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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by One Nil on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is Ball-Oriented Defending: How to defend, press and actively win the ball feat.]]></title>
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            <category><![CDATA[jurgen-klopp]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Nov 2021 09:32:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-12T09:40:33.927Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>What is Ball-Oriented Defending: How to defend, press and actively win the ball feat. Rangnick, Klopp &amp; Nagelsmann</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z35HtJk2VpIMRJBYTKahFw.jpeg" /></figure><p>A team which wants to play ball-oriented football needs to look at its behaviour off-the-ball with utmost attention. Some may even argue that what a ball-oriented team does when they don’t have the ball is more important than any other facet of the game, as ball-orientation is mainly about keeping the entire team inclined towards the ball and creating advantageous situations thereon. There are certain pointers which are absolutely non-negotiable for a team to be able to benefit from ball-orientation.</p><p>You could also consider these pointers as traits or even as outcomes of a team that trains hard on their orientation with the ball. Whatever term we may use, the story remains that the team needs to keep these intact at all times and any diversion from these can break the system, structure, principles and all the man-hours put in during the training session, trying to perfect this. So what are the principles when it comes to ball-orientation?</p><h3>General Principles:</h3><p><strong>i) Hyper-Focus on the ball and the ball only:</strong><br>Every movement made by the team, irrespective of whether it is moving towards a flank or moving higher up the pitch, is based on the movement of the ball and not based on any other factor</p><p><strong>ii) Compactness vertically &amp; horizontally:</strong><br>The team remains closely-knit both horizontally as well as vertically and this is the main reason why the team is able to defend in orientation to where the ball is as they cannot afford any gaps between the lines</p><p><strong>iii) Intense Pressing &amp; Closing-down:</strong><br>Whenever the team decides to press or close down the opponent, there is no hesitation or skepticism in the minds of the players. There is only one reason why the press is activated and that is to win the ball back. Hence, the team goes all out with 100% intention to regain possession</p><p><strong>iv) Forcing opponent to take risks:</strong><br>We can call it a principle or simply a consequence of the way, a ball-oriented defends across the pitch. Whatsoever it is, it is an important aspect to keep in mind that the opponent in possession is put regularly in risk-reward situations. Owing to the ball-oriented team’s structure, pressing and high defensive-line, the opponents are forced to take risky options which don’t have proportional a reward possibility. <br> <br>High risk always means high reward while low risk always means low reward. This is a rule that can be applied to many generic situations. However in football, there is an element of technical execution by a human player that comes first. Only when the execution is perfect, the high-risk high-reward rule comes into play. Take an example of an aerial through-ball by a team from its own-third directly into the opponent’s third. Only if the player executing the pass overcomes the pressing, gains space and time, picks a perfectly-timed run and executes the pass, the chance of a reward is possible. The probability of this being executed to perfection on a repeated-basis is nowhere close to the chances of the pass being over-weighted to the goalkeeper or under-weighted to become an aerial duel for the centre-backs.</p><p>While the above-mentioned principles form the foundation of how a ball-oriented team works, there are a couple of more principles which I personally believe that need utmost attention to: the <strong>use of Pressing Triggers and Pressing Traps.</strong></p><p><strong>a) Pressing-Cues or Triggers <em>(When to press)</em>:</strong><br>Since the intensity is at its peak during the press, it is not feasible to press without a systematic methodology in place. Such a methodology is constituted by what we call as pressing-cues or triggers, meaning a certain action/event which gives the signal to the defending team to activate the press.</p><p>These pressing cues may or may not be applicable to all thirds across the pitch depends on other factors like the risk appetite, level of pressure to be maintained against each opponent and so on. For example as far as pressing in the opponent’s own-third is concerned, some of the common pressing cues can be as follows:<br> <br><em>i) Back-Pass by a CB to a GK<br>ii) Cross field pass by one CB to another<br>iii) Pass by CB to DM which has too much tempo on it, making it difficult for the DM to control<br>iv) Penetrative Dribbling/ ball-carrying by a CB</em></p><p><strong>b) Pressing-Traps <em>(Where to press)</em>:</strong><br>While pressing-cues/triggers determine when to press, pressing traps determine where to press. These traps refer to zones which are created by the defending team to lure the opponent into playing the ball there and then activate an intense, high press to win the ball back. This is yet another way to add a strategic methodology to the high-pressing. Where to create traps depends on a team’s approach to the game.</p><p>What these principles bring to the defending team oriented to the ball is control over the game. It enables the team to stay on the front-foot and decide the tempo of the game even when they actually don’t have the ball. How it is perceived depends on the particular person’s view or understanding of football. Some may perceive this to be the way football is supposed to be play, some may perceive it as risky, some may see how ball-oriented defending can help a team when’s attack as well. So to understand the principles in a more detailed way, we can look at how it works in different thirds of the pitch, trying to address some key pointers about pressing: <strong>When, Where, How and How much</strong></p><h4>Ball-orientation in the opponent’s own-third:</h4><p>When we talk about pressing the opponent in his own-third, it is common to assume high and intense pressure on the opponent centre-backs immediately after they receive the ball. But in truth, ball-oriented defending is far from pressing or committing to win the ball back all the time, in all areas and from all players. The pressing has a set of rules and fixed methodologies which have to be practiced and executed to perfection, to become a ball-oriented team who are tough to play-out against.</p><p><strong>Starting Positions:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SuhMBXdq_AlH1JT2c8yo9Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ideal Starting Positions of a ball-oriented team during a goal-kick situation for the opponent</figcaption></figure><p>The most important factor for the defending team here is to start with the correct positioning right from the first-line of pressure. For a team that is ball-oriented, this would mean having central coverage up-front and not being sliced through vertically. Given the high-line defence, even a few seconds along with a few metres of space given to an opponent in the central areas can seriously threaten the backline. Of course, not having a high-line defence when the ball is in the opponent’s own-third is not even an option as the team won’t be ball-oriented anymore if it drops its defensive line deep. As mentioned earlier, the basic idea of ball-orientation in defence is about the entire team being as close to the ball as possible at all times.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0m_8e8nPVxkxpWJzSPONIw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Potential gaps that can be found against a defending team that is NOT narrow through the middle</figcaption></figure><p>Any structure that doesn’t have a narrow first-line press will be prone to be sliced through vertically owing to the gaps that can be utilized to link-up with the midfield. <strong>Especially with the increasing use of deep full-backs</strong> by teams in goal-kick situations, it is becoming easier to stretch the first-line press and create gaps through which ball can be progressed. Hence, the ideal positioning to begin the first-line of pressing with would be to ensure central cover. This would ensure that the opponents don’t get time or space from where they can create harm and naturally encourage them to pursue wider routes to progress the ball. If the opponent is pushed wider right from their own-third, it makes it easier to press them against the touchline and win the ball back by cramping space.</p><p><strong>Dividing the pitch into 2 halves to force and keep the opponent in either of them:</strong></p><p>We saw how it is of utmost importance to have central coverage during pressure in the opponent’s own-third and how it can drive the opponent wider during build-up. There is also a methodology by which the ball-oriented team can pin its’ opponent against the touchline, after which an intense-press can be activated. This can be achieved by maintaining angles as they close down the opponents during pressure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6t-4i7HZym0cnJejP5F6IQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Visual representation of the pitch being divided into two horizontal halves to limit the playing-area for the opponent by pinning them within one half</figcaption></figure><p>To understand this better, let us take the example of a goal-kick. The first line of pressure (on most occasions) doesn’t start with a pre-determined angled but the angling of their pressure starts right after the first pass has been made by the goalkeeper. Assuming the goalkeeper starts play with the right centre-back, then the ball-oriented team angle themselves in such a way that the right centre-back can neither go back to the goalkeeper nor pursue any passing options in the centre by using shadow-cover.</p><p>Shadow-covering plays an important role in being able to send a team towards one flank and blocking any possible route to switch play. The important pointer here is that the shadow-cover created needs to cut out the passing option on the opposite side of where you want the ball-holder to go. In other words, if the defending team wants the ball-holder to go towards the right flank, then the shadow-cover needs to cut out the passing option available on the left. Of course, it goes without saying that first the defending team needs to have the right structure on the right-flank to be able to make such a decision.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i-vJiwlpl3rULIYWsVDCVw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ideal player movements during a press to remain ball-near side against an opponent playing out from the back</figcaption></figure><p>Before the pass has been made by the goalkeeper to one of the centre-backs, there is numerical superiority for the ball-oriented defending team neither in the right nor the left half of the pitch as they focus on protecting the middle first. But once the goalkeeper has chosen a centre-back to pass to, the process of using shadow-cover to pin the opponent into one-half of the pitch, begins. The objective is to make the opponent full-back or wing-back receive the ball and create an overload around the ball to the extent that the only option that the opponent has, is to play it long with the hope of one of his forwards winning a duel against the backline. Since the ball-oriented team will swarm the player with the ball against the touchline, there is a huge risk of losing the ball in their own-half. So, on many occasions this play ends with the player with the ball attempting an improbable long-pass without sufficient space or time for an accurate execution and losing possession.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dIeN8T3UBn2iBnjbvm55UQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Numerical superiority on one half of the pitch while restricting options to switch play to the other side and winning the ball back by closing down on the ball with numbers</figcaption></figure><p>Let us have a look at an example of the same now…</p><p><strong>Julian Nagelsmann’s Leipzig</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*tFGjj1H5MCpOrzLOs1JWZg.gif" /></figure><p>This is an example from Julian Nagelsmann’s Leipzig in the 2020–21 season in an away game against Augsburg. You would be able to see clearly how the pressing was not intense in the first few seconds but once the centre-back played a horizontal pass across his own goal, the pressing trigger was activated.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1__KFVpTCVONzb3KkxyQmA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Leipzig attackers along with their midfield ensured that a switch of play was not possible. You may try noticing how Poulsen bends his run to cover-shadow the opponent DM while Angelino waits for the centre-back to receive, turn and play to the full-back. If Angelino already closes down the opponent full-back, then the centre-back is going to receive and look for other options on the field, which may as well be a long-ball over the top. <strong>But the question is: What is easier? Winning the ball back high and wide even if it is 2–3 seconds later or forcing an error a few seconds earlier and winning the ball deeper into your own half?</strong></p><p>This is why it is important to allow the opponent full-back to first receive the ball and then close down. This as per my understanding is what is called a <strong>Pressing Trap.</strong> You can clearly see how it forced Augsburg to try progressing from the flank where numerical superiority was in favour of Leipzig and switching flanks was not possible too. When these numbers pressurized the ball-holder, it did not give enough time/space for an accurate pass, leading to an easy interception followed by a couple of passes and a shot, (all in first-touch) to find the back of the net.</p><p>We can also look at examples of the above pointers demonstrated by other coaches who use this methodology to good effect. Since we already saw pinning down an opponent on the wide areas, we shall also look at examples of what happens when the opponents take the central route:</p><p><strong>a) Ralf Rangnick</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Zuy2PL5lzd_J_K27-8UI1g.gif" /><figcaption>An example of narrow central positioning, pressing and anticipation helping Leipzig score an easy goal from the opponent’s goal-kick</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dSi3SyF1W6GagmLN8jCumg.jpeg" /></figure><p>You would be able to see a narrow first-line irrespective of how wide and spread out the opponent centre-backs or full-backs are. As we had seen, the obvious benefit when the opponent tries to go wide using their centre-back/full-back is that Leipzig will be able to restrict them to that half of the pitch, cut-off switches and pin them against the touchline. Owing to that, there are situations when the opponent would try to take a central route and that’s when the narrowness of the first-line helps massively.</p><p>In the image above, you can see the exact moment the opponent midfielder drops deep and receives the ball from the goalkeeper. In this moment, every Leizpig player is closer to the ball as compared to any potential passing option. (Poulsen closer than the opponent’s DM, Werner closer than the opponent’s CB, Sabitzer closer than both CB as well as LB).</p><p>So in such a situation, the ball-receiver is forced to go back to the goalkeeper as he also has pressure from behind, which wouldn’t let him receive and turn. But since the opponents are closer to the ball than the receiver’s own teammates, any potential mistake in the execution can result in easy chances.</p><p><strong>b) Jurgen Klopp</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*xqOzCIYtKHTp-TXvxtY54w.gif" /><figcaption>Sadio Mane hits the post moments before Liverpool made it 3–1 in the famous 4–3 win against Man City</figcaption></figure><p>This game was probably the best non-Rangnick example I could think of, for how a team needs to structure itself off-the-ball while being ball-oriented. <br>Yes, there are tweaks and differences that each coach would instill in order to create their own versions from this ideology but the core principles remain the same.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/994/1*tCFcMkrS2Hguc1R7r0fJAA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Liverpool’s narrow front-three and midfield-three causing problems for City’s ball-progression owing to their perfect start-positions and systematic pressing</figcaption></figure><p>Again, you would be able to observe patterns similar to the above example we saw from Rangnick’s Leipzig. In short, a narrow shape covering the central areas who always remain closer to the ball as compared to the potential passing options of the ball-holder/receiver. Hence, when this narrow structure keeps closing down the ball gradually, it would lead to a situation wherein the ball-holder is forced to go for longer options. Otherwise, even a small margin of error could prove costly owing to the closeness to goal from the centre.</p><p><strong>So to summarize, the most important pointers to keep in mind are:</strong></p><p><em>i) To start in the right positions (narrow/compact shape, closely-knit, <br>central-focused)</em></p><p><em>ii) To await/hold positions till the right moment (to see where the opponent wants to go: CB/FB/DM)</em></p><p><em>iii) To react together and start closing down the ball with intensity at the right moment (when the ball has been released by opponent into a particular area)</em></p><p><em>iv) The kind of reaction, movement and closing down by the team will depend on the location of the ball (wide or central route)</em></p><h4>Ball-orientation in the middle-third:</h4><p>Especially for a team that uses ball-oriented defending, it often happens so that pressing and defensive actions are at its maximum in this area of the pitch. When the opponent starts a possession spell in their own-third, the focus is on starting off with the right shape to stop the opponent’s verticality, direct him towards wide areas and pinning against the touchline with numbers. Of course, if the ball is won back within the opponent’s own-third itself, then nothing like it but since the opponent would also have various attempts to reach the middle-third and get past the first wave of pressure, <br>it is the last phase before the opponent can enter the final-third and get closer to goal.</p><p>So how does the ball-oriented team actually execute ball-winning in the middle-third? As always, this too is a coordinated effort by the entire team right from the team’s centre-backs to the forwards. They all have pre-determined actions/movements depending on the area through which the ball enters the middle-third. However, each line (defenders, midfielders and attackers) has an overarching theme that acts as the foundation for their actions and decisions made in the middle-third.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/989/1*hFvIebUK_9uSQHe5Q-IV8w.jpeg" /><figcaption>An overview of all the player-roles, responsibilities of the attack, midfield and defence lines when it comes to defending the middle-third.</figcaption></figure><p>To understand better the overarching theme of each line, we can have a look at the image above in which the ball-oriented team is defending in a 4–4–2 Diamond against the opponent in possession in a 4–3–3. We will also be looking at the activities such as <strong>‘Squeezing’ and ‘Swarming’ </strong>in detail.</p><p><strong>Attack-Line:<br></strong>In my opinion, the most important line of pressure (arguably) right until the opponent progresses the ball into the final-third is the first-line. As we saw in the previous section about pressing approach in opponent’s own-third, the attackers set up the base/ foundation to guide the opponents into a particular direction, restrict them into one half of the pitch and then close down. Similar to that, central coverage will be applicable also against an opponent trying to enter the middle-third. The first objective is to not let them enter the middle-third at all and instead force them to make riskier decisions. However, the additional responsibility begins if the opponent has managed to penetrate through the attackers or by passed them from either side. In that case, the task in hand is quite simple: track-back to reduce the space between the lines for the opponents in possession of the ball. I would like to call this action as ‘squeezing’ as the objective is literally to squeeze the opponent for space. The logic yet again is simple; When the opponent lacks space, he is bound to take an extra second or two which is when the closely-knit lines (attackers &amp; midfielders) close down the ball-holder and win the ball back.</p><p><strong>Let’s look at an example of this particular movement:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Xcz0lVduo8NLliw_iBCDrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Left: Opponent RB playing into his CM, Right: Attackers reduce gap between them and the midfield-line and squeeze the space was available to the ball-receiver</figcaption></figure><p>We can also have a look at an example from a game and for this, I am going to take you back to the 4–3 Liverpool win against City once again:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F643189402%3Fh%3D73618192ca%26app_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F643189402&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1293891488-d5ffe0ed5f2e8967255f94a4893053c115b89ecd08b200633_1280&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1920" height="1080" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/29cd11bba65afce70ffcc05038d2dd6d/href">https://medium.com/media/29cd11bba65afce70ffcc05038d2dd6d/href</a></iframe><p>In the video above, you can see Man City comfortably pass through Liverpool’s first-line of pressure by going wide early and using their fullback. However, Liverpool stop City from entering further into the middle-third owing to their ball-oriented high defensive-line along with the midfield-three also sliding across towards ball-side. It was then the work of attackers, especially Roberto Firmino and Mohamed Salah.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*7IzQPvV89UchpdIAqNne2w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Firmino &amp; Salah squeezed the space between the lines (yellow-shaded area), which is also where Fernandinho received the ball.</figcaption></figure><p>Firmino is quick to see that Fernandinho receives a square-pass at a slow tempo (pressing-trigger) from Danilo at left-back. Since Firmino was already not too far from Fernandinho, he was quick to press him and also close down Gundogan. Gundogan knew he cannot afford to turn after receiving the ball and hence plays it back to Otamendi but Salah had already covered that option. From there, it was simply a blistering-quick attack by Salah &amp; Mane to make it 3–1.</p><p>In this scenario, the goal was created only owing to the pressure by Firmino and Salah who squeezed the space between them and their midfield on the ball-near side. Again, it is important to remember that it was made effective owing to the rest of the team keeping the playing area absolutely small for the opponent. Only then will any pressure applied by any player translate into winning the ball back and then creating a chance from it.</p><p><strong>Midfield-Line:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*652iVlcnTwNhn_Ew79vniA.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Left) Opponent trying to enter the middle-third via wide areas but (Right) midfield-line shuffles across to the ball-near side and allows no space or time to the ball-receiver</figcaption></figure><p>The midfield-line is usually needed to start with the right position between defence and attack, occupying the absolute centre of the middle-third. So in terms of setting-up against the ball entering the middle-third, the midfield line’s movement is mostly horizontal (right-to-left or left-to-right). The direction of movement will, of course, depend on which side is being used to progress the ball by the opponent. The scope for vertical movement within the middle-third is quite limited owing to the forwards in front of them and the defensive-line behind them. Specific opponent-based tweaks can also be carried out like you can see in the image above, how the attacking-midfielder or no.10 of the ball-oriented team is marking the opponent’s defensive-midfielder while the 3 CMs are responsible of shifting side-to-side and cover the width of the pitch.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gKKzoILdw4wBZjpZZdgXLw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Rangnick’s Leipzig vs Leverkusen from 2018–19 Bundesliga</figcaption></figure><p>You can see in the image above how Leipzig’s midfield-line as well as the entire team <em>(similar to Klopp Liverpool vs Man City)</em> has shifted to the ball-side and made the playing area really compact for the opponent. The only way the opponent can progress the ball further is via long-switches to the other flank. These switches have to be in such a way that they are not too long for their own player to chase down nor too short that Leipzig will be able to shuffle across in time to close down the ball-receiver. Adding to this, the ball-holder needs to execute these passes to perfection while he will also be pressed and closed down. If the Leipzig attackers need to be able to press with full intensity without having to think about being beaten, then the midfield-line need to be in the right position to step in. This is the logical reasoning behind the midfield-line having to shift from side-to-side and cover the width of the pitch, in situations when opponent tries to enter from the wide areas. If the opponent wants to enter through the middle, then the midfield-line pretty much needs to maintain their position while the next plan of action will either be for the attack-line or the defensive-line depending on whether the ball is in front of midfield or it has reached behind them.</p><p><strong>Defence-Line:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bJbhTE4ISOYmBHebGnBbGg.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Left Pic) Opponent trying to play a deep-pass into their attacker and progress further into the middle-third but (Right Pic) defender stepping up to squeeze space and time for the ball-receiver</figcaption></figure><p>A major part of the defensive-line’s movement is bound to be forward or diagonally forward, depending on which vertical lane is being used to by the opponent to progress the ball into the middle-third. Just like the attack-line which tracks back and ensures ‘squeezing’ the opposition for space, the defensive-line pushes up, gets closer to the midfielders and ‘squeeze’ the space between lines furthermore.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/551/1*EGfRyX9b4vlot0_A8WEoyA.gif" /><figcaption>Rangnick’s Leipzig scoring vs Wolfsburg due to their defensive-line pushing high to squeeze space</figcaption></figure><p>To summarize all the pointers we had seen in this section, I would like to show you a short-clip in which we will see Rangnick’s Leipzig defend the middle-third while the attackers, midfielders and the defenders all execute their respective duties and squeeze space, close down and press the ball-holder to win the ball back.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F644711815%3Fh%3Db76ad10428%26app_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F644711815&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1296862202-ee3b91c964e7c2c1bcf01fae2a41f94f885c846bfd85f1b9e_1280&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1920" height="1080" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/443de3639c3459317e656e3955807e15/href">https://medium.com/media/443de3639c3459317e656e3955807e15/href</a></iframe><p>As you saw in the clip, Leipzig were setup in a 4–2–2–2 formation (which was the most frequently used shape by Rangnick) and you would be able to see how the ball-near attacker (Poulsen) and ball-near defender (Halstenberg) squeeze space by tracking-back and stepping-up respectively. With the midfielders also shuffling to the ball-side instead of staying centre, there is a numerical superiority around the ball which makes it easier to win the ball back.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vNk8R-67U-n19E7Qi6P3RQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>A snap from the Leipzig-BVB game just a few seconds before the ball was won back</figcaption></figure><p>Here you can see how less the distance is between the team’s left-back (Halstenberg) and the striker (Poulsen) while there is also support from other players (highlighted yellow). This is in case the players forming the diamond lose out on any of the duels and possession goes back to BVB, then there are enough options to counter-press immediately.</p><p><strong>Swarming<br></strong>The above example naturally leads me to talking about ‘swarming’ in this section. Swarming is a key team activity that happens often in the middle-third for a team using ball-orientation. As the name suggests, this term simply means swarming the ball-holder with numbers to form multiple cover-shadows around him and ultimately win the ball back. This could be done by two, three or even four players depending upon the location of the ball and the ball-holder on the pitch, especially in the middle-third.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6QAD8I4VbqbQ5yG5sVKs6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>An example of Rangnick’s Leipzig swarming the ball-holder (Coman) allowing him no space or time to progress the ball further</figcaption></figure><p>The 2v1, 3v1 or occasional 4v1 pressures are effective in winning the ball back for obvious reasons. But if it is indeed so effective, then why cannot all teams deploy pressing/ closing down in high numbers?</p><p>The most common reason for why not every team can do it is <strong>the lack of a narrow, compact and a water-tight ball-oriented defensive system in place</strong>. As we had just seen, ball-orientation allows teams to squeeze the space available for the opponent. When the playing space is already limited and on top of that, if the defending team has more numbers near the ball, 2v1, 3v1 or even 4v1 is possible. This is because there is <strong>constant and continuous cover</strong> to the player who goes into pressing or closing down owing to the attackers, midfielders and defenders being always close to each other.</p><p>Imagine similar 2v1 or 3v1 pressures happening with the rest of the team’s shape not being narrow or compact. It would simply be an impossible task if the two/three who are pressing the ball-holder don’t have support coming in if the pressure is evaded.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sYpKm2sQGqNkEeyX_XcOew.jpeg" /><figcaption>The team in red trying to create a 2v1 pressure against the opponent right-back when the attack, midfield and defence lines are not compact or close to each can lead to disaster. The red net is the network of passes that the opponent centre-back can access after receiving a back pass from the right-back</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Variations in Swarming:<br></strong>We saw how ball-oriented teams can squeeze space for the opponent and swarm the ball-holder to win back possession. However, there can be slight variations in the details when it comes to the pressing. For example, we can look at two variations in pressing done by ball-oriented teams. This is not to say that these two are the only allowed and existing ways to win back possession but we can look at these two to understand how different ways work in an equally effective manner.</p><p><strong>First let us have a look at the S.A.R.D Rule by Rangnick:<br></strong>S.A.R.D is simply the abbreviated form of four German words that the player needs to remember while pressing the opponent with the ball. (as quoted by current RB Leipzig Head Coach Jesse Marsch in a webinar)<br> <br><strong><em>S — Sprinten (Sprinting)<br>A — Alle Gemeinsam (All Together)<br>R — Reingehen (Going in)<br>D — Dazukommen (Second Wave of Pressure)</em></strong></p><p>These are meant to be taken as the four absolutely important steps to be considered by Rangnick’s team as they approach an opponent in possession of the ball, to press. So what do these terms exactly mean?<br> <br><strong>Sprinten: </strong><br>Refers to the players movement from their start position till they reach the opponent to be pressed. They need to sprint at the opponent in full speed. Ideally these pressure attempts need to be in short-bursts or in other words, small distance x max speed with as much intensity as possible to maintain physical efficiency</p><p><strong>A — Alle Gemeinsam (All Together):</strong> <br>The pressing needs to happen together as a team and not just by 1–2 players alone. We have seen the reasons as to why this is important already in the previous sections</p><p><strong>R — Reingehen (Going in):</strong><br>In this context, going in 100% into the action of winning the ball back from the opponent without an iota of doubt. S There has to be no hesitation during the attempt to win the ball back and the player’s approach must almost be like like attempting to run through the opponent</p><p><strong>D — Dazukommen:</strong><br>Dazukommen refers to the second and every following wave of pressure that follows after a press has been initiated. When one player starts the pressure, there has to be a follow-up pressure from the next closest player to ensure that the pressing-spell which was initiated, proves successful to the team. If there is no second or third wave of pressure that follows the first one, then the team in possession can progress the ball easily after beating the first pressure attempt alone. This will also defeat the purpose of a team being oriented to the ball as the opponent will gain space + time on the ball against a high and narrow line of defence.