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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nathan Chen on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nathan Chen on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@nathan.writes?source=rss-6774bca3f1c5------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Nathan Chen on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Empty Signals (April 3, Resolution)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nathan.writes/empty-signals-april-3-resolution-20e1ddd05639?source=rss-6774bca3f1c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20e1ddd05639</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[token]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[signaling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Apr 2019 19:47:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-10T14:48:37.748Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KDKdlRX_OrBdoVbfslwuVA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Don’t trust the light.</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Resolution</em></strong><em> is a near-weekly blog at the intersection of economics, Web 3.0 and venture capital. Views do not reflect those of my employer. This week’s post is the story of how I got scammed in early crypto and what it taught me about signals; particularly, the ones you want to see.</em></p><p>In late 2016, I was a heathen. Before joining ConsenSys — and my subsequent enlightenment — I was only another gambler, using the time-tested excuse of a<em> ‘</em>diversified portfolio’ to justify buying different altcoins.</p><p>In one particular search for my next fix, I noticed a project named Contingency getting repeated traction on trading forums. The white paper went into technical detail about new types of token marketplaces for betting and casino games, but nothing that had the world-changing meme potential I was looking for.</p><p>That was, until my eyes came across this sentence from <a href="https://medium.com/@ContingencyTech/what-is-contingency-9e88c60616f9">one of their blog posts</a>:</p><blockquote><em>Contingency, for lack of a better term is like the </em><strong><em>“Uber of Casinos”</em></strong><em>.</em></blockquote><p>Finally — language I could <em>understand</em>.</p><p>I set out to do my due diligence: verifying the team’s LinkedIns, testing the code in their white paper, and seeking the opinions of others. There were positive signals everywhere. Even Contingency’s team was pleasantly active online. The feedback built up my confidence like a hot streak at the poker table; it’s easier to raise the stakes when you feel Lady Luck by your side.</p><p>Going to their contract address on Etherscan was the final nail in the coffin. The address contained a waterfall of ether pouring in from hundreds of transactions, satisfying both my desire for social proof and financial commitment.</p><p>This is the unsung promise of blockchain: cryptographically-verified transactions to speed up your FOMO.</p><p>I imagined hundreds of tech-savvy individuals that had done their comprehensive diligence and came back with a strong conviction in the project. The amount of surging capital surely reflected an educated market that knew a good deal when it saw one.</p><p><em>I’m a small fish. Why not follow the whales?</em></p><p>And so with ‘investment funds’ earmarked from time spent washing dishes in the back of a narrow Chipotle kitchen, I took a leap of faith. 4 ETH was sent to their contract. $40 in those days — or in my mental accounting, six hours of scrubbing pots in scalding hot water.</p><p>A few days later, I watched the timer prefaced with “ICO Ends In:” reach 0:00:00. The timer began counting down negative digits and a few weeks after that the website was gone.</p><p>For a while I had fantasies of the SEC swooping in to render justice, often to the tune of “Ride of the Valkyries.” The fact that a <a href="https://medium.com/@ContingencyTech/contingency-who-are-they-77778ece54ff">publicly-known team</a> pulled such a fraud was unbelievable. To this day they’ve gotten off scot-free, albeit like most other scams from that era. The team’s <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x31e77f01cf1f678bb12bd345116b1bee0d140d26">wallet address</a>, which at one point held over 20,000 ETH, is still being liquidated. My paycheck for that six-hour shift of dishwashing is long gone — and worth 15x what it used to be — but no pile of dirty kitchen iron has ever intimidated me again. I broke even, in my book.</p><p>So where did my diligence go wrong? Perhaps the whitepaper was a falsified work of technical jargon or the third-party bloggers spouting positive reviews were paid off. The possibilities lead down a rabbit hole, but the most telling signal was always front and center: the transactions behind their token sale.</p><p>Imagine the following activity:</p><p>Somebody connects two checking accounts to an online stock exchange platform. They use one account to buy the same stock three times in a row, each through a <em>separate transaction</em>. Then, they transfer funds from this checking account to the second. Finally, they use the second account to initiate <em>four more transactions</em> for the same stock. Overall, the largest transaction is worth $20,000 and the smallest one <strong>$4</strong>.</p><p>Now replace the stock exchange platform with a token sale contract and each checking account with an Ethereum address. This is an instance of strange behavior with <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x8dd84121be30223b93622fc464c0b0d7b133c37f">this address</a>, <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xf11cc2152d3e1e44825eb4cc71eac0e9a6f5f2b1">another address</a>, and the Contingency <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xc96eec418b50c538c3f3e32e71575da068a97401">token sale contract</a>. The previous actions are inane, although admittedly far from a smoking gun. They do undoubtedly contribute to an embellished view of the sale: more transactions, a larger diversity in the amounts being sent to the smart contract, and if you’re not paying close attention to the wallets behind the transactions — more participants.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/0*Lg9U1wF3vIzDsXae" /><figcaption>Only a theory, of course.</figcaption></figure><p>It turns out a blockchain is great for forging signals. The core principles of trustlessness and transparency frame verification as an on-chain activity. Accordingly, this is where deception thrives: where information is supposed to be most secure. Consensus protocols and Sybil-resistance address the technical side of trust, but not the human one.