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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nicholas Chirls on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nicholas Chirls on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Nicholas Chirls on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nchirls?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Photon Health]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/notation-capital/photon-health-331585f1e0f3?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/331585f1e0f3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Chirls]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Aug 2024 16:04:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-15T16:04:06.926Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Why we just wrote our largest check in a decade into </em><a href="https://www.photon.health/"><em>Photon Health</em></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kbw0SiiQ6B4YTG6oHN_22Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Otto, Rado, and Sam — Co-founders, Photon Health</figcaption></figure><p>I first met <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ottosipe/">Otto</a> in the summer of 2021 and quickly had a feeling that we’d be working together for a very long time. During that first phone call, Otto was considering leaving his role as Director of Eng at <a href="https://thirtymadison.com/">Thirty Madison</a>. I recall being impressed with his deep understanding of the inner workings of healthcare infrastructure, both from a technical and business perspective. He had an unwavering belief that he could help build the tools that would fundamentally change how the industry treats patients. I also knew that I wanted to be part of that, in whatever way I could support him.</p><p>Over the course of the next 6 months, we planned how Otto might strike out on his own. He had an idea that he couldn’t shake. After building e-prescribing integrations at Thirty Madison, he was convinced that there must be a better way for providers to route prescriptions, and for patients to have more visibility into and control over how and where their scripts get sent. This might sound like a simple idea, but the competition is a monopolistic incumbent that has built a tightly controlled pharmacy network over the past 20+ years. We need more truly ambitious ideas in healthcare, versus incremental progress, so I offered to lead his pre-seed round towards the end of 2021. And today, we are co-leading the company’s $9 million round with Flare Capital, which includes participation from Floating Point, GG1, Ritual Headwater and Scrub Capital.</p><blockquote><a href="https://www.photon.health/">Photon’s</a> mission is simple: <strong>To enable patients to own their prescriptions.</strong></blockquote><p>Oddly enough, this is how it used to work back in the day when doctors wrote patients a physical script. Photon’s “unlock” involves giving providers the tools to do this, but purpose-built for a modern age. Surescripts has built something powerful — a strong network of providers and pharmacies to send scripts digitally, but their product is painful to integrate with. As a result, the most important participant is left out — the patient! Patients today have no idea what their drugs will cost, if they’re covered by their health plan, where they might be in-stock, and how long they’ll have to wait. This friction leads to embarrassingly low adherence rates for medications in the U.S. — a $300 billion a year problem — and increasingly poor health outcomes. I believe that what America needs is a new prescription network built from the ground up with patients at the center.</p><p>Photon has designed a product that I can only describe as beautifully simple for its users (patients, providers, pharmacies), but wildly ambitious and complex underneath the hood. In crypto, we call this the “mullet” — complex web3 on the back-end, but simple for users akin to web2 on the front-end. Photon is the mullet of prescription networks. I’m sure Otto will appreciate that analogy :-)</p><p>How does it actually work? Photon builds prescribing tools and APIs for providers to write and deliver digital scripts to their patients, which they receive via Photon. Patients can then choose to send their scripts to almost any pharmacy. This enables patients to actually own their prescriptions, while keeping a digital record and wallet for all of their historical medications.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*EPM6CP54vzeb-aO1BW-4Zg.gif" /><figcaption>Photon Health in action</figcaption></figure><p>Customers like Sesame, Summer Health and Blueberry love Photon because the product is extremely easy to integrate with (days versus months), and saves them hundreds of hours of time coordinating between their patients and pharmacies. <strong>Most importantly, with a digital script in hand, patients can now go shopping. </strong>While Photon enables patients to send scripts to almost any pharmacy in the U.S., pharmacies can choose to integrate with Photon directly in order to display pricing, inventory, and so on. In other words, Photon is bringing the e-commerce revolution to pharmacy.</p><p><strong>This is the largest investment we’ve made to date at Notation.</strong> We believe that Otto, his co-founders Rado and Sam, and the rest of the exceptional team at Photon are on their way to building a generational company here in Brooklyn, NYC. Most importantly, I believe Photon Health has the opportunity to dramatically lower the cost of drugs in the US, and provide patients better transparency into and greater control over how they get their medication.