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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Oğuzhan Açıkgöz on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Oğuzhan Açıkgöz on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Oğuzhan Açıkgöz on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Future of Ukrainian Temporary Protection Status Holders in Ireland and EU Law]]></title>
            <link>https://oguzhanacikgoz.medium.com/the-future-of-ukrainian-temporary-protection-status-holders-in-ireland-and-eu-law-e1ce32b59d4c?source=rss-8da455a4c11f------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Oğuzhan Açıkgöz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2024 13:54:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-14T13:54:28.355Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*0Q8ZnBHMkhkdcddq.jpg" /><figcaption><em>© dovapi | Freepik</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>I. Introduction</strong></p><p>Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, like most European countries, Ireland initially welcomed refugees from Ukraine, having implemented temporary protection in accordance with the European Council’s Directive as of March 2022. [1] Additionally, on 16 February 2023, Ireland extended temporary protection for an additional year, that is until March 2024. [2] As of 31 January 2024, Ireland has received over 101,200 individuals from Ukraine, with 74,500 currently residing in state-provided housing and 57,000 in fully serviced accommodations. [3] A significant number of these individuals receive additional financial support, and more than 16,000 are currently in employment. [4] However, the scope of temporary protection on the ground has gradually shrunk, arguably through a process of compassion fatigue. In December 2023, the Irish Government announced that the special status granted to Ukrainian refugees would end. Benefits for State residents under status, for example, were reduced from €220 to €38.80 per week, and the right to apply for social assistance was made conditional on leaving State housing. Ireland further announced that from the end of January 2024, new arrivals from the country will only be provided with State accommodation for up to 90 days. [5] The uncertainty of the war between Ukraine and Russia directly affects the policy-making process of the Irish government and changes the conditions for obtaining temporary protection status for newly arrived Ukrainian refugees. As per Article 4 of the Directive that was accepted in March 2022, considering the temporary protection regimes cannot continue for more than three years, the war between Ukraine and Russia could change these time limits. [6]</p><p>This post provides a brief overview of the circumstances surrounding individuals with temporary protection status from Ukraine in Ireland and also explores potential scenarios that may unfold after the conclusion of the temporary protection period for Ukrainians in the European Union.</p><p><strong>II. Temporary Protection Status in Ireland</strong></p><p>Temporary protection under European Union law is an extraordinary measure designed by the European Commission in the aftermath of the Yugoslav war to offer immediate asylum to forcibly displaced individuals from non-EU countries. [7] It is extended to those who cannot return to their homeland, and whose arrival in masses is deemed by the commission to potentially overcrowd the existing protection scheme. Enacted under the Temporary Protection Directive of 2001, Ireland opted in on April 11, 2003. [8] The directive’s application in Ireland began which took effect on December 31, 2003. [9] Under Irish law, the directive was incorporated by Section 60 of the International Protection Act of 2015, in the context of large influxes of refugees into Europe triggered by the Arab spring. [10] However, it was not until March of 2022, when prompted by the war in Ukraine, that the temporary protection status offered by the directive was activated for the first time. [11] The directive entailed more generous benefits to persons under temporary protection than those under international protection in for example, family reunification rights that were only extended to Ukrainian refugees in Ireland. According to Section 60(2), displaced persons can enter and stay in Ireland based on a Council Decision, with their data registered by the Minister for Justice. Permission granted under Section 60(7) were initially valid for one year and can be renewed, allowing beneficiaries of temporary protection to work, pursue education, and access medical care and social welfare benefits on par with Irish citizens, with beneficiaries not needing to take any action for its renewal. However, section 60(8) outlines conditions for revoking temporary protection, including a decision by the Council to end it, the person being transferred to another EU member state, or exclusion based on reasons enumerated under Section 60(3).</p><p>In response to the widespread displacement of Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion, EU took unified action by unanimously approving the Council’s Implementation of Decision 2022/382 on March 4, 2022. This decision activated the Council Directive 2001/55/EC, as a measure to address the urgent humanitarian needs of the affected population. According to the Directive, temporary protection in Ireland is extended to specific categories of individuals who have been compelled to leave Ukraine due to the Russian invasion. [12]. This includes: Ukrainian nationals who were residing in Ukraine before February 24, 2022; Nationals of a third country (other than Ukraine) or stateless persons who would have qualified for international protection, including refugee status or an equivalent national protection status in Ukraine, and were residing there before February 24, 2022; Family members of individuals covered by Article 2 of the Directive, provided the family already resided in Ukraine prior to February 24, 2022. [13] Additionally, family members encompass spouses or partners, unmarried minor children of either, and other close dependent family relatives living together as a family unit before the specified date. [14]</p><p>According to the Ministry of Justice, people who are considering leaving Ukraine and traveling to Ireland may do so without a visa and will be entitled to temporary protection under the Temporary Protection Directive. Persons without a valid passport may also use other forms of ID to travel. Family members who are not Ukrainian citizens may require a visa for travel. [15]</p><p><strong>III. Extensions and