</p><p>Breaking down the process of a player pressing an opponent into smaller steps helps the players remember ‘how’ they have to press and it is also easier to identify and point-out the exact point when they go wrong with pressing. <br>For example, if a player didn’t sprint to close down the opponent and was too slow which allowed the opponent to progress forward, then it is easy to point out to the ‘Sprinten’ in S.A.R.D. Another example could be that a player didn’t go all-in to win the ball back and it was half-a-tackle which allowed the opponent to win the duel comfortably, then the problem area was ‘Reingehen’ in S.A.R.D.</p><p><strong>Avoiding the ‘Half-Press’<br></strong>What it ultimately enables the players to do is seamless execution of the ‘press’ at all times as it is absolutely critical in order for the entire system to work. A team that deploys a high-line but does not press the opponents correctly can simply be by-passed with through-balls in behind the last line. So these principles are to be instilled into minds of the players so deeply that they can execute this systematic pressing by default. It also helps in avoiding the ‘half-press’ that a lot of players tend to do unintentionally. What I mean by a ‘half-press’ is when a player’s press is not intense enough to reach the ball-holder and close him down nor is it weak enough to stay near a potential passing option. Such situations are the worst for a defending team as the ball-holder is neither closed down nor is his passing option marked and it is an easy route to progress the ball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*AvW7pIZD7wyfiBM0FAmjTw.gif" /><figcaption>Manchester United’s series of half-press attempts allowing Liverpool to play through them comfortably before scoring the first goal in their 0–5 thrashing in October</figcaption></figure><p>You can clearly see in the above clip how Bruno Fernandes on Van Dijk, Wan-Bissaka on Robertson, Lindelof on Jota, all do a half-press. In other words, they do not close down their opponent intensely enough that the ball-holder has no space nor do they stay back in their positions to be able to intercept/ close down the next ball-receiver.</p><p>This is exactly what Rangnick had spoken about in the coaching conference with Coaches Voice recently when he spoke about adding little bit of pressing to one’s game, he went on to say:</p><p><strong><em>“What is a little bit of pressing? A little bit of pressing is like a little bit pregnant. You are either pregnant or you are not, either you want to press or not!”</em></strong></p><p>If you haven’t already, then try noticing in the future how the teams who have top coaches either press completely or don’t press at all. In most cases, you would find the teams who have clarity in this aspect to press well.</p><p><strong>Close down and not tackle by Julian Nagelsmann:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gLLmht6RWvsd2PMzOocM6w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Nagelsmann has several times mentioned the importance of his team being close to the ball as well as to the goal as a methodology of both attacking and defending with numbers</figcaption></figure><p>This was a very similar idea to Rangnick executed by Nagelsmann during his time at RB Leipzig. Almost all of the principles from Rangnick were retained but the major change being the frequency of tackling. Nagelsmann believed in engaging his players in as few direct duels as possible while trying to win the ball back. He instead believed in closing down the space + time available on the ball for the opponent with the team being oriented to the ball but forcing the opponent to make a mistake rather than proactively tackling the ball.</p><p>The reasoning behind this was that he believed that his players would have to invest extra energy if they have to tackle and win a ball back. Moreover, the tackler of the ball is usually not in the best body-position or angle to contribute to attacking immediately after winning the ball back and he could also be prone to losing the ball if counter-pressed by the opponent. So RB Leipzig adopted to be ball-oriented, press/close down on cue, give no space/time for the opponent but not tackle.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*W6z5cMI0A2fnQqWHXfTLbA.gif" /><figcaption>An example of Nagelsmann’s Leipzig closing down/pressing but not tackling or engaging in a direct duel with the opponent.</figcaption></figure><p>In the 2020–21 Bundesliga Season, Nagelsmann’s Leipzig maintained a unique record as they were positioned 2nd highest in terms of pressure attempts in the opponent’s third, 3rd highest in terms of pressure attempts in the middle-third and all this while they were also 2nd in terms of possession% but they were the 2nd lowest in the league in terms of tackle attempts. This is slowly changing in his current tenure with Bayern Munchen but this was certainly the case as far as his RB Leipzig were concerned.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1017/1*_0w1YXt_A4Vd1yllgzQa-w.jpeg" /></figure><p>In an interview with the 11freunde.de, he talks about the same and goes on to mention, <strong><em>“I prefer to force the opponent to make a bad pass than to win the ball in a direct duel as duels are associated with too many coincidences”</em></strong></p><p>This cannot be confused with the half-press that we saw earlier as the closing down happens perfectly and there is a shadow created in front of the ball-holder that is big enough to not let him make a pass but the energy, effort and overall risk of being beaten is saved by not tackling unless necessary. However, you would also notice that the other principles like closing down the ball-holder, maintaining minimum gap between lines, high-line defence, are not missed out. To summarize the section, different coaches may add small tweaks to the details and nuances but retain the major principles.</p><h4>Ball-Orientation in the team’s own-third:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xDFGPBVRTpbJCSQ-78_qdg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sample Graphic in which the ball-oriented team is defending in a 4–4–2 Diamond: The team needs to be closely-knit, well connected and maintain a narrow-shape with focus in the centre</figcaption></figure><p>The objective is to maintain a narrow, compact structure with the last line trying to be at a height which restricts the opponent from entering and staying in the final-third owing to a constant lack of space and time. It wouldn’t be an over-statement to say that this is the main objective of the defending team itself. The height of the defensive-line does not want to drop low or rather low enough to afford time and space to the opponents in the final-third, irrespective of the opponents’ quality to find the space in-behind. This is something which can be a double-edged sword, in the sense that it is almost always difficult for the attacking team to approach but can also put the defending team at risk as well. Why is it so?</p><p><strong>The Double-Edged Sword:<br></strong>There is an inherent risk that the defending team faces whenever the opponent enters the final-third as perfectly-timed runs coupled with well-weighted passes can indeed lead to conceding chances from dangerous areas. But the very strength of this style of defending lies here as well. The height of the defensive-line constantly keeps the size of the pitch vertically limited for the opponent.</p><p>It is a way of indirectly provoking the opponent to take the risk and go for ‘that’ pass in-behind the defence without worrying about losing possession. We can look at it from the perspective of a Poker game. Imagine a player raising the bet while the other player is thinking whether he should call his opponent’s bluff or fold and let go to minimize damage. In this case, it is entirely a gamble as to what decision is to be made next and that depends on the gut, hunch, knack of the player. However, the difference here is that it is not entirely a gamble and there are some control-determinants in the hands of the defending team. Let us look at how such a control is established in the gamble:</p><p><strong>a) Hyper-focused in the centre: <br></strong>The opponent is never allowed time and space in the zone-14 or while trying to enter this zone. The CBs or DMs are always present in these zones and ready to close down the opponent on the ball before he gets sufficient time to execute his decision.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fEjnRmlesliAVJYrIrb-sQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Yes, the team does move based on the movement of the ball given that the defensive system is ball-oriented. However, they still always protect the central zone irrespective of where the ball is.</p><p><strong>b) When to hold and when to fold:<br></strong>In order to be able to establish an effective defensive system in the final-third, the defensive-line needs to be adept at decision-making in moments of pressure. One such decision that the defensive-line needs to get right as many times as possible in a game, is about their positioning. In other words, when do we hold the height of the line and when do we fall back?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ai3r6a3pJBwyRI-IjZNdOA.jpeg" /></figure><p>This is a challenge that any defensive-line is bound to face as the line chooses to remain as high as possible, even as the opponent approaches the final-third. So it is absolutely critical that the line knows when to drop and when to hold the height. The most basic rule to be remembered by the backline is to make their decision based on the existing/potential pressure on the ball-carrying opponent during the attack or opponent’s positive transition.</p><p>Let us take an example of an opponent’s counter-attack in which three opponent attackers are against the ball-oriented team’s back-four. (4v3 in favour of the defending team) This means that the midfielders of the defending team are still tracking-back and the defensive-line are left all by themselves to handle the situation. In such a scenario, the defensive-line does not hold its height and chooses to gradually fall-back while containing the dribble/ball-carrying of the opponent to ensure he does not have acres of space in front of him. This ensures that no defender from the back-line is beaten 1v1 by the opponent attacker in the final-third as he avoids committing to it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2RgjTD6zB1z9UZrmVT7bwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Here Konate takes on Coman in a 1v1 situation instead of dropping-back to the edge of the penalty area as he has sufficient support around the ball as compared to Coman and hence worthy of a risk.</figcaption></figure><p>If in the same scenario, there was pressure from a teammate on the opponent carrying the ball, then a defender would not be hesitant in stepping out from his defensive-line and making it 2v1 against the opponent attacker. It is much less probable that an attacker is able to beat 2 players than 1 and hence, a full-fledged commitment from a defender to step out of his defensive-line is a calculated-risk in favour of the defending team in its own-third. Therefore, final-third defending boils down to such key decisions which are taken based on maximizing chances of winning-back possession while minimizing risk as well.</p><p><strong>Creating numerical superiority pressures in dangerous zones:<br></strong>When we say dangerous zones, we are talking about those areas from where there is enough accessibility for a shot at goal or a penetrating pass into the box to put an attacker through on goal. It is of utmost importance to ensure that the opponent has the least amount of space and time available in order to minimize the potential threat. Hence, Rangnick’s men try to create numerical superiority in these areas or in simpler words, 2v1 / 3v1 pressures against the opponent holding the ball. The idea is to either win the ball back or atleast send the ball to a less-threatening area (towards the wing). Once the ball is moved to the wing, then they can adapt to pressing the opponent against the touchline with 2v1 or 3v1, depending on the situation.</p><p><strong>A clip of Rangnick’s Leipzig defending the final-third in which you can see all of the above points being demonstrated</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F644958645%3Fh%3D7216ed4489%26app_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F644958645&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1297304333-4992698515700c4e6a0dd8ebd15ab11923c8db4b3baffa58d_1280&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1920" height="1080" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/73e915cc2006b9346d41ac71cac8e43e/href">https://medium.com/media/73e915cc2006b9346d41ac71cac8e43e/href</a></iframe><h4>Some Stats to demonstrate how Rangnick’s Leipzig behaved on the pitch from the 2018/19 Bundesliga:</h4><p>i) <strong>Highest pressing success % in Europe’s top-five leagues in 2018–19 at 32%</strong> where a successful press refers to winning the ball back within 5 seconds of pressure.</p><p><strong>ii) Aerial Dominance: RB Leipzig were the team with the highest aerial success % in the 2018–19 Bundesliga with 55.3%</strong> <br>There were only three teams ahead of this number among Europe’s top-five leagues. Given the playing style of RB Leipzig under Ralf Rangnick, aerial dominance is a critical element as the high-pressure in the opponent’s own-third and the middle-third naturally forced them to go long in an attempt to by pass the high defensive-line. This meant that the CBs Upamecano, Konate and Orban had to face aerial battles on a regular basis. The success in these aerial battles were key to winning back possession after a wave of high, intense pressing. You may be able to imagine how much of a waste of effort it would be, if after seconds of intense pressure, the defending team is not able to win a blindly-lofted long ball in the air and fails to win back possession. Hence, it was absolutely critical that the CBs are able to complement the midfield and attack lines who force the opponent to go long and take the aerial route.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qxLbaS18fTiLKQo3qjXqwg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Three centre-backs played a major role in Rangnick’s Leipzig in the 2018–19 season and all three were excellent in the air in terms of quantity, quality or even both</figcaption></figure><p><strong>iii) 2nd highest goalkeeper actions outside the penalty area in Bundesliga and 4th highest in Europe’s top-five leagues</strong><br>These actions refer to the sweeping actions performed by the goalkeeper outside the penalty area. This is yet another important part of the system given the height at which RB Leipzig’s defensive-line positions itself. While the combination of pressing and the high defensive-line helps them win the ball back within the opponent’s half or catch them offside when they try to go long, there are some occasions in which a perfectly-weighted ball is played behind the defensive line to a perfectly-timed run of an opponent attacker. In such situations, the role of the goalkeeper is of immense value as if he is able to anticipate these situations and sweep outside the penalty area, then it completely stifles the opponent’s chances of creating danger.</p><p><strong>iv) RB Leipzig had faced the 2nd least number of shots in Bundesliga and the 5th least number of shots among Europe’s top-five leagues<br></strong>A major reason why it was possible to pull this off was all the factors that we just saw in the article; a well drilled defensive-system that is proactive, plays on the front-foot to put the opponent in difficult situations and make them take risks that carry minute chances of a favourable result.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>I have tried to cover ball-oriented defending as extensively as possible at the same time trying not to keep it so long that it becomes impossible to read. It is, of course possible to discuss this topic a lot more in detail as well but in my next piece I will try to show the other side of ball-orientation which will talk about the effects of the same on transitions, possession and chance-creation. <br>If time permits, I will also try to cover training sessions which are useful for a team to inherit ball-orientation along with the right kind of player-profiles that a club needs to scout to be able to execute this style effectively.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2cf0daaad0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Die Mannschaft: Tactically analyzing Germany’s EURO 2021]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/die-mannschaft-tactically-analyzing-germanys-euro-2021-fb04ae82b379?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb04ae82b379</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bundesliga]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bayern-munich]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uefa-euro-2020]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[germany]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jun 2021 07:29:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-23T11:08:20.462Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G80TE80qJCbpUdS8hpu-nw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Whether or not one would agree on Germany being the best side of the tournament so far or not, there is little doubt to whether they have been one of the most entertaining sides to watch so far or not. It is not only the mixture of experience, young-talent and never-ending passion that makes them a team to watch out for but it is also the group that they had been drawn into, which has made things all the more curious for the fans.</p><p>With the reigning World Champions France and the reigning European Champions Portugal as the opening fixtures of the tournament, Germany have had quite a lot of thinking to do in terms of finding the most suited, effective and balanced system with the names they have in hand. One may have felt after their hard-fought 1–0 loss to France that coach Joachim Loew may not get the best farewell possible as Portugal could have also been a tricky matchup their knack of grinding out results. However, die Mannschaft turned cranked it up a notch against the defending Champions and looked an entirely different beast in the final-third.</p><p>So what was the difference for Germany in possession, what changed over the two games and what can we expect from Germany’s last fixture? Let’s take a look!</p><h4>STRUGGLE AGAINST FRANCE</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*AiXw4ZTSM7uP8UZ2XMqUhQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>France’s Defensive-Shape against Germany</figcaption></figure><p>France’s Defensive Shape for most parts of the game was a traditional 4–3–3 with the Back-Four &amp; Mid-Three forming compact lines in front of the penalty area and the front-three providing passive pressure on Germany’s Centre-Backs. France were careful about not letting Germany’s midfield slice through them in the central areas and hence the World Champions’ major objective was not to allow Germany’s front-three to drop into space to receive the ball and turn towards goal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E5LKqYz3IxzxXBy9DpY_mw.jpeg" /><figcaption>France’s Defensive-Shape against Germany</figcaption></figure><p>With the likes of Hummels and Ginter as part of Germany’s back-three, there were attempts by the centre-backs to find Havertz, Muller or Gnabry who would drop into space in front of French’s midfield but before they could receive, control and ready to progress the ball, the trio of Pogba-Kante-Rabiot’s pressure was on them. <br> <br>However, Germany were allowed to go wide via their wing-backs who could receive the ball mostly in the shaded-area given in the above image. Space was allowed on either side of the mid-three and in front of the French full-backs. However, the problem was France’s quick close-down once the ball reached Kimmich or Gosens along the touchline.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ccZszYdA1hwHFOx-YmL66A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Defending the wide-areas along the touchlines with pressing-chains</figcaption></figure><p>When Germany tried using their wing-backs Kimmich &amp; Gosens, France closed-down the space as quickly as possible with the ball-side full-back. winger, central-midfielder with support from Kante available as well. This not only ensured that the wing-back couldn’t progress forward but also could not connect with the nearby passing options as they were mostly shadow-covered by French’s pressing-trio.</p><p>After a series of failed-attempts, Germany were forcing play through the central-areas by trying to connect with their front-three between the lines. However, there was hardly any space between France’s midfield-trio and back-four. While Germany were left with no solid plan to breach the French defence, the lack of runs in-behind didn’t help their case either.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0nyjK7by4GDuyBxHNKaBng.jpeg" /><figcaption>A well positioned back-four with sufficient width and height to allow space in front of the full-backs and not in-behind, to encourage Germany to play to the touchline for easier pressing</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see in the image above, there was very little space between France’s defence &amp; midfield with their front-three also trying to block passing lanes into Kroos &amp; Gundogan. Germany were forced to playing into the shaded-area with the hope that Kimmich &amp; Gosens could receive with lesser-pressure and make combination-play in the wide areas with the front-three. But the quick closing-down of the wide areas also made it challenging for Germany, forcing them to go central</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/851/1*babRtPTBnbhmy0_eJ7hV-w.jpeg" /><figcaption>At the end of Matchday 1, Germany topped the charts for use of central-zones to attack with 32% of their attacks attempted through the middle</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>A simple stat which narrates the story of how Germans failed in penetrating the French defence through the middle:</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>i) 9 tackles, 11 interceptions &amp; 16 clearances between French CBs &amp; the midfield-trio<br>ii) 0 dribbles completed by the entire German attack &amp; midfield combined</em></strong></p><h4>REDEMPTION AGAINST PORTUGAL</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/991/1*hVZWYaabCc_HWiOhrYjE8A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Portugal’s Defensive-Structure against Germany (Space to attack represented by shaded area)</figcaption></figure><p>It looked like die Mannschaft had learnt their lessons, did their homework and were out on the pitch against Portugal to prove a point. On the other hand, Portugal from the get-go were not in the game owing to their shape off-the-ball which made things a tad bit easier for Germans to go all-out in the final-third. <strong><br> <br></strong>As you can see in the image above, the major problem with Portugal was that they got a combination of factors absolutely wrong to create a perfect mix of how-not-to-defend. <br> <br><strong><em>To name a few:</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>i) Height &amp; Width of back-four<br>ii) The space they occupied and the space they didn’t<br>iii) The pressing intensity of the attackers — Ronaldo, Jota &amp; Bernardo Silva</em></strong></p><p>Portugal’s Defensive Structure was a flat 4–5–1 with Ronaldo as the lone forward and all the others falling back into forming a compact, narrow structure to not let Germany progress through the middle. So what exactly was wrong with the height, width, space coverage and pressing by Portugal?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wpSalMoPRVKsmy3qSz8pjw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Narrow + High Backline with not sufficient support from wingers to defend the wide-areas</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see in the image above, the back-four is positioned extremely narrow, high up-field with enough space to attack in-behind them. While this has proven an effective tactic when executed right, Portugal were far from it. The whole point of a narrow and a high-back four will carry a meaning only when there is pressure by the attackers on the opponent’s ball-progressors. <br> <br>The simplest reason is, when your defensive structure is high &amp; narrow, then there is space for the opponent to run in-behind. Hence if the opponent’s ball-progressor is given ample time and space on the ball to pick out the right passes, then it is pretty much a matter of time before the defence is breached. To prevent this from happening, the attackers need to press and least, close down space/time on the ball. There was virtually no pressing from the likes of any of Portuguese attackers. While Ronaldo’s role was pretty much waiting for the counter-attack, Jota &amp; Bernardo Silva’s roles off-the-ball had no clarity. Either they weren’t given enough clarity or their execution was abysmal. <br> <strong><br></strong>With Portugal’s back-four maintaining such less width, it is important to have some protection on the flanks as Germany positioned their wing-backs Kimmich &amp; Gosens I the same line as their front-three. So it was almost as though Germany were playing with 5-man forward line in possession (3–2–5 shape). Now that makes it very simple for Jota &amp; B.Silva as they either close down the ball-progressor (Ginter/Rudiger) or they stay close to the wing-backs (Kimmich/Gosens) to cut off the passing-lane. But what had actually happened? NEITHER!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IcNAdCujywB-nQ0lSlpwTw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Seconds before Germany’s 2nd goal: Shaded-Area represents the space offered to Germany on both flanks</figcaption></figure><p>The above image is a snap from the game just seconds before Germany’s 2nd goal. As you can see, Rudiger charges with the ball with no pressure on him. Here, B. Silva is supposed to make a decision quickly between closing down Rudiger &amp; Gosens. The lack of decisiveness leaves him in a place which neither is close enough to Gosens cut the passing-lane nor close enough to Rudiger to go for a tackle. This allows Rudiger to find Gosens, who combines with Muller and in the next few seconds, the ball is behind the net.</p><h4>Comparing France &amp; Portugal’s handling of the exact-same situation</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*A5i8sxwoSi_KFzckwKtgFg.gif" /></figure><p><strong><em>In the above clip:</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>i) Pogba holds his position alongside the back-four without charging at Rudiger and hence is able to close down Gosens after he receives the ball</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>ii) France’s back-four also retreat quickly to the edge of the penalty area to avoid a pass in-behind the defence</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*XiaNYS7bPjUhv_ku4bJPYA.gif" /></figure><p><strong><em>In the same situation, Portugal collectively make a blunder:</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>i) B.Silva steps out of position to close down Rudiger, which is too late</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>ii) Portugal’s back-four retreats way too late, after the pass has been released</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>iii) Back-Four not staggered correctly in terms of width, way too narrow which leaves far-post completely empty with Kimmich awaiting patiently</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4IBv2BPx_svuq_wt2aO8UA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bernardo Silva clearly stuck between charging at Rudiger or closing down Gosens, allowing space for Rudiger to play a simple pass into Gosens</figcaption></figure><p>The image above capturing the same shot as we saw above from a different angle. With this height and width of back-four being maintained, there needs to be either pressure on the ball-progressor or protection on the flanks to cut out simple passes. Personally, I feel this is about adjusting the defensive structure as a whole. The extreme narrowness of both the back-four and mid-three shifted the entire onus of defending wide areas on the attackers. In case of France, you can see how the width of back-four and mid-three were balanced to the extent that there weren’t acres of space in-behind or on the flanks. It is quite possible that it is the fear of being played through the middle which causes this over-narrowness we are talking about.</p><p><strong>Another Example of France’s Defending in the Wide-Areas</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*b0HrVUgwzJ5DmiGs2O74zQ.gif" /><figcaption>This time, Griezmann holds his position to protect the flanks and forces Rudiger to <br> pass the ball inwards to Havertz who tries to go out-wide but Pavard is <br> well-positioned</figcaption></figure><p>In this game, Germany regularly blitzed the flanks with overloads of to pull Portugal towards ball-side and switch play to the other. There was a stark difference in the way Gosens’ role had transformed from the game against France to this game</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/902/1*vp7SGPWSsSQKfs4Sw1YoWQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The picture on the left is Gosens touch-map against France and the picture on the right is Gosens touch-map against Portugal</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>i) You can clearly see the difference as Gosens had just 2 touches in the penalty area against France while he had about 7 touches in the box against Portugal</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>ii) It is also visible how he had much fewer touches in his own-half against Portugal as compared to the game against France. This was mainly due to the high-positioning</em></strong></p><h4>APPROACHING HUNGARY</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/440/1*zzi1pINw6vRB9TCX7Zrmsw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hungary have easily been among the most organized, disciplined and hard-working teams without the ball in this EURO so far and hence, it is not going to be a cakewalk for the Germans in anyway. Coach Marco Rossi has blended his classic Italian-flavoured 5–3–2 shape off-the-ball which almost leaves no space in the final-third for the opposition to exploit.</p><p>As you can see in the image above, the Hungary back-line comprises of three centre-backs with two wing-backs forming the back-five. Ahead of them, there is a midfield-trio which has arguably been the highlight of this team as they work like clockwork, shifting from one flank to the other across the entire width of the pitch. Without the midfield-trio of András Schäfer, Ádám Nagy &amp; László Kleinheisler, the system would pretty much break down eventually as the three cover an insane amount of ground to maintain solidity.</p><p>In the first two games of Hungary, we saw that their approach was pretty clear: Sit back, stay disciplined, deny space, win the ball back and hit the opposition on the counter. Having seen the firepower of Germany against Portugal, it wouldn’t be of surprise for Hungary to stick to the same formula. It has pretty much worked wonders for them despite the record stating a <br>3–0 loss against Portugal, the determination to not give up was evident till the penalty was awarded for Portugal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JOEqHP7e5zvCqNHAIXrKNQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the image above, you can see the clear 5–3–2 shape that we were talking about. The objective is simple to absorb pressure, cover the spaces, refuse to be pulled out of position and give the opponent no space to penetrate into the final-third. As simple as it sounds, it is probably a mighty difficult task for a team like Hungary to keep defending Champions Portugal at bay for 84 minutes and World Champions France for 66 minutes. Especially given the massive difference in quality on an individual player-to-player basis, it is definitely the planning, discipline, determination and hard-work which has made Hungary a tough side to beat.</p><p><strong>A sample showcasing how the team’s Defensive-Structure functions</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*HI1SuePcy5YmFfgrhQFKhA.gif" /></figure><p>To show you an example of the Hungary’s structural balance and how they close-down spaces across the width of the pitch, here is an animation of the team’s movements.