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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nick Danforth on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nick Danforth on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Nick Danforth on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chastened Choices: Contingency, Utopia and the Challenge of Applied History]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/chastened-choices-contingency-utopia-and-the-challenge-of-applied-history-fc6fbced469e?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jan 2024 16:21:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-12T16:21:44.928Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’m not sure whether historians’ newfound enthusiasm for contingency was inevitable. But it certainly fits well with the political commitments of many in the profession. If you reject pragmatism to embrace the possibility of radical change in your politics, it makes sense that your approach to the past would be predicated on the assumption that at every point in history an almost unlimited range of outcomes were available.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4ePHYQeJLZO42TV9TF942g.png" /></figure><p>History would certainly be boring without contingency, and politics would be futile if we assumed outcomes were all predetermined. But there is a risk to going too far in the other direction, and treating contingency as a license to engage in utopian thinking. Some contingencies are less likely than others. Some seem so unlikely as to be virtually impossible. Embracing an exaggerated form of contingency prevents us from wrestling with these questions.</p><p>Moreover, historical actors constantly struggled to determine which political programs were realistic and which weren’t. Taken to an extreme, a commitment to contingency can prevent us from understanding them on their own terms. And, of course, to the extent this is all about politics, if we base our own political programs on inaccurate assumptions about what is possible, we will fail to achieve our goals and quite likely create unnecessary suffering in the process. As someone who finds a case for pragmatism in their study of history, I’d argue that pessimism and impossibility deserve their place in historical debates as well.</p><p>In a 2007 piece for the American Historical Association magazine titled “What Does It Mean to Think Historically,” Thomas Andrews and Flannery Burke <a href="https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/january-2007/what-does-it-mean-to-think-historically">explain</a> contingency by saying “Change a single prior condition, and any historical outcome could have turned out differently.” For example, “Lee could have won at Gettysburg, Gore might have won in Florida, China might have inaugurated the world’s first industrial revolution.” In short, “To assert that the past is contingent is to impress upon students the notion that the future is up for grabs.”</p><p>But is this really the version of contingency that we want to elevate as central to historical thinking? The historical record turns out to be uniquely unhelpful for answering the question of whether history could have turned out differently. Lee probably could have won at Gettysburg, but would that have overcome all the factors working against him in the wider war? Gore, many of us still believe, did win Florida, but still lost the election because he faced structural obstacles in the form of a hostile Supreme Court majority. Let’s say China inaugurated the first industrial revolution. Would the environment be any better off for it?</p><p>Not surprisingly, historians are particularly excited to argue for the contingency of things they don’t like. The triumph of nationalism, for example, is something whose contingency we are regularly reminded of, whether in Austro-Hungarian Trieste or the <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520343702/imperial-resilience">Ottoman Middle East</a>. Of course, it would be a mistake to treat the collapse of these multi-ethnic Empires as pre-ordained, and the manner in which they broke apart was most certainly contingent. But does this mean everything was really up for grabs? As Aviel Roshwald <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/127/1/311/6573634?redirectedFrom=fulltext&amp;login=false#.YmqgbFayGQc.twitter">points out</a>: “The very fact that so many varied historical paths across multiple continents over the course of the past several centuries have led to the planet-wide emergence, in successive waves, of self-declared nation-states suggests that this has been a heavily overdetermined outcome….”</p><p>Perhaps somehow the tragedy of modern nationalism could have been avoided. But simply assuming that was possible leaves us uniquely unprepared to evaluate the choices faced by those who had ample reason to lack such optimism. Consider the Greek-Turkish population exchange. Contemporary accounts have stressed the sheer scale of the suffering it wrought, as a million and a half people were uprooted from their homes. But they have also gone further in suggesting that the international community’s support for the exchange was a product of a blind ideological commitment to national homogeneity. Yet the international supporters of the exchange had just witnessed the Armenian Genocide, and were watching Christians in Turkey and Muslims in Greece get murdered on a daily basis. In this context, where violent nationalism already appeared to have carried the day, betting on inclusive binational states carried dangers as well. Some scholars, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Humanism-Ruins-Entangled-Greek-Turkish-Population/dp/1503606864">writing about the exchange</a>, have explicitly rejected the logic of the lesser evil. Diplomats, for whom the lesser evil meant less people killed, did not always feel they had this luxury. In this case, historians should certainly question their conclusions. But we should not let our own optimistic faith in limitless contingency lead us to dismiss the way they understood the choices that they faced.</p><p>As it turns out, once you reject the premise that historical actors faced any limits to what they could achieve, it becomes easy to pass judgement from an exacting ideological perspective. Consider several books by Sam Moyn. If you <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374173708/humane">argue</a> that making war more humane is actually bad because it precludes efforts to end war entirely, you are making a remarkably bold claim about the achievability of that goal. Evidence from the last two thousand, two hundred or twenty years might suggest that the realistic alternative to humane war is less humane war rather than no war at all. In 2016, Trump won <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-recent-history-of-bombing-the-shit-out-of-em">promising</a> a less humane war against ISIS, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isis-islamic-state-strikes-death-toll">delivered</a> on his promise. Similarly, if you <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300266214/liberalism-against-itself/">suggest</a> that the liberalism of fear precluded greater social progress, you are assuming the fear was unrealistic and greater progress was achievable. These, at least seem like plausible assumptions. Still the burden of proof is on the historian, it can’t be outsourced to some abstract belief in contingency. Otherwise, you end up in the awkward situation of reprimanding bunch of people who fled the Nazis for being too worked up about the prospect of authoritarianism.</p><p>Against this backdrop, it is easy to see why contingency is at the heart of the debate over public-facing and applied history. You can certainly do excellent popular and politically-engaged history premised on an unbounded optimism about what political change can accomplish. You can point out the deep imperfections of the present and explain the historical processes that brought us here. By raising people’s awareness you can then lay the groundwork for progress. But this is different from the kind of applied history that seeks to offer recommendations for people in positions of political power. If you view the trade-offs faced by policymakers as fundamentally illegitimate, you won’t be able to offer them advice no matter how progressive or well-meaning they might be.</p><p>A few years ago, I attended a talk by a historian whose work on the history of sectarianism in the Middle East I admire. He criticized U.S. policymakers, and Obama in particular, for their essentialist understanding of sectarian conflict. They failed to realize that these divisions were not eternal, but rather the result of political circumstances. Contingent even. Agreeing, I asked how a more nuanced understanding of sectarianism might inform better policy. He rejected the premise, arguing that the U.S. government was not capable of playing a positive role in Middle Eastern politics. I asked whether it could offer lessons for other actors, perhaps the United Nations or Lebanese politicians. He was skeptical, pointing out that the U.N. had repeatedly demonstrated its uselessness and Lebanese politicians were hopelessly corrupt.