’s press, Liverpool were forced (or rather baited) to build through the left, where, with Saka tucked in-field, there was an easy clipped ball for Alisson to play to Tsimikas on the touchline. This was the trigger for Ben White, to jump and engage Tsimikas high-up, as well as the rest of Arsenal’s structure shifting across towards the Liverpool’s left:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9sS-9uD3NpeHu4Nos0FOUQ.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal proceeded to squeeze the area of play which forced Liverpool to be direct.</p><p>Multiple times LFC tried to play in behind Diaz to isolate with with Saliba, who didn’t have the same success as Mané did in the same scenario against Ben White last season at Anfield.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sSLahWk0AqEIXDX2dmfI8Q.png" /></figure><p>Alternatively, Klopp instructed Darwin to drop deep to force Saliba to follow him high up the pitch, in order for Diaz to find himself free, however Thomas Partey was ready for that as he would rotate quickly out to cover the Colombian winger:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H9Jsf3kkJvmJ4HVAPoZ60g.png" /></figure><p>The other option Liverpool searched for was a usual one, utilising Thiago’s and van Dijk’s elite passing range to find Salah isolated on the right. Tierney at times has struggled with dealing with that switch, which is why Arteta selecting Tomiyasu at LB was such a masterstroke, he won everything in the air and dealt with Salah on the 1v1 every single time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oEsOukkzQTqfaBIT_ess1g.png" /></figure><p>Following their early goal, Arsenal became increasingly more passive in their press as time passed in the first half, allowing Liverpool to progress to the middle third, facing little to no pressure.</p><p>Arsenal would then retreat into primarily a 5–3–2 mid-block, as Xhaka would drop into the backline to track Jota’s runs in behind. Partey screened the backline, while Saka and Martinelli tucked inside to track Liverpool’s two best progressors: Thiago and Trent Alexander-Arnold. Front 2 of Ødegaard and Jesus was in position to jump on the CB’s, while also blocking the passage towards the centre of the pitch with their shadow-cover:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3zox2q26q50gyokILoco4g.png" /></figure><p>In possession, Arsenal mostly refrained to play short from goal-kicks due to Liverpool’s high 4–2–4 press, instead going long and looking to win duels in the midfield (where they had an overload), or in behind to their wingers to attack in space.</p><p>When they managed to consolidate possession in the middle-third, Arsenal again looked for the overload in midfield, dropping Jesus who excels at receiving with back to goal and turning away from markers, like in the instance below. Ball ends up with Ødegaard with multiple options:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y82D0yiemhw8-MgH2dRn_g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-hoVBHQVvfqE4rf-vTaigA.png" /></figure><p>Aside from that, Arsenal’s main mechanism for chance creation was through their wingers, and in particular getting the ball to them with pace and space to attack the FB.</p><p>FB’s remain deep &amp; wide stretching Liverpool’s block horizontally and vertically. Xhaka’s positioning in the left half-space pinning Liverpool’s RCB &amp; RB allowed Martinelli to attack Alexander-Arnold 1v1 so often.</p><p>Arsenal looked for that mismatch primarily, and so built through the left-side mainly. As we so often see, there also was the obvious counter to that, as when Liverpool’s block shifted across, Arsenal would sometimes switch the play to the weak side, where Saka can attack Tsimikas with Ben White overlapping:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KBW-Nck1YbchkLkSj1RJuA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6QWiMOcM01laOyzESTMGkw.png" /></figure><p>Despite all that, Arsenal’s lack of intensity in their press in the closing stages of the half, which allowed Thiago to get free and progress the ball, allowed Liverpool to get back into this game.</p><p>Second half we saw a switch in the pressing scheme from Arteta. Arsenal went man-to-man with an ultra-aggressive 3–1–4–2 press. Xhaka pushed higher up to mark Henderson and prevent the +1 in midfield, while Saka took Thiago out of the game with his man-marking. Also, following Diaz coming off for Firmino, Liverpool changed their attacking dynamics with Jota going to the LW, and Firmino operating as the #10 closer to the LHS, as opposed to Jota in the first half. Partey proceeded to pick him up:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J8cjZ6vxiRTG2Em7V9Uu2A.png" /></figure><p>This change worked very well for Arsenal, as for the majority of the second half they stifled Liverpool’s build-up forcing them to go long, where Arsenal’s back 3 would dominate duels.