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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nomos Nexus on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Nomos Nexus on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Not now when I am winning: The Short-sightedness of rejecting Proportional Electoral Systems]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nomosnexus/not-now-when-i-am-winning-the-short-sightedness-of-rejecting-proportional-electoral-systems-eb7f4ae3c291?source=rss-3d8209e0cafa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eb7f4ae3c291</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[proportional-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-parties]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[majoritarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electoral-systems]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nomos Nexus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2025 19:34:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-25T19:34:21.435Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Prioritizing short-term interests over long-term strategies is a haunting characteristic of the political landscape in the “pluralistic” (in the party sense) West. The news and the election cycles “force” the hand of decision-makers to act in a manner that will optimize instant success, lest they be ousted from their party, or lose prospects of being in power in the future.</p><p>Whilst there are numerous examples of this reality — most notably the increased lending from governments, reliance on internal and external debt, and quantitative easing to “patch-up” the ills of the economy just in time to secure popularity in the re-election, or to prevent disaster before the burden of government transitions to the opposing political faction — when it comes to the electoral arena, the most striking example is the refusal of political parties with any actual weight in traditionally First-Past-the-Post countries to determinably push the implementation of some form of a proportional system.</p><p>Before delving into the “missed” opportunities of former challengers to alter the electoral system, we ought to review why first-past the post was historically implemented and how it was sensible and beneficial for the period in which it applied almost universally in the democratic societies — which were far fewer at the time, compared to now.</p><p>The countries which first come to mind when thinking of the First-Past-the-Post electoral system are those of the Commonwealth, notably the United Kingdom and its political “children”, like the U.S.A. Given that the UK, was one of the first countries to properly introduce the notion of organised political action through parties and electoral processes in the modern sense, the system remains in place as part of tradition. Given that in its judicial composition, Britain relies heavily on precedent and tradition, inertia keeps the system alive in a period when it is no longer applicable.</p><p>When First-Past-the-Post was applied, the political landscape was diametrically different to the one we have today. Most notably, universal suffrage had not been introduced, meaning that only small portions of the populace could partake in the electoral process, namely land-owning elites and aristocrats, which constituted high-information, highly integrated into the political apparatus individuals. Thus, given the essentially non-ideological nature of the electoral process, it was natural that there would be a limited number of factions, representing a narrow set of choices often of a binary nature — for or against a prevailing issue of the day which had to be addressed. Given that the electing sub electorate likely had personal connections with the candidates and/or the leadership of the parties they supported, First-Past-the-Post made perfect sense to elect the representative which expressed the wishes of the largest portion of the voting elites, even if this was by a small margin — the work of the government had to continue and thus could not, nor should it be impeded by quarrels over policy matters, that had no major substantial reformative aims. In concrete terms, a landowner vs. merchant dispute whilst important for the economy in general, did not ideologically challenge the status quo of the regime.</p><p>The XX century and especially the end of World War I, brought about the emergence of mass politics, which were dubbed as such due to the effort of parties to appeal, call to action and encompass in their ranks the largest number of individuals and groups possible, but also because they addressed specific group. These parties were charged ideologically beyond any historical precedent and represented worldviews challenging the existing order, which had brought about WWI. Communism, Socialism, Fascism and everything in between was being expressed in a lively and fiery manner by new political formations that wanted to garner power. In this instance, a First-Past-the-Post system might still have its utilities. In a fragmented political landscape, in which violence might erupt, and revolutionary fervour is ever-present, it is beneficial to have an electoral system which would create a stable government and would not divide to a point where non-electoral means of achieving power would seem the only viable path to executive power.