Termination of Temporary Protection Status</strong></p><p>Temporary protection will be terminated individually in case of resettlement, voluntary repatriation, benefiting from the protection of another country, transfer to the residence permit, or death. [16] In the event that the Russian invasion concludes and Ukraine becomes secure for those under temporary protection to return before March 4, 2025, the Council has the authority to make a decision, backed by a qualified majority upon the Commission’s proposal, to conclude the temporary protection scheme. In such an instance, individuals classified as temporary protection beneficiaries, apprehensive of potential persecution, torture, or exposure to inhumane or degrading treatment and punishment, are entitled to submit applications for international protection. [17]</p><p>If the Russian invasion of Ukraine persists beyond March 2025 or, in the event of its conclusion, leaves Ukraine in conditions unsuitable for the secure and sustainable return of the protected groups, the automatic termination of the temporary protection regime will occur on March 4, 2025, as the stipulated time limit will be reached. In adherence to Directive 2001/55/EC, according to Section 21 of the Council Implementing Decision 2022, the stipulated duration for temporary protection is initially set for one year. Unless concluded under the conditions specified in Article 6(1)(b) of the Directive, this period is subject to automatic extensions of six-month intervals, with a maximum extension period of one year. Therefore according to Article 6(1)(a) of the Directive, temporary protection shall come to an end when the maximum duration has been reached within 3 years. Article 21 of the Decision states Ireland is bound by Directive 2001/55/EC and is therefore taking part in the adoption of this Decision.</p><p><strong>IV. Discussion and Conclusion</strong></p><p>As a result, the legal situation of Ukrainian temporary protection holders after March 4, 2025 is unclear. This state of uncertainty affects policy-making processes regarding the internal governance of states. With accepting Directive, states are obliged to provide residence, access to the labor market and housing, medical assistance, social welfare assistance, and access to education for children. Preparing plans to exit strategies from temporary schemes necessitates anticipating future developments. Much is dependent upon the dynamics of the conflict spurring this displacement — its duration, intensity, outcome, and other elements of its evolution — as well as upon Ukraine’s post-war recovery. [18] If the war extends beyond the conclusion of temporary protection arrangements, both policy choices and the available options for Ukrainians will likely be constrained. Recent findings from a UNHCR survey indicate that while 65% express a desire to eventually return to Ukraine, the majority intend to remain in their current host country for the foreseeable future. [19] As the war persists without a feasible pathway for repatriation, the number of individuals willing or able to plan a return diminishes. In such circumstances, the emphasis on remaining in the current location becomes increasingly significant as a practical and viable solution. [20]</p><p>However, if the war continues, sending Ukrainians back to an unsafe country is clearly not possible in the context of international human rights under the principle of non-refoulement. [21] For this reason, the European Union should make a new regulation regarding time extensions for temporary protection status. During this extended period, European Union countries should act with the principle of equal responsibility and ensure that they fulfill their responsibilities towards Ukrainian temporary protection holders. Moreover, if a common decision is made about the uncertainty of the war by the EU, member states should work to extend the temporary status of Ukrainians and focus on social protection to avoid violations of Ukrainians’ human rights. States should start working to transition from temporary measures to permanent measures. Temporary protection has primarily been designed as an ad hoc emergency solution without the intention of providing a long-term right to stay. Extended durations of temporary status negatively impact individuals’ and families’ social and economic integration. For example, the Temporary Protection Directive called on States to provide status holders with the right to access education and the access to the labor market. If these students continue their education in their native language in the host country, it will make it difficult for them to get used to the current country, and they may not find the motivation to learn the language of the country they come to temporarily. On the other hand, employers may be less open to investing in workers with uncertain futures, and Ukrainian workers may be less motivated to take the necessary steps to learn the national language or find a job that will make full use of their skills.</p><p><strong>REFERENCES</strong></p><p>[1] Carmen González Enríquez, ‘The welcome given to Ukrainian refugees: some challenges and uncertainties’ (2022) Policy Report of Elcano Royal Institute 2.</p><p>[2] European Council on Refugees and Exiles Asylum Information Database Ireland Report (2022) 3.</p><p>[3] Department of Justice, Government approves changes to measures for those fleeing war in Ukraine, Press Release (Access Date: 15 February 2024).</p><p><a href="https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/b5d86-government-approves-changes-to-measures-for-those-fleeing-war-in-ukraine/">https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/b5d86-government-approves-changes-to-measures-for-those-fleeing-war-in-ukraine/</a></p><p>[4] ibid.</p><p>[5] Ronan McGreevy, ‘More than 500 Ukrainians arriving in Ireland each week’ (2024) The Irish Times (Access Date: 5 February 2024).</p><p><a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/social-affairs/2024/01/03/more-than-500-ukrainians-arriving-in-ireland-each-week-as-changes-to-welfare-payments-set-to-come-into-effect/">https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/social-affairs/2024/01/03/more-than-500-ukrainians-arriving-in-ireland-each-week-as-changes-to-welfare-payments-set-to-come-into-effect/</a></p><p>[6] Communication from the Commission on Operational guidelines for the implementation of Council implementing Decision 2022/382 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection 2022/C 126 I/01 (Accessed Date: 5 February 2024)</p><p><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022XC0321%2803%29&amp;qid=1647940863274">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022XC0321%2803%29&amp;qid=1647940863274</a></p><p>[7] H. Deniz Genç and N. Aslı Şirin Öner, ‘Why not Activated? The Temporary Protection Directive and the Mystery of Temporary Protection in the European Union’ (2019) International Journal of Political Science &amp; Urban Studies 5.