<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Omar Ismail, CFA on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Omar Ismail, CFA on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@omar-ismail?source=rss-b1c89e0d0133------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:30:30 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@omar-ismail/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[5 Requirements for Investing in AI Startups]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/startup-grind/5-requirements-for-investing-in-ai-startups-b86bbb537411?source=rss-b1c89e0d0133------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b86bbb537411</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Ismail, CFA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2020 16:36:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-06T16:36:01.075Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*LLKZxuKSUWsoXzot" /></figure><blockquote><em>“Artificial intelligence will be more profound for humanity than fire and electricity.”</em></blockquote><blockquote>- Sundar Pichai (CEO — Google)</blockquote><p>I believe that early-stage AI offers the most exciting investment opportunity of our generation. However, analysing these investments is not straightforward. <strong>Early-stage AI businesses are fundamentally different to their SaaS counterparts.</strong></p><p>In many ways, they look the same — 2 or 3 scrappy founders in their early 30s… a polished pitch deck explaining how the business is solving a major problem in a large market… products that are built from code, live on cloud servers, have a sleek UI, and integrate with existing systems via APIs.</p><p>However, the economics of a SaaS startup are fundamentally different to that of an early-stage AI. The attraction of SaaS lies in the ability to build it once (at a relatively low fixed cost) and sell it an infinite number of times (at a negligible variable cost). Contrastingly, <a href="https://twitter.com/eturner303/status/1223976313544773634">significant fixed costs are required to build and train the data models</a> that are at the core of an AI. What’s more, these models are like an open fire — needing constant fuel (data and processing power) in order to avoid burning out (eg through <a href="https://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/data-drift-what-it-is-and-how-to-avoid-it/#:~:text=Data%20drift%20is%20the%20sum,explains%20in%20greater%20detail%20here.">data drift</a>). As such, AI suffers from consistently high variable costs. These characteristics mean that to build a scalable AI business, one needs a very different playbook.</p><p>The following are 5 requirements that I have for early-stage (pre-seed to Series A) AI investments. I hope that they prove helpful to both investors and entrepreneurs who are active in this space.</p><h3><strong>Requirement 1: Laser focus </strong>🔍</h3><p>Early-stage AI should be more focussed on a specific problem and/or segment of the market than their SaaS counterparts.</p><p>There are two reasons for this:</p><h4><strong>Better economics</strong></h4><p>Most AI models are based on supervised learning. This requires collecting and processing vast amounts of <em>clean</em> and <em>labelled</em> data. The fixed costs associated with data acquisition can be considerable – particularly if this data is purchased from multiple sources. Once the data has been acquired, it must be cleaned and labelled, which is often a highly manual and labour intensive process. Finally, processing the data to train the model requires considerable cloud compute costs. These steps make AI costly to build and scale.</p><p>The amount of data that is needed by an AI model is correlated with the breadth of the problem that it is trying to solve. The broader the problem — the more edge cases that are likely to arise. As such, addressing a problem that is too broad will lead to excessive resource requirements.</p><p>By being laser focussed on (i) what the exact problem is; (ii) who the customers are; (iii) which data is needed, and (iv) what level of accuracy is optimal — a startup can optimise its cost base. The lesson, as Chris Dixon perfectly articulates it is: <a href="https://cdixon.org/2015/02/01/the-ai-startup-idea-maze">‘Narrow the domain’ and then Narrow the domain even more’</a>. You can always expand the scope later.</p><p>Whereas a SaaS business may be targeting the whole of market X, I would prefer an AI to target a subset of X initially — provided that subset’s revenue potential is large enough to yield venture returns (discussed further in requirement 2).</p><p>Note that this assumption may not hold true in a <a href="https://lambdalabs.com/blog/demystifying-gpt-3/">GPT-3</a> world, which would dramatically reduce the cost of data acquisition and model training. However, it is still too early to know with any certainty whether this will be the case.</p><h4><strong>Less competition</strong></h4><p>AI is synonymous with behemoths. Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, IBM, Alphabet, Apple, Intel, Baidu and Alibaba have all invested heavily in the space. Generally speaking, these players are developing ‘horizontal AI’ solutions— creating AI that can be applied across multiple industries and use cases simultaneously (eg Siri or Alexa). They seek broader (and by implication more lucrative) market opportunities.</p><p>By opting for a more focussed approach, a startup can avoid direct competition with larger incumbents. Even in the face of direct competition, by focussing on a specific niche, a startup can create a competitive advantage by designing a product experience that is better catered to the customers within that specific domain.</p><h3><strong>Requirement 2: A large SAM (not just TAM) </strong>📈</h3><p>The economics of venture capital means that potential investments must have a vast Total Addressable Market (TAM). It is unlikely that most startups will be able to capture &gt;10% of a market within the investment horizon (~10 years). As such, the market that is being captured must be large enough to create a reasonable chance that the business will some day be “venture scale” (&gt;$100m in ARR).</p><p>However, investors also acknowledge that the best strategy for a startup is to initially focus on a niche within the broader market, achieve product-market fit, and subsequently expand into adjacent markets. This initial target market is known as the Serviceable Available Market (SAM).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*R3sZ6knlYAPhBtxS.jpeg" /></figure><p>The nature of software development means that the cost of entering adjacent markets is very low — making it straight forward for SaaS startups to expand from their SAM to their TAM. Investors are willing to accept a lower SAM initially — with the expectation that the company can expand into new markets in the future.</p><p>Expanding into adjacent markets is much harder for an AI startup. AI models are not well suited to lateral thought (the ability to take experiences from one set of circumstances to a different set). A SaaS business can enter an adjacent market with only minimal dev and sales resource allocation. Contrastingly, an AI will need to be re-build and/or re-train their model to address the new customer problem. As discussed above, this is very costly. What’s more, addressing this new problem will likely require a new dataset — eroding any previous data defensibility that the company had built. These factors make moving from the SAM to the TAM very difficult — even if the use cases look similar on the surface.</p><p>As a result of this characteristic, I look for AI startups whose current product caters to a vast SAM — with the assumption that they will not be able to expand into adjacent markets in the near-term.</p><p>To receive future posts as a newsletter – click here 📬</p><h3><strong>Requirement 3: Data defensibility </strong>🛡</h3><p>The best way for an AI startup to create a sustainable competitive advantage is through data. The algorithms underlying the model are less defensible, in my view. Many of these architectures are publicly available — having being built in academic settings. Pre-trained models can be accessed via open-source libraries — and model parameters can be optimised automatically.