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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Christopher Ryan on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Kunai Analysis #1 — Analyzing Linux Activity with Kunai]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/kunai-analysis-1-analyzing-linux-activity-with-kunai-ba0c4dab7076?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux-threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux-threat-detection]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 02:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-02T02:01:02.407Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the previous article, we looked at how to build Linux threat detection with Kunai on an Ubuntu Server. Detection, however, is only one part of the investigation. The next challenge is understanding what the collected events actually tell us.</p><p>In this blog, we will focus on several important Kunai events and how they can be correlated to understand what happened on a Linux host.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_gv4EoShmP6A3I-vcz8Gvg.jpeg" /></figure><p>For analysis purpose it is more useful to focus on events that help answer these questions:</p><blockquote>What was executed?<br>What files were created or modified?<br>Was a script involved?<br>Did the host communicate with an external system?<br>Was there any persistence activity?<br>Were any artifacts removed?</blockquote><p>For this article, I will focus on six Kunai events that are useful as a starting point for Linux threat analysis:</p><pre>execve<br>execve_script<br>write_config<br>dns_query<br>connect<br>file_unlink</pre><p>The goal is not to analyze these events independently.</p><p>The goal is to correlate them and use the available context to understand what happened on the host.</p><h3>1. Understanding Kunai Events</h3><p>Before looking at individual events, it is useful to understand the structure of a Kunai event. Please find the example event log below</p><pre>{<br> &quot;data&quot;: &quot;…&quot;,<br> &quot;info&quot;: {<br> // Host related information<br> &quot;host&quot;: {<br> // Unique host uuid<br> &quot;uuid&quot;: &quot;c030b40d-0eab-417b-b33a-22d952357984&quot;,<br> // Hostname of the host running kunai<br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;hal&quot;,<br> // Container information if any, null otherwise<br> &quot;container&quot;: {<br> // Name of the container<br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;ubuntu-kunai-test&quot;,<br> // Type of container<br> &quot;type&quot;: &quot;docker&quot;<br> }<br> },<br> // Event related information<br> &quot;event&quot;: {<br> // A string which can be used by external tools to identify kunai&#39;s logs<br> &quot;source&quot;: &quot;kunai&quot;,<br> // Event type identifier<br> &quot;id&quot;: 1,<br> // Event type name<br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;execve&quot;,<br> // Unique identifier for an event<br> &quot;uuid&quot;: &quot;87f5cb64–11ca-fd34–26af-b47f84132543&quot;,<br> // Not relevant, here for diagnosis purposes<br> &quot;batch&quot;: 131<br> },<br> // Information about the task generating this event<br> &quot;task&quot;: {<br> // Task name<br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;ls&quot;,<br> // Identifier of the task (process or thread)<br> &quot;pid&quot;: 1981502,<br> // Thread Group ID of the task (same for all threads of a process)<br> // When pid == tgid we are in the main thread.<br> &quot;tgid&quot;: 1981502,<br> // A uuid common to all the events generated by the same<br> // task group/process (i.e. all threads). You can search by<br> // this value in order to see the whole activity of a process<br> &quot;guuid&quot;: &quot;cd5415c4–7750–0000–7c85–4ef53e3c1e00&quot;,<br> // Effective uid of the task<br> &quot;uid&quot;: 1000,<br> // Effective gid of the task<br> &quot;gid&quot;: 1000,<br> // Information about Linux namespaces<br> &quot;namespaces&quot;: {<br> // mnt namespace id<br> &quot;mnt&quot;: 4026531841<br> },<br> // task_struct flags https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.6.5/source/include/linux/sched.h#L767<br> // combination of process flags https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.6.5/source/include/linux/sched.h#L1726<br> &quot;flags&quot;: &quot;0x400000&quot;,<br> // Indicates whether the task is in a zombie state<br> &quot;zombie&quot;: true<br> },<br> // Information about the parent task. This section<br> // contains the same kind of information as the task section<br> &quot;parent_task&quot;: {<br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;3&quot;,<br> &quot;pid&quot;: 1981500,<br> &quot;tgid&quot;: 1981500,<br> &quot;guuid&quot;: &quot;a679f5c3–7750–0000–7c85–4ef53c3c1e00&quot;,<br> &quot;uid&quot;: 1000,<br> &quot;gid&quot;: 1000,<br> &quot;namespaces&quot;: {<br> &quot;mnt&quot;: 4026531841<br> },<br> &quot;flags&quot;: &quot;0x400000&quot;,<br> &quot;zombie&quot;: false<br> },<br> // UTC timestamp of the event<br> &quot;utc_time&quot;: &quot;2024–11–19T09:55:53.138247256Z&quot;<br> }<br>}</pre><p>Kunai events generally contain an info section and a data section.</p><p>The info section contains information that can be useful for identifying and correlating events, such as the event name, timestamp, task information, and parent task.</p><p>The data section contains information specific to the event.</p><p>For example, an execution event can contain fields related to the command line, executable, parent process, and process ancestry.</p><p>Some fields that are useful during analysis include:</p><pre>info.event<br>info.task<br>info.parent_task<br>info.utc_time</pre><p>For process-related events, fields such as:</p><pre>data.command_line<br>data.parent_command_line<br>data.parent_exe<br>data.ancestors<br>data.exe.path</pre><p>can provide additional context.</p><h3>2. execve — Start With Process Execution</h3><p>One of the most important events to understand is execve.</p><p>The event is generated when a process executes a program. This makes it one of the most useful starting points when investigating activity on a Linux system.</p><p>For example, consider the following Kunai event:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;data&quot;: {<br>    &quot;ancestors&quot;: &quot;/usr/lib/systemd/systemd|/usr/bin/login|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/xinit|/usr/bin/i3|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/urxvt|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/timeout|/usr/bin/bash&quot;,<br>    &quot;parent_command_line&quot;: &quot;bash -ec \&quot;trash=/tmp/trash; mkdir -p $trash; while [ true ]; do t=$(mktemp -d -p $trash); for i in {0..100000}; do echo \\\&quot;AHHHH\\\&quot; &gt; $t/test$i.txt; done &amp;&amp; rm -rf $t; done\&quot;&quot;,<br>    &quot;parent_exe&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/bash&quot;,<br>    &quot;command_line&quot;: &quot;mktemp -d -p /tmp/trash&quot;,<br>    &quot;exe&quot;: {<br>      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/mktemp&quot;,<br>      &quot;sha256&quot;: &quot;f32938cf25ddd6f6800a8e9b406595534d0eb27993587bbdeee2e83dd97d8406&quot;<br>    }<br>  },<br>  &quot;info&quot;: {<br>    &quot;event&quot;: {<br>      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;execve&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;utc_time&quot;: &quot;2025-06-10T14:00:42.814301638Z&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>At first glance, there is nothing particularly suspicious about:</p><pre>mktemp -d -p /tmp/trash</pre><p>mktemp is a legitimate Linux utility and is commonly used to create temporary files and directories.</p><p>However, the execve event gives us much more context.</p><p>The parent_command_line shows that the process was launched as part of:</p><pre>bash -ec &quot;trash=/tmp/trash; mkdir -p $trash; while [ true ]; do t=$(mktemp -d -p $trash); ...&quot;</pre><p>This immediately changes the investigation.</p><p>The parent process is repeatedly creating temporary directories under:</p><pre>/tmp/trash</pre><p>and then generating a large number of files:</p><pre>for i in {0..100000}; do<br>    echo &quot;AHHHH&quot; &gt; $t/test$i.txt<br>done</pre><p>The directory is subsequently removed:</p><pre>rm -rf $t</pre><p>So instead of looking at mktemp in isolation, we can understand the behavior from the surrounding process context:</p><pre>bash → mktemp → create temporary directory → create many files → rm -rf</pre><p>This is a good example of why process lineage and command-line context are important during Kunai analysis.</p><p>The executable itself is not necessarily suspicious.</p><p>The <strong>behavior surrounding the executable</strong> is what deserves investigation.</p><h3>What should we check?</h3><p>When reviewing an execve event, I normally start with:</p><pre>command_line<br>parent_command_line<br>parent_exe<br>ancestors<br>exe.path<br>exe.sha256<br>utc_time</pre><p>In this example, command_line tells us:</p><pre>mktemp -d -p /tmp/trash</pre><p>but parent_command_line explains why it was executed.</p><p>The ancestors field provides even more context:</p><pre>systemd<br> → login<br> → zsh<br> → bash<br> → xinit<br> → i3<br> → bash<br> → urxvt<br> → zsh<br> → bash<br> → timeout<br> → bash<br> → mktemp</pre><p>This does not automatically make the activity malicious. Instead, it gives the analyst enough context to continue the investigation.</p><p>For example, we could now look for the subsequent file creation and deletion activity associated with the temporary directory.