</p><p>i) As you can see, the first unmarked passing option available for the centre-back in possession is the near-side full-back</p><p>ii) The near-side central-midfielder goes to close down the full-back receiving the ball, with the entire midfield-trio shifting ball-side</p><p>iii) The near-side striker also falls back to provide support</p><p>iv) Incase the opponent decides to go back and change flanks, then it may be difficult for the midfield-trio to shift across to the other end of the pitch</p><p>v) Farside wing-back charges up-field to close down opponent with the rest of the defence sliding across to become a 4–4–2</p><p><strong>Possible Setup to unlock Hungary: A 3–1–4–2 or 3–3–4</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/989/1*A4TOQS-pU0LGKR-hMRUxCw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Starting XI vs Hungary with the shape in-possession</figcaption></figure><p>First of all, it is important for us to understand where the space is before we get into the shape, formation and other specific factors. The only possible challenge for Hungary in their own-half has been dealing with width in the middle-third. Let’s find out by looking at their shape and analyse why the shape proposes could work wonders for die Mannschaft.</p><p><strong>Goretzka as the Lone-Pivot</strong></p><p>A single-pivot would be better off than the 3–4–2–1 that Germany have fielded is because Hungary play with two men up-front. When Germany field a double-pivot it would be an easy reference point for them to shadow-cover and press the centre-backs in possession. With a single-pivot in Goretzka, Germany can break the first-line of Hungary with ease as a 3–1 shape will only require the wide centre-backs to increase the gap between the two-strikers with their passing and when there is sufficient gap, Goretzka can receive and break the first-line.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*5RiXXc4xATPU_7difp_H_Q.gif" /><figcaption>Single-Pivot either finds space between the first-line or keeps the strikers narrow, allowing space for wide CBs to advance into the middle-third</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Kroos-Kimmich on the Half-Spaces in the Middle-Third</strong></p><p>As mentioned earlier, the mid-trio are responsible for covering the entire width of the pitch as they don’t play with natural wingers. Yes, they do get help from the farside wing-back when there is a switch of flanks. However, it is possible to pin the wing-backs along the defence with the right positioning of players and giving the best-passers space and time on the ball. So in my humble opinion, the space to look for is on either side of midfield and deploying Germany’s best passers in that space directly. When we speak of the best passers in Germany, the first two names are Toni Kroos and Joshua Kimmich by default. These have been two players for whom the opponent doesn’t want to give time or space on the ball as when they pick their teammates’ runs, it is going to connect 9/10 times. The problem for Hungary here could be that, their midfield-trio will have to keep shuttling right and left in order to ensure both don’t get any time or space on the ball. While it is a possibility, it is an uphill task to keep doing the same consistently when the opponent has the ball 65–70% of the time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*QS_ARqOx5MEIq3_MlU0Sdw.gif" /><figcaption>Kimmich-Kroos positioning on the half-spaces in the middle-third to pull the midfield across, followed by quick switch of flanks. If the flank change doesn’t happen in speed, then it will give opponent enough time to re-organize</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Diagonal Runs from the Wide-Attackers may be of utmost importance</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*bzfiFcZFYY5ZYO_UYfm2XA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Diagonal passes into the box from half-spaces to be met by Diagonal out-to-in runs from wide-attackers. This will be very hard to defend against as a five-man backline</figcaption></figure><p>When playing against a back-five which is as drilled as Marco Rossi’s Hungary, it is realistic to accept that there is going to be very less space just outside the penalty-area which is where any attacking team would love to have the ball in. It is also not going to be possible for Germany to use Kimmich-Gosens to the maximum potential in the way they did against Portugal as in that scenario, it was a back-four which was extremely narrow and high, giving space to attack the flanks. In this case, there is going to be a five-man backline which will be deep across the width of the pitch in and around the penalty area. So there wouldn’t be much space to make straight runs in-behind. However, the alternate that can be considered is to make diagonal run-ins from outside to inside through the five-man backline. It will be all the more better if the in-to-out runs are doable from both flanks. Hence, the shape proposed above (3–3–4/ 3–1–4–2) shall allow Germany to do the same with Gnabry-Gosens on one side and Sane-Havertz on the other side.</p><p>As shown in the animation earlier, a major reason why this can be done is the positioning of Kroos-Kimmich on the wide half-spaces in the middle-third. With the kind of passing-range the German-duo have, it would be deadly to have them play-in diagonal balls from the half-spaces into the box with the likes of Sane-Havertz or Gnabry-Gosens running in to meet them.</p><p><strong>Plan Summary</strong></p><p><strong>i) 3v2 Advantage with the three centre-backs against Hungary’s two-strikers</strong></p><p><strong>ii) Single-Pivot of Goretzka to either keep the strikers narrow, allowing space for wide centre-backs to push forward and attack or receive between the lines and progress play</strong></p><p><strong>iii) Kroos-Kimmich on the outside of Hungary’s midfield-trio, going wider to receive passers from the centre-backs and pulling the midfield along with them</strong></p><p><strong>iv) Quick switch of flanks to attack the farside where numerical superiority is bound to be there and find space+time on the ball</strong></p><p><strong>v) Diagonal passes from Kroos-Kimmich from the half-spaces into the box to be met by Diagonal runs-in from the likes of Gnabry-Gosens or Sane-Havertz</strong></p><p><strong>vi) Gnabry &amp; Sane to be kept in opposite flanks to have 1v1 expertise on both flanks, which can also be used as an option in the wide areas to beat defenders and enter the penalty-area</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb04ae82b379" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to beat the 4–2–3–1: A Guide for In-Possession Tactics]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/how-to-beat-the-4-2-3-1-a-guide-for-in-possession-tactics-8f229fcb7a25?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8f229fcb7a25</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uefa-champions-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[la-liga]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bundesliga]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Jun 2021 09:59:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-14T06:28:21.845Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 4–2–3–1 is one of the toughest shapes to break through as it covers almost all the key areas with a near-perfect vertical &amp; horizontal staggering and there is very little space left open for the team in possession to take advantage of. However, there are ways to break down every defensive-shape or structure with the main objective being to pull players out of position, create space, moving the ball into that space and progressing further up-field. So when it comes to breaking down the 4–2–3–1, how do we go about doing it? While there could be many ways of going about it, we are going to be focusing on the use of a 3–4–2–1 to break down the 4–2–3–1</p><p><strong>Setting the Tempo:<br> </strong><br>When a team is in possession, it is of utmost importance for them to understand at what tempo they need to maintain in possession. However, it is not as effective when decided by the team in possession without taking into account their opponent’s approach. The tempo, ideally should depend on whether the opponent wants to press or sit-back and if they want to press then how high is the pressure. A simple reason why this is important is because the answers to the above questions will tell us if there is going to be space, if there is then where is the space and if that can be utilized to pull the opponent’s defensive structure out of shape. Each<strong> </strong>approach from the opponent calls for a different approach from our own team in possession. <br> <br>Let’s say for example that the opponent is willing to pressure our team high in our own-third and prevent us playing out from the back. This means that for every pass we make, every time we move the ball, there is going to be a chain reaction from the opponent players in their pressing movement. Now, it is important for us to remember that space is created and will always be created only when the opponent’s defensive structure is in motion. This holds true for a team’s defensive structure in any phase of the pitch. Without atleast 1 opponent player in movement, there cannot be any space created in their defensive shape.</p><p>So to contextualize<strong> </strong>this principle to the current scenario, all we need to know is if space is going to be created by itself from the opponent’s press or should we lure the opponent into pressing and in turn, create space?<br> <strong><br>When the opponent is already on a high-pressure mode,</strong> then we don’t have to channel any effort into space creation but simply play at a quick tempo to take advantage of the small pockets which will keep coming up between the lines. This is because, the opponents will be in constant motion following along our players’ tightly. So the focus needs to be on how to be accurate, sharp and swift in ball-circulation with as few touches on the ball as possible, while playing out from the back. <br> <br><strong>If the opponent is happy to sit back and maintain his shape</strong>, this is a completely different scenario as the opponent is going to wait for us to come at them. Here, it may be wiser to lower the tempo and be patient until the right moment arises. This will be a game of patience wherein the team with the better composure usually gets the better of the other. But when we speak of the right moment for the team in possession, how exactly do we define it? It is simply that point when we successfully pull an opponent player out of his position by baiting him into pressure and create a gap or pocket of space to progress the ball. If the team in possession is staggered in right horizontal and vertical lines, the opponent’s defensive structure can be pulled out of position regularly, making ball progression smooth and seamless!</p><p>So we will be looking at breaking down the 4–2–3–1 with a 3–4–2–1 and progressing from one-third of the pitch to another, taking into account both approaches from the opponent:</p><p>a) When the opponent uses high-pressure<br>b) When the opponent sits back to absorb pressure<br>Now let us begin with the first-third of the pitch</p><h4>Goal-Kick Strategies</h4><p><strong>a) Switch to a Back-Four</strong></p><p>In a back-three setup, one of the biggest advantages in possession is the extra width from the extra centre-back while playing out from the back. However, when it comes to a goal-kick situation, three centre-backs in the same line across the width of the pitch may make it easier for the opponent to close down the GK’s passing options. Let us see an illustration on why such is the case:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/991/1*yMM6NiCx2YCFfhMmNaNsig.jpeg" /></figure><p>The image above is an example of what could happen when the three centre-backs are lined up across the width of the pitch in front of the GK. With the CB in the middle on the same line as the GK, it makes it easy for the opponent striker to close down if he puts himself also on the same line. Let’s say the CB is inside the box until the pass is made. Even in that case, the opponent striker’s trajectory of pressure is just one straight line to close down both the CB and the GK. In other words, it will eventually force the GK or the CB to a misplaced long-pass in an attempt to evade pressure.<br> <br>Misplaced long-passes forced out of pressure will only stifle the team in possession from building play from the back. There needs to be a setup which will stretch the opponent’s first line of pressure, allowing the GK enough passing options to progress the ball. So how do we position the three centre-backs to achieve that?</p><p><strong>Centre-Back’s Alternate Positions during Goal-Kicks<br> <br></strong>There are two<strong> </strong>options that can be carried out in order to stretch the opponent’s first-line of pressure and find pockets of space to play out from the back. It will be necessary to push one of the CBs into another area of the pitch for an easier progression. As a result of the same, the GK along with the remaining 2 centre-backs takes the onus of a width across the pitch in the first-line of attack</p><p><strong>Pushing one centre-back into Midfield:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/996/1*FHY9fIouz4L9S4_hvZ4WSA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let us look at the scenario in which one of the centre-backs is pushed into midfield along with the other two central-midfielders to form almost what is like a 4–3–3. A major reason why this would offer an advantage to the team in possession is that it ensures there are enough numbers in midfield, which can be used to progress the ball if the opponent’s first-line of pressure is baited into pressing. In other words, overloading the gap between the opponent’s first-line and second-line of pressure is the priority for an easy ball-progression. <br> <br>The success of this methodology depends largely on whether the GK along with the 2 centre-backs will be able to attract the opponent’s first-line into pressing them. Hence, the first couple of passes might have to be between the GK and the centre-backs in the same line as him until one of the opponent attackers step out. Once the opponent attacker decides to charge into pressure, that’s when the team in possession brings the wing-backs also into play in order to use more width and get past the first-line. <br> <br>Once past the first-line of pressure, there can be focus on bringing the ball into an area from where the team in possession can be more threatening. So, the wing-back can look for options in the middle to combine and progress forward. If the pressing is high, it is of utmost importance to have fewer touches, quick release and off-the-ball movement from the passing options to ensure they are always available to receive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*FKOJLK7VMBrKXusKmQ0QEw.gif" /></figure><p><strong><em>So in this strategy, the key pointers for the team in possession are as follows:<br> <br>a) Make the first line of three across the width of the pitch using GK and two centre-backs with the third centre-back joining the midfield<br> <br>b) The centre-back and the two central-midfielders occupy the pace between the opponent’s first-line and second-line of pressure</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>c) GK + 2 Centre-backs attract pressure from opponent’s first-line and progress the ball using further width — via the wing-backs<br> <br>d) Further progress into the middle-third, by moving the ball into areas where there is numerical superiority after baiting the opponent into pressure</em></strong></p><p><strong>Pushing one centre-back out-wide:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1012/1*lRqqFvkEBlcLfTE6IwtgOw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let us look at the scenario in which one of the centre-backs goes out-wide while the GK and the remaining 2 centre-backs are responsible for utilizing the width across the pitch forming the first-line of attack. Yet again the key is to bait the first-line of opponent’s attack into pressing the GK and the two centre-backs. But what happens after that will be different. Here, the major advantage would be the overload on one flank of the pitch like show in the image above. (Overload of right-flank with one centre-back moving wide)<br> <br>With one centre-back moving to the flank, it gives freedom for the wing-back to push even higher up field. With the near-side central-midfielder and the attacking-midfielder also there for support, the team in possession have 5 players on one flank whom they can use for ball-progression. The only way the opponents can avoid being out-numbered is by committing more players to that flank, which would lead to tilting of their defensive structure to one side.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*iIRtZa86M_hYz9rjq-WwxA.gif" /></figure><p>With the right combination-play, the team in possession can easily surpass the opponents’ pressure on the strong-flank itself. If the opponent manages to tilt their defensive structure and allow their players to be lured in towards the flank to prevent the numerical superiority, then the gap is going to arise on the far-side, which can be taken advantage of using the wing-back’s run from blind side.</p><p><strong>Scenario 1: Same flank playing out</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*eNnMSeRz-yJC_rGFvYh3XA.gif" /></figure><p>Assuming that the opponents don’t get attracted to one flank and are simply using passive pressure to try and stop the build-up, then progression can happen in the strong-sided flank using the numerical superiority. The important point to remember here would be for the attacking-midfielder to keep the opponent’s full-back pinned to him as drawing him out of position would create space for the wing-back to run into. Of course, there is a requirement for some bit of courageous and accurate passing in order to pull this off but against any kind of pressure, a surprise vertical pass is the weapon that can slice through them.</p><p><strong>Scenario 2: Luring Pressure on to one-flank and hitting from blind-side</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MMzhBq9GImKuL_tGepWC9w.jpeg" /></figure><p>In case the opponents decide to stop progression on the strong-sided flank, they will have to push their team towards that flank to close down gaps and fight numerical superiority. This automatically leads to opening of space on the far side of the pitch. That is when the role of the wing-back on the far side would be key as a perfectly-timed run coupled with a perfectly-weighted through ball can give the wing-back acres of free space to run into.</p><p><strong><em>Key-Pointers to Remember during Build-Up against High-Pressure:</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>· One pass/ dribble to lure pressure and then go for verticality to penetrate into space created</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>· One or Two-Touch football, preferably touches to be as few as possible</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>· Use of Pre-determined combinations &amp; patterns to avoid thinking when on the ball</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>· Objective is to move the ball between each line of pressure quickly</em></strong></p><p><strong>Build-Up against Low-Press</strong></p><p>Progress quickly to the middle-third in order to build an attack that would offer an advantageous position to our team while entering the final-third</p><h4><strong>Progressing from the Middle-Third into the Final-Third</strong></h4><p>While I would like to believe that, the previous section would have given you a fair-idea about how to play out from the back against a 4–2–3–1 shape without having to hoof it over, let’s move on to the next section which is arguably the most important of them all: <strong>The Middle-Third<br> <br></strong>We will be looking at this section assuming that the team in possession has reached up-field till the middle-third and the defending team with the <br>4–2–3–1 shape has retreated into a mid-bloc press. This has been the trend in top-flight football in recent times as it allows the defending team to protect the central area and force the team in possession to go wide. Hence, a defending team with a solid defensive plan would generally aim to achieve the following in the middle-third</p><p>· <strong><em>Prevent conceding in the middle by remaining compact</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>· As a trade-off, give the CBs time on the ball but cover dangerous passing options and not get sliced through</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>· Force opposition into the wider areas as closing down the player in possession against the touchline is a smarter way to create pressure</em></strong></p><p>So, in order to deal with this scenario, let us first have a look at the shape for the team in possession against mid-bloc pressure and analyse:</p><p><strong>Against Mid-Bloc Pressure</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/896/1*fxwDwkqe497YtCnZutS2Mw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Luring the Opponent-Winger:</strong></p><p>As you can see in the image above, as the team in possession enters the middle-third, the central CB is on the ball with the striker trying to close down space. The immediate passing options are of course, to the right CB and the left CB. This is the pass which the team in possession would hope lures pressure from the opponent winger. If the opponent winger is successfully lured into pressure, then there is a free pass into the wing-back who is hugging the touchline, after which there is acres of space for him to run down and connect with the Left Attacking Midfielder or Right Attacking Midfielder. <br> <strong><br> </strong><br><strong>2v1 for DMs against opponent’s number 10:</strong><br> <br>There is also the availability of the 2 Defensive-Midfielders who have been highlighted along with the opponent’s number 10, who is in between them. However, there would be much more use to them if they actually don’t receive a pass directly from the central CB for a simple reason. Let us take the scenario of one of the DMs receiving a pass and see what could happen:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/908/1*oQ_ZUZPZ926QehhehQQFTQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The DM has received a pass directly from the central CB and he may not be under any direct pressure for a second. But look at the opponents positioning around him without the opponents having to move. There is a natural shadow-cover for the opponents who can just close down the DM in possession while also covering his nearby passing options. This can result in a turnover of possession right outside zone-14 for the opponent, who can then just reach the penalty area in a matter of seconds and create a chance. <br> <br>To avoid this risk, there can be the use of diagonal passes in order to enter the middle-third and progress further upfield. When we speak of diagonal passes in this context, there are 2 main ones which can be utilized:</p><p><strong><em>· Left Centre-Back to DM</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>· Right Centre-back to DM</em></strong></p><p>This is when the 2v1 created by the DMs against the opponent’s number-10 comes into play as a key differentiator. When the Left/Right Centre-Back is in possession, then it is the job of the nearside DM to go closer, asking for a pass. This will be a bait to lure the opponent number-10 into pressing the DM and leaving the other DM free to receive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/896/1*AbUmpOjCgoyEAQWHbP3Sdg.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see, the opponent’s number-10 gets lured into pressing the nearside DM, leaving the other DM free. Now the DM who is free, needs to make an appropriate movement to position himself for a pass from the centre-back. The advantage of this pass is that, it allows the DM to receive the pass on the half-turn with his body ready to face the attacking-half and set himself up perfectly. From thereon, he can decide to either carry the ball or release it to a player giving a run; depending on the situation, the reaction of the opponents and teammates.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*r7M_hyN19EnLSTqRrQoETw.gif" /><figcaption><strong><em>A sample showcasing how the team in possession can reach the final-third via this route</em></strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/895/1*7uJSib2szg41-dalNdQ6KA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The positioning of the wide attacking-midfielders (No.7 &amp; 10) are also key in order to make this work as by occupying the half-spaces, they can keep 3 opponents engaged and distracted. They will also be pulling the opponent’s defensive shape narrow, creating space for the wing-backs to charge up-field</p><p><strong>Against Low-Bloc Defending</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/756/1*KdTUE976QvKymtNveQLKHQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The scenario totally changes the approach to be taken in the middle-third. This is assuming that the opponent drops-off and lets the team in possession have space and time on the ball. This means that factors like patience, picking the right moment, moving the opponent to create space and then attacking the space are of utmost importance. As you can see in the image above, the 4–2–3–1 shape changes into a 4–4–1–1 as the opponent drops off to protect the final-third. This in turn, creates space in the interior corridors of the middle-third. Occupying this space is pretty much the key to unlocking the 4–4–1–1 as the shape has the ability to protect all key areas and it is possible to create chances only by forcing the opponent to step out, take a risk and get out of shape.</p><p><strong>Numerical Superiority in Wide Areas:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/895/1*OGeMUJHfACI78sDpfyztNg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Given that the opponent centre-backs are protected by two defensive-midfielders right in front of them, it wouldn’t be easy to penetrate through the middle or pull the opponent out of position. Hence, numerical superiority would be a wiser-route as the team in possession have a wing-back, a wide attacking-midfielder, a wide centre-back, making it easy to create overloads.</p><p><strong>Wide Centre-back joining the attack</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*jz7qGD0_cnjrndojzpObaQ.gif" /></figure><p>Numerical superiority in the wide-areas is in general, a very difficult challenge to deal with for any defensive shape. In order to ensure that there is no significant threat despite being outnumbered, the defensive shape will have to tilt towards the ball-side and ensure the team in possession won’t be able to have a simple 4v2 Rondo exercise to move further upfield. If they fail to do so, then as mentioned it would be a simple rondo-exercise for the team in possession to play and move forward. <br> <br>As you can see in the animation above, a dangerous numerical superiority can be achieved in the wide-areas in favour of the team in possession by making the wide centre-back join the attack along with the other wide-attackers. This can be achieved with a simple rotational movement that will send the near-side DM back to where the central CB is positioned and in turn, the central CB takes the wide CB’s position. The wide CB then charges forward to take up a position outwide, which gives full freedom to the wing-back in attack.</p><p><strong>Tilting the opponent and attacking the far-side</strong><br> <br>The options outwide are sufficient to progress on the same flank. However, if the opponent’s defensive shape manages to tilt towards the ball-side and see out attacks, then the natural solution would be to attack the far-side. This can be done with precisely timed switches of play to the far-side, where the opponent would have conceded space in order to have enough numbers on the ball-side.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*tLvx1jbPrdvhySZKY5JIkQ.gif" /></figure><p>In the animation above, you can see an example of what we discussed. The opponent proactively tilts his defensive structure towards ball-side in order to avoid getting outnumbered in the wide areas. This creates space on the far-side, which can be attacked by the wing-back along the touchline. The only requirement here is that of an excellent passer who would be able to accurately launch the pass into the far-side towards the wing-back, who can attack from there.</p><p><strong><em>Key-Pointers to Remember in the middle-third:</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>a) Objective is to progress further and further up gradually till the final-third and try not to go back once progressed to a point forward</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>b) Keeping the ball patiently and waiting for the right moment</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>c) Series of non-penetrative passes followed by one penetrative pass</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>d) Test the Waters to see if a vertical pass or carry instigates pressure.<br>If yes, then take advantage of the space created. <br>If no, then pass back and restart from another focal-point</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>e) Calculated Risks at regular intervals are key as otherwise, it will lead to continuous non-threatening passes</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>f) Tilting the opponent from side to side is important as touchline pressure is a common trigger-point for pressure</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>g) Use the entire width of the pitch for better passing angles for centre-backs into the defensive-midfielders</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>h) If the DMs also spread themselves wide along with the CBs, then they would end up blocking the passing-lanes of CBs into the AMs, occupying same positions</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/905/1*_4txHCUOxkt-Acx0GUdVqg.jpeg" /><figcaption>For example: CBs spread across wide, then DMs and AMs must stay narrow to create diagonal passing angles to avoid blocking passing options and enable <strong>(Diagonal passes from out-to-in created)</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/894/1*Hh3YDb92beZg4I4ySjwamQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>CBs positioned narrow to bring opponent’s first-line of pressure narrow and find wing-backs in space <strong>(Diagonal passes from in-to-out and then scan)</strong></figcaption></figure><p>The other way for the team to position itself is by the centre-backs and the defensive-midfielders narrowing it in the middle to attract the opponent’s striker and the three-behind him to also narrow themselves. This will create ample space for the wing-backs along the touchline, who can then charge forward and combine with the wide attacking-midfielders. <br><strong>(Diagonal passes from in-to-out and then scan)<br> <br></strong>So a team can either go in-to-out or out-to-in but the important principle here is to move the ball forward using as many diagonal-passes as possible</p><p><strong>Some Possible Patterns &amp; Combination-Plays to reach the Penalty-Area</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*EUWXVH1OTLZJ3IP6y4ahEw.gif" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*_EIdYzQx1xj1t5E3WNvxMg.gif" /></figure><h4><strong>Final-Third Attacking</strong></h4><p>Any amount of planning that a team can do in the first two-thirds will remain in vain, if they are unable to produce the desired outcomes in the final-third. However, in this article or probably in any article, I wouldn’t detail out final-third attacking to the extent of taking sample scenarios like we had seen for the first two-thirds of the pitch. I personally believe that since football is a dynamic sport with changes happening every second, there are only a few moments that we can control in the game and final-third attacking is definitely not among them. While we can give an approximate idea as to how the player can go about a 1v1 duel, it is not possible to exactly chart out instructions for any player. Two simple steps to the right or to the left by the opponent defender can have an impact on the plans we make for the team. <br> <br><strong>Is it not applicable for the planning done for the first two-thirds of the pitch also?<br> </strong><br>Yes it absolutely is true for all parts of the pitch. Which is why, it may be important for the team to have a basic planning on how to play out from the back, goal-kicks, set-pieces and other dead-ball situations but the team should be able to understand the overall idea as to how to move the ball around, how to move the opponent by moving the ball, how to create space and attack that space. That is the overall point that we are trying to make here with such articles. But as far as the final-third is concerned, once a player is in possession of the ball against a defender 1v1 in a dangerous space near the box, then it is totally up to him to make the best decision possible to design the attack from thereon. Any amount of scripting we attempt to do there, may not only spoil the beauty of attack but could also be impractical to that particular scenario as no 1v1 duel happens the way we exactly imagine it in our heads. Hence, there is mostly no point in instructing players to follow one particular method once they are in that space in the final-third against an opponent. As many sources say about what Pep Guardiola says to his team, <br> <br><strong><em>“My job is to bring you to the final-third and then its up to you to create the chance and score the goal!”</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8f229fcb7a25" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to beat a 4–3–3: The Thomas Tuchel way…]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/how-to-beat-a-4-3-3-the-thomas-tuchel-way-7df50ed22b01?