<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Shra_23 on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Shra_23 on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@nightdare666?source=rss-1febea99cea3------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:21:32 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@nightdare666/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I Found Session Not Invalidated After Account Deletion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nightdare666/how-i-found-session-not-invalidated-after-account-deletion-3fb154fb5172?source=rss-1febea99cea3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3fb154fb5172</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shra_23]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Apr 2025 22:31:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-07T22:31:17.969Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How I Found Session Not Invalidated After Account Deletion</p><p>(And Turned a Duplicate into a Fresh Critical Bug)</p><p>---</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MxX6hEmdFR5tOmUzYVc4pA.png" /></figure><p>Introduction</p><p>Hi everyone!</p><p>This story is not just about finding a bug, but about thinking deeper when facing a duplicate report — something every beginner bounty hunter should know.<br>Remember: When you hit a wall, sometimes the best bugs are hiding just behind it.</p><p>---</p><p>The First Bug: Session Not Invalidated After Password Change</p><p>While testing the authentication flows, I focused on how the application handles password resets and session management — two important areas where many bugs still exist.</p><p>Here’s the simple flow I tested:</p><p>1. Login on Browser A (say Chrome) using valid credentials.</p><p>2. Open Browser B (say Firefox) and instead of logging in, request a password reset.</p><p>3. After resetting the password, log in to Browser B with the new password.</p><p>Expectation:<br>Browser A should detect that the password has been changed and log out the session immediately. (This is basic security hygiene.)</p><p>Reality:<br>Browser A remained logged in.<br>The old session was still active even after a password reset!</p><p>&gt; [Vulnerability: Session Not Invalidated After Password Change]</p><p>---</p><p>Reporting the Bug</p><p>I quickly drafted a clean report, showing:</p><p>Steps to reproduce.</p><p>Expected vs. actual behavior.</p><p>Security impact (account takeover scenarios).</p><p>Then I waited…</p><p>Result:<br>Duplicate.<br>(Sigh.)</p><p>---</p><p>At This Point: Most Beginners Would Stop.</p><p>But I Didn&#39;t.</p><p>---</p><p>A New Idea: What Happens After Deleting an Account?</p><p>My brain kicked into &quot;What else?&quot; mode.<br>I asked myself:</p><p>&gt; If password change doesn’t kill old sessions, what about account deletion?</p><p>So I tested:</p><p>1. Delete the account from Browser B (where I had changed the password).</p><p>2. Go back to Browser A — and guess what?</p><p>The session was still alive!</p><p>But... most of the functionality was disabled (expected since the account was gone).</p><p>Now, this is half interesting, but not a full impact yet.</p><p>---</p><p>Then the Real Magic Happened</p><p>I wondered:</p><p>&gt; If I create a new account with the same email that was deleted, would Browser A&#39;s old session still connect?</p><p>I tried it:</p><p>Registered a new account with the same email.</p><p>Set a different password.</p><p>Opened Browser A…</p><p>Boom. The old session activated again — fully functional!<br>I was able to access and control the brand new account.</p><p>&gt; [Vulnerability: Session Resurrected After Account Recreation]</p><p>---</p><p>Why Is This Dangerous?</p><p>This combination of bugs makes for a critical attack chain:</p><p>If an attacker compromises a session once, the user has no real recovery path.</p><p>Changing the password?</p><p>&gt; No effect, session persists.</p><p>Deleting the account?</p><p>&gt; No effect, session persists — and attacker can hijack newly created accounts with the same email.</p><p>&gt; In real-world terms:<br>If a user suspects their account is compromised, they are defenseless.</p><p>---</p><p>Root Cause (Technical Guess)</p><p>Sessions were being linked to email addresses instead of account identifiers (like user IDs).</p><p>When the user deleted their account, only the backend record was deleted, but active sessions were not cleared.</p><p>When the email was reused, the session magically attached to the new account.</p><p>---</p><p>Key Takeaways for Beginners</p><p>1. Always test both sides: after changing passwords, deleting accounts, updating email addresses, etc.</p><p>2. Duplicates are opportunities:</p><p>If your report is marked duplicate, dig deeper.</p><p>Look for chained scenarios.</p><p>3. Think about attacker mindset:</p><p>How would a real attacker exploit session weaknesses?</p><p>Can they maintain access even after security actions?</p><p>4. Session management bugs are gold:</p><p>They often look &quot;small&quot; but can be chained for high impact.</p><p>---</p><p>Final Outcome</p><p>I submitted the second bug (Session Resurrected After Account Recreation), explaining the full attack scenario.<br>It got triaged successfully.