</p><p>If you’d like to join us on this mission, get in touch with <a href="https://x.com/nchirls">me personally</a>. LFG.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=331585f1e0f3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/notation-capital/photon-health-331585f1e0f3">Photon Health</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/notation-capital">Notation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Current State of “Seed” Investing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nchirls/the-current-state-of-seed-investing-c2929443058f?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2929443058f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[seed-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Chirls]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Apr 2016 14:00:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-29T14:01:05.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After sharing a <a href="https://twitter.com/nchirls/status/725437262645870592">couple quotes</a> about the seed VC ecosystem on twitter, I figured I’d write a longer post so that founders might better understand what they should expect from “seed” investors when raising their first institutional round of capital. I’m highlighting a few quotes below that I’ve overheard recently (just in the last few weeks). They’re indicative of the current environment, as well as the natural cyclical evolution of the venture ecosystem.</p><h4>“Seed” VC #1: “Could you please send a 12 month cohort analysis?”</h4><p>Translation: How much do the users / customers that have signed up in the past year engage with your product / service? The assumption is that you’ve had a product in market for at least a year.</p><h4>“Seed” VC #2: “We’re a [seed] fund that invests behind product market fit.”</h4><p>Translation: We mainly invest in companies that are already showing significant measurable growth.</p><h4>“Seed” VC #3: “We don’t really take a close look at SaaS companies that are doing under 100k in MRR anymore. Similar for marketplace or lending businesses doing under 100k in monthly GMV.”</h4><p>Translation: We mainly invest in companies that are showing growth on non-trivial base numbers…ie. 100k+ in revenue per month.</p><p>I often meet founders that are surprised or discouraged by these statements, but really they’re just pitching the wrong firms without knowing it. What these comments represent is a fundamental shift in the way the seed funds of the last decade view their core business.</p><p>In a podcast we’re producing (stay tuned, coming soon!), <a href="https://twitter.com/naval">Naval Ravikant</a> explained to us recently that what the “seed” funds do today is actually equivalent to what Series B investing used to be in the nineties and oughts. In the decades leading up to 2010, Seed / Angel was for the initial idea, Series A for building out the product, Series B for launching and marketing the product, Series C for scaling it. In the late oughts, a number of angels and VCs raised institutional funds for the first time (ie. Floodgate, First Round, Lowercase, SoftTech, etc). They were true first institutional money at the seed stage, and they all did extremely well. Since 2010, these same smart seed funds, and there are lots of them, had the opportunity to raise much larger funds - just a handful chose not to. The lure of management fees, paid as a percentage of assets under management over 10 years, is a powerful incentive. Now these same seed VCs are managing funds that tend to be at least $100M or more in size, and thus most are no longer in the traditional seed business.</p><p>Why don’t these former seed investors just call themselves Series A or Series B investors (ie. what they actually are)? Naval explained that the “seed” funds today actually have no incentive to re-brand, even though they’ve raised much larger funds and have moved up the VC stack (ie. Series A, B, etc). The reason he explained is simple: Because they’ve all positioned themselves as first institutional money in, and it’s uncomfortable to go back to their LPs (their investors) and explain that their business has fundamentally changed. Some of these seed investors will turn out to be great Series A and Series B investors. Some won’t.</p><p>What does this mean for early-stage founders? It means that more often than not, although you’re pitching a VC firm that has “seed investor” branded on the door, their fund size indicates that they’re actually a Series A or Series B investor, which is consistent with some of the quotes as well as Naval’s explanation above. It doesn’t mean that your product or business is broken, just that it hasn’t really gotten started yet, and you need to find investors that understand that and are comfortable investing before there is meaningful data or product-market fit.</p><p>Of course, there are always exceptions. If you’re a successful founder with meaningful previous exits, for example, then you’ll likely have no problem raising millions out of the gate from “seed” investors. Some of the quotes above could also just be VC code for he/she doesn’t like your startup all that much.</p><p>But for everyone else, particularly first-time founders, where do you go to raise initial capital? The good news is that the market for startup capital tends to be extremely competitive and efficient, and investors are already sniffing this opportunity out. There’s a new group of investors that are thrilled to watch the previous cohort of seed investors cycle out by raising larger funds and move into what is traditionally considered Series A and Series B investing. In the wake of this previous cohort, new angel investors, accelerators, and now “pre-seed” funds are filling these new early-stage capital gaps.