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7df50ed22b01</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[paris-saint-germain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thomas-tuchel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jurgen-klopp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liverpool-fc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Feb 2021 07:52:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-16T08:02:40.096Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ahkvHPCaHyg6U0wBXPAk2A.jpeg" /><figcaption>One of modern football’s greatest thinkers Thomas Tuchel is known for his tactical masterclasses against specific teams, formations &amp; structures. Today we have a look at his huge win against Klopp’s Liverpool in 2018</figcaption></figure><p>With Thomas Tuchel’s arrival at the Stamford Bridge, most of the tactics-enthusiasts have been excited to see what he would bring. Five Premier League games, one FA Cup and we have seen a free-flowing, forward-thinking, positive, vertically-inclined Chelsea who were structured 3–2–5 in possession and 5–2–3 out of possession.</p><p>However as ardent followers of Tuchel would know, these variants in structures or formations aren’t new to the German and he pretty much goes for any shape which allows his side to stick to his principles and play the football of his kind.</p><p>Speaking of which, there was one game of Tuchel which in particular left me thinking for days. The first time I watched this game, I was too carried away by how things were falling in place for Tuchel’s side and I failed to notice the small nuances and important details which led them to victory.</p><p>When I watched the game the second time and then the third time, I could see these details which were almost like intelligent cheese traps or fish baits, perfectly setup to lure the opponent in and BAM…go for the kill! It was no ordinary opponent as well, it was Jurgen Klopp’s Liverpool who were playing the football of their lifetime with every team in Europe hating to face them.</p><p>It was indeed a special victory apart from the fact that Liverpool were at their best because there are certain shapes or structures in football which don’t have noticeable or innate weaknesses as such. The 4–3–3 is one such structure as it ticks almost all boxes both in possession and out of possession. Tactically it is one of the most challenging structures to break down, especially when a team’s 4–3–3 is a well-oiled machine.</p><p>The structure usually is a 4–1–4–1 without possession but if the team wants to press high and win the ball back in advanced areas of the pitch, then it mostly remains a 4–3–3 without the ball as well. This is what Klopp’s Liverpool preferred to do in the 2018–19 season, maintaining the 4–3–3 with and without the ball to be able to maintain a high-line, apply pressure in advanced areas and win the ball back as high up the pitch as possible. The reason why its difficult for teams to break down a 4–3–3 is because it covers all areas of the pitch:<br> <br> a) There is width in first-line of pressure with three players covering the entire width of the pitch</p><p>b) There are three midfielders behind the first-line of pressure, meaning midfield overload is also not easy, especially with the DM always shielding the back-four</p><p>c) The wingers can fall back to help the full-back and additional support from the right/left central midfielder means the wide areas are also well-covered</p><p>d) With the sufficient support from the midfield in the front and wingers tracking-back, it is not easy to pull the back-four out of position as well and even on the rare occasion it happens, there are enough numbers for back-up and recovery</p><h4><strong>Beating a 4–3–3 the Tuchel Way…</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/644/1*s3Quyro5hJwk-z6vvlM3Vw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tuchel masterminded what could be considered one of the best tactical plans ever laid out against Klopp’s Liverpool</figcaption></figure><p>PSG had been beaten 3–2 by Liverpool in the first fixture at Anfield and there were quite a few lessons that Tuchel had to learn. Credit where its due as not many coaches manage to learn from a loss, make the necessary changes and come out absolutely prepared for the next game against the same opponent. Not only did Tuchel learn his lessons but the execution was absolutely spot on by PSG. Personally, it is one of the best tactical masterclasses I have ever seen owing to the sheer courage of what PSG had set out to do, so let’s get into quickly!</p><p>A major part of this article is to talk about what PSG did on the ball to leave Liverpool chasing shadows for most part of the game. So, let us begin with the basic structure that PSG adapted in possession:</p><h4><strong>1) First-third &amp; Build-up</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gJFC0ykh43dHH-TEPV_Cig.jpeg" /><figcaption>PSG’s structure in possession vs Liverpool</figcaption></figure><p>It is difficult to give a name to this unorthodox structure as it can be called anything depending on how you see it. But as far as we understand the objective is concerned, there is no debate there. Some could call this a 5–1–4, some could call this a 3–3–4, some could even call this a 3–3–2–2. This is very typical of Tuchel and you would have noticed it if you have followed him over the years. No matter how unorthodox or complex the shape is, if it is going to help his team achieve the objective then that is it! This is something you would be able to notice even in his apprentice Julian Nagelsmann. The formation or shape would be a tool to help him achieve the objectives for that particular game against that particular opponent.</p><p>As you can see in the image above, PSG in-possession opted to go for a back-three with Silva-Marquinhos-Kimpembe, supported a sole central-midfielder in Verratti and two wing-backs in Kehrer-Bernat. The real twist here is with the four attackers in Mbappe-Cavani-Neymar-Di Maria. None of their positioning was that of a typical winger or a striker as all four occupied certain half-spaces leaving the centre totally empty.</p><h4><strong>Vertical &amp; Horizontal Staggering</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zaKaKFTKcbY3uItA_xnPEA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here is a look at PSG’s positioning with the vertical lanes, I have divided the pitch into 7 vertical lanes for the naked eye in order to understand the staggering in an easier way. On each of the flanks, you would be able to observe how despite the side centre-back, wing-back, wide attacking-midfielder and striker being positioned close to each other, they all occupy different vertical lanes which leads to the creation of diagonal angles. These diagonal angles turned out to be key for PSG to progress the ball from one-third to another and create quick passing combinations using the numerical superiority in the wide areas. You would also be able to notice that in the centre-most zone except Marquinhos and Verratti, who are also mostly in their own half. In the attacking-half, the centre zone was mostly empty leaving the Liverpool centre-backs and central-midfield no one to mark directly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fmEgOTOr2pEEvyyjISSVaA.jpeg" /><figcaption>4 PSG players in 3 wide-lanes on each flank creating diagonal angles to ensure more passing options</figcaption></figure><p>Usually, there are five vertical lanes: 1 Central Zone, 2 Half-Spaces (Right &amp; Left), 2 Wings (Right &amp; Left) but for more diagonals which in turn will give more passing angles, a few coaches like Tuchel or Naglesmann further create separate vertical lanes in wide areas. In this case, you can see 4 players occupying 3 vertical lanes with Kimpembe, Bernat, Neymar &amp; Mbappe on the left and similarly Silva, Kehrer, Di Maria &amp; Cavani on the right.</p><h4><strong>Liverpool’s usual pressing with the attacking and midfield trios</strong></h4><p>We are all aware of Liverpool’s high-pressing works wonders for them to win the ball back in advanced areas of the pitch. The front-three makes sure it isn’t easy for the opposition centre-backs to progress the ball through the middle, by using cover-shadow and not allowing passes directly to the central-midfielders. This is further supported by Liverpool’s midfield trio who also maintain a narrow shape and push high up the pitch.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1017/1*0qoFaX1CPokG6Vdj0dI2mQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Liverpool’s front-three &amp; mid-three made it really difficult for PSG centre-backs in the earlier fixture by blocking off the central zones completely</figcaption></figure><p>This is a snapshot from the earlier fixture between Liverpool &amp; PSG which was at Anfield. PSG faced quite a lot of trouble playing out from the back and progressing the ball further up-field as Liverpool’s front-three along with the midfield-three suffocated space in the centre, forcing PSG to depend merely on the individual brilliance of Neymar and Mbappe. You can see in the image how Kimpembe (on the ball), has no feasible passing option with every player (except Silva) marked in touch-tight distance by a Liverpool player. Owing to this, PSG hardly were able to arrive into the final-third with the right structure and positioning.</p><h4><strong>Don’t Play through the press but around the press</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zhs8fpWyvZtIU_zUyc6paQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>6v1 in the middle for Liverpool and outnumbered in the wide areas</figcaption></figure><p>This was definitely addressed in the return fixture with PSG’s unorthodox 3–3–4 structure in possession as they totally nullified Liverpool’s pressure. One way of escaping the pressure is by forcing it through the middle by gambling on the central-midfielders’ ability to fend off the press. But there is always a chance of being outnumbered and dispossessed as Liverpool’s front-three and mid-three’s pressing trap crushes the receivers in the middle to force errors and turnover of possession. So there was a completely different route that Tuchel took to surpass the press and reach the final-third in threatening positions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YyLVOR3D6MiWxpnrMMWEGw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Liverpool’s six players in the middle had no one to pressure as Verratti was sole central-midfielder for PSG</figcaption></figure><p>This was the structure adopted by PSG in build-up and you can see how the three centre-backs split wide and stretch Liverpool’s first line of pressure with the wing-backs offering support to them. Liverpool’s front-three along with the mid-three form their usual pressing trap but PSG haven’t committed any player in the centre except Verratti. In other words, what is happening here is a 6v1 in the middle in favour of Liverpool while in the wide areas, there are enough numbers for PSG to go around the pressing trap.</p><h4><strong>Numerical Superiority in wide areas</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KXq1gt01KuYOUAzRFnYLfA.jpeg" /><figcaption>All the 2v1s created against Liverpool’s wide players: Mane, Milner &amp; Robertson on the left and Salah, Wijnaldum &amp; Gomez on the right</figcaption></figure><p>By saying playing around the press, I simply mean creating numerical superiority in the wide areas and asking difficult questions to the players who are responsible for defending the wider areas. In case of Liverpool, these players were: Mane, Milner &amp; Robertson on the left flank with Salah, Wijnaldum and Gomez on the right flank. If you look at the image above, PSG with 4 players on each of the wide areas, they were able to create 2v1s at every situation. At every height in the wider areas, you can see how a Liverpool player always has to answer a question: Should I go pressurize the ball-holder or should I go to his near passing option? Should I give him time or close him down? Should I go here or should I go there?</p><p>It is extremely difficult to be able to have the right answer to these questions for the entirety of the game. That is when defending or closing down spaces becomes difficult because there will always be a battle going on in the defending player’s own head: What should I do now? Unfortunately in football, there is no time for the player to think, answer those questions and then act, which is exactly where he begins to make mistakes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*p0PxQ6lJgrzvIGw_MA9qKQ.gif" /><figcaption>Creating 2v1s against Liverpool’s forwards with back-five and Verratti supporting possession</figcaption></figure><p>To summarize PSG’s build-up play in the first-third, it was about patience, keeping the ball, used entire width of the pitch with centre-backs splitting wide to draw Liverpool’s front-three and mid-three into one side (mostly to the right). This in turn, opened up the other side (left) which was PSG’s cue to progressing the ball into the middle-third.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*ngSKU7Hs0xyeG-WTwG7mgA.gif" /><figcaption>Liverpool’s front-three and mid-three forming a compact pressing cage in the middle which PSG managed to get past by drawing them to one flank and quickly changing to the other</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>2) Build-Up Play to progress into the middle-third</strong></h4><p>As we had quite a detailed look at how PSG went about build-up in the first-third, let us have a look at how they progressed the ball into the middle-third and made themselves ready for attack. As far as ball-progression is concerned, there were two players who played a key role in helping PSG’s transition from their own-third into the middle: Neymar &amp; Di Maria. Their unique positioning allowed PSG to find pockets of space in the middle-third as they successfully evaded the high-press from Liverpool’s midfield-trio.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-hCtgJ-ppzlYKVF1xYW0rg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Neymar &amp; Di Maria positioned outside of Liverpool’s midfield-three</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see in the image above, Neymar &amp; Di Maria positioned themselves in a unique half-space. They were neither wingers nor attacking midfielders, the closest term we could think of is a ‘Mezzala’ but even for a Mezzala, they were quite widely placed. The main objective of this positioning was actually to be on the outside of Liverpool’s midfield-trio, in an attempt to pull them out of position by drawing pressure. If you look at the image above, it is clear how Neymar positioned himself outside of Milner while Di Maria positioned himself outside of Wijnaldum. While Milner &amp; Wijnaldum swapped positions frequently, Neymar &amp; Di Maria’s objective remained: Stay just outside of the midfield-trio and stretch them by becoming available for a pass from the PSG centre-backs.</p><h4><strong>Patience from the centre-backs to pick the right pass</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Dr7DOIhoDkHF5Vwk9u0pUA.gif" /><figcaption>A sample build-up play of how PSG kept getting past Liverpool’s front-three and into the middle-third</figcaption></figure><p>As we saw earlier, PSG’s numerical superiority over Liverpool’s front-three, got Silva-Marquinhos-Kimpembe into positions with time and space on the ball to pick the right pass and progress the ball into the middle-third. While wing-backs Kehrer &amp; Bernat were also free for most part of the game, they were never used to progress play into the next phase. As the widest players for PSG, they maintained width throughout and them receiving passes helped in titling/ attracting Liverpool’s defensive structure to one side and freeing up the other. This is when one of Silva-Marquinhos-Kimpembe would get space &amp; time on the ball to pick the right passing option.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F512811227%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F512811227&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1061796938_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1914" height="968" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/607a8badda1503067ca5748ec9924f09/href">https://medium.com/media/607a8badda1503067ca5748ec9924f09/href</a></iframe><p>Here is a clipping from the first-half of the game when PSG’s centre-backs held possession for over a minute continuously before they decided to penetrate with a vertical pass. I have increased the speed of the video to save your time but you would be able to notice the pattern either way as towards the end of the clipping, it is Kimpembe who played the vertical pass to Neymar.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5Bs82C56HBKbAE4h0khTwQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ball with Silva towards the right flank, space created on the left flank with Liverpool tilted heavily to the right</figcaption></figure><p>If you look at what happens seconds before that pass, you would notice that the ball was played to Kehrer, to which Liverpool reacted by shifting heavily towards the flank. After this, there was a quick switch of play via Kehrer to Silva to Marquinhos to Kimpembe, who had sufficient time to pick out Neymar.</p><h4><strong>Blindside Run-ins</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*es0UwAl0ASN9xaQOIOnImQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Neymar’s deceiving movement made it extremely hard for Wijnaldum to pick the drop-ins to space</figcaption></figure><p>One weapon which Neymar &amp; Di Maria (especially Neymar) had to use more often than usual were runs from Liverpool midfield’s blindside, to drop into space and become available to receive the ball. This gave a particularly hard time to Wijnaldum/ Milner (mostly Wijnaldum as he spent more time at right central-midfield) given how good Neymar is at manipulating his movement.</p><p>The typical deceiving run of Neymar started with him moving away from the half-space and towards the wing to get Wijnaldum to believe he didn’t have to bother about space in front of him as he thought that the Brazilian was behind him and moving towards the wide areas. But after seconds of disguise, Neymar quickly accelerated from Wijnaldum’s blindside (from behind) to reach ahead into the space in front of him and received passes from the centre-backs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*TvgtfsVKHqPNmoceUixuPw.gif" /><figcaption>Ball-Progression with Neymar right before the opening goal</figcaption></figure><p>Watch the above clipping carefully as Neymar waited for Kimpembe to set himself for the pass. Until that moment, Neymar stayed behind Wijnaldum and kept walking away from the centre to deceive Wijnaldum into thinking that he was heading towards the wide areas. But once Kimpembe set himself up for the pass, Neymar made the quick sprint into space from Wijnaldum’s blindside and received the pass. To make things worse for Liverpool, Neymar on receiving the pass also drew two players (both Henderson &amp; Wijnaldum) onto him and released Verratti into space. This is the play that led to PSG’s opening goal as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*n-KskdQ2eSJsYmDzqlUHeg.gif" /><figcaption>Link-up between Neymar-Verratti-Mbappe after ball progression leading to a half-chance</figcaption></figure><p>This was no way a one-off situation but looked pretty much like a well-planned manoeuvre by PSG in order to utilize the space created on either side of Liverpool’s midfield.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/438/1*KlcrZ9mdAjNd3_I5LQBr-w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Neymar Touchmap vs Liverpool</figcaption></figure><p>The yellow-shaded region on the touchmap is the area we were just talking about. It is the area which was the blindside of Wijnaldum for most part of the game and also the area in which Neymar received passes from the centre-backs. You would be able to notice that out of 80-odd touches by Neymar, nearly 40 of them have come from that area.</p><p><strong><em>Some key stats:</em></strong></p><p><em>a) Neymar completed the game with:</em></p><p><em>b) Most number of touches by a PSG player</em></p><p><em>c) Most number of touches by a PSG player in the middle-third as well as in the attacking-third</em></p><p><em>d) Most number of dribble attempts by any player on the pitch (8)</em></p><p><em>e) Most progressive-yards carried by any player on the pitch (224)</em></p><p><em>f) Most carries into the final-third by any player on the pitch (13)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/485/1*kFePPqto6wjc0boduC3eSw.jpeg" /><figcaption>PSG’s use of the pitch to attack: More Orange = Higher Concentration of play</figcaption></figure><p>You would be able to notice how the right flank has more concentration in the first-third while the left-flank has even more concentration in the middle-third. This in itself, is an implication of how PSG favoured the right-flank in deeper areas to pull Liverpool towards their right and to quickly change sides and hit them on the left with Neymar’s movement.</p><p>As far as the attack directions were concerned, PSG utilized the wings 77% and central channel being 23% as compared to their season average in 2018–19, which was 70% wings and 30% central channel. This is understandable given how Neymar, Mbappe, Bernat; probably the mot important players in the middle-third, were all on the left.</p><h4><strong>3) Final-Third and Chance-Creation</strong></h4><p>In contrary to PSG’s approach in the initial phases of the pitch, in the final-third it was all about fewer touches, quicker passing and dynamic movement. None of us are alien to Liverpool’s press the moment an opponent tries to or has entered the final-third. This is especially true with regard to the midfield-three of Liverpool: Henderson, Wijnaldum &amp; Milner. Hence as opposed to the patient keep-the-ball approach, it was about keeping-the-ball for as less time as possible and moving it quickly using passing combinations formed using the numerical superiority created in the wide areas.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7FDIc__MLe6nq142JRQ5Uw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The central area was left unoccupied by PSG in the final-third as well just like how the central area had only Verratti in the first-third</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see in the image above, the most unique feature about Tuchel’s setup was how there were two strikers and yet none of the centre-backs had any player in front of them to deal with. As half-space attackers Neymar &amp; Di Maria occupied spaces outside of Liverpool’s midfield trio, strikers Mbappe &amp; Cavani occupied the space between the centre-back and full-back on their respective sides. The main reason behind occupying such a position was to pin back the entire back-four with just two players. Since Mbappe positioned himself between Lovren-Gomez, both the defenders had to stay in position and avoid stepping out to press as the danger of a run-in behind was always in their head.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HM-0ZBtQJZaCItSONUWXqw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The responsibility to receive the ball from the first or middle-third and quickly progress further into the danger zones was given to these five players in the middle. In most cases, none of these players were given the time to hold the ball and think. The only player who was able to hold the ball, carry it on his own to pockets of space, attract opponents to release another teammate was Neymar. While the others did a neat job of their own, none of them were really given time to create any harm.</p><p>Hence, it is possible that Tuchel wanted to have players who are extremely skilled on the ball to ensure that it is either moved vertically at pace or atleast won’t be dispossessed cheaply by Liverpool’s pressure. In that regard, none of Neymar-Mbappe-Di Maria-Verratti were technically deficient and proved to be the perfect selection for the given scenario.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QKPNaSfXYWq0xDhzK8elhw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tuchel chose to attack Liverpool using the overloads in the wide areas with the half-space attackers Neymar &amp; Di Maria combining with the strikers and Verratti’s support playing an integral part</figcaption></figure><p>There weren’t many long spells of possession that PSG could enjoy. However that was without a doubt, the smarter approach as three attackers attacking wide (Striker-Wingback-Half Space Attacker) with Verratti’s support from a more interior-central zone proved to be little too pacey for the Liverpool’s defence. The main reason for this was Liverpool’s midfield being by-passed easily by PSG, leading to situations wherein Liverpool’s defence were caught 4v4.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*dBWjTkwoWnn29k9v4eXKpw.gif" /><figcaption>Build-up to the opening goal: Try noticing how once the ball entered the middle-third, no PSG player took more than one or two touches and moved the ball quickly before Liverpool’s press could recover</figcaption></figure><p>Notice how once Kimpembe found Neymar who dropped into space, every player who touched the ball ever since till the goal was scored took only 1 or 2 touches. The sequence of touches since Kimpembe’s pass till the goal:</p><p><strong><em>Neymar — 2 Touches<br> Verratti — 2 Touches<br> Di Maria — 1 Touch<br> Verratti — 1 Touch<br> Mbappe — 1 Touch<br> Bernat — 2 Touches (Goalscorer)</em></strong></p><p>PSG’s centre-backs along with the support of the wing-backs, held the ball for almost a minute continuously before creating this goal. However, the time they took to move the ball from midfield to goal, since Kimpembe’s pass was not more than 10 seconds. This is probably the easiest way to explain PSG’s contrasting approach in the first-third vs final-third.</p><h4><strong>Diagonal run-in of widest player: A Tuchel Special!</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mCS7ZtAdvcZ6I0XLneJwZQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bernat’s diagonal run-in from the touchline into the penalty area prior to the goal. Liverpool’s back-four occupied by PSG’s two strikers leaving Kehrer &amp; Bernat totally free</figcaption></figure><p>We discussed about everything that was happening in the central areas and half-spaces but we somehow didn’t focus on how the goal was scored when it was neither of Neymar, Mbappe, Cavani or Di Maria. The goal-scorer was Juan Bernat who was out wide at left wing-back till our eyes could notice but it is almost as if he disappears and then suddenly appears inside the box at an unbelievably perfect moment. Mbappe crossed, ball ricocheted, didn’t reach Cavani and Liverpool’s defence had gotten all the attackers covered. What they least expected at that moment was a PSG player totally free and unmarked, controlling the ball in front of the 6-yard box and calmly placing it past Allison as they entire back-four looked on.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y_N3JjGHTG02uNjL60578A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Liverpool’s back-four occupied by PSG’s two strikers as their movement is in between the centre-backs and full-backs</figcaption></figure><p>Probably the most important element to understand here is how this was made possible. It is certainly not a plain instruction from Tuchel to the wing-backs that make diagonal runs from touchline into the box. It is a combined effort by multiple players who are indirectly contributing for this move to succeed.</p><p>As we saw earlier, Mbappe &amp; Cavani’s positioning was unique, smart and pinned the Liverpool back-four from stepping out. By leaving the central space free and occupying the space between the centre-back and the full-back, each striker took out two of Liverpool’s back-four: Mbappe with Joe Gomez-Lovren, Cavani with Van Dijk-Robertson. This left Neymar and Di Maria to be taken care of by Liverpool’s midfielders Wijnaldum &amp; Milner respectively. Now this ultimately meant that wing-backs Bernat &amp; Kehrer had to be taken care of by Salah &amp; Mane respectively. With Salah not tracking-back and Mbappe-Cavani occupying the right positions, Liverpool’s entire back-four was occupied. This in turn, allowed Bernat to make a free run into the box, followed by a calm finish.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Az9KNm2Z4fSR-18kqtUzeQ.gif" /></figure><p>Notice how Bernat starts from hugging the touchline and makes a diagonal run straight into the penalty area. You can also notice how Mbappe &amp; Cavani also keep the entire back-four occupied with their movement in between Liverpool’s centre-back and full-back</p><h4>The Diamond-Training Pitch</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/868/1*mJU1ZXwW4pj1KaUi7WDLwA.jpeg" /></figure><p>While there would be quite a lot of people aware of Tuchel’s diamond-shaped pitch in his training sessions, I still want to reiterate how these intricate details translate to meaningful results on the pitch. What you see in the image above, is an example of one of Tuchel’s training sessions from Borussia Dortmund. It is a simple 5v5 game with 1 neutral player in the middle to support the team in possession. The only twist here is that the four corners of the pitch have been cut-off to create the diamond-shaped pitch.</p><p>It is possible that there are people who may think, “What is the whole point of this when you have the entire pitch in a real game?”. It is actually for a different reason that these diamond pitches are used in training. Many players tend to develop a bad habit while progressing the ball into the attacking-third: <strong><em>The centre-back plays the ball wide to a full-back/ wing-back and then the wing-back plays the winger with a straight pass along the touchline.</em></strong></p><p>If you couldn’t visualize from the words, here is a demonstration of that using PSG’s setup against Liverpool just for an example:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*xP6H8L8ohnf_Z_-5SdIb7g.gif" /><figcaption>A pass along the touchline by the full-back or wing-back to the winger ahead of him, is the arguably the easiest pass to defend given no man gets free, no increase in space and touchline blocks one side</figcaption></figure><p>It is certainly not a crime going by mere rules but look at it from the point-of-view of a coach who wants his team to progress the ball to the final-third with the player on the ball having enough passing options for support in different angles. None of it would be possible when you play that vertical pass along the touchline to a wide-attacker. It is arguably the easiest pass to defend against for the opponent who doesn’t even have to put in a ton of effort. It is simply a matter of space as when the centre-back plays it to the full-back/wing-back, one side of the pitch is already out of access as he has a touchline behind him. Now when this is followed by a straight vertical pass along the touchline, the team in possession furthermore loses space with the ball-receiver having a man ready to close him down and other opponents closing down other passing options by hardly shuffling across a few yards.</p><p><strong><em>P.S. — This pass is not to be confused with releasing a winger making a diagonal run-in behind the defence as such passes are made in the interior half-space / corridor</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1014/1*ZH99_yTY_hmQWcj1GFYrRQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The diamond-shaped pitch encourages wide players to look towards the central areas and not down the line</figcaption></figure><p>So by creating a pitch in the shape of a diamond, what Tuchel does is to force his full-backs or wing-backs to bring the ball back into the central areas while entering the final-third. This way, the ball-receiver has more space, better angles to receive, better shielding and more passing options as well. So in short, the players can go wide in the middle-third by playing to the wing-backs but the next step would be to bring the ball diagonally forwards or take it diagonally backwards and change side to tilt the opponent to the other side. Owing to this principle, Tuchel’s wing-backs are also habituated to making the diagonal runs-in from wide areas into the box, which is exactly what Bernat did before scoring PSG’s opener against Liverpool.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>There is no one specific way to beat any team, shape, structure or formation as football is extremely dynamic with unique moments all throughout the game. But every team will for sure have its own gaps and weaknesses which the opponent can exploit if identified accurately. That is exactly what Tuchel managed to do with Klopp’s Liverpool as he spotted the gaps, applied his own principles, drew up a plan and executed it to perfection!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7df50ed22b01" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ATK Mohun Bagan and the 3–5–2: A Complete Breakdown with Solutions for opponents]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/atk-mohun-bagan-and-the-3-5-2-a-complete-breakdown-with-solutions-for-opponents-2b68db7d23f3?