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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nina Powell on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Nina Powell on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why didn’t psychology lose its credibility?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes/why-didnt-psychology-lose-its-credibility-345961ab6312?source=rss-a4fa64e353da------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[replication-crisis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nina Powell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Mar 2021 05:07:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-17T05:07:57.526Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wCjw6jQGeFlbP0_ae0NDVg.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Nina Powell</p><p>It’s well known that psychology has <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/11/psychologys-replication-crisis-real/576223/">failed to reproduce</a> the findings of major field-defining research. Consequently, as The Atlantic put it, “the stuff of textbooks and TED Talks might not be real”. The explanations for psychology’s problem with reproducibility range from the occasional outright fabrication, to more common exaggeration and poor methodology. Remarkably, despite the failure to produce reliable research, psychology as a whole still continues on as though nothing happened. By that I don’t mean that nothing has been done to address this issue — there are major movements to ensure that psychology research holds up to stringent peer review and methodological checks (e.g., pre-registration of predictions, journals dedicated to publishing replications, failed or otherwise, and increasing demands for multi-study papers with a replication check built-in). What I do mean is that the reputation of psychology has remained largely intact. Instead of a declining interest in psychology, we see increasing student numbers at the undergraduate and graduate level, and the continued societal thirst for psychological interpretations for human behaviour. The field seemingly lost none of its popularity and little of its credibility even though more than half of its foundational research doesn’t hold up.</p><p>I recently asked students taking my introductory psychology course why psychology is so popular in spite of its failure. The answers were rather heartening. The students pointed out that psychological questions will continue to interest us so long as we are curious about ourselves. Another student argued that failure is interesting — when things fail, we’re motivated to understand and figure things out. Success means that things just become accepted as fact, and then we stop trying to understand. In this sense, psychology’s failure might be a good thing. I agree with the sentiment that failure is interesting and does not, by itself, undermine the project of trying to understand ourselves through psychological research. But I don’t see the current changes in psychological research practice as ones that commit the field to accepting and pushing past these failures in an effort to access deeper and more meaningful questions and understanding.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BdvuXU-_UfIrukzFYpLZ1g.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Psychology needs to drop the defensiveness</strong></p><p>In nearly all introductory courses in a psychology curriculum, you will find an opening gambit about what differentiates psychology from other disciplines. You will also find this as part of the standard rhetoric at university open days if you visit the psychology booths — how is psychology different from social work, sociology, philosophy, etc.? The answer that the textbook and the open day representative will typically give is that “psychology is a science!” We’re the same as biology and physics and chemistry — we use the scientific method, which means we are committed to the pursuit of scientific fact.</p><p>It is true that psychological experimentation uses the scientific method. Psychologists test predictions based in theory and existing research by measuring something of interest and eliminating confounding factors. Many other considerations go into designing a study to ensure reliable and valid findings, but the central point is that these considerations are a part of an overarching scientific method shared with other STEM fields. Yet just because psychology uses these methods does not mean it is anything like these other fields. Psychology deals with the human subject and human subjects are capricious in a way that objective physical bodies are not. Instead of accepting the separation of psychology from the physical sciences, psychology has been excruciatingly defensive and has insisted it become part of the “hard sciences”.</p><p>In rejecting its reputation as a “soft science,” psychology has rejected its origins and is now trying to be something that it cannot be. Psychology was born out of a meeting of philosophy and the natural sciences. Questions about the human condition have existed for centuries before psychology ever existed, yet today, you will find psychologists openly disinterested, and even outright disdainful of philosophy as though it were a weaker subject. You’ll see the same attitude in psychology academic circles towards sociology, anthropology, and other “soft or social sciences”. I’ve heard this belief articulated at major psychology conferences from big name academics. Undergraduate and graduate students are advised to avoid anything associated with “soft science” and to always adopt the empirical methods of the hard sciences. Tragically, colleagues in the “soft disciplines” are reluctant to collaborate with psychology researchers because they are discouraged by that narrative.