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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@oluwagbemiga?source=rss-e4779477236c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@oluwagbemiga?source=rss-e4779477236c------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[GCP Chronicles 2— IAM: Identity and Access Management on The Google Cloud Platform]]></title>
            <link>https://oluwagbemiga.medium.com/gcp-chronicles-2-iam-identity-and-access-management-on-the-google-cloud-platform-1a4dac298992?source=rss-e4779477236c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1a4dac298992</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gcp-security-operations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gcp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google-cloud-platform]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jan 2025 23:47:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-15T23:47:39.537Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Welcome to the second piece in my GCP series where I write about the google cloud platform, and it’s security.<br>In this edition, we will be exploring Identity and access management on the cloud. This is a very important aspect of data handling and privacy and is in fact a giant part of cyber security.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*98H4kbyynscV9mtexYmEJQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>Identity and Access Management</strong></h4><p>IAM is a big part of cloud computing as it addresses the very critical issues of privacy and security.<br>Access is a big part of privacy, you do not want a random entity having access to your personal or organizational data. All over the world privacy laws get stricter everyday as data becomes more sensitive and valuable.</p><p>At the forefront of protecting the privacy of data is cybersecurity. one of the integral aspects of cybersecurity is cybersecurity architecture. <br>a lot of cyber security architecture rules like defense in depth(meaning at every point every entity must be authorized), and least privilege(meaning only users who are entitled to a data, should have access to it), rely on a robust IAM platform or system to function efficiently.</p><p>Think of a firm that has a multi story building as its office, on the last floor we have the lowest clearance level staff like the clerks, the clearance level increases per floor, until you get to the top floor where you have top management. <br>To access any floor in the building, each individual has a key card that only lets you access as high up the building as you are authorized to, the key cards are assigned to you, and the permissions set by the security team. In this case, the Floors of the building is the resource hierarchy as it defines the structure of the organization. <br>The Key cards are the roles and permissions set to you by the administrators, who in this instance, are the security team who handed the key cards to you</p><h4><strong>Identity and Access Management on google cloud</strong></h4><p>The IAM system on Google Cloud defines and governs who can access and manage resources on the cloud. The IAM system allows entities(administrators), to assign specific roles to each entity, user or group, ensuring that they only have access and control over resources they are authorized to and need to perform their jobs.</p><h4><strong>Identity and roles</strong></h4><p>Two major concepts constitute IAM on google cloud, Cloud Identity and IAM roles. <br>Cloud Identity is a tool used to manage users, groups, and policies within Google Cloud. <br>It is a major proponent of the identity management framework on the cloud platform and is used to integrate with systems like Active Directory on a virtual private network. <br>A principal is the technical term that describes any entity, user, or service that requires access to perform a specific task.</p><h4><strong>IAM roles</strong></h4><p>IAM roles are a collection of permissions that define and govern what actions a user, entity or sometimes service can perform on specific cloud resources. <br>Roles are a collection because most users on a cloud platform have more than one action or task that they perform so they need a couple of permissions for each action. <br>It is also worthy of note that these permissions do not apply to all resources but to only the select resources that the user must interact with to complete their tasks.</p><p>Roles in IAM can be categorized into basic, predefined, or custom roles.<br>Basic Roles are broad roles such as <strong>Owner</strong>, <strong>Editor</strong>, and <strong>Viewer</strong>, which grant a wide range of permissions in a project. <br>These roles are simple to manage and assign, however, they are not explicit enough to ensure security measures like defense-in-depth.</p><p><strong>Predefined Roles</strong> are roles that are custom to specific Google Cloud services. For example, <strong>InstanceAdmin</strong> for the Compute Engine service grants permissions to manage virtual machines, and <strong>StorageAdmin</strong> for the Cloud Storage service grants permissions to manage buckets and objects. <br>These services need these permissions to connect to other services and make changes to other cloud resources(a service is also regarded as an entity on google cloud). <br>Predefined roles are highly specific, this is very good practice as it ensure defense-in-depth and the principle of least privilege.