</p><p>To be clear, these seem like entirely fair judgements of the U.S., the U.N. and, from everything I have heard, the Lebanese political class. But the result is still a paradoxical one. If you believe that near infinite progress is possible, and assume that our failure to achieve it results largely from the persistent shortcomings of those in power, it becomes all too easy to slip into <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/society/joan-scott-judgement-history/">a new kind of fatalism</a>. Writing off all political actors as irredeemable forecloses the possibility for more limited but still meaningful short-term change.</p><p>Pragmatism can all too easily slide into complicity, and I may well be naïve about the prospects for working within existing institutions. We can all come up with plenty of historical examples where individuals were vindicated in thinking the future was truly up for grabs. Then again, there are plenty of examples of individuals who paid dearly for their faith in this sort of contingency. If nothing else, we have a choice in which example we heed. History can help in form that choice.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fc6fbced469e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Under the Shadow of the Crescent Moon]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/under-the-shadow-of-the-crescent-moon-9daf16e1132?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2020 11:36:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-15T11:51:06.605Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>A made up history of the modern Middle East where the Ottomans solved everything</strong></h4><p><a href="https://aeon.co/essays/ottoman-cosmopolitanism-and-the-myth-of-the-sectarian-middle-east"><em>In a recent essay for Aeon, Ussama Makdisi argue</em></a><em>s that “European colonisation put an abrupt end to [Ottoman] political experiments towards a more equal, diverse and ecumenical Arab world.” The following account envisions what would have happened if those experiments had been allowed to succeed.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/1*OYRmP1GlZQsV7eZdqUyKcg.png" /></figure><p>Anyone searching for the start of the much-discussed “Middle East Miracle” might well begin with the Ottoman restoration of 1924.</p><p>In June of that year, the now famous Veli Pasha assumed the throne in Istanbul and declared that the centuries-old Empire would henceforth be reconfigured as the Ottoman Constitutional Caliphal Confederation. While in hindsight this appears to be an obvious outgrowth of earlier Ottoman reform efforts, we must remember how startling it seemed at the time. Veli Pasha was an unlikely reformer as well. He had been relatively unknown even to his countrymen before his army’s dramatic recapture of Rumelia made him a household name throughout the world. Born to poor parents in the humble town of Yozgat, few imagined he would rise to reshape the 20th century — defeating European imperialism, reforming Islam, discrediting the concept of the nation state and remaking modernity in a fundamentally more humane way.</p><p>Those practicing military or diplomatic history might be interested in the details of how Veli Pasha upended centuries of geopolitics and enabled the Ottomans to emerge more powerful from the chaos of World War One. But for our purposes, we will focus on the more important subject of what his success meant for the Middle East and the world.</p><p>What proved so brilliant about the Ottoman Empire’s new model of constitutional caliphal confederation was that it simultaneously solved all the basic problems that had vexed both Western and non-Western political thinkers since the end of the medieval period. As constitutional Caliph, Veli Pasha maintained religious legitimacy in the eyes of his Muslim subjects and gave them the space to forge an authentic form of Islamic modernity untainted by radicalism. By doing this without resort to problematic Western conceptions of secularism, he also avoided creating any form of fundamentalist backlash. More importantly, the constitutional Caliphate also gave the Empire’s Christian subjects full freedom as co-equal citizens. Because of the Empire’s ecumenical tradition, they understood that the Caliph could be the defender of Islam and their constitutional rights at the same time. Some Christians even aspired to become Caliph themselves. In Veli Pasha’s famous formulation, the Sultan would be a Muslim ruler to those who demanded a Muslim ruler and a non-Muslim ruler to those who did not.</p><p>The confederal aspect of the new Ottoman administrative system followed a similar logic. When members of the empire’s ethnic minorities appealed for self rule in order to promote their own languages and cultures, Veli offered them a form of local autonomy that satisfied this wish without in any way encouraging more radical separatist demands. As importantly, he ensured that each ethnic group would exercise their autonomy in a manner which members of other ethnicities would not resent. The local parliaments in each of the Empire’s reconstituted vilayets, for example, were free to allocate their own budgets in areas such as education, but could not do so in a way that promoted their own languages or cultures over others. By encouraging cultural diversity while rejecting the foreign ideology of nationalism, the Ottoman Confederation squared a circle which had ensnared countless other countries.</p><p>Imperial harmony was also facilitated by the careful geographic delimitation of these autonomous regions. Instead of drawing their borders with no regard for the identities or wishes of the inhabitants, Veli Pasha drew them in a way that took these identities into account but did not in any way reify them. By doing so judiciously, Veli’s Ottoman Ethnicity Commission created a series of largely homogeneous regions out of the Empire’s diverse ethnic geography, ensuring each village ended up in the region it preferred without creating a complex patchwork of enclaves and exclaves that would subsequently be condemned as cynically impractical by their inhabitants.</p><p>The enduring vitality of the new Ottoman system, sometimes called centralized decentralization, was proven time and time again over the ensuing decades. Where European democracies saw their unity destroyed by class conflicts, the Ottoman model of alternate modernity steered the state through a turbulent period of industrialization without any destabilizing ideological divides. Where some European leaders consolidated power by blaming minorities for the disruptions brought about by modernization, Ottoman modernity simply avoided these disruptions, thereby preventing the rise of populism, fascism and right wing authoritarianism. This meant that by the second half of the twentieth century, the Ottoman’s pre/post-nationalist model of tolerance was so consolidated that it was only strengthened by the many waves of immigrants drawn by the Empire’s economic success.</p><p>The results of this success are obvious. Today, hundreds of millions of people live happily under the shadow of the crescent moon. From Bitola to Basra, the flag of the Ottoman Constitutional Caliphal Confederation stands as a constant rebuke to the benighted people of the West. Its elegantly curved forms remind us that we could have solved the world’s problems if only we had rejected all the ideologies that originally seemed like solutions to them.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9daf16e1132" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How We Had a Coup]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/how-we-had-a-coup-c1be0779b638?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c1be0779b638</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2020 18:06:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-02T16:31:09.325Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>From Aziz Nesin’s 1965 </em><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/%C4%B0htilali_Nas%C4%B1l_Yapt%C4%B1k.html?id=Zp6cDwAAQBAJ"><em>book</em></a><em> “İhtilali Nasıl Yaptık.”</em></p><p>When you really think about it, we deserve to be in power today. We belong in power. If we don’t find ourselves there at the moment, it’s a matter of our misfortune. Not entirely misfortune. Admittedly, we might have made a slight mistake.</p><p>We had carried out our coup and taken power. But sadly, we were unable to notify anyone that we had carried it out or taken power. And a coup doesn’t do any good if no one knows and the people never find out.</p><p>Imagine what a mess we were in. One night you’re carrying out a coup and completely, yes completely, seizing control of the country. But you aren’t able to tell the country you’ve seized it.