<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Neil McCulloch on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Neil McCulloch on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:35:24 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to do a Remain Alliance with Labour without supporting Jeremy Corbyn]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/how-to-do-a-remain-alliance-with-labour-without-supporting-jeremy-corbyn-a3b9aa480834?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3b9aa480834</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2019 07:36:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-12T07:36:04.207Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We all know that whether Boris Johnson wins this election or not will be determined by the results in Labour-Tory marginals in the North of England (we might not like it, but it is true). The Brexit party are now standing down in the Tory held areas, making it even harder for Labour to become the largest party. In many of those areas, the Lib Dems get a significant vote, but far off any chance of winning. Exactly the same is true in many Lib Dem-Tory marginals in the South and South West where Labour votes dissipate the remain vote, making it harder for the Lib Dems to win. If Labour had a leader that wasn’t political Marmite, the Lib Dems could simply do a deal to stand down in Northern seats in return for Labour standing down in the Lib Dem ones; the result would be a Lib-Lab government and the end of Brexit. But Jeremy Corbyn is toxic — particularly to remain Tories that the Lib Dems need in the South and so they cannot support him. Instead what Labour and Lib Dems should do is this:</p><ol><li>The two parties should agree a set of Lab-Tory marginals in the North where Labour would like the Lib Dems to stand aside; and an equal number of Lib Dem-Tory marginals where the Lib Dems want Labour to stand aside</li><li>Each party contacts its constituencies to see whether they are willing to ask voters to ‘teleport’ their votes to a paired constituency where the candidate that has a chance of winning.</li><li>Where the pairings are agreed, the Lib Dem constituency chairs in Lab-Tory marginals (NOT the party) announce that they are doing something radical and withdrawing their candidate and asking their voters to vote for the Labour candidate — but (and here is the key) — they should not regard this as a vote for the Labour, but rather as a vote for the Lib Dem candidate in the Lib-Dem-Tory marginal in the South that they are paired with. i.e. ‘teleport your vote, by voting Labour’.</li><li>At exactly the same time, the Labour constituency chairs in LibDem-Tory marginals announce that they are withdrawing their candidate and asking Labour voters to vote for the Lib Dem candidate — not as a vote for the Lib Dems, but as a vote for the Labour candidate in the North. They too are teleporting their votes.</li></ol><p>If Labour and the Lib Dems did 20 or so of these pairings, it would make a massive difference to the election outcome — and neither party has to say that it supports the other.</p><p>Over the last 3.5 years we have all wanted at various points to ‘teleport’ ourselves out of Brexit — here is our chance.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3b9aa480834" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why either the EU or Jeremy Corbyn may end up saving Mrs May and Brexit]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/why-either-the-eu-or-jeremy-corbyn-may-end-up-saving-mrs-may-and-brexit-3c9102b54287?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c9102b54287</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[jeremy-corbyn]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[customs-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[irish-border]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chequer]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Jul 2018 16:08:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-28T16:08:01.606Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mrs May, it seems, has finally chosen a side. Having faced down her Brexiters she has gone for a soft Brexit with her Chequers plan. Unfortunately for her, this plan appears to please almost nobody — not the EU who have already rejected her proposed customs arrangement, not the Brexiters who complain of BINO (Brexit in Name Only) and certainly not the Conservative Party members who find it an embarrassing emasculation of their dreams. Yet there is a calculating method in her madness — and, although she would never say so, she is relying on either EU or Mr. Corbyn to save her Brexit plans. Here is why.</p><p>Mrs. May’s interest is to get a Brexit deal through parliament and agreed with the EU. Failure to get a deal would be the end of her, but she is not an ideologue — any deal will do. Whatever deal she finally proposes to parliament, Labour will want to vote against it — after all, this is their chance to bring the government down. Therefore, to win, Mrs May needs both the DUP and most of the Brexiters. The former require a deal that does not draw a border down the Irish Sea (they care less about whether some kind of a border is re-introduced with Ireland). The latter, are also unionists and also don’t care about creating a border in Ireland (particularly if they can blame it on the EU). Hence the real issue is not getting the support of both groups — the real ‘problem’ is that the EU will not agree to the sort of deal that would bring both groups on board. The EU are pushing for an Irish backstop — a legally binding agreement for Northern Ireland to remain, effectively, in the single market and customs union. Agreeing to that would lose both the Brexiteers (because it is soft) and the DUP (because it would require an Irish Sea border).</p><p>But, as I pointed out some time ago <a href="http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2017/12/12/the-irish-border-and-the-revenge-of-game-theory">here</a>, this is an odd position for the EU to take because it doesn’t serve the interests of 26 of the 27 states. Although all the 27 would prefer a softer to a harder Brexit, they would prefer an orderly transition to a harder Brexit over a chaotic No Deal. Only Ireland, because its desire to maintain the Good Friday Agreement and its economically integrated Ireland is against this. The British government, of course, claims to wish this too — but relatively few of its members really care about Ireland and the Brexiters are already floating the idea that the Good Friday Agreement is no longer ‘helpful’. Hence, the deal that would win May a vote in parliament is not a soft Brexit, but a harder Brexit that would place a border in Ireland. It is the EU, by backing Ireland’s position, that makes this outcome difficult.</p><p>Interestingly, Mrs May clearly believes that the EU’s support for Ireland will last. As a result, with the Chequers deal, she has clearly signalled her preference for a soft Brexit. But she continues with the mantra that we will be leaving the Customs Union and the Single Market. For the latter, the EU will, reluctantly, agree that we can nominally leave the Single Market, as long as, in practice, our rules are exactly the same as those of the EU (and we lose access as soon as we change them to be otherwise) — this is the Vassal State option. On Customs, the EU has already rejected the ludicrous notion that we should collect EU tariffs and remit them if the goods were bound for the EU. Even if this could have worked in theory, the recently passed amendment saying that we will only do this if the EU countries do the same, makes this a non-starter — Poland are not about to start collecting UK tariffs for us and nor is anybody else.