</p><p><strong>Custom Roles</strong> are the most flexible(customizable) of all role types, Organizations and other cloud administrators that require even more control over permissions can create custom roles. <br>These roles are crafted to provide a very specific set of permissions, allowing them to properly implement the least-privilege access model. <br>With custom roles, users receive only the permissions needed to perform their tasks, minimizing security risks.</p><h4><strong>Case Scenario</strong></h4><p>Imagine a firm which has multiple departments such as marketing, finance, and engineering. Each department needs access to specific Google Cloud resources. <br>Defense in depth and the least privilege access model demand that there must be strong controls to ensure that employees only have access to the specific resources and permissions they need to do their jobs. Let’s theorize their IAM configuration.</p><p>The whole firm is located in an organizational node while each department is located in their individual folder nodes. <br>The finance department for example, belongs to the finance folder, where all resources related to the finance team is stored. <br>Except some staffs are limited to individual projects all the staffs are given access to the folder of the department they belong.</p><p>For the IAM system, Only specific employees(mostly executives, or to-level IT admins) have the <strong>Owner</strong> role for the organization node, granting them full control over the entire cloud account. Meanwhile, <strong>editors</strong> and <strong>viewers</strong> are granted roles at the project or folder level(mostly for the departmental managers), ensuring that each department can manage its resources independently.</p><p>The engineering team could leverage service accounts to enable continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) processes. <br>These service accounts are granted specific permissions to access Google Cloud Storage and Compute Engine, allowing the engineering team to manage virtual machines and store application artifacts without needing direct human intervention. (You can give me your own ideas of what the marketing and finance version of this would be in the comment section.)</p><h4><strong>You’ve made it thus far</strong></h4><p>We have come to the end of this edition of my GCP chronicles I hope you now have a good mental grasp of what IAM looks like on google cloud. More importantly, I hope you had fun, if you did, clap for me and leave a comment below, thanks.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1a4dac298992" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Chronicles 1 — The Google Cloud Resource Hierarchy]]></title>
            <link>https://oluwagbemiga.medium.com/gcp-chronicles-1-the-google-cloud-resource-hierarchy-06ffb46c2bc9?source=rss-e4779477236c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/06ffb46c2bc9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gcp-security-operations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gcp]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 23:59:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-01T23:59:47.195Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>GCP Chronicles 1 — The Google Cloud Resource Hierarchy</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*02lOS6HdJNd543x-ksW7FQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I am really excited about 2025 and all it has to offer! Fewer people are making new year resolutions, but we face the new year with unwavering hope. This year, I’ll be committing to being a prodigy in the google Cloud Platform, the goal is to earn the Google Cloud Security Engineer Certificate, but more importantly, I will be exploring a whole new and exciting niche of technology — the world of cloud computing.</p><p>In this article, the first of a series where I’ll be documenting my journey through the adventures and challenges of mastering the Google Cloud Platform, I will be discussing the Google Cloud Resource Hierarchy — a very foundational concept that anchors the Google Cloud Platform.</p><h3><strong>Google Cloud Resource Hierarchy</strong></h3><p>The cloud is all about resources, digital assets that are essential to the seamless operation of billions of business globally. <br>The Google Cloud Resource Hierarchy is a foundational structure within the google cloud Platform that organizes all resource into four distinct levels or nodes: <strong>resources</strong>, <strong>projects</strong>, <strong>folders</strong>, and an <strong>organization node</strong>. These hierarchy not only define how polices are applied and managed across these levels, they ensure flexibility in managing resources, policies, and permissions.</p><h3>The Resource Node</h3><p>The resources node is the lowest level in the cloud resource hierarchy, it represents basic computational units like storage, processing, and data management. Examples of resources include virtual machines(VMs), Storage buckets, Big Query tables, and so much more. Resources serves as building blocks that contribute to the functionality of a project.