</p><p>Why are we calling ourselves “pre-seed” VCs? Primarily because “seed” investors aren’t going to willfully re-brand themselves and so this is the best term we’ve got at the moment, which we realize isn’t great. Nonetheless, these new pre-seed funds (as well as angels and accelerators) are the VCs that most true early-stage founders should focus on pitching and partnering with when they’re just getting going.</p><p>What exactly does <a href="http://notationcapital.com/">Notation Capital</a> do? <strong>We’re actually first institutional money in.</strong> We <strong>lead</strong> these initial rounds of financing. There is no project or team that’s “too early” for us. We get a kick out of working with founders at this formative, messy stage, and we believe we can be good partners during this period. Last but not least, we can introduce you to fantastic “seed” investors when you’re raising your Series B :-)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2929443058f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The PATH Act: So…uh…Why aren’t we Paying our Taxes?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nchirls/the-path-act-so-uh-why-aren-t-we-paying-our-taxes-43ff4960c5?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43ff4960c5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Chirls]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2016 12:44:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-01-26T22:16:24.160Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I recently discovered the <a href="http://waysandmeans.house.gov/more-details-on-the-protecting-americans-from-tax-hikes-act-of-2015/">PATH Act</a>, and although I haven’t had time to fully digest it or read the actual underlying tax code, if the <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2016/01/25/early-stage-investing-for-entrepreneurs-and-individual-investors-just-got-a-whole-lot-more-attractive/">headlines</a> hold even a modicum of truth, then the implications are quite dramatic for tech startups.</p><p><strong>At first glance, the PATH Act seems completely misguided, out of touch, and just flat out embarrassing for participants in the technology ecosystem.</strong></p><p>As far as I understand, the PATH tax credit has two major implications:</p><ul><li>Startups that generate less than $5M in revenue don’t have to pay payroll taxes for a total credit of up to $250k per year.</li><li><em>Startup founders and investors that make an investment in a company with less than $50M in revenue don’t have to pay any taxes (up to a $10M gain) if/when the company exits if they hold the stock for &gt; 5 years.</em></li></ul><p>The first credit seems innocuous enough, but the second one, if true…well…we’ve lost our way.</p><p>The main reason cited for these tax credits is to create better incentives for founders to build startups and investors to fund them. This may legitimately help for the average small business, but as far as I can tell, there’s been no shortage of interest from founders or VCs in recent years to build and invest in technology startups. It’s also worth mentioning that the existing tax on capital gains, which founders and investors pay when a tech startup exits, is already 20%, well below the average income tax paid in the United States. Warren Buffet has been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html">rightly outspoken about this issue</a> and has argued that we should <strong>raise</strong> capital gains taxes, rather than lower them…or in the case of PATH, eliminate them completely.</p><p>So how did this happen? My guess is it’s a combination of hubris and greed, but by all means, please opine because I’d love to be wrong on this. Selfishly, and moral arguments aside…you know why greed is bad for the startup community? It creates enemies, and it’s often a sign that the end is near. It’s something specific that folks look back on and say, “That really was the beginning of the end wasn’t it…and well, screw those people anyway, they got what they deserved.” This is exactly what we say now about the employees on Wall Street that figured out all the loopholes in ’08.</p><p>So rather than celebrating paying less (or in this case no tax), maybe as a community we take a step back and ask whether or not this feels right. Successful technology startups regularly create many millions of dollars in wealth for founders and investors. Have you ever heard of a startup founder deciding not to start a startup because she has to pay the capital gains tax when she sells her company? I haven’t either.</p><p>So then when did it become OK for us to celebrate not paying our fair share? And what should we do about it?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43ff4960c5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Always On]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nchirls/always-on-b014d43a45b9?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b014d43a45b9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[depression]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Chirls]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2015 15:18:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-11T16:02:59.493Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>New York, I Love You But You’re Bringing Me Down — LCD Soundsystem</blockquote><p>The Internet is everywhere now, and it’s always on. It’s on our desktops and in our pockets and our cars and our microwave ovens. There’s a connection ready to light up in NYC and Berlin and little rural towns in Kenya. The places it’s not, it will be soon. The Internet is everywhere, but man, it’s kind of got me down lately.