</p><p>[8] Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 (Access Date: 5 February 2024).</p><p><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001L0055&amp;qid=1648223587338">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001L0055&amp;qid=1648223587338</a></p><p>[9] European Council on Refugees and Exiles Asylum Information Database Ireland Report (2022) 3.</p><p>[10] Section 60 of International Protection Act 2015 (Access Date: 5 February 2024)</p><p><a href="https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/66/section/60/enacted/en/html">https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/66/section/60/enacted/en/html</a></p><p>[11] Tamara Kortukova et al. ‘Peculiarities of the Legal Regulation of Temporary Protection in the European Union in the Context of the Aggressive War of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine’ (2023) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 669.</p><p>[12] Communication from the Commission on Operational guidelines for the implementation of Council implementing Decision 2022/382 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection 2022/C 126 I/01 (Accessed Date: 5 February 2024)</p><p><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022XC0321%2803%29&amp;qid=1647940863274">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022XC0321%2803%29&amp;qid=1647940863274</a></p><p>[13] ibid.</p><p>[14] ibid.</p><p>[15] Ministry of Justice Press Release dated 4 March 2022. (Access Date: 6 February 2024)</p><p><a href="https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/c25ec-minister-mcentee-attends-justice-and-home-affairs-council-in-brussels/?referrer=https://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR22000044">https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/c25ec-minister-mcentee-attends-justice-and-home-affairs-council-in-brussels/?referrer=https://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR22000044</a></p><p>[16] Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘The End of Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation of Refugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection’ (1999) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 343.</p><p>[17] Meltem İneli-Ciger, ‘What happens next? Scenarios following the end of the temporary protection in the EU’ (2023) EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy Blog (Access Date: 3 February 2024).</p><p><a href="https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/what-happens-next-scenarios-following-the-end-of-the-temporary-protection-in-the-eu/">https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/what-happens-next-scenarios-following-the-end-of-the-temporary-protection-in-the-eu/</a></p><p>[18] International Center for Migration Policy Development Discussion Paper, RESPONDING TO DISPLACEMENT FROM UKRAINE: Past, present, and future policies (2023) (Access Date: 27 January 2024).</p><p><a href="https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/59200/file/Responding%2520to%2520displacement%2520from%2520Ukraine%2520Past%2520present%2520and%2520future%2520policies.pdf">https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/59200/file/Responding%2520to%2520displacement%2520from%2520Ukraine%2520Past%2520present%2520and%2520future%2520policies.pdf</a></p><p>[19] ibid.</p><p>[20] ibid.</p><p>[21] According to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, under international human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm. This principle applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status. (Access Date: 10 February 2024).</p><p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf">https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e1ce32b59d4c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Post-Genocide Rebuilding: State Grants Mechanism for Political Parties in the Rwandan Multi-Party…]]></title>
            <link>https://oguzhanacikgoz.medium.com/post-genocide-rebuilding-state-grants-mechanism-for-political-parties-in-the-rwandan-multi-party-0745a85b7e6b?source=rss-8da455a4c11f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwanda]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Oğuzhan Açıkgöz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Feb 2024 13:38:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-02T13:43:31.552Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Post-Genocide Rebuilding: State Grants Mechanism for Political Parties in the Rwandan Multi-Party System</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/873/1*Vmu3_zPLoy-LgSaRmjiXHg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/2018-left-rwandans-more-inclusive-parliament">The News Times</a></figcaption></figure><p>In multi-party political life, eliminating the disadvantages caused by the financial problems that political parties will face is an important issue that should be considered carefully. It is a practice seen in democratic countries to provide state grants to political parties to facilitate their activities, to support political parties from public resources in solving financial problems, and to ensure that the race for power takes place under equal conditions. On the other hand, the criteria to be set for aid to political parties should not corrupt democracy and disturb the balance between political parties. The principle of state aid to political parties is intended to ensure that parties fulfill their functions independently of social and economic power centers. Providing state grants also has the effect of preventing political parties from falling under the influence of large capital groups and making it easier for different classes in society to make policies. Thus, it becomes easier for political parties that can barely survive with membership fees to engage in politics independently. Contrary to this, financing political parties with state aid also raises concerns about dependence on the state. This dependence is particularly evident when state grants cover more than half of the parties’ expenses. It is very difficult to reconcile this situation with democracy. Since State grants constitute a large part of the income of political parties, it can gradually lead to cartelization in the political arena. In addition, political parties that receive state aid and have different programs can remain as indifferent as possible to the demands coming from society.