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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by NearAndDistant on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Do Tax Cuts for the Rich Create Jobs?]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://nearanddistant.medium.com/do-tax-cuts-for-the-rich-create-jobs-5d7d1428eee1?source=rss-2b78b11f9990------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2600/0*wwm7j7L4eeIguoxx" width="6000"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">The (You&#x2019;d Think Predictable) Economic Consequences of Cutting Taxes for the Rich</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://nearanddistant.medium.com/do-tax-cuts-for-the-rich-create-jobs-5d7d1428eee1?source=rss-2b78b11f9990------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <category><![CDATA[cost-of-living]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[NearAndDistant]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Aug 2022 15:43:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-07T15:43:24.350Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Phenomenal Cosmic Powers]]></title>
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            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[NearAndDistant]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:20:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-05T17:20:33.072Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>or, how the Gini Index has become our singular moral compass and why that’s really not a good thing.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*UHVhfAW0EOmVUBinbvu-9Q.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>“The distribution of wealth is one of today’s most widely discussed and controversial issues”</blockquote><p>This is how Piketty’s ‘Capital in the 21st Century’ starts, and if the distribution of wealth is the issue, then the Gini Index is the measure.</p><p>The UN, WHO and World Bank (and most national governments) use the Gini Index as their primary measure of inequality. In addition, in the award-winning and highly influential book, The Spirit Level, the index is used to assess inequality against a range of social ills (Wilson and Pickett, 2009: 32).</p><p>You may not have even heard of it before. Still, the Gini index has become a powerful tool to describe and direct policy on inequality.</p><p>With all the decisions and tracking pinned to the Gini Index and the readiness of its use, there must continue to be a caution: here be dragons. The index is just a model and, George Box famously warned us, “all models are wrong”. Yet it is “widely used as [the primary] proxy measure for distributive injustice in both academic and popular discussion” (Everett and Everett, 2015: 188). Still, as we shall see, we’re asking a lot of one number. As the real Genie said — we’ve put “Phenomenal Cosmic Powers in an Itty Bitty Living Space”.</p><p>The belief in those ‘phenomenal’ powers can lead us astray, especially when the index has major misgivings. So let’s go through those and see if we can humble the Gini somewhat. Specifically, we will find that the index has five major pitfalls we should always look out for:</p><ul><li><em>It is, as all models, a vast simplification in which we lose vital context</em></li><li><em>The same index value can describe very different distributions</em></li><li><em>It treats sections of the distribution with different weight</em></li><li><em>Its use can lead morally neutral circumstances to be seen as moral</em></li><li><em>There is little consensus on what is a good and bad index value</em></li></ul><p>So first, let’s recap quickly. What is the Gini Index, and what can and can’t our little cosmic friend do?</p><p>Named after its inventor, the Italian statistician, fascist and eugenist, Corrado Gini. The index summarises the Lorenz Curve (shown below) to a simple ratio on a scale of 0 to 1. This ratio describes the divergence of an actual distribution (the solid line) from a theoretically perfect one (the dashed line). When the index returns a 1, then one person owns everything, and when it returns a 0, everyone owns the exact same.</p><p>To illustrate, assume a society of 100,000 people with a total income of $10m. We start counting them one by one, adding up their income as they pass us. Receiving an equal amount, each new person we counted (x-axis) would increase the cumulative income (y-axis) by the same amount, or y = x. In our example, each person would have $100 or 0.001% of total income [($10m/100,000)/$10,000,000] giving us the dashed ‘Line of equality’ below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/928/1*lC6zPycf9zmH8Dd74R5VXQ.png" /></figure><p>In reality, we know this isn’t what happens, but it gives us a baseline to measure the divergence of the actual distribution. To create the actual distribution of income (the solid ‘Lorenz curve’, shown above), we rank individuals from lowest to highest-paid and start our counting and summing again. Due to the ranking, each subsequent person either keeps the curve straight (no change in income) or curls the curve upwards (an increase in income). The steeper the curl, the more the last few people in line are hoarding.</p><p>To go back to our example, our first person (the poorest) may only receive $2 and the last (the richest) may receive $2,000. Both of which are lower and higher, respectively, than our theoretically equal society where everyone received $100 equally.</p><p>When we plot these theoretical and actual scenarios, the Lorenz curve lets us visually and quickly represent what percentage of the population (x-axis) owns what percentage of the income (y-axis).</p><p>Here is where we go back to our Italian Fascist, Corrado Gini, and his Gini Index. Corrado noticed that if we divided the area between the line of ‘Perfect equality’ and the ‘Lorenz curve’ (shown as ‘A’) and divided that by the whole area under the line of ‘Perfect equality’ (shown as A + B). We would have a simple proportion known as the Gini Index (Sitthiyot and Holasut, 2020: 2).</p><p>In a way, treating us as units, the Lorenz Curve stacks us from poorest to richest on top of each other. For example, shown below, we can derive a simple Lorenz curve from UK income deciles stacked on top of each other.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zz1xWDvAwm9Fp-9PbfcW_g.jpeg" /></figure><p>We can start to see the Lorenz Curve as graphically representing another image we all know and the Gini and summarising it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/462/1*zQ_fQh3exGBn_l-sHpZ2Cw.jpeg" /></figure><p>There, all caught up. Now that we’re on the same page, a quick point on its popularity as a measure.</p><blockquote>“The liberty of the strong, whether their strength is physical or economic, must be restrained.” — Isaiah Berlin</blockquote><p>Everyone knows inequality (except apparently Economists) is a current and immediate problem. Policies, protests, conferences, books, papers, headlines, and bars are filled with the topic: politicians partying while people can’t pay rent; banks bailed-out in crisis but people left in theirs; tax evasion by the wealthy; the “1%” on one side and the starving, poverty-stricken and oppressed on the other.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1xsqoqgeAeLTrBmlGUyxjQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Creative Commons: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:OccupyFrankfurt_22_October_2011_1.JPG">https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:OccupyFrankfurt_22_October_2011_1.JPG</a></figcaption></figure><p>It is within this maelstrom of complexity and discussion where the Gini Index derives so much power. In one number between 0 and 1, everyone can speak the same language. This singular focus is a relatively new phenomenon. As Noble Prize winner, Angus Deaton, and Princeton University Professor, Anne Case, point out:</p><p>“In the early days of the 21st century, [the Gini Index] was merely one of several measures of statistical dispersion that specialist researchers would use, among other things, to gauge the gaps between incomes. But after the financial crisis this single number suddenly loomed large in blockbuster state-of-society books, such as The Spirit Level, and in seminars in the Obama White House, where it was used to show that America’s problem with social mobility was matched by its problem with inequality.”</p><p>And so it has been ever since. There have been notable amendments, newly proposed statistics (Sitthiyot and Holasut, 2020), and stratifications (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014). However, none have managed to move the needle away from the all-seeing Gini.</p><p>For all the advantages of having one metric, which is easily understandable and comparable, we must know the limitations. We must guard against giving too much power and to an ‘itty bitty space’.</p><h3>The Pitfalls (or, <strong>The 5 Squirtels)</strong></h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fembed%2F6166816&amp;display_name=Tenor&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fview%2Fsquirtle-gang-squirtle-shades-shady-lol-gif-6166816&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fc.tenor.com%2Fh5xtfCInGHYAAAAC%2Fsquirtle-gang-squirtle.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=tenor" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/47f261dfcec3d35db2661b492c835753/href">https://medium.com/media/47f261dfcec3d35db2661b492c835753/href</a></iframe><h4>Simple at Heart</h4><blockquote>“All Models are Wrong, Some Models are Useful” — George Box</blockquote><p>The first pitfall is the weakness and strength of all statistic models. They, and other models, are wrong by creation. Their creation relies on allowing errors to produce simplification and, therefore, usability. For all an obvious point, it’s worth re-noting when we see one statistic portrayed as the holy grail.</p><p>We shouldn’t expect anything more. This is not a failure of statistics but of humans “to expect one summary measure to capture the features of an entire distribution” (Gastwirth, 2017: 9). Yet, since the index influences policy and discourse, we must keep this in mind and interpret it with care.<br>As we have seen, using the Lorenz Curve, the Gini Index is held up as summarising the whole distribution against perfect equality. But ‘summarising’ is the opposite of ‘elaboration’, the price of which is we lose a lot of information.</p><p>Yet we still act as if the Gini index can tell us “all that a distribution can tell us about the inequality between the bottom and the middle of the hierarchy as well as between the middle and the top or between the top and the very top.” (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014: 266). This is plainly not true. It’s an average.</p><p>Forgetting this risks “following the white rabbit” of our model where we claim the index is showing us something deeper than it can. This matters, for if we want to explore exactly how much the 1% actually have, or if the poorest have made gains, the index cannot by itself tell us this. Within the index, the 1% is as well hidden as the most destitute.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*YO4khJ5PZFsq9FvHuiQbMw.gif" /></figure><p>Remember, the index is only used to measure wealth and no other aspect of inequality. We all know that there are many features of inequality other than income: education, health and happiness (Luptáčik and Nežinský, 2020: 562). None of which are held up as high as income as they are not as easily quantifiable. Yet, there are situations in which, if contextualised with other features, we may not have such a problem with inequality of wealth. For example, if everyone was fed and free, would it matter so much if some had more than others?</p><p>In a similar but more narrow vein, the index collapses down different forms of wealth, such as employment, rent, capital etc. This produces yet another problem for us. As pointed out by Piketty and Goldhammer: “Gini coefficients and other synthetic indices tend to confuse inequality in regard to labour with inequality in regard to capital, even though the economic mechanisms at work, as well as the normative justifications of inequality, are very different in the two cases.” (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014: 266). This, in turn, makes it “so that it is impossible to distinguish clearly among the multiple dimensions of [income] inequality and the various mechanisms at work.” (Ibid: 243).</p><p>In short the index is a model in which we pick one aspect of inequality, wealth, and then aggregate several types of wealth into one distribution before collapsing it all down into one number. Why does this matter? Well it matters because for all we can summarise inequality so we can talk about it using the index, we need to act not talk. The index sterilises any pointing of a finger or direction of policy as we lose the ability to say who, what and why. Using the index you cannot say “in the last 5 years the 1% has taken an extra 15% of all rental income” you can only say “wealth has become more concentrated, on average” which leaves us in inertia.</p><h4>Same-Same but Different</h4><blockquote>“Data are just summaries of thousands of stories — tell a few of those stories to help make the data meaningful.” — Chip and Dan Heath</blockquote><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fembed%2F20908369&amp;display_name=Tenor&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fview%2Fyou-and-i-are-not-so-different-raimi-meme-green-goblin-spiderman-gif-20908369&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fc.tenor.com%2FiN7Ny-VwX8IAAAAC%2Fyou-and-i-are-not-so-different-raimi-meme.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=tenor" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/453398cb72d48950272bbd5fd2118914/href">https://medium.com/media/453398cb72d48950272bbd5fd2118914/href</a></iframe><p>Some commentators highlight that the index gives the same or similar figures for different distributions. They point out that the Lorenz curve, from which the index is derived, can look very different but give the same overall index. De Maio (2007: 850) states that knowing the index can produce “differing patterns of income distribution, but nevertheless resulting in very similar Gini coefficient” is, in fact, its main weakness.</p><p>Sitthiyot and Holasut (2020: 3) give an excellent example of this, worth repeating here in full:</p><p>“whenever two or more countries share the same value of the Gini index… income inequality among them could be very different if taking into consideration the information on the income share held by the richest and that held by the poorest. For example, based on the data from the World Bank, in 2015, Greece and Thailand have the same Gini index (0.360) but the ratio of the income share held by the richest 10% to the income share held by the poorest 10% in Greece is 13.8 while that in Thailand is 8.9. In addition… in 2015, the United Kingdom and Israel also share the same Gini index (0.360) but the ratio of the income share of the top 10% to the income share of the bottom 10% in the United Kingdom equals 4.2, whereas that in Israel equals 5.8. That countries share the same Gini index but differ in the income gap between the richest and the poorest indicates that the Gini index alone cannot tell the difference in income inequality among countries.”</p><p>What does knowing that Israel and the U.K. have the same index tell us? Certainly not that the two countries have the same income distribution or that income shares concentrate in the same places (i.e. the top 20%, 10% or 0.01%).