</p><p>However, it is my informed conviction that in the aftermath of WWII and increasingly so after the World Financial Crisis of 2008, this system has become completely redundant and counter-productive in breeding more radicalism, political despair, immobility of the masses and irritation of those with a public and ideological vocation. When the Financial Crisis hit the U.S.A., the protests against the status quo were extremely interesting from the viewpoint of a political theorist. On the one hand, the “usual” crowds of left-wing redistributionists were blaming the 1% for the disaster, whilst on the same streets a very different ideological group was also blaming the elites, not because they support some form of socialism or redistributive policies, but because they saw governmental intervention in the market and collusion of big business with the state as the cause of the collapse. To encapsulate the moment ideologically, there were at this point, at least four recognisable ideological factions; those of the traditional, centre-right and centre-left dichotomies and two emerging more “radical” factions on their respective right and left. The Tea Party and the Bernie Bros, were just as relevant in 2015 as their mainstream counterparts. If either of these factions lost in their side of the battle they would feel unrepresented by the binary choice Republican v. Democrat. This is exemplified by the fact that a large proportion of individuals who supported and voted for Bernie Sanders in the primaries did not vote for Hillary Clinton, the perceived “centrist” candidate in the race, whilst it has highly anticipated that if Trump were to lose to the mainstream centre-right establishment of the GOP he would run as an independent and potentially divide the party fatally. Nevertheless, what allows for such firebrands like Trump and others for both parties on a more localised level to garner success and overcome the limitations of First-Past-the-Post, which I am denouncing is the primary mechanism within parties in the U.S., which sadly is not part of the political tradition in Europe.</p><p>To arrive at the matter at hand, I am genuinely intrigued by the lack of vitalism in pushing for electoral reform. Part of this reluctancy to invest significant energy in such initiative is perhaps a respect for tradition, and whilst I do not reject such an assumption, I argue that the main reason for majoritarianism remaining prevalent, even when it has completely failed to serve the multitude of policy and ideological segments of which the current electorate is made of, is the fact that when parties are able to enact change, they find themselves favoured by the system, therefore there is a bizarre safety mechanism that ensures continuity for this outdated system.</p><p>The two more recent examples of this inaction is that of Marine Le Pen, when the former Prime Minister Michel Barnier, reluctantly sat down to negotiate with her and her National Rally party, in order to avoid his government falling due to the non-approval of the budget. As a political observer and commentator, I thought this was a golden opportunity to push towards electoral reform, however this was mentioned very briefly and only in speculation from right-wing media in the country. The majoritarian system has hurt Le Pen’s political formation the most, given that it was precisely created to prevent radical candidates from entering the legislative and consequentially accessing executive power. To illustrate this, we can reflect on the 2017 French Legislative Elections, when the National Rally received 13.2% of the popular vote in the first round, which ended up translating in 8 seats in a legislative body of 577, so a 9.5 times smaller representation, mathematically speaking.</p><p>In wit, one would believe that if any political power, in a given developed democracy would relentlessly and at any opportunity would attempt electoral reform that would be the National Rally. However, this was not the case. The reason being that seeing the statistical trends of her performance, Le Pen can conclude that she will manage to capture many more constituencies within the majoritarian system, enough to even garner a legislative majority. In the meantime, she also understands that her brand of politics will never popular enough to secure such a result in a more proportional system and she would have to “fish” for allies and compromises. Therefore, she would rather “sacrifice” a couple of electoral cycles and embrace power, using the tools that the system had devised against her.</p><p>Another telling example is that of Nigel Farage and Reform Party. They swept the recent local elections, precisely leveraging the First-Past-the-Post. As the last few European Elections prior to the formal completion of BREXIT indicated — alongside current polling for Reform — Farage has a ceiling of popularity which stands at around 25%. He has ceased calls for electoral reform, even though his party with 14.3% of the popular vote in the UK elections of 2024, only received 5 seats, when by comparison the Liberal Democrats with 12.2% won 72 constituencies. Surely, that would be revolting to the point where Reform should champion the issue of electoral change as much as its other flagship issues. However, what Farage and his companions must have understood is that again, now that they are winning there is no need to push for such a reform. Allowing electoral statistics and the traditional parties to work their self-destructive magic, Farage could seize a Parliamentarian majority, with slightly above a quarter of the popular support.