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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Omar Alzughaibi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Omar Alzughaibi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Omar Alzughaibi on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 10:43:08 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[From JavaScript Analysis To UUID Pattern Exploration Revealed a Critical IDOR!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/from-javascript-analysis-to-uuid-pattern-exploration-revealed-a-critical-idor-5c526451e7ec?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5c526451e7ec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[js]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[idor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Oct 2024 09:41:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-19T09:41:34.267Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey everyone! After a little break, I’m back and excited to share an amazing story about finding a serious vulnerability. This one’s a real gem, and I think you’ll find it really interesting!</p><p>Let’s dive right in!</p><h3>The Scenario: A Government Portal</h3><p>my investigation begins with a government portal offering sensitive services to users. To protect the organization’s identity, I’ve tweaked the details a bit, but the essence of the story remains. So, buckle up and let’s get started!</p><h3>Step 1: Analyzing JavaScript Files</h3><p>I started by diving into the JavaScript files of the site. Since it’s built on React, many endpoints are accessible on the client side. After discovering some vulnerabilities in the JavaScript files, I tried collecting more files using various methods, but came up empty ):</p><p>Here’s a quick tip: When you open a site and check the Dev Tools, you’ll see the JavaScript files loaded by your browser. However, this isn’t the complete picture. Some files might be hidden or loaded dynamically, such as those for admin functions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*86Mf_px7UjFXK4L5" /></figure><p>Determined to find these hidden gems, I employed some tricks to extract as many JavaScript files as possible. Despite my efforts, I wasn’t having much luck ):</p><p>Then I noticed a pattern in the file names, like users.js, customer.js, and static.js. This gave me an idea: what if I tried fuzzing the JavaScript file names?</p><h3>The Discovery: JavaScript File Fuzzing</h3><p>Most of us are familiar with path guessing or fuzzing, but have you ever thought of applying fuzzing to JavaScript files?</p><p>That’s exactly what I did. Upon noticing the file naming pattern, I compiled a list of possible JavaScript file names based on the site’s nature. With the help of my best friend ChatGPT and a tool called RSMangler I created a wordlist with potential patterns for the site.</p><p>I ran the fuzzing process and, to my surprise, discovered a new JavaScript file named Reports.js.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*huTXF5NADW2Yr19J" /></figure><h3>Step 2: Breaking UUID To achieve IDOR!</h3><p>Inside Report.js, I found an endpoint on the client side that allowed me to modify (my own) government documents via an API request. Exciting right? But the real fun was just beginning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*k0wsys0BCIza243W" /><figcaption>Never trust UUIDs (:</figcaption></figure><p>Upon examining the API request, I saw parameters like RequestId in the path and id in the JSON body. It became clear that the backend used UUIDs to identify user requests. I was curious if changing UUIDs could let me alter documents. So I created a second account, obtained its UUID, and tried updating it using my first account. I was able to do so, which indicated an IDOR vulnerability. However, since UUIDs are generally non-guessable, this might not be directly exploitable ):</p><p>But I didn’t stop there. I investigated the structure of the UUIDs further, as sometimes there might be misconfigurations. I made several requests and extracted UUID values for different requests. To my excitement, I noticed that all the UUIDs followed a specific pattern, such as:</p><ul><li>f6b168b5-A805-ef11-A832–005056066af7</li><li>13a6d3c4-Ab05-ef11-A832–005056066af7</li><li>972a6aad-Ab05-ee11-A832–005056066af7</li><li>b542816d-Ab05-ef11-A832–005056066af7</li></ul><p>As you can see, all UUIDs followed the same pattern except for the first segment, which was variable. I was thrilled to discover that the UUID pattern was consistent across all accounts!</p><p>Armed with this information, I could update any government document for anyone by simply guessing the first part of the UUID. And with no rate limits on the API, it made the process quite straightforward.</p><p>Key Takeaways:</p><ul><li>Don’t limit your analysis to accessible JavaScript files — search for hidden ones too.</li><li>Never trust UUIDs — they can be deceptive!