</p><p>This problem finds its roots in simplification, but the actual problem itself is due to comparison of that simplification. Also known as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anscombe%27s_quartet">Anscombe’s quartet</a> and more modernly as ‘<a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/going-beyond-summary-statistics-345c27f829d8">Datasaurus</a>’, shown below. Quite colourful patterns can have the same mean, deviations and correlations. This is also true of inequality summary statistics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HjuIXUi7-RFfX2xF9SSPHw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="http://albertocairo.com/">Alberto Cairo</a> created the <a href="http://www.thefunctionalart.com/2016/08/download-datasaurus-never-trust-summary.html">Datasaurus</a> dataset which urges people to “never trust summary statistics alone; always visualize your data”, since, while the data exhibits normal seeming statistics, plotting the data reveals a picture of a dinosaur.</figcaption></figure><p>As well as not being able to tell us the difference in income distribution across countries, we lose sight of the minimum and maximum incomes using the index. For example, in two societies “where [in one] annual income ranges between $1000 and $100,000… [, and the other] income ranges between $1,000,000 and $100,000,000… the Gini coefficient would be identical for these two societies since it measures only relative differences in income or wealth” (Everett and Everett, 2015: 189).</p><p>OK fine, I hear you say, we can’t directly compare but surely having a lower index mean a more equal distribution? Unfortunately, not necessarily:</p><p>“The fact that the Gini coefficient is lower does not imply that the Lorenz curve is everywhere higher [or closer to equality]: the curves may intersect. The Gini coefficient can [therefore]… be described in terms of the mean difference.” (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015: xiii).</p><p>Take the below of which all four panels represents different income distributions. The top and bottoms have the same index values and the left values are lower (more equal) than the right. We can clearly see from this that in the top-right the bottom 30% of society receive around 15% of the total income. Whereas in the bottom-left (with a lower Gini value) they receive 8% or nearly half the total wealth of the other distribution with a higher index value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t3dLh2NWgtQ_vuNAjhdrHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://medium.com/u/2b78b11f9990">NearAndDistant</a> | Data: ONS</figcaption></figure><p>We must therefore take care in our interpretation of the same index value <em>and</em> an index that is lower (Sitthiyot and Holasut, 2020: 2). Specifically, a lower index could be averaging comparatively lower and <em>higher</em> parts of the distribution to produce a value we think of as “more equal” when it is in fact anything but.</p><p>We need to ‘tell a few more stories’. Academics accomplish this using the many other statistics which are available to us. Palma (2011) and Dorling (2014), for instance, use the “ratio the share of total income of a fixed percent, for example, 10 or 20, at the upper end of the distribution to the share of income of a fixed percent, for example, 40 or 20&quot; (Gastwirth, 2017: 2). This would guard us against some of the loss of contextual data in each respective distribution due to its simplification.</p><p>There is, of course, another way to “tell a few of those stories”, and that is, obviously, to actually tell people’s stories. In a finance lecture, I was once told that “a profit and loss statement cannot tell you if there is a rat in the kitchen”, and the same applies here. What good is knowing if there is more equality if there are rampant social ills? We could find the same index across countries, but this could mean very little in relation to their actual distribution. Although the index allows us to compare, and this is a good thing, it becomes sterile without this comparison being framed in context. Leading us to pitfalls such as thinking a lower index is always better.</p><h4>Where does the Index Concentrate</h4><blockquote>“The eye of wealth is elevated towards higher stations, and seldom descends to examine the actions of those who are placed below the level of its notice.” — Samuel Johnson</blockquote><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fembed%2F3477500&amp;display_name=Tenor&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fview%2Fpulp-fiction-1994-quentin-tarantino-gif-3477500&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fc.tenor.com%2FBJQDEgnj8KYAAAAC%2Fpulp-fiction.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=tenor" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f04d93d469ed48ce61f6df5a26607cea/href">https://medium.com/media/f04d93d469ed48ce61f6df5a26607cea/href</a></iframe><p>We can only assess what we focus on. The same is true of statistics. So we need to know where the Gini Index focuses to use and interpret it accordingly. It has been challenged routinely for being “least sensitive to transfers among the very rich and very poor.” (Gastwirth, 2017: 1). This causes problems when our discussion centres so much of the very wealthy.</p><p>The index is subject to the gravitational pull of certain factors, much like the mean average is subject to outliers. Gastwirth contends there are two types of gravitational pulls on the index due to modern income distributions: fat, populous middles, and long, less populous tails. Transfer effects differ within this fat middle or between the tails (ibid: 7). Within these types, transfers can preserve or change the relative order of the donor and recipient.</p><p>This can lead to some counterintuitive results. When the Gini index value changes the effect will vary “whether it preserves or changes the order or ranks of the households, the difference in the ranks of the donor and recipient of a transfer, and who receives the additional income.” (ibid: 2)</p><p>For example, small transfers to the lower tail of the distribution decrease the index, which is intuitive. But suppose the same transfer goes from the middle to the top. Then, even if the transfer changes an individual rank, it is given less weight than if it were given to either tail. Given the increased discussion of ‘the 1%’, we can see how this fact could make the index inappropriate to assess this phenomenon.</p><p>We can see this below. We take the UK 2021 decile data and manipulate it to transfer 10% between deciles to record the changes to the index. In the last column to the right we see what would happen to the index if each decile individually sent the top 10% of society, 10% of their respective incomes. We would expect that the index would continually increase (i.e. that wealth was becoming more concentrated) but that’s not what we see.</p><p>Up to deciles 1–4 our index is increasing (to 0.3420) but once we hit our 5th decile the index starts decreasing and keeps decreasing until we reach the actual index for the UK in 2021 (0.3339).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2iGInqimiMsXqGqXYRbI_g.jpeg" /></figure><p>As Gatswirth notes, the index “cannot capture all the changes in the income distribution that economists or policy makers are interested in” (ibid: 9). This is not only a limitation of the index it is a solid argument to assess the underlying data and not just assume that a change in the index has (or has not) produced more overall equality.</p><p>What we should take very seriously is that the index will not always signal changes which we would assume increase or decrease inequality:</p><p>“The transfers of primary interest in economics obey the Pigou–Dalton criteria (Thon and Wallace 2004), which states that transfers from a poorer to a richer household increase inequality, while transfers from a richer household to a poorer one… decreases inequality. Although [as shown]… in a few illustrative examples this principle will not hold.” (ibid: 9)</p><h4>The Index as a Moral Compass</h4><blockquote>“Statistics are human beings with the tears wiped off.” — Paul Brodeur</blockquote><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fembed%2F18568761&amp;display_name=Tenor&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fview%2Fpirates-of-the-caribbean2-jack-sparrow-johnny-depp-compass-pirates-of-the-caribbean-gif-18568761&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fc.tenor.com%2FxAL90JCl8ngAAAAC%2Fpirates-of-the-caribbean2-jack-sparrow.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=tenor" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ee682e30dc0912f8b7baf2c568cf74d9/href">https://medium.com/media/ee682e30dc0912f8b7baf2c568cf74d9/href</a></iframe><p>Max Lorenz knew that his work on inequality could not by itself make value judgements. He states in his 1905 work, “There may be wide difference of opinion as to the significance of a very unequal distribution of wealth, but there can be no doubt as to the importance of knowing whether the present distribution is becoming more”.</p><p>Yet, the index’s use swings between mathematically unequal and morally unfair very quickly, and it is to this subject we now turn. Before we start, we won’t be saying we cannot form value judgements from statistical facts (by our very nature, we cannot escape this leap, facts have meaning). Instead, we show how much the index can be explained by factors other than those which lead to them being ‘morally unfair’.</p><p>By its very nature, a population contains people with different characteristics. These characteristics produce a very skewed view of the world when aggregated in summaries such as the index. We must also note that some of these characteristics are fluid in time whereas the index is a ‘snapshot’.</p><p>Take age, for instance. Some of our population will be working whereas, some will be retired. If we accept that as we near retirement, we are at the height of our earning potential, taking a lower income in retirement. We can end up in a situation where the index would give us high inequality figures that reflect this fact more than an ‘unfair’ distribution. Everett and Everett (2015) highlight this by modelling an equal society in which everybody earns, promotes, saves and lives equally with no inheritance:</p><p>“First, looking at income, we see that salary increases from $50,000 at 21 years of age exponentially to $129,813 at the retirement age of 65, at which point an income of $41,852 from annuities kicks in until death at the age of 80. This produces a Gini of .208 for income (using the usual, static OECD calculation). When we look at wealth instead of income, the inequality is considerably greater (as it is in all actual Western societies), with a Gini of .400, resulting from older workers’ accumulation of compounded salary increases and interest on regular savings over time.” (Everett and Everett, 2015: 192)</p><p>This fact does not mean that an index of 0.4 is fair in the real world. On the contrary, it shows us that an index of 0.4 could originate from a morally neutral position based on one primary characteristic of all societies, i.e. age.</p><p>We can look at this another way. Suppose you were this society’s technocratic government and wanted to reduce income inequality instead of dealing with any fundamental cause. In that case, you could force people to retire five years later, at 70 instead of 65. In this case, “we would see the income Gini drop from .208 to .165, largely because there would be fewer ‘poor’ retirees with relatively small incomes” (Everett and Everett, 2015: 193).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UvjYS5-iuQLtGJkBBbgxKA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The above shows us the Lorenz curves for the U.K. population in 2021 but this time split by non-retired and retired individuals. As we can see, the Lorenz income curve for the retired group is lower across the population than for the non-retired. The Gini Index is also lower (3.52%).</p><p>In this way, the abstraction of the index could force us to jump to conclusions that are not warranted. For example, increases in inequality due to malicious income concentration instead of an ageing population.</p><p>Piketty and Goldhammer (2014: 267) warn us that the index produces “an abstract and sterile view of inequality, which makes it difficult for people to grasp their position in the contemporary hierarchy (always a useful exercise, particularly when one belongs to the upper centiles of the distribution and tends to forget it, as is often the case with economists).” But we can also be sent on wild goose chases when we use the index, as we do, as a moral compass. We can end up being led towards a ‘datasaurus’ instead of where we should be being led, which is towards concentrations of wealth or people who need support.</p><p>In this way, by themselves, at least “Gini coefficients ought not to be used as proxy measures of distributive injustice.” (Everett and Everett, 2015: 202). Instead, we must create policy and our frame of reference on who holds what in a far more granular and targeted way to create the necessary weight of argument. This is where the ‘1%’ metric (the share of income held by the top 1% of earners) has played a vital role. This metric gives us a window into the Gini Index’s hidden tail and allows this to lie at the feet of a definitive group. Compare this to finding a 0.7 index and we can see what Piketty means by being ‘abstracted and sterilised’ into inaction.</p><h4>What Does Good Look Like?</h4><blockquote>“If all the statisticians in the world were laid head to toe, they wouldn’t be able to reach a conclusion” — Anon</blockquote><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fl2JeeWKJgGVpIdddK%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Fthesimpsons-the-simpsons-14x5-l2JeeWKJgGVpIdddK&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fl2JeeWKJgGVpIdddK%2Fgiphy.gif%3Fcid%3D790b761134b616a6d72f6d66ba117db5a5f1ac09e467e9d2%26rid%3Dgiphy.gif%26ct%3Dg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="326" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/142a99bc80f19a4f94c2bec24b61c346/href">https://medium.com/media/142a99bc80f19a4f94c2bec24b61c346/href</a></iframe><p>Just what is a ‘normal’ index value? What value is a practical aim? 0 (perfect equality), or would 0.15 be OK? Does history inform us of what we have reasonably been able to achieve? When do we have to start worrying, 0.4 or 0.85?</p><p>We should, as social scientists, have something to say about what good looks like. Attempts to answer this question in reference to the Gini index almost exclusively rely on history to establish the ‘top’ of the index, i.e. how far have we managed to push equality in past known egalitarian societies. As an example, Luebker (2010: 4) concentrates on the close-to-egalitarian city of Teotihuacan, 100 B.C. to A.D. 600 (which Graeber and Wengrow recently relied heavily on in ‘A Dawn of Everything’):</p><p>“The city is particularly interesting from a social perspective for what may have been one of the earliest examples of state-subsidized housing in the ancient New World… Our results… yield a Gini value of .12 for the households of Teotihuacan, indicating a lack of concentration of wealth in the ancient city. The high-status houses were only slightly larger than the average apartment compound, and the city lacks a huge royal palace. As for low- status residences, these structures — and their area per household — are much smaller than apartment compounds, but the difference is not sufficient to generate a high level of wealth concentration.” (Smith et al., 2014: 319–20)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ViB1QIVtaSo9j1KeadodHA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Teotihuacan, Creative Commons: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:View_from_Pyramide_de_la_luna.jpg">https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:View_from_Pyramide_de_la_luna.jpg</a></figcaption></figure><p>More recent examples exist which show the modern limits:<br>“It comes as no surprise that no [current] country has a Gini coefficient close to zero or one, the theoretical limits of the measure. To find genuinely low levels of inequality, one has to resort to historical examples from the Slovak Republic (0.19), Sweden (0.20), the Czech Republic (0.21) and Finland (0.21) that all date back to the 1980s and early 1990s (inequality in these countries has since increased).”