</p><p>As such, I believe that the best thing an AI startup can do is to create a data moat. I do not mean simply seeking to achieve scale. Indeed, I believe that <a href="https://a16z.com/2019/05/09/data-network-effects-moats/">data has limited scale advantages.</a> Instead, I prefer a company to have (i) access to proprietary data; (ii) a unique process for combining and enriching data from publicly available sources; (iii) a process for gathering data in a scalable and cost effective way; (iv) a process for creating reliable synthetic data (eg using Generative adversarial networks).</p><p>Founders should be comfortable articulating why they have the optimal strategy with regards to data acquisition, processing, quality, storage and provisioning.</p><h3><strong>Requirement 4: High value use cases with a low risk of failure </strong>💰</h3><p>For AI startups to have commercial viability, they must be able to yield significant value for customers (through revenue generation or cost reduction).</p><p>Generally speaking, B2B AI integrations are more cumbersome relative to their SaaS equivalents. They require a notable time and resource commitment from potential customers. These customers will not be willing to devote these resources for a ‘nice to have’ product. Instead, the ROI of adopting the AI should make it a ‘must-have’ – where the cost-benefit trade off to the customer is clear (and preferably immediate). I look for use cases where AI can solve the problem 10x more effectively than non-AI alternatives.</p><p>However, the use cases must also have a low-risk of failure. The old AI adage is that AI is “really good at <em>partially</em> solving just about any problem.” Most startups can build a model that can achieve between 80–90% accuracy. However, it becomes exponentially harder to increase accuracy beyond this. The resource requirements to achieve &gt;95% make the economics unfeasible for most use cases. As such, I prefer startups that cater to use cases where an approximation is sufficient.</p><h3><strong>Requirement 5: No need for explainability </strong>🤷‍♂️</h3><p>AI is superior to humans in many regards. For example, with regards to assignment (identifying what something is, or the extent to which items are connected); grouping (determining correlations and subsets in data); generation (creating images or text based on inputs) and forecasting (predicting changes in time series data).</p><p>However, one fundamental shortcoming of AI currently is its inability to explain <em>why</em> it has come to the conclusions that it has — known as the ‘black box dilemma’. AI models are trained with a lot of parameters on which transformations are applied. Subsequently, the process of pre-processing and model construction becomes a black-box that is very hard to interpret by the end user.</p><p>For example, in the context of decision making, AI can produce predictions about individuals’ credit risk and health status by mapping a user’s features into classes. However, the exact reasons for these connections are not elaborated. <strong>The prediction comes with no justification.</strong> More worryingly, in some cases, the algorithms have actually inherited human prejudices or biases that are hidden within the training data. This can result in situations where AI is producing unfair or even abhorrent decisions on critical issues.</p><p>A lot of work is being done on the development of Explainable AI (XAI). currently. However, we are still years away from achieving widespread XAI. I prefer an early-stage company to be addressing a problem where the absence of an explanation has only minor implications (ie content recommendations instead of “big ticket” decisions like military strategy or medical diagnoses).</p><h3>Concluding thoughts</h3><p>Early-stage AI founders have a more challenging road ahead of them relative to their SaaS equivalents. However, by truly understanding the economic characteristics of AI, they can build highly profitable businesses, that address some of the most important problems of our time.</p><p><strong>If you’re an early-stage AI founder with a focus on video, audio or gaming — drop me a line on </strong><a href="/service/mailto:omar@rooksnestventures.com"><strong>omar@rooksnestventures.com</strong></a><strong>. I’ll respond! 👋</strong></p><p>To receive future posts as a newsletter - <a href="https://omarismail.substack.com/p/coming-soon">click here</a> 📬</p><figure><a href="https://sgtr.cc/2XH2U0j"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xTGvpsG_lwJvGKaTlGc-yQ.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="https://sgtr.cc/3civmLD"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*evD8OQSj8LDRlbGsYTqWyA.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="http://bit.ly/2QPjKqG"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/1*sdKS9u5ciPkHD0tjQfMeTw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b86bbb537411" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/startup-grind/5-requirements-for-investing-in-ai-startups-b86bbb537411">5 Requirements for Investing in AI Startups</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/startup-grind">Startup Grind</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to Analyse a Competitive Landscape: A Framework for VCs and Founders]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/startup-grind/how-to-analyse-a-competitive-landscape-a-framework-for-vcs-and-founders-d6af6254de58?source=rss-b1c89e0d0133------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6af6254de58</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Ismail, CFA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2020 20:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-23T20:01:01.019Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/0*j0YLtkhrZbtbq1lJ.jpg" /></figure><blockquote><em>‘Competition is for losers. If you want to create and capture lasting value, look to build a monopoly’</em></blockquote><blockquote>- Peter Thiel (PayPal and Palantir Co-founder)</blockquote><p>Competition is one of the key determinants of a startup’s success or failure. However, despite its importance, I find that many founders (and investors 🤭) only loosely understand the implications of competitive landscapes.</p><p>What does it really mean to say that a startup faces ‘tough competition?’ Does it matter that there are already existing companies serving the same customers? When can a startup successfully compete against Amazon or Google? When is a market too crowded?</p><p>In this post, I‘ll attempt to answer these questions. I discuss three types of market structure:</p><ul><li>Winner takes all (WTA)</li><li>Winners take most (WTM)</li><li>Fragmented</li></ul><p>I’ll outline the causal factors that lead to each of these market structures. Most importantly, I’ll discuss how startups can successfully operate within each structure.</p><p>I hope that this framework will be helpful to both entrepreneurs and investors in assessing early-stage, competitive strategy.</p><h3>TL;DR</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aiW_dv79ySLqmTLnwW7t8w.png" /></figure><p><strong>*To receive future posts as a newsletter — </strong><a href="https://omarismail.substack.com/p/coming-soon"><strong>click here</strong></a><strong> 📬*</strong></p><h3><strong>Winner takes all (WTA) </strong>💰💰💰</h3><h3><strong>Description</strong></h3><p>A market in which the top one or two companies capture a large share (&gt;80%) of revenues.</p><p>The causal factors that lead to this market structure mean that the dominant player(s) have very deep moats — making competition incredibly challenging. As Ben Thompson articulates it — incumbents can be eclipsed, not displaced.</p><p>Most WTA markets are dominated by behemoths (eg YouTube in UGC video, Google in Web search, and Amazon in horizontal e-commerce). However, there are examples of smaller and more niche WTA markets (eg Cameo with celebrity messaging). Global network effects are the key contributor to these niche WTA markets (discussed below).</p><p>WTA markets require a Total Addressable Market (TAM) size &gt;$200m to achieve venture scale (assuming the top 2 players capture &gt;80% market share).