</p><p>Rest assured, we carefully accounted for everything. We didn’t neglect the slightest or most remote possibility. No coup in history was as well calculated and flawlessly executed as ours. We just forgot one thing. To look at the almanac. If we’d looked at the almanac we would have seen that mid-July in Övreke is always at least a little rainy. ­Somehow, in all the excitement of the coup, none of our friends in the junta thought to listen to the weather report on the radio. Or call the Meteorology Bureau and ask.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/337/1*yTx9P4Z9mEtBenr7i5DEkQ.png" /></figure><p>Do you know what a little bit of mid-July rain means for us in Övreke? Life completely stops. As soon as a few drops fall, radios stop working, telephones stop ringing, water, gas and electricity are cut, buses, planes, trains, ferries, cars, every means of transportation stops running. So we decided July was just right for a coup. Because in Övreke, July is so hot that our entire capital of Matrakopolis empties out. Only the people so poor that they have to worry about making a living remain. All the ministers and government grandees and leading figures of Övreke go, together with the prominent families who can’t stand the heat, to cool off in their summer homes or coastal resorts. In July, no one remains in the offices of the capital of Matrakopolis besides the janitors asleep in their chairs in the office lobbies. In other words, the government is empty. At this point, a coup is nothing more than opening the office doors and walking inside. Anyone who gets it into their heads to say “alright folks let’s have a coup,” can have one.</p><p>I’m still astounded that, having accounted for everything, as you can see, we managed to forget that in Övreke in July there’s always a sprinkling of rain. Dear god that was dumb.</p><p>Me, Colonel Ebülhijab and First Lieutenant Ibnibevval we going to take the radio station. Major General Hüseyin El Matraki and three others were going to take the Palace of Flavor Restaurant. District Governor Mahmed Medibani and four others were going to take the post office and the dormitory of the girl’s school. General Hayyam and his team had been assigned the stadium and the slaughterhouse.</p><p>In short, we’d assigned all the most important places to capture in a coup. Blind Hamidullah, Military Protocol Director Fourth Class (Retired), was even going to take the prison and, if the coup was unsuccessful, set aside the best cells for us. We’d really thought of everything.</p><p>At the stroke of midnight we were ready to mobilize and occupy all of the government ministries.</p><p>One member of our junta, Colonel Sehabüljenap, suggested we not bother with the Central Bank. Major General Ebülfeddal asked why.</p><p>The Colonel responded, “let’s not waste manpower on ministries that don’t do anything.”</p><p>Accepting his suggestion, we quickly gave up on taking the Ministries of Finance, Planning, and Statistics.</p><p>In tallying the ministries that didn’t do anything, Colonel Ebülhijap realized there weren’t any that did do anything and said, “if we give up on seizing the useless ministries, we’ll have to give up on the whole coup.”</p><p>“But it’s because we can’t find a ministry that does do anything that we’re having a coup” explained District Governor Behlul. And with that we realized why we were about to act.</p><p>My compatriots were going to telephone to tell me when they had seized all the government ministries, and I was going to inform the people of Övreke that the coup had been successful. Because of my deep and resonant voice, radio duty had been given to me.</p><p>Right as we were about to deploy, First Lieutenant Ibnibevval said, “Look are the Americans on board with this coup? A coup won’t work without the Americans’ approval.”</p><p>We decided to send a four-person committee, including myself, to appeal to the American Ambassador. As we reached him, we saw five other people who were just leaving. If we didn’t act fast, we realized, another group would carry out its coup before ours.</p><p>The Ambassador received us warmly.</p><p>Suddenly, our spokesman turned to us and said, “well look at this, I can’t for the life of me remember what the Americans call a coup. Does anyone know the English word for it.”</p><p>I did, of course, but in the heat of the moment I forgot too. So sadly, we told the Ambassador we were about to do something, but we couldn’t tell him what it was we were about to do. At that point I tried to convey our plans to him through hand gestures, but the esteemed Ambassador misunderstood what I meant and took offense.</p><p>Finally, we got our point across. The Ambassador responded, “If you succeed, we support you. If you don’t, we continue to support the current government.”</p><p>Having gotten our guarantee from the Americans, we all set about our work.</p><p>In the absence of any resistance, we strolled into the Radio station. Then we waited for the call from our compatriots. After three hours passed without a call, we began to worry. If they arrested our fellow plotters, they could catch us here easily. As a precaution, we decided that if they found us and asked what our business was at the radio station, we would say that we were here to give us a concert and play a march. But — more bad luck — there wasn’t a single person among us who could play an instrument. We went from room to room and gathered up the instruments we could find. I got a lute and started practicing. One of us got a tambourine and another some sort of stringed thing.</p><p>I told Colonel Ebülhijap, “go check, have our friends have seized power yet?”</p><p>The colonel marched proudly off into the darkness, just like that. When we didn’t hear from him I sent the First Lieutenant. He didn’t come back. I started to get scared that the coup was turning into a fiasco. Maybe I’d be smart to save myself by going to the government and reporting the plot.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/327/1*O7SsyVrUqzVU8TpgtlTSXg.png" /></figure><p>As I was considering this, my last remaining compatriot said, “By this point our friends must have taken over the government. You should go on the radio and announce that we are now in control, that nothing will change in the country and that no one has any reason to fear.”</p><p>“It’s easy to say that on the radio,” I replied, “but if they’ve got all our friends and thrown them in jail already won’t we sound a bit stupid?”</p><p>A little while later the lights went out. First we thought it was a fuse, but then we realized the electricity had been completely cut. I went out on the street. It was completely dark. Since there were no cars I proceeded to the main ministry on foot. There was Colonel Ebülfeddal.</p><p>“What happened Ebülfeddal?” I asked.</p><p>“I got them” He said.</p><p>“You got the king?” I said.</p><p>“No, there was another junta. They were going to do a coup tonight too. I captured all of them before I got to the government. We won’t let anyone else have a coup.”</p><p>Later we learned there were four separate juntas with coups planned for that night.</p><p>“Why didn’t you call me to tell me you were finished with the coup,” I asked Colonel Zührevi.</p><p>“How could I call you?” he said, “the telephones aren’t working”</p><p>“You weren’t supposed to cut all the lines…”</p><p>“We didn’t cut them. There was a little rain in the evening. It took down the whole system.”</p><p>“Couldn’t you have sent someone with the news by car?”</p><p>“I’m saying it rained. Don’t you understand what that means in Övreke? Cars don’t run. Weren’t you aware?</p><p>“So what now? The nation doesn’t even know about our new regime.”</p><p>Colonel Zührevi spread our map out on the table and put a chess set on it.</p><p>“My mind is so confused I need to play some chess to clear my head,” he said to Ebülfeddal. “Come on.”</p><p>I went back to the radio station to announce the news. On the road I found Major Habibi. The poor Major had taken off his shoes to protect them from the mud and was carrying them under his arm.</p><p>Seeing me he said, “Just look at this. They left us no choice but to revolt.”</p><p>Major Habibi said he had been sent to occupy the Treasury. But finding it empty he went to occupy two more ministries without even leaving a guard.</p><p>Major General Ferik added “If I’d known that overthrowing the government was this easy, I would have done it years ago when I was still a captain and retired as a marshal already.”</p><p>With the comrades I met on the road I continued to the radio station singing “Is it so easy to fool my Dürriye?”</p><p>As I began to tell the people of Övreke, with my deep and resonant voice, that we had taken power, an officer came in.</p><p>“You’re shouting for nothing,” he said. “Ever since the rain started, broadcasting stopped. There’s a technical problem with the station.”</p><p>“Alright then, how should we tell the nation we’ve taken over,” I asked, “send them each an individually addressed letter?”</p><p>Ebülhijap jumped in, “The telephones are working. Let’s start calling people. Then they can tell each other.” He dialed a random number and started talking.