</p><p>These examples are informative. Firstly, we should repeat, that very similar index values (0.12 for Teotihuacan and 0.19 for the Slovak Republic) can be generated for very different societies and should be interpreted with care and within a broader analysis. Nevertheless, these examples give us a semblance of what the ‘top’ looks like for normal variation within the index and gets us some way to manage our expectations.</p><p>As for what normal looks like, there is a rough and broad agreement on the index’s normal <em>modern</em> ranges. Wilson and Pickett (2009: 32) state the “most common values tend to be between 0.3 and 0.5”. Piketty and Goldhammer (2014: 266) tell us that “the Gini coefficient varies from roughly 0.2 to 0.4 in the distributions of labor income observed in actual societies, from 0.6 to 0.9 for observed distributions of capital ownership, and from 0.3 to 0.5 for total income inequality.”</p><p>None of this (historic or modern) gives us a real view of what we should be aiming for though, only what was or is. Helpfully, Luebkar (2010: 4) tries to to give us an answer through applicable thresholds with examples.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lPCm97BOH_T8xcSMqzCZ4g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2X7MfaTWoEZW146bEdP-Xg.png" /><figcaption>Taken from Leubkar (2010)</figcaption></figure><p>This is not a perfect framework. For example, according to anthropology, “egalitarian communities have Gini coefficients of less than 0.40” (Smith, 1991: 389). Also, we have seen that most countries range between 0.3 and 0.5 or 0.2 to 0.4, dependent on the source. Does this mean that most modern nations are egalitarian? You’d be hard to find anyone who would back this claim. Nevertheless, Luebkar gives us a framework which we can use to direct further analysis.</p><h3>Concluding Remarks</h3><blockquote>“The emphasis should be on eliminating poverty” — Feldstein</blockquote><p>We’ve tried here to examine if the Gini Index is, in reality, a “Phenomenal Cosmic Power in an Itty Bitty Living Space” as the real Genie says. Instead, we’ve found (probably unsurprisingly) that it has been imbued with powers way beyond its limitations.</p><p>The index is not any more right nor useful than any other statistic. However, it was adopted as it had advantages over its predecessors (class and skillset income tables of absolute values). This was because of its ability to aggregate, standardised, and be bounded (Sitthiyot and Holasut, 2020: 3), making it extremely useful for comparisons.</p><p>It can be applied to different facets of inequality to show the distribution “irrespective of the form the wealth takes: landownership, financial assets, net worth, or animal ownership.” (Smith, 1991: 370). It can also be applied to different steps in income distribution, such as pre-tax and post-tax income. This gives us the ability to assess the changes taxes and benefits make to the distribution. These are its main advantages.</p><p>As we have shown though, there are multiple pitfalls in using or interpreting the index. Pitfalls that we will undoubtedly fall into without context or a broader analysis. This was, in fact, Corrado Gini’s original intention. Gini never gave priority to his models. Instead, “He confronted reality by trying to understand the logic behind the events and only after he used those statistical and mathematical tools strictly necessary to make a model” (Giorgi, 2011: 15). Gini (for all his failures) knew that his area of study was not mathematics. It was the situation. His models could not point us to the right feet to lay blame. They could only support an argument.</p><p>Modern economists have partly remembered this fact but replaced the ‘human context’ (the actual situation) with other models. According to Frank Cowell, an economist at the London School of Economics, “<a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ask-gini/">One is to look beyond the Gini as a single statistic. The other is to consider whether it might be useful to use a model of the upper tail of the distribution, so you get a clearer picture.</a>” This advice points to other models, of which “there are well over 50” (Sitthiyot and Holasut, 2020: 2). So which do we use? And would this provide the practical direction given what we’ve seen about amoral determinants?</p><p>The first question has multiple answers. These answers are based on the analysis target and the analyst’s preference. This will differ depending on the target: poverty, class differences, labour versus capital, or the 1% etc. remembering “the way one tries to measure inequality is never neutral.” (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014: 270).</p><p>Some have proposed composite indexes incorporating the Gini index and the income share of the top and bottom 10% (Sitthiyot and Holasut, 2020: 3). Others have pushed “Government agencies [to] publish the Gini index along with the mean, median, and quintiles [and] include the deciles and 95th and 99th percentiles of the distribution and the shares (or average income) of each decile and the top 5 and 1 percent” (Gastwirth, 2017: 10; Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014: 269). Some point to decile ratios (De Maio, 2007: 850). Piketty has also recently argued that we should revert to how we used to measure income inequality in “social tables” during the enlightenment (ibid: 269).</p><p>These give us vastly more context, as shown below. Though, in my personal opinion, there is any replacing simply showing the Lorenz curve along with the Gini summary statistics. Failing that, we need to at least show these other summaries to contextualise our average.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qit3B-cXFwAdFrvh1CEbjg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Graphic: <a href="https://medium.com/u/2b78b11f9990">NearAndDistant</a> | Data: ONS</figcaption></figure><p>What is surprising is that in “trying to tell more of those stories”, nobody seems to consider the stories of the homelessness, food bank users or individuals in despair. No amount of statistics can show this.</p><p>To answer the second question, even if we devised new composite indexes, published more granular data or went back to a historical method of measuring inequality, would this give us clear policy direction? This is the ‘Feldstein question’. Feldstein steps back from the index’s abstraction (ironically following its creator’s lead) and asks what we are trying to achieve. His answer inverts the thinking in which indices would point us:</p><p>“To the extent that distributional concerns motivate the design of social insurance, the emphasis should be on eliminating poverty and not on the overall distribution of income or the general extent of inequality. Like most economists, I accept the Pareto principle that an economy is better off if someone gains and no one loses. This is true even if the gainer has above-average income, causing a Gini coefficient measure of income distribution to shift to greater inequality.” (Feldstein, 2005: 12)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JtZ1aHM6Gt9wkEwP" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@breakyourboundaries4?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Matt Collamer</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>And surely this is true. Less inequality is not our aim (especially if that’s directed by an index which can show greater equality while wealth in concentrating). Our aim should be to help those that need it. To curtail vast concentrations of wealth not because they <em>are, in and of itself, </em>but because others need support. We cannot make a statistic our moral compass in this.</p><p>This is where we leave it. We have shown that the Gini Index is a useful tool but vastly imbued with powers unwarranted to its station. Its creator knew the index produced a “simplification of reality” (Giorgi, 2011: 15) and needed to be used appropriately. Piketty recently took up this charge, knowing the index “gives a simplistic, overly optimistic, and difficult-to-interpret picture of what is really going on” (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014: 367).</p><p>The key here, I feel, is that using statistics (even when measuring inequality) should be post-politics, not pre. We should define what our political aims are first. Statistics cannot determine these for us. If we aim to eliminate poverty, then let’s do that. If we desire to curtail the use of income to produce undemocratic power structures, let’s change that. The index and a host of others can be used to highlight the problem and verify what we define as the problem. Still, they cannot define the problem, and more so, they cannot show us what to do. We probably already know.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/565/0*pcZg12Yi5JXeIdlB.png" /></figure><p><em>All code for the above graphics can be found, here: </em><a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/tree/main/projects/lorenz_gini"><em>https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/tree/main/projects/lorenz_gini</em></a></p><h4><strong>Bibliography</strong></h4><p>⁃ Anand, S. and Segal, P. (2008) ‘What Do We Know about Global Income Inequality?’, Journal of Economic Literature, 46(1), pp. 57–94.</p><p>⁃ De Maio, F.G. (2007) ‘Income inequality measures’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health (1979-), 61(10), pp. 849–852.</p><p>⁃ Everett, T.J. and Everett, B.M. (2015) ‘Justice and Gini coefficients’, Politics, Philosophy &amp; Economics, 14(2), pp. 187–208.</p><p>⁃ Feldstein, M. (2005) ‘Rethinking Social Insurance’, The American Economic Review, 95, pp. 1–24.</p><p>⁃ Gastwirth, J.L. (2017) ‘Is the Gini Index of Inequality Overly Sensitive to Changes in the Middle of the Income Distribution?’, Statistics and Public Policy, 4(1), pp. 1–11.</p><p>⁃ Giorgi, G.M. (2011) ‘Corrado Gini: the man and the scientist’, METRON, 69(1), pp. 1–28.</p><p>⁃ Lamb, E. (no date) Ask Gini: How to Measure Inequality, Scientific American.</p><p>⁃ Lerman, I. (1984) ‘A Note of the Calculation and interpretation of the Gini Index’, p. 6.</p><p>⁃ Lorenz, M.O. (1905) ‘Methods of Measuring the Concentration of Wealth’, Publications of the American Statistical Association, 9(70), pp. 209– 219.</p><p>⁃ Luebker, M. (2010) ‘TRAVAIL Policy Brief №3’, p. 8.</p><p>⁃ Luptáčik, M. and Nežinský, E. (2020) ‘Measuring income inequalities beyond the Gini coefficient’, Central European Journal of Operations Research, 28(2), pp. 561–578.</p><p>⁃ Nolan, B. (2001) ‘Inequality: The Price of Prosperity?’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 90(357), pp. 29–37.</p><p>⁃ Pyatt, G. (1976) ‘On the Interpretation and Disaggregation of Gini Coefficients’, The Economic Journal, 86(342), pp. 243–255.</p><p>⁃ Sitthiyot, T. and Holasut, K. (2020) ‘A simple method for measuring inequality’, Palgrave Communications, 6(1), p. 112.</p><p>⁃ Smith, C.L. (1991) ‘Measures and Meaning in Comparisons of Wealth Equlality’, Social Indicators Research, 24(4), pp. 367–392.</p><p>⁃ Smith, M.E. et al. (2014) ‘Quantitative Measures of Wealth Inequality in Ancient Central Mexican Communities’, Advances in Archaeological Practice, 2(4), pp. 311–323.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6663865c62f7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Divided Kingdom: The Poorest Pay More]]></title>
            <link>https://nearanddistant.medium.com/in-the-uk-the-poorest-pay-more-25af41aa00a3?source=rss-2b78b11f9990------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/25af41aa00a3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[r]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uk]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[NearAndDistant]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Apr 2022 21:43:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-05T22:37:49.525Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The lottery of birth and the failure of help in modern Britain</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lK4zGesNDwJeHUCPKOveBQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@meganreandrews?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Megan Andrews</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>As much as political and economic divisions within race or gender do not ‘just happen’, nor do geographical ones. Their occurrence is a sign that something has gone wrong at a structural level, either through design or pure negligence.</p><p>One task of modern representative democratic government is to make sure that exactly this does not occur; to enact policies that fend off the gross inequalities of the past and to make sure that there is political and economic equality for all. That we <strong><em>all </em></strong>have the same rights and opportunities. Within this remit, it is safe to say that the UK government has decidedly failed (or just given up).</p><p>The <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7484/">UK is the most unequal county in the developed world</a> and in contrast to other developed countries, <a href="https://www.economist.com/britain/2020/07/30/why-britain-is-more-geographically-unequal-than-any-other-rich-country">doesn’t just have ‘poor bits’ but an entire poor half</a>. As the UK’s former PM, Theresa May, declared “<a href="http://&quot;If you&#39;re born poor, you will die on average nine years earlier than others.&quot;">if you’re born poor [in the UK], you will die on average nine years earlier than others</a>”. That’s on average. <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectancies">The range of life expectancy between rich and poor geographies in England is 19 years</a> (between Blackpool in the North and Richmond Upon Thames in the South).</p><p><em>In other words, the UK is not only the most unequal place in the developed world but it is geographically defined by its spacial inequality.</em></p><p>The direct impact of the UK government’s failure to prevent structural divides is that just by the lottery of where they’re born, an individual could find themselves living a relatively more miserable and shorter life, compared to if they were born 300 miles South, within the same country.</p><p>This didn’t happen overnight. The slow burn of the UK’s acceptance of gross spacial inequality has continually occurred since the 1990s, when the UK was the <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/regional-inequalities-and-brexit/">most regionally equal country in Europe</a>. We have previously spoken about <strong><em>market</em></strong> inequality across the UK (before any tax or welfare corrections) and the growing gap in salaries, rental income and in particular self-employment income.