</p><p>For instance, If I was building a virtual network on the cloud, I would need a couple of virtual machines, routers, switches etc. each of these are the resources in the hierarchy, enabling my proposed network to function correctly.</p><h3>IAM on The Resource Node</h3><p>While the resource hierarchy defines the organization of resources, The Identity and Access Management (IAM) is a system that governs who can access and manage these resources. IAM enables administrators to assign specific roles to each user, ensuring interaction only with resources they are authorized to access.</p><p>Imagine a firm with a multi-story building as its office, on the lower floors, you have staff with the lowest level of clearance like the clerks, while higher floors have increased clearance levels, until you get to the top floor where you have top management. To access a floor, individuals use a key card that is programmed to access only the floors you are authorized to visit. The Floors of the building represents the resource hierarchy as it defines the structure of the organization. The Key cards are the roles and permissions set to you by the administrators, who in this case, are the security team who handed the key cards to you.</p><p>On the Google Cloud Platform, IAM consist of three components: The Principal, the role, and the resource. The **principal** is the entity(user, service account, or group) that needs access to a resource. The **role** specifies what actions the principal can perform (such as viewing, editing, or managing resources). Finally, the **resource** is the specific item or service within the Google Cloud hierarchy that the principal needs to access.</p><blockquote>You can learn more about <a href="https://oluwagbemiga.medium.com/">IAM on the Google Cloud Platform, I have a comprehensive article on my medium profile.</a></blockquote><h3>The Projects Node</h3><p>The project node serves as a container for managing and organizing resources that are activated towards a specific purpose. For instance, when building a web application, a project will act as a container for resources such as the operating system, LAMP server, and other components required for development.</p><p>The projects node provides a robust foundation for enabling, configuring, and disabling services. It streamlines the organization and configuration of billing for services being used, and granting permission to collaborators. it also acts as a boundary for IAM roles and policy settings. In essence, these functionalities are managed at the project level of the resource hierarchy.</p><p>Each project has unique attributes including an ID, a number, and a name. Some of these attributes such as the ID, are immutable and globally unique. So as to ensure that each project is distinctly identifiable within the Google Cloud Platform.</p><h3>The Folder Node</h3><p>The folder node provides a layer of organization between the projects and organization node. By grouping projects into folders, policies and settings can be managed more effectively across multiple projects, streamlining administration. Folders allows administrators to apply consistent policies and configurations to related projects, which is very beneficial, as it aligns with the structure of most organizations.</p><p>A company might have four ongoing projects, two under the finance department, and the other two under the operations department, each pair share similar policies and configurations. Grouping them into folders by the team they belong to will be an absolute game changer. Furthermore, all of the settings in the projects level can be applied in the folder level to make resource and policy management efficient.</p><h3>The Organizational Node</h3><p>At the top of the resource hierarchy sits the organizational Node. This is basically the entire cloud real estate of a business or entity. This includes all its resources, projects and folders. Essentially, it is the google cloud account of the entity or business.</p><p>The organizational node centralizes the management of all the cloud resources and policies, making it easier to apply global policies (polices that affect the entirety of this account), and access management rules, enabling efficient and secure operations on a large scale.</p><blockquote>If you made it here, thank you for reading till the end, I hope you learnt something new, or rather I made you remember a few things you already forgot.<br>This article is not a tutorial so it might not be as explicit as you might want, if you are interested in learning more, visit the Google Cloud Platform Today.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=06ffb46c2bc9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SOC167 — LS Command Detected in Requested URL.]]></title>