</p><p>Perhaps it is this defensiveness that makes the response to the reproducibility crisis all the more unsurprising. The response was largely to clamp down on methods and take a heavy-handed approach to becoming an even harder science. It was as though psychologists amped up their defensiveness to a whole new level — we can fix this mess by becoming an even harder science! But it’s not going to work, and here’s why.</p><p><strong>Psychology is not like the natural sciences</strong></p><p>Psychology has defended its scientific reputation over the years by attempting to use stringent scientific methodology that works to eliminate confounds when investigating a variable of interest. But some things which psychologists attempt to understand are inherently confounded. To remove the confounds in many cases is to deconstruct and dilute the subject or variable of interest to the point of meaninglessness. Morality, for example, which is my area of interest, is confounded by time, place, ideology, politics, religion, culture, etc. because it is made by us, for us, and therefore not separate from us in any objective sense. You cannot make morality un-confounded from everything that makes us, “us”, because then it would no longer be morality.</p><p>To think that the stricter the methodology the better psychology will fare is to entirely miss the point of what psychology is. And this may explain why psychology has, and will continue, to face issues with reproducibility. A great deal of psychology is inherently a social science and you can’t turn a social science into a hard science because they are different beasts. Psychological research can be informative, it can describe and illuminate what we are, but psychological research is also frustrating. Findings can be local in space and time and dependent on a context that may never repeat, and so the findings can be inherently non-replicable. Psychology will never be as definitive as the hard sciences, which will make psychology less interesting to some and more interesting to others.</p><p>Psychology needs to worry less about being a hard science and using more stringent methods, and more about acceptance of how the nature of what we aim to investigate is variable, ever-changing and ever-dependent on other aspects of humanity. A failure to reproduce in many cases is not a failure, it’s just an indication that psychology is not like the natural sciences, and if we can get over that, maybe we can have an honest conversation about what the field can and cannot do.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=345961ab6312" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes/why-didnt-psychology-lose-its-credibility-345961ab6312">Why didn’t psychology lose its credibility?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes">Cognitive Handshakes</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nudge, Nudge, Nudge. Why Don’t You Ever Think?!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes/nudge-nudge-nudge-why-dont-you-ever-think-3a6452a4e82c?source=rss-a4fa64e353da------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rationality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nudge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nina Powell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 07:28:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-23T07:28:05.050Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*jqdCGtgtXmPNuxLEZeGQOg.png" /></figure><p>Blog post by Stuart Derbyshire and Nina Powell to motivate their book, <em>Think! The Antidote to Nudge.</em></p><p><em>Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness</em> was written by University of Chicago economist Richard H. Thaler and Harvard Law School Professor Cass R. Sunstein, and first published in 2008. The book had a rapid and tremendous impact. In 2009, the US Government recruited Cass Sunstein to head The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs <strong>(</strong><a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira"><strong>OIRA</strong></a><strong>)</strong>, and in 2010, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/sep/09/cameron-nudge-unit-economic-behaviour"><strong>Richard Thaler was in London</strong></a> to advise the UK Prime Minister in establishing a “nudge unit”, more formally known as the Behavioural Insight Team. A similar unit was setup in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2632154"><strong>Germany</strong></a><strong>,</strong> and another in <a href="https://ybit.jp/top-en"><strong>Japan</strong></a>.