</p><p>An alternative explanation as to why resources in the UK are not being poured towards electoral reform, could also be the failed AV referendum of 2011, negotiated by the Liberal Democrats in order to enter coalition government with the Conservative David Cameron, which was rejected by the voters and failed to gather the 50% required participation to become mandatory. Whilst, Alternative Voting is not a proportional system, it was considered a “middle-ground” solution, however it also got rejected, thus indicating that the mood is not there for the British public to accept such a change in its long-held tradition.</p><p>Nevertheless, even when entertaining such alternative considerations, I maintain that the major reason that electoral reform is so challenging in countries where majoritarianism is part of the tradition, is due to the fact that when subjects that theoretically would want such changes arrive at a position of power, utilize the system rather than risk needing coalitions for their future power plans. This inevitably will lead to more frustration and feelings of alienation by large segments of the public, which could metastasize into non-electoral modes of thinking for thinkers and ideological movements that find themselves temporarily lost due to this systemic disadvantage. With the proliferation of the internet and the free exchange of ideas, it is inevitable that evermore niche ideological tendencies will break down the electoral in ways that cannot be confined into a two — or even four — party system. How will the party establishments deal with this reality remains a puzzle for the future. Endo-party democracy can only do so much in containing fragmentation, large coalition-building will be necessary in the next few years, alliances that will be structured on utilitarian thinking of having to accept the least amount of compromises.</p><p>This issue of ideological divergences will be discussed in another blog, so look out for that!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eb7f4ae3c291" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Occupying the Ideological Conservative Left: A closer look into the BSW]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nomosnexus/occupying-the-ideological-conservative-left-a-closer-look-into-the-bsw-705fda6c9109?source=rss-3d8209e0cafa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/705fda6c9109</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bsw]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[germany]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-behavior]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nomos Nexus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Dec 2024 15:28:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-07T15:28:55.145Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this blog, the political, and especially the electoral arena is seen through the lenses of an economist, as a market, where there is an ideological demand and an offer that corresponds — or not — to the what the public requires.</p><p>As most people — even those uninterested in politics — will know, generally what we define as right and left wing, is delineated as follows: right wingers are fiscally liberal — nominally favour lower rates of taxation and are opposed to a large intervening “nanny-state”, whilst remaining sceptical towards what is deemed as social “progression”, in the historicist meaning of the word; on the other hand, left-wing parties are socialist and collectivist in the economic sphere, whilst being promoters of societal changes, given that traditional norms and structures are perceived as institutionally of the right and serving the “oppressor” class.</p><p>Being “far-right/left”, merely implies pushing these stances to their logical conclusion and moving away from the consensus of the “centre” which has governed the West from the end of the Cold War, up until roughly 2016 and remains strongly positioned to the day of the writing of this article.</p><p>Surprisingly, there is little interest in has been — for lack of a better term — dubbed in this article as “conservative left”, namely a political offer which is left-wing economically, therefore in favour of social welfare and a constructive state that intervenes actively in the economic sphere, for the purposes of redistribution and support of those who are considered less fortunate, whilst being nationalistic, sceptical of radical social changes and championing values historically associated with the right, such as tradition, religion and authority.