</p><p>Since everyone in in the junta was keeping tabs on everyone else, we were able to listen to Ebülhijap’s conversation via wiretap:</p><p>“We’re the Revolutionary Committee…</p><p>A sleepy voice answered, “What? Which Committee?”</p><p>The conversation continued:</p><p>“We have taken control of the country.”</p><p>“God bless you. We were just wondering who we could find to topple this government and get us out of this mess. Who are you?”</p><p>“I’m Colonel Ebülhijap of the Revolutionary Committee. We just wanted you to know we’d taken over and ask if you could tell your neighbors.”</p><p>“Where are you calling from?”</p><p>“The radio station. Who are you?”</p><p>“I’m the Chief Minister.”</p><p>“Whooooo?” the Colonel cried, fainting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/349/1*nFOeVZD1zz6PvRb_x4gdog.png" /></figure><p>The lines must have gotten crossed in the rain, and now the Colonel had just tipped off the government.</p><p>“Look at this scandal,” Lieutenant Ibnibevval declared, “no one even knows we’re running the country.”</p><p>“Forget about running the country,” General Hayyam said, “they’re going to come arrest us all.”</p><p>“Why didn’t you arrest the Chief Minister?” I asked.</p><p>“The roads were too muddy to send a car.”</p><p>And suddenly we all rushed back to our regular jobs. I went to my office at the Self Defense Ministry and started furiously reading a stack of classified memos.</p><p>A little later the Minister called me to his office: “According to information received from our intelligence services, if it hadn’t rained tonight a revolutionary junta was going to launch a coup d’etat against our government. Here are the reports… Investigate immediately.”</p><p>“Should I have them arrested” I asked?</p><p>“What nonsense.” he roared. “To the contrary. We’ll act like nothing happened so that they can have their coup and spare our government from the misery of holding power. We just need to have a plane waiting to flee in….”</p><p>It’s been a full five years since our coup. We really should be in power now. But alas we weren’t ever able to tell anybody that we actually were. Power is pointless if the nation doesn’t know you have it. The poor people of Övreke don’t even know that their government was overthrown five years ago. They still think it’s legitimate.</p><p>To anyone who wants to have a coup in Övreke, I say choose a clear night. And, just to make sure things go smoothly, give the government a quiet heads up first.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c1be0779b638" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Reform Needed in Islam?]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/is-reform-needed-in-islam-4e153b6c5063?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4e153b6c5063</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[islam]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Aug 2019 14:07:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-22T14:07:19.173Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over 50 years ago Islamic reformers already realized this was a dumb question.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/629/1*Zch9nTw_NYFu_8NEX_hRGQ.png" /></figure><p>In 1958, the magazine <em>Turkish Thought </em>asked a number of Turkish thinkers a question that had been the subject of considerable debate over the previous decade, and indeed the previous century: “Is Reform [Reform] Needed in Islam?”[1]An array of answers appeared over the course of two issues, each author getting a few pages for his views and a quick pen-and-ink sketch by way of introduction.[2]What emerges most clearly from the responses is that many thinkers felt it would be most appropriate to conduct a serious debate about the nature of modern Islam without recourse to the Christian idea of “reform.”</p><p>Ismail Hakkı Danişmend began with the most forceful articulation of a position held by several respondents: “[Reform] is neither necessary nor needed. Because Islam, from the perspective of being the final and most perfect religion, can already make the necessary improvements [islahat] itself.” In Danişmend’s view, the concept of reform, specifically the use of the borrowed word “reform,” was inextricably linked to the Christian experience of the Protestant reformation. Inherent in Luther’s idea of reform, Danişmend explained, was the belief that the Catholic church had strayed from a correct or pure form of Christianity. But Islam, Danişmend maintained, had not been distorted enough to need such drastic measures applied to it. Explaining the inappropriateness of the parallel with reference to Islam’s superiority, Danişmend wrote: “The Quran is truly God’s word. If it were, like the Bible, an invented and adapted book, in that case reform could be a matter for discussion. As a result, in the Bible and Christianity, reform occurred.” Since the Quran was a much more perfect sort of book, there could be no talk of reforming it.</p><p>Rhetorically, a least, Danişmend joined a number of other authors in trying to minimize the importance of the changes that were needed within Islam, seemingly in order to dispel any implication that the need for change represented a shortcoming of the faith. That any call for “reform” implied a fundamental inadequacy of Islam was perhaps best articulated by another contributor to the debate, Ali Fuat Başgil: “For almost fourteen centuries Islam, as shown and explained by the prophet, has endured without any changes. Neither in its creed or its operation has Islam become “deformed” [déformé] such that we can speak of reform [réforme]. Several other authors added to this critique by pointing out that the “reforms” of Martin Luther had in fact tended toward fundamentalism. Ziya Ülgen thought that it was this parallel that made talk of ‘reform” in Islam inappropriate. As he explained: “Reform — as it is seen in Islamic history — gives way to violent fundamentalism [taassuba]…. If reform unites religion and temporal power… it destroys secularism: it takes the form of Haricilik or Wahabbism.”</p><p>Other authors also insisted while the reform Islam needed may have been parallel to the reform Luther introduced in Christianity, Islam certainly did not have to borrow the idea of reform from Christianity. In fact, several authors argued, Islam’s history and doctrine were conducive to just the sort of reform the religion needed. Thus if Danişmend believed that Islam contained the seeds of its own “improvement” other authors were just as sure it contained the seeds of its own modernization. Ülgen articulated the common ground underlying these semantic debates when he explained while for a number of reasons “reform” was the wrong word, “modernism” [modernism] would be perfectly appropriate. “Modernism, as it could accommodate secularism, could also accommodate the ideas of nationalism and contemporary civilization.” Just as cultural change, even of the sort that made Turkey more like the West, could be “modernization,” not “Westernization” Ülgen suggested that changes in Islamic practice, even those that made Islam more like Protestantism, need not be “reform.”</p><p>[1]All quotes taken from Türk Düşüncesi, Issues 52 and 53, 1958–1959.</p><p>[2]The prize for most modest response certainly went to Professor Ahmed Ateş, who wrote back simply: “This is truly a serious issue. To say either yes or no one would truly have to be qualified in every sense… Considering all of this, I do not believe myself to be sufficiently qualified to speak on such a topic. I’m sorry.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e153b6c5063" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A look to Turkey’s past, from the New York Times]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/a-look-to-turkeys-past-from-the-new-york-times-362d8293d2ec?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/362d8293d2ec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Jun 2019 00:06:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-05T10:25:30.877Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-efHiBq6O_4hVuLn_-72AQ.png" /></figure><p><em>In October 2008, the New York Times Turkey correspondent took a boat tour along the Bosporus with historian Murat Belge. “History can be slippery in Turkey,” the reporter explained: “The official version is kept under lock and key, and writers can be punished for trying to open it.” Over fish and raki, Belge explained “We have a very unhealthy relation with our history… It’s basically a collection of lies.” Turkey experienced a “painful birth” and, as Belge observed, “We are still suffering the consequences.”</em></p><p><em>2007 and 2008 saw a series of dramatic political developments in Turkey. Abdullah Gul was elected president, the AKP survived a closure case and the now notorious Ergenekon trials began. To help American readers make sense of it all, the New York Times offered a steady stream of historical context, presumably an antidote to the “collection of lies” Turks had been fed. I have tried to compile bits and pieces of it spread across several articles into a relatively coherent narrative. The results serve as an elegant distillation what Ilker Ayturk </em><a href="https://www.academia.edu/19569728/Post-post-Kemalizm_Yeni_Bir_Paradigmay%C4%B1_Beklerken"><em>has called</em></a><em> the Post-Kemalist Paradigm. It’s not that it’s all completely wrong, but then that’s what made it so dangerous:</em></p><p>“[A] look to Turkey’s past is useful to understand its complicated present.