</p><h3><strong>Causal factors</strong></h3><h4><strong>Economies of scale </strong>⚖️</h4><p>One of the key contributing factors to WTA markets is the presence of economies of scale. Some products have considerable fixed cost requirements. For example, the supply chain investments required to facilitate a vertically integrated, horizontal e-commerce business like Amazon are vast. In these instances, being bigger than the competition becomes a major advantage. Bigger companies can spread these fixed costs across more users, resulting in a lower cost per user/unit relative to smaller competitors.</p><p>Once a company reaches a certain size, its cost advantage becomes insurmountable to most new entrants. The dominant company can use predatory pricing to price the products at below-cost pricing. Consequently, other firms cannot compete, and eventually have to exit the market. <a href="https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2014/9/4/why-amazon-has-no-profits-and-why-it-works">Amazon has been accused of such a practices in the past.</a> The chart below shows how the company sacrificed profits for decades in the pursuit of impenetrable scale advantages.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*GzMbTLj-N8TVDOEG.jpg" /></figure><p>Economies of scale on their own can only lead to WTM markets, not WTA markets. Provided the revenue potential is large enough, investors will be willing to provide new entrants with enough capital to compete against the incumbent. Investors will see through near-term losses with the view that once the new entrant has achieved scale, the economics will be more favourable.</p><p><strong>As such, economies of scale must be combined with another one of the causal factors discussed below to yield a WTA market.</strong></p><h4><strong>(Global) Network effects </strong>🕸</h4><p>A network effect occurs when the value of a product or service goes up as more people use it. Telephones, eBay, and WhatsApp are good examples of network effects at work. The more people that use WhatsApp, the more people one can contact, and thus, the more valuable the product.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZAVCU5ax1GzhBdHq.png" /><figcaption>The telephone is a commonly cited example of network effects at work. The more users (nodes) in the network, the more valuable the network becomes.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The type of network is what determines the degree of fragmentation in a market. Network effects create WTA markets when the network is based on a global network (rather than a local network).</strong></p><p>A global network is one in which each node is theoretically connected to every other node in the network. Each new (random) connection adds value to the entire network. A telephone network is the best example of a global network effect. New additions (telephone users) makes the ecosystem more valuable, since there are more potential points of contact. The presence of global network effects is one of the key contributors to WTA markets. The stronger the network effects, the more concentrated the market will be. Examples of this happening in practice include YouTube, LinkedIn and Cameo<strong>.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/654/1*Jr9pAAOoKq95dWf7ouIL-A.png" /><figcaption>Global network (left) vs Local or clustered network (right). Global network effects create WTA markets; whereas local network effects are more likely to create WTM or Fragmented markets.</figcaption></figure><p>Global networks are in contrast to local networks. A local network is when the nodes are connected in clusters, based on a common modalities, such as physical location, common interests or employers. An example of a local network is Slack. The addition of unconnected participants to the network adds negligible value to users. It is unlikely that existing users will ever communicate with a new random user, unless the new user joins the existing user’s cluster (Slack Group). Value is only added each time someone within the cluster joins Slack (eg a new employee of the same company).</p><p>Local network effects provide defensibility — but only in ‘clusters’. <a href="https://www.nfx.com/post/network-effects-bible/#:~:text=Reed&#39;s%20Law,-Reed&#39;s%20Law%20was&amp;text=While%20Reed%20acknowledged%20that%20%E2%80%9Cmany,even%20faster%20than%20other%20networks.">Additionally, clustering allows value to be increased faster than in global networks.</a> These features lead to markets with several dominant players. Local network effects explain why enterprise IMs have a WTM market structure (ie Slack, Skype, Teams, Stride are all significant players in the space).</p><p><strong>The more localised a network, the more fragmented the market structure. </strong>For example, in the CRM space, there are hundreds of players, due to fact that network effects are clustered based on many different industry verticals.</p><h4><strong><em>High switching costs </em></strong>🤯</h4><p>If the cost or inconvenience of migrating to a different product are high, a product will be sticky. Customers are ‘locked in’. For example, the costs of an organisation switching to a new operating system are significant. Consequently, these occurrences may only occur every few decades. This stickiness results in WTA and WTM markets.</p><p><strong>The more sticky the dominant product(s), the more concentrated the market will be.</strong></p><h4><strong><em>Global distribution </em></strong>🌍</h4><p>The ability to access all potential customers of a product is a crucial facet of WTA markets. If boundaries exist (eg geographic or regulatory barriers) then competing companies (eg local alternatives) can cater to these under-served customer groups. This would result in WTM or Fragmented markets.</p><h4>Commoditised demands 🤷‍♂️</h4><p>For one player to dominate the entire market, user demands must be relatively commoditised (ie all users are happy with the same product or service).</p><p>For example, in the confines of our current technology, it is difficult to imagine how one could differentiate Web search well enough to actively take on Google.</p><h3><strong>What startups need to compete in a WTA market</strong></h3><h4><strong>Early mover advantages </strong>🥇</h4><p>Early entry enables companies to benefit from economies of scale, build a moat based on network effects, and avoid the challenges associated with acquiring ‘locked in’ users. <a href="https://hbr.org/2005/04/the-half-truth-of-first-mover-advantage">It is important to note that the <strong>first</strong> mover does not necessarily have the greatest advantage.</a></p><h4><strong>Technological innovation </strong>💾</h4><p>WTA disruption is infrequent. Startups products must be able to provide an experience that is 10x better than the incumbents (eg Microsoft’s PC vs Intel’s Mainframe). This often requires major technological innovations and/or platform shifts. For example, Web search in its current incarnation is only likely to be disrupted once AI is cogent enough to answer users’ questions directly.</p><h4><strong>Access to capital </strong>💸</h4><p>Since WTA markets often benefit from economies of scale, startups may require significant capital investments to take on the incumbent.</p><h3><strong>Winners take most (WTM) </strong>💰💰</h3><h3>Description</h3><p>A WTM market is a concentrated market structure in which the top 10 players capture a large share (&gt;80%) of revenues.</p><p>While barriers to entry do exist, startups can win market share through product differentiation and/or strategic positioning. Since products are differentiated, it is possible for companies to compete on more than just price. This enables them to achieve attractive SaaS margins (60–80%) over the long-run.</p><p><strong>For startups looking to raise venture capital, this is the best market structure to address.</strong> To achieve venture scale, startups should seek a Total Addressable Market (TAM) &gt;$10bn.</p><p>Examples of WTM markets include mobility (ie Uber, Lyft, Didi Chuxing, Gett, Addison Lee, Grab, Bolt), travel search-engines (ie Booking.com, TripAdvisor, Expedia, Skyscanner) and online fashion (ie ASOS, Boohoo, Zalando, Farfetch, Depop).