</p><p>This is the important lesson when analyzing execve:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Do not judge a process only by its executable name. Look at what executed it, how it was executed, and what happened around it.</em></strong></blockquote><h3>3. execve_script — Investigate Script Execution</h3><p>The next event worth looking at is execve_script.</p><p>This event is useful when a process executes a script through an interpreter such as Bash, Python, or another scripting engine.</p><p>Consider this Kunai event:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;data&quot;: {<br>    &quot;parent_command_line&quot;: &quot;/bin/bash generate-activity.sh&quot;,<br>    &quot;parent_exe&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/bash&quot;,<br>    &quot;command_line&quot;: &quot;/bin/bash /tmp/tmp.KsA9Ym95fq_kunai_test.sh&quot;,<br>    &quot;exe&quot;: {<br>      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/tmp/tmp.KsA9Ym95fq_kunai_test.sh&quot;,<br>      &quot;sha256&quot;: &quot;cda81b42b75647daf6b70a626380c199fe665d721e63bfe34c96b65da0289627&quot;,<br>      &quot;size&quot;: 21<br>    },<br>    &quot;interpreter&quot;: {<br>      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/bash&quot;,<br>      &quot;sha256&quot;: &quot;68bac453a428796f18114a1bf43420d814e36555808ec98eacb782de565c06eb&quot;,<br>      &quot;size&quot;: 1100632<br>    }<br>  },<br>  &quot;info&quot;: {<br>    &quot;event&quot;: {<br>      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;execve_script&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;utc_time&quot;: &quot;2025-06-10T14:00:30.925394727Z&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>The first thing we can see is:</p><pre>/bin/bash /tmp/tmp.KsA9Ym95fq_kunai_test.sh</pre><p>This tells us that Bash executed a script located under /tmp.</p><p>The event also provides a separate interpreter object:</p><pre>interpreter.path:<br>/usr/bin/bash</pre><p>This is useful because we can distinguish between the <strong>script being executed</strong> and the <strong>program responsible for interpreting it</strong>.</p><p>In this case:</p><pre>Script      → /tmp/tmp.KsA9Ym95fq_kunai_test.sh<br>Interpreter → /usr/bin/bash</pre><p>We can also see how the script was launched:</p><pre>parent_command_line:<br>/bin/bash generate-activity.sh</pre><p>So the immediate activity can be summarized as:</p><pre>generate-activity.sh → /tmp/tmp.KsA9Ym95fq_kunai_test.sh</pre><p>This is already useful during an investigation.</p><p>Instead of simply seeing:</p><pre>bash</pre><p>we know that Bash was used to execute a specific script from /tmp.</p><h3>Why does the script location matter?</h3><p>The location does not automatically make the script malicious.</p><p>/tmp is commonly used by legitimate applications and scripts.</p><p>However, a script executed from a temporary directory is worth investigating when it appears together with other suspicious activity.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>execve → file creation → execve_script</pre><p>could indicate that a process created a temporary script and subsequently executed it.</p><p>If we then observe network activity:</p><pre>execve → file creation → execve_script → connect</pre><p>we now have a stronger reason to investigate the script and the process responsible for it.</p><p>The important point is that execve_script gives us additional context that a normal process execution event may not provide.</p><h3>What should we check?</h3><p>When reviewing execve_script, focus on:</p><pre>command_line<br>parent_command_line<br>parent_exe<br>exe.path<br>exe.sha256<br>interpreter.path<br>interpreter.sha256<br>utc_time</pre><p>For example:</p><pre>Script:<br> /tmp/tmp.KsA9Ym95fq_kunai_test.sh</pre><pre>Interpreter:<br> /usr/bin/bash</pre><pre>Parent:<br> /bin/bash generate-activity.sh</pre><p>This gives us a simple investigation starting point:</p><blockquote><strong><em>What is the script, who executed it, and why was it executed?</em></strong></blockquote><h3>A useful correlation</h3><p>If the script was created shortly before the execve_script event, we can investigate the file creation event.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>file_create → execve_script</pre><p>If the script then makes an external connection:</p><pre>file_create → execve_script → dns_query → connect</pre><p>we can investigate the entire activity rather than treating the script execution as an isolated event.</p><p>This is where Kunai becomes useful for analysis: the event tells us what happened, while correlation helps us understand why it happened.</p><h3>4. write_config — Investigate Configuration Changes</h3><p>Configuration files are important evidence during an investigation because attackers may modify them to change how a service or application behaves.</p><p>The write_config event helps identify when a process writes to a configuration file.</p><p>For example, this event was generated when tee wrote to /etc/kunai_test.conf:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;data&quot;: {<br>    &quot;ancestors&quot;: &quot;/usr/lib/systemd/systemd|/usr/bin/login|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/xinit|/usr/bin/i3|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/urxvt|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/sudo|/usr/bin/sudo&quot;,<br>    &quot;command_line&quot;: &quot;tee /etc/kunai_test.conf&quot;,<br>    &quot;exe&quot;: {<br>      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/tee&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/etc/kunai_test.conf&quot;<br>  },<br>  &quot;info&quot;: {<br>    &quot;host&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;event&quot;: {<br>      &quot;source&quot;: &quot;kunai&quot;,<br>      &quot;id&quot;: 84,<br>      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;write_config&quot;,<br>      &quot;uuid&quot;: &quot;4903ced0-5bad-c3db-9325-5ea6a6c4da90&quot;,<br>      &quot;batch&quot;: 877<br>    },<br>    &quot;task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;parent_task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;utc_time&quot;: &quot;2024-10-29T12:48:02.474792288Z&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>The important fields here are:</p><ul><li>command_line — shows how the configuration was written.</li><li>exe.path — shows the program performing the write, in this case /usr/bin/tee.</li><li>path — shows the configuration file that was modified.</li><li>ancestors — provides the process history leading to the activity.</li><li>utc_time — tells us when the modification occurred.</li></ul><p>The key detail is:</p><pre>tee /etc/kunai_test.conf</pre><p>This tells us that /usr/bin/tee was used to write to /etc/kunai_test.conf.</p><p>The process ancestry also shows that the activity came through sudo:</p><pre>... → bash → sudo → sudo → tee</pre><p>This is useful because a configuration change should not be analyzed only from the file path. We also want to understand <strong>who initiated the change and how the process obtained the privileges required to modify the file</strong>.</p><p>A configuration write is not automatically malicious. System administrators and applications routinely modify files under /etc. The investigation becomes more interesting when the modified file, process ancestry, command line, or timing is unusual.</p><p>For example, an analyst could correlate the event with other activity:</p><pre>execve → write_config → execve_script</pre><p>This could indicate that a process was executed, a configuration file was modified, and a script was subsequently executed.</p><p>The main question when analyzing write_config is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>What configuration was changed, who changed it, and why?</em></strong></blockquote><p>This makes write_config particularly useful for finding changes that may support persistence, alter application behavior, or modify system configuration.</p><h3>5. dns_query — Investigate DNS Activity</h3><p>DNS activity is useful during an investigation because it can show which domains a process tried to resolve before making a network connection.</p><p>Kunai’s dns_query event provides information about the DNS query, the response, and the DNS resolver that handled the request. The event is generated for DNS traffic over UDP/53 or TCP/53.</p><p>For example, this event was generated when curl accessed a Kunai-related website:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;data&quot;: {<br>    &quot;ancestors&quot;: &quot;/usr/lib/systemd/systemd|/usr/bin/login|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/xinit|/usr/bin/i3|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/urxvt|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash&quot;,<br>    &quot;command_line&quot;: &quot;curl https://why.kunai.rocks&quot;,<br>    &quot;exe&quot;: {<br>      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/curl&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;socket&quot;: {<br>      &quot;domain&quot;: &quot;AF_INET&quot;,<br>      &quot;type&quot;: &quot;SOCK_DGRAM&quot;,<br>      &quot;proto&quot;: &quot;UDP&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;src&quot;: {<br>      &quot;ip&quot;: &quot;192.168.1.152&quot;,<br>      &quot;port&quot;: 13267<br>    },<br>    &quot;query&quot;: &quot;kunai-project.github.io&quot;,<br>    &quot;response&quot;: &quot;185.199.110.153;185.199.111.153;185.199.109.153;185.199.108.153&quot;,<br>    &quot;dns_server&quot;: {<br>      &quot;ip&quot;: &quot;192.168.1.1&quot;,<br>      &quot;port&quot;: 53,<br>      &quot;public&quot;: false,<br>      &quot;is_v6&quot;: false<br>    },<br>    &quot;community_id&quot;: &quot;1:XT9OMvFiajrWmMOXr4N3TI+3Etc=&quot;<br>  },<br>  &quot;info&quot;: {<br>    &quot;host&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;event&quot;: {<br>      &quot;source&quot;: &quot;kunai&quot;,<br>      &quot;id&quot;: 61,<br>      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;dns_query&quot;,<br>      &quot;uuid&quot;: &quot;ecc87c39-8da3-0b9d-4060-480fdef2efd7&quot;,<br>      &quot;batch&quot;: 878<br>    },<br>    &quot;task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;parent_task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;utc_time&quot;: &quot;2024-10-29T12:48:02.470834988Z&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>The first thing to look at is the process that generated the DNS activity:</p><pre>command_line: curl https://why.kunai.rocks<br>exe.path: /usr/bin/curl</pre><p>This gives us context about <strong>which program initiated the activity and what it was trying to access</strong>.