</p><p>A Nudge is something that influences behaviour but without dictating any particular choice or option. A menu, for example, can be organised so that diners are more likely to choose items that are lower in calories. Placing the number of calories against each menu item, <a href="https://london.eater.com/2020/7/27/21339897/calories-restaurant-menus-uk-boris-johnson-obesity-coronavirus"><strong>currently favoured by the UK Prime Minister</strong></a> and mandatory since 2018 in America, is an example of a menu nudge. The calorie information doesn’t force the diner to do anything different from what they would have ordinarily done, it merely serves as a reminder, a nudge, tilting the odds towards the choice of lower calorie items. In Singapore, around two-thirds of the population eat at “<a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/healthy-hawker-food-no-such-thing-hpb-10580250"><strong>Hawker Centres</strong></a>” at least four times a week. The abundant Hawker Centres are open air food courts serving an exceptional range of dishes for very reasonable (circa 5 USD) prices. Since around 2015, every Hawker centre has adopted healthier choice symbols provided by the government to formally identify options with fewer calories, and lower fat and salt content. Again, the symbols do not mandate choosing the low calorie, low fat, low salt option, they merely nudge the patron in that direction. Thaler and Sunstein are careful to emphasise that “a nudge is not a mandate, it does not dictate choices. Putting fruit on the front of the menu and chocolate on the back is a nudge but taking chocolate off the menu all together is not. Nudges are not bans.”</p><p>Nudge policy can consequently appeal both to those who want better control over people’s choices and to those who want the freedom to make their own choices, and Thaler and Sunstein characterise the use of nudges as <em>libertarian paternalism</em>. Moreover, they argue that libertarian paternalism makes sense because all choices must be made in some context and under some conditions. Where items are placed on a menu will influence what diners eat, similarly where items are placed in the grocery store influences what people buy. How credit card charges are communicated influences how much credit card debt people carry, the relative price of goods influences what people spend, the exact wording of government advice influences whether people follow it, and so on. It makes sense, therefore, to organise the choice context to deliver maximum benefit to consumers and society. If a deliberate manipulation of context can reduce obesity, curb problem drinking, and encourage better retirement planning, then such manipulation is a good thing. People struggle to make the best decisions for their lives, and some decisions involve complexities that pose unreasonable challenges. There is merit in nudge policy making life easier. Who would complain? We would.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f23ycp_OLa-rqZUOGMyKDw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The problems with nudge begin when we consider who has the power to arrange the context in which choices are made, and on whose authority they operate. While it is probably true that many people struggle at least some of the time with their diet and other life choices, it is a jump from there to the assumption that people prefer their choices to be nudged by professional dieticians. “Would anyone object” Thaler and Sunstein ask rhetorically, “to putting the fruit and salad before the desserts at an elementary school cafeteria if the result were to induce kids to eat more apples and fewer Twinkie’s?” Well, since they asked. If the decision had been made openly, in full consultation with the teaching staff, the canteen staff, and the parents, and if objections and problems had been fully addressed, then we would not object. But such an approach is vanishingly rare and violates the intent of nudge to provide a quick fix.</p><p>Nudge is meant to be easy, but changing human behaviours is rarely straightforward, and the best choices are rarely obvious. Nutritionists argue, for example, over whether the sugar in fruit is a problem or not, whether sugar from carbs is good or bad, what kinds of fat are good or bad, and so on with a myriad of other food choices. It might seem obvious that saving for the future makes sense, but foregoing the trip of a lifetime now and choosing to save for the future is a gamble that doesn’t pay off if premature death or illness deny that future.</p><p>The examples so far involve relatively banal nudges associated with eating, saving and shopping. The complications multiply when nudge is applied to issues such as social justice, global warming, workplace efficiency and so on. Conceding to nudge in those complex policy domains means sacrificing some of our most important social decisions to a cabal of experts who nudge us into different hiring practices, commuting habits, and working environments to make the world “better”.</p><p>This brings us to the central problem with libertarian paternalism: it undermines individual and collective responsibility. We can understand how a nudge can be attractive, but if someone only makes a choice because of the context then they are not taking personal responsibility for their decisions. Personal responsibility begins with the acceptance that we are the authority when it comes to decisions about our own life, and we must negotiate the consequences of those decisions. Nudge also undermines collective responsibility, which comes from an active citizenry that puts in place policies and procedures that have been openly debated and decided. Even when those policies are “wrong”, we argue that it is still better to implement them because that is how we are taken seriously both individually and collectively. A healthy individual and a healthy society is persuaded by argument and held accountable by outcomes that follow those arguments. Allowing experts to create a context in which our decisions are nudged along a particular path creates a barrier between our decisions and our responsibility, which ultimately provides excuses and infantilises the citizenry. We can’t avoid all nudge, but we believe we should avoid as much nudge as possible and replace nudge with as much thought as possible. That is why we will be writing <em>Think! The Antidote to Nudge</em>.