</p><p>“Turkey’s current struggle is the latest chapter in a remarkable history that began in the 1920s, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, looking toward Europe, destroyed all connections to the East, changing the alphabet into Latin letters, placing mosques under state control and crushing the religious hierarchy…. In Turkey’s painful birth… Ataturk, disassembled the structure of the Ottoman state, which had been in place for 600 years. Instead of forging a national identity based on the Ottomans, he emphasized “Turkishness,” reaching back to the Hittites in 2600 B.C.</p><p>“The model for a new Turkish state, Ataturk believed, was to be found in the nations of Europe and the West, where modern thought and reason had made the societies rich. Religion, he concluded, was a major hindrance to becoming modern…. In a wrenching effort to forge a national identity in the 1920s, the education system fed a heavy diet of nationalism…. Religious Turks, always on the periphery, sought ways around the state.…</p><p>“In the country as a whole, religious Turks have felt like second-class citizens for generations…. For most of Turkey’s history, upper-class Turks have occupied the presidency and imposed Western values onto the conservative Anatolian heartland below…. A powerful elite of military officers, judges and senior bureaucrats has steered the country from behind the scenes since its inception in 1923 and has overthrown the government four times.</p><p>“While Europe redefined its ideas of modernity in ways that emphasized democracy, tolerance and human rights, Turkey’s leaders continued down a path of rigid, corrupt and sometimes harshly repressive rule.… [T]he secularists who founded the state out of the Ottoman Empire’s remains are now lagging behind religious Turks in efforts to modernize it…. Nationalists are more likely than Islamists to be suspicious of the West, and also more likely to be violent….</p><p>“Mr. Erdogan’s party has been the most flexible and open of all parties that consider Islam an important part of Turkish society…. Still, secular, urban Turks are suspicious. The worldview of much of the senior leadership of [Erdogan’s] party differs substantially from their own. But some of that concern stems from a deep-rooted class divide.</p><p>“The merchant class [President Abdullah] Gul comes from was kept out of power by the elite, and its backer, the military, which has ousted four elected governments since 1960.… [H]is success... marks the first time in Turkish history that a party had prevailed against the military. It also upsets the power hierarchy in Turkey… by opening up the presidency — an elite secular post that was first occupied by this country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk — to a new class of reform-minded leaders, who are from Turkey’s provinces, for decades considered backward by the elite.</p><p>“Turkey is a NATO member and a strong American ally in a troubled region, and its stability is crucial. Its current political soul-searching attempts to find answers to the very questions that Americans have been asking since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001: Can an Islamic-oriented government that is popularly elected be democratic and westward-looking?</p><p>“Today, Turkey is poised to join Europe — if the continent will have it — in what would be the fulfillment of Ataturk’s vision. But in an irony of history, it is a group of politicians who value Islam who are hoisting Turkey up toward the club, which Ataturk’s secular contemporaries never were able to do.</p><p>Sources:</p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/world/europe/19iht-turkey.1.5782217.html?searchResultPosition=14">https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/world/europe/19iht-turkey.1.5782217.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/europe/29iht-29turkey-child.5914494.html?searchResultPosition=32">https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/europe/29iht-29turkey-child.5914494.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/world/europe/22iht-turkey.5.6773765.html?searchResultPosition=2">https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/world/europe/22iht-turkey.5.6773765.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/europe/23iht-turkey.5.6794446.html?searchResultPosition=10">https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/europe/23iht-turkey.5.6794446.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/asia/28iht-turkey.4.7290442.html?searchResultPosition=11">https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/asia/28iht-turkey.4.7290442.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/europe/28iht-28gul.7281666.html?searchResultPosition=25">https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/europe/28iht-28gul.7281666.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/world/europe/06turkey.html?searchResultPosition=49">https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/world/europe/06turkey.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/world/europe/22iht-turkey.1.13880093.html?searchResultPosition=17">https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/world/europe/22iht-turkey.1.13880093.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/world/europe/20iht-turkey.4.17113235.html?searchResultPosition=24">https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/world/europe/20iht-turkey.4.17113235.html</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=362d8293d2ec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Turkey Votes: May 14, 1950]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/turkey-votes-may-14-1950-6f993245f30a?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6f993245f30a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 May 2019 15:46:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-19T16:06:18.062Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/888/1*canjm3yp9xIywIHjAorL0A.png" /><figcaption>Ulus, May 14, 1950</figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of May 14, 1950, with rain falling across much of the country, millions of Turkish citizens went to vote in what they did not yet know would be the country’s first free election.</p><p>Newspaper reports conveyed both the novelty and solemnity of the occasion. In Kayseri, at the City Club, a heartfelt handshake between government and opposition candidates left fellow diners in tears. In Eskisehir, men and women, some in full veils, formed separate lines and alternated voting. In Balikesir, members of the governing party provoked involuntary laughter when they complained of intimidation from the opposition. Even voters who remembered the “fevered elections” of the late Ottoman period were “awed” by their experience at the polls. One opposition reporter in Ankara spotted the Speaker of Parliament waiting to vote. As he was about to say “I bet this this the first time you ever stood in line” a citizen, waiting impatiently behind the Speaker, told him to hurry up. Later, as the sun went down, the Democratic Party distributed food to ballot box observers, as well as candles in case the electricity went out. The “election marathon” continued throughout the night, with eager listeners staying up next to their radios and bringing news to impatient neighbors.</p><p>By the next morning, it was becoming clear that the Democratic Party had won by a substantial margin and would form the country’s new government. In the following days, Turkish papers sought to articulate the historic meaning of what had just happened. “After this great war, Turkey has taken its place among the Western democratic states,” a writer for Cumhuriyet declared. “Among the Eastern nations,” added another, “it was perhaps the first show this maturity.” Credit belonged to the Turkish nation itself. In the words of one columnist: “Our nation, which throughout history founded strong states and mighty empires, which remained unbowed by the fierce blows of fate, has embraced the advanced methods of contemporary civilization and taken charge of our government with our own hands.” Indeed, cast in these grand terms, it was a “happy coincidence” that Turkey’s “Democracy Holiday” had fallen on the same month as two other equally fortunate events: Fatih’s conquest of Istanbul on May 29thand Ataturk’s journey to Anatolia to launch Turkey’s War of Independence on May 19th.