</p><p>Article 54(2) of the Rwandan Constitution states that the procedures for the formation and operation of these political organizations, the conduct of their leaders, and the method of obtaining State grants are specified by an organic law. According to Article 28 of Organic Law no 10/2013/OL of 11/07/2013, State assets cannot be used in the activities or interests of a political organization. However, the State provides grants as follows: in each financial year, the Government provides equal grants to registered political organizations through the authority responsible for the registration of political organizations, following the financial resources of the State; the State provides grants from the budget to political organizations and independent candidates to support their campaign activities. The State grant provided for a political organization or independent candidate that receives at least five percent of the votes cast. Additionally, according to Article 24, the Organic Law governing political organizations and politicians prohibits foreign donations and donations from public enterprises or governmental parastatals.</p><p>In Rwandan practice, this system disadvantages smaller political parties and independent candidates as they are ineligible to receive government funding for their election campaigns. The Rwandan Constitution recognizes a multiparty system and all officially registered political parties are authorized to freely operate in the whole country. Eight parties comprise the Rwandan government: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) leads a coalition that includes the Centrist Democratic Party (PDC), the Rwandan Labor [formerly Socialist] Party (PSR), the Ideal [formerly Islamic] Democratic Party (PDI), and the Democratic Popular Union (UPDR). Other parties in the government include the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Liberal Party (PL), and the Concord Progressive Party (PPC). Other political parties include the Democratic Republican Movement or MDR (officially banned); Party for Democratic Renewal (officially banned). The National Consultative Forum of Political Organizations (NFPO) is composed of these 11 registered political organizations which signed the NFPO Internal Rules and Regulations. NFPO is a permanent framework for political career development, democratic governance, leadership, and political conflict resolution for Political parties’ members. The NFPO is financed through two main sources of funding, state grants as well as financial support from development partners. According to the priorities, the NFPO will make an annual fund for its ordinary budget from the Government. Planned activities shall be done in partnership with stakeholders including Government Institutions (national), UN Agencies and embassies based in Kigali, civil society organizations, and media.</p><p>The constitution and laws outline a multiparty system but provide few rights for parties and their candidates. There are two ways for political parties to receive State grants: either exceeding the 5 percent rate in the elections or receiving state financial support through NFPO. The law no longer required all registered political parties to join the NFPO, but the government strongly encouraged registered parties to become members there. Although this situation ensures political unity, it suppresses political competition and public debate. Considering that there are strict rules on external funding of political parties, these two ways of providing financial support to the parties create state pressure on them.</p><p>It is essential for Rwanda to continually evaluate and refine its approach to state grants, ensuring that financial support does not compromise the principles of democracy. Striking a delicate balance between providing necessary resources for political parties and safeguarding the independence and diversity of political voices is paramount. An inclusive system that addresses the concerns of smaller parties and independent candidates while maintaining transparency and fairness in the allocation of state grants will contribute to a more robust and dynamic democratic environment in Rwanda.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/519/1*fZhkzmFyNZceLTXcsivLgw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0745a85b7e6b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Göçmenleri Taşıyan Teknenin Batırılmasına İlişkin Davada Sözleşme İhlalleri | Davacı: Safi ve…]]></title>
            <link>https://oguzhanacikgoz.medium.com/g%C3%B6%C3%A7menleri-ta%C5%9F%C4%B1yan-teknenin-bat%C4%B1r%C4%B1lmas%C4%B1na-i%CC%87li%C5%9Fkin-davada-s%C3%B6zle%C5%9Fme-i%CC%87hlalleri-davac%C4%B1-safi-ve-2a5be2ced1eb?source=rss-8da455a4c11f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-court-of-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Oğuzhan Açıkgöz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jul 2022 11:02:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-01T15:09:19.116Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Göçmenleri Taşıyan Teknenin Batırılmasına İlişkin Davada Sözleşme İhlalleri | Davacı: Safi ve Diğerleri, Davalı: Yunanistan (Başvuru No:5418/15)</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/864/0*LlTs94a0hv-sv6Gu" /><figcaption>Photo by Adel al-Thabti from Anadolu Agency</figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong>İlgili davanın AİHM Basın Bülteninin Türkçe Çevirisi | Turkish Translation of ECHR Press Release</strong></blockquote><p><strong>Özet</strong></p><p>“Safi ve Diğerleri Yunanistan’a Karşı Davası”, 27 yabancı uyruklu kişiyi taşıyan bir balıkçı teknesinin Ege Denizi’nde Farmakonisi adası açıklarında 20 Ocak 2014 tarihinde batması ve işbu dava başvurucularının akrabaları dahil 11 kişinin ölümüyle ilgilidir.</p><p>Dairenin bugünkü kararında davaya ilişkin, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi oybirliğiyle, aşağıdakilerin mevcut olduğuna karar vermiştir:</p><p><strong>Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin 2. maddesinin (yaşam hakkı) prosedürel başlığı altında ihlal edilmesi.</strong> Mahkeme, yargılamalarda eksiklikler olduğunu tespit etmiş ve Yunanistan makamlarının, teknenin battığı koşullara ışık tutabilecek kapsamlı ve etkili bir soruşturma yürütmediği sonucuna varmıştır.