</p><p>In a rare lapse of concentration, Liverpool scored their second goal. Partey loses track of Firmino, as Jota comes inside and receives from Henderson in the pocket between Partey and Saka. Jota then plays in Firmino, neither of the Arsenal CB’s track his run, and proceeds to score yet another goal against the Gunners:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oqRKdlHJMbm1apATpUEYow.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_YmwmyF7aXuLz5A2_PLMrw.png" /></figure><p>Aside from that bleep, Arsenal were excellent at consolidating possession in Liverpool’s third in the second half, making good use of the ball and counter-pressing with numbers to win the ball back after losing it.</p><p>Arsenal at times would force the entire Liverpool 11 back in their own third with many numbers in and around the box, while their defenders were so high up and sustained pressure once the ball was cleared:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vQevyiNZ3meBDvkhAsq47g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eA4KHz94VMnNrUZ_ZCq1Lg.png" /></figure><p>Ben White from RB as the 6th attacker was key for Arsenal to overload Liverpool’s back-line, consistently making underlapping and overlapping runs in the box, and being found mostly by Saka in position for cutbacks in a loaded area:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N5KASNvGCRTMjo596VzNrw.png" /></figure><p>Granit Xhaka was also incredibly key for Arsenal, as highlighted earlier, for his positioning in the left half-space, allowing Martinelli to thrive on the outside:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*32VRyrSxAVhM3duULpLjIg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rzkdkAR70q1i8xPXEHwN9g.png" /></figure><p>Xhaka’s underlaps when Martinelli received out-wide were also extremely important. In this instance, in the phase of play that led to Arsenal’s 3rd goal, Xhaka receives the chest-down from Jesus, finds Martinelli and makes a great run in position for the cutback:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Udds_ceWZdk_aopcz_ZveA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jRcdaEcseBk7P_yEq7Y8bw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kr8Lf2NeAY78eE2b55QpgQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K5kvG7b41KW2vdE4tehc6A.png" /></figure><p>Following Arsenal’s third goal, Arteta swapped out Ødegaard for Tierney, and instructed his team to see out the game by defending in a 5–4–1 block:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HrYxqCFXPy3-2i1bblBucA.png" /></figure><p>Thanks for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ce369a381de" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Arsenal’s chance creation mechanisms vs Brentford]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@n.stephanatos/arsenals-chance-creation-mechanisms-vs-brentford-fbd4751914f1?source=rss-df677172cfb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fbd4751914f1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolas Stephanatos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2022 15:02:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-22T15:02:25.460Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Arsenal came away with a very comfortable 0–3 win in Brentford’s home turf on Sunday, a ground where they suffered a narrative-defining 2–0 defeat, just 400 days ago. A show of dominance from a team that has been transformed into a (too early to call?) winning machine in little more than a year. Upon rewatching, I examined and broke down some of the on-ball mechanisms they used in their build-up and final third play, en route to the big victory:</p><p>Let’s not sugarcoat things, as impressive as Arteta’s game-model and system is, the main difference from last season’s defeat and Sunday, is playing personnel. Aaron Ramsdale, Gabriel Jesus, William Saliba, Gabriel Magalhães, Fabio Vieira and Bukayo Saka did not start the game on August 13th, 2021, while others like Gabriel Martinelli and Ben White were far below their current level. The reason I say this, is because Arsenal’s shape in the build-up, was a product of Arteta’s trust to his current players, and their quality under pressure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kGLTevRbL-yM8xprfh7JVw.png" /></figure><p>Just by looking at the above, you will notice that aside from the goalkeeper-induced +1 against the first line of Brentford’s press, there are no clear numerical advantages across the pitch, but there are qualitative ones. Arteta’s made it clear in the past, first and foremost you need quality, and quality is what Arsenal have right now. Let’s delve deeper into the details:</p><p>Arsenal with their quality and Arteta’s clear game-model, tried to exploit Brentford’s aggressive 5–3–2/3–5–2 shape out of possession. From its nature, this shape requires a very aggressive midfield 3, shifting from side to side to pin Arsenal into wide areas, where they are closed off by the touchline. Arsenal in turn, attempted to use this principle to their advantage, by playing the ball from left to right and right to left, until gaps appear on the weak side.