</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>And there you have it! From analyzing JavaScript files to cracking UUID patterns, this journey led to discovering a critical IDOR vulnerability. I hope you found this tale as intriguing as I did.</p><p>If you enjoyed this story or learned something new, don’t forget to hit that like button and share it with your network!</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/omarzzu">X\Twitter<br></a><a href="https://twitter.com/omarzzu">https://twitter.com/omarzzu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5c526451e7ec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ CSRF Bypass Combined with IDOR To Complete Account Takeover!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/csrf-bypass-combined-with-idor-to-complete-account-takeover-f4995c5946d3?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f4995c5946d3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[idor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2024 08:38:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-10T08:38:01.827Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NXEX3f83BNFgpj0Z" /><figcaption>401 Unauthorized: Not as protected as you think!</figcaption></figure><p>Welcome everyone,</p><p>Continuing the chain series, today we have a light chain.</p><p>CSRF Bypass + IDOR To Account Take Over</p><p>First, let’s take a quick look at the website.</p><p>I’ll explain the nature of the website in general. We can consider the website as providing services like shopping, and the nature of the site includes sensitive services.</p><p>I started examining the website, and at first, I focused on anything related to authentication, such as changing the email and more.</p><p>So I started with the update email function.</p><p>And the first thing that caught my eye was the “user_id” parameter in the request body to update email.</p><p>I tried to change the parameter to another account number, but unfortunately, it returned a Response 401 unauthorized.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6xKdlQ3xQcQgUH3K" /><figcaption>Rember Getting 401 Unauthorized is Not as safe as you think (;</figcaption></figure><p>I tried to bypass verification in several ways:</p><ol><li>By changing the Request method to get, put, delete, patch, etc.</li><li>I tried Parameter Pollution like</li></ol><pre>?user_id=&lt;attacker_id&gt;&amp;user_id=&lt;victim_id&gt;</pre><p>3. I tried adding special characters like</p><pre>0a% %20 %1c %09 %00</pre><p>Despite my several attempts, none of them worked, which was unfortunate. However, I didn’t stop there.</p><p>From here, I forgot about the IDOR and continued my testing</p><p>After attempts with the update email function, I noticed something, which is that the csrf_token value changes with each Request.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ncRCTdBCmGFQysdl" /><figcaption>Having a CSRF token != guarantee protection ;)</figcaption></figure><p>This led me to search for any specific patterns or files in the client-side JavaScript that might contain alg to generate the CSRF Token, but unfortunately, I couldn’t find anything.</p><p>Undeterred, I proceeded to test the CSRF token for possible bypasses. I tried the following techniques:</p><ol><li>Removing the CSRF token parameter entirely.</li><li>Attempting to set the parameter value to an empty string like csrf=0 or via an array like csrf[]=0.</li><li>Changing the Content-Type header.</li><li>Attempting to convert the POST request method to GET.</li></ol><p>However, none of these attempts succeeded either.</p><p>Guess what? Did I stop? Nope.</p><p>Then, an idea struck my mind: generating a new CSRF token but not using it immediately. The plan was to perform an update email request, capture the token value, and then drop the request. This way, the CSRF token would remain valid.</p><p>I took the token, created a CSRF script, and embedded the token within it. I tested it with my secondary account, and the first thing I noticed was that the error response changed.</p><p>Instead of an “Invalid token” error, I received a 401 Unauthorized response which matches the IDOR protection.</p><p><strong>Sounds interesting right? (;</strong></p><p>Now, I knew the CSRF bypass was working. However, the user_id parameter needed to match the victim’s user account. So, the next step was to obtain the user_id.</p><p>Fortunately, within the same website, I had discovered Stored XSS. This allowed me to create a simple script that could fetch the user_id.</p><p>However, this method required minimal interaction from the user, reducing the severity of the vulnerability and likely resulting in a smaller reward ):</p><p>To overcome this, I combined the CSRF script with a script that simultaneously guessed multiple user_id. As mentioned earlier, user_ids were easy to guess.</p><p>So, here’s a little recap of the steps I took:</p><ol><li>Perform an update email request, capturing the CSRF token and ensuring the drop request keeps the token valid.