</p><p>Consider two popular signals used to evaluate investments: <em>who else is investing </em>and<em> how much they’re putting in</em>. To an extent, a blockchain provides this information on-chain, but these signals are useless without any account of identity. There’s this masquerade of a single source of truth when pseudonymous addresses actually provide additional degrees of freedom for manipulation and collusion.</p><p>It’s all too easy in situations like token sales where signals are speculative. In these public auctions, activity is perceived as performance and the signal becomes self-referential. With the opacity of blockchain, all bad actors have to do is add fuel to the fire. For instance, <a href="https://media.consensys.net/a-retrospective-of-the-eos-token-sale-172d3437932b">one possible tactic</a>:</p><blockquote><em>“Take… the funds raised and use them to buy the token sold in the crowd sale…while the sale is still going on.”</em></blockquote><p>Cycles of wash trades, all leveraging the ‘transparency’ of a blockchain to create the illusion of liquidity for speculators. When faced with the ostensible facts, few people can resist kneeling before the wisdom of the crowd.</p><p>My own story of blunder deserves little pity — play stupid games, win stupid prizes. However, it’s heartbreaking to imagine the newcomers who join this space enamored with a vision of the world made possible by decentralization, only to be swindled by someone who knew what they wanted to see.</p><p>Before evaluating a signal, it’s always worth it to <a href="https://medium.com/@nathan.writes/the-fundamental-assumption-of-cryptosystems-723d32dc461a">question your assumptions</a>. As signals are reduced to a set of Boolean expressions, they lose the meaning of what they were meant to capture. The map of cryptocurrency — your landmarks of investors, capital raised, verified transactions — is far from the territory. Be careful not to let it lead you astray.</p><p><em>A huge thank you to </em><a href="https://twitter.com/zherring?lang=en"><em>Zach Herring</em></a><em> for his constructive feedback.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20e1ddd05639" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Venture Capital is Unraveling (March 13, Resolution)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nathan.writes/venture-capital-is-unraveling-march-13-resolution-3f5d78fef3bd?source=rss-6774bca3f1c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3f5d78fef3bd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[market-design]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2019 16:48:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-14T15:42:07.669Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MUGHXSqybTKy2krfM9Mocg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>Resolution</em></strong><em> will be a weekly series at the intersection of economics, Web 3.0 and venture capital. Views do not reflect those of my employer. This week’s subject is on one of my favorite topics, market design</em><strong><em>, </em></strong><em>and how it shows that Silicon Valley is getting too smart for its own good.</em></p><p>In the book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Who-Gets-What-Why-Matchmaking/dp/0544705289"><em>Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design</em></a><em>, </em>Alvin Roth identifies a trend in the 1980s where law firms were making offers to students upon acceptance to law school.<em> </em>Roth writes:</p><blockquote>Those firms undoubtedly would have liked to see how their prospective hires actually did in law school — but they worried that if they waited, other firms would snap up the best talent before them. So they told themselves that if Yale Law School wanted a student, that student also had a strong chance of becoming a good lawyer</blockquote><p>This was a suboptimal situation for all parties involved. The students were forced to make a career-defining decision earlier than they were ready for. The law firms were forced to extend job offers to students without seeing their performance in classes that would ostensibly prepare them for those careers. Roth calls this characteristic <a href="http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2009/06/unraveling.html">unraveling</a>: when transactions in a marketplace occur inefficiently early.</p><p>Marketplaces still accomplish their purpose even as they unravel. After all, both parties choose to opt-in. Students want jobs and law firms want a chance at the best talent — and those desires were met.</p><p><strong>In an irrational market, it is rational to make irrational decisions.</strong></p><p>However, unraveling leads to market failure. The bubble pops. Law firms end up with poor employees and students end up in bad situations. Eventually, an external force must act upon the system to bring it back to balance (in this case, the National Association for Law Placement).</p><p>Enter venture capital<em> à la </em>Silicon Valley, where everyone wants to be contrarian and they do so by mimicking their favorite underground thought leader, which they found through the retweet of a prominent VC on Twitter.</p><p>The current<strong> ‘</strong>red pill’<strong> </strong>of VC lies in the palm of Basecamp CEO Jason Fried, who has built a brand on the claim that <a href="https://www.recode.net/2019/1/23/18193685/venture-capital-money-kills-business-basecamp-ceo-jason-fried">venture capital is killing startups</a>. The movement <a href="https://qz.com/1540608/the-problem-with-silicon-valleys-obsession-with-blitzscaling-growth/">rallies against blitzscaling</a> and pushes a viciously minimalist approach to business— <em>sustainable</em> growth at all costs. As the story goes, the industry is a vicious cycle of founders accepting checks that are too big and investors willing to write bigger checks.</p><p>Are the trends they identify a sign of the market unraveling? The signals are there, like when some of the biggest names in Web 3.0 venture capital raise a $133 million round for a team that later realizes <a href="https://www.basis.io/">they couldn’t actually achieve what they set out to do</a>. In Web 3.0, the signals are even more alarming as investors have had to lower their focal point for minimum viable investment criteria — there simply aren’t enough examples of success in the space to inform their predictions. But while Jason Fried, Tim O’Reilly and others can provide a host of data points showing the inefficiency of venture capital, my observation sits at the level of <em>worldview</em>.