</p><p>One of the most compelling components of the Internet is that it gives almost anyone a voice. Soon it will be everyone. Using this feature — on twitter, a blog, comments on Reddit, or anywhere else — can be wildly empowering. But in the last six months or so, I’ve noticed the more time I spend on these networks — the more time I spend chattering or lurking or broadcasting — the more down I tend to become. The act of writing and publishing this post may seem contradictory, but it’s an attempt to explain what’s going on.</p><p>Here’s the thing I’ve discovered in the last couple months: this is not an inherent design flaw specific to the Internet, but something simpler — I think I’ve just been depressed, and I think the Always On Internet tends to intensify these periods of depression. I’ve followed Brad Feld’s <a href="http://www.feld.com/archives/category/depression-2">writing on depression</a> for the last few years with great interest, and so I figured I’d share a little about my own, in case it helps someone else feeling similarly.</p><p>For my closest friends who I’ve know since I was a kid, none of this is surprising. But when I tell people who I’ve gotten to know more recently — particularly people in the tech industry — that sometimes I get low, it often comes as a surprise. These folks often respond that I seem to be so positive and outgoing and a glass half full kind of person. I think I am those things most of the time. But depression is a really weird beast of a thing, it affects different people in all sorts of different ways, and it’s often hard to point to any <a href="https://medium.com/@sarahrainone/depression-is-not-a-binary-system-6f0a4d8b21c4">one thing in particular</a> and say, “There! That’s it. That’s depression!”</p><p>For me, my bouts of depression don’t tend to span long periods of time, but I do struggle with them often. This can be a blessing and a curse. The blessing is that my low periods don’t usually last more than a week at a time, but the curse is that the time tends to be short enough so that it’s easy to mistake it as just a crummy week. These are weeks in which no matter what happens, good or bad, I feel amorphous, I lack energy, I spend time scrolling through email without any objective, and I generally feel stuck in the mud.</p><p>For me, depression is inward facing. So even while I’m down, I can feel great joy and positivity and optimism for the people around me, but it’s almost impossible to feel that for myself, no matter the things that are happening in my life. What I’ve found recently is that during these low periods, the Always On Internet, at least for me, tends to be an overwhelming amount of awesome. The streams of noise and high fives and congratulations and money, the seemingly endless number of people killing it — these things tend to make me feel worse, not out of jealousy or by comparison, but because I feel somewhat alien to these aggressively celebratory emotions. There are weeks when all I want to do is crawl inwards, but in an Always On World, I too, especially for my work, feel the pressure to always be on.</p><p>At this very moment, I’m coming up from about ten days of feeling down. It’s an amazing feeling, but I tread carefully because I know it won’t last. I thought a great deal about whether or not I’d publish this post, it’s uncomfortable for me to write this, but hopefully it might be comforting or helpful for others to read. If you’re someone that struggles with this too, let’s make a better effort of turning off the Internet together during these low periods, let’s take a deep breath, and know that we always come out on the other side alright.</p><p>One of the worst parts I remember about my brief stint on Wall Street after college was that I felt like I couldn’t be myself, that there were certain parts of me I had to censor. Something I’ve always loved about startups and founders is that the best ones tend to embrace weirdness and individuality and differences. So the truth about me is that sometimes I get depressed for no good reason. And if we’re going to live in this Always On world, I might as fucking well be myself.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b014d43a45b9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On Negotiating Valuations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nchirls/on-negotiating-valuations-dab0dc92dbab?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dab0dc92dbab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Chirls]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2015 13:36:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-04T13:40:14.305Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>…and the impact of VC portfolio construction on startups.</blockquote><p><em>Since starting Notation Capital earlier this year, we’ve led (or co-led) 8 pre-seed rounds in new companies. Each investment involved at least some amount of negotiation, often regarding valuation. </em><strong>Beating founders down on price is probably the least enjoyable part of any investor’s job, but it’s an inevitable occupational hazard. </strong><em>What follows are some thoughts on valuation, the market, negotiating with founders, and ultimately making investments and forming long-term partnerships.</em></p><p>Let’s start at the beginning: Why does valuation matter to VCs?</p><p>Paul Graham <a href="http://www.paulgraham.com/angelinvesting.html">wrote</a> several years ago that angel investors shouldn’t pay much attention to early-stage valuations. If the ultimate outcome for the company is potentially billions in value, does it matter if you initially invest at a $7M pre-money rather than a $4M pre-money? The answer, like many things, is yes and no.