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_ybguHVWrALnJDJpFvrHjg.png" /></figure><p>Above, we can see the key to this idea, which is the right-back Ben White, who stays deep and wide, and attracts the Brentford LCM who jumps to press him. This does two things:</p><ul><li>First, open the right pocket, where the playmaker Fabio Vieira has space to receive if needed (as the LWB is pinned by Saka higher up).</li><li>Second and most importantly, open a huge amount of space on the weak side (left), as Brentford’s midfield 3 has to shift across in order to not leave any central space.</li></ul><p>The back-line is completely pinned back, as the positioning of Arsenal’s front 5 is keeping them on their toes. 1v1&#39;s are created all across the width of the pitch, as illustrated (Tierney also pinning the RWB in the bottom left, not shown in the image).</p><p>Here’s the continuation of the phase of play in the previous image: Few seconds later, the ball is still in the overloaded right-hand side, with Vieira on the ball in position to switch to the weak-side, where the LCB Gabriel, drifts into the open space to get on the ball:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mjBcCXP-NPuL_03PbK0OQg.png" /></figure><p>Gabriel takes it on his stride, and drives into the open space with the ball, as a result of the positioning of the Arsenal forwards, pinning the Brentford back-line back. Xhaka’s third man run towards the left half-space is crucial.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rx9j27cUyPhfCR508wMQpg.png" /></figure><p>As Gabriel enters the final third, Brentford’s RCM is in a conundrum, as he doesn’t know whether to jump on Gabriel or follow Xhaka’s run. Gabriel finds Martinelli who’s found himself into CF space after rotating with Jesus. Xhaka is running into the box unobstructed, as the RCB jumps on Martinelli. The mistake here is Brentford’s CCB being passive and not tight on Martinelli, and leaving the RCB in 2v1:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z0e60JspMujV8k8guHTm_A.png" /></figure><p>The result here is obvious, as Xhaka finds himself free inside the box in position for a shot/cutback. Once again, it is key to note that Tierney’s positioning creates the space there, by keeping the RWB engaged out wide:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mDyLfgz2Fn0vW8nGlPwH1g.png" /></figure><p>From a wider angle, the 2–3–5 shape Arsenal morphed into when entering the middle third of the pitch is illustrated quite clearly, engaging Brentford’s 5–3–2 man-to-man:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gg4F-gZKFurVv2zYCtOnCQ.png" /></figure><p>Arsenal got into that shape with regularity, and refraining from attacking against a settled backline if the numbers weren’t there.</p><p>Here in a transition opportunity, Arsenal’s interiors and full-backs are too low. Xhaka finds Martinelli wide-left and instead of taking the opportunity to attack the RWB 1v1 without options around him, he circulates the ball back to Tierney, so the rest of the team can get into shape:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aoTcUFzIiO4iUaywX85U6Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ixVx2YZPllZXIxTXN5DJ8Q.png" /></figure><p>Lots of Arsenal’s key principles highlighted in the build-up to their second goal:</p><p>During another instance of right-sided build-up, Xhaka drifts further centrally to open space on the weak-side for Tierney to progress:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CJo44-TLYRlgjtOsrsJ-GA.png" /></figure><p>Tierney drives forward and passes it to Martinelli:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qlx2lb0IP_-b2jg1jVRlbA.png" /></figure><p>Martinelli cuts inside with the ball, before finding the metronome, Thomas Partey, who plays out back to the right to Vieira, as Tierney starts sprinting towards his final third position. Once again, Arsenal switching from side to side until gaps appear:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EvPDQjOhJQDqjzGH3G89FA.png" /></figure><p>Vieira drifts inside, no gaps yet, but it’s fine, switch once again side-to-side through Thomas Partey. In the meanwhile, Arsenal begin the process of flooding the box with men, as the two FB’s are high-up to allow the front 3 to attack the area:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PQtC8oXwoF0_1miLgiLkrg.png" /></figure><p>Box