</p><h3>Causal factors</h3><p>All the factors that contribute to WTA markets also contribute to WTM markets. However, the addition of the following factors makes them WTM, rather than WTA.</p><h4><strong>Multi-tenanting </strong>👯</h4><p>Multi-tenanting is the ability for users of a product to use alternative products simultaneously — with very low friction. For example, when using social networks, the costs associated with uploading a photo to both Facebook and Instagram are negligible. Similarly, sellers can list the same product on eBay and Cragislist simultaneously with little effort. Multi-tenanting weakens the strength of network effects, resulting in a greater fragmentation of the market.</p><h4><strong>(Local) network effects </strong>🕸</h4><p>As discussed in the section above.</p><h4><strong>Regulatory constraints </strong>👨🏻‍⚖️</h4><p>Antitrust regulations may turn WTA markets into WTM. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770">The European Commission’s stance on Google’s dominance of the online advertising market</a> is a recent example of this in practice. Regulatory decisions may create opportunities for the long tail to capture market share.</p><h4>Fragmented demands 👨‍👩‍👧‍👦</h4><p>If there are many different types of user, there will be more demand for product differentiation. This results in a more fragmented market structure. Common dimensions of differentiation include breadth vs focus, cost vs quality, simplicity vs sophistication and performance vs speed.</p><h3>What startups need to compete in a WTM market</h3><h4><strong>Differentiated products that cater to under-served segments </strong>🥱</h4><p>To succeed in WTM markets, startups must create product experiences that address the pain points of a specific segment of the market. In an attempt to capture a wide segment of the market, incumbents will most likely build broader and less focussed products. This enables competition to emerge. For example, Superhuman catered to the segment of email users who placed considerable value on productivity and efficiency; Robinhood focussed on catering to users with minimal knowledge of finance, but an interest in investing in stocks; Masterclass focussed on users who are interested in paying a premium for celebrity tutorials. Provided the value of that segment (Serviceable Addressable Market — SAM) is large enough, there will be an opportunity for startups to reach considerable scale.</p><h4><strong>Business model innovation </strong>🙃</h4><p>Changing a business model changes the economic make-up of a business. This can enable effective competition with incumbents.</p><p>For example, startups can adopt a marketplace model instead of a B2C model (eg Depop vs ASOS). This diminishes the power of the incumbent’s economies of scale. In the case of Depop, the fixed costs associated with launching a vertically integrated e-commerce business were eradicated by transferring these over to the marketplace’s sellers.</p><p>Startups can also win share by innovating on pricing models. For example, a freemium model can lower the switching costs for users. Google Docs used this approach to successfully to win market share from Microsoft Word.</p><h3><strong>Fragmented </strong>💰</h3><h3>Description</h3><p>A market structure in which no single player captures &gt;20% of revenues. Instead, there is a long-tail of companies, all competing for the same customers.</p><p>Most businesses operating in fragmented markets will not grow to venture scale. They can only grow to a size that is too small to justify the risks associated with venture investment. It is possible to achieve venture scale. However, it is much more challenging to do so. To de-risk investments, investors should look for a TAM &gt;$100bn.</p><p>These market structures are best suited to founders looking to build lifestyle businesses or <a href="https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/deals/roll-up-strategy/#:~:text=A%20roll%20up%20strategy%20is,operational%20costs%2C%20and%20increase%20revenues">private equity firms looking to adopt a ‘roll-up’ strategy.</a></p><p>Examples include CRM tools, HR tools and D2C brands.</p><h3>Causal factors</h3><h4>Diseconomies of scale 📉</h4><p>In certain instances, it is a weakness to have more users/scale. For example, if fixed costs are low but variable costs are high, there are limited cost advantages to scale. In these instances, more scale results in more complexity, and thus more cost inefficiency.</p><p>Diseconomies of scale are not just restricted to costs. There may be brand implications. For example, D2C brands may see their brand being tarnished as they scale (and become more ‘mainstream’). Diseconomies of scale might also include an inability to deliver effective service and personalisation as a business scales.</p><p>These diseconomies provide smaller players with advantages — which increases the fragmentation of a market.</p><h4>Low barriers to entry 𝌉</h4><p>Provided a market is large enough, low barriers to entry will entice new entrants into a market. The lower the barriers, the higher the fragmentation.</p><h3>What startups need to compete in a Fragmented market</h3><h4>Early-mover advantages 🥇</h4><p>Early movers are best placed to compete in fragmented markets. By entering a market first, startups can develop a strong brand as the established incumbent. <a href="https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2019-06-17-gartner-says-worldwide-customer-experience-and-relati">For example, Salesforce has a ~20% market share of the global CRM market.</a> While competition is tough and fragmentation is high (for the reasons mentioned above), Salesforce’s brand provides it with a moat which enables it to defend its market share.</p><h4>Sales &amp; marketing investment 👨‍💼</h4><p>Low barriers to entry means that many similar products will compete for market share. This reduces the differentiation in the market. Since differentiation is low, startups must win share through strong sales and marketing efforts. This requires investing appropriately in sales and marketing staff. Additionally, companies can innovate with effective Growth marketing (eg <a href="https://www.reforge.com/blog/growth-loops">baking viral loops into the product).</a></p><h4>Low friction user acquisition 💆‍♀️</h4><p>Since there are so many competitors, a startup must make it as easy as possible for users to migrate to their product. If the friction is too high, users will simply opt for one of the many competing products or services.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>Not all market structures are born equal. Founders and VCs should always identify which of the three market structures their company is operating in.</p><ul><li>If there are limited advantages to scale, low barriers to entry and no network effects, the market will likely become fragmented. Fragmented markets are easy to enter, but difficult to achieve considerable scale in. Such markets are highly competitive, and are more likely to produce lifestyle businesses than venture scale companies.</li><li>WTA markets are often difficult to enter. Disruption happens infrequently, and generally requires fundamental shifts in technologies and platforms. Startups can succeed in (niche) WTA markets by building innovative products that cater to niche uses cases and benefit from global network effects.</li><li><strong>WTM markets are the most attractive from a venture perspective.</strong> Startups can win share from incumbents by addressing the pain points of a specific user segment, or through business model innovation. Provided the TAM and SAM are large enough, these markets can often accommodate several (5–15) venture scale businesses.</li></ul><p><strong>If you’re a startup founder and want to chat about your competitive strategy — drop me a line on omar@rooksnestventures.com 👋</strong></p><p>To receive future posts as a newsletter — <a href="https://omarismail.substack.com/p/coming-soon">click here</a> 📬</p><figure><a href="https://sgtr.cc/2XH2U0j"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xTGvpsG_lwJvGKaTlGc-yQ.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="https://sgtr.cc/3civmLD"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*evD8OQSj8LDRlbGsYTqWyA.