</p><p>I say this is surprising, given that from the earliest systemic analysis of public opinion there is a clear indication that large segments of the public, on a base or instinctual level subscribe to such an ideological stance and would therefore be prone to support electoral subjects that promote such a worldview. To illustrate this point, I can refer to Seymour Martin Lipset — an authority on public opinion formation — and his seminal work, “Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics” (1960), throughout which as he was examining the attitudes amongst voters, noted that a large segment of the working class, supported left-wing economic reforms — as is to be expected — however, expressed hard-right social views, most notably resisting progressive ideas about the family structure, supporting a punitive, rather than a rehabilitating justice system and even showing admiration for the practices of fascist dictators. The author explains this ideological convergence, as a product of social insecurity and cultural dynamics. The phenomenon was named “working-class authoritarianism” by Lipset, but throughout the rest of his research he clearly indicates that such “irregular” modes of thinking were present in other social strata.</p><p>In another classic study, conducted by Eric Hoffer, entitled “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements” (1951), the author delves into the psychological and sociological factors which push a large segment of the public to rally themselves around movements that promise economic security, coupled with cultural unity.</p><p>Therefore, it is evident that the electoral “market”, had a “consumer” base for a product that was genuinely rare, beyond fringe electoral subjects who marketed themselves too far outside the Overton Window on the authoritarian right, therefore could not capture the mood of this electorate. One explanation as to why this ideological space was not occupied by successful political entrepreneurs could be the fact that material and historical conditions were impeding such an undertaking to flourish. Increasing productivity, rising living standards and the Cold War dictated the dominance of the two-party system, and the ideological nature of the dichotomy that was described in the opening paragraphs.</p><p>Alas, these conditions apply no longer. The political West is being outcompeted in economic production, living standards are falling drastically and an array of socio-political conditions have made large segments of the public re-assess their political allegiances and re-position themselves in the ideological spectrum.</p><p>Thus, a political movement that capitalized on this vacuum and provides the “par excellence” example for our analysis is the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance — Reason and Justice (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht — Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, BSW), a party founded only a few months before in the beginning of this year. The first thing that is evident is the presence of the name of the leader in the party’s title, thus re-enforcing what was stated <a href="https://nomosnexus.blogspot.com/2024/11/the-winning-formula-for-new-political.html">in the first article of this blog</a> that one of the elements of the “winning formula” for new political parties is to have a leader that has an established political career that can be marketed effectively to the public. This combination of the novice with the familiar, is highly effective in the post-2008 party system.</p><p>The party is a break-away from “Die Linke”, the left-wing party, which was electorally viable in the East of Germany, being perceived as a “soft” descendant of the socialist regime of in the D.R.G and was supported by people nostalgic of the system. However, in the latter years it had shifted much more to the progressive side of the social equation, embracing environmentalism, the doctrine of open borders and generally bought on the whole package of policies, where it could not possibly compete, given that the original purveyors of such ideals, the Greens had picked all the fruits of that tree. This made way for the AfD, albeit right-wing and quite libertarian economically to increase its support in the East of Germany — to the point of becoming the first party in several regions and the overall first party amongst the youth and men in the East — merely due to its social rhetoric and anti-migration stance.</p><p>Extracting many others from Die Linke, such as Amira Mohamed Ali, Christian Leye etc., Wagenknecht positioned the new party as a left-wing, populist alternative, advocating socialist policies, combined with a critical view of the green agenda, Euroscepticism, anti-migration and social conservatism. For any thinking observer of politics, this ideological “cocktail” was bound to succeed.</p><p>However, what makes this political subject even more exciting in the eyes of the Political Behaviourist is the novice and unique intra-party structure. The BSW literally created a layered referral membership system, similar to luxury brands, or pyramid schemes — you choose whichever one you prefer as an example. The vision is to have a small and intentionally limited membership base. The party distinguishes between full members and registered supporters. Applicants for membership must be vouched for by an existing member and every single application must be approved by the party’s Federal Executive Board. In the beginning, the party membership was capped at 450, however due to the large volume of applications and referrals, it has been increased to allow 2000 full memberships by 2025. This was justified by Wagenknecht as necessary to ensure that only believers in the cause can be part of the decision-making bodies of the party, and no one can obstruct the strategic vision implemented in its formation.