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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Lukmon Tobiloba Oloko on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Lukmon Tobiloba Oloko on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@olokolukmontobiloba?source=rss-e4f405492b02------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Lukmon Tobiloba Oloko on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@olokolukmontobiloba?source=rss-e4f405492b02------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@olokolukmontobiloba/phishing-mail-detected-excel-4-0-macros-43156171bd2e?source=rss-e4f405492b02------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43156171bd2e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukmon Tobiloba Oloko]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 2024 14:07:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-30T14:07:17.973Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros</strong></p><p>An alert was triggered on June 13, 2021, at 02:13 PM, indicating a potential phishing mail attempt. Lars, a staff member with the Hostname Lars PRD, got a suspicious email containing an Excel extension. I started my investigation by looking at the monitoring page for more information about the alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vqzTJ_f2R2jp8Utb" /></figure><p>The monitoring page provides important information about the alert</p><p><strong>Event time: Jun 13, 2021, 02:13 PM</strong></p><p><strong>SMTP Address: 24.213.228.54</strong></p><p><strong>SOURCE address: trenton@tritowncomputers.com</strong></p><p><strong>Destination Address: lars@letsdefend.io</strong></p><p><strong>Device Action: Allowed</strong></p><p><strong>The next step was to check the email content</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/811/0*Nj9oQg14LL3l38e8" /></figure><p>the email sent contained a suspicious zip file 11f44531fb088d31307d87b01e8eabff.zip.zip. I will extract and analyse the zip file in a controlled environment like a sandbox. I will be running this using Virus Total.</p><p>Firstly, I opened the playbook, as this will guide us with my analysis.</p><p><strong>PLAYBOOK</strong></p><p>Now that I have some context on what I’m looking for, let’s dig into the incident. To ensure a good investigation of the case, l will be following the play book suggested by LetsDefend.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1014/0*Uh0_qOpgGoLPTufE" /></figure><p>I used a VM machine to download and extract the suspicious file. I used the Ubuntu terminal to get the md5 hash values of the files, so I could analyse product services like virus total and anyrun</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WG6gxyeUUnVMdGQd" /></figure><p>After extracting the md5 hash value of the suspicious file, I proceeded to run the analysis on the virus’s total</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gX_x47EjcfBJzlGm" /></figure><p>After running the hash value of the suspicious file on the virus total, it came back malicious. I continued my analysis by looking for more IOC. I was able to get 2 domains that are associated with the zip file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZkpCRDb7tdOWIfHe" /></figure><p>The domains associated with the malicious file are:</p><ol><li><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/fb01eb825c81a539aa7e668356b85e5c11950c2f93cab3b8ecd26da3142615ee">https://nws.visionconsulting.ro/N1G1KCXA/dot.html</a></li><li><a href="https://royalpalm.sparkblue.lk/vCNhYrq3Yg8/dot.html">https://royalpalm.sparkblue.lk/vCNhYrq3Yg8/dot.html</a></li></ol><p>I continued to analyze the domain to get the IP addresses associated with them which are: 188[.]213[.]19[.]81 and 192[.]232[.]219[.]67 respectively.</p><p>Caring out further analysis using any run. I ran the malicious zip file, I was able to see the processes carried out by the file while running.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WsIk0arSuk1qTtjJ" /></figure><p>The malicious zip file created a parent process C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE. This has been flagged as malicious with a score of 100.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TRQnNZQ1vNTIm2QC" /></figure><p>The process C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE. Execute a command, regsvr32-s../iroto.dll. This command is common with spear phishing techniques as stated in the mitre Att&amp;ck matrix.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/907/0*Ay8PYzxTFtcI-9Bo" /></figure><p>The next task in the playbook is to determine if the email delivered to the user’s mailbox</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/962/0*647IOh08Y4Q0YK_7" /></figure><p>To determine this, I went to the alert and checked the Device action. As seen below. The device action is Allowed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/873/0*hMCsnbJbtWq1XDOI" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1002/0*6jb2VumBcoezhbdJ" /></figure><p>Since I confirmed the email was delivered to the user, I can get the user’s IP address and filter out the traffic in the log management. I also determined the 2 IP addresses associated with the malicious file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/934/0*LHPHXdVSY8JSezkB" /></figure><p>I located the user’s IP address above to be 172[.]16[.]17[.]57. I earlier also determined the suspicious ip address to be 188[.]213[.]19[.]81 and 192[.]232[.]219[.]67. I can proceed to filter the log to determine if any communication was made.