</p><p><a href="https://nearanddistant.medium.com/the-divided-kingdom-the-uks-north-south-divide-is-the-most-unequal-in-the-developed-world-d6ca5c972943">The Divided Kingdom: the UKs North-South divide is the most unequal in the developed world</a></p><p>The market in modern economies creates inequalities for which corrections need to be made. We all buy into the assumption that markets should be allowed to create deficiencies due to the advantages of productivity we gain from this, yet we must correct for those deficiencies post-hoc; this is normally accomplished through redistribution. The bigger the gap, the bigger the correction.</p><p>What efforts then, through the UK redistributive tax and welfare system, does the UK make to try and correct this situation? What do they do to make sure that in such a wealthy country, citizens of the UK all have — at minimum — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/dec/25/how-the-welfare-state-is-failing-the-vulnerable">the ability to feed and house themselves and their families</a>, live broadly similar quality and years of life and dampen the lottery of birth.</p><p>We will see that the system the UK has to correct market inequalities is either not fit for purpose, nor is it trying to correct the deficiencies anymore. At worst, we find regressive taxes where higher relative taxes are paid by the poorest places. At best, the UK’s system reimburses taxes in a mangle of cash flows to the poorest, making them no better or worse off financially than the original market inequalities it tried to fix.</p><h3>“…countries have poor bits. Britain has a poor half”</h3><p>Let’s start with where the UK’s poor are. The threshold that normally defines poverty is those living on less than or equal to 60% of median income. ONS provides this data for the UK’s sub-regions, which allows us to graphically show where the UK’s poor are concentrated and live, respectively. The last full series for these figures was in 2018, so we’ll use that year here for consistency.</p><p>Current official estimates suggest that on the whole, <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn07096/">around 14% of the UK population (after housing costs</a>) live in poverty. That includes 25% of the child population. That’s millions (and millions) of people deprived in one of the world’s wealthiest countries.</p><p>When we map that 14% geographically, we can starkly see what’s colloquially known as the ‘North-South divide’ in England and what The Economist called “the poor half” but what could just as easily be called the UK’s ‘squashed middle’. This is shown in “2018 Poverty Rates per NUTS2 Area” (below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*91Bs2AaTS8gWK5a0KYl3QQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The squashed middle is geographically concentrated poor in the <a href="https://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/mps-ask-north-still-poorer-16137629">North</a>, the Midlands, Wales and Northern Ireland of the UK. In these areas some sub-regions have nearly a third of their population living in poverty.</p><p>We can also see this divide in disposable income (“2018 Regional Differences”, below). The North East receives 20% below the UK’s average disposable income per head, while London receives nearly 40% above the average.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kkv_MAQixn8Bcds9a3sUXA.png" /><figcaption>Code: [UK Divided] <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>The normal challenge raised to such geographic disparities (at least in the UK) is “well, housing costs and prices are different outside London and the South so people are paid lower in those places” and they’re right, they are. However, the inequality shown here (as noted) is <em>after</em> housing costs are incurred - what we’re seeing can’t be explained by the need to pay higher rents or mortgages.</p><p>In addition, this challenge does not explain why the poorest regions also have the highest rates of poverty. If prices are different in different places <strong>and</strong> they’re associated with income in those places, then we would expect to see a <em>uniform</em> poverty level across sub/regions (all else being equal) as prices flex to income differentials. Instead what we see is there are specific regions of the UK where people consistently face <strong><em>double</em></strong> the poverty, <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/twenty-worst-areas-uk-child-23794168">higher child poverty rates</a> and far lower disposable incomes regardless of prices or welfare in that region.</p><p>Given the massive emphasis on welfare in the UK where <em>“</em><a href="https://cpag.org.uk/sites/default/files/CPAG-the-poor-of-the-mass-media-Jul14.pdf"><em>Stories about the abuse of benefits made up 19 per cent of the British stories about poor people</em></a><em>”</em><strong> </strong>and the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/business/economics/2012/11/scroungers-fraudsters-and-parasites-how-media-coverage-affects-our-view-benefit-cl">continued moral panic</a> about it across the British media, we would be forgiven in thinking that welfare was going to the right places (those in poverty) but misused by those who ‘just want a handout’.</p><p>But what if welfare was going to the wrong places? And what if when it does go to the right places, it doesn’t actually make much difference…</p><h3>Death, Welfare and Taxes</h3><p>Let’s be clear, those that live in London and the South who earn more, pay more money into the public pot. That should not surprise us - the sheer sums of market income the South receives inevitably dictate through our progressive <em>income tax</em> system, that as they earn more, they pay more.</p><p>The more important question concerns putting these absolute payments in context to their respective market salaries, to understand if this absolute amount is a <strong><em>relatively fair share or even a relatively large amount</em></strong>. To do this we need to split out the taxes on different types of income (which have different tax rates) and then aggregate against all income recieved.</p><p>A simple way to demonstrate this is <a href="https://twitter.com/AnyaLOvermann/status/1473270589796274180?s=20&amp;t=CWzpUDuSkt80rGFsB-4fpA">this</a> Tweet and takedown of Elon Musk claiming he will pay “$11 billion in taxes this year”. We hear a similar argument in the UK from the wealthiest individuals and regions and we must ask the same question to those who lament that they ‘foot the public bill’ — what is your payment relative to your income? Even for our pseudo-Randian Ubermensch Elon, a small percentage of a large number can still be a Tweet-worthy large absolute number. In comparison a large percentage of a small number could be relatively crippling to those who bear it, even though it’s a small absolute amount.</p><p>The narrative is always the same; the rich always complain about how much in absolute terms they pay into the public pot. That’s illuminating. If the rich complained about how much cash they were left with, their moral indignation would be met with laughter.</p><p>One way to show the absolute result of our redistributive system regionally is to visualise the household <strong><em>per head net position of taxes and welfare, </em></strong>i.e. the amount that each person in each county or local authority pay in taxes, netted against what they receive in welfare. This tells us if each sub-region per head is on average in surplus (receive more welfare than are taxed) or deficit (pay more tax than they receive in welfare). This is shown in “Absolute Net Transfers Per Head” below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G6dkAb3cdBT0qiQlFZ5XSA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Code: [Absolute Net Transfers Per Head] <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/failed_welfare_gdhi.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/failed_welfare_gdhi.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>We can see that there are only 16 counties or local authorities that have a surplus position. A number of these are coastal areas (East and West of South England) and as seen in the “2018 Poverty Rates per NUTS2 Areas” graphic above, here we do not find significant poverty — this could easily be explained by pensioners choosing to live in these areas.</p><p>On average, most region’s individuals pay between £1 to £2,500 per head, each year, into the public pot. London and Greater London predominantly pay double that amount. Only one place pays a magnitude higher on average per person, which is London’s Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, paying £20,000 each per year.</p><p>Some of the poorest geographies are, as we would expect, in surplus position i.e. offered more than they give, for example, parts of Wales and the North West which have nearly a third of their respective populations living in dire poverty. These regions and their populations need market rates corrected in order to live within their respective counties which (when the market fails to provide this as it often does) is meant to be done through the welfare state. However looking at the picture above, it’s not as the tabloids make it seem i.e. that welfare is predominantly funded by and funnelled from rich regions towards poorer ones. It’s not exactly “London funding everyone else” — far from it.</p><p>What we definitely don’t see is the mirror image of “2018 Regional Differences”, where regions with higher disposable incomes pay more into the public pot. On average, everyone seems to pay roughly equal amounts in absolute terms and this gradually increases into the Centre of London instead of across the wider South.</p><h3>It’s All Relative</h3><p>As we’ve discussed, it’s not enough to show absolutes and call that fair. If someone on minimum wage and Richard Branson both paid the same absolute amount (or even if Branson paid double), most people would think it a stretch to say this was a fair system. We expect those who earn more to also pay more and it stands that those regions that earn more also pay more. However for the most part, this does not seem to be happening on a per head basis.</p><p>To explore the relative taxes and welfare that each region pays and receives on average, we break down geographic taxes and welfare individually (show below) in a little more detail before bringing them together as above but in relative terms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L7Z2zlrcwpJHI8ORUEQiFw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iZQNRo1Fnt_bwyse-6NZUg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The first thing to point out is that every part of the UK receives benefits of some kind (shown in the “welfare benefits” map above). We should expect this. Statutory maternity pay, disability allowances, incapacity benefits and pensions will occur in all walks of life (there is one strange case of Child Benefits of which all decile groups receive in equal absolute amounts — but that’s for another time). This flies in the face of those of the neoliberal tendency who push the message that benefits or welfare dependence is a moral vice, that each should be an island. Instead, everyone is receiving help.</p><p>Most counties receive between 10–40% per-head in benefits. There are only 4 counties and local authorities that per head, received less than 10% of their gross average income in benefits. They are:</p><ul><li>Kensington &amp; Chelsea (6.1%)</li><li>Westminster (7.4%)</li><li>City of London (7.7%)</li><li>Wandsworth (8.1%)</li></ul><p>Notice that the benefits map is again not reflective of vulnerability, as seen in the first two poverty and disposable income maps, but much more like the absolute transfer, i.e. that those who in absolute terms pay more, receive less relative welfare. Probably a reflection of the large denominator of income.</p><p>The “Taxes” map shows who relatively pays. This provides an unintuitive view; it neither follows the absolute payments in relative terms (which would indicate that the absolute amount is a large portion) nor is the opposite of the welfare map (meaning that those that receive relatively little also pay a relatively large amount into the public pot). In fact, as a percentage of their total market income, taxes look heavily skewed towards the very regions that crop up as suffering the most poverty, a lack of disposable income and who also are in receipt of the highest relative welfare.</p><p>There is another simple way to explore this. The maps below show the UK’s top 30 sub-regions receiving the highest <strong><em>relative</em></strong> welfare benefits per head<strong><em> (right)</em></strong> and the 30 sub-regions with the highest relative taxes <strong><em>(left)</em></strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i3_-oo09BNQIjcs_V5r5Yg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XC1IJ3uJ2bfo1jrbVFet3Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>By and large, there is evidence here that our welfare system is funnelling towards <strong><em>some</em></strong><em> </em>of the poorest regions. Notably though, there are no sub-regions from the Midlands and only two from Northern Ireland even though they make up a significant portion of the most deprived parts of the UK.</p><p>What is key to point out here is that within both the top 30 sub-regions for relative amounts of benefits and taxes, we find significant cross-over - indeed 1/3 of the ‘top 30’ lists are exactly the same. The following are both relatively significant payers of taxes and receivers of welfare per head:</p><p><strong>Scotland</strong></p><ul><li>East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland</li></ul><p><strong>Wales</strong></p><ul><li>Central Valleys</li><li>Gwent Valleys</li><li>Swansea</li><li>Bridgend and Neath Port Talbot</li><li>Isle of Anglesey</li></ul><p><strong>North England</strong></p><ul><li>Blackburn with Darwen</li><li>South Teesside</li><li>South West Wales</li><li>Sunderland</li></ul><p>This is a weird finding. We would not expect on the basis of welfare redistributing financial income from the least vulnerable to the most, that the same cities (for instance) showed up in both the highest payers and highest receivers; unless of course, their regional inequality was so significant that <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/compendium/economicreview/february2020/analysingregionaleconomicandwellbeingtrends">there was only a handful of very rich people</a>.</p><h3>Bring it all together</h3><p>At this point, we’ve shown where the poor are and described the structural geography which British politics has created. We’ve also shown that far from welfare going to the places which have the highest poverty rates, we actually see some of the highest relative tax rates and a non-uniform welfare support. What’s the impact of this?</p><p>One way to begin answering this is to peg each region’s gross income at 100% and show the total taxes, as well as the benefits as percentages of that figure. The graphic below shows this and the picture starts to become a bit clearer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dnP2mAVUKpwp1Fbjswz8gg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Code: [% Net] <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/failed_welfare_gdhi.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/failed_welfare_gdhi.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>What this highlights is that because of the absolute <a href="https://nearanddistant.medium.com/the-divided-kingdom-the-uks-north-south-divide-is-the-most-unequal-in-the-developed-world-d6ca5c972943">difference in starting positions</a>, when we layer over what we have seen above (the relatively high taxes and high welfare payments to the poor regions), welfare becomes a simple return of those poor regions’ taxes to them, rather than any regional redistribution to them to fend off deprivation.