</p><p><strong>Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin 2. maddesinin (yaşam hakkı) kapsamındaki pozitif yükümlülüğe uyulmaması nedeniyle işbu maddenin ihlal edilmesi. </strong>Mahkeme, Yunan makamlarının, başvuranlara ve akrabalarına Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesinin gerektirdiği koruma düzeyini sağlamak için kendilerinden makul olarak beklenebilecek her şeyi yapmadıklarını tespit etmiştir.</p><p><strong>Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin 3. maddesinin (insanlık dışı veya aşağılayıcı muamele yasağı) ihlal edilmesi. </strong>Tekne battıktan sonra Farmakonisi’ye varıldığında üst aramaları nedeniyle aşağılayıcı muameleye maruz kalan batan teknede bulunan 12 başvurucu ile ilgili olarak 3. maddenin ihlal edildiği tespit edilmiştir.</p><p><strong>Temel Bilgiler</strong></p><p>Mahkeme başvurusu, 13 Afgan uyruklu, iki Suriye uyruklu ve bir Filistin uyrukludan oluşan 16 kişilik bir grup tarafından yapılmıştır. Dava, 20 Ocak 2014&#39;te 27 yabancı uyrukluyu taşıyan bir balıkçı teknesinin Ege Denizi’nde Farmakonisi adası açıklarında batmasıyla ilgilidir. Teknenin batmasıyla 11 kişinin öldüğü davada başvurucular, batan teknede bulunan hayatta kalan kişiler ve teknenin batmasıyla hayatını kaybeden kişilerin akrabalarından oluşmaktadır.</p><p>Başvuranlara göre, Yunanistan’a ait sahil güvenlik gemisi, mültecileri Türk sularına doğru geri itmek için çok yüksek bir hızla hareket etmektedir. Yunan sahil güvenlik gemisinin bu hareketi, balıkçı teknesinin alabora olmasına neden olmuştur.</p><p>Yunanistan makamlarınca ise, mültecileri kurtarmak için Farmakonisi adasına doğru çekilmekte olan tekne, gemidekilerin paniliği ve ani hareketleri nedeniyle alabora olmuştur.</p><p><strong>Şikayetler, Mahkemenin Prosedürü ve Oluşumu</strong></p><p>Başvurucular, Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesine (yaşam hakkı) dayanarak, tekne battığında sahil güvenlik görevlilerinin eylemleri ve/veya ihmalleri nedeniyle hayatlarının tehlikeye atıldığını ileri sürmüşlerdir. Başvuranlardan bazıları da bu doğrultuda akrabalarının ölümlerini gerekçe göstererek şikayette bulunmuşlardır.</p><p>Başvurucular, Sözleşme’nin 2. maddenin prosedürel başlığına dayanarak, ölümcül kazanın sorumlularını belirlemek için ulusal makamlar tarafından yürütülen idari ve adli soruşturmanın yetersiz olduğunu iddia etmişlerdir.</p><p>Sözleşme’nin 13. maddesi (etkili başvuru hakkı) kapsamında, 2. madde kapsamında şikayetlerini iletebilecekleri etkili bir iç hukuk yoluna sahip olmadıklarını ileri sürmüşlerdir.</p><p>Mahkeme, bu şikayetleri yalnızca 2. madde kapsamında incelemeye karar vermiştir.</p><p>Ayrıca Başvurucular Sözleşme’nin 3. maddesine (insanlık dışı veya aşağılayıcı muamele yasağı) dayanarak, sahil güvenlik görevlileri tarafından Farmakonisi adasına nakledilmelerinin ardından insanlık dışı ve/veya aşağılayıcı muameleye maruz kaldıklarından şikâyetçi olmuşlardır.</p><p>Başvuru, 21 Ocak 2015 tarihinde Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’ne yapılmıştır.</p><p>Mahkeme kararı, aşağıda belirtilen yedi yargıçtan oluşan Daire tarafından verilmiştir:</p><p>Marko Bošnjak (Slovenya), Başkan,</p><p>Péter Paczolay (Macaristan),</p><p>Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Polonya),</p><p>Alena Poláčková (Slovakya),</p><p>Erik Wennerström (İsveç),</p><p>Raffaele Sabato (İtalya),</p><p>Ioannis Ktistakis (Yunanistan),</p><p>ve Renata Degener, Bölüm Kayıt Memuru.</p><p><strong>Mahkeme Kararı</strong></p><p><strong>Madde 2: Ulusal makamlarca yürütülen soruşturmalara ilişkin</strong></p><p>Mahkeme, söz konusu olaylara karışan sahil güvenlik görevlileri hakkında cezai takibat başlatıldığını gözlemlemiştir. Bu tür yargılamalar, ilke olarak, davanın koşullarına ışık tutabilir ve gerçeklerin belirlenmesine ve uygun olduğunda sorumluların cezalandırılmasına yol açabilirdi. Ancak Mahkeme, yargılamaya ilişkin olarak aşağıdakileri not etmiştir.</p><p>İlk olarak, başvuranlardan bazıları, kendilerinden ifade alındığında beyanlarının yorumlanmasındaki sorunlara ilişkin şikayette bulunmuşlardır. Yetkililer tarafından kaydedilen ifade beyanlarının gerçek içeriğini yansıtmadığını ve “gemidekilerin ani hareketleri sonucu teknenin battığını” hiçbir zaman söylemediklerini belirtmişlerdir. İki tercüman hakkında, mesleki görevlerini yerine getirmediklerine ilişkin kovuşturma başlatılmış ve tercümanlardan birini beraat ettiren Ceza Mahkemesi, diğer tercümanın aslında başvuranların dilini konuşmadığını kabul etmiştir. Yetkililer, bu ciddi yorum sorunları hakkında 23 Ocak 2014 tarihinde bilgilendirilmiştir. Ancak, ifadelerin kayıtlarında ciddi kusurlar bulunmasına rağmen, bunlar Cumhuriyet savcısı yargılamayı durdurana kadar dava dosyasının parçası olarak kalmıştır. Mahkeme, yetkililerin, başvuranların bu tür kusurlara ilişkin iddialarından haberdar olduklarında, en azından ifadeleri dava dosyasına eklemeden önce bunları incelemeleri gerektiği görüşündedir.</p><p>İkinci olarak, başvuranlar Cumhuriyet savcısından balıkçı teknesinin sahadan çıkarılmasını ve uzmanlar tarafından incelenmesini, kendilerine sahil güvenlik görevlileri arasındaki iletişimin kaydını ve Farmakonisi askeri üssündeki sinyal ve radar verilerini sağlamasını ve bu verilerin bilirkişiler tarafından incelenmesini talep etmişlerdir. Bu taleplerden sadece ilk ikisi savcı tarafından kabul edilmişti. Mahkeme, davanın yalnızca yetkililer tarafından bilinen çok karmaşık yönleri içerdiğini tespit etmiştir. Mahkeme’nin görüşüne göre, başvurucuların talep ettikleri kayıtlar olmaksızın son derece ciddi olaylarla ilgili olan yargılamalara gerektiği gibi katılıp katılmadıkları oldukça tartışmalıdır, çünkü davanın özü tam olarak burada bulunmaktadır.</p><p>Üçüncü olarak, Mahkeme, davaya devam etmemekle birlikte, savcının sadece “Türkiye karasularına çekilme veya çekme prosedürü olarak herhangi bir geri itme uygulaması olmadığını” belirttiğini gözlemlemiştir. Başvuranlara göre, o zamanki Deniz İşleri Bakanı’nın daha önce Yunan makamlarının “göçmenleri Türk tarafına geri gönderdiğini” belirttiğini ve Yunanistan’a gelmeleri engellenen göçmenlerin sayısının “fazla” olduğunu ifade etmiştir. Başvuranlar, yetkili savcı tarafından incelenmemiş başka iddialarda da bulunmuşlardır. Özellikle, söz konusu operasyonun tamamının, kendilerinin ve yakınlarının yaşam hakkının korunmasını garanti altına alacak şekilde düzenlenmediğinden ve yürütülmediğinden, koordinasyon ve araştırma merkezine bilgi verilmediğinden ve ilgili uluslararası belgelerin hükümlerine uyulmadığından şikayetçi olmuşlardır. Mahkeme’nin görüşüne göre, bunlar, takip edilmeyen açık soruşturma hatlarıydı ve bu nedenle, soruşturmanın teknenin battığı kesin koşulları belirleme kabiliyetini engelliyordu.</p><p>Buna göre, tüm başvuranlar bakımından Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesi prosedürel başlığı altında ihlal edilmiştir.