            <link>https://oluwagbemiga.medium.com/soc167-ls-command-detected-in-requested-url-8c31fc6a372b?source=rss-e4779477236c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c31fc6a372b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-training]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team-operations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-operation-center]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Dec 2024 06:07:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-06T06:07:15.590Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>SOC167 — LS Command Detected in Requested URL.</h3><p>Hi genius, In this article I’ll walk you through investigating an alert on the Lets Defend SIEM tool. You’ll see how we gather information, analyze data, and make decisions. Lets do this.</p><p><strong>Background Information</strong></p><p>We are investigating an alert about a suspected <strong>LS command Injection<em>. </em></strong>here is what we know so far:</p><pre>## Event Details<br>| **Parameter**              | **Details**                             |<br>|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------|<br>| **Event ID**               | 117                                     |<br>| **Event Time**             | February 27, 2022, 12:36 AM             |<br>| **Rule**                   | SOC167 - LS Command Detected in Requested URL |<br>| **Alert Level**            | Security Analyst                        |<br>| **Hostname**               | EliotPRD                                |<br>| **Destination IP Address** | 188.114.96.15                           |<br>| **Source IP Address**      | 172.16.17.46                            |<br>| **HTTP Request Method**    | GET                                     |<br>| **Requested URL**          | [https://letsdefend.io/blog/?s=skills](https://letsdefend.io/blog/?s=skills) |<br>| **User-Agent**             | Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0 |<br>| **Alert Trigger Reason**   | URL Contains LS                         |<br>| **Device Action**          | Allowed                                 |<br></pre><p><strong>What do we actually know about LS Command injection?</strong></p><p>Applications that fail to handle user inputs properly are vulnerable to <strong>command injection attacks</strong>. These attacks exploit these vulnerabilities to send commands directly to the server hosting the application</p><p>In an LS command attack, the attacker injects the LS command through a web request. If successful, this provides the hacker with information about the contents of the server’s directory and even the file structure. Which can be used to compromise the system later on.</p><p>An example of an LS command attack: It includes using a separator (e.g., ;) to divide the LS command</p><pre>http://example.com/search?query=;ls</pre><h3>Into The Play Book</h3><blockquote>Step 1: Create the case</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qW90uT1oRJPONDdwpyNa4w.png" /></figure><blockquote>Step 2: Start the Playbook</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_g8wji1YR-5ObLBVxWkJZA.png" /></figure><blockquote>Step 3: Gather information</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jgPR7YUJP7hGp5CwRe02gQ.png" /></figure><p>This Prompt gives us an idea of what to look for before starting the investigation. We have studied the rule name, which is 117: Ls command. and we also understand what the attack means, the nature, and the impact.</p><p>We’ve also been given information about the two devices though which the traffic is occurring: Destination IP Address: <strong>188.114.96.15</strong>, and Source IP Address: <strong>172.16.17.46.</strong></p><blockquote>Step 4: Collect Data on the parties involved</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AONyXX5UWyma1dhN7bJIqg.png" /></figure><p>The ownership of both Ip addresses can be found in the SIEM tool’s endpoint (for the source address) and through the WHOIS lookup tool for the destination address. The hostname has been provided to us. I also scanned for the reputation of the destination address and it came back clean.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TAkqGgimStllKlXV0EWYLw.png" /></figure><blockquote>Step 5: Let’s examine the HTTP traffic</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FWCV5kBYXAE5SQU16Z318w.png" /></figure><p>To do this, we visit the Log management tab of the SIEM and filter the logs to only display only requests sent to the destination IP Address: <strong>188.114.96.15.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F6tR3v4sFC9_0wAc68L1zw.png" /></figure><p>From this, we can deduce that 7 requests where sent between the two hosts. Let’s go through each of these requests to find any suspicious traffic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aL95cLqKoCtY18WSNw4e8w.png" /></figure><p>Going through the logs, the URLs appeared normal, except this:</p><pre>https://letsdefend.io/blog/?s=skills</pre><p>When comparing it to an example of a LS command Injection:</p><pre>http://example.com/search?query=;ls</pre><p>We can see that the flagged request is very similar to a typical LS command attack.</p><blockquote>Step 6: Do we Think the traffic is malicious?</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F75p0HuQtle-dS8mtQkg4Q.png" /></figure><p>The traffic is non-malicious. We can deduce that ours was not actually a LS Command attack as it did not have the <strong>; seperator, </strong>that separates the URLS from the commands in an attack.