</p><p>All of which leaves Mrs May with a terrible dilemma. If she wants to be out of the Customs Union, able to sign deals with the rest of the world, as has been the mantra forever, then there must either be a border in the Irish sea, or a border in Ireland. The DUP won’t accept the former; and the EU won’t accept the latter. But there is another option — an option that would allow her to win a parliamentary vote and stay as PM — it is to call Labour’s bluff. The only substantial difference between the government’s position on Brexit and that of Labour is on the customs union. It was Keir Starmer’s stroke of genius to persuade Corbyn to support membership of the Customs Union. It solves the Irish border problem, keeps the free flow of goods and the EU will accept it. If, after trying and failing with her Chequers deal, Mrs May were to finally face down the Brexiters by agreeing to remain in the Customs Union (or some face saving equivalent e.g. a Customs Partnership where we set our tariffs to be identical to the EUs — a bit like the ‘common rulebook’), it would be very hard for the Labour to vote against it. She could challenge Labour to dare to block Brexit. Labour would then be in a very difficult position. If they opposed, and the vote was lost, she could blame them for having scuppered Brexit. This might bolster her chances of winning an election (but Labour might welcome an election). Or she could simply wait, while the chaos of No Deal unfolded and then bring back her proposed plan and dare them to reject it again. Holding a gun to Labour’s head might get her the soft Brexit she wants — and having secured it would bolster her own electoral chances. Of course, abandoning her position on the Customs Union will immediately result in a vote of no confidence from the Brexiter side and howls of protest in the party. But most of the parliamentary party want a soft Brexit — she should win a no confidence vote because most Tory politicians know that her replacement with a Brexiter would result in a damaging hard Brexit, or no deal at all. Neither will serve their own electoral prospects well — a soft Brexit would serve their interests much better.</p><p>The bottom line is that, if a deal cannot be achieved without an Irish backstop, then getting a deal requires either Northern Ireland or all of the UK to remain in some kind of customs partnership. The former loses the DUP, the latter the ERG, but losing either means losing the vote in parliament. She currently appears to be banking on the EU 26 persuading Ireland to accept some kind of border in Ireland — this would allow her to pursue (formal) exit from the Customs Union and the Single Market (with suitable fudges for Northern Ireland) and keep both the DUP and the ERG on board. But if the EU stay true to Ireland, she will be forced to suddenly switch and blackmail Jeremy Corbyn to save herself and Brexit.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c9102b54287" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[I agree with Nigel Farage]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/i-agree-with-nigel-farage-16d9a59a415d?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/16d9a59a415d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Feb 2018 12:51:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-17T12:51:27.070Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For the first (and hopefully the last) time in my life I agree with something that Nigel Farage said — we need a second referendum on Brexit. Of course, he wants one for a rather different reason from me. He sees that the Leave camp are now losing all the arguments on the damage that Brexit will cause and that, as a result, some elements of the government are gravitating towards the softest feasible Brexit. True to his ‘Brexit at all cost’ mantra, he wants a second referendum to force the government into the hard Brexit that he believes the British people voted for in 2016.</p><p>Yet, in a way, he is right. I am quite sure that Leave voters didn’t believe that they were voting for the high costs, additional bureaucracy and slower growth that a hard Brexit would deliver — they were told that these were a myth — a scare story — and are now beginning to realise that they are all too real. At the same time, I don’t believe for a moment that Leave voters voted to Brexit In Name Only — BRINO — the latest acronym to torment the debate.</p><p>The government’s approach to this dilemma represents the worst of all possible worlds. To appease the hard Brexiters, May has agreed that we will be out of the single market and out of the customs union. Fair enough — this would give us freedom to strike our own trade deals, and change regulations in whatever way we liked without restraint from Brussels. But this means significant additional costs associated with customs clearance and checks that goods and services we sell to the EU comply with their regulations, since they will no longer automatically do so. This is simple logic. If we are out, we are out and so obviously must comply with the controls and checks that the EU apply to all ‘third countries’ (just as they will have to comply with ours). Pretty much everyone, bar the most rabid Brexiteers, accept that this will be damaging to our economy, at least in the short-term — but it is at least a clear and coherent position: out means out with all the freedoms and costs that got with.</p><p>Sadly, however, to appease the majority of remainers in the Conservative party, the government argues that, while outside the customs union and the single market, we will nonetheless negotiate a special arrangement which allows ‘frictionless trade’. Eh? We already have frictionless trade. We got rid of the friction of customs controls by being in the customs union. We got rid of the friction of regulatory checks, by being in the single market. It is simply logically impossible to argue that we will leave the arrangements that were specifically created to give us frictionless trade — arrangements which were created by the UK, in partnership with the other EU countries — and then to say that we will have frictionless trade. It is not a matter of opinion, it is a matter of logic. The government’s position is that 2+2= 4 but that miraculously it is also simultaneously equal to 5. Such doublethink can only lead to grief.</p><p>And consider the confusion of Michel Barnier when confronted with a negotiator that does not know what he wants. If we say that we want to be out of the customs union and single market, the EU will say ‘fine’ and we can discuss with the EU how to make the checks and bureaucracy as simple as possible — but checks there will be; or if we say we want to stay in the customs unions and single market, the EU will say ‘fine’, but then we will have to follow the rules, including the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. But we are saying we want to be out, with all the benefits of being in, and without following any of the rules. Does anyone seriously believe that the EU would agree to this? How can Michel Barnier even respond to such a demand other than as he has, with a shrug and a request for us to make up our minds.