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="http://bit.ly/2QPjKqG"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/1*sdKS9u5ciPkHD0tjQfMeTw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6af6254de58" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/startup-grind/how-to-analyse-a-competitive-landscape-a-framework-for-vcs-and-founders-d6af6254de58">How to Analyse a Competitive Landscape: A Framework for VCs and Founders</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/startup-grind">Startup Grind</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How will Covid change the world? A review of history.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/how-will-covid-change-the-world-a-review-of-history-f844a21f4771?source=rss-b1c89e0d0133------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f844a21f4771</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Ismail, CFA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2020 13:46:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-06T13:42:05.558Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pFpqUjKCLaUs6ZVs.jpg" /><figcaption>Thomas Cole: The Course of Empire, Destruction</figcaption></figure><h3>How Will Covid Change the World? A Review of History</h3><p><em>Venture Capital is a long-term game. It requires having a (correct) view of how the world of the future will look. Crises make this task difficult. They create kinks in the trajectory of history. They shake the foundations of society, accelerating existing trends while bringing underlying tensions to the fore. The world following a crisis is very different to the world that preceded it.</em></p><p><em>What follows is my examination of the potential long-term impacts of the Covid crisis. I used history as a guide — examining 35 major historical crises to understand how and why these events changed the course of history. In this section, I explore the potential political, economic and social implications of the Covid crisis. Part two will cover the behavioural and technological implications.</em></p><h3>Covid — an archetypal crisis</h3><p>A crisis is defined as “a time of intense difficulty or danger”. By all measures, the world is in the midst of a crisis.</p><p>In the US, Covid-19 has killed more Americans than the Vietnam War, Gulf War, Afghanistan War, and Iraq War… combined. The global economy is forecast to shed <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/policy/wesp-mid-2020-report.html">&gt;$8.5 trillion<strong> </strong>in GDP over the next two years</a>— wiping out all of the gains of the past four years in the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression. The world is angry. Polarisation is rife. In the wake of heinous racial injustice, churches have been set alight and statues have been torn down across the world. Internationally, tensions between China and the US (as well as with India and Taiwan) have escalated to uncomfortable levels — with Xi Jinping calling for the military to <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/world/2020/05/chinese-president-xi-jinping-tells-military-to-prepare-for-war-boosts-defence-budget.html">“prepare for war”.</a></p><p>This feels intensely difficult and dangerous.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/466/0*_necdgV9aiHOqJ_D.jpg" /><figcaption>A standoff between opposing sets of protestors at a North West BLM march. Source: The Gazette</figcaption></figure><h4>A historic moment with an uncertain outcome</h4><p>The roots of the word ‘crisis’ are thought-provoking. The word is derived from the ancient Greek word ‘<em>krisis</em>’ which was a key term in Hippocratic medicine. It described a turning point in a disease — a fork in the road, marking either the beginning of a recovery or the onset of death.</p><p>So… we are in the midst of a significant moment. However, the outcome is fundamentally uncertain. The world will change forever. The jury is out on whether this will be for better, or for worse.</p><h4>History repeats itself</h4><p>How can we navigate through such uncertainty? Fortunately, history is a valuable teacher. At Rooks Nest Ventures — we firmly believe in the concept of historic recurrence — the view that history repeats itself through patterns of cause and effect.</p><p>I used this approach to better predict the long-term outcomes of this current crisis. I analysed 35 historic crises — from the Black Death to the Suez Crisis — in an attempt to identify common themes. While these crises had many notable differences, I found that their effects could be clustered into five categories.</p><h4><strong>Historically, crises have:</strong></h4><ol><li>Changed the established political order (Part I)</li><li>Caused and/or contributed to international conflicts (Part I)</li><li>Changed the socioeconomic order (Part I)</li><li>Caused persistent behavioural changes (Part II)</li><li>Accelerated the adoption of certain technologies (Part II)</li></ol><p>I used this ‘framework’ to reflect on the current crisis. In what follows, I explore a range of potential second-order effects for each theme.</p><h4>TLDR; I’ve summarised my predictions in this table:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UFWkoP443YkXpui6TjYAHg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Crises change the political order</strong></h3><p>Crises have historically led to changes in the domestic balance of political power. This has ranged from democratic regime change to the total overhaul of established political systems.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Changes in income or wealth often lead to political instability</em></strong></blockquote><p>Crises frequently lead to significant changes that alter a segment of the populace’s economic position. This rebalancing is often a zero-sum game — and the losers in this game are often not happy about it.</p><p>For example, the Black Death is often ascribed as being one of the key contributors to the collapse of feudalism in Europe. The pandemic led to a drastic reduction in the size of the workforce, with several European cities losing up to 60% of their population. This made it harder to find workers to plow fields and harvest crops, leading to a marked increase in wages for the working peasants. In England, in order to defend their financial interests, the Lords enacted the Statute of Labourers, which capped the wages of workers. This heightened antagonism between the working class and the aristocrats in the proceeding years — ultimately culminating in the Peasants’ revolt in 1381. The Revolt was the first time that the peasants had joined together in order to achieve political change — and is seen by historians as the beginning of the end for the feudal system in England.</p><p>Economic frustration can also manifest itself in a fragmentation of the political landscape. Typically, this has led to extremist parties gaining popularity. The biggest beneficiaries of this in modern history have been far right parties. Since 1870, they have seen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/events/2015/20151001_post_crisis_slump/documents/c._trebesch.pdf">an increase in their vote shares of ~30%</a> relative to the pre-crisis level in the five years following a systemic financial crisis.</p><p>The most popular manifestation of this in modern history was the rise of Nazi Germany as a result of WWI reparations and the Great Depression. Deteriorating economic conditions in the 1930s fostered anger and fear amongst the population. They sought scapegoats for the extreme hardships brought about by the crisis. This helped Hitler to find an audience for his antisemitic and anticommunist rhetoric that depicted Jews as the cause of the Depression. Fear and uncertainty about Germany’s future also led many Germans in search of the kind of stability that Hitler offered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/446/0*DiE61w62g3lX_ei9.jpg" /><figcaption>Poster proclaiming “Our Last Hope — Hitler,” 1932. Source: <em>US Holocaust Memorial Museum</em></figcaption></figure><p>More recently, following the Great Recession, there has been widespread political fragmentation in Europe. Parties on the extreme right such as Front National in France or Golden Dawn in Greece have enjoyed major electoral successes. Populist or Eurosceptic parties such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos, the party of True Finns, UKIP, or the Alternative for Germany posted surprising success during recent elections — at the expense of their established centrist counterparts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*15PJZHezApd0gt5D.