</p><p>Meritocracy is firmly integrated in the realm of venture capital and startups. While others like Alex Danco have <a href="https://medium.com/social-capital/techs-diversity-problem-february-24-2019-snippets-56d0fd2fa62e">written brilliantly on the effects of SV meritocracy on diversity</a>, my qualm is also on how it demands focus on micro-scale improvements when macro-scale ones may be needed. The resulting atmosphere is one where both venture capitalists and founders complain, but nothing changes.</p><p>Meritocracy emphasizes ownership. If a venture capital investment turns out to be a dud, we are quick to point out that success is never guaranteed and internalize lessons like how to improve the diligence process. It’s similar to the law firm in the 1980s that ends up with an associate lawyer who doesn’t actually know law. The law firm ‘goes back to the books’ and re-assesses the associate’s early background to avoid similar signals with new candidates — <em>in the same broken system of extending offers to newly-admitted law students</em>. To take personal ownership of the mistake does not address the issue underlying the market, and as long as the systemic issue exists we can expect behavior to continue similarly and even worsen.</p><p>When markets unravel, participants engage in a <em>race to zero</em>: engaging in earlier transactions on the assessment of even earlier signals. This frames the current VC focus on differentiation, where funds search for earlier opportunities to invest on signals that others aren’t seeing. When your feedback loop is ten years* it’s hard to remain grounded. There’s a reason that bubbles are predicated on derivatives — not specifically the financial instrument, but second-degree relationships — because at some point the valuation becomes uncoupled from fundamental value. As with bubbles, the system works until it doesn’t.</p><p>The behaviors of both law firms in the 1980s and today’s venture capital firms are the best strategy available to them. <strong>In an irrational market, it is rational to make irrational decisions. </strong>To<strong> </strong>opt out of these behaviors is even more destructive than participating in them. They’re the only way to play the game.</p><p>The environment encourages firms to focus on the optimization of unit results, not on system-level solutions. Accordingly, venture capital unravels**. Escaping this state of suboptimal equilibrium will require a large shift in mindshare and plenty of work to follow. It begins with an honest conversation.</p><p><em>*Ten years is the average investment horizon for venture firms.</em></p><p><em>**It’s hard to push against the inertia of unraveling. The allure of market failure is that it’s the only outcome where everyone else also fails(and most importantly, the responsibility of failure doesn’t reside with you and you alone).</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f5d78fef3bd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exploring Partial Common Ownership on the Monopoly Board]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nathan.writes/exploring-partial-common-ownership-on-the-monopoly-board-59163ad73608?source=rss-6774bca3f1c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/59163ad73608</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[radicalxchange]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[radical-markets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mechanism-design]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[games]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Mar 2019 19:13:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-06T19:13:02.574Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SUdQA_PuncKzKvrW68WjTg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Property is monopoly.</figcaption></figure><p>The classic game of <em>Monopoly </em>holds a paradigm everyone is familiar with: once you purchase property, it is yours to keep. It is the foundation of the game, which for the children to adults that play it, is a caricature of real estate in American culture. Amidst the darker overtones of bankrupting your competitors, the morale of the story is clear: the one with the largest monopoly wins.</p><p>This simple concept of property ownership has also led to a housing and rental crisis in the United States. The picture above is an example, which likely invokes a thought similar to:</p><ol><li>The owner of the house is being stubborn and petty.</li><li>The developers of the adjacent land are being evil.</li><li>(If you’re me) — how could anyone tolerate the construction noise?</li></ol><p>In any case, most would agree that this is not an optimal outcome for the house owner <strong>or</strong> adjacent land developers. It’s a lose-lose.</p><p>This state has been reached because property owners have no obligation to sell or effectively use their land. The permanence of their rights has led to intense rent-seeking, price inflation, or worse — pure speculative holding. The latter results in no utility for society, despite land being a shared experience and a part of nature.</p><p>Our flawed model of ownership is especially tangible in cities like Vancouver, B.C, where a census has identified over <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4068194/vancouver-empty-homes-tax/">25,000 empty homes</a>. Houses with nobody living in them. Land that isn’t benefiting anyone. This is such a problem that the government imposed a vacancy tax, only to dismally report a year later their vacancy rate only <a href="https://vancouver.ca/files/cov/empty-homes-tax-annual-report.pdf">increased by .1% as a result</a>.</p><p>The problem runs deeper than any end-of-pipe solution can address. To solve this, we have to reconsider our fundamental understanding of ownership.</p><p>As always, the classics provide a start. As Seneca admonishes in a letter,</p><blockquote><em>‘But I’m being turned off the land my father and grandfather owned before me! ‘Well, so what? Who owned the land before your grandfather? Are you in a position to identify the community, let alone the individual, to whom it originally belonged? You entered on it as a tenant, not an absolute owner. Whose tenant, you may ask? Your heir’s, and that only if you’re lucky… what you possess and call your own is really public property, or mankind’s property for that matter.</em></blockquote><p>To prevent monopolization, it’s necessary to shift from a model of private property to “mankind’s property” — from individual ownership to the commons.</p><p>In the book<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Radical-Markets-Uprooting-Capitalism-Democracy/dp/0691177503"> Radical Markets</a>, Glen Weyl and Eric Posner explore this type of alternative in the COST mechanism: a common ownership self-assessed tax. In the following, I will explain several characteristics of this model (also known as the <em>Harberger Tax</em>), and share insights derived from practicing it with the <a href="https://www.meetup.com/RadicalXChange-NYC/">RadicalxChange NYC meetup</a> in an alternative version of the board game <em>Monopoly</em>. The usage of games — both virtual and physical — to learn is valuable as it allows for hands-on learning without any financial or real property risk.