</p><p>For that particular billion dollar company, no, it doesn’t matter. If you had the opportunity to invest at the seed stage in Uber, Dropbox, Airbnb, you should have done so. In hindsight the initial valuation wouldn’t have mattered much, because the ultimate outcomes for these companies have been so extraordinary. In a typical venture capital fund, there will be 30–40 companies in the portfolio. So if you believe that you have the ability to pick a multi-billion dollar company in each basket of 40 seed-stage companies (or in our case pre-seed), then you’ll do well, irrespective of the initial entry point valuation. You can invest at $10M caps all day long and it won’t matter much.</p><p>The catch is…no one can do this (consistently over time). No one. Not even Sacca. Not anyone. I believe this is the very reason YC now has 100+ companies in each batch. I think Sam Altman understands this truth well.</p><p>If, however, you don’t believe you can consistently pick a multi-billion dollar exit in each seed-stage portfolio of 40 companies (because you can’t), then average entry valuation suddenly becomes a lot more important. This requires some quick and dirty math to demonstrate.</p><p>Let’s assume the target for your $8M fund with 40 portfolio companies is 3x cash-on-cash returns, and that after subsequent capital raises your ownership in successful portfolio companies will ultimately be diluted by approximately 50%.</p><p>Scenario #1 — If the average initial valuation is $6M, for $200k you’ll own about 3% initially, which over time will be diluted down to 1.5%. To return $24M to your LPs, the approximate implied enterprise value of the portfolio has to be about $1.6B — A huge fucking number.</p><p>Scenario #2 — If the average initial valuation is $3M, for $200k you’ll own about 6% initially, which over time will be diluted down to 3%. To return $24M to your LPs, the approximate implied enterprise value of the portfolio has to be about $800M. A big number, but half as large as scenario #1.</p><p>It’s important to note that these are extremely rough demonstrations of portfolio construction implications, enterprise values, and don’t take into account pro-rata rights, among other ways to maintain ownership over time. But it’s a useful look into what the numbers have to be to provide meaningful returns for a small seed fund…and the numbers are undoubtedly large. As demonstrated above, assuming we’re not super confident we can pick a multi-billion dollar company out of 40 at the seed stage, initial average valuations matter (a lot). It can very well be the difference between a top performing fund and a mediocre one.</p><p>Aside from simple portfolio construction, there are two other major reasons we, specifically Notation Capital, care about valuation and ownership.</p><p>The first is a simple story that we told our own LPs and investors (which you can read in our <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/Notation/notation-capital-fund-1-pitch-deck">deck</a>. As a small fund that takes a relatively concentrated approach and works closely with our portfolio companies, we might earn higher ownership on balance than the average angel investor could do alone. Our goal is to do what we said we would.</p><p>The second reason is that we spend a lot of time with each company we partner with and need our ownership to reflect not just our financial investment, but our time as well. The founders we’ve partnered with will attest to the fact that in the early days, we really dig in and help in key areas: technical recruiting and team building, product architecture and scale, capital raising. We also pride ourselves in being available — literally 24/7 — to the founders we work with. We celebrate wins, but we’re available to chat through tough days too, and we figure out together how to keep on going. We do this because we really do love it. But we also do this because we have proper financial incentives and at a very basic level, that means meaningful ownership in the businesses we partner with.</p><p>Thus far, in the eight months we’ve been operating Notation Capital, our ownership expectations tend to be initially higher than the founders we work with. This doesn’t come as a surprise — there is almost always valuation tension between founders and VCs.</p><p>How do the founders we work with initially tend to settle on valuation expectations? Below is a list of some common items founders tend to reference in our negotiations.</p><p>1) Other Founders — Startup founders often know many other founders in the community. In the same way VCs trade valuation notes, founders do too. We often hear that “my founder friend X raised at $Y valuation.”</p><p>2) Friends / Family / Advisors — Startup founders almost always have friends, family and advisors helping them through a financing. Raising capital tends to be stressful, so it’s good to have a support system. This category tends to have wildly varied views and advice regarding valuation.</p><p>3) AngelList / Crunchbase Data — These are great sources for aggregate level market data and we often hear that “On AngelList, a seed stage company on average should raise at a $5M valuation” or some version thereof.</p><p>4) Techcrunch / Press</p><p>All of these sources, except for maybe Techcrunch (lol), can be good starting points and/or guides in a valuation negotiation. At the early stages of a company, it’s impossible to value the business as the present value of its future cashflows, so it helps to point to something.