</p><p>Having witnessed the subversion of many new political formations by entryism and their transformation into something unrecognisable to what they were in the beginning (notably the “5 Star Movement” in Italy), from a practical point of view this strategy is highly commendable. Additionally, imagine the motivation of the rare few that are admitted to be full-time members to campaign for the party, to contribute and to be active.</p><p>In the first five months of existence, the party secured approximately 6% of the national vote in Germany for the European Elections, performing particularly well in eastern German States and condemning Die Linke, extracting votes from the ruling SPD, and according to meta-analyses conducted the AfD. The timing of the creation of the party is indicative of the electoral expertise at the helm of the party. It is a well-established that European Elections are a more fertile ground for new political subjects, given that voters do not perceive them as crucial, view them as a vehicle to send political messages without much consequence — therefore, there is a significant increase in the protest vote — and the centrist electorate is likely to participate less and engage less in campaigning.</p><p>In subsequent months, in state elections in the eastern regions of Saxony, Thuringia, and Branderburg, the BSW garnered 11–16% of the vote, possibly being the kingmaker in some of these states. The appeal to disaffected voters was recorded immediately by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lower-taxes-higher-pensions-new-leftist-party-wins-over-germanys-disaffected-2024-06-10/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Reuters</a>. It is remarkable how a 10-month old party beat most of the established brands in German politics.</p><p>The story of the leader of the party, is almost as provoking as that of the political subject itself. Sahra Wagenknecht was born in East Germany, from an Iranian father and a mother that worked in the state-run art distributor in East Berlin. She joined the Socialist Unity Party in early 1989, a time-period when one assumes that most young people would be looking away from left-wing politics in Eastern Germany. She studied philosophy and modern German literature at universities in Jena and Berlin, but did not complete her thesis, due to a lack of support for her research — is that not the fate of most interesting people in contemporary academia??… I digress — however she did manage to earn a PhD in economics in 2012, having led the Communist Platform within the Die Linke throughout the late 2000s. Most notably, she was vice-chair of the Parliamentary Group from 2015 to 2019, period throughout the party was drifting away from the concerns of its traditional electoral base, towards more “trendy” ideologies.</p><p>One can speculate that this relatively long experience with the structures of Die Linke, positioned her in a favourable position to be able to extract functionaries and people with local influence, which can be an additional explanatory factor for the very fast electoral success of the party.</p><p>As re-iterated above, the blog does not intent in making normative assessments’ whatsoever. The “good” in the eye of the entrepreneur is what brings more capital, which in this case is votes. Whether this ideological stance is “right” or “wrong” is a matter of discussion in philosophy forums and undoubtedly it is a crucial and fruitful discussion to be had. The point that ought to be conveyed clearly in this case is that as theoretically framed, there is indeed an electoral pull for such a blend of politics, and other political entrepreneurs ought to exploit the existing vacuum in a lot of countries.</p><p>In another example of the success of this formula, is evident in France where the first party currently, although known in the punditry parlance as “far-right”, is anything but when it comes to its economic platform that can be more appropriately described as “welfare chauvinistic”. The “nanny state” is preferable as long as it serves nationals, rather than foreigners. Michel Barnier’s government fell due to not being able to comply with the National Rally’s high spending demands. For both the BSW and the RN, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/">poll trends</a> show them on the rise.</p><p>In future blogs, other non-orthodox political cocktails will be analysed to judge them, for their electoral viability, but this ought to have been the first, given that it is more established in the literature as a viable alternative and the electoral results support the thesis.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=705fda6c9109" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The “Winning Formula” for new Political Parties]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@nomosnexus/the-winning-formula-for-new-political-parties-691a3cbbe5dc?source=rss-3d8209e0cafa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/691a3cbbe5dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[party-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electoral-behavior]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nomos Nexus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 Nov 2024 15:42:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-30T15:42:40.885Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7ouYp9m_fFIfGoawtGZZRw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, it became evident, even beyond the realm of the academic discipline of Political Behaviour that the socio-economic landscapes across Europe having undergone significant shifts, required a move away from the “catch-all” paradigm of the party system, which was prevalent throughout the 20-th century, especially after the fall of the Eastern Bloc.