</li><li>Take the CSRF token value and create a CSRF script.</li><li>Within the same script, create another script to guess the user_id.</li></ol><p>So I tested the CSRF script with my secondary account, and I was able to change the email to any email!I desired. Hence, I successfully bypassed the CSRF protection and the user_id validation altogether!</p><p>Now, by simply going to the password reset page and entering the email I changed to the victim’s email, I could achieve a full account takeover!</p><blockquote><em>In the end, Keep in mind having protection doesn’t mean you’re fully protected (;</em></blockquote><p>I hope my explanation was clear.</p><p>If you found it helpful, don’t forget to Like, Repost, and share your thoughts in the comments (;</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/omarzzu/">twitter\X: https://twitter.com/omarzzu/</a></p><p>Thanks for your Reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f4995c5946d3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Chain of Rate Limit Bypass and Weak Token Expiry Leads To Account Take Over]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/chain-of-rate-limit-bypass-and-weak-token-expiry-leads-to-account-take-over-d9cddf598c9c?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d9cddf598c9c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 Mar 2024 17:35:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-30T17:35:16.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi everyone,</p><p>Back with a little chain.</p><p>Let me break it down for you So let’s begin!</p><blockquote>- First off, let’s understand the process of password reset on the website.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ck4q8nJUWz8UfqwcXkdCBA.png" /></figure><blockquote>It’s a usual process: the user enters their email and receives a link like this on their email: <br>TARGET.COM/redirect?action=reset_password&amp;lang=EN&amp;code=CODEHERE</blockquote><blockquote>The key thing to notice is that the website relies entirely on one parameter value, “CODE”.</blockquote><blockquote>This parameter value is guessable but takes time.</blockquote><h4><strong>Now onto the next step: does the token expire?</strong></h4><blockquote>Something important to know is that while the parameter value is guessable, it takes time.</blockquote><blockquote>I left the email unopened for a day and returned to it. Indeed, the token didn’t expire, and I was able to reset the password.</blockquote><ul><li>But now, the crucial point is to see if there’s a Rate Limit. This is where we attempt brute force for the token and instantly reset the password.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O46HzCq7g57B5GgDOZqImQ.png" /><figcaption>Rate Limit</figcaption></figure><p>After attempts, Unfortunately, there was a Rate Limit );</p><blockquote>So, Here I could Report the Bug as the Token Not Expired, But the Severity will be low.</blockquote><blockquote>But I didn’t stop there. I tried to find a technique to bypass the Rate Limit.</blockquote><blockquote>After many attempts, I noticed that the website only blocked the IP.</blockquote><blockquote>I managed to bypass it by using a Burp extension called “IP ROTATE,” as shown in the picture.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lsXbcswRgZxDOUABhPp3Fg.png" /></figure><blockquote>In essence, it connects to AWS servers, and with each request, the IP changes.</blockquote><blockquote>As we knew the token didn’t expire, I was able to reset the password, thus leading to an Account Take Over.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GgiMvIthOUoti5tTruc0Lg.png" /></figure><p>In conclusion, I hope my explanation was clear.</p><p>And if you found it helpful, don’t forget to Like and share your thoughts</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/Omarzzu">Twitter\X</a><br><a href="https://twitter.com/Omarzzu">https://twitter.com/Omarzzu</a></p><p>Thank you for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d9cddf598c9c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ Race Conditions + IDOR Leads to Bypass Email Verification & Phone Verification]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/race-conditions-idor-leads-to-bypass-email-verification-phone-verification-f62c7d7b97e5?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f62c7d7b97e5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 11:16:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-11T18:50:23.586Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>First, we need to understand the verification process on the website. When creating a new account, you need to verify your email and phone number. To verify your phone number, you need to confirm it through the link sent to your email, and from that link, you can enter the OTP.