</p><p>How do we get out of this mess? The answer is simple. Let the negotiators plough on, attempting to square the circle. Given the UK’s insistence on leaving the customs union and the single market there are only two possible outcomes. Either we will accept that there must be some checks and will come to a deal that tries to minimise them — a mediocre deal that damages the economy, but a deal nonetheless. Or we will fail as the EU becomes increasingly exasperated with the illogicality of our position and we will crash out with no deal. Either way, let’s set a deadline — how about the 23 June? Then armed with either a deal or no deal, let’s go back to the people with a simple question “Is this what you want, or would you prefer to stay in the EU?” Let’s do what Nigel Farage suggests and settle this for a generation. When we know what leaving really means, we will have a real choice — not between the sunny uplands of Brexiter’s imagination, but between a real deal and the status quo because, for now, we are still in the EU. If the Leave side win again, the Remainers must shut up for a generation and we must all strive to make it work. But if the British public decide, on reflection, that leaving is really not worth all the grief, the Brexiters must accept the result because it will be the informed will of the British people.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=16d9a59a415d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Globalisation is Good]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/globalisation-is-good-f85830dba70d?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f85830dba70d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[globalization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[globalisation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Jan 2017 12:55:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-08T12:55:49.420Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’m getting really fed up with hearing again and again in every conversation about the impact of Trump’s election or the implications of Brexit, how “globalisation” is really to blame. Apparently, it is globalisation that is to blame for the lower-middle classes in the US and the UK having not seen an increase in their standard of living for the last 20 years or so. The backlash against globalisation has led to support for the protectionist and outright xenophobic policies espoused by Trump and UKIP and other alt-right parties throughout Europe. So goes the narrative — but it is rubbish.</p><p>Has there been a stagnation in the living standards of less well educated people in Western countries over the last 20 years? The answer is yes. For the most part they haven’t got worse off (contrary to repeated assertions) — but they haven’t gone forward either and they feel like they have gone backwards because the wealthy have increased their wealth spectacularly (see the figure for the US below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/403/1*vxZSBM5zq4tM2W3CJg4pEA.png" /></figure><p>The problem is that this losing out has been attributed to globalisation which is not the real culprit. Think about what globalisation has actually consisted of in the last few decades.</p><p>First there is trade. Trade barriers have fallen across the world. As a result, trade increased far faster than economic growth for decades (until the 2008 crash). Yet the result of this has been wonderful. Not only can we benefit from an immense variety of goods and services from all over the world now; but we can also sell the extraordinary wealth of products and ideas that we make pretty much everywhere. The “gains from trade” have been substantial — and not just for the bosses. Workers in developing countries have gained as they have geared up their export industries to serve global markets, pulling themselves out of poverty in the process. As the same time — and contrary to the unrelenting narrative peddled by the media — workers in rich countries have benefited from new products and services to consume and new markets for their own products. The expansion of trade in the last 50 years has been an extraordinarily good thing for the world, including for working people in rich countries.</p><p>But wait, I hear you say — what about all those jobs that have been outsourced? That has hurt the working class for the benefit of workers in Mexico, Vietnam and China surely? And surely the globalisation of capital has meant that firms have taken their money out of rich countries and put it in poor countries to exploit their low wages? This view is so pervasive that it seems heresy — even nonsensical — to question it — but it simply isn’t right. As <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w12372">Harrison and McMillan’s 2007 paper </a>shows, yes some firms have outsourced and where the workers were doing the same kind of work, this has reduced employment at home; but firms have also made investments in complementary tasks abroad which have increased employment at home — the net effect — very little indeed (indeed in Liu and Treffler’s famous “<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w14061">Much Ado about Nothing” paper</a>, the net effect is positive for the US).</p><p>So if globalisation of trade and capital is so wonderful, why have the working class in rich countries done so badly? There are three real culprits — technology, the unfree movement of labour, and the deregulation of finance (and related, the lack of an international mechanism for resolving macroeconomic imbalances)</p><p>Take the one everyone agrees on first — the deregulation of finance. Everyone now accepts that the steady process of deregulating finance during the 1980s and the 1990s was a contributor towards the 2008 crash. By allowing investment banks to speculate with the deposits of ordinary households, finance went into overdrive — accentuating the boom and, when it inevitably came, deepening the crash. There is a reason why we tightly regulated finance after the second world war — Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s wonderful 2011 <a href="http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/">book</a> of the last 800 years of financial crashes — entitled “This Time is Different” — makes this point beautifully. (Unfortunately, we have, as always, failed to learn our lesson. Immediately after the crash, a huge swath of new tighter regulation was put into place to restrict what banks can do. But, this regulation is already chaffing the collars of the bankers and is already being gradually, quietly unwound (see the FT <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/41c88e94-7043-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926">here</a>)</p><p>Deregulated finance hurt the working class in two ways. First, it was the people at the bottom end who were encouraged to borrow beyond their means and who then had their assets repossessed when the crash came; the rich were able to keep paying. But more important in the long-run, financial crashes destroy the public finances. The reason the poor have felt pain for a decade, particularly in the UK, is that the crash wiped out government revenues which increased the deficit enormously (far more than the bailouts). Combine this with traditional conservative governments who believe in balancing the books and this results in austerity. The relentless assault, particularly in the UK, on public expenditure, especially on welfare, is one of the reasons that the poor have fared so badly over the last decade.