</p><p>To summarize, political scientists have delineated the history of party politics — mostly in the West where elections and democratic considerations apply — into different eras, in order to describe the nature and ideological content of political parties that competed in the electoral arena. Thus, in the early 20-th century the political arena was characterized by “mass” parties who were dubbed as such, due to their intent in mobilizing masses of the electorate in order to achieve political power, mostly appealing to a certain socio-economic class in the material sense.</p><p>In concrete terms, left-wing political movements aimed at garnering the political energy of the working classes and capitalize on their electoral power, with little consideration or interest of mobilizing support outside this designated sub-electorate. Similarly, other ideological appeals were aimed at specific socio-economical groupings, rather than the electorate as a whole. Naturally, this is a generalization, but as it is common in the Social Sciences we accept conventional generalisation that serve as adequate frameworks of analysis.</p><p>After the end of WWII, the electoral scenery was shaped to the political party reality that we have come to understand in recent years. Ideology was put into a secondary frame and parties were aiming to appeal and capture the vote of evermore wider publics, to the point that political leaders would argue that any voter regardless of demographic and social identity would be better off supporting them. This dynamic created two-party systems in the majority of democratic countries, where centre-left and centre-right were alternating in power, with a public that was switching their voting patterns between electoral subjects and with political formations did not occupy the extremes of the ideological spectrum and generally continued the same line of policy in matters such as Foreign Policy, adherence to international institutions and standards, as well as a generally centrist-mixed economic policy, with no hardline libertarian or distributionist policies.</p><p>However, the 2008 crisis not only upended economies but also sowed distrust in established political systems. From the Tea Party on the Right, to the “Occupy” movement on the left, in the USA, the two party-system was fragmented, as even in countries where the First-Past-the-Post system basically ensured the hegemony of such a dualistic reality, many factions based on niche ideological priorities and increasingly identitarian focus, were proliferating.</p><p>In countries like Greece, Italy, and Spain, which were hit hardest by austerity, this disillusionment was stark. Citizens demanded alternatives, leading to the emergence of numerous political parties — both radical and moderate — that aimed to either disrupt or reimagine the status quo. Therefore, a clear theoretical break can be observed from the “catch-all”, system. Polarization, “hardcore” ideology and identity politics were back on the electoral menu, and in retrospect we can attest that these were not temporary trends, but remained salient up to the point where the perceived “extremes” have more positions of power and public influence in numerous countries such as Italy, France, Germany, the UK and of course in the US, where primaries guarantee that disruptions in the base of political parties will be reflected in Congressional and Presidential races.</p><p>However, even though establishing that the party system framework is outdated, is an evident statement, what is replacing it, is not clear. We don’t only lack a consensus, but generally we lack even theories when it comes to what the new era of party politics ought to be names and what characterizes it.</p><p>For this reason, I conducted a study focusing on the EU-14, countries with longer histories of democracy that would allow me to encapsulate mature political trends and to see where the new parties are driving the system as a whole.</p><p>What became apparent when I was collecting the data was that contrary to the narrative that new parties are primarily populist or extremist, — as alarmingly portrayed by the media — given that out of 75 new political parties studied, roughly half (39) were classified as anti-establishment, while the other half (36) were moderate challengers. This balance underscores that dissatisfaction with mainstream politics was not read correctly by all political entrepreneurs who came into the political “market” with the same ideological and organisational proposition as hegemonic, old parties. In the subsequent analysis, I prove that the only way an ideologically moderate party — such as the “En Marche” of Emmanuel Macron — could only be electorally viable and successful with they innovate in terms of organisation and recruitment.