</p><p>On the eve of the election, the semi-official paper of the Democratic Party predicted the nation would carry out its “national responsibility” in a manner “befitting a civilized society” that could serve as an “example to other nations.” Now, after the election, Zafer noted proudly that participation rates exceeded those in many Western countries, and at many polling stations women exceeded men. Amidst scattered accusations that the Democratic Party represented a departure from Ataturk’s principles, the paper proclaimed that with the elections “national sovereignty perfected the principles and institutions established by Ataturk.” What’s more “with our final democracy revolution, the Turkish nation has proven itself qualified to achieve all of Ataturk’s revolutionary expectations.” Drawing out the continuity more explicitly, one columnist observed: “May 19thwas the start of our war of independence. Since that date, we built a free homeland and independent country. But with May 14 we now feel we live as free citizens with independent consciences upon this free and independent land.” More pointedly, another noted that, among its most significant mistakes, the Republican People’s Party had “appropriated the revolutionary achievements that belong to the nation as a whole” and “exploited them for partisan purposes.”</p><p>Meanwhile, the newspaper Ulus captured the sentiments of the Republican People’s Party, which tried to put the best historic spin on its defeat. The CHP had given Turkey’s citizens “the world’s greatest election laws” which allowed for the birth and victory of the opposition. For its part, the Democratic Party had emerged from within the CHP’s ranks and largely “copied” its policies. With the Democrats accusing Inonu of being a dictator, an Ulus editorial argued the election results definitively proved otherwise. Turkey “was not a dictatorship and had not been.” To the contrary, “Ataturk laid the foundation for this democratic revolution. He raised the statute. Ismet Inonu gave life to the statue.” The world had “never encountered a statesmen of Inonu’s stature who encouraged the wishes of the nation and gave up power in deference to them.” “That this lofty gesture had been engraved into the history of civilization by a Turkish leader was an honor to the nation.” Moreover, Ulus writers believed that the setback, while embarrassing, would likely prove temporary. Editor Huseyin Cahit Yalcin approvingly quoted a Turkish villager who, when asked about the possibility he wouldn’t like the new government, explained “after throwing out a government that’s been planted in power for 25 years, we’ll throw out the new one whenever we like.”</p><p>Turkish papers eagerly reprinted foreign coverage of the elections as well. American, French and British praise received the most interest, but positive responses from countries such as Greece, Brazil and Russia made an appearance as well. From Paris, Le Monde declared that above all, the significance of the moment lay in the “appearance of political will in a nation that had at no point ever been invited to seriously proclaim its views.” Another French paper concluded that “if the simple Turkish peasant has found his self-respect, we must conclude that this noble nation realized a four century achievement in four years.” For their part, British papers were eager to give both Ataturk and the Turkish people their due. Th elections were “Ataturk’s greatest victory” wrote the Daily Mail. “He appreciated what the Turkish nation needed to learn before they were thrown into Western style democracy and he taught it to them himself.” Under the headline “In a country used to earthquakes, an election landslide!” the Glasgow Herald noted that while “[d]ictatorship in Turkey was never of the worst sort…. these elections proved that modern people won’t support dictatorship of any sort.”</p><p>Finally, American observers were no less sweeping in their assessments of the election. The New York Times declared it the “first transfer of power in accordance with the freely stated popular will in six centuries of Turkish history.” On May 15th, the paper of record confidently reported: “The astonishing upset in the Turkish elections… is a result of which not only Turkey but Western democracy can be proud… That ancient country, once known as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ looks today like a vigorous young recruit to the sort of world we believe in and want to see….” With similar optimism, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department announced that the elections were a sign of democracy’s healthy development in the Near East.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6f993245f30a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Between Reaction and Irrelevance: the regrettably contested politics of diplomatic history]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/between-reaction-and-irrelevance-the-regrettably-contested-politics-of-diplomatic-history-221d2de175a3?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/221d2de175a3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Aug 2018 15:38:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-19T15:38:34.771Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This piece was originally commissioned as a response to Hal Brands’ “</em><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjKxpq2q_fcAhUCUt8KHSjxAmMQFjAAegQIABAC&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftnsr.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F08%2FVol-1-Issue-1-Brands.pdf&amp;usg=AOvVaw2i_GAb9b6JeGtefyTUiELi"><em>The Tragedy and Triumph of Diplomatic History</em></a><em>,” published in the December 2017 issue of the </em>Texas National Security Review (Volume 1, Issue 1).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*kKqc6Bzfpf2_5yHioVQqFw.png" /></figure><p>Too often, debates over diplomatic history appear to pit scholars hoping the field can return to its roots against others who see those roots as inherently reactionary. On one side are defenders of traditional diplomatic history, often conservative, who think discussion of race, gender, and culture are a distraction from truly important questions of hard power and statecraft. On the other side are liberal historians in other subfields for whom this dismissive attitude has tainted the entire enterprise. And, as Niall Ferguson recently demonstrated, in these debates it is often the defenders of traditional diplomatic history who are most vocally calling for “publicly engaged” or “applied” history, usually meaning work of immediate use to U.S. policymakers.</p><p>This, of course, is a caricature of a far more complicated discussion. But these attitudes are sufficiently widespread on both sides to hinder the efforts of all those scholars seeking to actually apply the insights of history’s cultural turn to the questions long asked by diplomatic historians. As the number of positions in diplomatic history decline — Hal Brands notes that there were three advertised for the 2015–2016 academic year — professional incentives push young scholars toward topics that will make them competitive in other history jobs. The result is a situation where journals like <em>Diplomatic History</em> try to catch up to trends in the broader field with special issues like “Sports and the Cold War” that satisfy no one. And graduate students still focus their efforts on journals that will be more appealing to hiring committees than <em>Diplomatic History</em>.</p><p>Historians on the left who are more critical of state power may understandably be less interested in writing “applied history” that readily appeals to policymakers.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> But up to a point, if you want people to listen to answers they don’t want to hear, asking the right questions can be a helpful first step. Making an extra effort at engagement, in this context, is all the more important when pushing the public or policymakers to engage with criticism. The alternative for liberal historians is ceding the entire conversation about international affairs to their colleagues across the hall in international relations or a handful of conservative scholars at think tanks. If historians and their departments remain hesitant to engage with power politics, their intellectual insights will gradually be written out of an important national conversation. And while many will be content to blame their newfound irrelevance on the very political institutions they disdain, the loss will the world’s.</p><p>Subjects like race, gender and culture are important to study for their own sake, and history departments have every reason to devote more resources to them. But scholars have also done important and often overlooked work in showing how these subjects can help answer longstanding questions about power politics rather than replacing them. Following President Donald Trump’s tweet about the size of his nuclear button, for example, there was a moment of pre-apocalyptic interest in the role of masculinity into mainstream security debates.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> But it need not take the threat of nuclear war to have a serious conversation about gender in diplomatic history. Indeed, among the many statesmen who believed in its importance was apparently President Lyndon B. Johnson, who, when asked by a reporter why the United States was fighting in Vietnam, allegedly responded “this is why” before whipping out his Lyndon Baines.