</p><p>This is showcased above, between London’s and the North East’s gross income before any redistributive efforts, at £37,050 and £17,818 respectively. When taxes, social contributions and other transfers were combined, an individual in the North East was taxed around 40% on average, whereas a Londoner was taxed on 35% of their income in 2018. Exactly the opposite of what we would expect to happen.</p><p>Welfare payments received by the region top this figure up to bring the North East back to 97% of their gross income in absolute terms, whereas London only gets back up to just over 75%. This explains why we don’t see much shift in the net income of the poorest regions because although they do, in fact, receive higher benefits, those benefits are paid onto a lower relative floor which is produced by higher relative taxes from a lower overall starting position.</p><p>This doesn’t necessarily need to be a bad thing but it relies on the market rates being enough to live on in that particular area, which in most cases they’re not. It also relies on a mangle of cash-flows out and then into people’s pockets post pay-day giving the most vulnerable less control to plan.</p><p>The table below, produced from the same data, makes this even clearer (if you needed more convincing). Here, we breakdown each type of tax regionally per head as absolute amounts <strong><em>and a relative percentage </em></strong>of the gross income in 2018 showing us where the higher taxes stem from.</p><blockquote>What this made apparent when we do this is that it is Social Contributions (such as National Insurance), are regressively weighted the poor regions at a tax level.</blockquote><p>Social contributions such as National Insurance regress from 12% to 2% when employment income hits the Upper Earning Limit. This means that with each extra pound earned, the wealthier pay relatively less of their overall income in taxes while the least wealthy are mostly stuck paying the higher relative rate. There are historic reasons for this but mostly they are defunct now.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dzGmH1QSDIVvxYAEjKyPZg.png" /></figure><p>This system isn’t working.</p><p>Our poorest regions have less income to start with and then get taxed more overall per head as we decrease the burden on higher income earners. On top of that they then get gawked at for receiving benefits which allows them to just get by. In other words, those benefits ‘scavengers’ are created by a system that doesn’t consider regional differences in starting incomes (the 0% Personal Allowance is £12,570 everywhere, for instance) and relatively takes more from the poorest and at some absolute value affords the richest a huge tax break.</p><p>This situation has become worse over the last two decades. For example, the North East on average received £1,509 per month in 2018. Once adjusted for taxes and rent paid, as well as benefits received, their monthly disposable income came to £1,416. In comparison London went from £3,133 per month gross to £2,447 (after taxes, benefits and rents) i.e. the rich never complain about what they’re left with.</p><blockquote>This amounts to a Londoner receiving 100% more in gross income and, even after paying taxes and rent, having 75% more to play around with in actual purchasing power than someone in the North East.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RFUsKX3uTg2yJK7y8pZXHw.jpeg" /></figure><p>A 75% difference in in-your-pocket income is vast for what amounts to a 300 mile car journey within the same country. As stated above by a former Prime Minister, miles translate into years and quality of life in the UK in pure geospatial inequality.</p><p>It’s time we call out geographic inequalities in the UK as what they are: structural and deliberate. The system is set up to reward the rich for being rich, allowing them to keep more the more they earn all the while getting more indignant about how much they will pay (not be left with).</p><p>The answer is that the UK cannot have its cake and eat it. We cannot have a system in which there are large regional differences in wealth, financial income and opportunity and then decide to tax everybody the same. This blanket regional approach results in those who start lower, being taxed relatively higher and forced into poverty only to then sneered at on national TV programmes and told to have better financial management.</p><p>The UK’s ‘great nation’ rhetoric is applicable to a smaller and smaller group. It’s time we all realise that that small group is not dotted amongst us but in a very specific place.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25af41aa00a3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Divided Kingdom: the UKs North-South divide is the most unequal in the developed world]]></title>
            <link>https://nearanddistant.medium.com/the-divided-kingdom-the-uks-north-south-divide-is-the-most-unequal-in-the-developed-world-d6ca5c972943?source=rss-2b78b11f9990------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6ca5c972943</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[r]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[NearAndDistant]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Nov 2021 22:38:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-14T16:53:04.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>(… or how far does the UK need to level up?)</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zOXQQuRTQaguCIfyUuypSA.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://unsplash.com/@jangottweiss">https://unsplash.com/@jangottweiss</a></figcaption></figure><p>When two groups under the same political<em> </em>system are so economically separate, at what point does normal variability become intolerable divide? <strong>The UK now has to find its own answer to that question as it finds itself the </strong><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7204c062-1047-11ea-a225-db2f231cfeae"><strong>most unequal of any developed country</strong></a><strong>. </strong>Simple geography splits the country across infrastructure, health, education, jobs and disposable income alike.</p><p>If you didn’t know already, the UK is an aggressively unequal place.</p><p>And we all get it, some places are poorer than others. You may live in one of those places; I grew up in one. To a certain degree, variability is inescapable across individual and geographic wealth. The question has never been ‘variability or no variability’, it’s always been how much variability is socially and politically tolerable.</p><p>… and I know what you’re thinking “don’t they all have flat screen TVs?” and correct, mostly they do (do they make them any other way?). Yet, across regions in the UK, a man can expect to watch that flat screen TV - on average - for 19 years less than a comparable man, living a 5 hour drive away because, well… <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectancies"><strong>he’d be dead that much earlier</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><p>This two-step pattern is replicated throughout the Kingdom’s so-called North-South divide which has resulted in the UK becoming the most unequal country in <a href="https://www.ippr.org/research/publications/state-of-the-north-2019">productivity, job-creation and disposable income</a>, the ability of families to independently feed their children (relying on <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-43544255">free-school-meals</a>, an awful modern euphemism), as well as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-34964522">education</a>. The list goes on…</p><p>The trouble is, it’s not enough to say it - <strong>we have to see it</strong>. The graphic below visualises the divide across disposable income. Using the UKs overall average disposable income (pegged at 100%), we can measure regions against that overall average as a benchmark.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P2O8mg6Lsyn8sfU7NQ538Q.png" /></figure><p>The above looks pretty bleak. I don’t know about you, but not being able to feed your kids, on top of a structural disadvantage of them getting ‘good’ grades, while having less money overall in your pocket and dying a fifth of a century earlier, <strong><em>within the same country</em></strong>… seems like something the UK needs to talk more about. It’s frankly a structural and historical embarrassment given the UK is no stranger to wealth; <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf">it’s the 5th largest economy in the world</a>.</p><blockquote><em>It’s not like this hasn’t been noticed by the UK government. Earlier this year, the Government announced it would soon release a White Paper on its ‘Levelling Up’ strategy with </em><a href="https://www.local.gov.uk/parliament/briefings-and-responses/levelling-agenda-house-commons-15-june-2021#levelling-up-white-paper">“bold new policy interventions to improve livelihoods and opportunities in all parts of the UK”</a>.<em> The plan is to reduce geographical inequalities through empowering local authorities, funnelling a ring-fenced £4.8bn to be used for a prospectus of ‘levelling up’ projects.</em></blockquote><p>And while I’m sure the government are being overly optimistic about £4.8bn being anywhere near enough to ‘level up’, what I’d like to do here is show you the gap that they’re trying to close. We must start to pull the ‘United’ veil off the United Kingdom in order to put more pressure onto the UK government to rapidly correct the gross inequalities it’s fostered.</p><p>So let’s get straight to the point, what is the difference between in-your-pocket income across the UK? The Office of National Statistics (ONS) publishes figures on exactly this: Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI). GDHI calculates the amount of money that <em>an average</em> individual has available to spend (or save) after any taxes are paid or benefits received.</p><p>As described in a Parliamentary briefing paper from 2018:</p><blockquote><em>&quot;[GDHI] calculates the amount of money in the economy accruing to the household sector (i.e. to people, rather than Government or businesses) in different areas, divided by the resident population to get a per head figure. This per head figure may be loosely understood as</em><a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8191/CBP-8191.pdf"><em> the average amount of money that individuals have to save or spend</em></a><em>.</em>&quot;</blockquote><p>At a high level, GDHI breaks the inputs into disposable income into three main parts (made up of various financial streams). We can summarise as:</p><p>Disposable Income = Income + Benefits - Taxes</p><p>The easiest way to show the components of GDHI (that I couldn&#39;t find on the normally very helpful ONS website) is visually, so I&#39;ve mocked this up below. This diagram shows the monthly GDHI financial data published for 2018 for the North East region, mapped in a Sankey diagram. This shows us how income flowed through — on average — per month to individuals and what contributed to their final Gross Disposable Income (see the notes at the end of this post for a simple breakdown of what each bit actually is).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Wj-D6IOr3MeSingMZs78yw.png" /><figcaption><strong>Code: </strong><a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/ons_gdhi_perhead_1997_to_2018.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/ons_gdhi_perhead_1997_to_2018.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>GDHI is therefore useful to explore patterns over time and because the figures are standardised per head, it also allows comparisons across areas of different population sizes (going forward we’ll refer to GDHI as simply disposable income). Due to the detail we are given, we can also explore how much the UK government has corrected income inequalities through redistributive measures i.e. how much these structural issues are down to a lack of redistributive policy over time (the next post).</p><p><em>Worth a note that the ONS release disposable income figures over four geographical levels but we’re specifically interested in regions here (in future posts we will drill down into other geographical levels). </em><br><br>Let’s use the same visualisation method as above and zoom out. Below, we can see the 2018 figures for all regions giving an immediate sense of where, for instance, compensation was significantly higher than other regions (London and South East) or where individual components such as compensation is significantly less for an average individual, e.g. the North East and Northern Ireland, compared to other regions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qqE7FYel9fikwPJkwPZJ-g.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Code: </strong><a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_nuts1_sankey.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_nuts1_sankey.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><h3>The Rich Gettin’ Richer and the Poor Gettin’ Poorer.</h3><p>Stripping away a layer, the table and graphic below shows overall <strong><em>monthly gross income</em></strong> (pre-benefit / pre-taxed income) across each region from 1997 to 2018. Using indices, we compare each region’s position relative to the overall average within each year. This tables the map we saw previously and stretches it out across all years. Mounting scaled colours onto this, we can see pretty quickly that <strong>the relative order of gross incomes across regions have not changed in the last two decades.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3VPi73dmsSNu-NjET3xSqA.png" /><figcaption><strong>Code:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>The rich regions are the South East, South West, London and the East of England (highlighted in green), their gross incomes have consistently been over the UK average (or very close to it i.e. the South West). The South East and London specifically, have seen their incomes shift from 121.2% and 125.7% above the UK average in 1997, to 117.8% and 154.6% above the UK average, respectively.</p><p>The other English bundle is known colloquially as The North (North East, North West and the Midlands) has, albeit governed by the exact same political system as the South of England, consistently fallen behind.</p><p>Scotland (highlighted in light green) which <a href="https://www.deliveringforscotland.gov.uk/scotland-in-the-uk/devolution/">devolved from the UK in 1998</a>, can be seen to be keeping up with the UK average in contrast to the other devolved nations, Northern Ireland and Wales. Wales consistently receives the least gross income of all UK regions, taking over from Northern Ireland in the early 2000s.</p><p>Taking all these regions together the range (the maximum income gap between regions), shown on the bottom row of the above table, expanded from 46.2% in 1997 to 80.6%, a widening of 34.4% between the highest earning and lowest earning regions. The rich gettin’ richer and the poor gettin’ poorer.</p><p>This becomes much more visible in a line plot, shown below. Here we show actual monthly incomes in different regions along with each region’s individual growth since 1997, in brackets. London has enjoyed a gross monthly income growth of 132% since 1997, with the lowest growth being in Wales (70%); for perspective <em>the </em>respective capitals are just a 3 hour drive away from each other.