</blockquote><p>To explain it clearly, let’s use the following scenario:</p><ul><li>Request 1 = Attacker</li><li>Request 2 = Victim</li></ul><blockquote>I started by examining the website and attempting to find a bug in the verification process after multiple attempts. I managed to exploit a race condition vulnerability by leveraging the response time and obtaining the same OTP. Here’s how the vulnerability occurred:</blockquote><p>To simulate the scenario by sending two requests simultaneously:</p><ul><li>To ensure simultaneous sending, I used different browsers</li><li>each with a different session, “<strong><em>as the server processes one request at a time per session.”</em></strong></li><li>Now, I sent the two requests at the exact same time by creating a group in Burp Suite and sending them using “Send group in parallel (last-byte sync)”.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/362/0*rHu32fFdeNPvwMYx" /><figcaption>“Send group in parallel (last-byte sync)”.</figcaption></figure><ul><li>By exploiting the race condition, I was able to obtain the same OTP number for both the victim and the attacker, as shown in the image. I got the same OTP for two different numbers.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dxgqesGs5UzoIo1m" /></figure><blockquote>However, as we mentioned earlier, to complete the verification process, you need to verify the OTP through the link sent to the email. So, obtaining the OTP alone doesn’t serve any purpose.</blockquote><p>After many attempts to bypass email verification, I noticed a parameter in the request body called “PKID”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5k66iCKa1Ch-3Ih-" /><figcaption>PKID Parameter</figcaption></figure><p>The interesting thing is that its value increases by one with each new account creation!</p><p>So, I created two accounts as part of the scenario: one as an attacker and the other as a victim, and I exploited the race condition to obtain the victim’s mobile OTP.</p><blockquote>Now, all that’s left is to bypass the link sent to the email. I did this by accessing the link in the email (as the attacker) and modifying the “PKID” parameter value to be one digit higher or lower, such as changing it from 5 to either 4 or 6. I also set the OTP parameter value to the same OTP that was received on the attacker’s and victim’s numbers, making them match.</blockquote><p>By doing this, I was able to bypass the email verification and phone verification.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FkNA1sKSqxgFDq%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FkNA1sKSqxgFDq%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia0.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExMzhqcnRpbmpuaTZiN2o2dnk0ZWFoanZqanJhb2p2Y2VkeGZ3MDZxdCZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2FkNA1sKSqxgFDq%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="226" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b8c5ecf5d76294ebf6fef08e5d2ac5a7/href">https://medium.com/media/b8c5ecf5d76294ebf6fef08e5d2ac5a7/href</a></iframe><ul><li>In conclusion, I hope my explanation was clear. If you found it helpful, don’t forget to like and follow me in <a href="https://twitter.com/Omarzzu">X\Twitte</a> and share your feedback.</li></ul><p>Thank you for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f62c7d7b97e5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Thorough Review Bug Bounty Hunter Certification [CBBH]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/thorough-review-bug-bounty-hunter-certification-cbbh-f39765da27bc?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f39765da27bc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackthebox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-hunter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-vulnerabilities]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Jan 2024 05:20:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-28T05:23:32.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Thorough Review Certified Bug Bounty Hunter [CBBH]</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*hIv0oYjGIFLnNUtG.png" /></figure><h3>Content:</h3><p>Let’s start with the content, and I see it as one of the best available sources if you want to learn Bug Bounty and focus solely on website vulnerabilities. The course consists of 20 modules, and each module has multiple sections. The great thing is that for each section you study, there is a practical lab to apply what you’ve learned. At the end of each module, there is a Skills Assessment, which is a lab exercise covering everything you learned in the module. Their labs are particularly impressive and closely resemble real-world scenarios, which I found to be the most interesting aspect.</p><p>As for the duration of completing the content, according to the course description, it would take approximately 18 days, with 8 hours of daily study. However, depending on your experience, it could take less or more time. But my advice is to not rush it, take your time, and understand everything thoroughly.