</p><p>The actual DNS lookup is shown by:</p><pre>query: kunai-project.github.io</pre><p>Kunai also records the returned IP addresses:</p><pre>response: 185.199.110.153<br>         185.199.111.153<br>         185.199.109.153<br>         185.199.108.153</pre><p>This is useful because the domain alone does not tell the complete story. During an investigation, we may also want to determine which IP addresses the host received and whether those addresses were subsequently contacted.</p><p>The DNS resolver is also recorded:</p><pre>dns_server:<br>  ip: 192.168.1.1<br>  port: 53<br>  public: false</pre><p>Here, the host sent the DNS request to the internal resolver 192.168.1.1 over UDP/53.</p><p>The important fields to inspect are:</p><ul><li>command_line — what the process was doing.</li><li>exe.path — which executable generated the activity.</li><li>query — the domain being resolved.</li><li>response — IP addresses returned by DNS.</li><li>dns_server — the DNS resolver used by the host.</li><li>utc_time — when the lookup occurred.</li><li>ancestors — how the process was launched.</li></ul><p>From a DFIR perspective, the value of dns_query becomes much greater when correlated with process and network events.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>execve → dns_query → connect</pre><p>This can give us a simple investigation path:</p><p><strong>A process was executed → it resolved a domain → it established a network connection.</strong></p><p>If the domain is suspicious, we can then go back to the process that generated the lookup and investigate its command line, parent process, executable path, and file activity.</p><p>The main question when analyzing dns_query is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Which process resolved the domain, what did the domain resolve to, and what happened next?</em></strong></blockquote><p>This shifts DNS analysis from simply looking at domains to reconstructing the activity that happened around them.</p><h3>6. connect — Identify Outbound Connections</h3><p>After identifying DNS activity, the next question is: <strong>did the process actually connect to the resolved IP address?</strong></p><p>The connect event is generated when a process attempts to connect to a remote IP address. Kunai can also correlate the destination hostname with a previous dns_query event, making it easier to connect the domain name with the actual network connection.</p><p>For example, this event was generated by curl:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;data&quot;: {<br>    &quot;ancestors&quot;: &quot;/usr/lib/systemd/systemd|/usr/bin/login|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/xinit|/usr/bin/i3|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/urxvt|/usr/bin/zsh|/usr/bin/bash&quot;,<br>    &quot;command_line&quot;: &quot;curl -d RCKhLa0Ka70LTYgF4eJiQkAspo9Yevj3dMjuSc0NwpOauPicV3P4bajH1paLQMvYGIILwrHk3cpxgS4FDVAUn5XiT0ucGNoVYd2FAjg6hP1zXSH9KCKJhB3ixUq8APtqSJ1DPVYGPOSyCIaHb9Nh4QOJe0UiYjogNoiFBRYVIL8hFgI607LW0MVxcTQqPdX9Utuw9MXxyEaN6TVcFWmKAxrV5BsgP9YYeXyWwda62Kg5aqsq2cdPy9jm9s6S6Brr https://why.kunai.rocks&quot;,<br>    &quot;exe&quot;: {<br>      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/curl&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;socket&quot;: {<br>      &quot;domain&quot;: &quot;AF_INET&quot;,<br>      &quot;type&quot;: &quot;SOCK_DGRAM&quot;,<br>      &quot;proto&quot;: &quot;UDP&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;src&quot;: {<br>      &quot;ip&quot;: &quot;192.168.1.152&quot;,<br>      &quot;port&quot;: 36749<br>    },<br>    &quot;dst&quot;: {<br>      &quot;hostname&quot;: &quot;kunai-project.github.io&quot;,<br>      &quot;ip&quot;: &quot;185.199.111.153&quot;,<br>      &quot;port&quot;: 443,<br>      &quot;public&quot;: true,<br>      &quot;is_v6&quot;: false<br>    },<br>    &quot;community_id&quot;: &quot;1:Zy0KM8lSsDjFs4mzmfFHjtBZfPI=&quot;,<br>    &quot;connected&quot;: true<br>  },<br>  &quot;info&quot;: {<br>    &quot;host&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;event&quot;: {<br>      &quot;source&quot;: &quot;kunai&quot;,<br>      &quot;id&quot;: 60,<br>      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;connect&quot;,<br>      &quot;uuid&quot;: &quot;6c1ab8dc-3e55-cdc9-12ea-b14d15366dba&quot;,<br>      &quot;batch&quot;: 877<br>    },<br>    &quot;task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;parent_task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;utc_time&quot;: &quot;2024-10-29T12:48:02.472813816Z&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>The first thing to identify is the process responsible for the connection:</p><pre>command_line: curl ... https://why.kunai.rocks<br>exe.path: /usr/bin/curl</pre><p>This tells us that /usr/bin/curl attempted the network connection.</p><p>The destination is shown under dst:</p><pre>hostname: kunai-project.github.io<br>ip:       185.199.111.153<br>port:     443<br>public:   true</pre><p>This gives us the complete destination context:</p><p><strong>curl → </strong><strong>kunai-project.github.io → </strong><strong>185.199.111.153:443</strong></p><p>The connected field is also important:</p><pre>connected: true</pre><p>In this event, the connection attempt was successful.</p><p>This is where connect becomes particularly useful when combined with the previous dns_query event. The earlier DNS event showed that kunai-project.github.io resolved to several IP addresses, including 185.199.111.153. The connect event then shows that the host actually connected to that IP.</p><p>We can therefore reconstruct a simple network activity chain:</p><pre>dns_query → connect</pre><p>Or, when combined with process execution:</p><pre>execve → dns_query → connect</pre><p>This gives the analyst more than just a list of network connections. We can start asking:</p><ul><li>Which process made the connection?</li><li>What domain was involved?</li><li>Which IP address was contacted?</li><li>Which port was used?</li><li>Was the destination public or internal?</li><li>Did the connection succeed?</li><li>What happened immediately before and after the connection?</li></ul><p>The command_line is especially important in this example. It contains a large -d argument before the destination URL. That does not automatically make the activity malicious, but it gives the analyst something to investigate further because the process was sending data as part of the request.</p><p>The main fields to inspect are:</p><ul><li>command_line — what the process was doing.</li><li>exe.path — which executable made the connection.</li><li>dst.hostname — the destination hostname, when available.</li><li>dst.ip — the remote IP address.</li><li>dst.port — the destination port.</li><li>dst.public — whether the destination is identified as public.</li><li>connected — whether the connection succeeded.</li><li>utc_time — when the connection occurred.</li><li>ancestors — the process ancestry.</li></ul><p>From a DFIR perspective, connect helps answer the next question after DNS analysis:</p><blockquote><strong><em>After resolving the domain, did the process actually communicate with the destination?</em></strong></blockquote><p>This makes dns_query and connect especially useful together. One shows the <strong>name resolution</strong>, while the other shows the <strong>network connection attempt</strong>.</p><p>The investigation can then continue by correlating the connection with file activity, scripts, or other processes to understand what the network communication was part of.</p><h3>7. file_unlink — Investigate File Deletion</h3><p>The file_unlink event is generated when a file is deleted from the filesystem.</p><p>File deletion can be completely normal. Linux services routinely create and remove temporary files, sockets, runtime files, and other artifacts. However, attackers may also delete files to remove traces after executing malicious activity.