</p><p>Another interesting point is London’s increase. Although this has always been apparent, coming out of the Financial Crisis in 2011, London started pulling away even more. It also coincided with the <a href="https://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/NIESR%20GE%20Briefing%20Paper%20No.%206%20-%20Regional%20Inequality%20in%20Household%20Incomes%20In%20The%20UK.pdf">Conservative government of 2010 to present</a> coming to power. This was a recovery spearheaded by bailouts for banks, low-interest rates for businesses and Conservative led austerity for the commons.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C9zV4ffo-cIcV48QR7iK2Q.png" /><figcaption><strong>Code:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>To go one step further, we can break down gross income into its different types. We can also explore if having London within our dataset skews the data, driving inequality through one heavy outlier.</p><p>First, a quick ONS jargon buster (yep jargon is confusing, yep it’s annoying):</p><ul><li><strong>Operating Surplus </strong>— property rental income (imputed or otherwise)</li><li><strong>Mixed Income</strong> — self-employment income</li><li><strong>Compensation</strong> — wages and salary</li><li><strong>Property Income </strong>— asset income e.g. shares (not housing, confusingly)</li></ul><p>Armed with this, the tables below break income into its respective types. I’ve separated out London on the right so we can answer the question of how much London skews our numbers but we’ll come back to this. Using the range — again shown at the bottom of these tables — we can see to what extent each income type is significantly different in each region.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-9tW22sHu33pWRPD9rWfRg.png" /><figcaption><strong>Code:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>Counter-intuitively, it is employee compensation (which is the main source of income in all regions) that has the least associated regional inequality - with and without London included. There is, no doubt, still a significant inequality associated with it as we can see.</p><p>The main income inequality when London is included (on the left) is self-employment income (mixed income). With a self-employed Londoner earning on average 150% more than a self-employed Northerner in the North East.</p><p>Whereas if we omit London (on the right) rental income (operating surplus) has the most associated inequality. Here a Southerner in the South East on average earns 88% more rental than — again — a Northerner in the North East.</p><p>Below, we plot the ranges for each income type over the entire period showing to what extent each inequality gap has been increasing over time. We can see that compensation has been relatively stable over the last two decades and that it is self-employment (mixed income) income and income from financial assets (property income) which are driving the majority of the inequality.</p><p>We could say then that we are very much still in the structural aftershock of the Financial Crisis, with those low-interest rates shunting financial assets and income (shares, bonds etc) to London and the South. And also that, for structural reasons, self-employment seems to be far more accessible for those in The South than anyone in The North.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pmlXE3WwmibRS4HLSw7FLA.png" /><figcaption><strong>Code:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>In contrast to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which have their devolved governments with <em>some </em>political control over their territories, The North of England economically looks like a different country but is governed by the exact same people as the South.</p><p>The last thing we touch on is the age old “yeah but what about housing costs? It’s more expensive to live down South” and again, correct, it is.</p><p>We would intuitively expect that a driving force of increasing income would come from increasing housing costs. The question then becomes ‘has housing increased the same across the board or proportionally to the associated increases in income?’</p><p>We can see housing payments against the UK average, below. The South <em>is</em> a more expensive place to live than the North; what we cannot see, is the massive divergence over time, which we do with gross income (which if you recall had a 34.4% increase between 1997–2018). Instead we see a 11.6% increase in the range in regard to housing costs.</p><p>In other words, <strong><em>housing costs</em></strong> are increasing across the United Kingdom, not just for a few regions as we see with income. <strong><em>The effect of which is to squeeze everyone </em></strong>and the consequence is those who have less end up proportionally paying similar housing rates to those who have more.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-DqiGZom5X7cwEL_joekQA.png" /><figcaption><strong>Code:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/blob/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018/gdhi_income_analysis.Rmd</a></figcaption></figure><p>So the fact that the UK finds itself as both one of the wealthiest and most unequal places, having to set a purposeful agenda to ‘level-up’. Would seem to be due to the fact that The South (specifically since the financial crisis and Conservative government - or indeed because of them) has been structurally allowed to far outstrip the rest of our economy for the last 10 years.</p><p>Levelling up seems strangely like a sort of ‘create the problem and the solution’ theatre. Conveniently, the mess should have enough political momentum and promise, just in time to hold through the next election in 2024. You have to wonder if that’s the play, or if it’s now a case of the Conservative government having to suddenly care and appease it’s newly adopted political base. In 2016 Brexit allowed the above pressure cooker to find a release valve having been <a href="https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-opportunities">voted for by the the less well-off, the unemployed, the least-educated and those who had found their financial situation consistently worsen</a>. Sound familiar… wonder if ‘levelling-up’ will put the lid back on that.</p><p>Find the code for all graphics above at my Github, here:<br><a href="https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/tree/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018">https://github.com/NearAndDistant/ruk/tree/main/projects/ons_region_gdhi_1997_2018</a></p><p><em>In the next post we’ll have a detailed look at the UK’s regional transfers and what impact, if any, interventions have on our gross figures to create a more equal distribution across regions using the tax and benefits system.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6ca5c972943" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[US Droughts Per County]]></title>
            <link>https://nearanddistant.medium.com/us-droughts-per-county-b6ee80d1d55c?source=rss-2b78b11f9990------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b6ee80d1d55c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gganimate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tidyverse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[r]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drought]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[NearAndDistant]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 Oct 2021 12:15:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-17T16:35:04.207Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How to animate maps in R</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*aikLxs46EGMKKFbT" /></figure><p>U.S. Drought Monitor is jointly produced by the National Drought Mitigation Center at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. They collect this data through a joint venture at droughtmonitor.unl.edu which gives an API to download this data for a variety of parameters e.g. time period, % population effected , % area effected etc.</p><p>Using this data and R we can enrich and visualise this data from 01–01–2019 (or before the data goes further) over time through an animated map . This piece is primarily a place to store and show the 13mb GIF (Twitter doesn’t allow &gt; 2.5mb) but while we’re here let’s talk through the process of getting here as well!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w7gLWiHow9qVsRyTNeE6Hw.gif" /></figure><p>First we can download the data from droughtmonitor.unl.edu with the only specification that changes is the time you wish to map across, the other parameters should be county level and categories. You can always filter the dates down inside the script but you’re better off saving the memory to deal with the larger crunching later on.</p><h4>Import &amp; Clean</h4><pre>library(tidyverse)</pre><pre>us_drought %<br>  pivot_longer(cols = c(None : D4) , names_to = &quot;drought_lvl&quot; , values_to = &quot;pct_pop&quot;) %&amp;gt;%<br>  janitor::clean_names() %&amp;gt;%<br>  mutate(fips = sprintf(&quot;%05s&quot; , fips)) %&amp;gt;%<br>  mutate(drought_lvl = factor(drought_lvl , <br>                              levels = c(&quot;None&quot; , &quot;D0&quot; , &quot;D1&quot; , &quot;D2&quot; , &quot;D3&quot; , &quot;D4&quot;),<br>                              labels = c(&quot;None&quot;, &quot;Abnormal&quot;, &quot;Moderate&quot;, &quot;Severe&quot;, &quot;Extreme&quot;, &quot;Exceptional&quot;))) %&amp;gt;%<br>  group_by(valid_start , fips) %&amp;gt;%<br>  slice_max(order_by = pct_pop , n = 1) %&amp;gt;%<br>  ungroup()</pre><p>Now if you use setwd() in your scripts then PLEASE STOP DOING THAT, <a href="http://jenrichmond.rbind.io/post/how-to-use-the-here-package/">read this article</a> to understand why. It essentially it boils down to making your script very fragile. As soon as you rename that file or move it, it script with setwd() breaks. This is all to real for someone else who may need to run your script where setwd() build off a very different environment. here() from the {here} package set the default file path to “the path to the top-level of my current project” of which you only need to specify any further folder structure you want embedded and file title.</p><p>Due to the wide format of the cvs data from Drought Monitor we need to tidy the data to show as a data matrix (long format) instead of denormalised (wide format). This will allow us to work with our data in a far easier form. We need to use pivot_longer() to specify the columns we wish to collapse cols = c(None:D4) as well as what we want to call the two columns we want to collapse into the observation name column and the observation value. In this instance we will have a drought level and a % population effected by that level as our value.</p><p>The last part of the wrangle is the group_by() %&gt;% slice_max() combo which allows us to group by an observation value and then take the top of that group. This allows us to bring back the highest drought level for each week (valid_start) in each county (fips) even though the dataset shows us each of the 5 levels (None , D1 , D2 , D3 , D4) for each county in each week broken down by what % of the population was effected. This allows us to plot only one value per county not five. Don&#39;t forget to ungroup().</p><p>In order to map we must download shape files to map onto which we can do using the R package {tigris]</p><h4>Maps</h4><pre>library(tigris)<br>library(sf)</pre><pre># import state and counties from tigris so we can filter out states we do not want to use (Alaska , Hawaii etc)</pre><pre>counties % <br>select(state_id = STATEFP , county_id = GEOID , county_name = NAMELSAD)</pre><pre># lookup_code for &quot;Alaska&quot; , &quot;Hawaii&quot; , &quot;Puerto Rico&quot; to strip them out of map<br>#https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/?cid=nrcs143_013697</pre><pre>#The code for Alaska is &#39;02&#39;.<br>#The code for Hawaii is &#39;15&#39;. <br>#The code for Puerto Rico is &#39;72&#39;.</pre><pre>counties %<br>  rename(fips = county_id) %&amp;gt;%<br>  filter(!state_id %in% c(&quot;02&quot; , &quot;15&quot; , &quot;72&quot;)) %&amp;gt;%<br>  st_simplify(dTolerance = 0.060)</pre><p>The {tigris} package has a very useful selection of US data one of which is county level data and polygon information for mapping which we can grab by loading the package — library(tigris) - and then loading the counties() function to save the data. We also don&#39;t want play with all the data the counties function has so we do some research and strip out the ones we don&#39;t want, here Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.</p><p>Last thing we do here is probably the most important part of the entire script for large amounts of data which can be anywhere past 1 million observations at this point and that is st_simplify(). st_simplify allows us to covert our polygons to a lower definition using the GEOS implementation of the Douglas-Peucker algorithm to reduce the vertex count. Essentially it lowers the detail of the shape files as shown below. This is very important as we&#39;re about to join these shape files to our drought data which we have for every week for every county for many years. When I did this for 2018-present data I had nearly 1 million observations I was going to join shape files to. Without lowering the detail of those polygons I would have ended up running out of memory and crashing out.</p><p>seine_simp = st_simplify(seine, dTolerance = 2000) # 2000 m</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zKoTybNpQH1Q6vmC" /></figure><h4>Joining</h4><pre>doParallel::registerDoParallel()</pre><pre># join into one table of geoinfo and droughts<br>counties_drought % <br>  inner_join(us_drought, by = &quot;fips&quot;)</pre><p>The parallel package from R 2.14.0 and later provides functions for parallel execution of R code on machines with multiple cores or processors or multiple computers. Again we&#39;re trying to give our script as much help as possible for the last crunch. In the end the actual join (if you&#39;ve simplified and create a parallel) should not be such a bad time.</p><h4>GIF Creation &amp; Static Graphics</h4><pre>library(showtext); showtext_auto() ; font_add_google(&quot;Amatic SC&quot; , &quot;amatic&quot;)<br>library(gganimate)<br>library(transformr)</pre><pre>drought_map_simp %<br>  #filter(valid_start &amp;gt;= &quot;2020-07-01&quot;) %&amp;gt;% # testing filter for gganimate<br>  #filter(valid_start == max(valid_start)) %&amp;gt;% # turn on for static map<br>  ggplot(aes(fill = drought_lvl)) +<br>  geom_sf() +<br>  borders(&quot;state&quot;) +<br>  transition_manual(valid_start) + # turn off static<br>  scale_fill_viridis_d(option = &quot;rocket&quot; , begin = 0 , end = 1) +<br>  labs(<br>    title = &quot;County Drought Levels Over Time Throughout the United States&quot;,<br>    subtitle = &quot;{current_frame}&quot;, # turn off static<br>    caption = &quot;Source: droughtmonitor.unl.edu | Graphic: @NearandDistant&quot;,<br>    fill = &quot;Drought Level&quot;) +<br>  ggthemes::theme_map() +<br>  coord_sf() +<br>############################################################# all theme elements<br>  theme(<br>    #text = element_text(family = &quot;BM Hanna Air Regular&quot;), # turn off for animation<br>    plot.title = element_text(vjust = -110 , size = 60 , face = &quot;bold&quot;),<br>    plot.subtitle = element_text(vjust = -105 , hjust = 0.95 , size = 60), # turn off static<br>    plot.caption = element_text(vjust = -10 , hjust = 0 , size = 40),<br>    legend.title = element_text(size = 50 , face = &quot;bold&quot;),<br>    legend.text = element_text(size = 40),<br>    legend.position = c(0,0.05),<br>    plot.margin = margin(-2,0,1,0, unit = &quot;cm&quot;))</pre><p>We can turn off the animation features (transition, subtitle render etc) and pull a static graphic from the above or turn them on a lock a GIF to be animated. The static graphic is shown below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*aikLxs46EGMKKFbT" /></figure><p>Lastly we need to take our GIF and animate it using {gganimate} shown below again using here::here() to save this properly!</p><h4>Animation</h4><pre>library(gifski)</pre><pre>drought_map %&amp;gt;%<br>animate(fps = 55 , nframe = 300 , <br>        height = 2000 , width = 2340,<br>        start_pause = 1, end_pause = 1,<br>        renderer = gifski_renderer(here::here(&quot;us_droughts_simp.gif&quot;)))</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6ee80d1d55c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Working Class Identity and Race.]]></title>