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MxX6hEmdFR5tOmUzYVc4pA.png" /></figure><p>---</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>Don’t just report bugs. Understand them. Extend them. Break assumptions.<br>That&#39;s the real hacker mindset.</p><p>&gt; Sometimes the real bug is hidden inside the duplicate you almost gave up on.</p><p>Happy Hunting!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3fb154fb5172" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I Found a $$$ Account Takeover Bug (And What You Can Learn From It)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nightdare666/how-i-found-a-account-takeover-bug-and-what-you-can-learn-from-it-af0d697f913d?source=rss-1febea99cea3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af0d697f913d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[idor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shra_23]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Apr 2025 07:06:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-06T07:25:19.371Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>How I Found a $$$ Account Takeover Bug (And What You Can Learn From It)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m28Esgch_SHFS3hXeKFECw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Bug bounty hunting isn’t always about fancy tools or complex exploits. Sometimes, all you need is curiosity, patience, and a browser. Here’s the story of how I discovered a critical account takeover vulnerability with zero user interaction, and what it taught me about web security.</p><p>---</p><p>The Discovery: A Curious Sign-Up Page</p><p>Like many bug bounty hunters, I was browsing a login and registration page of a web app (let&#39;s call it TargetApp). While testing, I noticed something odd: when I tried to sign up with an existing User ID, the app would say, &quot;User ID already exists.&quot;</p><p>Hmm... so the app is confirming which User IDs are valid...</p><p>That was my first clue.</p><p>---</p><p>The Roadblock</p><p>After logging into my own test account, I noticed the URL looked something like this:</p><p>https://TargetApp.com/chp/index.html#?registrationId=ENCODED_USERID</p><p>Now I had two questions:</p><p>1. What happens if I replace my encoded User ID with someone else’s?</p><p>2. What’s stopping me from accessing someone else’s account?</p><p>I expected some kind of session validation or token mismatch to block me.</p><p>But to my surprise… it didn’t.</p><p>---</p><p>The Bypass: Simple Trick, Big Impact</p><p>Here’s what I did:</p><p>1. I created two accounts: one attacker and one victim.</p><p>2. Logged in with the attacker account in Browser A.</p><p>3. Copied the URL and replaced my registrationId with the victim’s base64-encoded User ID.</p><p>4. Opened the link in Browser B (not logged in).</p><p>5. When the page tried redirecting to login, I quickly clicked the (X) to stop the refresh.</p><p>Boom — I was inside the victim’s dashboard.</p><p>Even though I couldn’t change anything, I could view sensitive information. In some cases, it could show personal data or even payment info — a serious privacy and compliance risk.</p><p>---</p><p>What Made This Possible?</p><p>The bug was a mix of three security issues:</p><p>1. Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)</p><p>The registrationId in the URL directly referenced a user account, and I could change it manually. There was no server-side check to verify if I had permission to access that user.</p><p>2. Session Mismanagement</p><p>The server didn’t properly invalidate or verify the session before rendering account details. Just loading a crafted URL was enough to display sensitive info before redirecting.</p><p>3. Weak Obfuscation</p><p>The User ID was simply base64 encoded — not encrypted, not signed, not protected. That’s like hiding a key under your doormat.</p><p>---</p><p>Breaking It Down for Beginners</p><p>Let me explain this in a simple way.</p><p>Imagine you’re part of a club. Every member has a locker, and your locker number is written on a sticker — but the sticker is just your name written backwards.</p><p>If someone knows your name, they can guess your locker number. If the club staff doesn’t check who you are before letting you open the locker, anyone can walk in and see what’s inside.</p><p>That’s what happened here.</p><p>---</p><p>Lessons Learned</p><p>1. Never trust the client-side – Just because something is encoded doesn’t mean it’s secure.</p><p>2. Always validate sessions on the server – Before showing private data, make sure the user is authenticated and authorized.</p><p>3. Simple bugs can have high impact – This bug didn’t need tools, scripts, or complex payloads. Just observation and testing.</p><p>---</p><p>Final Words</p><p>After reporting the bug, it was triaged and eventually rewarded with $$$. I had to follow up several times, but the Bugcrowd team handled it professionally in the end.</p><p>This experience reminded me why I love bug bounty: it&#39;s like digital detective work. If you&#39;re curious, patient, and ready to think outside the box, even a simple detail can turn into a big win.</p><p>---</p><p>If you&#39;re just starting in web security, my advice: don’t skip the basics. Look at how pages behave. Test every input. Question everything.</p><p>Sometimes, the next big bug is hidden in plain sight.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af0d697f913d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>