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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nate Slade on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nate Slade on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Nate Slade on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Smartphone Apps Could Help Us Naturalize Logic]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@natesladeit/smartphone-apps-could-help-us-naturalize-logic-397e0f5c4238?source=rss-8ad6c0760f6f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[problem-solving]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rationality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decisions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nate Slade]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 May 2018 17:44:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-03T17:44:48.953Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r378wpxS0Smdl_qxXg9lRQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Current State of Affairs</figcaption></figure><p>We do not think like computers. That is a good thing. Only in science fiction is it anything but, and even there the results are usually lack luster. Most computers cannot extricate themselves from the simplest of situations; look up the frame problem. On the other hand, we are very much less consistent than our electronic partners. Consistency, being the very stuff of traditional logic, has traditionally been a prominent obstacle to our having a very high opinion of ourselves.</p><p>Models of ideal human reasoners, for example, tend to predicate cognitive features that are not apt to be plausible of human cognition: say, human cognition should obey the axioms of the predicate calculus, its inferences (or sets of beliefs) are to be closed under logical deduction/implication, etc. (Woods, 2013, ch. 1 &amp; 2). Evidence in cognitive science, however, shows that humans do not operate on their propositional representations in ways that (always) obey these standards (Ibid. &amp; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). So, a problem crops up for any prospect of naturalizing logic for human reasoners.</p><p>The ordinary strategy doesn’t work. The practical world, ever changing, leaves us poorly situated for coming up with a formal language or set of axioms from which, in conjunction with input propositions, we can predict the cognitive behavior of actual agents (Woods, 2013). Yet, the armchair leaves us with a rationality divorced from practice, an ivory tower without stairs; its models do not much predict or represent actual behavior. So, what can we do, to recognize our real rationality better? What can we do to put a stairway between the entranceway and our lofty ideals? <br> <br>This question is problematic.</p><p>Already, it disposes us to look for one logic, one strategy, one fantastic attempt at what will be yet another singular failure. To transcend myopathy, the kaleidoscopic brilliance of a many hued and multi-faceted specificity recommends itself: Don’t look for reason in general, model reason in particular.</p><p>As Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout (2005, ch.2) point out, there are several easily deployed statistical tools that predict complex phenomena such as a person’s personality inventory or chances of success in school or at a new job. Some can even be deployed by intelligent second graders (<em>Ibid.</em>). All are easier to use than it is for a person to develop expertise, and experts would usually be more accurate if they ditched their expertise and just deployed simple algorithms or statistical procedures (<em>Ibid.</em>). Were experts to limit themselves to deploying such algorithms, then we might expect that we could come up with a model of expert inference by modeling the rules for deploying those algorithms. We would then have hopes of developing a normatively constraining logic, which would be a naturalized logic with at least the prospect of being descriptively adequate. It would be a logic of expertise localized to particular domains of cognitive enterprise: e.g. making psychological assessments, deciding who to hire, and so on.</p><p>In today’s world of handy apps at everyone’s fingertips, it would not be too fool hardy to suppose that game theorists (or psychologists who study decision-making) could come up with apps, which would allow people to enter decision options and give weight to a number of criteria, but which wouldn’t let them be candidates for Dutch books. Such theorists could even design apps for particular sorts of decisions (maximizing or satisficing) or utilities (which schools to go to, what to eat, etc.). With how early our young are trained on devices that would allow them to make use of such programs, it might be reasonable to expect them, for certain domains of cognitive enterprise, to reason without them just as soon as they would dig a hole without a shovel. If we could come up with a logic of when to use a shovel, then we should be able to come up with a logic of when to use app a, b, or c. As developers of such apps improve their functionality and ease of deployment, as they become as useful for carrying out cognitive enterprises as using a shovel is for digging a hole, we might expect that we could come up with a normatively constraining, naturalized logic that would become descriptive of ordinary people. We’d have to model rules for deploying the apps and axiomatize them in an artificial language.</p><p>As logicians, we may hope for content neutral logics (or logics that are equally at home in determining the validity of an argument as they are in your deciding whether you should get a blue cup instead of the red one), but it is clear that human’s do not reason in a content neutral way. Moreover, we have already been making logics for particular domains of cognitive enterprise already: inductive inference, deductive inference, doxastic inference, modal inference, etc. Why not “apptive” inferences (inferring that you should use an app)? So, we should not object too immediately to my proposal by stating the obvious: the axioms that summarize when it is appropriate to deploy the apps may be quantifications over particular subject matters, sets of propositions, or whatever.</p><p>Much of our reasoning is associationist, and insofar as it is, a descriptively adequate logic of human reasoners cannot exclude a set of logics that function relative to certain domains of subject or cognitive enterprise. And when you really come down to it, “inference on the basis of logical connectives irrespective of non-logical content” does not have a constant meaning. Predicates in Sentential Logic are non-logical content; the values of variables in Predicate Logic, at least, are non-logical content; they are features actual objects have. As logic becomes more precise, it rules in more content (or stand-ins for content). And, perhaps this is too much to hope for, but we may hope that the values of certain variables can be logical content in a human logic.</p><p>References</p><p>Bishop, M. A. and J. D. Trout (2005) <em>Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment</em>. New York: Oxford University Press</p><p>Woods, J. (2013). <em>Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference. </em>London: College Publications</p><p>Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and A. Tversky (1982). <em>Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. </em>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=397e0f5c4238" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Language Controls Expectation]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@natesladeit/language-controls-expectation-1a85414eb335?source=rss-8ad6c0760f6f------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2600/1*rVu5_G5zGM040x66Y9_a5w.jpeg" width="4272"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Different languages cause people to make different predictions: Some are more descriptive than others, and this results in significant&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@natesladeit/language-controls-expectation-1a85414eb335?source=rss-8ad6c0760f6f------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/@natesladeit/language-controls-expectation-1a85414eb335?source=rss-8ad6c0760f6f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thoughts-and-ideas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[predictions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[behavior]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nate Slade]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2018 19:30:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-20T19:53:31.608Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Fiction Test]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@natesladeit/the-fiction-test-f3c11cd74ebe?source=rss-8ad6c0760f6f------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2600/1*T9H_DxBDMigcmLR4hXBxnw.jpeg" width="5472"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">The biggest reason we read fiction is to have vicarious experience. The next biggest draw is the promise of learning a bit about ourselves&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@natesladeit/the-fiction-test-f3c11cd74ebe?source=rss-8ad6c0760f6f------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[genre-fiction]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nate Slade]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2018 22:32:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-20T20:08:11.015Z</atom:updated>
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