            <link>https://nearanddistant.medium.com/working-class-identity-and-race-31a527e427c?source=rss-2b78b11f9990------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/31a527e427c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[george-floyd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[race]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[class]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blm]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[NearAndDistant]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 Oct 2021 12:07:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-17T16:40:38.379Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The complex history of the British working class and race.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Nd9xq5WtnnsxQVJd4SMImw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@photomasala?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Kristina Gadeikyte</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Against the backdrop of a novel coronavirus, forcing 1.7 billion individuals worldwide into quarantine during the early months of 2020, the world was paused. In that pause, we collectively watched the drawn out and tormented murder of a 46-year-old father of five. With an officer’s knee crushing the nape of his neck we heard his last words:</p><blockquote><em>“They’re gonna kill me, they’re gonna kill me. I cannot breathe. I can’t breathe. Please sir, please sir, please. I can’t breathe.”</em></blockquote><p>Suddenly the acute viral threat we had felt in our communities was now pivoted to the chronic racial threat our black neighbors feel in our communities everyday. As a black man, George Floyd was twice as likely to take his last breath once he encountered the police that day relative to his white counterpart. His murder, far from being an isolated event, was always a potential predestined physical conclusion of deep rooted conceptions, prejudices and structures that black men, women and children are born into; and it’s not just America. In the UK, if you are part of the approximate 3% of the population which is black, you can expect to be disproportionately stopped and searched some 9 times more than if you are white. You are far more likely to have force used against you, and you can also expect to take your last breath in police custody inordinately compared to any other ethnic population in the country¹<em>.</em> Black lives matter, don’t they? It would seem from the evidence, we have concluded: no, not as much. Our common humanity is far from common and still very much reserved over racial lines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sZl8liOOWbk9kReiksc7Vw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Education and Class</strong></p><p>The current zeitgeist in the UK has it that far from the historical trend of the upper-class driving, propagating and profiting from racism and racist institutions, it is now the ‘uneducated’ working class alone that harbours racist prejudice and resentment. It is the ‘uneducated’ part that we cling to. We hold this view and pass over the fact that our current PM Boris Johnson is, in a lot of senses, educated in the highest rated educational facilities England has to offer. That his education seemed, far from ridding him of his racism, to further arm Boris with the language and historical context for it. Mr Johnson is on record stating that Africa’s developmental issue “is not that we were once in charge but that we are not in charge anymore”, that African’s are “flag-waving piccaninnies” and have “Watermelon smiles” all in 2002 alone; but that stigma has never really attached to him; or the class he sits within.</p><figure><img alt="Advertising for Picaninny Freeze (1922)" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*xZUXMYRrbyEM1j-x" /><figcaption><em>Advertising for Picaninny Freeze</em> (<em>1922</em>)</figcaption></figure><p>This educational stigma has stuck to the less educated working class. We assume those at the bottom of our society are where the most racist of individuals and groups are found due to this educational gap². But the evidence for education’s effect on racism and racial prejudice can be summarised by Mr Johnson in the above: that education may change the expression of your racism but not the fact you are racist. Numerous <em>“studies find that highly educated Whites are no more likely than less educated Whites to support specific policies designed to overcome racial inequality”³</em>. For instance, if your education does not give you contact with other races, has racial prejudice contained implicitly within in it or simply ignores other races, then your education could instead give depth to your racial prejudice as opposed to ridding you of it. Curiously higher education could make you feel less threatened by other races if the educational system does not cater to them, and as your attainment inadvertently distances yourself from day-to-day contact with other races in the upper echelons of English society⁴ . The quality of education counts. If education cannot be relied upon to explain racism and racial prejudice what about the economic threat education allows you to rise above?</p><p><em>“If the perception that Britain’s minorities are an economic threat is an important source of hostility towards minority groups then such hostility is likely to be concentrated in the lower social classes, with whom ethnic minorities have in the past competed most directly” (Ford, 2008). </em>This explanation fits the portrayal of the English working class and disadvantaged as the “beleaguered natives” swept aside through incoming immigration and ethnic diversity. The economic hostility propagates the idea that the working class is ‘white’ and <em>“prioritises issues of identity over inequality” </em>as the main characteristic of the disadvantaged class in England⁵.<strong> </strong>Working Class racism, it would seem,stems from the ill-founded anxiety and fear of other races with similar economic and political interests crowding them out or being put before their own interests; this is key to what we will concentrate on in this piece.</p><p>We speak of the working class in England as a wholly white group. We (or indeed some of the sub-groups of the working class) invoke the working class ‘group’ in opposition to other racial ‘groups’ which veer for political and economic attention, neatly summed up in the reactionary ‘All Lives Matter’ counter-protests. These tensions are actively propagated by our continued conception of shared economic interests with one group as ‘opposed’ to another centered around racial identity instead of equality⁶. This group conception (or class consciousness) is real in so much as it’s a relational in it’s definition: my family are <em>defined</em> by my conception of how I relate to them as opposed to others. This is no small point, my relational conception of the world is my internal model, and in turn becomes how I experience world, or put or another way:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“… those systems of meaning, concepts, categories</em></strong><em><br></em><strong><em>and representations which make sense of the world,<br>and through which individuals come to ‘live’ “⁷</em></strong></blockquote><p>Due to this fluidity of group conception influencing an individual behaviour (examples of which are shown in the graphic below), the concept of your group is open to, and is use in, political weaponising. If we allow ourselves to be passive, and not active in relating the truth of the disadvantaged in England, our conception becomes malleable to others hands. We see this today as we continue to watch the working class and their group conception of themselves be stirred up by Nigel Farage, Tommy Robinson and now “All Lives Matter”⁸.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/642/0*IUcov7Zzxq0CO8zV" /></figure><p>It’s now time for the working class to prevent this weaponising themselves and to renew their relation and consciousness of each other. To actively participate in reflecting the truth: that the working class should not, and cannot, define itself as racially homogeneous. In doing so it actually pits itself against itself in an identity row of “us” vs “them”, framing disadvantage through political identity instead of political inequality⁹.</p><p>Today within the two lowest earning quintiles in the UK, you will find 62% of the UK’s black population along with 37% of the white population. A black man can expect to end up poor in the UK at twice the rate of a white man¹⁰. Right now, those most disadvantaged are demanding that their race should not influence their class. Opposing this idea can only conclude in asking to keep that racial disadvantage at the bottom of our society. The UK working class must transparently look at the power distribution in the UK and those in similar economic and political situations and see that political and economic equality across races always favours white people across all classes; this is structural racism.</p><p>But why? Why does talk of disadvantage throw up identity politics and call upon the narrative of the “beleaguered native”? How did political identity get so wrapped up to political inequality for the most disadvantaged in England. To understand why race is so entangled in class in the UK we must look back to the origins of the working class in England and expose that original entanglement and its failings. When we do we see that the idea of race has deep and fundamental ties with the working class in England that still muddy our concept today. The language and balance of forces have changed but the relational conception of “us” vs “them” is deeply rooted and we allow this to be the case as we actively relate to one another.</p><p><strong>Setting the Scene</strong></p><p>The English Working Class was first crystalised as a distinct group in English (and indeed Western) society between the 1780–1830s, around 6–7 generations ago. During this period the turning over of systematic slavery was gaining immense ground within the African enslaved communities within the Caribbean. In the West Thomas Paine’s ‘The Rights of Man’ had stoked passionate discussions surrounding equality, and the political movement calling for the abolition of slavery in English colonies had found it’s way centre stage in English Parliament.</p><p>Curiously in his seminal (and romanticised) work on the origin and crystalisation of the working class E.P. Thompson does not mention slavery, the Haitian revolution, the numerous Caribbean uprisings, or the eventual emancipation of African men and women. There is no excuse for this. it was emancipation of the African slave that the disadvantaged in England were reacting against in forming themselves as a group. The abolition of slavery played a pivotal role in the defining and eventual uprising and reform of the new English Working Class¹¹. In order to explain why and how the working class chose to define itself as the white working class, we must briefly turn to the pseudo-scientific basis that gave legitimacy to the social idea of slavery and the stratification of race.</p><p>Science as a community held a very different place during this period. It followed social norms rather than challenged them and in turn followed rather than lead the social conception of race and slavery¹². There were genuine and scholarly discussions in biological sciences surrounding what became our social concept of ‘race’ between two schools, the Monogeneticists and Polygeneticists. The Polygenesis school put forth that races were to be seen as distinct and separate species. The Monogenesis school held that different races were of one single species and that biological differences were not so distinct. The Monogensis school eventually won out. This was mostly due to the fact that the Polygenesis school could not embed smoothly within the UK due to the preeminence of Christianity within the country. Polygenesis was seen as a direct contradiction of the book of Genesis, that all humanity is descended from Adam and Eve. It was seen as heretical to claim multiple species of man, where would they have came from if not the white Adam and his white Eve…</p><p>Alas there was still a social contradiction for Monogenesis to alleviate: the contradiction of holding that there was a single genetic origin of races but also continuing the social conception of superiority of one race. To solve this contradiction the idea of historical condition was put forward. It was established that there was a chain of lesser to greater types of races within the species of man, of which the white race through his historical civilisation, became the greatest and was fit to rule. The degradation of other races was therefore seen as circumstantial and not genetic as the polygenesis school thought put forward. All was not lost it seemed, we could ‘teach’ civilisation. More Bible anyone…</p><p>Given this backdrop, the question of slavery reform and the abolition movement became a question for the common Englishman of why there was such a focus on ‘them’. They vehemently questioned bringing “common humanity” to black men, women and children indentured as slaves when there were eminent issues and demands for equal political recognition of the white working class at home. Those contesting the abolition of slavery in the early 19 century found that <em>“in their eyes, the money and attention being poured into the abolitionist movement would have been better spent on the equally exploited, but inherently more deserving, white British workers”¹³</em>. Abolition was seen as a direction of attention and financial resources towards a hierarchical lesser race, less deserving than the more immediate issues the “beleaguered natives” in the UK.</p><p>Indeed to summarise this point in the 1824 short story ‘An Appeal to the Fairer Sex’ (Inviting their attention to the present situation of climbing boys)’ John Holland has his fictional young chimney sweep Henry lament:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“They loved the negro ‘oer the wave,<br>they strove to set him free;<br>But though I am a little slave,<br>there’s nobody loves me.”</em></strong></blockquote><p>This reaction to the attention paid to black African slavery instead of the English working class condition and need, as portrayed against the backdrop of Transatlantic African slavery, led to direct comparisons of working conditions to slavery; which it was not. These comparisons can be seen in literature throughout Europe during this time. For example Ernt’s Willcomm’s ‘White Slaves’ portrayed the long hours, low pay and chronic conditions of the industrial workers and pulled on the sentiment and attention given to slavery.