</p><p>For example, this event shows a file being removed from /run/udev:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;data&quot;: {<br>    &quot;ancestors&quot;: &quot;/usr/lib/systemd/systemd|/usr/bin/udevadm&quot;,<br>    &quot;command_line&quot;: &quot;/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd&quot;,<br>    &quot;exe&quot;: {<br>      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/usr/bin/udevadm&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;path&quot;: &quot;/run/udev/watch/b43:128&quot;,<br>    &quot;success&quot;: true<br>  },<br>  &quot;info&quot;: {<br>    &quot;host&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;event&quot;: {<br>      &quot;source&quot;: &quot;kunai&quot;,<br>      &quot;id&quot;: 86,<br>      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;file_unlink&quot;,<br>      &quot;uuid&quot;: &quot;66d58529-0b24-ef1d-2b27-3e5a5a85d31b&quot;,<br>      &quot;batch&quot;: 643<br>    },<br>    &quot;task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;parent_task&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,<br>    &quot;utc_time&quot;: &quot;2024-10-29T12:47:59.189301629Z&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>The most important field is:</p><pre>path: /run/udev/watch/b43:128</pre><p>This tells us which file was removed.</p><p>We can then look at the process responsible:</p><pre>command_line: /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd<br>exe.path:    /usr/bin/udevadm</pre><p>The process ancestry also gives us additional context:</p><pre>systemd → udevadm</pre><p>In this particular example, the deleted file is under /run/udev, and the activity is associated with the system&#39;s udev components. This can be consistent with normal system activity rather than malicious file deletion.</p><p>The success field tells us whether the unlink operation succeeded:</p><pre>success: true</pre><p>This means the file was successfully removed.</p><p>The important fields to inspect are:</p><ul><li>path — which file was deleted.</li><li>command_line — what the process was doing.</li><li>exe.path — which executable performed the deletion.</li><li>ancestors — how the process was launched.</li><li>success — whether the deletion succeeded.</li><li>utc_time — when the deletion occurred.</li></ul><p>The key point is that <strong>a file deletion event by itself does not prove malicious activity</strong>.</p><p>Instead, look at the surrounding events. For example, if an unusual script creates a file, executes it, communicates externally, and then deletes it, the deletion becomes much more interesting:</p><pre>file_create → execve_script → dns_query → connect → file_unlink</pre><p>This sequence could represent a temporary file being created, executed, used for network communication, and then removed.</p><p>In contrast, a deletion involving a normal system process and a temporary runtime file may simply be routine Linux activity.</p><p>The main question when analyzing file_unlink is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>What was deleted, which process deleted it, and does the deletion make sense in the surrounding activity?</em></strong></blockquote><p>This makes file_unlink particularly useful when investigating <strong>cleanup behavior</strong>. Rather than treating every deletion as suspicious, use it as another piece of evidence when reconstructing what happened on the host.</p><h3>8. Putting the Events Together</h3><p>The real value of Kunai analysis comes from correlation.</p><p>For example, imagine we observe:</p><pre>execve → file_create → execve_script</pre><p>This tells us that a process executed a command, a file was created, and a script was subsequently executed.</p><p>We can then continue the investigation:</p><pre>execve → file_create → execve_script → dns_query → connect</pre><p>Now we have execution, file activity, script execution, and network activity occurring in the same investigation window.</p><p>If the activity ends with:</p><pre>file_unlink</pre><p>we may have:</p><pre>execve → file_create → execve_script → dns_query → connect → file_unlink</pre><p>This is much more useful than reviewing six unrelated JSON events.</p><p>The analyst can now investigate the sequence as a single activity:</p><blockquote><em>What executed the initial command?</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>What file was created?</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>What script was executed?</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>What domain was queried?</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>What remote system was contacted?</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>What file was eventually deleted?</em></blockquote><p>This is the basic approach I would recommend when starting Kunai analysis.</p><h3>9. A Practical Analysis Workflow</h3><p>When starting with a Kunai log, I would begin with execve.</p><p>Look for unusual commands, unexpected binaries, suspicious locations, and unusual parent-child relationships.</p><p>From there, check execve_script if scripts or interpreters are involved.</p><p>If the activity creates or modifies files, investigate the corresponding file_create, write, or write_config events.</p><p>For network-related activity, correlate dns_query with connect to determine what the process was attempting to reach.</p><p>Finally, check file_unlink to determine whether any artifacts were removed after execution.</p><p>A simple investigation may therefore look like:</p><pre>execve → file_create → execve_script → write_config → dns_query → connect → file_unlink</pre><p>Not every investigation will contain all of these events.</p><p>The purpose is to use whichever events are available to build the most complete timeline possible.</p><h3>10. What Should the Analyst Produce?</h3><p>The final result of the investigation should not simply be:</p><pre>Suspicious execve detected.<br>Suspicious connect detected.<br>Suspicious file deletion detected.</pre><p>That does not explain what happened.</p><p>Instead, the analyst should be able to describe the activity in context.</p><p>For example:</p><blockquote><em>A shell process executed a command that resulted in a script being created and executed from </em><em>/tmp. The script subsequently generated DNS activity and established an outbound connection to a remote system. The temporary script was later deleted.</em></blockquote><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Kunai provides a large amount of telemetry that can be used to investigate Linux activity. However, analysts do not need to start by reviewing every event.</p><p>For a basic investigation, six events provide a useful starting point:</p><pre>execve<br>execve_script<br>write_config<br>dns_query<br>connect<br>file_unlink</pre><p>Each event provides a different piece of the investigation.</p><p>execve helps us understand process execution.</p><p>execve_script provides additional visibility into script execution and interpreters.</p><p>write_config helps identify configuration changes.</p><p>dns_query and connect provide network context.</p><p>file_unlink can help identify cleanup activity.</p><p>The important part is how these events are correlated.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba0c4dab7076" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/kunai-analysis-1-analyzing-linux-activity-with-kunai-ba0c4dab7076">Kunai Analysis #1 — Analyzing Linux Activity with Kunai</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Kunai Engineering #1 — Building Linux Threat Detection with Kunai on Ubuntu Server]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/kunai-engineering-1-building-linux-threat-detection-with-kunai-on-ubuntu-server-a8d66178f439?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a8d66178f439</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-detection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[detection-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux-threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux-dfir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 02:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-01T02:01:02.382Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Linux provides a wide range of tools for monitoring system activity, including auditd, Sysmon for Linux, Falco, and osquery. However, gaining meaningful security visibility often requires combining multiple tools and data sources. This is where <strong>Kunai</strong> comes in, bringing system monitoring capabilities together with a focus on security visibility.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pY6uaKX8gBWs5u6rJzdVsQ.png" /></figure><p>Kunai (<a href="https://why.kunai.rocks/">https://why.kunai.rocks/</a>) is built specifically for Linux threat hunting, using <strong>eBPF</strong> and <strong>Rust</strong> to collect and analyze system activity. It can also monitor activity inside containers and apply the same threat-hunting rules across them.</p><p>In this article, I’ll walk through my setup of Kunai v0.7.0-rc.1 on <strong>Ubuntu Server 24.04</strong>, from enabling BPF LSM and installing Kunai to configuring it and creating a simple detection rule.</p><h3>1. Enabling BPF LSM</h3><p>First, check the currently enabled Linux Security Modules:</p><pre>cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/944/1*pvZrcKFmNfDHbZd8SLNXUg.png" /></figure><p>Kunai’s hardening mode requires <strong>bpf </strong>to be present in this list.</p><p>We need to add the LSM configuration to GRUB, Instead of editing /etc/default/grub manually using nano, the following command updates GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT using sed.</p><pre>sudo sed -i \<br>&#39;s/^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=.