</p><p><strong>Madde 2: Hayatın korunmasına yönelik pozitif tedbirlere ilişkin</strong></p><p>Mahkeme, 20 Ocak 2014 tarihinde gerçekleştirilen operasyonun bir takım belirli ayrıntıları veya başvuranları Türkiye kıyılarına geri itme girişimi olup olmadığı konusunda bir görüş belirtemeyeceğini değerlendirmiştir. Bu yetersizliğin büyük ölçüde ulusal makamlar tarafından kapsamlı ve etkili bir soruşturma yapılmamasından kaynaklandığına işaret etmiştir.</p><p>Bu yetersizliğin büyük ölçüde ulusal makamlar tarafından kapsamlı ve etkili bir soruşturma yapılmamasından kaynaklandığına işaret edilmiştir.</p><p>Ancak bazı olguların taraflar arasında ihtilaflı olmadığını ya da dava dosyasındaki delillerden ve yerel mahkemelerin kararlarından inkar edilemez şekilde açık olduğunu gözlemlemiştir. Olay yerine vardıklarında, PLS 136&#39;nin mürettebatı, balıkçı teknesinin seyir halinde olduğu fiziksel durumların ve gemide kadın ve çocukların olduğu gerçeği hakkında bilgi sahibi olmuşlardır. Hükümete göre, bakımsız ve seyir için uygun olmayan teknenin durumu, izin verilen azami sınırı aşan yolcu sayısı ve olay yerindeki olumsuz hava koşulları nedeniyle teknenin Farmakonisi’de emniyete çekilmesi için emirler verilmiştir.</p><p>Yetkililerin, bir sürat teknesi olan ve gerekli kurtarma ekipmanına sahip olmayan PLS 136 adlı bir gemiyi kullanarak başvuranları güvenli bir yere nasıl ulaştırmayı amaçladıklarına dair bir açıklama yapılmamıştır. Ayrıca sahil güvenlik ekipleri, herhangi bir noktada ek yardım talep etme olasılığını düşünmemiş veya ilgili makamlara kurtarma operasyonu için daha uygun bir geminin olay yerine gönderilmesi gerektiği konusunda bilgi vermemiştir. Başvuranların iddialarına göre, balıkçı teknesinden kurtarılan yolculara, PLS 136&#39;da can yeleği bulunmadığından can yelekleri verilmemiştir.</p><p>Dahası çekme işleminin ilk aşaması, teknenin pruvasındaki demirleme noktasının ayrılmasıyla kesintiye uğramıştı. Hükümetin iddia ettiği gibi, teknedekiler arasındaki panik ve ani hareketler nedeniyle balıkçı teknesinin alabora olduğu varsayıldığında bile, Mahkeme, olay yerindeki koşullar göz önüne alındığında, böyle bir paniğin beklendiğini gözlemleyebilir. Buna rağmen sahil güvenlik ekipleri botu çekmek için ikinci bir girişimde bulunmuştur. Hükümet, ilk seferde panik gözlemlenmesine rağmen, ikinci girişimi gerçekleştirmekte neden ısrar ettiklerini açıklamamıştır.</p><p>Ayrıca, koordinasyon ve araştırma merkezine olay hakkında sabah 02.13&#39;e kadar bilgi verilmemiştir ve bu sırada balıkçı teknesi çoktan yarım şekilde batmıştır. Saat 02.16&#39;ya gelindiğinde tekne tamamen batmış ve başvuranların bazı akrabaları kabin içinde mahsur kalmıştır. Mahkeme, bu bağlamda, böyle bir durumda zaman faktörünün büyük önemini vurgulamıştır.</p><p>Ayrıca, bölgede seyir halinde olan tüm gemileri olay yerine hızlı bir şekilde gidebilmeleri için uyaran bir “Mayday Relay” çağrısı, sahil güvenlik ekipleri tarafından koordinasyon merkezine gecikmeli olarak bilgi verildikten 12 dakika sonra, saat 02.25&#39;e kadar gönderilmemiştir. Mevcut kurtarma kaynaklarının seferber edilmesi ve varışında önemli bir gecikme daha yaşanmıştır: ulusal koordinasyon ve araştırma merkezi tarafından saat 2.29&#39;da talep edilen helikopter, saat 3.52&#39;ye kadar olay yerine ulaşmamıştı; ulusal koordinasyon ve araştırma merkezi tarafından bir donanma gemisi temini sabah saat 2.45&#39;e kadar talep edilmemişti ve ilk sahil güvenlik gemisi olan PLS 616, saat 3.32&#39;ye kadar olay yerine gelmemiştir.</p><p>Mahkeme, Hükümet’in mevcut davadaki belirli eksiklikler ve gecikmeler hakkında herhangi bir açıklama yapmadığını ve operasyonun yürütülme ve organize edilme biçimine ilişkin ciddi soruların ortaya çıktığını kaydetmiştir. Buna göre, Yunan makamlarının, başvuranlara ve akrabalarına Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesinin gerektirdiği koruma düzeyini sağlamak için kendilerinden makul olarak beklenebilecek her şeyi yapmadıklarını tespit etmiştir. Bu nedenle, tüm başvuranlar açısından bu madde ihlal edilmiştir.</p><p><strong>Madde 3: Aşağılayıcı muameleye ilişkin (başvuruculardan 12&#39;si ile ilgili olarak)</strong></p><p>Mahkeme, ilgili başvuranların Farmakonisi’ye geldiklerinde hareket etmekte özgür olmadıklarını kaydetmiştir. Yetkililerin kontrolü altındaydılar ve bu nedenle güvenlik güçlerinin talimatlarına uymaları bekleniyordu. Ayrıca, batan tekneden sağ kurtulanların bir açık hava basketbol sahasına götürüldüklerini ve soyunmalarının emredildiğini gözlemlemiştir. Daha sonra diğer kurtulanların ve bir grup askerin önünde üstleri arandı. Öne eğilmeleri ve dönmeleri istendi.</p><p>Hükümet, güvenliği sağlamak için çıplak aramanın neden gerekli olduğunu açıklamamıştır. Ayrıca, aramanın yapılmasını gerektiren başka kamu politikası mülahazaları olduğunu da iddia etmemişlerdir. Ayrıca, başvuranların silahlı olduklarına veya güvenlik güçlerinin güvenliğine tehdit oluşturduğuna dair herhangi bir şüphe bulunduğunu belirtmemişlerdir. Aksine, başvuranlar Farmakonisi’ye vardıklarında bitkin düşmüş, olaylar karşısında şok olmuş ve akrabalarının akıbetinden endişe duymuşlardır.</p><p>Aramanın yapıldığı koşullara ilişkin olarak, Mahkeme, ilgili başvuranların en az 13 kişinin aynı anda ve aynı yerde soyunmaya zorlandıklarını gözlemlemiştir. Başvuranların son derece savunmasız bir durumda oldukları gerçeği göz önünde bulundurulmuştur: Batan bir tekneden yeni kurtulmuşlardı ve bazıları akrabalarını kaybetmişti. Şüphesiz aşırı stresli bir durumdaydılar ve yoğun acı ve keder duyguları yaşıyorlardı.</p><p>Tüm bu bilgiler arkaplanında, söz konusu 12 başvurucu üzerinde bu koşullarda gerçekleştirilen vücut aramalarının, usulüne uygun olarak herhangi bir zorlayıcı güvenlik gereksinimine veya kargaşayı veya suçu önleme ihtiyacına dayandığı söylenemez.</p><p>Mahkeme, aramanın, bu başvuranların, çıplak aramaların kaçınılmaz olarak içerdiği -kaçınılmaz ve dolayısıyla tolere edilebilir- düzeyi aşan bir aşağılanma derecesi ile sonuçlanan kısıtlanma, aşağılanma ve endişe duyguları yaşamalarına neden olabileceğini tespit etmiştir. Bu tür koşullar altında bu başvuranların yaptıkları aramanın Sözleşme’nin 3. maddesi anlamında aşağılayıcı muamele teşkil ettiği sonucuna varmıştır. Bu nedenle, ilgili 12 başvuran açısından bu madde ihlal edilmiştir.</p><p><strong>Adil Tazmin (Madde 41)</strong></p><p>Mahkeme, başvuranların uğradıkları manevi zarara ilişkin olarak Yunanistan’ın toplam 330.000 Euro (EUR) tazminat ödemesine karar vermiştir ve bu miktar aşağıdaki şekilde bölünmüştür: başvuranlardan birine 100.000 Euro, başvuranlardan üçüne müştereken 80.000 Euro, Diğer başvuranlara 40.000 Euro ve kalan 11 başvuranın her birine 10.000 Euro.</p><p>Bu basın bülteni, Registry tarafından hazırlanmış bir belgedir. Mahkemeyi bağlamaz. Mahkeme ile ilgili kararlar, hükümler ve daha fazla bilgi <a href="http://www.echr.coe.int/">www.echr.coe.int</a> adresinde bulunabilir.</p><p>Mahkeme kararının tam hali <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-218457">https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-218457</a> bağlantısında olup, sadece Fransızcası mevcuttur.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/519/1*Z8_2OLJbPBzaMxUl6b8TGw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a5be2ced1eb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Restoring Family Unity Separated Due To Immigration: Sen v.]]></title>