</p><p>Founders tend to take early-stage valuation negotiations very seriously, as they should when they sell a part of their company. But often it goes further than that, particularly when founders tend to tie valuation to self-worth and/or the odds of success. Although helpful as a starting point, each of the sources above can also be critically flawed.</p><p>Valuation data for early-stage companies in aggregate can be very difficult to apply to a particular company in a uniform manner, particularly given the myriad of differences between founders, markets, and everything in between. Yes, a friend may have raised their seed round at a $10M valuation pre-launch. That has very little to do with your company. Friends, family and advisors, although helpful from a support perspective, tend to be extremely valuation insensitive. For example, a founder’s mother, in order to support her daughter, may write a small check at a high valuation for no other reason than she loves her daughter unconditionally. An advisor, incentivized by advisory shares, may also push a founder to expect higher valuations than normal. These folks tend to write small checks at very high valuations, which is not necessarily indicative of the real market clearing price and can cause complications down the road.</p><p><strong>Here’s the bottom line: The current valuation is what someone will pay to buy a meaningful piece of your company.</strong></p><p>What constitutes a meaningful sale for early-stage companies? I think I’d consider it 10% of the company or more. Anything less, although it may be material to the founder, is not an entirely accurate reflection of current valuation. What we see often, which can be challenging for founders to correct, is a friend / family / advisor writing a small check at a high valuation, encouraging the founder to go out and raise a round at that same valuation, only to find it must be amended, or worse, it negatively impacts a fundraise because institutions balk at the high price.</p><p>What makes a valuation negotiation particularly bizarre, is that at the same time the VC is negotiating a founder down on price, she is making clear by wanting to invest in the first place that she believes the company may be worth considerably more in the future. What founders often mistake is that the current value of the company tends to account both for the size and the odds of a potential future outcome. In other words, risk. When we offer a term sheet to a founder, we’re not speaking to the ultimate future value of the company (we obviously think it will be a lot higher than it is now). We’re not speaking to average valuations in the market or the press. We’re not speaking to whether or not we believe the founder is capable of executing. <strong>We’re simply speaking to what the valuation and ownership must be so that we feel properly compensated for the investment risk being taken and the amount of time we’ll spend working with the founder and the team.</strong></p><p>Sometimes there are other investors that may offer higher valuations than we do. It’s not necessarily because we’re wrong and they’re right (or vice versa)…it’s simply because they price the risk and time effort differently. The early-stage startup market is becoming more and more efficient every day, so founders can be reasonably confident that they will find the appropriate valuation and clearing price. Although inevitably emotional, founders would do well to try and not take the ultimate valuation personally, especially because it will never get any easier or less emotional. Consider public market CEOs who have to face the judgment of the masses every single day.</p><p>An interesting note: in recent conversations with other seed stage VCs, it’s remarkable how many investors are terrified to have honest and open negotiations with founders. In a frothy market in which founders often have more leverage than the capital that supports them, many investors are throwing basic portfolio construction theory to the wind and crossing their fingers for that $1 billion plus outcome out of 40. A few will come out huge winners, but most small funds won’t make it through the winter.</p><p>Alex and I started Notation Capital because we’ve always loved working with technical founders in the trenches, at the very infancy of an idea. We think we’ve gotten pretty good at it and we think we can be really helpful at this stage in NYC. We’d like to do what we do for a very long time — we’d like to be around come spring.</p><p>And so for us, that means discipline in a hot market. That means math that feels like it makes sense. And that often means negotiating valuations with founders — something that makes our jobs less fun than they usually are. As it turns out, something unexpected happens when you have brutally honest conversations with founders at this early stage — you build the basis of a strong working relationship right from the start.</p><p>We tell the founders we partner with that we’re rarely the cheapest source of capital in town, but that we work hard for every share of ownership we earn. If we don’t earn it, we know founders won’t be good references for us in the future, and without stellar references, there’ll be no future to speak of. So ultimately the founders we partner with will decide our fate, and maybe that’s just the way it should be.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dab0dc92dbab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building a Firm v. Investing Money]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nchirls/building-a-firm-v-investing-money-fd30f5f75cd7?