*/GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=&quot;lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,apparmor,bpf&quot;/&#39; \<br>/etc/default/grub</pre><p>Verify the configuration:</p><pre>sudo cat /etc/default/grub</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*i_3ywt92AGFzPhQ5S_Z4nw.png" /></figure><p>Then update GRUB and reboot:</p><pre>sudo update-grub<br>sudo reboot</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*NVTAWohz4_Fgf7yf9wlsxw.png" /></figure><p>After reboot, verify it:</p><pre>cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm</pre><p>You should see:</p><pre>lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,apparmor,bpf</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/1*NPQ1aPK7cAKFwjyc_t2Dzg.png" /></figure><p>This step is important because Kunai’s --harden installation checks for BPF LSM before continuing.</p><h3>2. Download and Configure Kunai</h3><p>Create a working directory:</p><pre>mkdir Kunai<br>cd Kunai</pre><p>Download the Kunai release and make the binary executable.</p><pre>wget https://github.com/kunai-project/kunai/releases/download/v0.7.0-rc.1/kunai-amd64</pre><pre>chmod +x ./kunai-amd64</pre><p>Then generate the default configuration:</p><pre>./kunai-amd64 config --dump &gt; kunai.conf</pre><p>Move the configuration into the Kunai configuration directory:</p><pre>sudo mkdir -p /etc/kunai/<br>sudo mv ./kunai.conf /etc/kunai/kunai.conf</pre><h3>3. Install Kunai as a Systemd Service</h3><p>Now install Kunai with hardening and systemd support:</p><pre>sudo ./kunai-amd64 install \<br>--config /etc/kunai/kunai.conf \<br>--systemd \<br>--enable-unit \<br>--harden</pre><p>The important options are:</p><ul><li>--config — specifies the Kunai configuration.</li><li>--systemd — creates a systemd service.</li><li>--enable-unit — enables the service.</li><li>--harden — enables the hardened installation checks.</li></ul><p>After installation, check the generated events:</p><pre>sudo systemctl start kunai<br>sudo tail -f /var/log/kunai/events.log</pre><p>At this point, Kunai should be collecting system activity.</p><p>For better tuning, In my setup I disabled send_data to reduce unnecessary event generation.</p><pre>sudo systemctl stop kunai<br>sudo nano /etc/kunai/kunai.conf<br>sudo systemctl restart kunai</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/398/1*nJBzEX5AGjDK_q8kGf4a5A.png" /></figure><h3>4. Creating a Detection Rule</h3><p>Kunai can monitor all system events, providing deep visibility but generating a large volume of data. Detection rules allow users to focus only on specific events and behaviors that matter for security monitoring.</p><p>This is where Kunai Detection rules become useful.</p><p>Create a rules directory:</p><pre>sudo mkdir -p /etc/kunai/rules/</pre><p>Create a rule file:</p><pre>sudo nano /etc/kunai/rules/example_rule.kunai</pre><p>For example, we can detect a binary pretending to be a Linux kernel worker thread:</p><pre>name: mimic.kthread<br>type: detection<br>meta:<br>  tags: [ &#39;os:linux&#39; ]<br>  attack: [ T1036 ]<br>  authors: [ qjerome ]<br>  comments:<br>    - tries to catch binaries masquerading kernel threads<br>match-on:<br>  events:<br>    kunai: [execve, execve_script]<br>matches:<br>  $task_is_kthread: .info.task.flags &amp;= &#39;0x200000&#39;<br>  $kthread_names: .info.task.name ~= &#39;^(kworker)&#39;<br>condition: not $task_is_kthread and $kthread_names<br>severity: 10</pre><p>The idea is simple:</p><blockquote><em>The rule evaluates fields from the Kunai event itself. </em><em>.info.task.flags is used to determine whether the task has the kernel-thread flag, while </em><em>.info.task.name is checked for the </em><em>kworker naming pattern. The final condition triggers when those two properties don&#39;t match.</em></blockquote><p>The rule also maps the behavior to <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1036</strong>, which is associated with masquerading.</p><p>Then update the main Kunai configuration so it knows where the detection rules are stored.</p><pre>sudo nano /etc/kunai/kunai.conf</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*TSorFq9gA7ef_oLjcJEf-A.png" /></figure><p>Then restart Kunai:</p><pre>sudo systemctl restart kunai</pre><p>This command below creates a benign test case where a normal user-space binary is given a name resembling a Linux kernel worker thread. When the binary executes, Kunai should see the execve event and evaluate it against the detection rule</p><pre>cp /usr/bin/ls /tmp/kworker<br>/tmp/kworker</pre><p>Now search the Kunai log for the detection:</p><pre>sudo grep -RniE &#39;mimic.kthread&#39; \<br>/var/log/kunai/events.log 2&gt;/dev/null | tail -50</pre><p>If the rule is working, Kunai should report the detection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*0UQbM2teHP0wqLcwQstt1w.png" /></figure><h3>Beyond Detection Rules</h3><p>Detection rules are only one part of Kunai’s capabilities. Kunai also provides mechanisms for filtering events, scanning for indicators of compromise, and taking automated response actions.</p><p>For example, Kunai can be integrated with YARA-based scanning to inspect files for known patterns, while automated actions can be used to respond to detected activity. These capabilities allow Kunai to move beyond passive monitoring toward a more active detection and response workflow.</p><p>In this article, however, we focused on the fundamentals: collecting Linux telemetry, understanding Kunai events, creating a detection rule, and validating that detection with a controlled test.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Setting up Kunai is more than simply installing a security agent. The combination of <strong>eBPF visibility</strong> and <strong>custom detection rules</strong> makes Kunai useful for investigating Linux activity and building practical threat detections.</p><p>The important lesson is to start with visibility, understand the events being generated, and then create focused rules for the behavior you actually want to detect.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a8d66178f439" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/kunai-engineering-1-building-linux-threat-detection-with-kunai-on-ubuntu-server-a8d66178f439">Kunai Engineering #1 — Building Linux Threat Detection with Kunai on Ubuntu Server</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Turning Linux Host Data into Forensic Evidence with UAC (Unix-like Artifact Collector) and DFIR…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/turning-linux-host-data-into-forensic-evidence-with-uac-unix-like-artifact-collector-and-dfir-fb5a3a4dbfb3?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb5a3a4dbfb3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[linux]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux-dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 02:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-02T02:01:02.188Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Turning Linux Host Data into Forensic Evidence with UAC (Unix-like Artifact Collector) and DFIR Companion</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3dbQ1VOOXyZ_N2po3ja6Qw.png" /></figure><p>When investigating a compromised Linux machine, the first challenge is usually not a lack of evidence.</p><p>It is the opposite.</p><p>A single server can generate thousands of log entries, authentication records, audit events, service messages, and other traces of activity. Buried somewhere inside that data may be the evidence needed to understand what happened.</p><p>The problem is figuring out where to start.</p><p>Instead of manually collecting individual files from a Linux host, this walkthrough uses <strong>UAC </strong>(Unix-like Artifact Collector) to gather a structured collection of forensic artifacts and then brings the relevant evidence into <strong>DFIR Companion</strong> for further examination.</p><p>The goal is simple:</p><p><strong>Collect first. Organize the evidence. Correlate the activity. Then investigate.</strong></p><h3>Why Collecting Linux Evidence Matters</h3><p>A Linux system leaves behind traces of activity in many different places.</p><p>Authentication attempts may appear in authentication logs. System events can be recorded by syslog, while Linux auditing can provide another layer of visibility through audit.log. Individual applications and services may also maintain their own records.</p><p>Looking at only one source can therefore give an incomplete picture.</p><p>For example, an authentication event might not immediately look suspicious. But if that event is followed by an unusual command, a new process, or another related system event, the overall sequence may tell a very different story.</p><p>That is why the first stage of an investigation is making sure the evidence is collected in a way that allows those relationships to be examined later.</p><h3>Preparing UAC</h3><p>For this investigation, I used <strong>UAC (Unix-like Artifact Collector)</strong> to acquire artifacts from the Linux host.</p><p>The version used in this walkthrough is UAC 3.3.0.</p><p>The archive can be downloaded directly from the UAC release:</p><pre>curl -L https://github.com/tclahr/uac/releases/download/v3.3.0/uac-3.3.0.tar.gz -o uac3.3.0.tar.gz</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/905/1*ku_I01OhBUUzhyMCDeqwZg.png" /></figure><p>After downloading the archive, extract it:</p><pre>tar -zxvf uac-3.3.0.tar.gz</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/509/1*_3X89QadNubSFtNrUSuHqw.png" /></figure><p>Then enter the extracted directory:</p><pre>cd uac-3.3.0</pre><p>At this stage, the collector is ready to be executed.</p><h3>Building the Evidence Collection</h3><p>UAC provides different collection profiles. For this walkthrough, the <strong>full profile</strong> is used to obtain a broad collection of artifacts from the host.