</p><h3>Exam:</h3><p>The exam lasts for 7 days, and you need to score a minimum of 80 out of 100 points. The exam covers multiple websites, and if you get stuck on one site for a long time, move on to the next one as it might be more beneficial. Also, try not to rely too much on automation because most vulnerabilities were found manually. You have two attempts for the exam, so if you fail the first one, you need to submit a report explaining what you found to receive feedback from the team. This will help you in your second attempt and prevent you from wasting it. After receiving feedback, you must schedule your retake within 14 days. As for the difficulty of the exam, it was challenging and required thinking, but it was enjoyable. At the end of the exam, if you score above 80, you need to write a detailed report explaining everything. Personally, I wrote it on the website labs.sysre.pt, which saved me time. While taking the exam, make sure to note down anything you discover on the side to avoid wasting time.</p><h3>Tips:</h3><ul><li>Take your time with each website, but don’t spend too much time on one if you feel stuck. Move on to the next one and come back later.</li><li>Take breaks because you’ll face challenges during the exam, and you need to take breaks and come back with fresh ideas.</li><li>Utilize the search feature in HTB Academy; it will be helpful.<br>Don’t rely too much on automation.</li><li>If you fail the first attempt, make sure to submit a report even if it’s empty, so you don’t miss the retake opportunity.</li><li>The exam requires critical thinking, so try not to limit yourself to one specific aspect. Many parts of the exam require you to connect multiple vulnerabilities to achieve success.</li><li>Lastly, try to document everything you learned from the course so you can refer back to it during the exam.</li></ul><p>In the end, I hope I covered the certification well.</p><p>don’t forget to follow me on <a href="https://twitter.com/omarzzu/">Twitter\X</a>: <a href="https://twitter.com/omarzzu/">https://twitter.com/omarzzu</a>/</p><p>Thank you for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f39765da27bc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Open Redirect Validation Bypass Leads To Account Take Over (ATO)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/open-redirect-validation-bypass-leads-to-account-take-over-ato-5166b3416e3f?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5166b3416e3f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacker]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Dec 2023 15:35:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-21T15:35:43.077Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>I discovered This vulnerability during an engagement</h3><blockquote>First, I started to understand and browse the website. Then, I focused on the register function, and my attention was immediately drawn to the “redirect_uri” parameter.</blockquote><blockquote><em>I attempted to test for an open redirect, but unfortunately, there was a (regex) validation for the parameter. I continued with the normal registration process.</em></blockquote><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FISOckXUybVfQ4%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FISOckXUybVfQ4%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExcDFyZjNhZWtqanJrMHEwbTY4dHVtd3BnczBrbjQyODBodm0zMDR2ZyZlcD12MV9naWZzX2dpZklkJmN0PWc%2FISOckXUybVfQ4%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="294" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9cfbca317b85abf7c2acd2c7c766060d/href">https://medium.com/media/9cfbca317b85abf7c2acd2c7c766060d/href</a></iframe><blockquote>I noticed that after registering, when attempting to log in, there was a GET request redirection along with the “access_token” parameter. The “access_token” contained a JWT token for the user.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bCJirH7wEZ_oUPPVlYCOVw.png" /><figcaption>Redirection with access token parameter</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>So In other words, if I could obtain it, it would result in a full ATO!</strong></h4><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — -</p><blockquote><strong>I tried to find a bypass for the “redirect_uri” parameter to achieve ATO. The issue is that the validation requires the host to be “redirect_uri=</strong><a href="http://target.com/"><strong>target.com</strong></a><strong>”. If I modify the domain or the TLD, I receive an error.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>After understanding the regex applied to the “redirect_uri” parameter, I attempted the following payloads:</strong></blockquote><ol><li><em>redirect_uri=trarget.com</em><em>/%09/myburpcollab.com</em></li><li><em>redirect_uri=trarget.com</em><em>//myburpcollab.com</em></li><li><em>redirect_uri=trarget.com\</em><em>myburpcollab.com</em></li><li><em>redirect_ur=target.com/ /</em><em>myburpcollab.com</em></li><li><em>redirect_uri=target.com&amp;redirect_uri=attacker.com</em></li><li><em>and more…</em></li></ol><p>Unfortunately, none of them worked. However, when I tried <strong><em>redirect_uri=target.com%40myburpcollab.com</em></strong><em> </em>and logged in, it resulted in a redirect to burp collab!!