</p><p><strong><em>Side note:</em></strong><em> If you haven’t heard about RadicalxChange, we are a community of artists, scholars, entrepreneurs and activists reimagining the future through mechanism design. We have an upcoming </em><a href="https://radicalxchange.org/"><em>conference in Detroit</em></a><em> and meetups in many cities worldwide — here’s a </em><a href="https://forum.radicalxchange.org/t/radicalxchange-chapter-list-find-your-city-here/13"><em>list</em></a><em>. If your city doesn’t have a chapter, consider starting your own! I’m happy to talk to anyone thinking about this.</em></p><h3>The COST Mechanism</h3><p>The common ownership self-assessed tax has several core elements to it. First, you assess the value of your ‘wealth’ (which will refer here to property, but could also be assets, labor, or other forms). This valuation brings a corresponding tax — about 7% is optimal, according to Glen and Eric’s writing. Your property is put on a continuous auction to the public at your valuation. The taxes that are collected are redistributed to the public as a social dividend, perhaps the basis of a universal basic income.</p><p>Although this may seem quite radical, the mechanism is incentive compatible and redefines property as not as being privately owned but leased from society. This addresses the monopoly problem mentioned earlier (and would satisfy Seneca). To understand why, it’s necessary to understand<strong> </strong><em>investment</em><strong> </strong>and <em>allocative efficiency</em>.</p><p><em>Investment efficiency </em>refers to the ability of property owners to invest in their land. Our current system promotes this type of efficiency. Landowners spend capital on their property knowing that it will be reflected in their overall property valuation. In contrast, there is also <em>allocative efficiency</em>, which refers to the rate by which assets flow to those who can be the most productive with those assets. As mentioned earlier, we have many signals that allocative efficiency is low in the states: empty homes, unused property, and rents that are disconnected from the true valuation of landowners. COST reduces investment efficiency and produces allocative efficiency. The tax disincentivizes landowners from setting a monopolistic price.</p><p><em>(Once again, the book </em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Radical-Markets-Uprooting-Capitalism-Democracy/dp/0691177503"><em>Radical Markets</em></a><em> by Glen Weyl and Eric Posner describes this and a lot more </em><strong><em>thoroughly</em></strong><em>, and I can’t recommend it enough for anyone interested in economics and markets.)</em></p><p><em>Monopoly</em> happens to be the perfect board game to teach this concept, both due to its structure and its story.</p><h3>The History of Monopoly</h3><p><em>Monopoly </em>was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/business/behind-monopoly-an-inventor-who-didnt-pass-go.html">created by a woman named Elizabeth Magie</a>, who sought to design a game that would help show people the power of anti-monopoly policy.</p><p>Yes — the intention of <em>Monopoly </em>was to promote equal distribution. Originally named <em>Landlord’s Game</em>, she drew up a set of contrasting rules: one value-creative, and the other ruthlessly zero-sum and monopolistic. The rules of the game we know today descend from the latter. Unfortunately, this is because someone would steal her concept of the monopolist version and sell it to the Parker Brothers. She received little attention and credit for her invention. Elizabeth’s vision of an instructive game experience never came to life commercially.</p><p>While the COST version of Monopoly is not part of her original ruleset, the act of examining monopolistic rules and practicing an alternative theory is one that resonates with the spirit of the game.</p><h3>COST Monopoly and Game Insights</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/1*dNIR2LDPp-Zp7LC4iH96Zg.jpeg" /><figcaption>All credit for gameplay design and rules goes to <a href="https://twitter.com/felixschleef"><strong>Felix Schleef</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>For the most part, our group followed the rules above. One rule we did add was auctioning a random piece of property off every turn. This helped increase the pace of the game.</p><p>The following are several insights that the group derived while discussing the game.</p><h4>Auctions are fun</h4><p>In retrospect, our auction system was a bit naive. We declared our bids verbally — highest bid won — and had the ‘bank’ play auctioneer. The chant of “Going once, going twice!” was unnecessary, although certainly entertaining. At one point, a couple people remarked that a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction">second-price sealed-bid auction</a> would be more productive. In the context of a game though, it would be too formal. The solemn process of submitting a sealed bid doesn’t allow for moments of “you’re <em>crazy </em>for bidding that much!”.</p><h4>Combined valuation doesn’t make sense with COST</h4><p>The game rule that allowed landowners to combine their property valuations did not seem conducive to the desired outcomes of COST. Each combination of property would receive a premium on its valuation due to the higher difficulty of acquiring multiple pieces of land. This consolidation of property then raises a prohibitively high barrier to becoming a landowner. A Harberger Tax benefits from modularity as opposed to integration.</p><h4>Speculation drives self-assessed valuation</h4><p>In the confines of <em>Monopoly</em> the valuation of your property should stem from discounting its future cash flow. This comes in the form of future rent. However, no one in the group made purchasing decisions based on the potential rents of property. Instead there was a race to ownership, fueled by an early abundance of money and competitive allure. We became familiar with system dynamics quickly. An auction for any piece of property immediately triggered a reassessment of the property around it. An owner of adjacent property that neglected to change their assessment would to their taxes or be bought out.</p><h4>The one who saves their cash until last wins</h4><p>In the endgame, scarcity drives behavior. The days of speculation end when property owners realize they can’t pay their self-assessed tax much longer. The reassessment of property that follows makes it ripe for those who are cash-rich to swoop in and dominate. I believe minimal purchasing until the endgame is the dominant strategy. <em>COST Monopoly </em>reflects a common feature of free markets: bubbles.