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b68db7d23f3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Dec 2020 09:48:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-27T09:58:14.411Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>ATK Mohun Bagan and their 3–5–2: Complete Breakdown with Solutions for Opponents</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/0*R2eij0bCtXtZ8fkb.jpeg" /></figure><p>ATK Mohun Bagan are off to a flying start in the Indian Super League 2020 and the 3–5–2 of Antonio Habas has been a highlight with majority of the teams not finding it comfortable to break it down. In more recent games, ATK have experimented with a 4–4–2 as well as a 4–3–3 but it is with the 3–5–2 that they have seemed the most solid so far. We shall have a look at the same in a detailed manner with focus on the following aspects:</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Formations &amp; Preferred Starting XI</strong></p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Approach in Possession</strong></p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>Approach without Possession</strong></p><p><strong>4. Weaknesses in ATK Mohun Bagan’s 3–5–2</strong></p><p><strong>5. Using the 3–3–3–1 to beat the 3–5–2</strong></p><p><strong>6. Possible Solutions for the opponent when in Possession</strong></p><p><strong>7</strong>. <strong>Possible Solutions for the opponent when not in Possession</strong></p><h4>Formation &amp; Preferred XI with 3–5–2</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/445/1*gTyFEaEwt6t2WqKuVybfPA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let us start with the most basic details of ATK Mohun Bagan. As you can see, this has been their preferred eleven, a very typical 3–5–2 formation with a back-three of Pritam-Tiri-Sandesh, Prabhir &amp; Subhashish as wing-backs, a midfield-trio of McHugh as the ‘6’ with any two out of Jayesh Rane &amp; Javi Hernandez as advanced midfielders, then followed by two strikers out of which one is always Roy Krishna and the other being any one out of Williams, Manvir Singh or Brad Inman. <br> <br><strong>Other central-midfield options</strong> include: Edu Garcia, Glan Martins &amp; Michael Soosairaj. All of these players have been tried out in the first 4 games in an attempt to figure out the best combination. But it looks like Javi-McHugh-Edu has been their best midfield till now. <br> <br><strong>Goalkeeper:</strong> Arindam Bhattacharya has started all games for ATK Mohun Bagan and he has done a good job with 17 saves from 7 games. He also has the most cleansheets in the league this season with 5.</p><h4>Approach in Possession</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/666/1*xynIpMfbSHusMaR78-IsTw.png" /><figcaption><em>3 central defenders split wide, McHugh stays deep along with the three to help in build-up while the other two central midfielders push higher up</em></figcaption></figure><p>ATK Mohun Bagan’s shape becomes a <strong>3–1–4–2 when in possession</strong> <strong>with the</strong> <strong>three central defenders spreading apart wide and the wing-backs pushing higher up the field. McHugh stays deep along with the central defenders with the advanced midfielders (Javi &amp; Rane) occupying more attacking positions.</strong> Rane generally offers support to McHugh with Javi pushing higher up. The two strikers are responsible for depth and they try occupying the opponent’s central defenders.</p><p>On contrary to what most believe, ATK Mohun Bagan don’t depend entirely on counter-attacking football and attacking only after absorbing pressure from the opponent. This season, they have been proactive in attack, trying to make use of the best abilities in the team.</p><h4>Tiri: The Playmaker</h4><p>The most important player when ATK Mohun Bagan are in possession is Tiri. The central defender is single-handedly responsible for progressing the ball from first-third to the next two-thirds of the pitch. <strong>He has got one of the best passing range among central defenders in the Indian Super League</strong>.</p><p>Despite being solid defenders, Pritam (RCB) &amp; Sandesh (LCB) are not most comfortable when it comes to progressing play into advanced areas and they entirely depend on Tiri for this job. <strong>Tiri is capable of playing the ball to any area of the pitch in any angle, whether its short or long or between the lines or directly to the striker</strong>, he is a complete package in passing. Here is a 1-minute video showcasing his passing from this season:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F494789285%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F494789285&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1023355317_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1366" height="694" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8678fb30963373d5fa7286b33a87164a/href">https://medium.com/media/8678fb30963373d5fa7286b33a87164a/href</a></iframe><p>As you may see, the others around Tiri <strong><em>(Pritam, Sandesh, McHugh)</em></strong> are there to attract the opponent’s pressure or move the opponent to one side and set up the team before Tiri decides to progress the ball into the last two phases of the pitch. <strong>A very common pattern you may see is Tiri’s long diagonal ball to right wing-back Prabir Das as he has got a good acceleration, pace and decent ball control and is a major source of attacking for ATK Mohun Bagan.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wwbOF4faYljCezGcJ0USfA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>(Data till first 4 games of ATK): In comparison to the other central-defenders and McHugh, Tiri dominates the numbers in terms of long-passes completed, forward passes completed &amp; passes into final-third completed</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Central midfielders move wide and strikers drop in</h4><p>Another common way of progressing the ball from first phase to the next two phases is by using the movement of the advanced central midfielders and the two strikers, basically: Rane, Javi, Roy Krishna &amp; Edu Garcia. These are the four central players in the attacking phases of the pitch and hence, a lot depends on their behaviour to progress the ball centrally.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*NHi7xC3f_z6tdR2-AcQELw.gif" /><figcaption>CMs go wide and empty space for Striker to drop in and RCB finds the Striker dropping in</figcaption></figure><p>It is a fast movement but try noticing what happens here: As Pritam (RCB) receives the ball, look at the central areas where central-midfielders Edu Garcia (№10) &amp; Glan Martins (№14) make runs away from the central areas to create space for Roy Krishna to drop in and receive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pXZNeO7lV8fLUDsWomOjOw.jpeg" /><figcaption>ATK Mohun Bagan’s central-midfielders are highlighted as they make runs away from the center to create space for striker to receive</figcaption></figure><p>For better understanding, let us have a closer look at what is happening here via this image. <strong>The two central midfielders are usually marked by the two central midfielders of the opponent who are in a 4–2–3–1 or 4–4–2, which is usually the formation when not in possession for many teams in the ISL.</strong> So once the two central midfielders get the attention of the opponent’s central midfielders, they move wider towards the wing to pull the opponents out of position and create a gap in front of the defence.</p><p><strong><em>Dark Red: ATK Mohun Bagan &amp; Orange: Opponent</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w_XEmnDXvnWO-ot7kzgRVA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5LtJ42HF2k_nVkvfwuWJ8Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Once that gap is created, there is space for the strikers to drop in and receive the pass from Pritam, Tiri or Sandesh. <strong>This is common especially with Roy Krishna as he shows movement both ways: Dropping deep into space or running behind the opponent’s defensive line as well.</strong></p><p>Here is a look at Roy Krishna’s touchmap in ISL 2020–21<br><strong><em>(Data till first 4 games of ATK):<br>Viz Courtesy: @</em></strong>DrMukherjeeS on Twitter</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/278/1*6KdJBUDb-QBJcQDMU2iJfQ.png" /><figcaption>Passes Received by Roy Krishna in the first 4 games</figcaption></figure><p>The blue circles represent the passes he has successfully received in ISL so far while the red circles represent passes attempted to receive but failed. You can see many successful &amp; unsuccessful passes which deep in midfield as well while only one pass he has received inside the box.</p><p><strong><em>Full Thread:</em></strong> <a href="https://twitter.com/DrMukherjeeS/status/1336621993291112448">https://twitter.com/DrMukherjeeS/status/1336621993291112448</a></p><h4>Wing-Backs connection with Central-Midfielders</h4><p>As with any of the 3–5–2 formation, the wing-backs play a very important role for ATK Mohun Bagan as well. We saw how Tiri tries to find the wing-backs in the final-phase with his direct, vertical passing. If that option is not possible, ATK try to move the ball into the second-phase of the pitch into their central-midfielders. <strong>However, the central midfielders don’t offer much verticality or penetration into the final-third. They are mostly positioned in wide half-spaces and then prefer to play combinations with the wing-backs.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*X8oeMZ6C3ZyQgu6xecK39Q.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>From an aerial view</em></strong>: The central-midfielders are usually in the half-space corridor, wide enough to form<strong> a triangle with the central defender and the wing-back</strong>. <strong>The central-midfielders usually act as connectors between the central-defenders and the wing-backs</strong> to progress the ball into the final phase.</p><p>Among the wing-backs, Prabir Das is much more attacking as compared to Subashish on the left. Because of this, the right central-midfielder is usually holding back to cover for Prabir. However on the left, the central-midfielder is a lot more attacking and makes runs out-wide or behind the defence and into the penalty area.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6BHI5Xabv5SIy8UwT3PsHA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data till first 4 games of ATK Mohun Bagan</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see, the central-midfielders have a good number of passes into the final-phase of the pitch but not many into the penalty area. But the wing-backs Prabir &amp; Subashish have a combined total of 23 pass attempts into the penalty area as compared to all the central-midfielders, who don’t even have 10 passes into penalty area together.</p><p><strong><em>Note:</em></strong><em> Prabir Das also has 6 touches in the penalty area in this ISL which is more than any defender or midfielder of ATK Mohun Bagan</em></p><h4>Approach when not in Possession</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/443/1*5MxFC6SzVmb-0pD5lCSUyA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>ATK Mohun Bagan are in a 5–3–2 formation without the ball and are usually in a high to medium block with the two-strikers and the three midfielders maintaining a compactness in the middle.</strong> They mostly try to stop the opponent playing out from the back smoothly and start pressing the opponent in the attacking third of the pitch.</p><h4>High press on the flanks</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gBZYaUDt8NcPLWH67ynENw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here is a sample snapshot of how they apply pressure very high up the pitch when their opponent tries to play out from the back. <strong>Many teams in the ISL use the right-back and left-back frequently during build-up in the first phase of the pitch. Since ATK Mohun Bagan have an extra defender at the back, they are able to create problems when their opponent does this</strong>. ATK send their left wing-back or right wing-back all the way up the pitch to close down the opponent’s full-back while the other four defenders slide across the pitch to maintain a back-four.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UtB5Tq4HEl2WcPGdJD4XQw.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see in<strong> </strong>the image above, r<strong>ight wing-back Prabir Das would go and close down the opponent’s left-back while the other defenders slide across the pitch and maintain defensive balance. The same would happen on the other flank with left wing-back Subashish closing down the opponent’s right-back and the other defenders sliding towards the right.</strong> Once the opponent’s full-backs are closed down, they find it difficult to play it back to the central-defender as well because ATK’s two strikers directly mark the opponent’s central-defenders. This is true especially with Roy Krishna as he is very quick and aggressive in his pressing.</p><p><strong><em>Some Samples:</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*XQMAvUx6sWIm7tLE1InLSA.gif" /><figcaption>High-press ATK Mohun Bagan’s LWB to close down the opponent’s RB</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*QlWzdRicTlUsppcdllBbmw.gif" /><figcaption>High-press ATK Mohun Bagan’s RWB to close down the opponent’s LB</figcaption></figure><h4>Pressure in central areas in 2nd phase of the pitch</h4><p>This has forced opponents to use faster passing and channel it in the central areas to progress the ball quickly. Once the opponents are forced to play through the centre, ATK’s three central-midfielders maintain their narrow shape and go for high pressure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_1nkbUp6Qn_AR1VwFUT9qA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here is another snapshot trying to show what happens usually. The opponent’s full-backs are always kept at a close distance by ATK’s wing-backs Prabir Das &amp; Subashish. <strong>Once opponents are forced to try central routes to progress the ball, ATK Mohun Bagan’s two strikers and three central-midfielders try to form a high-pressure zone between the five of them.</strong> This is to stop the opponent from using his central-midfielders as any pass which enters into this zone would mean rapid high pressing from the five ATK Mohun Bagan players <strong><em>(2 strikers + 3 central-midfielders)</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*_Cx4QZnUL1S2lMAIpbCgaA.gif" /></figure><p>I have slowed down the clipping for you to be able to carefully observe the same here. Odisha try to move the ball higher up the pitch using their central-midfielder and you can see the pressure from the five ATK Mohun Bagan players <em>(2 strikers + 3 central-midfielders).</em></p><p><strong><em>Note: Try noticing how the three midfielders of ATK Mohun Bagan are very high up and narrow as well to try to squeeze the space for Odisha’s central midfield</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*16vIkKx6sY_7ZhbOSR756w.jpeg" /></figure><p>This is the shape we were discussing earlier on as ATK Mohun Bagan wait for the cue to apply high pressure, which is a pass by the opponent to their central-midfielder. Here is what happens after the pass is made by the opponent into the central zone:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GlwUQ77uKBop7ypAWv2oOg.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see in the snapshot above, there are five ATK Mohun Bagan players <strong><em>(the 2 strikers + 3 central-midfielders)</em></strong>. You would also notice how the five players are just meters away from each other while trying to press. <br> <br>This is evident even in terms of numbers as McHugh’s aggression has led him to have the highest number of fouls in the ISL this season with 20 in 7games. He is also among the top three for number of tackles in the ISL this season with over 45.</p><p><strong>The Long Route taken by ATK’s opponents<br> </strong><br>The third alternative for opponents to attack ATK Mohun Bagan would be to take the long route, which is <strong>to hoof the ball over the top to by pass the five central players and directly challenge their back-three of Pritam-Tiri-Jhingan. </strong>This is a very uncertain way of attacking as a lot depends on whether the aerial battle or the second ball is won by the attacker against that back-three. <strong>The three central-defenders of ATK Mohun Bagan average almost 70% success in aerial duels. <em>(Data till first 4 games)</em></strong><br> <br>But if the opponents aren’t able to cope with the pressure from ATK Mohun Bagan on the flanks and in the centre, then they choose to go long and lose possession very often. Hence, this has been favourable to ATK Mohun Bagan in the five games so far and if we have to summarize their off-the-ball approach in one line then we could say…<br> <br><strong><em>Stay compact with the two strikers and three midfielders, protect the centre while push wing-backs high up to close down opponent’s full-backs and force them into taking risks and win back possession</em></strong></p><h4>Weaknesses in ATK Mohun Bagan:</h4><h4>In Possession</h4><p><strong>a) Over-Reliance on Tiri:</strong></p><p>This has been a pretty obvious factor when we look at the ATK Mohun Bagan’s ball progression from the first phase into advanced phases of the pitch. Except for Tiri’s vertical or long-passing, they are left with no solid plan to progress the ball. <strong>His absence against Jamshedpur showed clearly as ATK struggled to create chances from open-play.</strong> Whenever Tiri is given time &amp; space on the ball, he is able to scan for the best possible option and execute the pass as well.</p><p><strong>b) Lack of Variety in Final-Third:</strong></p><p>Again, this point is in connection with the previous one. ATK Mohun Bagan are limited in terms of having variety and different dimensions in attack<strong>. A major source of creating chances is from the flanks using their wing-backs. You may remember the numbers about passes into penalty area, which was dominated by Prabir Das &amp; Subashish and the midfielders’ contribution being significantly less. </strong>ATK have scored a number of goals against the run of play, from set-pieces or individual brilliance. The chances created from open-play have been quite limited.</p><h4>Out of Possession</h4><p><strong>a) Narrow First-Line Press:</strong></p><p>The first-line of pressure from ATK Mohun Bagan is of the two strikers. It is always difficult to cover the entire width of the pitch with two players. Hence if ATK’s opponents are able to have enough width while playing out from the back, then it is possible to stretch the two strikers wide and open up space to progress the ball further.</p><p><strong>b) Space between Defence &amp; Midfield:</strong></p><p>We had seen earlier how the midfield-trio pushes up and maintains a narrow compact pressing trap in the central area. As the three-midfielders push higher up, there is space created between the defence and midfield as the three central-defenders stay with the attackers. Ideally, they are supposed to be pushing up along with the three midfielders to avoid this space getting created but often not the case.</p><p><strong><em>Here is an example:</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a_az72kRoqi4iM3F3Ex2tw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>The red-shaded area is the space which gets created when ATK Mohun Bagan’s first two lines of pressure are beaten. </strong>Odisha, ideally should have had players in this area to take advantage of the situation but as you can see, they don’t overload in this area and instead go for a shot and the attack ends in a goal-kick</p><h4>Possible Solutions for ATK Mohun Bagan’s opponents:</h4><p><strong>In Possession</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/430/1*t8OKRbUt6lD20thwhtpBpQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>3–3–3–1 to counter ATK’s 3–5–2</figcaption></figure><p>A possible solution for an opponent might be to alter their shape a little bit to take advantage of the inherent weaknesses in ATK Mohun Bagan. The reason being that facing ATK’s 3–5–2 is going to be an entirely different challenge as it is a team with a completely different shape, structure and approach than the others in the ISL. Hence switching to a back-three can provide the opponent with many advantages in terms of numerical superiority in key areas.</p><p>Now that we also had a look at the major weaknesses in ATK Mohun Bagan’s 3–5–2, which is a lack of width in first line of pressure and space between the lines of defence and midfield, a change in shape can allow the opponent to make the most out of these two weaknesses. Let us have a look at how it can work:</p><p><strong>Splitting ATK’s first-line of pressure</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/1*vpF6-_Ao1gDnmqUeMXjanQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Switching to a back-three provides a direct 3v2 advantage in the first-phase of the pitch.</strong> Till now, ATK Mohun Bagan’s two strikers have been able to press the opponent’s centre-backs directly man-to-man and also ensuring shadow-cover on the opponent’s central midfielders. This can be overcome comfortably with three players at the back who are positioned away from each other across the width of the pitch.</p><p><strong>When ATK Mohun Bagan were up against teams of back-four, we saw how Prabir Das &amp; Subashish could go all the way up the pitch and close down the opponent’s full-backs.</strong> But with a back-three supported by two wing-backs, there would be no way to close down the right and left center-back without losing organization.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OVpxTYUoTADigsJfyQQBDA.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see, ATK Mohun Bagan’s wing-backs would be occupied by the opponents’ own wing-backs. <strong>It would also be risky for ATK’s central-midfielders to come up the pitch to close down the right &amp; left central-defenders as the opponent’s attacking midfielders in half-spaces would be let free.</strong><br> <br>This already makes it difficult for ATK Mohun Bagan as they would be forced to move away from their usual high-press in the central areas and rather sit deeper to absorb pressure. <strong>There is a lot of possibility for ATK Mohun Bagan to be pulled out of position in case they choose to apply high pressure because of the numbers advantage.</strong></p><p><strong>Utilizing the Space between Defence &amp; Midfield</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/1*vpF6-_Ao1gDnmqUeMXjanQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>While this picture was already posted a little earlier while explaining about the shape, I would like to bring it back to your attention to focus on what happens in the final-phase of the pitch. <strong>We had seen earlier how ATK Mohun Bagan have a tendency to leave out space in between midfield &amp; defence.</strong> No team in the ISL were visibly trying to take advantage of this space by overloading this space and the right &amp; left half-spaces.</p><p><strong>Overloading these areas with players who have positional intelligence could cause a lot of trouble for ATK Mohun Bagan when they are trying to defend. </strong>If ATK want to be careful, it can result in their three central-midfielders getting pinned back in front of the defence, which would allow the opponent to keep control of the ball, maintain possession and break them down eventually.</p><h4>Practical Examples of ball-progression using the 3–3–3–1</h4><p><strong>From the Right-Flank</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*vbZCt4lFCAx-GGid2Vn8zw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*oQWrvgbbd9X_WjbhxZVjUw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the above snapshots, you can see how the 3–3–3–1 formation could provide a numerical advantage without taking too many risks. The right central-defender can play it to the right wing-back who would attract pressure from ATK Mohun Bagan’s left wing-back. That is a space that can be utilized by the opponent’s right attacking-midfielder by playing a pass directly or a quick combination with the other attacking-midfielder or the ‘6’.</p><p><strong><em>P.S. — The same move can be replicated on the left-flank as well</em></strong></p><p><strong>From the Central Channel</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/978/1*AGQXXji_Y9k7YzNGWddmzQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/964/1*dbQ9he7H0qedJOHp7qIqcA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/964/1*VbnA3vgGVYNmCn5RLC6Qtg.jpeg" /></figure><p>This can be another possible move when the opponent want to take the central channel. Once the two strikers are split wide apart, the ‘6’ can drop little deeper to receive the pass from the central-defender. Once he receives and makes a turn, he can try to connect with the three attacking-midfielders behind ATK Mohun Bagan’s midfield. With quick passing, intelligent movement and the right body positions to receive the passes, it is possible to slice through ATK’s pressure from the centre itself.</p><p><strong>From the Left-Flank</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/971/1*sJgQC5oFYrj8MddLrBHiMA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/1*9lnAfeNqOz1wY-JDB5Swyg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Yet another way to play out from the back but this time, it is a move from the left-flank. First, the right &amp; left central-defenders can split wide <strong><em>(as you can see in the first picture)</em></strong>. Then if the left central-defender receives the ball, he can carry the ball forward till he attracts pressure from ATK Mohun Bagan’s midfielder. Then one of the attacking-midfielders can make himself available to receive the ball directly from the left central-defender</p><p><strong><em>P.S. </em></strong>— <strong><em>The same move can be replicated on the right-flank as well</em></strong></p><h4>Possible Solutions for ATK Mohun Bagan’s opponents:</h4><p><strong>When not in Possession</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/447/1*HyezBllYl3Ouo5mrbp7rcA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The 3–3–3–1 formation can fall back into a 5–4–1 with the diamond in midfield being retained. The only difference would be the wing-backs falling back to join the three central-defenders and form a back-five. However, there will be some defensive diligence required from the three attacking-midfielders of the opponent.</p><p>Just like a variety of advantages that the opponent could gain while in possession, this shape will provide with them with some key advantages when they are without the ball. Let us have a look at how:</p><p><strong>Basic Numerical Advantage in the final-phase</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vAv8TbeuIJ3TEHFUN49afA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>The most important advantage here would be the 3v2 that the opponent can enjoy against ATK Mohun Bagan’s two strikers</strong>. We saw earlier how ATK’s strikers, especially Roy Krishna tends to drop deep into space to receive the ball. In case of three central-defenders, one defender can follow Roy Krishna even when he drops deep without worrying about a space being created as there would be four defenders to compensate. This can allow the opponent to mark Roy Krishna tightly and not let him any time or space on the ball.</p><p>Similarly, we saw how ATK Mohun Bagan’s central-midfielders tend to go out wide to connect with their wing-backs and pull out the opponent’s central midfielders into wide areas, along with them. This usually opened up space in front of the defence as many teams used two central-midfielders to screen their defence. <strong>In this case, even if two midfielders of the opponent follow ATK’s midfielders into wide areas, there would still be a ‘6’ in front of the defence.</strong></p><p><strong>Possible Issue with a back-four</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KB-ZJJZ4cnbEU_GKpBSa3g.jpeg" /></figure><p>With a flat back-four defence, one major problem apart from the central-midfielders getting pulled out of position happens when ATK Mohun Bagan’s wing-backs are in possession. Here is a sample when ATK’s left wing-back receives the ball.<strong> If the opponent’s right winger fails to track back, it is easy for their opponent’s right-back to get attracted to close down the left wing-back. When the right-back is pulled out of position, there is a space created for the ATK striker to run into.</strong> This can happen very less when it’s a back-three supported by two wing-backs as the wing-backs would be in charge of ATK’s wing-backs, avoiding confusion.</p><p><strong>Closing down the Ball-Progressor in the back-three</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vAv8TbeuIJ3TEHFUN49afA.jpeg" /></figure><p>It would be absolutely important to close down ATK’s Tiri when they are in possession as they are heavily reliant to progress the ball forward. While many teams have been hesitant to apply heavy pressure on Tiri, it would be interesting to see what ATK do with their play-making central-defender under constant pressure. Without any doubts or second thoughts, the opponent’s striker may need to close down Tiri as quickly as possible and not allow him any time or space on the ball.</p><p><strong>In case of ATK Mohun Bagan, it is Tiri. In case of another team, there would be another defender who will be in charge of ball-progression owing to his passing-range being a notch above the others. </strong>He could be in the centre of the three or the right center-back or the left center-back. Who so ever it is, he needs to be given no time or space when he is in possession.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/1*f2Gcibju3hKp56w6Ht0T7A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Even if Pritam (RCB) or Jhingan (LCB) are allowed a few more seconds on the ball than usual, it would still be okay as they aren’t the best of passers. But despite that if Pritam or Jhingan need to be closed down, it would still be possible with a slight rotation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/1*4gaBSbXCAkiLygKgK16_8Q.png" /></figure><p>The attacking-midfielder on Pritam’s side can go to apply pressure on Pritam while the other two midfielders of the opponent can slide across and take up the marking duties of the other players. This is the advantage of having three central-midfielders in front of defence as compared to two.</p><p>Now let us have a look at other situations for example, Pritam (RCB) passes it to Prabir (RWB):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/1*jsRtceAgix0PJ8zyH86TXg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here ATK’s right wing-back Prabir could be in possession but the opponent can still remain well-positioned as the left wing-back would directly close down Prabir with one attacking midfielder marking McHugh and Angulo marking Tiri.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*muL48raYj2RJhoZHfY1Ncg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The same could be repeated on ATK’s left-flank as well: Tiri &amp; McHugh tightly marked with Jhingan having space and time on the ball but no promising passing option available.</p><p><strong><em>So to summarize the entire defensive strategy in one or two lines, we could say…</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fJRsImQW8T41yjQWL6HS5g.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>Allow 2v4 disadvantage in the first-phase of the pitch with Angulo &amp; one attacking midfielder marking tightly on Tiri &amp; McHugh while Pritam &amp; Sandesh receive time &amp; space on the ball. Enjoy 8v6 advantage in own half with 3 midfielders and 5 defenders taking care of ATK’s remaining players</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b68db7d23f3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Atletico 2.0: Proactive, Possession, Passing & Panache: In-depth Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/atletico-2-0-proactive-possession-passing-panache-in-depth-analysis-7d24c209a756?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d24c209a756</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[la-liga]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[atletico-madrid]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Nov 2020 11:14:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-27T14:22:04.405Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DH_Dzemz9ltGJXyQuZAuXg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Atletico are off to a flying start in La Liga this season with <strong>6 wins &amp; 2 draws from 8 games, scoring 18 goals and conceding just 2</strong> in the process. This was definitely not what a majority of us expected, especially given the departure of Thomas Partey on the final day of the transfer window. But it looks like Diego Simeone has found his mojo and this time, he seems to have found it in a fashion that we don’t really associate him with.<br> <br>From relying on the opponent’s disorganization which was a reactive approach to the game, <strong>Atletico have become far more proactive</strong> and have evolved into a team which wants to take the driver seat and dictate the game’s pace. Yes, it is no more about the rigid, risk-averse 4–4–2 that would refuse to break down and wait patiently for the perfect moment to counter-attack. Now El Cholo’s men rather want to <strong>be comfortable in possession, more passes, more circulation of the ball to move the opponent, break them down gradually and dominate the game</strong>. Even apart from possession, they have managed to change several other dimensions as well. Let us go through them one by one:</p><h4>More Possession &amp; More Passing to move the opponent</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/785/1*uhM3vWlf3xNgC3g77lTgCw.png" /></figure><p>Here is a graph that shows Atletico’s passing &amp; possession trend over the past 4 seasons. <strong>Atletico for the first time are averaging 54% possession in the Simeone era</strong>. Of course, we have just gotten done with a couple of months of La Liga and we have almost 30 weeks to go but from the way Atletico have approached each of their opponents, it doesn’t look like a temporary workaround but more so like a change of stamp. <br> <br>As you can see in the graph, <strong>Atletico have always averaged below 500 pass attempts per game over the years with the 2019–20 season having 463 pass attempts per game. Taking into the first 8 gameweeks of the 2020–21 season, they average almost 600 passes per game, which is close to a 30% increase</strong> from the previous season. Its not only about the number of passes but even in terms of accuracy, there is a significant improvement from around 78% to over 83%</p><h4>Verticality &amp; Directness</h4><p>When we say more possession or more passing, this isn’t just about keeping the ball for the heck of it and not attacking when they can. Atletico have been one of the most direct, vertical and attacking sides in La Liga this season. Let us have a look at directness in comparison to other teams in the league:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D3zmHdutKUJ3RTrLtS_8-Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see, the x-axis shows the number of completed passes per game while the y-axis shows the progressive distance as a percentage from those passes. <strong>For example, if your team covered 200 yards from a sequence of passes out of which only 20 yards were directed towards goal, then your progressive distance covered % is 10 (200/20).