</p><p>To fully comprehend the framework of the study, I would like to underscore how when it comes to electoral issues the political arena is similar to an economic market. Entrepreneurs (politicians) offer a product (the party) which has to be more favourable to the consumer (the voter) than their competitors. To do this in such a crowded market as that of political parties is challenging and requires innovative strategic management when it comes to how the party is organised and great marketing (campaigning).</p><p>Having run the analysis of political parties that managed to survive their first years of existence and become electoral powerhouses either in government, or major opposition players I came to the conclusion that success for these new parties often hinges on a few critical factors:</p><p>1. <strong>Ideological Distinction and Positioning</strong>:</p><p>New parties thrive when they communicate in strong terms against the status quo, even when they lack a clearly definable ideological identity. The “par excellence” example of this would be the “5-Star Movement” in Italy which managed to get into power, employing a very rhetorically heavy campaign, whilst not confining itself to traditional camps. Anti-establishment parties often exploit populist rhetoric, presenting themselves as champions of the “people” against a corrupt elite, and empirically this communication strategy seems to resonate with the electorate, especially young voters.</p><p>2. <strong>Flexibility and Organizational Innovation</strong>:</p><p>Unlike traditional “catch-all” parties, successful newcomers tend to adopt decentralized or innovative organizational structures. For instance, Italy’s 5 Star Movement leveraged digital platforms for member participation, creating a sense of direct democracy. This openness contrasts sharply with the bureaucratic rigidity of older parties. Digitalisation of the membership and decision-making process is a MUST for any political party that wants to have electoral success in the 21-st century.</p><p>3. <strong>Leadership and Accessibility</strong>:</p><p>Charismatic leadership remains a cornerstone of success. Leaders with a pre-existing public profile or a clear vision can rally initial support more effectively. EM in France branded the political party with his initials and marketed himself as the embodiment of a new movement, which was proven enough to gain presidential power, in a country as fragmented and politicised as France. Beppe Grillo, Nigel Farage, Donald Trump — are all proof that a good figurehead in today’s popular culture can be sufficient to ensure political success, provided that people feel it is a mass movement (easily accessible and with opportunities for personal growth and careerism within the movement) and that it tries to replace the status-quo.</p><p>4. <strong>Exploiting Socio-Political Moments</strong>:</p><p>Timing is critical, as is often the case in other markets besides the electoral one. Many of the successful parties capitalized on specific crises, whether economic, cultural, or related to national identity. For example, the Brexit Party in the UK and Vox in Spain rose to prominence by addressing national debates on sovereignty and immigration, respectively. If there is a migrant crisis, any entrepreneur needs to act fast and preferably first. The attention span of the public has decreased radically the last decades, and if one employs rhetoric or tries to occupy an ideological position that has been taken before, the electorate is prone not to pay attention and to purchase the stock of the undertaking that first drew their attention effectively.</p><p><strong>Lessons for Today’s Political Entrepreneurs</strong></p><p>These findings remain highly relevant in today’s volatile political climate. For aspiring political entrepreneurs, the winning formula involves:</p><p>Tapping into unaddressed grievances or societal shifts.</p><p>Innovating organizationally to appeal to disenchanted but digitally savvy voters.</p><p>Striking a balance between charismatic leadership and participatory mechanisms.</p><p>While the barriers to entry in politics remain high, especially in more entrenched systems, the demand for alternatives to traditional parties suggests that the door for new players is far from closed. Understanding and applying these principles can turn political discontent into electoral momentum, reshaping the political landscape for years to come.</p><p>In wit, albeit what is presented here is not a perfect “formula”, it should clearly signal that new political parties if they want to break through in the electoral market ought to be rhetorically strong, but ideologically flexible, digitally present and inclusive for careerists and people who want to become activists; and crucially act within time-frameworks where the established parties are vulnerable and fail to account for new crises or realities.</p><p>Whilst I lack the hubris to name the new party system, I can reiterate after looking at the numbers that the “catch-all” system of political parties is dead, something that I believe most members of the People’s European Party and Social-Democrats in Brussels can confirm.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=691a3cbbe5dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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