</p><p>Even today we still see people still sensationalising and referring to the white child labor of the industrial revolution as chattel slavery, which to repeat, it was not. David Keys in his article ‘Revealed: Industrial Revolution was powered by child slaves’ in The Independent in 2010 laments again the for the <em>white child slave</em> during this time. Whereas the actual paper by Oxford professor Jane Humphries doesn’t once mention white ‘slavery’, as if aware it was not. If we go back to the bible of working class formation with E.P. Thompson’s work, writing in 1963, and along the same vein compares the class system in Britain in the decades after 1975 as “apartheid whose effects — in the niceties of social and educational discrimination — can be felt to this day”. Here again calling on far stronger systems put in place along racial lines and built of the backside of pseudo-scientific and racial hierarchy of the ‘social chain’. This must stop. These comparisons are at best conceptually inaccurate and tone deaf and at worse trying to redirect the emotional weight and atrocities of racism back towards political inequality in the white race in isolation.</p><p>We can now understand that there was a concerted effort to play off and play down the competing issue of slavery abolition and an<em> “explicit depiction of degraded black humanity as a comparator against which white, specifically working-class, intellectual or moral superiority could be claimed.</em>”¹⁴ This pseudo-social narrative of the undue attention to a ‘lesser’ race and the idea of creating ‘common humanity’ before white ‘political equality’ would form a foundational characteristic of the disadvantaged in England. This playing off and weaponsing of race to redirect the attention back onto themselves has been eerily reflected in the reactive ‘All Lives Matter’ and the playing down of ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement today.</p><p>Industrial labour was not white slavery, and while the white working class were horrifically treated their conception of this only caught fire against the tensions of having African slaves be given more equality (or common humanity) before they were given further political equality to other white men. To hit home this point fully in talking about the value of African slave in comparison to Irish laborers we see their complete domination as property as opposed to labor: <em>“the niggers are worth too much to be risked here; if the paddies [Irish] are knocked overboard or get their backs broke, nobody loses anything”</em> quotes Fredric Olmsted from a shipworker in 1855 Alabama. Reflecting the racial-chain of the African, seen in the Western world as the lowest race and the subject of chattel property and certainly not labour or labour rights. When the slave emancipation act was finally passed in 1833, the British government agreed to compensate the slave-owners, to the amount of around £20,000,000, for the loss of their human ‘property’.</p><p><strong>The Political Weaponising of Race</strong></p><p>In politics we see this portrayal more viciously used and weaponised to stir up and galvanise the white disadvantaged. In Leeds you can go to the plaque of “The Factory King” Richard Oastler, a prominent abolitionist and working class reformer, to see his recently refurbished bust and read quotes from his famous working class reform letter in 1830 on ‘Yorkshire Slavery’ which when read in full contains this statement:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“Let truth speak out, appalling as the statement may appear. The fact is true.</em></strong> <strong><em>Thousands of our fellow-creatures and fellow-subjects, both male and female, the miserable inhabitants of a Yorkshire town, are this very moment existing in a state of slavery, more horrid than are the victims of that hellish system ‘colonial slavery’.” … “The very streets which receive the droppings of an ‘Anti-Slavery Society’ are every morning wet by the tears of innocent victims at the accursed shrine of avarice, who are compelled (not by the cart-whip of the negro slave-driver) but by the dread of the equally appalling thong or strap of the over-looker”</em></strong></blockquote><p>It became the norm of politicans and national voices to shore up group belonging and cement the relational conception of the new disadvantaged white group. The working class from their very conception defined themselves negatively against slaves who were seen to be given undue attention as a lesser and more distant race13. This homogeneity would lead to a skewed identity not based off disadvantage but as a distinct racial group with common objectives. Thus race became entangled in the English conception of their disadvantage as ‘natives’. The popular Cobbett’s Political Register in 1816, a periodical journal for political purposes for the unreformed parliament, allowed their platform for Major John Cartwright the “father of reform” himself, to state that</p><blockquote><strong><em>“On the Negro Slave Trade nothing short of complete abolition will content them. But a complete abolition of the English Slave Trade seems so little to their taste[.] That [in] touching [upon] that object, they prefer confining all their exertions within those guilty walls, where they with a certainty know that, unbacked by the nations voice, they must fail.”¹⁵</em></strong>.</blockquote><p>Cobbett himself very explicitly used the pseudo-scientific basis for his weaponising of race, describing African slaves as<em> “animalistic, and suggested that their suffering was therefore less acute than that experienced by the more intellectually and morally sensitive white English working class.”¹⁶</em>. Cobbett was again met with applause when, during a public lecture in 1830, he expressed his ‘indignation’ at hearing MPs <strong><em>“whine over the sorrows of the fat and greasy negro in Jamaica . . . while our own countrymen are found in such a condition under their very eyes”¹⁷</em></strong> And therefore “in the years between 1780 and 1832 most English working people came to feel an identity of interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs.”¹⁸</p><p>History becomes and informs the present. And just as is propagated today, 6–7 generations ago while the disadvantaged in England grouped themselves for the first time we find that those leading and actively participating in this group conception, horrifically using race to galvanise the disadvantaged. They <em>“Expounded an ever-narrower nationalism, they questioned the very humanity of enslaved and free Africans in the same pages that their plans for a politically and socially reformed Britain took shape. The idea of an apparently fundamentally different and inferior racial antitype made the mere social distinctions used to disenfranchise and exploit English workers seem far less significant by comparison. In this way, the English working class came to understand itself as the white working class, almost from its very inception.”¹⁹</em></p><p><strong>Yesterday Becomes Today</strong></p><p>Modern day sociological theory supports the need for re-conceptualisation. Your concept of your group informs and influences your behaviour just as your behaviour propagates and influences the concept of the group. This propagation will continue unless challenged by either the individuals themselves or external forces.<em> </em>In sociology this is explained in Group Theory<em> as “emphasis[ing] the importance of group interests in shaping intergroup conflict and co-operation. From this perspective, racial hostility is conceptualised not as an individual vice, but as a collective phenomenon that is affected by the structure of intergroup relations.”²⁰</em></p><p>Hopefully we have shown that the racial characteristic of disadvantage and ‘class’ in England has been there since it’s inception and still hounds the narrative and relations to this day. It doesn’t have to be like that. The question then becomes how do we move forward? According to Group Theory there are two ways this conceptual and relational correction can happen, either through top-down leadership or bottom-up active participation. Given our current Prime Minister has such contempt for the black community as to play off racial stereotypes for gags I do not see this being through leadership at this point, nor should we particularly need this to be the case, structural issues aside. That being said, in the void of positive leadership, we should not let the modern day Cobbett’s and Cartwright’s continually mobilise the working class over racial lines and tap into the “beleaguered native” cited above in characters such as Farage, and leadership groups such as UKIP, and the Vote Leave campaign Mr Johnson spearheaded.</p><p>Active and passive participation in the formation of groups is constantly happening in the day-to-day interactions we have, and the narrative we tell ourselves / allow others to tell us, as a nation. So it should be noted again, within the two lowest earning quintiles in the UK, you will find 62% of the UKs black population along with 37% of the white population. A black man can expect to end up poor in the UK at twice the rate of a white man. This needs actively correcting and supported to bring a common humanity across racial lines to the most disadvantaged in this country before any further propagation of the advantages afforded to the white working class. Actively correct yourself, your friends and challenge the portrayal of the most disadvantaged in this country being white, that is only part of the picture, and certainly not the piece to focus on; if there is suffering and hardship, help deal with the suffering and hardship, do not shore yourself up so that it doesn’t happen to you.</p><p>Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice calls out for this active supporting as shifting the concept: “<em>contact must occur under specific conditions for it to have positive effects: equal status between the in-group member and out-group member within the situation; the pursuit of common goals; intergroup co-operation; and the normative support of authorities, law or custom.</em>”²¹</p><p>Outside of active participation in the formation of the group, there is the passive formation of just being around those of different races allowing individuals to relate and shift their concept of who is in their group: <em>“Consistent with the contact hypothesis, the size of a ward’s black population is negatively related to each of the five measures of racial hostility. That is, whites who live in neighborhoods with relatively large black populations are less likely to express negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities than whites who live in areas with few blacks.”²²</em></p><p>We can see this statistically play out in Figure 1 which displays how the likelihood of a typical respondent giving a racially hostile response varies according to the size of the ward’s black population.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/935/0*ioYm3BiTUM07HU9j" /></figure><p>Whites who live in areas with few non-whites are more likely to say that black and Asian immigration has been bad for Britain, that immigrants take jobs from the British-born and that immigrants do not make Britain more open to new ideas and cultures than are whites who live in more racially diverse neighborhoods²³. In this way we should correct our threat, racial diversity allows you to be less racist, assimilate a wider group, and correct century old conceptions of ‘the other’. Embrace diversity, you have far more in common with those racially diverse but in the same economic condition as you than those in a different class.</p><p>The conception and structure needs to change, disadvantage should not follow racial lines, anyone who disagrees and has managed it this far: I applaud your delusion. The concept of class being racial is centuries old and incorrect; it was then and it is now. The disadvantaged must relate to each other from across racial lines, not within, and re-conceive their political sway as a single racially diverse group. The fact right now BLM is demanding the correction of chronic disadvantage in their particular racial group as a whole should be supported by all those disadvantaged in England. They form part of the most disadvantaged group and should not been seen as separately dealing with their own issues. They are your issues, just worse, for no other reason than their melanin levels. BLM is not asking for an advantage along racial lines, but equality along racial lines so that the subjugation and double-disadvantage is corrected. Widen your conception of who suffers with you, correct your privilege and widen your group when possible. Break the century old racial chain.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p><strong>1.</strong>How many black people die in police custody in England and Wales?, 3, June 2020<br><strong>2.</strong> It’s not the ‘White Working Class’, Faiza Shaheen, 7 March 2019<br><strong>3</strong>. The Impact of Education on Inter-Group Attitudes: A Multiracial Analysis, Geoffrey T. Wodtke, 2014<br><strong>4. </strong>Is racial prejudice declining in Britain?, Rob Ford, 2008<br><strong>5.</strong> Finding Common Ground Against Disadvantage: Challenging the Ethnicisation of Class, Rogaly and Taylor, 2013<br><strong>6.</strong> The Making of the Working Class, E.P. Thompson, 1963, page 27)<br><strong>7. </strong>Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance’, Hall, 1980, page 334)<br><strong>8.</strong> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/racism-on-the-rise-since-brexit-vote-nationwide-study-reveals">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/racism-on-the-rise-since-brexit-vote-nationwide-study-reveals</a><br><strong>9.</strong> <em>Finding Common Ground Against Disadvantage: Challenging the Ethnicisation of Class, Rogaly and Taylor, 2013</em><br><strong>10.</strong> <a href="https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/work-pay-and-benefits/pay-and-income/income-distribution/latest">https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/work-pay-and-benefits/pay-and-income/income-distribution/latest</a><br><strong>11.</strong> The Mysterious Intersections of Race and Class, Gargi Bhattacharyya, Runnymede, 2017<br><strong>12.</strong> <em>Race in Science, Nancy Stepan,</em> <em>4–5</em><br><strong>13.</strong> <em>Slavery and the Birth of Working Class Racism in the UK, 1814–1833, Ryan Hanley 2017</em><br><strong>14.</strong> <em>ibid</em><br><strong>15.</strong> <em>Major Cartwright, Cobbett’s Political Register, 15 June 1816, 757: </em><a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=-0haAAAAYAAJ&amp;pg"><em>https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=-0haAAAAYAAJ&amp;pg</em></a><br><strong>16.</strong> <em>Slavery and the Birth of Working Class Racism in the UK, 1814–1833, Ryan Hanley, 2017</em>, <em>Page 11</em><br><strong>17.</strong> ibid<br><strong>18.</strong> The Making of the Working Class, E.P. Thompson, 1963, page 11)<br><strong>19. William Cobbett, A Third Lecture on the French Revolution, 11, 1830</strong><br><strong>20.</strong> <em>The Contextual Determinants of Whites’ Racial Attitudes in England, Bowyer, 2001</em><br><strong>21.</strong> <em>Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice</em>, 1979<br><strong>22. </strong><em>The Contextual Determinants of Whites’ Racial Attitudes in England, Bowyer, 2001</em><br><strong>23.</strong> ibid</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=31a527e427c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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