</p><p>However, the deregulation of finance was only a contributory factor in causing the crisis. The underlying cause was that the world still does not have any reasonable way of dealing with macroeconomic imbalances. Bankers are always reckless with lending when interest rates are low for an extended period, no matter what the regulations — but the cause of low interest rates was the huge surpluses generated by China (and Germany) and the corresponding current account deficits of the United States. The immense flows of capital into US Treasury bonds to finance these deficits helped to keep interest rates low and encourage excess. Normally such an imbalance would be resolved by a sliding currency, but as the US holds the world’s reserve currency, it could accommodate the imbalance by merely sucking in more and more capital from abroad. What the world needs — as <a href="http://www.econ.jku.at/members%5CLandesmann%5Cfiles%5CWS08%5C239339%5CDiplomarbeit_Klaffenboeck_zentrale_kapitel.pdf">Keynes proposed in Bretton Woods</a> — is a way of forcing both surplus and deficit nations to adjust (e.g. China appreciating its currency, and the US letting the dollar slide). But Keynes failed to get the world to implement his approach to encouraging adjustment — primarily because the US, then a major surplus country, saw no need to adjust. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese were similarly reluctant when asked to share the burden of macroeconomic adjustment in the 2000s resulting in the usual outcome — adjustment by crisis.</p><p>Now the more controversial point. If there is a single culprit for the plight of the working class in the West, it is not globalisation, it is technology (see Acemoglu’s nice analysis <a href="http://www.nber.org/reporter/winter03/technologyandinequality.html">here</a>). Technological development has increased at an extraordinary pace due to the development of the internet and the expansion of computing into every area of life. This has been a truly wonderful thing. The ability to call another person anywhere in the planet for free on your laptop is (to me at least) mind boggling; the huge increases in productivity resulting from improvements in technology have made all of our lives immeasurably richer. But they have also placed a high premium on intellectual skill in the labour force. People without those skills get left out — those with such skills saw their wages increase. It is technology that is primarily responsible for the fate of the working class — not so much by “taking their jobs”, but simply by making their skill set redundant. But this is a very unpopular explanation, because we all like to love technology. After all, technological advances have brought us wonderful things — being against technology feels (and is) Luddite. It’s much more appealing to blame foreigners and bankers than something we actually like.</p><p>And most unpopular of all, there is the solution that didn’t happen — the free movement of labour. As the UK clamours to “take back control” there appears to be no recognition at all that one of the reasons for the stagnation of working class wages is the <em>immobility</em> of labour. Adam Smith’s vision of liberal trade was not just freedom for goods, services and capital — it entailed free movement of labour too. Why? Because without free movement of labour, it is harder for workers to capture the benefits of globalisation.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> When workers can move — within countries and between countries — they gain in two ways. The workers that move gain — often substantially — as they shift to places which can use their skills and experience more productively; where you work is still the most important determinant of how productive you will be — even more important than education. But it also helps those left behind. This is not just through remittances to those left behind, but because it shrinks the labour supply in the place from which they come, which makes labour scarcer pushing up wages. Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson’s wonderful <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/globalization-and-history">Globalisation and History</a> shows how the mass migration of Europeans to the New World in the 19th and early 20th century, dramatically boosted wages in “old Europe” for those left behind.</p><p>In short — we have got the narrative on globalisation almost exactly wrong. Globalisation was and is good. It boosted employment, growth and investment and brought people in rich and poor countries goods and services which they could only have dreamed of in previous generations. It is one of the most important forces for boosting human welfare that the world has ever seen. By demonising globalisation and wrongly blaming it for the ills that we are rightly concerned about, we run the risk of pursuing policies which will be truly disastrous. Closing borders or erecting protectionist barriers will shrink trade and investment and depress wages — not the reverse. The effect will be particularly bad for the lower skilled working population — the first to be laid off in a high-skill world. Allowing the financial system to deregulate again, without even seeking, never mind finding, a solution to the major macroeconomic imbalances that still plague the world, will eventually and inevitably lead to another crash and more austerity for exactly the same group. Failing to invest in education and life-long re-skilling of the working population will increasingly marginalise the less well educated as technology continues to advance. Responding by closing the border to the free movement of people may protect low skill jobs from foreign workers — but it will shrink the economy by more, destroying more jobs than it protects.</p><p>In short, we need to stop blaming globalisation for all our ills and recognise the real causes for our problems. Being open and liberal has made us better off — being closed and illiberal will surely do the reverse.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> My fellow economists always jump on this statement and point out that economic theory says that factor prices can be equalised without labour mobility. Such people have spent too much time in theory and not enough in empirics — it simply isn’t true.</p><p>ba/Ic�OP��</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f85830dba70d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to actually get the best Brexit deal for Britain — threaten to stay!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/how-to-actually-get-the-best-brexit-deal-for-britain-threaten-to-stay-4ac14a361f52?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ac14a361f52</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[article-50]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[high-court]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Nov 2016 10:38:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-11T10:38:03.849Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As a Lib Dem internationalist, I, like so many people, am upset by the Brexit vote and cliff over which Mrs. May appears determined to drive us. But I’m also a little tired now of the endless outpouring of grief about the issue. Rather I think it is time that we put together an alternative vision for how we might get Britain the best possible deal from Brexit. Mrs. May is determined to push through triggering Article 50 without the consent of Parliament (we will see if the Supreme Court lets her) and then to negotiate and agree a deal without any significant say for the British people or their representatives. She is doing so because she knows that there is no possibility of getting a deal with the EU that is anything like as good as the deal that we currently have — Europe will make us pay — at the very best we may end up with something which is not quite as bad as just being any old random country, but not by much.