</p><h3>Towards More Games and Testing</h3><p>This was a fascinating look at the downstream effects of mechanism design. The context of a simple board game allowed us to practice a new theory that has been centuries in the making (no, seriously — go read <a href="http://radicalmarkets.com/">Radical Markets</a> to understand the historical underpinnings of COST). Taking theory out of the confines of a whitepaper or book should not be underrated, and I hope to see more ‘remixes’ of familiar games as a form of education.</p><p>In our session, we experienced the formation and <em>pop</em> of a real estate bubble in less than the span of a couple hours. That the experience was valuable should be no surprise given the history of Monopoly. To cultivate real world insights through the play of a cardboard-and-plastic game is just what Elizabeth Magie intended.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OD8Hgq7pjQiLd8c2jGNVBQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Proof of work. Thanks to everyone that came out, Fanny for taking the picture, and <em>the </em><a href="https://www.thebushwickgenerator.com/"><em>Bushwick Generator</em></a><em> for hosting our game night.</em></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=59163ad73608" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Fundamental Assumption of Cryptosystems]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nathan.writes/the-fundamental-assumption-of-cryptosystems-723d32dc461a?source=rss-6774bca3f1c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/723d32dc461a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptoeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[token-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incentives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elephant-in-the-brain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2018 20:49:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-21T13:37:28.127Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/438/1*zup-8NI4TiP1ueHZlGeovg.png" /><figcaption>The elephant in the brain. The less we know about our ugly motives, the better. Image from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4lEvvY1r5U">Robin Hanson’s lecture for Learn Liberty</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>There is one statement everyone in this space believes but doesn’t want to say out loud: that <em>token holders purchase tokens believing they will increase in price</em>. It’s what Robin Hanson calls an <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Elephant-Brain-Hidden-Motives-Everyday/dp/0190495995">Elephant in the Brain</a>, a motive that is true but stigmatized — to the point where we develop explanations to hide it. If necessary, to deceive ourselves. But the elephant always remains standing there.</p><p>In the crypto space, especially among builders and token engineers, profit motive is an unsightly subject to talk about. We’re supposed to be changing the world, after all. Talking about profit motive or valuation in certain communities — much less <em>your </em>profit motive — will relegate you as someone with lesser intentions. It’s noble to claim you’re not thinking about the price (crypto’s favorite <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_signalling">virtue signal</a>), but it’s in the back of all of our minds.</p><p>We don’t talk about this motive enough. If we did, teams would be building their product with this primary token holder incentive in mind. There is no better way to exemplify a user-first mentality. In an ideal world where teams take ownership, increasing token price would be a forcing function for evaluating milestones and product features. Instead, teams flout any accountability for the financial valuation of their token. With <a href="https://blog.relevant.community/how-to-make-bonding-curves-for-continuous-token-models-3784653f8b17">bonding curves</a> and other mechanisms I’ll explore in a future post, this doesn’t entirely need to be the case. It turns out this sector of monetary design is relatively unexplored. But to explain why an intervention in thinking is necessary, it’s important to first correct a base misconception: that tokens are equity.</p><p>As a token holder, you have no claim to company assets. <em>You are not entitled to a slice of that network’s success</em>. Consider how Aragon currently has a <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/aragon/">market cap of $30 million</a>, while holding <a href="https://blog.aragon.org/the-aragon-token-sale-the-numbers-12d03c8b97d3/">$80 million worth of ETH</a> from their token sale. Remember that the next time you find yourself thinking of tokens as equity. Tokens don’t come with rights; they come with promises.</p><p>(Furthermore, the perception that because a founding team holds some portion of the tokens generated, they have “skin in the game” to drive future success, is <strong>simply false</strong>. They’ve already received their cash and are the ones ‘printing money’ in the first place. The “skin in the game” mentality <em>doesn’t apply if the cost of acquiring your stake was zero</em>.)</p><p>The implicit promise a team will always give is that the price of their token will increase. Accordingly, we’ve known that token fundraisers have been broken for a while now. Teams have all the leverage and token holders have none. Mechanisms like Vitalik’s <a href="https://ethresear.ch/t/explanation-of-daicos/465">DAICO</a> seek to mitigate this by enabling token holders to have additional controls over the flow of funding.</p><p>Ultimately, changes to token sales don’t address the root cause, which is the disconnect between token <em>value</em> and<em> price</em>. The value of a token is the subjective value it entitles you to as a network participant. The price of a token is how much it trades for on the market. Raising the value doesn’t necessarily raise the price, and this leads to problems because <strong>teams</strong> <strong>and their token holders aren’t aligned on what the definition of success is</strong>.</p><p>This misalignment can be seen in the criteria for DAICO assessment. While Vitalik writes that token holders will slow or shut down funding based on poor development progress, token holders are just as likely to seek reparations if their token price doesn’t increase or show signs of moving. However, new features and milestones, along with success metrics such as daily active users, can be achieved without increasing the price of the token. Since token price is an indicator of success for token holders (it’s their <em>skin in the game</em>), we’re left with a one-sided incentive system.