</p><blockquote>Step 7: We should check other traffic for confirmation</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e2ZfKvGCFUQ7lKr6FiFZCA.png" /></figure><p>Yes, there is actually different traffic coming from the same device.</p><blockquote>Step 8: Now we enter our analyst note</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_zgtJKbxZTfCslm44wOpCA.png" /></figure><p>Here’s Mine: This alert was mis-triggered, according to my analysis, due to absence of injection indicators like separators, the web traffic is clean.</p><blockquote>Step 9: Now we finish our playbook</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*95GHfDsqC_uqsngZun_dVQ.png" /></figure><blockquote>Step 9: Don’t go yet, one minor task remaining, lets close the alert.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hp64IkDW9lkrJ2Jm1RdUtg.png" /></figure><p>Here we decide if the alert is a true positive or not, seeing as it is a false alarm, it is definitely a false positive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J9XUFE-j1U8sK3nHEzJPzw.png" /></figure><p>Right here we can see our Results. Thank you for sticking with me so far.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J9XUFE-j1U8sK3nHEzJPzw.png" /></figure><p>Thank you for sticking till the end, If you found this walkthrough helpful, do not hesitate to encourage me with a clap, a comment, and a follow.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c31fc6a372b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Follow Along as I Investigate a Suspected LLMNR Attack: Security Operation Chronicles.]]></title>
            <link>https://oluwagbemiga.medium.com/follow-along-as-i-investigate-a-suspected-llmnr-attack-security-operation-chronicles-99f86a5188de?source=rss-e4779477236c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99f86a5188de</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-operation-center]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[siem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Dec 2024 08:58:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-03T08:58:53.486Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As a Network Forensics expert, I will be conducting an in-depth analysis of an escalated alert that involves an intrusion into our network, and possible data theft.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O5FezNML4FIpJ1z_xogMHg.png" /></figure><p><strong>What is the scenario?</strong></p><p>The IDS device alerted us to a possible rogue device in the internal Active Directory network. The Intrusion Detection System also indicated signs of LLMNR traffic, which is unusual. It is suspected that an LLMNR poisoning attack occurred. The LLMNR traffic was directed towards Forela-WKstn002, which has the IP address 172.17.79.136. A limited packet capture from the surrounding time is provided to me, the Network Forensics expert. Since this occurred in the Active Directory VLAN, it is suggested that I perform network threat hunting exercise with the Active Directory attack vector in mind, specifically focusing on LLMNR poisoning.</p><p>I have been given a list of tasks to perform to guide me through the network threat hunting exercise and gather enough information about the attack.</p><blockquote><strong>Task 1: </strong>Its suspected by the security team that there was a rogue device in Forela’s internal network running responder tool to perform an LLMNR Poisoning attack. Please find the malicious IP Address of the machine.</blockquote><p>To find the IP address of the malicious machine, we have to first look into the Packet capture file that was handed over.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C17AcZa_fft6HlPY3mQbGw.png" /></figure><p>The Packet file is quite voluminous so I would need to set a filter in Wireshark to only display <strong>LLMNR</strong> queries and responses. I know that <strong>LLMNR</strong> operates on the <strong>UDP</strong> protocol on port <strong>5355</strong>. so I filter with “udp.port==5355&quot;.</p><pre>udp.port==5355</pre><p>Now I get a much more customized view.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P3jzs70tFTi4TB-z9fTGKQ.png" /></figure><p>While examining each packets, we can see here that the machine with Ip Address: 172.17.79.136 sent out a broadcast querying for the hostname: DCC01.</p><p>We know from standard practice that this is an error: Hostnames are usually in the format of “DC01”, ”DC02”, with DC meaning Domain Controller. We also know this because the only reason the query fell back to LLMNR is because that hostname ”DCC01” could not be resolved(found).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TqKqD-_Rxy8BTQxmMIKzFA.png" /></figure><p>Going further through the packets, we find that a machine with IP Address: 172.17.79.135 delivering a response to this query, posing as the machine with the hostname “DCC01”. From these turn of events, we can infer that this machine has abused the lack of authentication in the LLMNR protocol.</p><p>We now have an answer to task 1: the IP Address of the malicious machine is <strong>172.17.79.135</strong>.</p><blockquote><strong>Task 2: </strong>What is the hostname of the rogue machine?</blockquote><p>To handle this, I filtered traffic to include only requests involving the malicious IP address and carefully examined each packet for a protocol that could reveal the hostname. I spotted a <strong>DHCP request packet</strong> using the DHCP protocol and took a peak, where I found the HostName.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*65jUjb2Xfx5c2eOD5PXNBQ.png" /></figure><p>We can clearly see in the details, the HostName: Kali.</p><blockquote><strong>Task 3: </strong>Now we need to confirm whether the attacker captured the user’s hash and it is crackable!! What is the username whose hash was captured?</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99f86a5188de" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Invisible Threats, Stealthy Hooks: Unmasking the Realities of Phishing 2.0.]]></title>