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>What’s more, changes in the field of history as a whole have already transformed diplomatic history in ways that actually make it more policy relevant. Chief among these is the successful incorporation of non-European languages and perspectives into the discipline. Today, for example, scholars would hesitate write about the Suez Crisis without using Arabic sources or Turkey’s entry into NATO without using Turkish ones. As a result, historians have come to better understand how global and local politics interact, how political motives are perceived and misperceived by diverse actors, and, more broadly, how American power has both succeeded and failed in shaping the world. As long as the United States remains militarily and diplomatically engaged around the globe, understanding these subjects will be crucial for effective policy-making.</p><p>Beyond the substance of historical scholarship, the debate over public engagement also touches on issues of style and venue and presentation. Historians working on the subject of interstate relations, whether they think of themselves as diplomatic historians or specialists in specific regions, now have a range of opportunities for sharing their insights with a wider audience. Hostility toward writing politically-relevant history in mainstream publications is nowhere near as widespread as sometime assumed. If more academic historians don’t, it is largely a result of the already overwhelming demands on their time in a comically competitive job market. Frustrating, however, is that to the extent this hostility exists, it takes a perniciously counter-productive and hypocritical form. The condemnation of presentism, for example, often seems most widespread among historians whose own work represents an elaborate, historically-couched critique of contemporary American foreign policy. Similarly, the historians most concerned with attacking mass media representations of, say, the Middle East, end up being the most judgmental toward scholars who try to fight these representations by writing for the mass media themselves.</p><p>Taking Middle East history as an example, one could think of the challenge politically-engaged scholars face as navigating between the perils of crude oversimplification and gratuitous obfuscation — a Scylla and Charybdis represented all too well by the rival figures of Thomas Friedman and Timothy Mitchell. The success of Friedman’s aggressively reductionist analysis of the Arab world — unburdened by a deep knowledge of its language or history and often deployed in support of American power — has helped tarnish the very idea of accessible writing in the minds of many scholars. Mitchell, in turn, a Columbia professor well known in the field for his work on British imperialism in Egypt, has played a similar role in promoting inaccessible writing as a stylistic and ideological alternative.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> Indeed, through his work on subjects such as colonial techno-power and carbon democracy, Mitchell has helped encourage the idea that the entire edifice of Western power is best critiqued in language that leaves any potentially sympathetic listeners outside of academia (and many within) hopelessly confused.</p><p>For anyone who believes that critiques of Western power deserve a wider hearing, the results of this trend are dangerously counter-productive. A generation of young scholars working on the Middle East has been encouraged, via websites like <em>Jadaliyya</em>, to present their valuable insights on contemporary politics in deliberately obtuse ways.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> And yet this approach comes at the expense of writing for publications that engage a wider audience extending beyond the already converted. In most mainstream publications, editors are far more likely to impose a strict stylistic litmus test on potential contributors than an ideological one. Plenty of articles appear every day demonstrating that relatively progressive ideas, presented clearly, can find a place in foreign policy debates.</p><p>To take just one example: A great deal of recent research on U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War has built on the work of scholars like Mitchell to explore how Washington mobilized ideas about modernity to justify and advance its political interests in the third world.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> It is a particularly relevant body of research, as many of the bedrock assumptions about modernity that emerged from that era continue to shape U.S. foreign policy for the worse today. Conveying the essence of this critique without oversimplifying remains difficult. But if you want to declare that modernity is a con game, there are publications like <em>Foreign Affairs</em> that will let you.</p><p>Beyond the substantive and stylistic concerns, there is also a structural element. The quickest way to ensure more publicly relevant scholarship focused on the traditional questions posed by diplomatic history would be to create more positions for it. And, of course, the quickest way to make sure the scholars filling those positions, whether at think tanks, research institutes or universities, share your politics is to make sure the funders do. With luck, as the range of people paid to research and write about foreign policy from a historical perspective becomes more ideologically diverse, it will encourage a deeper and more organic relationship between the vital concerns that have long animated diplomatic history and the equally vital concerns of liberal historians across the discipline.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> A point made well in John Glaser’s earlier entry: “Truth, Power, and the Academy: A Response to Hal Brands.” <em>War on the Rocks</em>, March 26, 2018</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Carol Cohn, “The Perils of Mixing Masculinity and Missiles,” New York Times, January 5, 2018.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> David M Friedman, <em>A Mind of Its Own</em> (Penguin, 2003), quoted by Emily Nussbaum, “The Penis as Text for Serious Thinkers: Be Careful What You Wish For,” <em>New York Times</em>, Dec 22, 2001.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Timothy Mitchell, <em>Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity</em> (University of California Press, 2002).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Examples are legion, but consider just one: A piece about the Gezi Park and Tahrir Square protests, making the eminently sensible point that there were similarities and differences between the two, both of which were rhetorically exploited by oppressive governments for problematic ends. Somehow, in the hands of Jadaliyya, the conclusion to the piece came out like this: “we choose to situate ourselves <em>between</em> the statements ‘is’ and ‘is not,’ claiming that Tahrir (is) (not) Taksim Square.” Needless to say, both the Gezi and Tahrir protests generated enormous interest among American policymakers and the editors of mainstream American publications. Engaging them simply required a willingness to defer to the conventions of readable prose. Danya Al-Saleh and Mohammed Rafi Arefin, “Taksim Is/Is Not Tahrir: Comparative Frameworks in Managing Protest,” <em>Jadaliyya</em>, July 27, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> For just one recent overview, see the H-Diplo Roundtable XIX, no. 13, “Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in U.S.-Arab Relations, 1945–1967” at <a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/949894/h-diplo-roundtable-xix-13-envisioning-arab-future-modernization-us">https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/949894/h-diplo-roundtable-xix-13-envisioning-arab-future-modernization-us</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=221d2de175a3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Extradition Distraction]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/the-extradition-distraction-d7c175a245ce?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d7c175a245ce</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Oct 2017 20:00:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-27T15:25:49.645Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The Extradition Distraction</strong></p><p>In the immediate aftermath of Turkey’s July 15 coup attempt, the debate in Washington over Fetullah Gulen’s role in it became inextricably linked with the debate over Turkey’s demand for his extradition. In different ways, this ongoing conflation serves the rhetorical interests of both sides, but in retrospect it would have been better for U.S.-Turkish relations if the two conversations had remained separate.