</p><p>Profit motive is a reality we must acknowledge, work with and design for. If a token’s price falls to zero, then as token engineers we have undoubtedly failed (perhaps even if the price falls below its initial auction). The problem is that the current discipline of token engineering focuses on building the platform (the <em>noble</em> pursuit) with little, if any, accountability to token price. It assumes a robust platform must result in an increase in pricing.</p><h4>This is the fundamental assumption of tokenized cryptosystems: that as the value of the network increases, it reflects ascending equilibria for the price of its token.</h4><p>In reality, the feedback loop between token value and price remains to be seen. The token holders for the the few working systems we see today — including Ethereum itself — will surely tell you their current token price does not reflect its value. The bridge from technology to financially-productive assets is not an efficient market.</p><p>One case study for this fundamental assumption on the micro-level can be examined through token-curated registries. For TCRs, the primary assumption is that the token price will increase given its ‘usefulness’ — or, the token’s power to curate a list that others perceive as valuable. The core incentive for curators to participate in the system is that it will increase the price of their tokens.</p><p><a href="https://adchain.com/">AdChain</a>, a mainnet-live TCR, is a list of quality websites to advertise on. Its token is now <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/adtoken/">trading under its initial auction price</a>, despite adding popular sites such as Bloomberg and rejecting the applications for low-quality ones. That is to say, despite the platform taking empirical steps to fulfill its purpose, its token is worth less now than when it was only an idea. This is after more than half a year of development. Similarly, Augur’s token price has only gone downhill since the release to mainnet — after three years of development.</p><p>There are two perspectives for these previous performances that give me hope, while also building apprehension.</p><ol><li><em>n</em> isn’t large enough to tell for certain how any of this works. Whether your <em>n </em>is the # of years or users, the crux of this argument is that we have yet to reach a stable equilibrium to properly assess these systems. The value of <em>n </em>is not tied a falsifiable hypothesis, and I suspect <em>n </em>will only ever come into being if these systems ever ‘succeed’.</li><li>The price of Ether is tied to and will affect token price. It does, I agree. And the more I think about it, the less it makes sense for a token’s value and price to be predicated on the stability of ETH.</li></ol><p>We don’t have enough evidence that our fundamental assumption of cryptosystems stands. There are pricing mechanisms and applications of monetary theory that force this, that I’m looking to explore and write more about. But at this point in time, I don’t have much faith in projects that tokenize or sell tokens. It’s foolish to build on an unset foundation — especially using the funds of others.</p><p><em>These views do not reflect those my employer, Consensys AG. Thanks to Alex Min and </em><a href="https://twitter.com/kacperwikiel">Kacper Wikieł</a> <em>for sparking this reflection.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=723d32dc461a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cryptoeconomic Design: Bringing Empathy to Decentralization]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nathan.writes/cryptoeconomic-design-bringing-empathy-to-decentralization-43705a8f7a35?source=rss-6774bca3f1c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43705a8f7a35</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[design-thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mechanism-design]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptoeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[token-engineering]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2018 13:04:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-17T13:04:43.998Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The rise of blockchain has brought with it new primitives, mechanisms and sources of truth. Unfortunately, the torrent of cryptocurrency projects and sales has divorced the token from the necessity of a working platform. In the fever to release, some teams disregarded due diligence to spark speculative economies. Many were doomed from the start. Once the token was released, the incentive mechanisms became in control.</p><p>After that period of chaos — blue-sky innovation — we’re now moving towards standardizing best practices and making sense of what we’ve unleashed. <a href="https://blog.oceanprotocol.com/towards-a-practice-of-token-engineering-b02feeeff7ca">Token engineering</a> arose to address this through the verification, optimization and simulation of token models. But in addition to a distinct engineering discipline, decentralization needs a field that considers the <em>business </em>and <em>design </em>of its applications.</p><h4>Cryptoeconomic design is the user-centered design and validation of token mechanisms.</h4><p>Drawing upon frameworks such as customer development and market design, cryptoeconomic design is an empathetic approach to creating distributed systems. An increasing modularity of experience means <em>humility </em>is<em> </em>critical for blockchain products. These applications will exist in a future where users will be able to pick their choice of transaction provider, arbitrator, market platform, identification credentials or otherwise. Their mechanisms must cater to user behavior and preferences, and cryptoeconomic design provides design-thinking processes to facilitate that alignment.</p><p>A mechanism that users do not want to participate in (even if it’s because they simply <em>don’t understand</em>) is a useless mechanism. To avoid this, we must <strong>validate </strong>that each mechanism is the right fit for its larger economic environment and that users <em>want to use it — </em>a core principle of cryptoeconomic design. Note that validating with users requires giving them something to test. Validation is necessarily unified with the art of design, both in experience and aesthetic.</p><p>A mechanism that does not work as designed is also a useless mechanism. That’s why we must <strong>verify </strong>the robustness and attack-resilience of each mechanism. This is what token engineering seeks to achieve. This is especially important at the protocol layer, where mathematical congruity is the purpose of its existence.