</p><p><a href="https://fass.nus.edu.sg/psy/people/derbyshire-stuart-william-george/"><strong>Stuart Derbyshire</strong></a> is an Associate Professor at the National University of Singapore</p><p><a href="https://fass.nus.edu.sg/psy/people/powell-nina/"><strong>Nina Powell</strong></a> is a Senior Lecturer at the National University of Singapore</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a6452a4e82c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes/nudge-nudge-nudge-why-dont-you-ever-think-3a6452a4e82c">Nudge, Nudge, Nudge. Why Don’t You Ever Think?!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes">Cognitive Handshakes</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Psychology is the problem, not the answer]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes/psychology-is-the-problem-not-the-answer-1282013b1260?source=rss-a4fa64e353da------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1282013b1260</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wellbeing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nina Powell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Aug 2019 12:35:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-25T12:58:35.060Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Written by Nina L. Powell</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NsFcpGecI6p5_h17b4RFlQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@moooooose">Mosa Moseneke</a> on Unsplash</figcaption></figure><p>I am an academic in the field of psychology but one that has become increasingly concerned at the direction psychology is taking. When I speak my thoughts on the mess psychology has created, many people suggest I should do something else or that I clearly want out. Maybe I could do something else, and the thought of getting out has crossed my mind, but I am deeply vested in the pursuit of psychological questions. And more importantly, advancement of any kind requires criticism and discord not just from those perceiving things from the outside, but especially from those directly involved with things from the inside.</p><p>Jonathon Haidt has similarly criticised psychology from the inside and I recently started reading his <em>The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure</em>. I’m very familiar with Jonathan Haidt, as he is a top researcher and theorist in my niche area of psychology — the psychology of moral judgments. Haidt and his co-author Greg Lukianoff, both psychologists, argue in this book that three untruths about the world are damaging young people, in particular those attending university. The three untruths boil down to essentially a belief that human beings are fragile, that human beings should trust their emotions and that human beings can be straightforwardly dichotomised into categories of good and bad. The bigger point that is being made is that because of our endorsement of these untruths, we are harming the younger generations in catering to their demands for protection from emotional harm. For instance, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/college-students-support-free-speech--unless-it-offends-them/2018/03/09/79f21c9e-23e4-11e8-94da-ebf9d112159c_story.html?noredirect=on">administrators agreeing to stop people with certain views from speaking on American college campuses</a> because students demand protection from being exposed to upsetting ideas is actually counterproductive. It is precisely from our exposure to difficult ideas and experiences of discomfort when hearing from opposing others that builds strength of mind, argument and character. While the authors’ perspectives are not unique (similar arguments have been made by academics and journalists such as <a href="https://www.spiked-online.com/2019/02/04/campus-censorship-is-not-a-myth/">Brendan O’Neill</a> and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/persons-of-interest/laura-kipniss-battle-against-vulnerability">Laura Kipnis</a>), what is perhaps uniquely frustrating about the authors of this book, and others like them (e.g., Jordan Peterson) is a profoundly misguided belief that psychology is part of the answer rather than the source of the problem.</p><p><strong>How psychology got us here in the first place</strong></p><p>The mid-to-late twentieth century rise in popularity of psychology brought with it two fundamental beliefs about human nature. First, the belief that human beings are irrational, weak-willed, and lack fundamental control over their thoughts, feelings and behaviours. And second, that psychological maladjustment and a disordered mind can offer an explanation for the turmoil we experience as a part of our human condition.