</strong> So, the total progressive distance covered <em>(in yards)</em> by all passes is summed up from game to game and averaged for the season. <br> <br>The only precautionary measure we need to take before assessing a team’s verticality based on this is to ensure their total passes completed per game isn’t significantly low as <strong>there is a negative relationship between progressive distance covered by passes and total number of passes. The progressive distance % will always be higher for those teams with a low number of passes</strong> as it is impossible for a team to make 700 passes with 50% of them being directed forward. It may happen as a one-off against an extremely low-block defence but not as an average over the course of a season unless they are machines. <br> <br>This is the reason why only those teams with a minimum number of completed passes per game of 400 have been taken into consideration for this graph. Here the negative relationship between the total of number of passes and progressive distance % will be visible as more the number of passes, lesser the percentage. However in case of Atletico, you’d notice how they have <strong>managed to average almost 500 passes per game but yet maintain a progressive % of 33. This roughly illustrates their verticality and directness while in possession.</strong></p><p><strong><em>Infact, the Rojiblancos boast the most number of goals from open play (16) and only behind Real Madrid &amp; Barcelona in terms of NPxG per 90 as well.</em></strong></p><h4>Use of Half-Spaces &amp; Interior Channels</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1uS6yjw4vC2TjImSMINMqQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>This has probably been the most definitive feature of Atletico’s gameplay this season. Anyone who had followed Atletico closely in the Simeone era would be aware of how majority of their attacking/ chances created from the flanks. Be it counter-attacking or be it gradual build-up, Simeone has always been heavily reliant on the wings for his creativity, which is a formation with two strikers also made sense given how he would have enough bodies in the box to attack the crosses. <strong>With the departure of Alvaro Morata, an aging Diego Costa and Joao Felix raring to prove his critics wrong, Simeone was left with no option but to adapt to his personnel. The times of Radamel Falcao, Diego Costa, Alvaro Morata, Antoine Griezmann are all part of the past now and it has been absolutely key that Simeone realized the need for an all-new Altetico 2.0 before another disappointing season could have hit the Wanda Metropolitano</strong>.</p><p>The protagonists in his team are no more tall, strong, commanding figures that outmuscle the opponent at every phase and dominate aerial-duels and second-balls. <strong>Simeone has an entirely different set of beasts at hand with the likes of Joao Felix, Angel Correa &amp; Marcos Llorente. Here, we are talking about exquisite first-touch, intelligent movement, passing and dribbling of superior technique. In short, Atletico’s front-line has become more silk and less steel. </strong>So, what Simeone has introduced in his team is occupying the half-spaces, interior channels and playing between the lines than taking the ball wide and bringing it back into the box.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LTFNFtBXeR4nExFAMu5_PQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The above graph shows<strong> Atletico’s preferred direction of attacks and chance creation since the 2016–17 season and as you can see, this is the first time they have touched 30% through the central channel. </strong>We will see this a bit more in detail later in this article but first, it is important to note that it is this tendency to attack more through the middle that has brought out the best out of several players, the most noteworthy being the Portuguese wonderkid Joao Felix. Some examples of central-channeled attacks with one or two-touch passing and quick combinations through the middle:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*KSwu7sHZrxVpUvCPMxqikw.gif" /><figcaption>Spell of possession vs Lokomotiv Moscow: Felix &amp; Correa come inwards and between the lines for a quick combination play with Suarez but doesn’t end up in a chance</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*WnDWmydWVStsFFR8mHS6sw.gif" /><figcaption>Spell of possession vs Cadiz: Felix &amp; Koke (from CM) arrive between the lines for a quick combination play which doesn’t end up as a chance but manage to retain possession and start attack again</figcaption></figure><h4>Unleashing the Beast: Joao Felix</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/0*NmCfz18PT3sq6b5v.jpg" /></figure><p>There were a lot of expectations when Atletico Madrid had signed Joao Felix to replace Antoine Griezmann and whether or not it worked out in the first season is something debatable. However, there is nothing debatable about the fact that Felix has been the best attacker in Spain this season. A major reason why the unleashing of Felix’s world-class ability has been possible is Atletico’s focus on attacking the half-spaces, interior-channels and playing between the lines. This style of attacking seems tailor-made to suit Felix’s prowess as an attacker and the Portuguese has looked unstoppable up until now. <strong>On the contrary, Felix was deployed in most if not all of the games, as a number 9 last season and it limited the space he could operate in.</strong> <strong>Now the Portuguese has a lot more freedom operating from the left half-space.</strong> Felix’s movement has been key to Atletico’s build-up as he drops deep, moves wide or even gives runs in behind the defence when necessary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qS8xxC5p0UfH_dt0UBPbeg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Joao Felix Stats in La Liga previous season vs current season comparison (2020–21 till Gameweek 7 of Atletico)</figcaption></figure><p>The huge difference in the numbers are self-explanatory, nothing needs to be said here. Here is a comparison of the heatmap from the 2019–20 La Liga as compared to 2020–21 La Liga:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/918/1*eL6evWEruF9OKWcGFsXzmg.jpeg" /></figure><p>You can see how in the 2019–20 season when he was deployed as a 9, multiple ways to fit him in were attempted but nothing was convincing. However in the 2020–21 season, he has been deployed in that left half-space and it has worked wonders for both Felix as well as Atletico Madrid.</p><h4>Unleashing the Beast: Mario Hermoso</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Kp7uPzvJW2W2K8Kz.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>It is quite possible that Mario Hermoso is the most underrated defender in La Liga</strong> and it is indeed surprising for one to think how there wasn’t a bidding war for Atletico to win to close his signing in the 2019–20 season. Similar to Felix, Hermoso too didn’t have the best of first seasons with the Rojiblancos but has made an outstanding start to the 2020–21 season in his new-found role. <strong>Having made his breakthrough as a left-back, Hermoso combines the strengths of a full-back as well as that of a centre-back. The former Real Madrid man is a combination of strength, speed and excellent on-the-ball abilities with special mention to his passing range.</strong></p><p>In order to make the best of the same, <strong>Simeone has deployed Hermoso in an all-new role this year as a left centre-back as part of a back-three.</strong> It has given Hermoso both space and time to excel in build-up as with three centre-backs, <strong>Atletico are able to create numerical superiority against the opponent’s first line of pressure (especially when the first line is of two attackers, making it 3v2)</strong>. Hermoso has played in this role for two games now (4–0 vs Cadiz &amp; 1–0 vs Barcelona) and he has hardly put a foot wrong in both of those games.</p><p>The biggest value-add that Hermoso has brought to Atletico is when they are in possession. <strong>The Spaniard has showcased his effectiveness as a ball-playing centre-back with his passing range being key in Atletico’s progression from one third to another. </strong>Being part of a back-three has helped his case as from the left centre-back or the right centre-back position, a player is able to progress the ball easier owing to the passing angles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pAR2pfF5R2d9p0HviL4vwg.jpeg" /></figure><p>This shows Hermoso in possession vs Cadiz’s 4–4–2. As you can see, he has numerous passing options and I have highlighted the ones which I thought were the most ideal. If you ach pass could move the opponent in one way,<br> <br><strong><em>Pass 1:</em></strong><em> Tilts opponent to the flank allowing far-side wingback to push<br></em><strong><em>Pass 2:</em></strong><em> The most direct and deepest pass to break through all lines<br></em><strong><em>Pass 3:</em></strong><em> Breaks first line of pressure and allows the receiver to charge forward into space<br></em><strong><em>Pass 4:</em></strong><em> Switch of flanks to tilt the opponent to the farside<br></em><strong><em>Pass 5:</em></strong><em> Most defensive option but necessary if opponent is defensively organized</em><br> <br>Given that Hermoso’s decision-making can send the opponent literally towards any direction, now it is upto his understanding of the game to pick the right option and other technical factors like timing and weight of the pass that will determine the quality of progression. Lets have a look at a couple of examples as to how he has done it</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*OxsbvrL2urr7zL8k8hqUew.gif" /><figcaption><strong>Atletico vs Barcelona:</strong> Hermoso sees that Barca have no numbers in the far-side before anyone and switches the flank from left to right in first-touch which leads to a goal-scoring opportunity</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Rz-UrEtQhJC6s8d2RnjMsg.gif" /><figcaption><strong>Atletico vs Barcelona:</strong> Hermoso spots Felix’s run seconds before he receives the ball and releases him in first touch which eventually leads to a decent scoring opportunity again</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Hermoso accumulated massive xG Build-up numbers as the third centre-back in the games against Cadiz &amp; Barcelona with 1.62. This is averages to 0.81 per game, which means that the possession spells involving Hermoso in a game, sum up to an 80% probability of the spell ending at goal.</strong> In the game against Cadiz, it was more about many number of small xG possession spells increasing the xG build-up figure as Atletico enjoyed almost 70% possession. However, in the game against Barcelona, Atletico had 46% possession and yet Hermoso was the player with the highest xG Chain as well as xG Build-up, including all 22 players on the pitch.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U1FsBeUIpyl8VMpuU9H_wA.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Mario Hermoso’s Pass-map vs Barcelona: </strong>He was able to break the lines and put Atletico in advanced attacking situations regularly</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Red: Passes that go towards own goal<br>Yellow: Passes that go forward but not break any line or progress the team<br>Green: Passes that go forward, break lines or progress the team into the next phase</em></strong></p><p>As you can see, Hermoso had made 8 line-breaking passes to put Atletico in a more advanced attacking position against Barcelona, accumulating the highest xG build-up in the game.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pcfnoXVpSGPg6XCuBfnlcw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hermoso is among the top of La Liga CBs in terms of Smart-Passes per 90 as well with 0.81</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Viz Credit: Ninad Barbadikar (Twitter: @NinadB_06)</em></strong></p><h4>Changing formations as per opponent</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2U5POHs9uYTUIEtb.jpg" /><figcaption>Diego Simeone has not preferred his standard 4–4–2 this season and has deployed a variety of formations which has changed from game-to-game basis the opponent</figcaption></figure><p>It is true that the way a team plays, its philosophy, ideology or approach towards the game cannot be defined by just the formation but it is absolutely essential how your team is staggered across the pitch vertically and horizontally in order to ensure that it facilitates the team to play as per its principles. On that note, <strong>Simeone has been loyal towards his flat 4–4–2 formation during the entire course of his managerial career at Atletico.</strong></p><p>If we take it into account the last 5 seasons for the sake of relevance, Simeone has on an average <strong>fielded the flat 4–4–2 for around 34–35 games out of the 38 games in La Liga</strong>.<strong> A maximum of 2–3 games per season could we see him use a 4–3–3 or a 4–2–3–1.</strong> This is another major change we have seen in the 2020–21 season as Simeone has ditched the standard 4–4–2 in many games. As discussed earlier, it is probably a realisation of the squad’s real strong suit which is completely in contrast to the strong suit of his previous years. It is probably for the first time since taking over at Atletico that Simeone has at his disposal:</p><p><strong><em>a) A front-line which is more technical than physical<br> <br>b) A set of midfielders who specialize in dominating/ circulating possession and proactively dictating the pace of the game<br> <br>c) Back-line with centre-backs who are excellent ball-players like Gimenez, Hermoso to support the above two departments</em></strong></p><p>There have been 3 games in which Simeone has gone in an absolutely different direction to what he has done in the past decade at Atletico. Let me highlight just those three games for easier understanding of what we have seen so far:</p><h4>3–4–2–1 with the ball / 5–3–2 without the ball vs Barcelona</h4><p>Atletico’s 1–0 victory against Barcelona was undoubtedly a Simeone masterclass that handed them the win. He had never beaten Barcelona in the league in his career with Atletico Madrid but for the kind of form with which he headed into the game, many saw it coming this time. Be it Pep or Enrique or Valverde or Setien, <strong>Simeone never fidgeted with his traditional 4–4–2 when he came up against Barcelona</strong> and it was almost as if Barcelona already knew what he was going to do and still it would be turn out to be a tough fight. But this game, Simeone may have caught Ronald Koeman off-guard with a twist to his team’s shape. <strong>He fielded out three centre-backs in Savic, Gimenez &amp; Hermoso with Tripper as right wing-back, Carrasco as left wing-back to form a 5–3–2 off-the-ball.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y15VOdxEH4wDmAVj7AKlOg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Atletico’s 5–3–2 shape off-the-ball vs Barcelona</figcaption></figure><p>Atletico maintained <strong>a solid 5–3–2 during Barca’s build-up with Felix &amp; Correa blocking passes into Frenkie De Jong &amp; Miralem Pjanic, in an attempt to force Barca to go wide</strong>. One could argue that Atletico were quite successful in doing so as the game ended with <strong>Jordi Alba &amp; Sergi Roberto having more touches than any player on the pitch.</strong> For most parts of the game, Atletico could keep Barca at bay as their back-five helped them slide across the pitch and manage the flanks. So despite the high number of touches, the impact of Alba &amp; Roberto was limited.</p><p>Sometimes when Barca entered the final-third, <strong>Atletico even shifted into a back-six with Llorente also joining the five defenders, forming a 6–3–1</strong>. It is no secret that the two full-backs at Barca have been responsible for creating chances this season as <strong>Alba &amp; Roberto remain the top-two in terms of key passes as well as xA.</strong> So, Atletico’s shape which allowed them to cover the width of the pitch without the centre-backs being stretched out, worked out significantly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OW_BtZehieLAXRUimoFNjg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Atletico had occasionally shifted to a 6–3–1 with Llorente joining the back-five as the diagonal pass from Messi to Alba or a direct through-ball to Dembele can open up space in-behind</figcaption></figure><p><strong>In Possession</strong></p><p>While in possession, <strong>Atletico shifted to a 3–4–2–1 with Llorente joining Correa &amp; Felix in attack and wing-backs charging forward to provide width.</strong> Atletico took advantage of Dembele’s lack of decisiveness in dealing with Hermoso, Carrasco &amp; Felix on the left, making it difficult for Roberto. This made defending the right-flank a nightmare for Barca and it wasn’t surprising how Hermoso dominated the game in possession. We had seen a couple of examples in the previous section as to how <strong>Hermoso’s passing was effective in creating chances. He also ended the game with the highest xG build-up on the pitch with 0.81</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0IibK1etrDD8M8ZE7GJ_yw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Atletico’s 3–4–2–1 shape vs Barcelona when in possession:</figcaption></figure><p>You can see how Saul stepping forward a bit allows Felix to drift wider towards Roberto. who is stuck between Felix &amp; Carrasco as Dembele’s poor positioning is neither cutting off Hermoso’s space nor helping Roberto with the 2 attackers</p><p><strong>Key Point from the game:<br></strong><em>Since 2016–17, Atletico have averaged possession of 32% vs Barcelona in all competitions and for the first time in the Simeone era, they have ended a game with 46% possession against Barcelona</em></p><h4><strong>4–3–3 vs Lokomotiv Moscow (Away)</strong></h4><p>Simeone<strong> </strong>was up against the tactically-drilled Lokomotiv Moscow side that has created waves amongst the fans with their display in the UEFA Champions League this season. Lokomotiv Moscow have preferred to line up in a 4–4–2 for most games in this competition and it looked very much like Simeone opted for a regular holding 4–3–3 to isolate their two central-midfielders and progress the ball via overloads in the middle.</p><p><strong>While it was indeed a holding 4–3–3 with Herrera as the lone number ‘6’, Saul &amp; Llorente as the advanced central midfielders and Felix-Suarez-Correa forming the front-three, there was a slight twist to this. Unlike the usual 4–3–3, Simeone used the advanced CMs <em>(Saul &amp; Llorente)</em> as wide midfielders, almost like Mezzalas</strong>. Although the game ended in a draw, this worked wonders for Atletico in terms of breaking down Lokomotiv’s rigid structure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_s9ZVmtMI7JhlZJRRjGLZw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Left Image:</strong> The passing structure of Atletico after the game vs Lokomotiv Moscow, creating triangles on both flanks with Felix-Lodi-Saul and Correa-Llorente-Trippier.</p><p><strong>Right Image:</strong> This was the shape that Simeone wanted to maintain, which in turn maximized passing options for Herrera</p><p>To begin with, Atletico already had two players on each flank to stretch Lokomotiv’s compact shape with <strong>Felix (LW), Lodi (LB) on the left and Correa (RW), Trippier (RB) on the right.</strong> So when Saul &amp; Llorente went wider, it added a third-man in both the flanks, pulling an extra man from Lokomotiv’s midfield to go wide to help out their full-back and winger.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CiDFHRAHu9xDnHpZh8YD0w.jpeg" /></figure><p>The CBs along with Herrera at ‘6’, create a 3v2 against Lokomotiv’s front-two and when you see further up the field, you can see <strong>how Saul &amp; Llorente go as wide as possible to pull out Lokomotiv’s wingers away from their central-midfielders. This leaves Lokomotiv’s central-midfielders 2v2 with Felix &amp; Correa</strong> who are operating between the lines in the interior channels <em>(a feature we saw earlier in the article). </em>Now let us have a look at how this helped Atletico progress into the final-third:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*6wrZFQFaqyAdOeAI3N74pw.gif" /><figcaption><strong>Spell of possession vs Lokomotiv: </strong>Felix makes a run away from the Lokomotiv central midfielder on his partial blind side to pull him out of position. The CM is already distracted by Saul’s unusually wide positioning. This creates a gap for Herrera to find Suarez directly</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q1VVXHt3UPJxzBrvoJj2DA.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Here is the snapshot seconds before the chance: </strong>Felix understood he was being shadow-covered by Lokomotiv’s central-midfielder and hence makes a run towards the left.</figcaption></figure><p>While the pass which created this attack is essentially the one by Herrera to Suarez, if you look at the build-up seconds prior to the pass, you would notice <strong>how Saul is the widest player out on the left. This creates a triangle out-wide on the left with Lodi as well as Felix, who drifts wide from inside gradually to distract Lokomotiv’s central midfielder and pull him out of position.</strong> Felix’s movement pulls the central-midfielder just wide enough to the left that the passing option opens up for Herrera to Suarez who lays it off to Correa. While they didn’t win the game, this was an effective way of progressing into the final-third and creating quick attacks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/659/1*0Yni4mI4QIQZ6Pg8MMpmnQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Atletico were able to make maximum use of the half-spaces owing to their structure with Felix &amp; Correa</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Key Points from the game:</strong><br> <br><em>i) Atletico’s plan worked out to perfection as Herrera ended the game with the most passes 91, dictating the pace of the game and circulating the ball to all areas of the pitch<br> <br>ii) Lokomotiv Moscow had a non-penalty xG of less than 0.2 and created absolutely no chances as Simeone had tactically outwitted them but the hand-ball incident leading to a penalty, was enough to draw the game.</em></p><h4>3–4–2–1 with the ball / 4–4–2 without the ball vs Cadiz</h4><p>The game against Cadiz was probably <strong>Atletico’s most dominant game this season</strong> in all competitions as they were in the driver-seat right from kick-off with the lion’s share of possession, creating chance after chance and allowing no way into the game for Cadiz. Let us not forget that despite being a newly promoted team, Cadiz are no pushovers as they sit fifth in the league with 4 wins and 2 draws out of 10 games. <strong>They have also preferred a flat 4–4–2 which sits deep, remains compact to deny space to the opponent and against Atletico it was no different.</strong></p><p>In order to break down this deep, compact and narrow 4–4–2, Simeone adapted to the <strong>3–4–2–1</strong> for the first time this season. The idea was to <strong>maintain numerical superiority over the opponent at every line as it will help Atletico keep possession. It was abundantly clear that Simeone wanted to keep the ball, dictate the pace of the game and keep creating chances to break them down gradually. His 3–4–2–1 was very similar to that of Julian Nagelsmann at RB Leipzig this year.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XOfZge4m9nKL68ZyOEJ6ng.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see in the snapshot, Savic-Gimenez-Hermoso form the trio of centre-backs, Koke-Herrera form a double pivot, Felix-Llorente are deployed in the half-spaces with Suarez as the ‘9’, Trippier and Saul provide width as <br> wing-backs. <strong>The idea here is to ensure that the opponent has to give up on either covering width or covering the central areas. With Felix &amp; Llorente in the interior channels, it forced Lokomotiv to let Trippier &amp; Saul completely free</strong>, which meant Atletico always had 1 option out-wide when they had to escape pressure.</p><p>In the picture above, I have <strong>highlighted in red, the area that Felix &amp; Llorente constantly occupied to receive the ball from the centre-backs or the central midfielders. Upon receiving the ball, it was upto the situation to decide if Felix/Llorente will take on defenders and carry the ball forward or play quick combinations with Suarez within the tight spaces or play it further wide to the wing-backs.</strong> It was virtually impossible for Cadiz to stop Atletico from dominating the game as in every area of the pitch, they were outnumbered by the Rojiblancos.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/426/1*6dmoQ2fnPrWq3yaagAOkfw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Heatmap of Felix &amp; Llorente combined, occupying the central zones to receive and progress the attacks forward</figcaption></figure><p>As we discussed earlier, utilizing Joao Felix in the half-space and between the lines seems to be paying off as he is able to take-on defenders, play killer passes, drop deep and pull out an opponent along with him and also make late runs into the box to score.</p><p><strong><em>Felix vs Cadiz: <br>2 goals, 1 assist, 3/3 successful dribbles, 4 key passes, 2 big chances created 5/7 ground-duels won</em></strong></p><p><strong>Key Points from the game:<br> <br></strong><em>i) Hermoso’s wide positioning towards the left allowed him to be the most dominant player on the pitch as when one of the Cadiz strikers stepped out to press him, Koke became free and it was easy to progress the ball<br> <br>ii) Hermoso &amp; Koke ended the game with the most touches as well as the most passes completed than any player on the pitch: Hermoso: 109 touches &amp; 94 passes, Koke: 104 touches &amp; 92 passes<br> <br>iii) Atletico ended the game with 68% possession, completing 717 passes at success rate of 91%, the highest ever by Atletico in the Simeone era</em></p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>We can summarize within a few points as to what constitutes the Atletico Madrid 2.0, which focuses on a proactive approach in possession just for an easier understanding of the bigger picture:<br> <br><strong><em>a) Create numerical superiority vs first-line of pressure</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>b) Have players in half-spaces and between the lines in advanced positions</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>c) Have atleast one option hugging the touchline for maximum width</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>d) Utilize the numerical superiority in the first phase and make the best passer a free man (Hermoso/ Herrera)</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>e) Use the player’s passing range to pick out passes staggered at different vertical &amp; horizontal levels for maximum passing options in the middle/final-third</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>f) Varying attacking combinations:</em></strong></p><p><em>i) Play it to widest passing option to tilt the opponent from one side to another<br>ii) Surprise opponent every now and then with low, fast pass into attackers between the lines/ in half-spaces<br>iii) Allow numerical superiority to happen in the flanks also by connecting the wing-back, half-space attacker, respective-sided CM/CB</em></p><p>It has certainly gotten the best out of some of the key players in their team and the results are also gradually proving to be positive. However, is this a temporary workaround to suit the strength of the players or is this going to be a new base foundation of what Atletico stands for in the years to come?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d24c209a756" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Erling Braut Håland: A complete analytical breakdown of why he is so special]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/erling-braut-h%C3%A5land-a-complete-analytical-breakdown-of-why-he-is-so-special-c068ae0b7539?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c068ae0b7539</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[borussia-dortmund]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bundesliga]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[erling-haaland]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2020 09:26:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-30T15:33:00.847Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7-YPHse8SnZUY6A8.jpg" /></figure><p>Last year, a young Norwegian took the football world by storm. After fantastic performances with the Norwegian youth teams, he made his first impression in the professional football sphere. And boy did he perform. First at Salzburg, later that season in Dortmund who paid 20 million € last winter for the striker. His name, you might have guessed it, Erling Haaland. In 40 games he scored 44 times and assisted for 10 goals. Not only in Austria but also in the German Bundesliga Haaland needed little time to adjust and scored and incredible seven goals in his first three games for Borussia Dortmund. But it was in the Champions League where he showed that he is special. Haaland scored ten goals in only eight matches. Those games were not played against small clubs but the likes of Paris St. Germain and, back-then, the defending champion Liverpool FC.</p><p>The way Haaland scores his goals is in particular impressive due to his young age. Haaland reads the defence well, makes great movements off the ball to confuse the defence and start in the open space. His great acceleration and speed along with his precise shooting make Haaland incredible hard to stop. Especially, in the ball dominant Dortmund squad, the Norwegian is the player who offers depth by sprinting behind the last defensive line. Here, he benefits of the gravity created by players like Sancho, Reus or Reyna. Due to their dribblings, defenders have to focus on what happens close to the ball at full speed. Haaland intelligently uses the lack of attention on him by attacking the space opened by a defender who has to press the ball carrier.</p><p>Let’s quickly go through the way Haaland behaves during the attacking phase and what other strikers can learn from him. We are going to be looking at the two most important aspects for a number ‘9’: <strong>Movement &amp; Finishing</strong></p><h4>The Movement</h4><p><strong><em>By Tobias Hahn (</em></strong><a href="https://twitter.com/hahn97_t"><strong><em>https://twitter.com/hahn97_t</em></strong></a><strong><em>)</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fzHJQOTJ9Q-o0lia.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Hide outside of the field of view of the defender</strong></p><p>One of the key components of Haaland’s offensive game is his positioning. As I mention regularly, it is crucial for a striker to create advantageous situations for oneself by being positioned in such a way that the defender can’t observe the ball and oneself simultaneously. The so-called blind side is the area which the defender can hardly observe without completely turning around. Haaland constantly uses this advantage in order to be the player who acts rather than reacts to what the defence gives him.</p><p>No matter if it is in the box or in front of it, Haaland constantly hides on the blind side often between the centre-backs or slightly behind one of them depending on the position of the ball and the available space.</p><p>Once the defender does only face the ball, Haaland accelerates and quickly attacks the open space to get his body between the defender and the ball. Especially, around the box, Haaland is great in attacking the space between centre-back and fullback to then finish with the first or second touch. Here, his favourite spot seems to be on the left side of the penalty spot in the box where he can finish strong with his left foot in either both corners of the goal leaving the goalkeeper clueless where the shot might go.</p><p><strong>Challenging the defender</strong></p><p>The way Haaland moves off-ball on the blind-sides deserves particular attention. You might think he has a variety of moves to confuse the defenders, well, you’re wrong. Haaland’s repertoire on movements is quite small, in fact, he has only one move giving him two options. However, he reads the game so well that this one move is enough for him to get in great attacking positions while still being hard to defend.</p><p>The video below shows the movement particularly well. Haaland uses a curved run to free himself up and hide behind the defender. By moving away from the defender in another field of vision, he hides on the blind side, draws the defender slightly towards him and then accelerates to attack the space he created for himself.