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/853/0*1NSxHDIRPo93zqQE" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*jubPxcysa5msxhR_" /></figure><p>Looking at the two images above, I saw that the user’s device established a connection with the c2 server through the two malicious IP addresses. The http requests and the device action are allowed, meaning the security systems didn’t stop the connections.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/0*PNdEDdavdJBXc2Va" /></figure><p>I also checked the endpoint device to establish if the malicious command was processed by the device. I saw in the image above that the endpoint device ran the command regsvr32-s../iroto.dll in the terminal history.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1017/0*sqCr3x-6HVWSWEHO" /></figure><p>The process ID on the endpoint device also showed the malicious command line and also the parent process. These confirmed that the phishing attempt was successful.</p><p><strong>CONTAINED?</strong></p><p>I have established that Lars’s device with the hostname LarsSPRD is compromised and needs to be contained to prevent the attack from spreading to other devices.</p><p>I also confirmed that LarsSPRD is the only device that opened the mail. I filtered the log with the 2 malicious IP addresses. I established that no other device was connected to the IP address.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zUaNjQtY2-EzU08K" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*jdAfvioNwLOtCxUa" /></figure><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>After carrying out the analysis, I confirmed the alert was a <strong>true positive.</strong> Lars got a phishing email and downloaded and extracted the malicious zip file. He established a connection with the c2 server through the malicious IP addresses. I also established that the Lars device is the only affected device and should be contained till the attack has been remediated.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*RV49xe0Xe08Ae-6C" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43156171bd2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SOC169 — Possible IDOR Attack Detected]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@olokolukmontobiloba/soc169-possible-idor-attack-detected-ba39b967fa31?source=rss-e4f405492b02------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba39b967fa31</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukmon Tobiloba Oloko]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Sep 2024 20:49:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-04T20:49:01.391Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>SOC169 — Possible IDOR Attack Detected</strong></p><p>An alert on 28 Feb 2022 at 10:48 pm indicated a possible IDOR attack on the web server. IDOR stands for Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), a web attack where a threat actor changes a URL or requests to access data or actions they’re not supposed to, bypassing security checks. Attackers can change a simple URL or ID to access others’ private information. This is dangerous because it lets them see or do things they shouldn’t, risking your data.</p><p>I started my investigation by looking at the monitoring page for more information about the alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qQc1gi8bieqOSykV" /></figure><p>Event ID: 119</p><p>Event time: Feb 28, 2022, 10:48 PM</p><p>Hostname: Webserver1005</p><p>SOURCE Address: 134[.]209[.]118[.]137</p><p>Rule: SOC169 Possible IDOR Attack Detected</p><p>Destination Address: 172[.]16[.]17[.]15</p><p>Requested URL: <a href="https://172[.]16[.]17[.]15/get_user_info/">https://172[.]16[.]17[.]15/get_user_info/</a></p><p>User Agent: Mozilla/4.0(compatible;MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; NET CLR 1.14322) . A user agent is a string of text sent by a web browser to a web server identifying itself and its capacity. From the above user agent, I identified information about the user’s web browser to be Internet Explorer 6.0 on Windows NT 5.1 Service Pack 1 with a .NET framework.</p><p>Alert Triggered Reason: Consecutive requests to the same page</p><p>Device Action: Allowed</p><p><strong>PLAYBOOK</strong></p><p>A playbook is a detailed guide outlining procedures and responses to handle security incidents quickly and effectively to counter threats and minimize damage.</p><p>I will use the playbook on the letsdefend page to help with my investigation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/986/0*hr-TfcTWpnkEzLPp" /></figure><p>From the monitoring page, I was able to see the rule that triggered this alert, the alert was triggered by a possible web attack called the IDOR (insecure Direct Object Reference). This attack happens when a website exposes a reference to an internal object (like a user ID) without proper access control. Threat actors can change the reference in the URL or request, accessing or modifying someone else’s data without permission. The requested URL on the monitoring page also confirms the possibility of an IDOR attack.