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: Guardian (UK)</figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Political incumbents are blamed for causing or mishandling the crisis</em></strong></blockquote><p>Another reason that crises lead to changes in the political order is blame. By definition, crises create intense difficulties. Intense difficulties are easy to mismanage. Mismanagement leads to blame. This blame can lead to governments being overthrown.</p><p>For example, following the Great Recession, Greece came perilously close to defaulting on its sovereign debt, which reached &gt;170% of GDP in 2011. The response of the government was to enforce sweeping austerity measures. The result of this was a severe recession that lasted for over 5 years — one of the longest recessions of any advanced economy (including the US Great Depression). There was a dramatic increase in unemployment and homelessness that still persists today.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EpHVci5ozCm235s8Zdwrkg.png" /><figcaption>Greece unemployment rate (%) — Source: Statista</figcaption></figure><p>This crisis led to a widespread loss of confidence in the government, sparking an early election. <a href="http://www.publicissue.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/01-1202pollselections2012_v10_eng.pdf">According to a poll in February 2012 </a>the governing party PASOK — which won the national elections of 2009 with 43.92% of the vote — saw its approval rating decline to 8%, placing it fifth after centre-right New Democracy (31%), left-wing Democratic Left (DIMAR) (18%), far-left Communist Party of Greece (KKE) (12.5%) and radical left Syriza (12%). The two-party system which had dominated Greek politics for over 30 years collapsed in the double elections of 6th May and 17 June 2012, with a coalition government formed between New Democracy, PASOK and DIMAR.</p><p>In the context of the current crisis, I believe that political changes could manifest in the following ways:</p><h4><strong><em>1) The disintegration of the European Union</em></strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*TeknmKkQ1ZWLNkE1.jpg" /></figure><p>2020 may prove to be a decisive turning point in Europe’s move towards disintegration. The EU has faced four internal crises over the past decade —the debt crisis, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the migrant crisis and most recently, Brexit. Each of these crises have brought into doubt the long term prospects of the European system. Covid-19 could well be the latest addition to this list.</p><p>Member states have mostly responded to the pandemic and its economic fallout in isolation. Internal border controls have been introduced (temporarily) between countries. Local inquiries are now questioning whether stronger border controls at the outset would have slowed the virus’ spread in its early days — threatening the very essence of the Schengen Area. All of this threatens the unity that the Union is supposed to represent.</p><p>While the fallout from Covid may not immediately lead to instances of ‘full’ disintegration such as Brexit, we may begin to see nation states pursuing ‘partial’ disintegration. This would consist of member states refusing to comply with EU rules on specific issues — such as public finances or the Schengen. In May, for example, Germany’s top court ruled that the European Central Bank’s (ECB) mass bond-buying programme intended to stabilise the eurozone was in violation of the German constitution. This was a historic moment — with Germany bringing into question the ECB’s independence and sovereignty — setting a precedent that places national legislation above that of the ECJ.</p><p>Other nations may follow suit. Currently, the ECJ is in a legal standoff with Poland and Hungary over their alleged failure to abide by commonly agreed decisions and democratic standards. These nations are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ecj-authority-challenged-by-poland-and-hungary/">already using the German precedent</a> as an argument to defend their national sovereignty over the wishes of the ECJ.</p><p><strong>These partial forms of disintegration undermine the very foundations on which the European system was built. I fear that Covid-19 will add further fuel to the pervasive isolationist ideology that has swept the continent over the past decade.</strong></p><h4><strong><em>2) An increasing number of weak or failed states</em></strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*uJ0ek02d80TOtBRh.png" /><figcaption>Source: Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace)</figcaption></figure><p>In many fragile countries, prolonged periods of unrest and/or corruption have left health systems under-prepared to deal with the current outbreak. Libya has seen an outflow of foreign medics during the war, which has left its health system highly vulnerable. In Venezuela, tensions between the Chavista government and the opposition have created a similar vacuum. In Iran, a slow and inadequate response by the government has caused major disruption in an already economically fragile state. Meanwhile, in Gaza, where the healthcare system was already struggling to serve its dense population, the government is under severe pressure to prevent a system wide collapse.</p><p>The risk of these failed states is exacerbated by a growing resistance across the developed world to accept refugees. This trend is likely to continue — in part due to a perceived risk of importing disease, but more likely, due to a hostility towards accepting immigrants during a time of significant unemployment. This has historical precedents. For example, during the Great Depression, the majority of Americans opposed increasing immigration to the United States, citing economic concerns. President Herbert Hoover enforced the “likely to become a public charge” (LPC) clause from a 1917 immigration law. This clause was designed to exclude any immigrant who lacked the economic means to be self-sufficient and who could potentially become a financial burden on the state.</p><p><strong>The combination of these factors may result in even more weak or failing states. Aside from the devastating humanitarian cost of this, I worry that this could further de-stabilise the already fragile Middle East — creating a fertile breeding ground for extremists groups to thrive.</strong></p><h3>Crises lead to international conflicts</h3><p><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/174713.The_Lessons_of_History">Throughout all of recorded human history, only 10 percent of humanity’s time on earth has been free of war.</a> Crises are often the catalyst for these international tensions.</p><p>The Black Death is cited as prolonging the 100 years war between England and France. Although the war had already begun in 1337, many scholars suggest that it lasted as long as it did due to the economic benefits that it afforded the noblemen — who were financially squeezed as a result of the plague.</p><p>In the 19th century, severe recessions frequently preceded wars. For example, shortly after the 1797’s economic deflation, a war erupted between the US and France (1798 -1800). The war between US and Great Britain in 1812 came soon after the depression in 1807–1808. Meanwhile, the long depression of 1873–1879 arguably laid the foundations for the Spanish-American war, and subsequently, the First World War.</p><p>More recently, during the Great Depression, US President Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun.</p><p>I expect the current crisis to escalate existing international tensions in the following ways:</p><h4>1) US-China decoupling</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vogFxQQ2WG2Viemn.jpg" /></figure><p>U.S.