</p><p>But there is a way of getting a dramatically better deal from Europe — threaten to stay. The High Court decision said that the government required to the consent of Parliament to trigger Article 50 because it viewed Article 50 as irrevocable and that triggering it would then inevitably lead to a change in UK law which must be approved by Parliament. The government will lose its appeal to the Supreme Court if it simply takes the same line as it did with the High Court because the logic of the High Court’s decision is irrefutable. However, their decision rests on an important assumption — that triggering Article 50 is irrevocable. Nothing in Article 50 says that this is so. If it is possible for a country to trigger Article 50 and start the process — and then subsequently change its mind and “untrigger” it, then Article 50 does not inevitably lead to a change in UK law and so the government would be entitled to trigger it without Parliamentary consent.</p><p>We need to know the answer to whether triggering Article 50 is irrevocable or not, because it has a major influence on the quality of the deal that we get. Consider our negotiating position once Article 50 has been triggered. If it is irrevocable, then our negotiating partners in the rest of the EU know that, if they simply twiddle their thumbs for two years, we will drop out of the EU with the worst possible outcome. Hence the base position for our negotiation is a terrible one. They may give us some small concessions, in part because it is in their interests to do so, but we are unlikely to get much because the base position is so bad. Now consider the situation if Article 50 can be “un triggered”. By triggering it, the rest of the EU have to negotiate with us; but they know that if they don’t give us the deal we want, there is a strong possibility that the UK can say “sorry — not good enough” and stay! In staying, we would continue to have veto powers over many things that the rest of the EU do want. Hence the threat of remaining is much more likely to get us a good deal than the threat of certain departure.</p><p>All of this relies on knowing whether Article 50 is irrevocable or not — so let’s find out. Let’s take a case to the European Court and get a clear decision. If it can’t be undone, then we will know that triggering Article 50 in itself is an act of national self-harm, and, as now, we will be torn between a clear democratic mandate to trigger it and the knowledge that doing so is not in the nation’s best interests. But if it can be undone, we will be in an immeasurable stronger position because it will not only help the government negotiate a better deal — but also provides the opportunity for the British people to have a say on the deal that the government finally obtains. Come on Gina Miller — there is another battle to be fought!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ac14a361f52" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What does Trump mean for development?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/what-does-trump-mean-for-development-8598a835a12c?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8598a835a12c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Nov 2016 21:42:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-10T21:42:08.112Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Like many people, I have spent the day reeling from the shock of Trump’s election win. Not only was it not expected — for unashamedly liberal internationalists like myself it was unthinkable. Yet the unthinkable now needs to be thought about. Leaving aside all the many other potential ramifications of Trump’s victory, I have tried to sketch out below what his Presidency might mean for development.</p><p><strong>Trade</strong>. Trump made much of his intention to tear up trade deals which he regards as bad for America. This includes not only TPP and TTIP, but also potentially the unravelling of NAFTA. Whilst the WTO was already in the chiller due to lack of support from the world’s leading economies for multilateral solutions, a Trump presidency might make it entirely redundant, at least for deals that involve the USA. Such moves would be bad for America and its immediate neighbours and would certainly make unblocking the Doha round of trade negotiations near impossible — but it is not clear that this approach will necessarily be bad for developing countries. Trump’s appears to want to strike deals with individual countries. This suggests that strategically important countries that are friendly to America might be able to strike bespoke deals with a Trump government that provide better access to the American market (in return for preference for American goods and services). However, whether the administration will have the resources or the energy to pursue such deals is very much in doubt; top priority will be securing new trading arrangements with the top trading blocks. This will inevitably mean striking a deal with China and renegotiating some kind of arrangement with the EU. Other countries are likely to take a back seat — probably for a while.</p><p><strong>Aid</strong>. To my knowledge, Donald Trump has said almost nothing about Aid and so it is very difficult to know what his views are on Aid. On the one hand, he might view Aid as a useful weapon in the armoury of international deal making; on the other, he might see it as a waste of money that should be spent on hard working Americans. Officials will be keen to persuade him that Aid is an important component of soft power. My guess, however, is that Aid will shrink considerably and focus much more on promoting transactions involving American firms (as, for example, Power Africa already does). Given his attitude toward international organisations, it seems unlikely that a President Trump will worry too much about the niceities of OECD rules on ODA. Moreover the substance of Aid may change in important ways: boosting (American) investment and trade will become even more important; supporting effective public health systems in poor countries probably much less so. And Mike Pence is likely to insist upon a deeply conservative approach — banning programmes that in any way support abortion or family planning or which accommodate liberal social values.</p><p><strong>Immigration.</strong> Trump’s signature policy has been to clamp down on immigration (and to deport the millions of people in America without legal status). Whether he does this or not, it is likely that the flow of migrants to America will slow sharply, as stricter controls are put in place. Remittances from the US may decline, particularly if he fulfils his threat to remove large numbers of illegal migrants. The pain and conflict associated with implementing the policies that he has stated mean that, almost inevitably, he will deliver less than he promised — but the policy environment for immigration will nonetheless change markedly and the large developmental benefits that it brings may be lost.