            <link>https://oguzhanacikgoz.medium.com/restoring-family-unity-separated-due-to-immigration-sen-v-eb061cccff3?source=rss-8da455a4c11f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eb061cccff3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[family]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Oğuzhan Açıkgöz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Dec 2021 16:33:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-17T16:33:32.336Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Restoring Family Unity Separated Due To Immigration: Sen v. the Netherlands, Application no. 31465/96, 21 December 2001 — European Court of Human Rights</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*KTq8iSzSd2bInoN7.jpg" /><figcaption>Credit: Pinterest</figcaption></figure><p>At the root of the case was an application brought against the Kingdom of the Netherlands, including three Turkish nationals, Zeki Şen, his wife Gülden Şen and their daughter Sinem Şen (“the applicants”). In this case, Zeki Şen (“the first applicant”) came to the Netherlands in 1977 at the age of 12 to visit his father in the context of family reunification. He has lived there ever since and has a residence permit (<em>vestigingsvergunning</em>). In 1982 he married Gülden Şen (“the second applicant”) in Turkey. He continued to live in Turkish lands after his marriage. On 8 August 1983 the couple’s daughter, Sinem Şen (the third applicant), was born in Turkey. The second applicant went to live with her husband in the Netherlands in 1986, after leaving the third applicant in the care of her sister and brother-in-law. He applied for and received a residence permit (<em>vergunning tot verblijf</em>) from the Dutch Ministry of Justice.<br> <br>On 26 October 1992 the first applicant applied for a temporary residence permit (<em>machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf</em>) in the Netherlands for Sinem. The couple explains that they did not make this request before due to the economic and social problems they faced. On 15 December 1992 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<em>Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken</em>) rejected the first applicant’s request. This was because it noted that the third applicant had to stay in the Netherlands for more than three months (the maximum period of validity of the temporary residence visa) and that applications had to be examined in the light of the relevant applicable provisions. It further noted that, pursuant to section 11 § 5 of the Aliens Act (<em>Vreemdelingenwet</em>), the granting of a residence permit could be refused on grounds of public interest. He justified that the Netherlands is a country with a high population density, that they follow a restrictive immigration policy considering the current situation in terms of population and employment, and that they do not allow foreigners to stay on their territory. Moreover, the ministry considered that Sinem’s parents did not belong to the family unit since she was now a member of her aunt’s family unit. Nor did it appear that the applicants had contributed financially or otherwise to their daughter’s education. They also never applied for family benefits for their daughters.<br> <br>The Appellants based their appeal on Article 8 § 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, hereinafter referred to as the Convention. This right aims above all to protect against interference in family life.<br> <br>In its conclusion, the European Court of Human Rights UNANIMOUSLY finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In this context, according to the ECtHR, it should not be forgotten that the family bond between a child born from a marriage union and his parents can only be broken in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, in the decision of the Sen v. the Netherlands case where both parents live separately from the child and the child lives in another country (21 December 2001, Application №31465/96, paragraph 28), the ECtHR drew attention to the following:<br> <br>[…] The Court recalls that the child born of wedlock is by law a part of that relationship; thus, from the moment of birth and due to the birth of a child, it can be broken up between the child and his parents only in exceptional circumstances due to events that occur later (Berrehab v. the Netherlands judgment, 21 June 1988, Series A №138, p. 14, paragraph 21 and Ahmut the Netherlands case decision, 28 November 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2030, paragraph 60) there is a link that constitutes “family life” (Gül v. Switzerland case decision, 19 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I, p. 173 -174, paragraph 32 and Boughanemi v. France judgment, 24 April 1996, Reports 1996-I, p. 608, paragraph 35).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/519/0*m4eDEx6e6n4VvHXu.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eb061cccff3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Overlooked Lives: World’s Unaccompanied Refugee Minors]]></title>