-Chinese relations have been deteriorating for years. Just before the outbreak, the two nations had begun to alleviate a two year trade war with the unveiling of the so-called “Phase One” trade deal. However, the pandemic has significantly diminished the prospects for cooperation — adding a new dimension to long-standing frictions.</p><p>In Washington, many hold the Chinese government responsible for the spread of Covid. They point to weeks of cover-up and a failure to promptly initiate a lockdown. Trump has publicly smeared China by persistently referring to Covid as the “Chinese Virus”. Contrastingly, China’s Communist Party are using their supposed relative success in dealing with the virus as international propaganda —<a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2020/04/16/chinas-post-covid-propaganda-push"> using this as an opportunity to expand their influence globally.</a></p><p>The idea of “decoupling” the two economies had already gained traction within the Trump Administration, even before the pandemic. Many in Washington pointed to the long-term consequences of an over dependence on a country with a spotty track record of espionage and IP theft.</p><p>Post-Covid, the motivation to separate the two economies will continue to grow. The value of newly announced Chinese direct investment projects into the US <a href="https://rhg.com/impact/china-investment-monitor/">fell to just $200m in the first quarter of this year</a>, down from an average of $2bn per quarter in 2019, $2.7bn a quarter in 2018 and ~$8bn a quarter in the 2016 and 2017. Lawmakers are already debating a series of measures to further separate the two nations — including bans on sensitive exports, additional tariffs on Chinese goods and a forced re-shoring of US companies. Within the private sector, there will be a renewed focus on protecting supply chains from future disruptions — stimulating the motivations for re-nationalisation.</p><p><strong>I believe that a de-coupling would be a net negative for the world, worsening global economic growth prospects and markedly de-stabilising international relations. However, I also fear that we have reached an </strong><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c920bce2-360e-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4"><strong>irreversible stage in the de-coupling.</strong></a></p><h4>2) A ‘post America’ world</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*sGaX1WMQSQRhJpI6.jpg" /></figure><p>One notable characteristic of the Covid crisis has been the marked lack of US leadership.<strong> I believe that this could be the catalyst that accelerates the decline of American hegemony.</strong></p><p>Since the end of WWII, the U.S. has been the central player in the international system. During the Cold War, it successfully rallied the world under the shared goal of tackling communism. It led the creation of international organisations such as the UN, NATO, the IMF and the World Bank. It was essential in orchestrating global agreements on trade, climate change, regional security and arms control. Americans were at the epicentre of the so called “<a href="https://de.usembassy.gov/the-importance-of-a-rules-based-international-order/">rules-based international order</a>.”</p><p>However, the US’ influence on the international stage has been declining since the end of the Cold War — a trend that has accelerated over the past two decades. Not the decline of American power — the country remains economically and militarily dominant — but a decline in its desire and capacity to use that power to influence global affairs.</p><p>President Obama led a pullback from Afghanistan and the Middle East. President Trump has essentially ended the U.S. presence in Syria, and is seeking to do the same in Afghanistan. Perhaps most significantly, he has shown little interest either in forming alliances or in preserving the US’ traditional leadership role in the face of international issues. His stance on the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization are both case in point.</p><p>Simultaneously, the power of other countries has grown, giving them both the ability and the desire to effect global affairs independently of U.S. desires. China and Russia, now significant economies on the world stage, contend the US’ position at the centre of global affairs.</p><p>This is more than just a self-inflicted choice by the US. Globally, there had already been a meaningful decline in the appeal of the ‘American dream’. Critics point to repeated cases of gun violence and school shootings, racial injustices and police brutality, economic mismanagement (2008 global financial crisis), and the growth of populism within Washington. American ideology is growing increasingly unattractive for many. Indeed, Gallup’s pollsters reported that worldwide approval of U.S. leadership plunged from 48% in 2016 <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/247037/image-leadership-poorer-china.aspx">to a record low of 31% in 2020</a>. This drop places the U.S below China’s 34% — leaving Germany as the most popular power with an approval of 39%.</p><p>This trend has been particularly pronounced in the current crisis. The US has not been at the centre of a collective effort to address the virus and its economic effects. In fact, the US has in many ways been a good exemplar of how not to handle the crisis. Its response has been slow, incoherent and divided. This was perhaps best captured by Trump’s call to inject disinfectant as a potential cure — a blatant demonstration of why post-truth populism cannot be used to tackle global crises. <strong>In my view, this will reinforce the increasingly widespread perception that the United States has lost its way.</strong></p><h3><strong>Crises change the socioeconomic order</strong></h3><p>Crises often create winners and losers — rebalancing the socioeconomic order. This can have severe political, economic and cultural ramifications.</p><p>Interestingly, most recessions tend to reduce income inequality. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15140326.2019.1620982">One study</a> found that business cycle recessions decreased inequality in more than fifty percent of counties. In the Great Depression, income inequality rose significantly in the lead up to the stock market crash, but fell sharply after that, and remained at a historically low level from the 1940s through the 1970s.</p><p>The Great Recession is a notable exception to this trend, however, with income and wealth inequality widening sharply in the subsequent years. Studies have shown that those with a lower socioeconomic status were the worst impacted by the recession. <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/11/759-recession.pdf">One study</a> found that 55% of Americans “lost ground” during the Great Recession (based on various hardships including unemployment, missed rent/mortgage payments, and reduced income), whereas the remaining 45% remained largely unscathed. The fraction suffering multiple hardships were those with the lowest education, income, and wealth. Similarly, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4200506/">another study</a> reported that, during 2007–09, more than 60% of families experienced a decline in wealth and one-quarter lost more half their wealth, but another quarter of Americans gained more than 25% in terms of wealth. Those with higher income and more wealth in 2007 were less likely to experience a subsequent decline in wealth.</p><p>In my view, the current economic downturn will be more akin to the Great Recession, resulting in the following effects:</p><h4>1) Widening economic inequality</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*c7Xr4qmByQkUO9BL.png" /></figure><p>Global lockdowns have resulted a collapse in economic activity. In the US, 30 million Americans filed for unemployment benefits in May. It took about a year to reach that number in the wake of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. Meanwhile, nearly a third of U.S. apartment renters didn’t pay any of their April rent during the first week of the month.