</p><p>Run the collector with elevated privileges:</p><pre>sudo ./uac -p full &lt;path&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/846/1*FNJGAARv6mDktU66yX8g8A.png" /></figure><p>The &lt;path&gt; should be replaced with the location where you want the collected evidence to be stored.</p><p>Using elevated privileges is important because some system artifacts are not accessible to a normal user.</p><p>Once UAC finishes, the resulting collection is packaged into a compressed archive, accompanied by a log describing the collection process.</p><p>This archive is what we will take into the analysis environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/864/1*TfJPWDGzqbhkchCkhMAIkA.png" /></figure><h3>Moving from Acquisition to Analysis</h3><p>After the collection has completed, transfer the generated archive to the machine where the forensic analysis will be performed.</p><p>Once it arrives, extract the archive.</p><p>The extracted directory represents the evidence gathered from the Linux host.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*-2ow9H-wfczHKDWGVJJa9w.png" /></figure><p>This is an important point in the workflow: <strong>the original host is the source of evidence, while the analysis environment is where we examine it.</strong></p><p>Keeping these stages separate makes the investigation easier to manage and reduces the need to repeatedly interact with the original system.</p><h3>Setting Up the Investigation in DFIR Companion</h3><p>With the UAC collection available, the next stage is to create an investigation in DFIR Companion.</p><p>Start by creating a new case using this button below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*8-GW0bISmwqcqLfi70AIfQ.png" /></figure><p>The case should contain the basic investigation information, including:</p><ul><li>Case ID</li><li>Case name</li><li>Investigator</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/954/1*QJ5uERHKGFS6VM1I4kz6Qg.png" /></figure><p>These details provide the investigation with an identifiable context before any artifacts are imported.</p><p>Then turn the AI analysis feature on</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*a5uX8sddNTrPVujUmL7hCg.png" /></figure><h3>Giving DFIR Companion the Evidence</h3><p>DFIR Companion provides an artifact-import function that allows the collected evidence to be added to the case, by using this button.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*RJZNGGXYrtR5qLyc_PZ6-g.png" /></figure><p>However, there is an important consideration before uploading anything:</p><p><strong>Do not assume that uploading more artifacts will automatically improve the investigation.</strong></p><p>A large collection can contain useful information, but it can also contain a significant amount of irrelevant data.</p><p>The better approach is to understand the incident first and then select artifacts that can help answer the investigation questions.</p><p>For a Linux server, examples of potentially relevant evidence include:</p><ul><li>audit.log</li><li>auth.log</li><li>Service-specific logs</li><li>Other logs generated by applications running on the host</li></ul><p>The exact selection depends on what is being investigated.</p><p>For example, an investigation involving suspicious login activity would naturally place more emphasis on authentication-related evidence. An investigation involving a particular service would require greater attention to that service’s logs.</p><p>The point is not to collect everything simply because it is available.</p><p>The point is to collect <strong>evidence that can help explain the event</strong>.</p><h3>Letting the Evidence Process</h3><p>Once the relevant artifacts have been imported, DFIR Companion processes the evidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*iN78ZoVBvW8RCSH1XXHO8g.png" /></figure><p>At this stage, the tool can analyze the available artifacts and produce findings that can help direct the investigation.</p><p>Rather than manually reviewing every piece of collected data from beginning to end, the generated results provide a starting point for identifying events that deserve closer attention.</p><p>After processing has finished, the investigation can be explored through the available dashboard views.</p><h3>Reviewing the Investigation Dashboard</h3><p>After the artifacts have been processed, DFIR Companion presents the investigation through a centralized dashboard.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CgobEgdVL5RB7o8lZJdHoQ.png" /></figure><p>The dashboard separates the investigation into two main areas.</p><p><strong>Active Leads</strong> highlights findings that currently need attention. In this case, it points to issues such as a MongoDB instance running without access control and an external SSH login followed by privilege escalation to root.</p><p><strong>Since Your Last Review</strong> provides a quick view of newly updated findings and changes in severity, making it easier to spot developments that may require further investigation.</p><p>This dashboard gives the analyst a quick overview of the most important findings before diving deeper into the underlying evidence.</p><h3>Exporting the Investigation Results</h3><p>Once the analysis has been completed, the results can be exported for further use.</p><p>DFIR Companion can provide investigation outputs such as:</p><ul><li>Forensic reports</li><li>IOC blocklists</li><li>Forensic timelines</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/455/1*WffruMImMFdwuEnLjoBfRg.png" /></figure><p>These outputs can be useful for documenting the investigation and communicating the results to other analysts or incident responders.</p><p>However, exported results should still be reviewed before being treated as the final forensic record.</p><p>Below are the result of the report</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W33zKohWXuVd5cUzTrtZHg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_RbWwsV5I8vDpILkpQlZjg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jzyd-bjbefjpdligz5urrA.png" /></figure><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>Linux forensic investigations can quickly become difficult when evidence is scattered across different logs and system sources.</p><p>A collection tool such as UAC can simplify the acquisition stage by gathering a broad set of artifacts from the host. Once that evidence has been transferred to an analysis environment, DFIR Companion can help turn the collected data into findings, timelines, attack mappings, and indicators that are easier to investigate.</p><p>But the most important part of the workflow is not the automation.</p><p>It is <strong>correlation</strong>.</p><p>A single event rarely explains an incident by itself. Its significance often becomes apparent only after it is connected with other activity occurring around the same time.</p><p>That is why a good forensic workflow should not be:</p><p><strong>Collect everything → upload everything → trust the findings.</strong></p><p>Instead, it should be:</p><p><strong>Collect → select → correlate → investigate → validate.</strong></p><p>UAC provides the evidence foundation. DFIR Companion helps organize and analyze that evidence. The investigator provides the context and makes the final determination.</p><p>And ultimately, that is what forensic investigation is about — not simply finding suspicious artifacts, but building an evidence-supported explanation of <strong>what happened, when it happened, and why the evidence supports that conclusion.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb5a3a4dbfb3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/turning-linux-host-data-into-forensic-evidence-with-uac-unix-like-artifact-collector-and-dfir-fb5a3a4dbfb3">Turning Linux Host Data into Forensic Evidence with UAC (Unix-like Artifact Collector) and DFIR…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[From KAPE to DFIR Companion: A Practical Windows Forensic Investigation Workflow]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/from-kape-to-dfir-companion-a-practical-windows-forensic-investigation-workflow-fbe276dcf8b9?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fbe276dcf8b9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kape]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 04:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-27T04:01:01.875Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Digital forensics often starts with a simple problem: there is too much evidence.</p><p>A compromised Windows machine can contain thousands of files, event logs, registry artifacts, Prefetch files, application logs, and other traces of attacker activity. Collecting everything is usually unnecessary. The real challenge is collecting the right evidence, processing it into a useful format, and then connecting the different artifacts together.</p><p>In this tutorial, I will show a practical workflow using <strong>KAPE and DFIR Companion</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lXyljmgB0xpegim_EOUxQw.png" /></figure><p>The workflow to collect and investigate is:</p><p><strong>Windows Host → KAPE Collection → KAPE Modules → Parsed Artifacts → DFIR Companion → Investigation</strong></p><p>The goal is not to let AI replace forensic analysis. Instead, DFIR Companion can help correlate fragmented artifacts and make the investigation easier to understand.