</p><p>The first belief was brought about through the rise in popularity of social psychology. Social experimentation post-WWII grew out of an effort to explain the atrocities that devastated Europe and the Asia Pacific. Studies such as those conducted by <a href="https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/psych-lies-and-audiotape-the-tarnished-legacy-of-the-milgram-shock-experiments/">Milgram</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/6/13/17449118/stanford-prison-experiment-fraud-psychology-replication">Zimbardo</a> proved that ordinary well-intentioned people could behave inhumanely when put under the right conditions — so easily were people swayed by the power of an authority figure or by their own perception of power that they would harm, even kill, an innocent person they had met just a few moments or days earlier. Ultimately, this undermined earlier rationalist perspectives that human beings made decisions on the basis of their ability to think and reason and control their behaviour. Now people were seen as being easily manipulated and influenced, too stupid or unaware to know any better, and therefore lacking control over their personhood.</p><p>This belief has persisted through to the 21st Century and at least in part contributed to a fatalistic view of humanity that unsurprisingly calls into question the achievements of man. With this fall from grace, humanity starts to look a bit pathetic, a bit ugly, and certainly a bit lame. And this might be a reasonable conclusion to draw based on psychological research if it weren’t for the fact that most of the basis for this view comes from bad research. Milgram and Zimbardo have been heavily criticised for promoting false and widely exaggerated claims from their respective studies, and the whole of social psychology has recently fallen into disrepute due to failures to replicate the results of foundational research.</p><p>So what does the psychological support of a misanthropic view of humanity have to do with the current culture crisis on American college campuses? When you combine this first belief with psychology’s normalisation and push of the pervasiveness of mental illness (e.g., anxiety, depression, learning disorders), you get a disdain for humanity coupled with a belief that we’re all a bit unwell. And in efforts to address mental illness, psychology has propagated the belief that all feelings are valid. It’s no wonder that young people feel fragile in the presence of differing views and perspectives if ultimately, they believe that they are suffering from mental illness <em>and </em>are irrationally susceptible to the “power of the situation” as social psychology often phrases it. There is no room for resilience or strength of mind over emotion when you’ve been told that your inner mental life is possibly damaged and certainly easily influenced. Likewise, it becomes easy to dismiss the views of others we don’t agree with as “stupid” or even “psychotic” rather than engage with those views because people are, thanks to psychology, pretty stupid and possibly psychotic. So you now have both a dismissing of others and a lack of belief in ourselves to be strong, resilient and rational in the face of difficulty or challenge, and it no longer seems surprising that college kids are demanding for campus speakers to be banned, and more administrative procedures to be put in place for their protection from words and ideas.</p><p><strong>The solution</strong></p><p>Part of why we are here is precisely because psychologists like Haidt have argued that human beings are naturally emotion-driven rather than rational, and that being rational takes immense effort or may not even be possible. In fact, as the authors point out, the very idea that exposure to words that we may not agree with causes damage comes from psychologist, Lisa Feldman who suggests that, “If words can cause stress, and if prolonged stress can cause physical harm, then it seems that speech — at least certain types of speech — can be a form of violence.” While I support the observations of Haidt and Lukianoff that this perspective is an injustice to young people and the principles of higher education, I think psychologising the problem is not going to get us out of this mess. Haidt and Lukianoff offer a psychological solution to this by further emphasising the possibility for rationality, in particular one that is trained through psychological intervention such as cognitive behavioural therapy. Instead, I offer the possibility that a close look at the history of psychology shows us that this field got us here in the first place, and what we need now is to abandon a psychological explanation for our current culture of fragility.</p><p>The psychological explanation undermines free will and rationality, and instead pathologizes what it is to be human. The very psychologists who wrote this book and rightly identify the problems we are facing in education are the very people who have promoted the view that psychology has proven human beings are emotion-driven, biased and fragile creatures who need protection and a therapeutic focus on well-being to survive. What we need is an anti-psychology movement that spends a bit less time on the irrational person. Instead, we need to spend more time on something bigger than the individual that revitalises our belief in collective strength and capability.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1282013b1260" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes/psychology-is-the-problem-not-the-answer-1282013b1260">Psychology is the problem, not the answer</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cognitive-handshakes">Cognitive Handshakes</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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