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd30f5f75cd7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Chirls]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2015 13:36:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-04T13:44:45.491Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Alex and I are about six months into operating </em><a href="http://notationcapital.com/"><em>Notation Capital</em></a><em>. Although we’re focused on finding, investing, and partnering with what we hope will ultimately be very large companies, I spend a lot of my time these days thinking about lots of things that have nothing to do with the merits of a particular investment, founder, company or market trend. What follows is some of the lessons I’ve learned as a new venture manager and some things that are top of mind for us as a firm. Many of these items speak to the difference between operating as a venture firm rather than an angel investor or startup studio.</em></p><p><strong>1) Short-Term v Long-Term Incentives</strong> - There is a near constant battle between short-term and long-term incentives as a new VC manager. Long-term we’re trying to maximize cash on cash returns and build a meaningful brand that resonates with early-stage founders. Short-term we’re trying to show enough progress so that we’ll be able to raise another fund in a couple years. This tension exists at operating companies too — a founder needs to properly lay out the long-term vision while making sure there’s a clear short-term roadmap that can be realistically executed.</p><p><strong>2) Institutional Process -</strong> Alex and I spend a lot of time thinking about our process as a partnership and a firm. How do we make decisions and allocate capital? How do we message those decisions to founders? How do we work through transparency and the occasional conflict as partners? How do we think about adding people to the partnership over time? How do we build institutional process into the fabric of the firm so that eventually we can scale it?</p><p><strong>3) Data -</strong> This is in many ways related to institutional process and documentation. We track data on potential and existing portfolio companies, but also data on ourselves and our decisions (investment memos, etc.). Why is this important? Initially, the goal is to keep ourselves honest and to learn and improve over time. Eventually, we can use this data to demonstrate to existing LPs (as well as future investors in Notation Capital) the specific way that we work and how we do what we do.</p><p><strong>4) Portfolio Construction -</strong> We spend a lot of time thinking about portfolio construction. What should our portfolio concentration look like (ie. how many companies in the fund)? Should we save meaningful capital for follow-on investments out of the core fund or structure SPVs with our existing LPs given the small size of Fund I? What do we need to optimize for in terms of average ownership?</p><p><strong>5) Valuation and Price Discipline -</strong> Well, it turns out these matter a lot. Average initial entry price has huge implications for what the enterprise value of the portfolio must achieve. As an institutional fund, there’s much more pressure to achieve certain ownership targets compared to an angel or corporate investor. This is the subject of a much longer post coming soon…!</p><p><strong>6) Pacing / Timing / Macro -</strong> Although I try my best not to, because it’s well out of our control, I spend time thinking about the larger macro environment and how we fit into it. Technically, we have 3 years to deploy this first fund, but should we do that faster? When is the optimal time to raise Fund II? It’s obviously before the market cools (if/when that happens), but how should we think about timing and pacing our investments within that context?</p><p><strong>7) LP Relationship Development -</strong> We learned a lot though our fundraising process for Notation Capital Fund I, and we’ll do it differently next time. Although at times it feels like a distraction, we’re building strong relationships now with people and institutions that we might partner with in the future. It feels much more natural (and it’s really important) to build these relationships over time when they’re not rushed.</p><p>As a whole, one of my key learnings as a new manager is that there’s a world of difference between building a portfolio of investments and building a long-term venture capital firm from the ground up. My hope is that we’re well on our way towards the latter.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd30f5f75cd7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Introducing Notation Capital]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nchirls/introducing-notation-capital-6b702451698e?source=rss-e081f1b35c6a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b702451698e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Chirls]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2015 13:35:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-04T13:49:03.077Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Autumn to winter, winter into spring,<br>Spring into summer, summer into fall, —<br>So rolls the changing year, and so we change;<br>Motion so swift, we know not that we move.</blockquote><blockquote>- Dinah Mulock Craik</blockquote><blockquote>Today we’re announcing the launch of <a href="http://notationcapital.com/">Notation Capital</a>, a pre-seed venture capital firm based in <a href="https://goo.gl/maps/KXrTw">Brooklyn, NY</a>.