</p><h3>1. Collect Evidence with KAPE</h3><p>In evidence collection KAPE is very useful, because it allows us to quickly collect forensic artifacts from a Windows system without manually searching through the entire filesystem.</p><p>Place KAPE on the system that will perform the collection.</p><p>Open:</p><p>gkape.exe</p><p>This launches KAPE’s graphical interface.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/1*IkInFXXonexbxYncBmhwcQ.png" /></figure><p>Enable:</p><p><strong>Use Target Options</strong></p><p>This allows us to select the KAPE targets that should be collected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*14UmiF67N89tUl1ZgawQ7Q.png" /></figure><h3>2. Select the Evidence Source</h3><p>For this investigation, the source is the Windows system partition:</p><p>C:\</p><p>The destination is the location where KAPE will store the collected evidence. I normally recommend keeping the collected evidence separate from the original source. Also, keep <strong>Flush</strong> disabled unless there is a specific reason to overwrite the destination. I also use %d in the output filename so the collection date is included automatically.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*cZR8GgSnBoy-JsWEwnoFyA.png" /></figure><h3>3. Choose the KAPE Targets</h3><p>There is no single KAPE target configuration that is perfect for every investigation.</p><p>The targets should depend on the incident.</p><p>For this experiment, I used:</p><ul><li>!BasicCollection</li><li>Prefetch</li></ul><p>The Basic Collection gives us several important evidence sources, including filesystem data, logs, registry hives, and other common forensic artifacts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/721/1*0nSzOcLqjHbFFMm3FF1f4g.png" /></figure><p>Prefetch is collected separately because it can provide useful evidence about program execution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/728/1*kecQnNLPijcZCz-9iyb4VA.png" /></figure><p>I also used a custom KAPE target for XAMPP logs because those logs were important to the web-server portion of the investigation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/731/1*Zj0030u8LP9WBvRpjHPJAw.png" /></figure><p>This is an important KAPE feature:</p><p><strong>If the evidence you need is not included in an existing target, create your own target.</strong></p><p>For example, if the investigation involves XAMPP, Apache, PHP, or another application, its logs may be worth collecting even if they are not part of your normal collection profile.</p><h3>4. Run the KAPE Collection</h3><p>Save it as Zip file</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/613/1*bjZxqqCIl3Ss3jTidHzvZw.png" /></figure><p>Then execute the collection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*jjT-oXTO192tBOMzcIPXvQ.png" /></figure><p>KAPE will collect the selected artifacts and create the forensic dump.</p><p>Depending on the amount of data collected and the speed of the system, this can take some time.</p><p>The result is your KAPE evidence set in the zip file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*LFI5bAjvCVywJgJy7-4xbQ.png" /></figure><h3>5. Parse the KAPE Evidence</h3><p>The KAPE collection we did before contains the original forensic artifacts.</p><p>Some of those artifacts are already human-readable, but many are much easier to analyze after processing. This is where <strong>KAPE Modules</strong> become useful.</p><p>Move the KAPE dump to the analysis machine.</p><p>Open KAPE again and enable:</p><p><strong>KAPE Modules</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*RPQ_ZGp-KOqusUjZUN3L3g.png" /></figure><p>The module source should point to the KAPE dump that was just collected. The module destination is where the processed results will be stored. Again, I keep <strong>Flush</strong> disabled and use %d in the output filename.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*fklJ8uTHoJhfQcTN4wtmsQ.png" /></figure><h3>6. Run the Appropriate KAPE Module</h3><p>The module you choose depends on the investigation.</p><p>For this experiment, I used:</p><p>!EZParser</p><p>This module processes many Windows forensic artifacts using Eric Zimmerman’s forensic tools.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*J4V-UNEFgzK4QmFtJ55__Q.png" /></figure><p>Click <strong>Execute</strong> and allow KAPE to process the evidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/342/1*_heWVZMGG5w146t1D_SpoQ.png" /></figure><p>The result is a collection of parsed forensic data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*wAuaYnf3K_1ZR5tMcadWxw.png" /></figure><p>A large portion of the output is available in formats such as CSV, which makes it much easier to search, filter, and analyze.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*GAy5Z-XQYybKfR8oy4MY_A.png" /></figure><p>However, there is an important limitation.</p><blockquote><strong>Parsed output is not the same thing as the original evidence. Not every artifact will necessarily be parsed.</strong></blockquote><p>The original evidence should always be preserved and reviewed when necessary.</p><p>Think of the workflow like this:</p><p>Original Evidence → Parsed Evidence → Investigation</p><p>The parsed files make analysis easier, but they should not replace the original forensic artifacts.</p><h3>7. Do Not Upload Everything to DFIR Companion</h3><p>This is probably the most important practical lesson from this workflow.</p><p>It is tempting to take the entire KAPE output and upload everything into DFIR Companion.</p><p>More evidence does <strong>not</strong> automatically mean a better investigation.</p><p>Too many unrelated artifacts can add noise and make correlation harder.</p><p>Instead, select artifacts based on the question you are trying to answer.</p><p>For example:</p><p>What executed? <br><strong>Check Prefetch, process creation logs</strong></p><p>What files were accessed? <br><strong>Check Filesystem artifacts, application logs</strong></p><p>For this experiment, I selected:</p><ul><li>Prefetch</li><li>Apache access logs</li></ul><p>These artifacts were chosen because the incident related to remote code execution from a web.</p><h3>8. Create New Case in DFIR Companion</h3><p>Create new case of analysis by pressing this button in the DFIR Companion console.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*8-GW0bISmwqcqLfi70AIfQ.png" /></figure><p>Enter the data needed like Case ID, Case Name and Investigator in the pop up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/925/1*zMoqsNaMky01Lp87CTb3_g.png" /></figure><h3>9. Import the Evidence into DFIR Companion</h3><p>Now we can move to DFIR Companion.</p><p>Enable the AI analysis feature. Here</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*a5uX8sddNTrPVujUmL7hCg.png" /></figure><p>The purpose of this feature is to allow DFIR Companion to analyze the artifacts we provide and correlate information between them.</p><p>Use the artifact upload function to import the evidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*RJZNGGXYrtR5qLyc_PZ6-g.png" /></figure><p>Select the parsed artifact that you want the AI to analyze</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*Vq2xgYIO-Nspjschajyx8A.png" /></figure><blockquote>The DFIR Companion also able to analyze <strong>some unparsed </strong>log such as <strong>.eml .json .csv .txt and .text</strong>. So that other evidence file like .evtx .pcap image file need to be parsed to relevant input</blockquote><p>For apache access log its acceptable by the DFIR Companion because its in text format.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*kXwdU5NDKKp2KPaM9eW37A.png" /></figure><h3>10. Assign Severity</h3><p>After importing an artifact, DFIR Companion asks for a severity level.</p><p>In this experiment, the tools used to generate the artifacts did not provide a severity score.</p><p>Therefore, Info can be used when there is no better classification available.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/919/1*thj-6I3mjYxVo_UrNyJvFQ.png" /></figure><p>Severity should not be confused with proof of malicious activity.</p><p>A forensic artifact can be useful even when it is classified as informational.</p><p>For example, a Prefetch entry may not be malicious by itself, but it can become important when correlated with:</p><ul><li>a suspicious process</li><li>an unusual command</li><li>a web request</li><li>a file-access event</li></ul><p>That correlation is where the investigation becomes interesting.</p><p>Wait for the artifact to be imported and analyzed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/457/1*YHmB4AM3yvuXBPtz1zSCMg.png" /></figure><h3>11. Choosing The Right Dashboard</h3><p>When everything is done, we can change the dashboard template by changing the type of the dashboard.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nt1BCqwBdNsbBn3UfBV_mA.png" /></figure><p>For example we can choose the<strong> Triage view</strong> to see the findings alerted by DFIR Companion and the timeline.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lSOyp7g5GIVTMYuhqpLY4g.png" /><figcaption>Findings</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bI-R3wNq6qZH23VWDgwt9A.png" /><figcaption>Timeline</figcaption></figure><p>Through <strong>analyst dashboard </strong>view we can see the attack mapping and the IoCs marked</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vy4_B_26Mu3_8FJRnCvKIg.png" /><figcaption>Kill Chain</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AMN6uLFUO6e_KqyvrLFm3Q.png" /><figcaption>IoCs</figcaption></figure><h3>12. Report and Presentation</h3><p>The tool also provide us with the presentation feature</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K1ktd20NitjpbfCRyeiHjA.png" /></figure><p>The contents of the presentation slide are the summary and detailed findings found by the tool.