</p><p>Token engineering and cryptoeconomic design serve to <strong>validate</strong> and <strong>verify </strong>decentralized applications and their constructs.</p><h3>In Action</h3><p>Through a simple shift in thinking, cryptoeconomic design became clear to me while I was designing a reputation system.</p><p>My first approach was to define the objectives of the reputation system. From there, I could define the types of metrics and feedback I would track. This established a foundation to determine what information to make visible to users, what matching algorithms were needed, and how to increase reputation within the system.</p><p>This approach was not unlike traditional mechanism design — starting out with your objective function and defining utility. However, a simple piece of feedback made me realize I was missing a crucial piece of insight.</p><blockquote>Why didn’t you begin with your users?</blockquote><p>Inspired, I went back to the drawing board <strong>starting with my </strong><a href="https://careerfoundry.com/en/blog/ux-design/how-to-define-a-user-persona/"><strong>user personas</strong></a><strong>. </strong>Based on their needs and psychographic details, what information did they want to see about other users? What were their ideal ways of contributing feedback to the system? What signals did they seek to send to others?</p><p>And given predicted answers to those questions, <em>how could I incentivise the behaviors desired by the platform?</em></p><p>At the end of the process, my system contained a set of hypotheses to validate with my users. I still had the foundation needed to facilitate matching and create an information architecture; <em>but my users came first. </em>In my first approach, I would have been left trying to reconcile their objectives with mine. If my system didn’t serve the user needs, it would have been a useless system.</p><h3>A Common Language</h3><p>Fields such as matching theory, auction theory and behavioral economics provide the foundation for cryptoeconomic design. These are fields with years of study and review behind them. The advent of decentralization has also brought friction-less <a href="https://bounties.network/">bounties</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/@ilovebagels/token-curated-registries-1-0-61a232f8dac7">token-curated registries</a> and prediction markets. These concepts are being implemented, tested and expanded upon. Good cryptoeconomic design will display a respect for both of these categories and an understanding of where each concept may come in play.</p><p>In this spirit, I will be releasing a series of design canvases for cryptomechanisms and systems. The inspiration for this is the <a href="https://www.alexandercowan.com/business-model-canvas-templates/">Business Model Canvas</a>, a standard template for business that is used around the world. It provides a high level view of busiess and provides the minimal guidance and structure to move forward. Anybody can follow the procedure; each category is relatively simple to understand. If desired, each category also holds plenty of nuance for a deep-dive. To take a philosophy from the gaming industry, these design canvases must be easy to learn and hard to master.</p><p>The first to be released will be the Reputation Systems Canvas, created with input from designers and blockchain consultants. Similarly, there is a need for canvases on TCRs, curation markets, voting systems and other structures being implemented in applications today.</p><p>These types of self-serve materials will go a long way in helping cryptoeconomics become accessible to the masses. The design of these canvases can be a common language — a translation of protocol to application. Like the business model canvas, these templates also provide an outline for technical design and implementation.</p><p>Canvases are simply the first step. Actual interface design patterns, gamification principles, heuristics of behavioral economics applied to these mechanisms — defining these will serve to create better mechanisms for people to use.</p><p>I am after the design of purposeful and mathematically-robust mechanisms — both in application and protocol — within a cohesive platform experience. Cryptoeconomic design and token engineering, like art and science, are the distinct perspectives needed to accomplish this.</p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author above do not necessarily represent the views of Consensys AG. To learn more about ConsenSys and Ethereum, </em><a href="https://consensys.net/"><em>please visit our website.</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43705a8f7a35" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cross-Mechanism Strategies: Markets on TCRs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nathan.writes/cross-mechanism-strategies-markets-on-tcrs-77fab1f1f9d3?source=rss-6774bca3f1c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/77fab1f1f9d3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[token-curated-registries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prediction-markets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 May 2018 14:22:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-13T14:22:32.433Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*Wg1Jmngk6yc83eSBFOdohQ.png" /></figure><p><em>The following requires a general understanding of </em><a href="https://medium.com/@ilovebagels/token-curated-registries-1-0-61a232f8dac7"><em>token-curated registries </em></a><em>(1.1, vote-slashing is mentioned) and </em><a href="https://blog.gnosis.pm/the-power-of-prediction-markets-fedea0b71244"><em>prediction markets</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>If I opened a prediction market on a token-curated registry application vote (the bet would be something like “Forbes.com will be accepted into the AdChain registry”), I could then use the prediction market probabilities to judge voting for or against a challenge. TCRs don’t present the odds of winning like a PM does. Given how votes are hidden in <a href="https://github.com/ConsenSys/PLCRVoting">PLCR voting</a>, and assuming the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/efficientmarkethypothesis.asp">efficient markets hypothesis</a>, the prediction market on an application vote theoretically becomes the best indicator of whether or not an application will pass.</p><p>This leads to a couple interesting cross-mechanism strategies. Only token holders of the registry can participate in a registry challenge vote. However, both token holders and general speculators can participate in a prediction market. These populations and mechanisms have different underlying incentives between them. The prediction market is the only signal that both populations have for judging the state of a TCR application.