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F465398898%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F465398898&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F970278449_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1352" height="696" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6e82d140484b402ed682ccbf86fa9580/href">https://medium.com/media/6e82d140484b402ed682ccbf86fa9580/href</a></iframe><p>The defender his drawn towards him because he fears the ball could be played directly to Haaland who beats the defenders by sprinting through the space between them. Furthermore, the defender wants to have contact to the Norwegian in order to defend him better. However, the defender opens space for Haaland who then can accelerate and attack the open space.</p><p>This simple curved run always follows the same principle, open space to attack and finish with the first touch. Depending on the situation, the outcome can be different. In fact, three different versions exist in regard to the position of the ball and the opponent.</p><p>Once Haaland is near the ball and close to both centre-backs, he performs the run we’ve seen above. His idea is quite simple. Open the space next to one of the centre-backs to score from the near post. Here, Haaland prefers the left side in order to score with his left foot. That’s why one can observe the movement above more regularly when Dortmund attacks through their strong left side with Sancho or through the halfspace. By sprinting into the space on the left of the goal, Haaland brings himself in perfect scoring position. Even thought the angle might be suboptimal, Haalands elite finishing allows him to still be effective. Compared to other strikers, Haaland can not only score through a light shoot in the right bottom corner but also through a powerful strike in the left top corner, as one can see in his second goal against Freiburg. Other strikers might have sprinted vertically in order to immediately receive the throughball and then cross it in. Haaland, however, again performs the blind side run, making it incredible hard for the defender to stop the ball and close the gap behind him. Haaland realizes that Lienhardt tries to stop the ball, thus he accelerates and attacks the space behind. In the end, the shoot is simply worldclass.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F469780411%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F469780411&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F977976290_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1352" height="696" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/51862627ec4d40570ecfebd2a3a4212e/href">https://medium.com/media/51862627ec4d40570ecfebd2a3a4212e/href</a></iframe><p>Even though the other scenarios involve the same movement by Haaland, they do rarely appear in the open field but rather in the box. As a striker, Haaland often finds himself between the two centre-backs in the centre, while his skilled teammates try to overcome the compact defence by combining through tight spaces. Here, Haaland again follows the principle of creating space for himself. For instance, when Dortmund is set to cross, Haaland would move away from the ballnear centre-back towards the ballfar one. Here, the Norwegian pays attention to his overall position and the angle towards the goal. His main objective is to attack the near post as quickly as possible, hence he has to start his run from a more central position in order to be able to score.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F469779727%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F469779727&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F977974320_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1352" height="696" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1303c23b4574561af98ad798d74d0c40/href">https://medium.com/media/1303c23b4574561af98ad798d74d0c40/href</a></iframe><p>His movement towards the ballfar centre-back has exactly that effect. The angle is perfect and the ballfar centre-backs sees his advantage in defending crosses flow away. Usually, he would be the one following the striker to the near post. When he reads the situation well, he would be able to pressure and deny the easy scoring option for the striker. Due to the same position of Haaland, the striker is now in the driver seat and will always be one step ahead of the defender.</p><p>This movement resembles the situation we’ve discussed above. Haaland would behave similar once enough space behind the last line would be available. Contrary to his behaviour in the box, he would perform the run slightly different in order to get a better scoring position.</p><p>In case space is available behind the defensive line closer to the far post, Haaland moves in that space. Especially, in counter-attacking situation where the fullback moved higher and is yet late to get back in the defensive chain, Haaland aims on attacking those spaces. In situations like that he would use a movement away from the defenders.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F469780156%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F469780156&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F977975693_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1352" height="696" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2f6bb916ca8d1c1e9ae37859ebb96ee1/href">https://medium.com/media/2f6bb916ca8d1c1e9ae37859ebb96ee1/href</a></iframe><p>Once again, the blind side plays a particular role, this time however, no defender can see him and the ball simultaneously. It is incredible how the striker always shows his teammates where he wants the ball while maintaining the perfect angle to the defender. His acceleration and the sudden change of rhythm and speed make him so dangerous in those scenes.</p><h4>Shooting &amp; Finishing</h4><p><strong><em>By Varun Madhav (</em></strong><a href="https://twitter.com/theonenil"><strong><em>https://twitter.com/theonenil</em></strong></a><strong><em>)</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*b31hiO4ynbDLRrXWEFF4aQ.png" /></figure><p>While we had an interesting look at how Haaland’s movement, spatial awareness and intelligence have been integral in getting him into threatening positions, there is no doubt that the Norweigan is up there among the best shooters in football today as well.</p><p><strong>Quantity &amp; Quality of Shooting</strong></p><p>Football has become more and more competitive by the day with teams of every size and shape giving importance to tactical intelligence and game management. Owing to this, there are games when even the best attacking systems struggle to create a truck-load of chances for the striker to pick and choose the ones he would finish. This is the most obvious reason why a striker being efficient or clinical is a necessity than a luxury these days. <br> <br>The simplest way to look at how efficient or clinical a striker has been; Quantity and Quality of shots are probably the two most important determinants.</p><p><strong>Quantity</strong><br> <br>There are teams which like to shoot from ambitious areas of the pitch if their striker has a powerful, accurate shot while there are others, who like to keep the ball and finish a possession spell only when a clear-cut chance has been created. So generally, the quantity of shots taken by a striker is largely dependent on the tactical system and the outlay of the team rather than it being an individual choice. While quantity might be affected by the system that the striker is part of, the quality is generated absolutely from his own ability. <br> <br>First let us have a look at the quantity of shots from a basic perspective, for strikers in Europe’s top-five leagues in the 2019–20 season in comparison to Erling Haaland (<strong><em>post his move to Borussia Dortmund)</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VdAi5zNQdJiMlEvJCsKRmQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>This is probably the simplest but not the most effective way to measure a striker’s quantity vs quality metric. Yet I choose not to ignore this methodology to have an understanding of the overall picture. As you can see, we have the average shots per game and average shots on-target per game of Erling Haaland in comparison to all strikers in Europe’s top-five leagues with 10 goals or more in the 2019–20 season. <br> <br>The Norweigan has just 0.12 shots per game lesser on an average than other strikers in the top-five leagues, a meagre difference (4%) that can be ignored and concluded that in general, the shots taken are at a similar level. But when you look at the shots-on-target per game, that’s where the real difference is. While strikers in the top-five leagues averaged 1.28 shots on-target, Haaland averages 1.69 shots on-target. This constitutes to Haaland having an incremental 0.41 shots on-target per game, which is 30% more than the average striker with 10+ goals in the top-five leagues. So it is safe to say that even from a basic perspective, it is pretty obvious that Haaland’s shots are noticeably more accurate than the average striker in Europe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TFv-tpL0cuotuyQvrMerHg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8X9cN1Wve2AHp5B6dzOR4w.jpeg" /></figure><p>The point to be noted here is the total number of shots taken by Haaland is 78 out of which, 48 have been on target. This means that the Dortmund forward has managed to 61% of his shots on target. Moreover, out of his 48 shots, he has managed to net 29 goals. This means that 60% of his shots on-target have been converted to goals. Most strikers wouldn’t have this level of conversion. To give you some context, let us take one of the highest scoring forwards in football today: Robert Lewandowski. He has managed to net about 49 goals but he had to take 102 shots for it, a conversion rate of less than 50%</p><p><strong>Quality:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*B-qg6yyTPN1viCJ2kMhm_Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>While we had a look at the shot-numbers in terms of quantity, here is a look at the other facet of shooting; Quality. Since quality of shots allows us to go a bit more in detail, here is a graph of shots-on-target % vs Goals — xG per 90 minutes.<br> <br>There are many determinants that we can play around with in order to measure the quality of shooting. Something as simple as the shots-on-target % gives you an idea of how many shots does a striker need to get one shot on-target, while the latest xG algorithms have also given birth to several other ways of measuring the finishing quality. In the graph above, I have combined both of these elements where in shots on-target % is compared against the rate at which the striker has underperformed/ overperformed his xG per 90 minutes. (Per 90 is to ensure number of games don’t impact)</p><p>As you can see, the top-right quadrant of the graph has strikers who have a high number of shots on-target % and also outperformed their xG, which means they are not only accurate shooters but clinical finishers as well.</p><p>The top-left quadrant has strikers who have outperformed their xG but not a healthy ratio in terms of shots on-target %. In other words, these strikers are capable of converting goals from difficult chances but not necessarily accurate in terms of shooting and could consider improving that.</p><p>The bottom-right quadrant has strikers who have a good ratio in terms of shots on-target % but have underperformed their xG. In other words, these strikers manage to get their shots on-target but are not necessarily clinical in their finishing. While it might not be a hard-and-fast rule, a possible interpretation could be that these strikers need to improve in terms of placement, power and shot-selection as their clinicality is not high despite having significant number of shots on-target</p><p>The bottom-left quadrant has strikers who neither have a good ratio in shots on-target % nor outperformed their xG, which means that they need to work a lot on both their shot accuracy as well as clinicality.<br> <br>Erling Haaland has been clearly ahead of most strikers both in terms of shots on-target % (over 55% of shots on-target) as well as outperforming his xG (0.40 goals more than xG per 90), making him one of the most accurate shooters and clinical finishers in Europe’s Top-Five Leagues.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/735/1*y60lh9eYwpKuQpEcYUNtlw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here, we have categorized Haaland’s 27 goals into three main types of finishes: Placement, Power, Tap-in which came from movement or positioning. To avoid penalty kicks having an impact on the open-play goals, they have been mentioned separately. Haaland has taken only 1 penalty kick for Borussia Dortmund since his arrival, which is represented by the 4%. <br> <br>41% (11/27) of his goals came as a result of proper placement, 29% (8/27) of his goals were owing to sheer power and 26% (7/27) of his goals were just a matter of pushing the ball into the net after an intelligent run or positioning.</p><h4>Areas shots taken from</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*42oAn622Z8BLhYEBXz73oA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here’s a graphical representation of Haaland’s goals categorized by area on the pitch. There are about 27 goals which have been taken into account, considering his arrival at Borussia Dortmund as the starting point. Goals scored in all major competitions such as Bundesliga, UEFA Champions League, DFL SuperCup (vs Bayern) and even the UEFA Nations League (for Norway) have been taken into consideration. <br> <br> This is for a general understanding about which area of the pitch does Haaland get his goals from and as the graph suggests, 19 goals come from inside the penalty area, 6 goals from inside the 6-yard box and just 2 from outside the box.</p><h4>Areas shots taken at</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6NjSWOjkz2tUnpnXdF3BbA.jpeg" /></figure><p>And here’s a graphical representation of Haaland’s goals categorized by areas in the goal aimed at. Similar to the above graph, here also we consider the 27 goals scored in top-flight competitions since arriving at Borussia Dortmund, including goals for the Norway National team. <br> <br>The target symbols denote the ball’s point of entry into goal for the 27 goals with the size of the target symbol being directly proportional to the difficulty (xG of that chance). So, a bigger target symbol means that it was a more difficult chance to finish while a smaller target symbol means an easier chance. However, when the player in question is Erling Haaland, there are hardly any easy chances with majority of the goals being jaw-dropping finishes, leaving no chance for the goal-keeper. <br> <br>19 of Haaland’s 27 goals have found the net from the top or bottom corners of the goal. While the focus on aiming for the corners is a fair reasoning as to why the Norweigan’s finishing is of such high quality, it is also interesting categorize the goals as top-half of the goal vs bottom-half of the goal.</p><h4>The Signature Erling Haaland Whip</h4><p>Haaland has 9 goals out of the 29, which have been scored in the top half of goal which is over 30%. It is definitely not normal for a striker to have over 30% of his goals scored at the height of a goal-keeper’s chest, especially when he has just 2 goals from outside the box. The most common occurrence of the ball gaining that kind of a height is when they are shot from long-range as the ball has ample time for the upward trajectory to take place. <br> <br>However in the case of Haaland, there seems to be a unique technique that gives the ball an upward, rising trajectory despite the location of the shot not being too far away from goal. Is it possible to shoot the ball with such perfection that it doesn’t go flying above the crossbar and also doesn’t reach the goal-keeper at a comfortable waist-height which would be an easy stop?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8bmcHVNbAhXQTtQ4iK_2ww.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong><em>Haaland’s goal vs PSG in the 2019–20 UEFA Champions League Round-of-16 Stage</em></strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wBaRQQk0sVlQ1SdfZlEBgQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong><em>Haaland’s goal vs Lazio in the 2020–21 UEFA Champions League Group Stage</em></strong></figcaption></figure><p>There are certain technical differences between the traditional driven shot from long-range and the whip-like shot of Haaland. First let us have a look at an example of a perfect traditional driven shot from long-range</p><p>As you can see, Van Bronckhorst’s goal against Uruguay in the 2010 FIFA World Cup Semi-Finals is surely up there among the perfect examples of how to pull the trigger from long-range. There are a few key-points in terms of its execution:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*fP-NH8U5k7F1iaRpJzR6Qg.gif" /><figcaption><strong><em>Giovanni Van Bronckhorst’s goal vs Uruguay in the 2010 FIFA World Cup Semi-Finals</em></strong></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>A strong planted-foot pointing towards the direction of shot, chest leaning over the ball, a big back-lift of the shooting leg, ankle locked, connecting the ball in the lower-middle area, a follow-through which sees the shooting leg go all the way up and then finally the shot-taker landing on the same leg with which he shot.</em></strong><br> <br>While this is generally the preferred technique to take a powerful shot from long-range, the technique used by Haaland in his shots to generate power is unique, if not completely new. The Norweigan’s technique has no follow-through whatsoever and he simply puts the shooting-foot abruptly on the ground upon shooting the ball. The idea is to hit the ball in the middle-to-lower area like a whip with his instep-lace as all the power needed to whip the ball would come from a huge back-lift. <br> <br>Haaland has scored numerous goals using this technique with the second goal against PSG in the UEFA Champions League Round-of-16, 1st leg at Dortmund being the most famous one:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*VjHwhp_ltvHKEknwp0MivA.gif" /><figcaption><strong><em>Here we can clearly see how Haaland’s left-foot after the shot has no follow-through and just gets planted firmly to the ground</em></strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*0K_RlkWGR_JkhFB0lPsNqg.gif" /><figcaption><strong><em>Yet another example: Haaland’s goal vs Werder Bremen in the Bundesliga last season with no follow-through but the goal going above the keeper’s waist</em></strong></figcaption></figure><p>In short, the technique is nothing but an extremely powerful back-spin which is created owing to the foot meeting the lower portion of the ball. This brings the ball off-the-ground, giving it an upward trajectory and taking it towards the roof of goal at full speed. This upward trajectory as the ball enters goal is a major reason why it is difficult for goal-keepers to stop. When the keeper is in his regular stance ready for a shot, he is on his toes with knees slightly bent. So right from the starting position, the keeper is already lagging behind in terms of height. As the shot is angled with power towards the roof of goal, it is impossible for the goalkeeper to get over the ball, especially if he was in anticipation of a low-driven shot. So a keeper’s best bet would be to get under the ball and increase its height to the extent that it goes over the crossbar and that is indeed a challenge.</p><p>I even had a discussion with a goal-keeping coach I know, regarding shots of this kind and here is what he had to say:</p><p><strong><em>“Since it is relatively rare compared to the “normal shots”, it’s much harder as your brain isn’t wired to understand motion (uprising trajectory) this way. A goal-keeper practices 100 shots, 99 are moving top-to-down even if ever so slightly. <br> <br>So you take a split second to read the shot, then your brain has to process the abnormal movement and that delay can be all the difference between a goal &amp; a save, because uprising shots are always hit with power. So definitely the power and the unusual movement of the ball is a killer combo”</em></strong><br> <br>Atleast as far as I have seen, a shot of this kind is pretty rare and you can find them only in the playbook of footballers with supreme shooting technique like Steven Gerrard or Kevin de Bruyne. I have mentioned these two names as I distinctly remember seeing them score some bangers with this technique.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*IPydrP6wlMEL68RED6vhhw.gif" /><figcaption><strong><em>Kevin De Bruyne scored for Wolfsburg using the same technique: Huge Backlift, No follow-through, uprising trajectory with full power</em></strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*TQESxafn5TtwKje8Shgp-A.gif" /><figcaption><strong><em>Steven Gerrard scores for Liverpool in the 2004–05 UEFA Champions League at the qualifiers stage using the same technique</em></strong></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Conclusion — By Tobias &amp; Myself!</strong></h4><p>As we could see, Erling Haaland follows a few simple principles to score his goal. Mainly the creation of space and the hiding on the blind side of the defender. The precision with which Haaland positions and performs his runs as well as the quick acceleration and the great finishing is the secret of his success. Overall, he is a great off-ball striker and simply knows when and where to attack, however, it is not rocket science. The Norwegian simply executes the fundamental principles of a striker nearly to perfection. To remember that Erling Haaland is almost a complete striker who can trouble any defender with his movement, physique, link-up, sharp-shooting, all at the age of 20 is simply mind-blowing. In fact, it wouldn’t be an overstatement to even say that he is already up there as one of the best strikers in the World.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c068ae0b7539" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[First Look at Andrea Pirlo’s Juventus: Tactics, Principles & What to Expect]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/first-look-at-andrea-pirlos-juventus-tactics-principles-what-to-expect-66d107b4a4a6?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/66d107b4a4a6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[serie-a]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cristiano-ronaldo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[juventus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2020 05:34:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-24T06:32:18.227Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*llA40O5rx0J835zIK30eEA.jpeg" /><figcaption>While there is a lot of talk going on with regard to the lack of experience as a first-team coach at the top-flight level, how exactly did Juventus look under Andrea Pirlo on his Serie A debut?</figcaption></figure><p>The arrival of Cristiano Ronaldo, Antonio Conte’s return to management with Inter, Atalanta’s attacking football, Lazio’s burst into the top three, Gattuso fighting back the crisis at Napoli, Ibrahimovic leading Milan back to winning ways…. While there are already enough reasons for someone to be excited about Serie A, here we are welcoming yet another addition to Italian football; <strong>Andrea Pirlo, The Manager!<br> </strong><br>For someone who vowed to never get into coaching or management not too long ago, Pirlo has certainly made a huge decision by accepting a club as big as Juventus as his first ever. Any football lover who has come across Pirlo the player, would know that falling in love with watching him play used to happen instantly or eventually but it was hard not to at all. With the way he used to find pockets of space to receive the ball, dictate the tempo, progress play into the final-third and create chances out of nowhere with his hawk-eyed vision, it was evident that he already had a thorough knowledge, ability to read and understand the game.<br> <br>However as cliched as it sounds, playing football and coaching a team are two totally different situations and there is no guarantee that a successful player will go on to become a successful coach. Having said that, there are some who have been successful in both careers and we can only wait and watch if Pirlo would turn out to become one such exception himself. So, what do the early signs say?<br> <br> <strong><br> Coaching Principles &amp; Objective</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dBy3N9dUh6IcX4Y_UKj04w.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>“The founding idea of my football is based off a will that is: purposeful, possessive and attacking. I want total football. The two principals of my football are: we must keep the ball for as long as possible and be ferocious in winning it back immediately. The teams that inspired my ideas as a football coach were: Cruyff’s Barcelona, then Guardiola’s, Van Gaal’s Ajax, Ancelotti’s AC Milan &amp; Conte’s Juventus”</em></strong><em><br> <br></em>These were Pirlo’s words when asked about the foundation of his team’s principles and how he would like to set them up. He wants his team to focus on not only keeping the possession of the ball but to have meaningful possession spells which translate into fruitful chances. Regaining possession as high and as quickly as possible is also one of the key characteristics he wants to instill. From what we saw against Sampdoria, it did seem like Pirlo’s Juventus checked all boxes. So how exactly were they setup and what in terms of tactics, can we expect from Pirlo in his debut season as a manager?</p><h4><strong>Formation</strong></h4><p><strong>Juventus maintained two different formations throughout the game: one when they have the ball and one when they don’t have the ball.</strong> By doing so, Pirlo has already shown that he is well aware of the basics of setting-up a team despite having no experience. The reason is simple; A team in possession of the ball and a team not in possession of the ball have completely different functions to carry out with different objectives in mind. <br> <br><strong>While it is not impossible to maintain one single formation during all phases of the game, there is a need for our players to occupy different spaces when we have the ball and a need to deny different spaces when we don’t have it.</strong> After all, the most basic objective of a team is to score goals and not concede and it is the coach/ manager’s duty to provide their team with a setup that will enable them to achieve both objectives in the easiest way possible.</p><h4><strong>Formation in possession: 3–4–1–2</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/453/1*O28rYGIt-Dl_yrCSRv0DGg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Juventus shape when in possession</figcaption></figure><p>While in possession, Juventus adapted a 3–4–1–2 shape, ensuring enough numerical superiority in the first phase for build-up without having to give up on width or depth. The preference was to keep possession of the ball while playing out from the back using the goalkeeper (Szczesny) and a 3–2 shape. <strong>The 3–2 here refers to the 3 defenders (Danilo, Bonucci &amp; Chiellini) and 2 midfielders (McKennie &amp; Rabiot) to be additional passing options beyond opponent’s first line of press.</strong></p><p><strong>Asymmetry in width</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fl9d3NaT2fJBjuRZNnj_HA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The 3–2 shape in build-up in the first-third with three defenders and two central-midfielders. Cristiano Ronaldo, Aaron Ramsey &amp; Dejan Kulusevski stay narrow in the central areas while Cuadrado &amp; Frabotta (circled black) provide the width</figcaption></figure><p>As Danilo joined the two center-backs to form a back-three in possession, Pirlo opted to go for asymmetry to provide width to Juventus in possession. <strong>On the left flank, Gianluca Frabotta bombed forward to be the attacking outlet while on the right flank, it was Juan Cuadrado who was the attacking outlet.</strong> The advantage of asymmetry especially while playing out from the back is that, the opponent’s attackers or the first line of pressure find it complicated to close down.</p><p><strong>A typical high-press pattern has the striker on one of the center-backs, left-winger on the right-back, right winger on the left-back and so on. With Danilo staying back with Bonucci &amp; Chiellini, the opponent would have to commit their front-three to press high, which would mean that left-back Frabotta or Cuadrado on the right are likely to be free. </strong>So the back-three was all about drawing pressure from Sampdoria to create gaps in other areas of the pitch, which can be utilized to progress play.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hnwQPh-kXVfJXo8RrEoGIw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Seconds before the opening goal: Danilo is about to receive the ball and attracts pressure from Sampdoria winger Mehdi Leris. Owing to this, Kulusevski (circled yellow) gets free in the right half-space. The full-back cannot follow Kulusevski as Cuadrado (circled black) is providing the width on the right flank.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*eTw1n8aLi4Xz2xU7K8ycIQ.gif" /><figcaption>Danilo is seconds ahead of the Sampdoria winger Leris as he sees the gap and plays the oncoming Kulusevski, who connects with Cuadrado and after a couple of passes exchanged, its 1–0. The back-three managed to draw the front-three of Sampdoria into pressing them and created gaps in the middle to lead to the opener</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Fluid front-three<br> <br>Cristiano Ronaldo &amp; Dejan Kulusevski were almost acting as a front-two with Aaron Ramsey as the connector between midfield and attack. </strong>The front-two were more of wide forwards who wanted to dominate the half-spaces (Ronaldo on the left and Kulusevski on the right). The main reason why Juve were able to convert their long spells of possession into real threatening chances was owing to the dynamic movement shown by Ronaldo, Kulusevski as well as Ramsey. For majority of the first half, the three were positioned high, narrow and close to each other. It was almost like a front-three who pinned back the opposition’s last line of defense.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6TOviOCoeBJahvm3xPrWyw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aaron Ramsey had maintained a close, narrow positioning along with the front-two of Ronaldo &amp; Kulusevski as they pinned the back-four with the width being provided by Cuadrado &amp; Frabotta (circled black)</figcaption></figure><p>However in the second half, <strong>Pirlo had made a small tweak to his attack with Ramsey withdrawing from his high positioning into a deeper role, more like a typical number 10.</strong> After this change, Juve were able to get the best out of Ramsey as they were more direct, more vertical and progressed play into the final third by playing into the Welshman’s feet. We will see more of this later.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/599/1*F9dZGLdAlqhudnYRPUsXZg.gif" /><figcaption>60 seconds of Juventus in possession: They start by playing out from the back with Szczesny and try to disorganize Sampdoria’s defensive structure without rushing into attacks. They wait for the right moment to progress play into the final-third. Until then, they simply try to move Sampdoria from one flank to another or draw them out of position by inviting pressure</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Positive Transition</strong></p><p>On winning the ball back, Juve prioritized on securing possession more than initiating counter-attacks or quick breaks. Again this is not a black-and-white rule that applies throughout the game but the general preference was to start possession spells from the back using Bonucci, Chiellini &amp; Danilo.</p><h4>Formation when not in possession:<strong> 4–4–2</strong></h4><p>It looked like Juve had a clear plan in place on how to approach the opponent when not in possession and executed it to perfection. Pirlo’s men adapted the traditional flat 4–4–2 shape with Ronaldo &amp; Kulusevski forming the first line of pressure while Ramsey &amp; Cuadrado joined the central-midfielders to form the second line of four and Danilo, Bonucci, Chiellini &amp; Frabotta forming the last line of defence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cTTAXNcqFxI5ip1F_8gIBA.gif" /><figcaption>Juventus maintaining the 4–4–2 shape in all phases of the pitch. Please note that these images didn’t occur immediately after one another in the game, it is to give you an idea of the shape in different thirds of the pitch</figcaption></figure><p>Pirlo did mention about his desire to win the ball back as high up the pitch as possible but this definitely <strong>didn’t mean that he wanted his team to press anyone and everyone who had the ball blindly with maximum intensity.</strong> It was rather a combination of hard work and smart work by Juventus as they excelled in keeping their opponents far from goal. <strong>Sampdoria had just 1 shot on target in the entire game</strong> and this is why Juve’s work off the ball needs a special mention here. <br> <br><strong>The Italian Champions were more than happy to let Sampdoria goal-keeper Emil Audero have the ball and remained passive in their pressing around the penalty area. There was almost never any pressure applied on Audero, rather focusing on maintaining a 10 v 10 inside the pitch simply because the moment a player is sent to close down the goalkeeper, the defending team is under the risk of leaving someone else free in the outfield. </strong>While Audero completed all of his short-passes comfortably, there were no clear gaps in Juve’s defensive structure for Sampdoria to utilize. Therefore, it didn’t matter how many passes Audero and Sampdoria’s center-backs exchanged between themselves, Juve were always organized.