</p><p>The communication happened between the web server with a hostname “Webserver1005” with the primary user as “webadmin35”. The source IP is identified to be 134[.]209[.]118[.]137. I checked the reputation of the IP address on abuseIP and I discovered the IP address has been reported more than 1500 times. This suggests the IP address to be very poor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/0*nrhEwqP2WYAMtrEr" /></figure><p>The HTTP request method is a POST, that confirms the flow of traffic to be from the internet to the company network. The POST request method sends data securely to a server, such as when you enter a password to log in. This suggests the user was trying to log in to the server.</p><p><strong>EXAMINE HTTP TRAFFIC</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/982/0*FZMLJgZtJVffz0aa" /></figure><ul><li>The next step is to examine the HTTP traffic. I went to log management to examine the communication between the 2 IP addresses to further understand the attack.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OZo9fRmZjBqG6eMu" /></figure><p>After filtering the logs, I identified the streams of communication between the user and the web server</p><p>I went through the raw logs to understand the attack and why the alert was triggered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DX66ULAbn5PCY8Ga" /></figure><p>The user made the first POST request at 10:45 am with the post parameter as user_id=2. This means the user is trying to log into a profile with ID value of 2. The HTTP response status suggests this request was successful.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/0*gpocI5tIK_R2wLZZ" /></figure><p>The same user made another POST request with a different post parameter user_id=1. This means the user might be trying to view a profile that doesn’t belong to them. The user continues changing the parameter on each post request to the server. These behaviours confirm the alert and attack to be an IDOR attack. All the requests had an HTTP response status of 200 and the HTTP response sizes were different, which suggests all requests were successful. This means the user was successful in carrying out the attack.</p><p><strong>IS THE TRAFFIC MALICIOUS?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/883/0*u59_l9IhNltsi26X" /></figure><p>The traffic is malicious as I detected an IDOR from the log analysis above. We confirmed the attacker was changing the value ID to access information that belongs to other users.</p><ul><li><strong>CHECK IF IT IS A PLANNED TEST</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/798/0*UxIfO2UjGKZ0LrJr" /></figure><p>I went through the email and I did not see any email indicating a planned test.</p><p><strong>WHAT IS THE DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/887/0*azG-tG3Iwbl9Hk-Y" /></figure><p>The direction of traffic is from the internet to the company network. The HTTP request method is POST, which means the attacker was sending data to the web server. The source IP address is the attacker’s IP address which confirms the traffic was coming from the internet into the company network.</p><p><strong>WAS THE ATTACK SUCCESSFUL?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/837/0*8_d9A2plcZFgGypO" /></figure><p>On the Log Management page, filtering by source IP showed that the attacker altered ID values to access the data of other users. The requests produced different response sizes and always returned a status code of 200,</p><p>indicating the attacker successfully accessed or modified unauthorized information due to an IDOR vulnerability.</p><p><strong>CONTAINED?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/0*XhBHAhYKh4ooYd7s" /></figure><p>After detecting a cyberattack, we contain a device to prevent further damage, limit the attack’s spread, secure sensitive data, and protect</p><p>other systems from being compromised. In this case, I contained the device because I can confirm the attack to be successful.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/983/0*0HwCx2CX79jOA1x8" /></figure><p><strong>ARTIFACTS</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1007/0*HOBKvXvFK-HFeE0N" /></figure><p>Artifacts are pieces of evidence left behind by an activity or process. The artifacts;</p><ul><li>The source IP address: 134[.]209[.]118[.]137</li><li>The POST parameters: the attacker attempted to view information belonging to other users by changing the ID value in the post parameters. The ID values were; user_id=2, user_id=3, user_id=4, user_id=5.</li></ul><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>The attacker successfully manipulated ID values to access unauthorized user data, as evidenced by varying response sizes and consistent 200 status codes. Immediate remediation is required to strengthen access controls and prevent future unauthorized access. Implementing proper validation checks and regular security audits will mitigate such risks and safeguard sensitive information<strong>.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba39b967fa31" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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