</p><p>The main incentive for registry token holders to vote is the quality of the registry, which in turn affects the value of the token. In equilibrium, token holders should make decisions that reflect the best curation of the list. There is also a secondary incentive for a vote, which is the distribution of the application or challenge deposit (and in TCRs 1.1, a portion of the losing staked votes) to the winning side. The second is assumed to be a lesser incentive to the first — short-term versus long-term.</p><p>There is only one incentive in a prediction market: the payout upon closure of the market to the winning side. For simplified discussion, we can assume the prediction market is able to correctly validate the result of a TCR vote.</p><p>Consider the following set of strategies for a registry token holder:</p><ol><li>I could vote on a TCR application, and then I could buy shares of the same side in the market. Since a TCR does not signal votes, this could be seen as signaling my vote to the community.</li><li>I could vote on a TCR application, and then I could hedge by buying shares of the opposing side in the corresponding prediction market.</li><li>I could abstain from TCR voting, but express my preference by buying shares on the prediction market.</li><li>I could vote on a TCR application and not participate in the prediction market.</li></ol><p>These are all viable strategies that don’t consider the odds of the prediction market in the decision. However, the prediction market, being the best signal of voting odds, is likely something that token holders will also consult before voting — diligence before getting their “skin-in-the-game”.</p><p>In theory, holders will choose to reinforce the market. This is a concept in behavioral economics known as the <a href="http://blogs.cornell.edu/info2040/2017/11/13/information-cascades-effects-on-markets-and-betting-behavior/">information cascade</a>. Consider the following example: a token holder believes an application should approved, but a challenge is initiated. Before commiting a vote and staking their tokens, they consult the prediction market and it says the application will likely be rejected. Given these odds, the token holder will abstain from voting “Yes” on an application — their honest preference — because they don’t want to be penalized through opportunity cost (frozen tokens), or in TCRs 1.1, slashed votes.</p><p>Rationally, a token holder will either reinforce the market or sell their tokens. This is best seen through the expected outcomes from the last example (token holder thinks an application should pass, prediction market disagrees), referring to the vote outcome as the short-term incentive, and token value as the long-term one:</p><ol><li>The expected value of voting “Yes” is negative short-term (their staked tokens are frozen or redistributed to those voting “No”), negative long-term (token holder believes the quality of listing will go down).</li><li>The expected value of voting “No” is positive short-term, negative long-term. This is reinforcing the market.</li><li>The expected value of abstaining from voting is 0 short-term, negative long-term.</li><li>The expected value of selling their tokens is positive or negative short-term, depending on when they bought them.</li></ol><p>Setting up equations and variables would give more nuance to each situation, but that’s unnecessary for the following takeaway: if you vote honestly in a TCR challenge when it’s opposed to the prediction market (#1), you should expect less value than any other strategy. If we assume rational actors, then at equilibrium this particular strategy will not occur as often as the other ones.</p><p><strong>And that’s fine, if you believe a prediction market will reflect the TCR vote (that is, that it’s fully efficient). </strong>An equilibrium strategy where you’re penalized for being honest is not incentive compatible, but that’s okay because it’s the majority (or voting quorum) that decides the quality of the registry. If your opinion was against the majority, then it’s against the best interest of the registry and should be discarded accordingly. You were going to be — and deserved to be— on the losing side anyway; prediction markets just make this process more efficient. <em>The efficient market will always know what’s best for the registry.</em></p><p>And if you don’t believe that? Well, there are several strategies at play.</p><p>Registry token holders participating in a prediction market on an application vote are committing <strong>insider-trading</strong>. They have access to information — the amount they’re staking in the vote — that the public doesn’t. There are many known strategies with insider-trading. As mentioned above, token holders are also looking to the prediction market for a signal that could factor into their decision to vote. The prediction market does<em> not </em>distinguish between shares bought by registry token holders or speculators — and speculators aren’t held by the same long-term incentives as token holders. They’re trying to game the system as well. A speculator can affect a token holders decision to vote by buying shares in the prediction market, and vice versa. A game of signals occurs and it is anyone’s guess who wins. Either the resulting price equilibrium of the prediction market is efficient, or it’s not.</p><p>The two sides I describe above — the degree to which prediction markets take into account information for its pricing — are really the differences between a <em>weak </em>or <em>strong</em> efficient markets hypothesis. We are now moving to the debate of how <a href="https://insidertrading.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001055">insider trading affects market efficiency</a>.</p><p>Whatever side you take in that debate, the strategies described still stand — prediction markets will unquestionably affect token holder strategies. At equilibrium, <em>rational token holders will choose to reinforce the prediction market</em>. Heuristically, the incentive compatibility of TCRs is affected by prediction markets. In a field that spans financial systems, cryptography and game theory, we will continue to see such cross-mechanism implications arise.</p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author above do not necessarily represent the views of Consensys AG. To learn more about ConsenSys and Ethereum, </em><a href="https://consensys.net/"><em>please visit our website.</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=77fab1f1f9d3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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