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*n6JbqX0iUiAjFzW2qp5XBg.gif" /><figcaption>A sample clip of Juventus’ pressing: They remain passive around the penalty area and allow time on the ball for the goal-keeper and the center-backs. The pressing becomes active and aggressive as the opponent enters the middle-third</figcaption></figure><p>Once Sampdoria progressed play into the first-third and gradually attempted to enter the middle-third, that’s when Juventus’ pressed relentlessly. <strong>Juve maintained an extremely low PPDA (Passes Per Defensive Action) of 6.79 or in other words, there was a pressure attempt for every 7 passes made by Sampdoria. Looking at pressing from another perspective, Juventus had made 154 pressure attempts despite having about 66% possession.</strong></p><p>Is this number high or low?<strong> </strong>Let’s take a look at some other teams who like to dominate the ball and maintain high-intensity pressure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/501/1*mLMz0n24IOeWnYxnSFnJ7w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Juventus vs Sampdoria in comparison to the 2019–20 season average of teams who dominate possession and press intensely. This is not to find out who is better but simply to give you an idea of Juve’s work off-the-ball</figcaption></figure><p>As you would be knowing, teams with over 65% possession wouldn’t have high number of pressure attempts as their opponents obviously have much lesser of the ball and hence the scope to press itself is limited. This should give you an idea of why it is a big deal to have over 150 pressure attempts when the opponent has the ball only for 35% of the game.<strong> The secret sauce of Juve was not to press blindingly high up the pitch but to ensure that they have a defensive shape that covers the right zones, leaves no clear passing option open for access and then press with high intensity.</strong></p><p><strong>Negative Transition</strong></p><p>While Juve did counter-press on losing possession in an attempt to stop the opponent from progressing forward quickly, it was not at the cost of losing their shape/ structure. The nearest player to the ball was usually in charge of the counter-press with the others just covering the safe passing options to encourage the opponent going long and risk losing possession. If it wasn’t possible, Pirlo’s men simply ensured their organization was in place and went back to defending. In short, defensive shape was always the priority with a risk-averse approach to counter-pressing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/549/1*ydiyLG83qWI87ORwCFK67A.gif" /><figcaption>Here you can see how Ramsey &amp; Kulusevski lead the charge in counter-pressing on losing possession, however the midfield line realize that there would be too many gaps if they commit to pressing and backed off to maintain the shape.</figcaption></figure><h4>Key Players in the system</h4><p>Although it has just been one game, there is no shame in admitting that the system worked wonders for Juventus. However there are certain players who deserve a special mention as they may go unnoticed while they are actually the key to make the system work:</p><p><strong>Aaron Ramsey</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8hDa-g6BdALWq9iZextLdw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Andrea Pirlo deployed Aaron Ramsey in a role tailor-made for the Welshman and was able to get a brilliant performance out of him</figcaption></figure><p>Aaron Ramsey had probably the trickiest role in the system and yet came through with flying colours. His positioning, movement and decision-making were key to converting spells of possession into goal-scoring chances. <strong>Credit to Pirlo where necessary as Ramsey was withdrawn from being part of an almost front-three in the first-half to a proper a no.10 like role for the second half. It gave Juventus much needed freedom while they progressed play from middle-third into the final-third as Ramsey acted as the connector, occupying spaces in between the lines.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/565/1*NdOJR7FFFSpHbMmPwmZAuA.gif" /><figcaption>Ramsey positioning himself between the lines to receive a pass directly from the center-back and creating a decent goal-scoring opportunity</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/587/1*9By068lHH_IvMDyt5bb5WA.gif" /><figcaption>Yet another example of Ramsey receiving the ball in between the lines and playing Ronaldo through in-behind the defense to create a clear cut opportunity. While we have seen a couple of them, there were many more such opportunities</figcaption></figure><p>Ramsey ended the game with — <strong>70 passes (83%), 6 key passes, 1 assist, 12/17 duels won and completed 2/2 dribbles. He was just as brilliant when Juventus weren’t in possession, as part of the second-line of four out on the left-flank. He managed to win back possession 7 times for Juve with 6 tackles and 1 interception, making his performance a complete package.</strong></p><p><strong>Danilo</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*x2hOSp2kqFd1H8JOJeBM7g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Danilo’s influence on the game was impactful especially during build-up in the first two-thirds and progressing Juventus into the final-third.</figcaption></figure><p>Danilo was yet another key influencer of the game having been deployed in a unique role. As we saw earlier, the Brazilian was responsible for drawing pressure from Sampdoria’s attackers to open gaps in other areas and progress play. He not only played a key part in Juve’s opening goal but also charged forward to act almost like an additional midfielder when Sampdoria adapted to fall deeper into their own third. Danilo finished the game with a massive <strong>121 touches and 101 passes at a 95% pass accuracy (most by any player on the pitch). Being a natural right-back and also having the prowess to excel in central areas, he is arguably a perfect fit to Pirlo’s system.</strong></p><p><strong>Wojciech Szczęsny</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GrbFLnExz_Ac-nnSs3RTbg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Wojciech Szczęsny was an integral part of Juventus’ build-up as he showed how he can excel with the ball at his feet. It is very likely that Pirlo will continue to expect the same from him</figcaption></figure><p>Although Wojciech Szczesny had almost no saves to make during the game, it doesn’t mean he didn’t have an important role to play in the victory. Szczesny was integral to Juve’s build-up as they mostly played out from the back than going long. <strong>He completed the game with 43 passes at a completion of 91%, out of which 31 were short-passes. Compare this to his numbers at Juve from the previous three seasons, Szczesny averages just 21 passes per game with 12 of them being short-passes. He has doubled the number of total passes played and almost tripled the number of short-passes played.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/574/1*AjMqx1wwlWu5YOCJS8rBCA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Szczesny vs Sampdoria in comparison to the 2019=20 season average of other goalkeepers who are in teams of similar playing style. Again, this is not to find out who was better but to give you an idea of the similarity in style</figcaption></figure><h4>Conclusion</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Fuqr4AaeqsjxQOQ552TV3Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Whlie Pirlo showed his tactical nous in his win against Sampdoria, there is still a lot of skepticism about how he would turn out as a manager. Will he be a success with Juve?</figcaption></figure><p>Clarity, Intent, Belief &amp; Work-rate were key ingredients of Pirlo’s Juventus. Although it may be a tad bit early to make any big statement as of now, it does look like the team has bought into Pirlo’s way of football and all the signs from the first game point to a bright future, which as a huge fan, I too hope will be the case!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66d107b4a4a6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tactical Preview: Can Chelsea fit in their trio in a 4–4–2]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/tactical-preview-can-chelsea-fit-in-their-trio-in-a-4-4-2-c02952e955b3?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c02952e955b3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chelsea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2020 14:17:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-14T18:59:51.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Tactical Preview: Can Chelsea fit in their trio in a 4–4–2?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MVxnPMiOckq2VsvFjJTrNg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Will Lampard be able to create a successful system fitting in all three of his stars?</figcaption></figure><p>Chelsea have had one of the most prolific transfer windows they have ever had in recent times. As the likes of Willian, Pedro and Giroud were all nearing the mid-30s, a revamp of the attacking unit was the need of the hour. With the addition of T<strong>imo Werner, Hakim Ziyech and Kai Havertz</strong>, the Blues have made an attempt towards building a well-oiled attacking machine for atleast the next 6–7 years. <br> <br>The combined fee of the three stars crosses <strong>a massive 150-million</strong>, which may still be considered reasonable by some, given their ability to perform. However, it is still absolutely essential that Manager Frank Lampard is able to ensure that these investments turn out to be fruitful ones by <strong>having a system in place, that would bring out the best in not only Werner, Ziyech and Havertz but also their new number ‘10’ Christian Pulisic. </strong><br> <br>There have been a lot of arguments going on amongst Chelsea fans and even among others who have been keen on finding out how Lampard can form a winning XI which brings the best out of all the attacking talent available and yet not give up the balance of the team. <br> <br><strong>The most discussed options seem to be 4–2–3–1, 4–3–3 or 4–1–4–1</strong> with at least one or two players in midfield adjusting himself into a position he isn’t really familiar with. Here is why an option which hasn’t been discussed at all, may actually be a viable one that checks all the boxes…<br> <br> <strong>The Good Ol’ 4–4–2!</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/443/1*6l_7UQrHxRNMpLHob0ccmw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Before we look into whether this is really a practically possible solution with some interesting detail, we have to address the elephant in the room, Ziyech and Havertz! <br> <br><strong><em>“Ziyech &amp; Havertz are identical players with identical playing styles occupying the same areas on the pitch</em></strong>”…if we had a penny every time we heard that!<br> <br>There is absolutely no truth to that statement and probably the laziest analysis made by fans without putting the effort to actually watch the two play for Leverkusen and Ajax. Okay let’s say there is some truth to it, given that both are left-footed players who have spent a considerable amount of games on the right flank with some good attacking output. Barring that, Havertz &amp; Ziyech are just as similar as night &amp; day. <br> <br><strong>On one hand, Havertz’ biggest strengths are close control of the ball, dribbling, shooting and finishing. On the other hand, Ziyech’s biggest strengths are vision, playmaking, crossing, 1v1 situations and engine-like lungs.</strong> To put it in short, Havertz is most effective inside the penalty area while Ziyech is most effective anywhere outside penalty area but within the final third, which means Lampard has two absolutely different beasts to deal with here.</p><h4><strong>Havertz shines as part of a front two</strong></h4><p>On paper, Leverkusen are shown to field Havertz as a right-winger in a <br>3–4–3 or a 4–2–3–1 for a majority of their games but if you ignore the <br>on-paper line-up and watch the games closely, you would realize that the German wonderkid has a lot more than just that. <strong>While he was deployed majorly as a false 9 since the restart of the season, he also spent a major part of the season as a forward in a front-two with Kevin Volland or Alario as the other striker and the right wing being take care of by Karim Bellarabi.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BgsayZNbwXPe5DachFl4Ig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Examples of average positioning with Havertz (no.29) in a right-forward position with Bellarabi (no.38) as the right-winger</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Overloading the wide areas — linkup with the right winger</strong></h4><p>As a right forward, Havertz’s connection with Bellarabi who was on the right wing was noteworthy as the duo were able to cause trouble via a variety of ways. They sometimes overloaded the flank, attracted pressure and played out of tight spaces and sometimes, made threatening off-the-ball movements to take out defenders and give space for the other one to dribble. <br> <br><strong>In fact, every game that Bellarabi was able to find the net, it was Havertz who was the striker as part of a front-two or as a false 9. He was also able to establish a similar connect with Moussa Diaby whenever the latter was deployed on the right wing.</strong> If Havertz can establish a similar connection with Ziyech on the right flank, then Lampard might not have much to worry about.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*LYRv-UYSRyaTBFNzx_2ovQ.gif" /><figcaption>Havertz connects with Diaby on the right flank but fails to get the shot off as he slips and gets it off target</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/511/1*awqTkblYKNOlrDoMzusecA.gif" /><figcaption>Havertz drops into midfield to pull a center-back along with him and allow space for Bellarabi to run into</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/482/1*gTVnr-BGDxXRuY6MusNrdA.gif" /><figcaption>Havertz goes out-wide to connect with Bellarabi and drifts in back into penalty area to finish the move</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Hold-Up Play as a Target-Man</strong></h4><p>This is one of Havertz’s major strengths which a significant number of fans aren’t aware of. The former-Leverkusen star excels in receiving passes with defender to his back. Standing at 6 ft. 2-and-half inches, his big frame allows him to shield the ball, scan and then release it without giving away possession. Moreover, owing to his technical superiority the German doesn’t have to rely on his physique all day every day. In times of being put under extremely high pressure, Havertz can also put the ball into space with an intelligent first-touch and beat the press. <br> <br>This means that Chelsea can also utilize him as a focal-point up front to bounce passes off to progress play from the middle-third to the final-third. It could also prove beneficial for Werner to play-off of him with quick passing combinations to get in behind the defenses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*tRqk8z8k4D7bXegRhNBBcg.gif" /><figcaption>Havertz’s no-look flick to put in Volland behind the defense</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/476/1*F13cydiJ3lNxay1RTyNHfA.gif" /><figcaption>Here you can see him controlling the ball with pressure from behind on one occasion while the other is an example of his excellent first touch to burst into space</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/436/1*U62YXCgAjvGZSsDDPrLUCg.gif" /><figcaption>Havertz cannot be easily outmuscled by the opponent with his physique</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Clinical-Finishing &amp; Aerial Threat</strong></h4><p>This is where Havertz can convince pretty much any manager to play him as a central-forward. His eye-for-goal is probably the biggest value-add he brings to any attack. The German’s finishing is just as clinical as any natural striker and he has hardly been wasteful in front of goal. He isn’t the kind of player who would pull the trigger as soon as he sees space but would rather like the ball to be teed up, find those small pockets around the 6-yard or arrive late into the box to find the back of the net. <br> <br><strong>Havertz was able to score 16 times for Leverkusen in League and European Competitions, all goals were from inside the penalty area. <br></strong> <br>For a relatively lean physique, Havertz is a significant aerial threat with his height, clever positioning and heading technique giving him the edge against centre-backs.<strong> Out of the 16 goals last season, 3 were headers and apart from that, he also had 10 headed-shot attempts. Here are a couple of examples…</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/459/1*XDEPqt0A1y4g6rgBS6NoNQ.gif" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/469/1*6boQS-2QBzuLlPQZKqkhMg.gif" /></figure><h4><strong>Ziyech, The Better Winger</strong></h4><p>While we looked at why Havertz can be a success as part of a front-two, it is also true that Ziyech is the clear winner in terms of who the better winger. As mentioned earlier, there are stark differences in what the major strengths are of the two players. Watching Ziyech’s trademark cutting in on his left-foot towards central areas and wreaking havoc, is an absolute treat to the eyes. The vision to pick runs in-behind the defence combining with the execution of his through balls and crosses from the right flank, needs to be utilized to the fullest.</p><p>As noted from an article by ‘The Athletic UK’,<strong> Ziyech averages 9.72 crosses per 90 mins which is only behind two Premier League cross-masters, Trent Alexander-Arnold at 10.70 and Kevin De Bruyne at 9.81.</strong></p><p>The Moroccan brings a totally different brand of attacking football which encourages free-flowing, risk-taking and forward-thinking. He doesn’t hesitate to pull the trigger when he has the ball with space ahead of him. It doesn’t matter where he is, he backs himself to give the goal-keeper a challenge. Only three players in Europe’s top five leagues shot more frequently than Ziyech last season, which pretty much sums up what he is about.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/523/1*O66acqBB49An7AWrnVrC8Q.gif" /><figcaption>Ziyech can pull the trigger from anywhere on the pitch when he feels he can test the keeper and many times, it pays off</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/450/1*QfzE-5YR0t-BM5APAu2iyQ.gif" /><figcaption>Ziyech doesn’t necessarily have to drift inwards to create his play, he can pretty much do it from the touchline as well</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Ziyech had attempted about 108 shots in League + European competitions with a massive 70 of them coming from outside the penalty area, a complete contrast to Havertz<br> </em></strong><br><strong>He also averaged over 3 key passes per 90 and over 4 dribble attempts per 90 as well. This is the kind of guy you want out-wide to stretch the opposition or in 1v1 against the opposition’s full-back.</strong> Ziyech is also known for his work-rate and engine-like lungs which could turn out to be key in terms of helping out the right-back when Chelsea are out of possession. He averaged about 6 tackle attempts per game in the group stage of the Champions League last season, a number which many defenders don’t have.</p><h4><strong>It takes Two to Timo</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*qZuoWsUA1khcalu3.jpg" /><figcaption>Timo Werner &amp; Kai Havertz could turn out to be one of the most lethal duos in the Premier League</figcaption></figure><p><strong>In the last 4 seasons in Bundesliga, Werner has managed to score 78 goals with RB Leipzig. This means that he averages over 19 goals per season,</strong> an excellent return on investment without a doubt. The catch here is that Werner has shown this level of consistency as part of a front-two and he has hardly had any playing time as the lone-striker. <strong>RB Leipzig have had 136 Bundesliga games since 2016–17 and out of these, they have started 116 games with a front-two. Even in the 20 games when RB Leipzig didn’t have a front-two, Werner was deployed majorly as the left-winger and not as the lone-striker. </strong><br> <br>It is most likely for the same reason that since the 2018 FIFA World Cup debacle, German National Team Manager Joachin Loew has preferred Werner as part of a front-two with Serge Gnabry/ Leroy Sane or as a left-winger when he goes for a lone-striker setup. With Havertz showing signs of excelling as part of a front-two, there is absolutely no reason why Lampard shouldn’t consider pairing the two Bundesliga starlets up-front with Ziyech and Pulisic as the dribblers/playmakers on the flanks. This will also keep the zone 14 or the area where a traditional ‘10’ operates empty for all four attackers to drop in as per the situation.</p><h4><strong>Defensive Diligence &amp; Team Balance</strong></h4><p>The only factor which casts doubt on whether Lampard should opt for a 4–4–2 is the fear of over-committing numbers up-front and giving up defensive diligence. This is indeed a point which needs to be given due attention to as Chelsea’s defensive issues remained unsolved towards the end of last season as well. One way of ensuring that the team doesn’t lose out on balance is through asymmetry. This is somewhat Chelsea has done in their previous title-winning campaigns under Jose Mourinho. In 2014–15, Mourinho had given license to bomb forward to Ivanovic on the right but held back Azpilicueta on the left.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0U0z46VRHllg617WH1IwKg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Chelsea’s shape in possession if they opt for the 4–4–2</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see, there are 5 players to attack with the front-four and Chilwell pushing forward from the left flank. This would give them 5 players to defend as well with the two centre-backs, two central-midfielders and Reece James/Azpilicueta positioning themselves in the middle-third as an option to rotation possession than going forward for width. With sufficient rotational movement, drop-ins to zone-14 and moving the opponent from flank-to-flank, this definitely has the potential to generate a lot of chances and hopefully a lot of goals!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c02952e955b3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Donny van de Beek a 6, 8 or 10: What can he bring to the Old Trafford?]]></title>
            <link>https://onenil.medium.com/donny-van-de-beek-a-6-8-or-10-what-can-he-bring-to-the-old-trafford-bef3b46b1020?source=rss-9879184b89d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bef3b46b1020</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-united]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[One Nil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2020 11:28:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-31T11:28:20.723Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Do5PZwDyRW2qEyjLGhQkmg.jpeg" /><figcaption>With Donny van de Beek’s move to the Theatre of Dreams all but done, let us have a look at what can he bring to the team’s midfield and to their attacking unit.</figcaption></figure><p>Donny van de Beek is definitely among the most unique footballers in top-flight football today and it is a bit unfortunate that it is not yet a widely known fact among mainstream fans. Lets quickly look at what makes him that unique and whether or not it makes sense for Manchester United to splurge the cash to bring him to Old Trafford:</p><h4>Raumdeuter-ness</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UKyZS77zROl1DBP30YPHrg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The picture probably says it all but let’s have a look at what it is in detail</figcaption></figure><p>Yes, you read it right…de Beek loves space! Although a midfielder, de Beek has the <strong>innate attacking ability and an eye-for-space,</strong> which makes him most effective in and around the box. The Dutchman’s intuitions are almost always right in those areas and he never shies away from making runs in-behind the defense and/or into the box. Owing to this, Ajax coach Erik Ten Haag never bothered to alter this side of his game and let him flow free.</p><p>The first time I had seen de Beek in full flow was when Ajax had started peaking with a winning-eleven in place towards the end of 2017–18 season. <strong>One of the very first comparisons I made to relate to him as an attacking midfielder was Thomas Muller. </strong>Even if de Beek isn’t at that level yet in terms of quality, he for sure seems to be cut from the same fabric.</p><p>Looking at some of his goals, it would be easier to understand what we are talking about here:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f19ddt0fjCw3CB17KbX3Jw.jpeg" /><figcaption>As you can see from the game against Athens in 2018–19 UEFA Champions League group stage game, as one defender stays with the dribbler and the other one taken out by David Neres’ run into near post, Van de Beek spots the opportunity from outside the box and makes a run out to far post</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/599/1*CSY7y9YfzDt4YduL6XrF6g.gif" /><figcaption>An intelligent run followed by a volley of supreme technique to beat the goalkeeper</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*TpGv6dajlbc_-bKS1VpTEg.gif" /><figcaption>Another example of an intelligent run-in by van de Beek with the further-most Ajax player taking out the center-back along with him</figcaption></figure><p>He also excels in finding those little pockets of space against an organised back-four and makes short bursts of runs in-behind them to put himself in goal-scoring positions. <strong>This is why he’s probably the closest thing to Muller in football today…</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*9yzlbHxHy5q3H_3jsBYLWA.gif" /><figcaption>van de Beek’s goal against Tottenham in the 2018–19 UEFA Champions League Semi-Finals, where he does enough just to break the offside trap</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/493/1*1aQ-fR9jRTwReUOWe4wOVg.gif" /><figcaption>Yet another example of finding space in between the back-four and making a quick run-in followed by a cheeky fake-shot to make a fool out of the goalkeeper</figcaption></figure><p>With finding space, making runs and in general, a high IQ in attack being his biggest strengths, there is absolutely no doubt that van de Beek should be deployed in the final-third, allowing him to operate in and around the penalty area, than in deeper positions. Even if you take a look at the numbers, it is pretty clear from where he scores his goals.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/546/1*NDsU2NocgG24cwiByt4AJA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Goals scored by the two players since 2017–18 in all competitions: You can see the similarity in the areas they get their goals from <strong><em>(Goals from penalty area include 6-yard box as well)</em></strong></figcaption></figure><p>Manchester United have not had a central midfielder arriving at the box to finish their attacking moves in a long time now. Let’s have a look at the heatmap of United’s midfielders in the 2019–20 Premier League:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*61uhwLiWfe7vuNam2lEspQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>From left: Paul Pogba, Jesse Lingard, Andreas Pereira, Juan Mata &amp; Bruno Fernandes</figcaption></figure><p>It is clear that United’s midfielders aren’t actively involved inside the penalty area except on an occasional basis. Now let’s have a look at de Beek’s heatmap to get an idea of how vast the difference is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/455/1*o-m7On3sI-puQhMAV-cU9A.jpeg" /><figcaption>As you can see, van de Beek’s involvement in the penalty area is much higher as compared to any of the midfielders United have had over the past 4 years</figcaption></figure><p>While we still do not know if United would be able to bring in a new striker in this window, the goal-scoring responsibility relies heavily upon United’s front-three with Bruno &amp; Pogba pitching. But now <strong>van de Beek could come handy in terms of sharing some of the load in terms of goal-scoring</strong> if he manages to find the net 10+ times over the course of the season</p><h4>Linking up with the ‘9’</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/957/1*9koh6yEAXJjFufUiczCBvA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Donny van de Beek’s connection with Dusan Tadic has been key to Ajax as well as tothe Dutchman’s evolution as one of the most promising attacking midfielders in Europe</figcaption></figure><p>As mentioned earlier, the most obvious way to get the best out of van de Beek is to allow him operate as the most advanced midfielder on the pitch and allowing link up with the front-three. However as he would start most of his runs or link-ups from central areas, his connection with the number 9 of the team is absolutely vital to leverage his impact.</p><p>At Ajax, Dusan Tadic has established this connection with him over the last couple of seasons which has allowed de Beek to bring out the best of himself. <strong>The quick give-and-gos, lay-offs and off-the-ball movement are all key for the two to work together and they duo does it effortlessly</strong>. Another underlying factor for this to work is also the kind of number ‘9’ that Tadic is for Ajax. <strong>He excels in a variety of things like dropping deeper into space, going wide to swap positions with wingers, receiving the ball with back to goal to hold-up play for de Beek to bounce passes off.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*pD4R1NQQLUSJgjVleFSfMg.gif" /><figcaption>Tadic and van de Beek connect at the edge of the penalty area to break through the Valencia back-four</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*tNQ2fuDcg-4scQEDwXfsDA.gif" /><figcaption>Tadic takes out Zouma to free up space for van de Beek to arrive into a scoring position and the Dutchman makes no mistake</figcaption></figure><p>Interestingly enough, Manchester United have a number ‘9’ in Martial who plays in a strikingly similar role. The 2019–20 season has especially been key for t<strong>he Frenchman as he has upped his game to a large extent in all of those areas that we spoke of like holding-up play with back to goal, taking defenders out wide with runs, drop deep to allow others into space </strong>and so on. While many fans are expecting United’s midfield to improve drastically,<strong> the player who will benefit the most out of de Beek’s transfer might just be Martial.</strong></p><h4>What you probably shouldn’t expect</h4><p>While we had a clear overview of de Beek’s strengths are, let us have a look at the things he may not be able to excel in:</p><p><strong>Not a ball-carrier</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3M2iOcnn4WWg9ShWmuylEA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Taking on opponents in ground-duels from deeper areas in midfield isn’t among the best of de Beek’s abilities</figcaption></figure><p>van de Beek is definitely not the one you want to hand over the responsibility of carrying the ball from deep in midfield into advances areas in the final-third. The Dutchman is indeed technically strong when on-the-ball <strong>but dribbling past 3–4 opponents by himself and playing a killer through ball might be an unrealistic expectation of him. In fact, de Beek averages less 1 dribble per game in any given season throughout his career</strong>. It is ideal to have quality midfielders in the middle-third to allow de Beek to operate in the advanced areas doing what he does best.</p><p><strong>Not a defensive midfielder</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E91xx8a0VKAiwJ-FssItng.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figuring out the best midfield trio with Bruno and Pogba already cementing their places in the XI is going to be a challenge. However de Beek needs to play as the further-most of the trio</figcaption></figure><p>This might be obvious by now, van de Beek isn’t the best fit for a double pivot in a 4–2–3–1 or to play as the single pivot in a 4–3–3. <strong>Do not mistake this for ball-winning. Yes, de Beek is good at tracking back from advanced areas and putting in tackles in the defensive-third. Over the last 3 seasons, the Dutchman has averaged over 2 tackles per game and he is also effective at counter-pressing</strong>. But there is a vast difference between ball-winning and defending. Tackling and winning the ball back is only the tip of the defending iceberg. Especially for someone playing as part of the double-pivot<strong>, game-reading, patience, covering dangerous spaces and shielding the back-four are all absolutely pivotal.</strong></p><p>Given de Beek’s technique, intelligence and understanding of the game, he may do a decent job of playing as one among the two-pivots but moving him away from the goal might not just be the smartest thing to do. The closer he is to the goal, the more effective he becomes. So although he may give you a couple of 7/10 games as a DM, it is not something to pursue in the long run.</p><h4>So overall, a Yay or Nay?</h4><p>So overall have Manchester United been smart in bringing van de Beek to Old Trafford? I would say yes but Ole just needs to ensure that there is a certain way of deploying the Dutchman in order to get the best out of him. There are already well-established stars in the United midfield and it is not going to be easy to compete with them in the highest level week in and week out. But if done right, van de Beek would undoubtedly be worth every penny or may be he could even turn out to be one of their best transfers in recent times!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bef3b46b1020" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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