            <link>https://oguzhanacikgoz.medium.com/overlooked-lives-worlds-unaccompanied-refugee-minors-fd071d2cc5?source=rss-8da455a4c11f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugee-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[children-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Oğuzhan Açıkgöz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Sep 2021 12:53:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-07T14:38:46.054Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/937/0*26Rs1AQXyASbAEyY" /><figcaption>Photo Credit: Khalil Mazraawi, 2013</figcaption></figure><p>The reasons for the separation of the child from the family are individual, but it can be seen that these reasons fall into two separate groups: involuntary separation and voluntary separation. Involuntary separation includes situations where the parents die, the child is abducted, or the child is lost. Voluntary separation encompasses situations where a child is abandoned or where parents believe the child has a better chance of surviving on his own.</p><p>Unaccompanied refugee children are particularly vulnerable. They have no one to provide them with food and shelter to meet their physical needs. When resources are scarce, often as in refugee camps, children — especially unaccompanied minors — are the first to die. Usually also others become victims of exploitation and abuse. Girls are also particularly vulnerable among incapacitated children, as many cultures place greater value on boys and girls are particularly easy targets for sexual abuse.</p><p>Unaccompanied refugee children do not have anyone to meet their psychological needs to ensure the continuity of the feeding process, which greatly contributes to their healthy mental development. This healthy development also requires the child to be able to cope with the traumas of being a refugee, being cut off from everything he knows, losing family and friends, witnessing brutality, and fearing personal harm. These traumas are hard enough for a child to deal with when they have a parent they can trust and provide the strength they need to keep going.</p><blockquote>An unaccompanied refugee child is alone, frightened and vulnerable.</blockquote><p>The need for special care and protection for children was recognized internationally for the first time in the 1924 League of Nations declaration on the rights of the child. Although a series of similar and related declarations followed, another sixty-five years would pass before the international community recognized both the very special status of children and the value of States entering into a treaty on their behalf. The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is rightly recognized today as a critical milestone in the legal protection of children.</p><p>Although unaccompanied children are refugees, they are actually the first and foremost people who should be considered as “children”. Therefore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child is an effective legal tool for unaccompanied refugee children, as it is applicable to all children at the international level without discrimination.</p><p>Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is directly related to refugee and asylum-seeking children “<em>States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties (22.1). For this purpose, States Parties shall provide, as they consider appropriate, cooperation in any efforts by the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental organizations co-operating with the United Nations to protect and assist such a child and to trace the parents or other members of the family of any refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for reunification with his or her family. In cases where no parents or other members of the family can be found, the child shall be accorded the same protection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his or her family environment for any reason, as set forth in the present Convention. (22.2)”</em></p><p>The general driving force behind national and international action on behalf of children is the recognition of their special care and protection needs, including legal protection. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child is rightly central to the legal protection of children, but protection is not just a narrow matter of rights and due process; rather, it also encompasses a wide range of developmental needs — for example, relief from hunger, care for victims of torture and other traumas, access to education and participation in social and cultural life. The CRC uniquely embraces the full spectrum of children’s rights, in particular affirming <em>the fundamental principle of the best interests </em>of the child in a full regimen geared towards the child’s development and self-fulfillment.</p><p>The idea that the child is entitled to special protection derives in part from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the special context of international humanitarian law. In the Geneva Convention, States are obliged to allow the free flow of assistance for children under the age of 15 and expectant mothers, or to facilitate the well-functioning of institutions for the care of children in the occupied territories. The 1977 Additional Protocols go further and explicitly affirm the special protection afforded to children.In Additional Protocol I Article 77 <em>“Children shall be treated with special respect and protected against any form of inappropriate aggression. The Parties to the Conflict shall provide them with the care and assistance they need. whether because of their age or for any other reason. (77.1)”</em></p><p>Both the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols link the protection of the child with the continuing maintenance of family life. Even in detention situations, families should be kept together wherever possible and every effort should be made to reunite families separated for reasons. The overall aim is to preserve, as much as possible, family life and, consequently, the natural process of child development.</p><p>From the child’s perspective, a permanent solution is not voluntary repatriation, local integration, resettlement, or even temporary protection. Rather, they provide the only permanent solution worth considering: the temporal and geographic context that instantly contributes to the child’s survival, protection and development. Therefore, when designing, implementing and pursuing durable solutions for unaccompanied refugee minors, the approach should be both principled and flexible and comprehensive enough to deal with the individuality of the child and local conditions, including ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic conditions. The principle of international law regarding the best interests of the child requires the strengthening of existing family support structures wherever possible, which will mean effective family tracing and reunification mechanisms. As the unaccompanied refugee child reaches adulthood, the protection of the child’s civil rights and special protection against exploitation and abuse will be needed, while education will likewise be an integral part of any successful and lasting solution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/519/1*fZhkzmFyNZceLTXcsivLgw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd071d2cc5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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