is now flooded, as Xhaka passes it wide left to Tierney, as the first gap appears:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ii5UcfBzRWI6x1ECvT4vWQ.png" /></figure><p>Brentford’s RCM moves in to close the gap and help out the RWB on the 1v1, which leaves Xhaka alone in the half-space, in prime position for a delivery into the flooded box:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BeoSvmk6gxTms0uTguuIzg.png" /></figure><p>Xhaka gets it perfectly and finds Jesus who peels off the back of his man and heads it in for 0–2:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RKe1ItAEnyV8XQN8a34iPw.png" /></figure><p>While Arsenal are a side that primarily wants to build short from the back, they are not afraid to go long and win duels, as Ramsdale, as well as the back 4 all have good passing range.</p><p>In this instance, Brentford press very high as Arsenal build towards the left. Tierney receives on the touchline, and the RCM jumps to press him. Following the initial switch towards the left, Brentford’s midfield 3 is not quick enough to shift across, meaning Brentford’s CCB has to jump high up the pitch to close the passing lane to Xhaka. Out of the picture, Jesus recongises that and drifts towards the left to create a 2v2 with Martinelli, against the RWB &amp; RCB. Tierney plays a long ball in behind to access that area:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-ZciE3881ijPODBVbmv0AQ.png" /></figure><p>Jesus uses his pace against the RCB, to get in behind and create a chance (qualitative advantage):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DgXoxRq_MJaw8Fvf3yyLqA.png" /></figure><p>Let’s now look at a couple of more ways Arsenal used to access key spaces on the ball:</p><p>First up, earlier we talked about quality on the ball under pressure. William Saliba displays that in abundance, with his technical ability coupled with great intelligence. As the ball is played towards him, he wants to access the metronome, Partey, but the passing lane to him is being closed by Ivan Toney. Saliba delays his first touch by backtracking, in order to get Toney to jump towards him, in turn creating the space to play the ball to Partey:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RmG1J2M7PwWf80drezsKSQ.png" /></figure><p>Next up, Granit Xhaka’s third man runs. We saw a great example with Arsenal’s first big chance of the game, here’s another one:</p><p>Martinelli is on the ball wide left, with no clear passing option. Xhaka creates one himself, by dragging Brentford’s RCM towards the box with a third man run:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nyaPA1TVyuSYAyG7hVAZDA.png" /></figure><p>This opens space for Martinelli to pass into Tierney (who in that instance inverted into midfield), with space for a shot:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sRiBtFnubUt8CIpClcQcrw.png" /></figure><p>With capable ball strikers, it is never a bad idea to create space for long-shooting opportunities. Fabio Vieira was brought into Arsenal in part for that reason, and displayed that for his team’s third goal:</p><p>Saliba uses his quality to beat Toney’s press once again, and following a 1–2 with Partey, he finds Vieira on the right. Ben White immediately sprints towards the opponent’s right recognising the chance for an overload:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YZH7yNhdP_-XvbqNleWhlg.png" /></figure><p>Vieira drives forward, and finds Saka on the right. Ben White’s marauding overlapping run, creates the 2v1 vs Brentford’s LWB, and in turn the space for Saka to cut inside unobstructed:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*91PbtghV0kondMGxFnYKPA.png" /></figure><p>After cutting inside, Saka, finds Vieira in the right half-space, who is free as the Brentford DM had to jump on Saka:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7BjoCzevQ5e0mMNrAQLIWQ.png" /></figure><p>The amount of Arsenal players in and around the box keep the Brentford players occupied enough, giving Fabio Vieira the split second of time he needs to line up a shot and make it 0–3:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x-zhZp1zsvWBKJdpSS72vg.png" /></figure><p>In conclusion, Arsenal have become a formidable side, using their quality coupled with simple yet effective positional mechanisms to fashion shooting chances for themselves. Obviously, this is only one part of the equation, as their deep build-up, high press, compact settled blocked and more, are equally crucial to their success. A lot of this stuff will be broken down on this blog in the next few months, so stay tuned.</p><p>Thanks for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fbd4751914f1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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