</p><p>The UN’s Framework for the Immediate Socio-Economic Response to the COVID 19 Crisis warns that:</p><blockquote><em>“The COVID-19 pandemic is far more than a health crisis: it is affecting societies and econ­omies at their core. While the impact of the pandemic will vary from country to country, it will most likely increase poverty and inequalities at a global scale.”</em></blockquote><p>I believe that there are several reasons for this widening economic inequality.</p><p>Firstly, as was the case in the Great Recession, I expect the unprecedented levels of monetary stimulus to disproportionally benefit those with high levels of financial asset ownership. Put very crudely, monetary stimulus measures such as quantitative easing (QE) promote large increases in financial asset prices, while driving down returns to middle class savers who have cash in the bank. While these monetary instruments are essential in economic recoveries, the biggest beneficiaries of these price rises in the Great Recession were those with substantial asset ownership. As such, the wealthy got wealthier, widening inequality between the ‘elite’ haves and the ‘ordinary’ have nots.</p><p>Secondly, I expect future austerity measures to widen inequality. T<a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2020/06/25/global-financial-stability-report-june-2020-update">he IMF has recently warned that global debt is at unmanageable levels</a> — with debt levels the highest they have been since WWII. A deleveraging will be necessary at some point in the near future. <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/jobs/austerity-and-inequality-there-link#:~:text=Inequality%20is%20at%20historic%20highs.&amp;text=Such%20fiscal%20consolidations%E2%80%94commonly%20referred,a%20recent%20IMF%20working%20paper.">Historically, such austerity measures have had a disproportionate impact on lower income households.</a></p><p>Thirdly, school closures have disproportionately affected low-income families. In the UK, school closures have had a heavy impact on families who rely on free school meals. Meanwhile, working parents in low income families have been straddled with (relatively) higher childcare costs. There also exists a wide disparity amongst populations with a higher income who are able to access the technology that can ensure education continues digitally during social isolation. The long-term impact of school closures is yet to be seen. However <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21256153/">a study</a> of a one week closure of schools in Taiwan during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak found that 18% of families lost income as a direct result — with disproportionate affects on the poorest.</p><p>Meanwhile, lockdowns and social distancing are disproportionally impacting lower income workers. <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/doing-what-it-takes/">Sectors already heavily affected have typical weekly pay of £320, compared to £455 for the economy as a whole.</a> Less than one-in-ten of those in the bottom half of earners say they can work from home, making it much harder for them to protect their incomes in the face of social distancing measures. Those in the most at-risk sectors and occupations also have less to fall back on, being around 25 per cent more likely than average to live in families with no savings at all.</p><p><strong>I believe widening economic inequality is a major problem, and would hope that governments take strong action to prevent a repeat of the Great Recession. </strong><a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook44p/EconEffects#:~:text=At%20a%20microeconomic%20level%2C%20inequality,and%20can%20lead%20to%20instability."><strong>Research on inequality points to worrying medium-term effects such as increasing economic instability, crime and deteriorating health standards.</strong></a></p><p>Inequality can be especially dangerous when the world is in a fragile state — as it is today. Two contrasting historical examples highlight this truth. In Athens, in 594 BC, due to considerable levels of inequality, the lower classes began to plot a revolt. Solon, an Athenian noble statesman was elected to reform the system. He devalued the currency, reduced debt and improved the economic conditions for the most economically disadvantaged. This ultimately averted the revolution. Contrastingly, when the Roman Senate refused to redistribute wealth at a similarly critical juncture, Rome was ravaged by a class civil war that went on from 133–30BC. This stratification of society was a key contributor to the ultimate collapse of the Roman SPQR.</p><p>This was not unique to Rome. Inequality has played a key role in the collapse of other civilisations — most notably the Han and Gupta empires. I hopes that we can avoid a similar fate.</p><h4>2) Growing support for populist parties across the world</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/0*3lMP44nqsuvCUasf.png" /></figure><p>Populist ideology has seen a surge of support across the world since the Great Recession. High profile manifestations of this in recent years include the election of Trump, the Brexit vote, the electoral successes of Italy’s Five Star Movement and Alternative for Germany and the election of right wing President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. In 2018, <a href="https://institute.global/policy/populists-power-around-world">20 populist</a> leaders held executive offices around the world — a five fold increase since 1990.</p><p>I believe that Covid-19 will only increase the support for populist ideologies across the world. I see this as the result of three interrelated consequences of the current crisis:</p><ol><li>Economic uncertainty — We are in the midst of the deepest recession in modern history. Fears over the economic implications of a second wave of infections has dampened business confidence, subduing investment, potentially leading to a prolonged period of unemployment. <a href="https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/event/14668/economic-correlates-populist-attitudes-eva-anduiza.pdf">Studies have shown the positive correlation between economic uncertainty and populism.</a></li><li>Socioeconomic inequality — the causes of which have been discussed above. The relationship between the two factors is discussed <a href="https://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/releases/high-wealth-inequality-linked-with-greater-support-for-populist-leaders.html">here</a>.</li><li>Nationalism — I see the growth of nationalism as a combination of (i) protectionism and anti-immigrationism in the face of high unemployment; (ii) re-nationalisation as states and firms seek to reduce future supply chain vulnerabilities.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/0*dHgLq7I8YYCa3wC8.png" /></figure><p><strong>I worry about the consequences of a further growth in populist movements across the world. Specifically, I fear that a continued distrust in institutions (especially the media and the judiciary) — will push us further into a post-truth world. I worry that rising political polarisation will lead to civil unrest and potential human rights abuses. Above all, I worry about the impacts that populism will have on de-democratising the world.</strong></p><h3>Concluding thoughts</h3><p>Covid-19 has accentuated a number of trends that have been materialising for decades — isolationism, populism, widening inequality, and an increasingly unstable international stage.</p><p>However, it is not too late. This crisis presents a fork in the road. We still have a choice as to which path we decide to tread. By opting for global cooperation, and by ensuring we provide support to the most economically disadvantaged in society, we can avoid a lonely, hostile and destitute outcome.</p><p>I will be publishing part two of this essay next week. In this, I will explore the behavioural and technological implications of the Covid crisis.</p><p><a href="https://omarismail.substack.com/"><em>Subscribe here to receive part two as a newsletter.</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f844a21f4771" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/how-will-covid-change-the-world-a-review-of-history-f844a21f4771">How will Covid change the world? A review of history.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>