</p><p><strong>Defence and conflict</strong>. Trump’s policies on foreign affairs have spoken simultaneously of making America strong again — suggesting a significant increase in military spending; and a desire to disengage from foreign wars. The former is almost inevitable. However, disengaging from America’s current external entanglements may be more difficult. If he follows through on this we may expect a resurgence of ISIS in Iraq — but this will also create political problems at home and so the jury is out on whether a Trump presidency would do more or less in Iraq. Elsewhere, predictions range from the view that the world will be safer as a result of deals between strongmen in US, China and Russia — or dramatically more fragile if those relationships sour.</p><p><strong>Climate change</strong>. Action on climate change may be one of the biggest losers from a Trump Presidency. However, the efforts of international diplomats to ensure that the Paris Agreement came into force this week may make it difficult for the US to disengage immediately from the treaty. Notwithstanding this, it is clear that climate policy will take a dramatic shift towards fossil fuel companies and away from considerations of sustainability. A key concern will be whether, if the US withdraws from the Agreeement, others will do so too — but this is probably less likely given the level of international commitment to the issue.</p><p><strong>Macroeconomics</strong>. Trump has promised to build world class infrastructure throughout the US (not to mention a rather large wall). He has also promised to significantly cut taxes. Together these point to significantly looser fiscal policy and widening budget deficits. This may drive up inflation and subsequently interest rates, drawing portfolio funds away from the rest of the world towards the US. This may lead to an appreciation of the currency in the medium term, damaging growth and widening trade deficits. It will be interesting to see whether the initial boom caused by expanded spending is followed by crisis or a sudden tightening and tax rises in a few years time. Whilst the initial boost may benefit developing countries in the short run, worsening macroeconomic imbalances in the world’s largest economy are not likely to help the development of other countries whether rich or poor.</p><p>But only time will tell if these predictions are borne out in the reality of this highly unpredictable President.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8598a835a12c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Trump’s win proves that emotions beat values]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/trumps-win-proves-that-emotions-beat-values-2f8df7004af8?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2f8df7004af8</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2016 09:58:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-09T09:58:03.690Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Like so many others — I’m in shock. How could America vote for Trump? Much has been made of the influence of non-college educated white men rebelling against globalisation — the sense that they are kicking an establishment that has not delivered for them. The same demographic that voted for Brexit, voted for Trump — a backlash against liberal values and liberal policies of the last 50 years. And that, I think, is why we failed — because our emphasis has been on values and policies. As a Liberal Democrat, I’m proud to stand for certain values — equality, non-disrimination, tolerance — these are important and good values, we should not abandon them. And I’m proud to stand up for evidence — policy that is based on facts is better than policy based on prejudice. But the sad truth that Trump’s election shows us is that values and evidence don’t win elections — elections are won by emotions.</p><p>This should not surprise us. Obama won, not by the strength of his policy proposals, but by instilling a strong sense of hope in the American people — hope is a powerful emotion. But so are fear and anger, and the poor, less educated, Americans are angry and afraid. They are not only angry that their lot has not improved over the last 20 years — they are angry that their progress has been slower than that of better educated Americans and slower than that of minorities and immigrants. It is their relative loss of status that they resent as much as their absolute loss of income. Trump tapped into this anger, this resentment, a raw emotion which, by definition, is set up in opposition to others that have done better — immigrants, foreigners, and, ironically given Trump’s billions, the wealthy elite.</p><p>The illiberal and discriminatory policies that may now follow will not stem the decline that Trump voters are angry about — but they may make them feel better. In the end, such policies are self-defeating — but that won’t stop them being tried. Only when Americans are sick of discrimination and division will they turn to a candidate offering inclusion and hope. Unfortunately the corrosive effect of illiberal policies takes time to be apparent. It happens through the investments which aren’t made, the jobs which aren’t created, the trade which doesn’t happen. And it is usually punctuated by desperate measures by the state to stem the decline — through investment incentives and special deals for friends at home and abroad. Eventually, the model will fail — but a lot of damage is done in the meantime.</p><p>So what is to be done? If emotions win, us Liberals have to understand what makes people feel good. Positive emotions can be as powerful as negative ones — we need to understand how to go high when they go low. And we need candidates that can communicate those emotions, that can empathize and inspire. Trump’s presidency may well be a disaster and a threat to liberal values worldwide — but our focus should not only be on opposing its excesses and pointing out its failures, but also on tapping into and nurturing a different set of emotions — pride, kindness, generosity and hope. Then, and only then, can we turn the dreadful tide that has just swept in.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f8df7004af8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Best of British Values]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/the-best-of-british-values-a83c77bd7afc?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a83c77bd7afc</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Jul 2016 21:44:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-16T21:44:47.681Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today I attended the Liberal Democrats Oxfordshire members conference. As a freshly minted member, I went with some trepidation expecting, perhaps, an assorted cardigan of worthy activists. What I found, to my great surprise, was inspiration.</p><p>Of course, there was much venting. This was the first county level meeting since the referendum. The Lib Dems is a proudly pro-European, internationalist party — the despair in the room was palpable — raw. From the scientist whose research programme depended on European collaboration, to the immigrant (of 30 years) witnessing abusive comments for the first time — the party is mourning the loss of a very close friend — Europe.