            <link>https://oluwagbemiga.medium.com/invisible-threats-stealthy-hooks-unmasking-the-realities-of-phishing-2-0-e6996e5bda0c?source=rss-e4779477236c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e6996e5bda0c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abraham Samuel Oluwagbenga]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jun 2023 01:30:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-27T01:30:06.877Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Discover the new techniques and technologies utilized by elite, next generation phishing actors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Pps7jlo4vzc_6R8h" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@avirichards?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Avi Richards</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>With the emergence of new and cutting-edge technology like artificial intelligence and the wide availability of tech knowledge and resources at the disposal of both good and bad actors, cybercriminals have evolved and found ways to deceive and trick individuals into divulging credentials and other valuable information.</p><h3>What’s the catch?</h3><p>In previous years, cybercriminals were generalists in their skillsets, attack techniques, and methodologies. However, in recent times, several attackers have specialized in fields such as phishing alone.</p><p>Some have gone even deeper, specializing in units such as phishing automation with machine learning. The advanced methods employed by these bad actors, cybercriminals, red team specialists, and other types of attackers in conducting phishing attacks have become more sophisticated.</p><p>In the following paragraphs, I will present some of the most popular new skills and trends in phishing.</p><h3>homoglyph phishing</h3><p>Homoglyph phishing is a sophisticated technique used by cybercriminals to create fraudulent websites, email addresses, or messages that closely resemble legitimate ones by exploiting the visual similarities between different characters or symbols, known as homoglyphs.</p><p>By utilizing these deceptive characters, they aim to trick users into believing they are interacting with a trusted or genuine source or organization.</p><p>For instance, imagine receiving an email that appears to be from your banking institution, with the sender’s address slightly altered using homoglyphs. Instead of “<a href="/service/mailto:support@bank.com">support@bank.com</a>,” the attacker uses “supp<em>о</em><a href="/service/mailto:rt@bank.com">rt@bank.com</a>” (Notice the shape of the letter o).</p><p>The letter “о” in the first email is actually English alphabet while the in the second is a Cyrillic character “<em>о</em>”.</p><p>Alternatively, and Similarly attackers can employ homoglyphs in URLs to create fraudulent websites. For instance, they might register a domain name like “<a href="http://www.bank-login.com/">www.bank-login.com</a>&quot; by replacing the letter “l” (U+006C) with the visually similar letter “ι” (U+04CF), which is the Greek letter ‘iota’. The resulting URL, “<a href="http://www.xn--bank-ogin-k9i.com/">www.bank-ӏog</a>ι<a href="http://www.xn--bank-ogin-k9i.com/">n.com</a>,&quot; visually appears identical to the original, but leads users to a malicious website designed to collect their login credentials.</p><p>Homoglyph phishing exploits the fact that many fonts and languages have similar-looking characters and alphabets that can be easily mistaken. This technique makes it challenging for users to detect the fraudulent nature of these messages or websites, as they appear partially or entirely visually indistinguishable from legitimate ones.</p><h3>The Solution</h3><p>To protect against homoglyph phishing attacks, it is essential to carefully examine email addresses, URLs, and messages for any suspicious characters or inconsistencies.</p><p>A rule of thumb to guide you is to not click any links directly from the mail or message except links where you don’t have to input any credential or details.</p><p>“While the strength of an intelligence agency lies in its technological capabilities, the true power of a spy lies in their mastery of social engineering. The ability to exploit human vulnerabilities and manipulate perceptions is often the most effective tool in the espionage arsenal.” — Unknown US Spy/Agent. You are the target, Stay vigilant.</p><p>Subscribe and be patient, part 2 in a bit..</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e6996e5bda0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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