</blockquote><p>At the beginning of this current technology cycle in New York City, sometime around ‘07-’08, an emerging group of hackers, artists, and creators started to build some amazing new projects. Some ultimately became successful companies like Tumblr or Makerbot or Venmo, some of them continue to do well as bootstrapped projects like Hype Machine, and some of them failed in both quiet and spectacular ways. These founders and companies formed the core of the NYC technology community today, and they built a talent pool of thousands of brilliant hackers and designers from the ground up.</p><p>As these companies have grown larger, so too have the VCs, many of the best angels and seed funds moving farther up the stack, raising much larger funds and deploying significantly larger amounts of capital compared to just a few years ago. This is, of course, a natural evolution in the expansion phase of any cycle.</p><p>In speaking with dozens of friends, hackers and founders in the last year, we’ve found a new narrative and set of thoughts slowly beginning to emerge that’s different in nuanced, but important ways compared to years past. The most talented people we know are thinking about and starting new things, and they’ve learned a great deal having grown up in the first wave of the cycle.</p><p>As the next wave of founders and startups get going, there’s a desire for creative freedom, space, and the time to be thoughtful about which problems are worth tackling. There’s a recognition that many of the most important companies today are driven by strong missions. And having watched the last wave of companies, we’ve noticed these founders are giving more thought to right sizing capital raising and growth early on.</p><blockquote>There’s an understanding that millions of dollars of seed capital can come at a cost — that there’s a category of company that requires less capital and for whom a check that size is either too early or unattainable, and that too much money can cause harm to the initial product and business.</blockquote><p>Founders will often need some initial capital to build out A+ teams and ship great products, but many at this stage don’t yet need (or want) millions of VC dollars to get to the next milestone. Million(s) for a seed round seems to be the de facto standard these days, not because of the initial capital requirements of the company, but because seed and venture funds have gotten so much larger and they need to deploy the cash. The alternative, choosing to raise just a few hundred thousand dollars, can oddly be <em>more difficult</em> because it means cobbling together 8–10 checks from angels, friends and family, among others.</p><p>These conversations and stories, taken together over the past year, have had a huge impact on why we decided to start Notation Capital now, as well as how we think about building the firm in the years to come. We’re calling Notation Capital a pre-seed fund, but really all that means is that we’re true risk capital investors — investing relatively small dollar amounts in extremely early technical founders or founding teams with the enduring will to bring interesting and innovative projects to life.</p><p>To us, pre-seed is that in-between state at the infancy of many new companies. Some of these pre-seed projects and founders will fail, as lots of ambitious things do, some will continue to live for many years at side-project scale, and some will become big businesses that over time raise large amounts of capital when needed.</p><blockquote>Notation Capital is built to fill this awkward early gap, supporting project and company building at the very earliest of stages. We believe the concept of “pre-seed” is a natural evolution in the cycle and will become standard in the next few years (until of course there is pre-pre-seed). A pre-seed investment is in many ways a more agile form of early startup financing, it allows the founder(s) to quickly get back to work on the product and is less dilutive than the standard seed round today.</blockquote><p>For the pre-seed projects we invest in, we’d like to be the first $100,000-$200,000 (we’re just fine being the only check to start) in rounds less than $400,000 total. We don’t consider anyone or any project “too early.” In fact, we’ve heard those words too often ourselves (both as founders and as VCs raising Notation Capital), so you’ll never hear us use them. We’d like to become true partners to the founding teams we work with, in the weeds day in and day out, just as Alex and I‘ve been for the last decade in NYC. In the past ten years we’ve built out a number of core technical teams and projects, architecting, shipping and scaling products like bitly, Chartbeat, Digg, Alphaworks, among others. We’ve led or participated in over 20 early-stage investments, many of them what we would consider pre-seed.</p><p>There are many reasons why we chose to start Notation Capital now. In the weeks to come, we’ll have lots more to say about who we are, what we do, and how we expect to work with the founders that choose to partner with us. Many more seed and venture funds exist today than just a few years ago, many opportunistically chasing the perception of high returns in the private company market. And so the “why” behind Notation Capital is really important to us, and we hope it will be for the founders we work with too.</p><p>In the meantime, we’ve included our contact information below, so feel free to drop us a line, even if you’re just beginning to think through a new idea you can’t seem to shake.</p><p>Much love and more soon.</p><p>Nick + Alex</p><p>nick@notationcapital.com / alex@notationcapital.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b702451698e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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