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rhAhfnc7Cs2lGHBA7TVuQg.png" /><figcaption>Request to My Burp collaborator!!</figcaption></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia3.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdnV4aW5ienloZWZxcnoxMjdmZzY5MmU1aHM2eTh3YjB2bGh1cmY1OSZlcD12MV9naWZzX2dpZklkJmN0PWc%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="320" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c4e20677eefc7302b6e999d54f324602/href">https://medium.com/media/c4e20677eefc7302b6e999d54f324602/href</a></iframe><blockquote>I was able to obtain the access_token because it was present in the URL parameter . So, I directly took the “access_token” parameter and added it after the Target domain like this: target.com/?access_token=jwt-token. This allowed me to gain full access to the account!</blockquote><p>don&#39;t forget to follow me on <a href="https://twitter.com/omarzzu/">Twitter\X:</a> https://twitter.com/omarzzu/</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5166b3416e3f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How can I (Account-Take-Over) any Account ? (3)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/how-can-i-account-take-over-any-account-3-648a67822276?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/648a67822276</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[account-take]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Jun 2023 05:49:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-22T05:49:14.151Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><a href="https://medium.com/@ozomarzu/how-can-i-account-take-over-any-account-2-9533d54bc33e?source=user_profile---------0----------------------------">How can I (Account-Take-Over) any Account ? (3)</a></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ll0hgQuCXUEBhH6f.png" /></figure><ul><li>First, when I create an account on the sites, more than one request goes to the server</li><li>And one of the requests was to put the name of the account</li><li>In the response of the request, there was an email for the name in the request</li><li>So I said, well, why don’t you try to change the name ?</li><li>I was shocked after I saw that if I changed the name, I could see the email of the user in the Response</li><li>Then I said let me try to add an email header to the request And see what happens ?</li><li>I was shocked after the email was changed in response !</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HzLMqA2quIC4_n2XLbO_WQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>So I went to my second account profile immediately to see if the email had changed ?</li><li>Unfortunately, it was not changed, although it was changed in response !</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FBEob5qwFkSJ7G%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FBEob5qwFkSJ7G%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FBEob5qwFkSJ7G%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="321" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2801ef58b0cf2276332db706b4cb9ee5/href">https://medium.com/media/2801ef58b0cf2276332db706b4cb9ee5/href</a></iframe><ul><li>Then I said maybe it was changed in the Back-End Only ?</li><li>I went to reset the password with the email that I changed</li><li>I was shocked when I saw that I had received a reset password email !!!\</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FQLvRBqfLXCphu%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FQLvRBqfLXCphu%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FQLvRBqfLXCphu%2F200.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="249" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ac40d821b2ecc3da0b844b7f7e22b69f/href">https://medium.com/media/ac40d821b2ecc3da0b844b7f7e22b69f/href</a></iframe><ul><li>Now I was able to take over any account just by knowing the username !</li></ul><h4>Thank you for reading !</h4><h4><strong>Wlc To my Twitter :<br></strong><a href="https://twitter.com/@omarzzu"><strong>https://twitter.com/@omarzzu</strong></a></h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=648a67822276" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How can I (Account-Take-Over) any Account ? (2)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/how-can-i-account-take-over-any-account-2-9533d54bc33e?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9533d54bc33e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[account-takeover]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 05:10:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-25T05:10:21.082Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><a href="https://medium.com/@ozomarzu/how-i-can-account-take-over-any-account-b3ce8b50c541?source=user_profile---------1----------------------------">How can I (Account-Take-Over) any Account ?