</p><p>And so it was natural that some wanted to go on the attack. To push for a second referendum, to expose the blatant lies of the Leave campaign, to point to the damage that Brexit has already caused. But the reason that the event was an inspiration was because as we discussed it, a clear positive strategy began to emerge — a strategy based on values.</p><p>What is it that makes us proud to be Brits? What are the best of British values? For me it is decency, fairness, openness, compassion — these are British values … and they are also liberal values. I feel proud when we put others before ourselves; I feel proud that since the Magna Carta we are all equal under the law; I feel proud that we live in a multi-cultural, multi-faith, multi-national country with all the vibrancy that such diversity gives us; I feel proud that British nurses were at the front line in treating Ebola — that we give foreign aid not for commercial gain because we want to help the world’s poorest people.</p><p>It’s tempting to say that these are the values of the Remainers — but they are also the values of Leavers. We are not the 48% — we are the 100% of ordinary, decent Brits. We seek to speak for the entire country because we all share these values. So what should our strategy be? As the youngest member in the room said “We need an emotional message, not just facts”. I agree and I think our message is simple — let’s be the Britain that makes us proud.</p><p>And let’s make it concrete and radical by focussing on three policies where the Tories are weak:</p><p>1. <strong>Immigration</strong>. We mustn’t shy away from the fact that many people voted leave because they are worried about immigration. They are right. While every study shows that migration from the EU is a net benefit to the country, that just doesn’t cut it with communities struggling with the burden of a rapid influx of migrants. But the solution isn’t to pull up the drawbridge — it is to ensure that those communities have the resources they need to thrive. We should not be apologetic about immigration, as Labour is; or simply anti-immigration as the Tories and UKIP are. Rather we should have a clear message: immigration is good — but it <em>does</em> impose costs and a Liberal Democrat government will ensure that communities have the resources to deal with those costs.</p><p>2. <strong>Housing</strong>. The lack of housing is a national scandal. Yet it is Conservative policy that makes it near impossible to build houses. Let’s encourage developers to apply for permission to build houses for ordinary people in Conservative heartlands — and watch the Tories reject the applications again and again and again. The Tories don’t want ordinary working people in their backyard — but it isn’t their backyard — it is our country and it belongs to ordinary working people that need a home.</p><p>3. <strong>Jobs</strong>. The uncertainty caused by the referendum is putting thousands of jobs at risk; the economy has already been severely damaged and there is likely worse to come. But rather than focussing on the lies of the Leave campaign, we have to do everything possible to protect jobs now. Specifically that means two things:</p><p>- Stopping unscrupulous employers who undercut British workers by paying immigrant workers below the minimum wage. The Conservatives want to use Brexit to undermine worker’s right — we should be arguing the opposite — that it is by ensuring a level playing field that we protect both British and EU workers.</p><p>- Stop tightening our belts. The Tories have been cutting and cutting and cutting — this is why services are bad. And they will keep on doing so because Mrs. May has just appointed a fiscal hawk to the Treasury. But Britain is tired of cuts — to restore confidence we need investment not further damaging cuts.</p><p>The Liberal Democrats want a decent Britain, a fair Britain, an open Britain, a compassionate Britain — and so do the vast majority of the British people. We don’t want to “take back control” — unlike the other parties, the Lib Dems were never out of control. Rather we want to inspire the British people to vote for the Britain that makes us proud.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a83c77bd7afc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Points based discrimination]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/points-based-discrimination-3c9d9e196c16?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c9d9e196c16</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 Jul 2016 16:28:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-10T16:28:23.394Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since the Brexit vote, there has been much discussion on how exactly to implement the curbs on the movement of people that many people clearly voted for. And the scheme that has been mentioned most often is introducing a “points based system”, after Nigel Farage declared support for such a system based on the Australian model. But what would a points based system actually look like? And would it be better than the alternatives?</p><p>A points based system means assessing each application from potential migrants according to a set of criteria — for example, the sector in which they work, their education or skills levels, their knowledge of or ties with the UK, English language ability and so forth. Achieving a certain level on each criteria earns points; only applicants above a certain threshold of points are allowed in. Such a scheme sounds eminently reasonable since it allows us to define the characteristics that we would like to see from potential migrants and only accept people who meet those.</p><p>Yet in practice a points-based scheme would be a huge backward step because it is a very inefficient way of achieving the objective of reducing migration. Consider how such a scheme might work. To have a points-based system you need to have a set of criteria to score. Who determines the criteria? Clearly it would be impossible for all those involved in the referendum vote to decide this; instead it will be decided by a group of “experts”, or civil servants. But the criteria that they choose to score may not be the same as those that would be chosen by the public. Then consider the points — for each level of each criteria one would accrue a certain number of points (e.g. different levels of English language proficiency would obtain different scores). But who determines how many points each criteria should obtain? Again, a civil servant in the Home Office will almost certainly be tasked with making these up. But on what basis — there is no sensible basis for working out whether a level 2 at English is more or less important than having a degree, or a British cousin. The resulting scheme will apply its discrimination in an entirely arbitrary fashion.</p><p>But worse still, there isn’t even theoretically a correct answer to the question of which criteria matter most. This is because different criteria matter more for different kinds of activities. Consider a migrant who comes to the UK for a job as a tour guide for UK citizens; in this case excellent English is essential. But if their job is as a French teacher in an immersive French course, then speaking English is irrelevant. The same is true for all other criteria: having a degree is important if a degree is needed for the job; but a positive hindrance if the job is for low skilled workers (yes we need those too). There is NO sensible single set of criteria that will let in the people that we want and need — any single set of criteria will let in too few people for some types of activities and too many for others.