</p><p>Over the past year, the evidence that Gulen ’s followers were centrally involved in the coup attempt has mounted. At the same time, as a result of Turkey’s subsequent response, it has become equally clear that Gulen will not, and should not, be extradited to Turkey. Focusing the debate on the imagined possibility of some future extradition enables the Turkish government to avoid acknowledging that its own actions have rendered this impossible. But it also enables Washington to perpetually put off any real discussion of Gulen’s guilt pending the improbable arrival of a solid legal case from Turkish prosecutors.</p><p>Moving past the extradition debate would allow for a more candid, focused and fruitful discussion over what, if anything, the United States could do to address Gulen’s role in the coup absent meaningful cooperation from the Turkish government.</p><p>In the days following Turkey’s coup attempt, many observers anticipated a coming U.S.-Turkish clash over Gulen’s extradition. I <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/turkeys-bitter-divisions-will-widen-after-the-failed-coup/">speculated</a>, for example, that:</p><blockquote>If Turkey produces clear evidence that Gulen’s followers were involved in the coup, but no evidence to implicate Gulen himself, the stage will be set for an epic confrontation between Erdogan’s anger and the strict requirements of the U.S. legal system for proof before extradition.</blockquote><p>The confrontation has certainly been epic, but today even this pessimistic assessment seems naive in envisioning the possibility of a functional extradition process. While the legal threshold for extradition (probable cause) was not necessarily insurmountable, it should have been clearer from the outset that in the post-coup climate Ankara would be unable to surmount it.</p><p>The Turkish government routinely cites the 84 boxes of evidence it provided the United States on Gulen but seldom discusses what was in them. It is telling that the formal Turkish government indictment against Gulen based on the events at the coup headquarters begins by <a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DLY9ZfoXkAEZWFE.jpg">invoking </a>the “ust akil,” a global mastermind that according to the indictment was working to topple Erdogan militarily after the failure of the Gezi Park protests. Moreover, in trying to explain the mechanism by which Gulen allegedly organized the coup, the indictment relies almost exclusively on the testimony of two <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/the-disappearing-imam-uncovering-the-mysteries-of-turkeys-coup-operation/">anonymous informants</a>, whose <a href="https://twitter.com/NicholasDanfort/status/915997300530364416">account </a>and motives provide grounds for serious skepticism. All this, coupled with widespread torture, sweeping purges and the thorough politicization of the Turkish legal system, has created enduring political and legal obstacles to extradition.</p><p>At the same time, focusing on the obvious inadequacy of the Turkish government’s case, as well as the many mysteries still surrounding the coup attempt itself, has become a convenient way for Washington to avoid a more thorough reckoning with Gulen’s involvement. The publicly available evidence, if sometimes <a href="https://medium.com/@15thJulyCoup/who-was-behind-the-15th-july-coup-in-turkey-19f75a5771c5">circumstantial</a>, is still <a href="https://twitter.com/06JAnk/status/915477657126612993">hard </a>to explain away, and seems to confirm the assessment of many within the U.S. government about Gulen’s guilt. While the geopolitical stakes may be vastly different, comparisons between Gulen and post-trial OJ Simpson are not out of place.</p><p>The bitter irony is that if Gulen approved of the coup attempt, he helped so thoroughly destroy Turkish democracy that he will never face justice in Turkey. The inability of Turkey to provide — and the appropriate refusal of the United States to accept anything less than — persuasive evidence of Gulen’s personal legal guilt should not preclude the recognition of the dangerous role he and his movement have played in attempting to shape Turkey’s politics by non-democratic means. The challenge for Washington is to find a way to acknowledge and respond to this reality that can help restore U.S. credibility in Turkey without rewarding Erdogan’s aggressive post-coup measures.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d7c175a245ce" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Question of Legacy: The Armenian Genocide’s Role in the Fate of Modern Turkey]]></title>
            <link>https://nick-danforth.medium.com/a-question-of-legacy-the-armenian-genocides-role-in-the-fate-of-modern-turkey-494d4f60f7dc?source=rss-1c5980c807a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/494d4f60f7dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[armenian-genocide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick Danforth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Apr 2017 16:39:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-23T16:39:42.698Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On April 24th the world will commemorate the 102nd anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, a seminal tragedy of the 20th century that modern Turkey still refuses to recognize.</p><p>With authoritarianism and ethnic violence taking a brutal toll on Turkey today, it is tempting to draw a connection between the country’s current suffering and its unacknowledged original sin. In recent years, liberal scholars in Turkey and abroad have offered eloquent and cogent arguments explaining how the legacy of genocide and its denial contributes to the persistence of the Turkey’s war against Kurdish separatists and its ongoing failure to democratize.</p><p>Indeed, the legacy of the genocide may persist in specific manifestations of modern Turkey’s social and political dysfunction. But stepping back to look at Turkey from a broader historical and geographic perspective reveals an alternate, perhaps more disturbing, narrative: after the murder of over a million people, the modern Turkish state that emerged in 1923 has actually experienced less political violence than most neighboring countries the Middle East, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. By the grim standards of the 20th century, Turkey’s post-genocide history has been, for its region, relatively peaceful and democratic.</p><p>This is not to discount the enormous violence the citizens of modern Turkey have endured, but simply to question in what causal sense it can be considered the “legacy” of genocide. Contrary to the widespread assumption in which state violence begets violence and government repression begets repression, in this case the story seems more complicated.</p><p>By 1950, a Turkish regime that still included unrepentant genocidaires among its members had successfully kept Turkey out of World War Two and then made a voluntarily transition to multi-party democracy. Meanwhile, across Europe, political leaders without this bloody background followed the path of fascism and irredentism into a continent-wide conflagration with incalculable human costs. After 1950, Turkey remained imperfectly democratic but hardly free from violence. In 1955 anti-Greek programs, sometimes referred to as “Turkey’s Kristalnacht” led to the death of 11 ethnically Greek citizens and the expulsion of tens of thousands more. Following a coup in 1960, the first of four in modern Turkish history, the country’s prime minister and two of his colleagues were executed. In the late 1970s rising left-right political struggles claimed thousands more victims. After another coup in 1980, hundreds of political prisoners were executed, and countless others tortured. Most brutal of all was the country’s decades long, still ongoing, civil war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a conflict in which as many as forty thousand people have been killed. More recently, an attempted coup last summer led to the death of 265 citizens, and a retaliatory wave of purges in which more people have been tortured or killed.</p><p>Yet during this same period of time, most countries in Turkey’s wider region suffered significantly worse violence with significantly less democracy; consider, in turn, the experience of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia.</p><p>Without delving too far into crude tallies of human cruelty, the comparison between Turkey and its neighbors should at least give us pause when presenting modern Turkey’s tribulations as a consequence of, or perhaps punishment for, the Turkish state’s foundational crime. The true victims of the Armenian genocide were, quite simply, the victims — the people who were killed, the people who survived, their families and their descendants.</p><p>Because of the genocide, and its subsequent denial, Turkey has faced ongoing, and entirely justified, international condemnation. But, in defiance of our moral expectations, it has not necessarily endured a unique legacy of violence or authoritarianism that nearby countries without the same dark history were spared.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=494d4f60f7dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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