</a> (2)</h3><blockquote><strong><em>- First of all, let’s understand the website</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong><em>- The site was a platform and each user has a profile</em></strong></li><li><strong><em>website was using a value for any change or any movement on the website that uses the Userid value</em></strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/419/0*H_XiTDqCEY6CguFo.png" /><figcaption><strong><em>UserId value</em></strong></figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong><em>I started trying to understand the website, and I discovered that the userId is responsible for everything</em></strong></li><li>I saw that the site, if you want to change the profile or update your account information, uses the userid value</li><li>So This means that the site does not check the cookie or the jwt token, but it checks the value of the userid</li></ul><blockquote>After I knew that it depends only on the userid, I said, “I want to know this value, how does it arise or how does it happen?”</blockquote><ul><li>I created a second account to see if the userid value is similar or not, but unfortunately it turned out to be completely different</li><li>I tried to check the js files to see if there is a specific algorithm to create the userid value or not, but unfortunately I didn’t get anything</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FvyTnNTrs3wqQ0UIvwE%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FvyTnNTrs3wqQ0UIvwE%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FvyTnNTrs3wqQ0UIvwE%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="362" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/64e1f5ce1903a0af37e5b6547b6a83c5/href">https://medium.com/media/64e1f5ce1903a0af37e5b6547b6a83c5/href</a></iframe><ul><li>The Next day I completed checking the site and I forgot the idea of the userid</li><li>While checking the site, I was inside one of the profiles and opened the source code</li><li>CTRL+ F -&gt; Userid</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/256/0*0kL2nFrs2wnUCHiq.png" /></figure><ul><li>I was shocked when I saw the userid value in the source code</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia3.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdnV4aW5ienloZWZxcnoxMjdmZzY5MmU1aHM2eTh3YjB2bGh1cmY1OSZlcD12MV9naWZzX2dpZklkJmN0PWc%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="320" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c4e20677eefc7302b6e999d54f324602/href">https://medium.com/media/c4e20677eefc7302b6e999d54f324602/href</a></iframe><ul><li>So, I went to the profile, right with the second account, and took the userid value</li><li>I did update email for my first account and changed the userid value to my second account</li><li>So I was able to change the account email, and thus I could Account-take-over on the platform without any interaction from the user!</li></ul><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — -<br>Takeaways :</p><ul><li>Always check the source code</li><li>Understand how the website works</li></ul><p>thank you for reading</p><p>Wlc To my Twitter :<br> <a href="https://twitter.com/@omarzzu">https://twitter.com/@omarzzu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9533d54bc33e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I was Able To Find Reflected XSS ?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/how-i-was-able-to-find-reflected-xss-f25fe1ea3134?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f25fe1ea3134</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 07:33:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-29T16:38:23.123Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*6SHm-pT82jSzKMyT.png" /></figure><h3>How I was Able To Find Reflected XSS ?</h3><h3><strong>Scope:</strong></h3><p>First of all the scope it was small Just a Login Page</p><blockquote><strong>1 — So The first thing that came to my mind </strong>Directory <strong>Brute Force</strong></blockquote><blockquote>- Unfortunately, I didn’t get anything</blockquote><blockquote>2- I Tried For , SQLI , user enumeration , Brute force protection , Default Credentials , etc . <br>- But also, unfortunately, I didn’t get anything</blockquote><h3>As usual, I said Maybe that there are no vulnerability here let me move on</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*lvkkUh2HNUu4Rebk.gif" /></figure><blockquote>But I said let me check parameter’s So I start for Parameter enumeration</blockquote><blockquote>So I found a Parameter Call [ ?Locale ] ,</blockquote><p>What Is XSS ? <a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting">https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting</a></p><blockquote>So I Start Testing For XSS and Then I put a Normal Payload [ “&gt;Test ] To see if it is reflected on the Source Code , But unfortunately I Faced this When I Try Open The Source Code</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D-UMZO13Re8QHysxawbWEw.png" /><figcaption>Okaayyy</figcaption></figure><blockquote>After attempts I found when I Put [ &lt;/script &gt; In The Parameter There is code reflected on the page Like This &gt;</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E6IjXWPsrjq6Z9HaT4hgpg.png" /></figure><blockquote>Then I said sure there is an interaction with the code, let me put a payload [ &lt;/script&gt; &lt;script&gt;alert(“omar”)&lt;/script&gt; ]</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jmefJ0N3IinUhxIT2toVHA.png" /></figure><h3>Finally I succeeded !!