</p><p>However, there are two groups of people who know how well suited migrant’s skills are for the UK market. The first group is employers. Employers don’t hire people randomly — they assess their qualifications and experience against the requirements for the job. They are much better placed than any civil servant to provide a nuanced view about the suitability of any particular migrant for employment in any specific job in the UK, since it is them that have to pay them. They have a much stronger incentive for getting it right. Hence one solution for the migration problem post-Brexit would be to let EU migrants come and live in the UK as they wish and give them a work permit should any employer decide that they are right for the job. This would ensure a perfect alignment between what employers actually need and the skills of the migrants. The only downside of this arrangement is that it is almost exactly what we have already.</p><p>The second group of people who have detailed knowledge of the suitability of migrant skills for the UK market are … migrants. We all know ourselves — we know what we are good at and what we are not. Hence the second solution to the problem would be to let EU migrants choose whether or not their skills are likely to be best deployed in the UK or in some other location in the EU. This is also an excellent solution since it allows migrants to take into account the myriad factors that might make them succeed or not in the various different locations throughout the EU — factors that often only they have knowledge of. The only “downside” of this arrangement is that it is called “free movement” and already included in the EU treaty.</p><p>Hence a points-basis system would discard the information from the two groups of people who actually know best whether migrants are likely to really add value — employers and migrants themselves — and instead institute a rigid, bureaucratic, one-size-fits-all, system that would provide employers with a poorer match for the skills that they need whilst keeping out migrants who might potentially add immensely to the UK’s economy (not to mention its linguistic and cultural diversity). The overall score for a points-based system? Nil points.</p><p>��-Rb��b</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c9d9e196c16" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[So what now?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@neilmcculloch/so-what-now-c48cf82ed3e3?source=rss-c2c680c50d34------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c48cf82ed3e3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Neil McCulloch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jul 2016 08:30:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-01T08:30:07.234Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The extraordinary events of the last few days just get more and more bizarre. Boris — having led the country to ruin, now decides that he is not going to stand? I felt angry at the mendacity of the campaign that he led. I now feel furious that the man doesn’t even have the courage to stand for the job that he so obviously coveted. It is as though a burglar has broken into your house, trashed everything and then left without even stealing anything — what was the point? Coward.</p><p>The only upside of his reckless, pointless, opportunism is that we may get as PM the only member of David’s cabinet with her head screwed on. Given a choice between an unknown Crabb and barely known Leadsom, a malevolent Fox, Gove — an arrogant prig hated by every teacher in the land, and Mrs. May — she is clearly the least worst option.</p><p>And then what? Whoever wins will take the UK out of the EU. They will press the nuclear button and trigger Article 50, after which point there is no return. They will negotiate a new deal. Yet as is becoming abundantly clear, the UK will not get an easy ride. The lie of the Leave campaign is already being borne out — Europe does not have to give us a good deal; indeed they have a strong incentive to give us a bad one to dissuade other splitters and also, frankly, to punish Britain for years of European miserabilism. Since no Conservative can agree to free movement of people, we are guaranteed not to get full access to the Single Market, damaging jobs and investment — permanently. As Tim Farron has said — Project Fear has become Project Fact.</p><p>Why then, do we accept it? Leaving the EU is a mistake. The Leave campaign tried to persuade us all that it would be fine. The £1.5 trillion (yes trillion) wiped off shares, the 30% fall in the pound, the freeze in investment and hiring, the constitutional paroxysms — all show that that was a lie. In life we have all made mistakes — sometimes bad ones. You really shouldn’t have married that disaster of a man/woman; it really wasn’t smart to saw off the branch you were sitting on; it really wasn’t smart to invest all your savings in that dud company — each of us can think of things that we have done that we regret — things that we know were mistakes — things that we would do differently if we only had another chance. And we all know that, when one makes a mistake the sensible thing to do is to admit it and, if at all possible, take back the rash action that did so much damage, even if it entails embarrassment or humiliation. Soldiering on with a mistake is never the right strategy.</p><p>But leaving the EU is a mistake that we have not yet made. Whilst we all accept that the referendum was a genuine poll of UK opinion, the UK government is not bound to accept it. We leave the EU when Article 50 is triggered — we did not leave on 23 June. Of course, it is political suicide to ignore the will of the people. Except, I imagine that the will of the people has already changed. Nobody really believed that the consequences would be so devastating — now we all know. Now faced with a foretaste of the damage that will ensue when we actually leave, many will want to change their mind. And they can. The fundamental responsibility of the UK government is to act in the best interests of the people of the UK. It is manifestly not in the best interests of the UK to leave the EU. The new Prime Minister should come out plainly and tell the nation — this is a mistake — we won’t do it.</p><p>Sadly, of course, they won’t. In all likelihood we will therefore be in the perverse situation in which we will have a Prime Minister who voted Remain and a nation, the majority of whom now realise the disaster that leaving would entail, nonetheless ploughing ahead with a decision that is in no one’s best interests. But it doesn’t have to be this way. Let us shout, let us scream — THIS IS A MISTAKE — DON’T DO IT. When you press the button on your computer to delete all your files, a little pop up appears that says “Are you really sure?” At the very least, the new Prime Minister should come to the nation and say clearly — “you have seen the consequences — are you really really sure you want to do this?” — not so much a second referendum as a confirmation vote. Only after the people of the UK have confirmed that they wish to commit economic suicide should the UK government put our head on the block.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c48cf82ed3e3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>