</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/0*jFoPUL2eNgSTJQy7" /></figure><p>But I said 100 percent that I will take a duplicate ):</p><p>I was surprised when the report was answered. It is not duplicate !</p><h4>Takeaways :</h4><p>1- Don’t Give up</p><p>2- take a brake And come back with stronger ideas</p><p><strong>3- Even if the scope is small, try Testing !</strong></p><p>Welcome To Twitter : <a href="https://twitter.com/Omarzzu">https://twitter.com/Omarzzu</a></p><h4>Thank you for reading</h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f25fe1ea3134" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I can Account Take Over any Account ?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@omarzzu/how-i-can-account-take-over-any-account-b3ce8b50c541?source=rss-c610fb3391d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b3ce8b50c541</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omar Alzughaibi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2023 13:31:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-21T09:06:59.922Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How can I (Account-Take-Over) any Account ?</h3><p>Hello everyone, for my first blog in this blog, I will explain How I can Account Take Over any Account .</p><p>Let’s Begin</p><h3>reconnaissance</h3><blockquote>While I do Subdomain Enumeration I looked at Sub Domain it was interesting It was Like This { app.dev.Target.com } So The Subdomains It was a copy of the original site</blockquote><blockquote>So Now After I finish Subdomains Enumeration I Start to browse The Subdomains one By one And try all The functions to understand The Target</blockquote><blockquote>So While I Browse The Main Domain I looked at the login Function The registration method was by number only , So I entered my number the verification was OTP 4 Digit !</blockquote><blockquote>I was surprised when the first thing that came to my mind was the brute force of the number But unfortunately They Have A Rate Limit</blockquote><p>So I Start To Find a Method To Bypass It</p><h4>I Try To Changing IP origin using headers =&gt;</h4><pre>X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1<br>X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1<br>X-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1<br>X-Remote-Addr: 127.0.0.1<br>X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1<br>X-Host: 127.0.0.1<br>X-Forwared-Host: 127.0.0.1</pre><p>But it didn’t work</p><p>—</p><h4>And also I tried to Using similar endpoints</h4><p>But it didn’t work ):</p><p>—</p><h4>And also I tried to Adding extra params to the path</h4><p>But it didn’t work ):</p><p>I tried a lot of Method to Bypass it but it didn’t work</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fl1KVaj5UcbHwrBMqI%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fl1KVaj5UcbHwrBMqI%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExeXBwY3J3MTltamdxa254ZGsyYjdwYmhtZDV2OTBzbTl6dDkyY2UxNSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2Fl1KVaj5UcbHwrBMqI%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9cbca5b10b7a00904009279dfa13d674/href">https://medium.com/media/9cbca5b10b7a00904009279dfa13d674/href</a></iframe><p>So I said let me move on To Other Functions</p><p>But I remembered The interesting Sub domain { app.dev.Target.com } Why don’t I try it To Brute Force The OTP ?</p><p>I tried but unfortunately it Have A Rate Limit</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><p>But I Said Why Not To Try To Bypass This Also ?</p><p>So I try To Changing IP origin using headers</p><pre>X-Forwarded-For:</pre><h3>And it worked ! I succeeded To Bypass The Rate Limit !!</h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExYWJiMDQxZjE2Y2I3YmNkYzRkMGJiNWZmN2NmZTAwZTc4NDE5MDE3ZiZjdD1n%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F5oOPvZJVEx6Za%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="319" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ccb5cd3b87711372ab1d13f2fbeb3f70/href">https://medium.com/media/ccb5cd3b87711372ab1d13f2fbeb3f70/href</a></iframe><h3>So Now I can Take Over any Account Just by knowing the Phone number !</h3><h4><strong>Takeaways :</strong></h4><ul><li>Don’t Give Up</li><li>Try All The Methods To Bypass (:</li></ul><p>Thank you for reading</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b3ce8b50c541" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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