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AZ8uelRNbXhusdwv7nzUGw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tYODt7p86DVmkgmWS-rlDA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*54SwjEF1zgk12k56sAhS5A.png" /></figure><p>After analyzing the artifacts, DFIR Companion provides export functions for generating outputs such as forensic reports, IOC blocklists, forensic timelines, etc</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MompAaQ7lOIof0pK7wbV9A.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion and Final Thoughts</h3><p>This workflow shows how <strong>KAPE and DFIR Companion can complement each other in a Windows forensic investigation</strong>. KAPE handles evidence collection and parsing, while DFIR Companion helps analyze and correlate the selected artifacts through findings, timelines, attack mapping, and IoCs.</p><p>The key is to collect and provide <strong>relevant evidence</strong>, rather than simply uploading everything. DFIR Companion can also export investigation results such as forensic reports, IOC blocklists, and forensic timelines. However, the generated findings should still be validated against the original evidence before being used as final forensic conclusions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fbe276dcf8b9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/from-kape-to-dfir-companion-a-practical-windows-forensic-investigation-workflow-fbe276dcf8b9">From KAPE to DFIR Companion: A Practical Windows Forensic Investigation Workflow</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My AWS Cloud Practitioner Experience (CLF-C02) — How I Passed in 2 Days]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@onle7231/my-aws-cloud-practitioner-experience-clf-c02-how-i-passed-in-2-days-005bbc13b742?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/005bbc13b742</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 10:39:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-23T10:43:00.251Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I passed the AWS Cloud Practitioner (CLF-C02) exam after just 2 days of studying without taking any courses and honestly, I didn’t expect it to be that doable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OekTqPy53qe7nErU01R5Pw.jpeg" /></figure><p>I should start by saying that I already have some background in IT, and that helped me a lot. Many of the concepts in AWS aren’t entirely new if you’ve worked with technology before. Instead, it often feels like learning a new “language” for things you already understand. Once I started connecting AWS services to tools and systems I was already familiar with, everything became much easier to grasp.</p><p>When I began studying, I quickly realized that <strong>a big part of the exam is simply remembering the names of AWS services and what they do</strong>. There are quite a lot of them, and at first it felt overwhelming. But after a while, I noticed that once you have a general idea of most services, you’re already more than halfway there. <strong>The rest is really about understanding when and why to use each service.</strong></p><p>To help with that, I spent time using ChatGPT to break things down in a simpler way. Whenever I didn’t understand a service, I would ask for explanations and examples of how it’s used in real scenarios. That made the learning process feel less like memorizing and more like actually understanding.</p><p>The day before the exam, I decided to look up past questions on Google and YouTube. Since this certification is quite popular, there’s no shortage of free resources online. This turned out to be a really good decision because some of the questions I saw during my practice showed up in a very similar form in the actual exam. It definitely gave me more confidence going in.</p><p>On the day of the exam, I took it online using the Pearson VUE platform. I made sure to check in about 30 minutes early, which I’d strongly recommend to anyone. The check-in process was more detailed than I expected. I had to run a system check, fill in my personal information, and take photos of both my ID and my surroundings. I also had to close all other applications on my laptop and make sure no remote access tools were running.</p><p>After that, a proctor connected with me and asked me to show my room using my camera. I had to move my phone and any other electronic devices away from my desk so that only my laptop remained. Once everything was verified, I was allowed to start the exam.</p><p>The exam itself was quite straightforward. Most of the questions focused on understanding what each AWS service does, while others tested how well you can choose the right service for a given scenario. Even though the exam duration is 90 minutes, I found myself finishing in about 40 to 50 minutes.</p><p>Right after submitting, I received my result immediately. Seeing that I passed was definitely a relief.</p><p>Looking back, I wouldn’t say the certification is particularly difficult, but it’s still a great starting point — especially if you’re new to cloud computing or just want to get a feel for how certification exams work. That said, if your goal is to build a serious career in cloud computing, I personally think going straight for an Associate-level certification might be a better investment of your time and money.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*INHNx1O2_K0DorET.png" /><figcaption>src: geeksforgeeks.org</figcaption></figure><p>Honestly, the main reason I took this certification was simple — I had a free voucher. Since I didn’t have to pay for it, I thought, why not give it a try?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=005bbc13b742" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Google Promises a Cybersecurity Job After This Certificate — But Is It Real?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@onle7231/google-promises-a-cybersecurity-job-after-this-certificate-but-is-it-real-8e2aaa2ecf30?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8e2aaa2ecf30</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google-cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google-certification]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2025 07:43:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-21T07:43:21.288Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Google Promises a Cybersecurity Job After This Certificate — But Is It Real?</h3><p>When I first saw Google promoting a <em>cybersecurity career</em> after their certificate, I was sceptical. So, I took the <strong>Google Cybersecurity Professional Certificate V2</strong> myself to see if it lives up to the hype.</p><p>You can check my badge here:</p><p><a href="https://www.credly.com/badges/9fe7ab70-c63e-4fb5-82bc-b4d7fd0991fe/linked_in_profile">Google Cybersecurity Professional Certificate V2 was issued by Coursera to Christopher Ryan.</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*K0X6N71lVHBNTtwC.jpg" /><figcaption>src: @<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUMdSRAQtKQ">tyson36990</a></figcaption></figure><p>So, is it worth it? <strong>It depends who you are.</strong><br>If you’re completely new to IT, this course might frustrate you — too many technical terms, not enough explanations. You’ll end up Googling and ChatGPT-ing your way through it.</p><p>But if you already know basic IT concepts, it’s actually pretty solid. You’ll get a clear picture of what cybersecurity analysts do day to day, analyzing logs, and a structured way to think about incidents. Personally, I finally understood how to apply the <strong>NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)</strong> when responding to alerts on platforms like Let’s Defend SIEM.</p><p>Still, let’s be real: <strong>this certificate won’t hand you a job.</strong> It’s not a shortcut — it’s a foundation. Great for building understanding, not credentials.</p><p>Yeah, you still have a long way to go after finishing the certificate <strong>KEEEPSSS GRINDDINGG!</strong></p><blockquote>“Google gives you the map — but you still have to make the journey yourself.”</blockquote><p><strong>Final verdict:</strong></p><p>If you’re new, start with free IT or networking courses first (like Cisco Netacad).<br>If you’ve got the basics down, then this Google certificate can help tie it all together.</p><p>Here are some free pre-course by Cisco Netacad</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.netacad.com/courses/introduction-to-cybersecurity?courseLang=en-US">Introduction to Cybersecurity</a></li><li><a href="https://www.netacad.com/courses/networking-basics?courseLang=en-US">Networking Basics</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e2aaa2ecf30" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Let’s Defend SOC146 — Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros Write Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@onle7231/lets-defend-soc146-phishing-mail-detected-excel-4-0-macros-write-up-5eda23ae82ec?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5eda23ae82ec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Dec 2024 13:14:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-26T13:14:42.566Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Let’s Defend SOC146 — Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros Write Up</strong></h3><p>Phishing e-mail attached with Excel Trojan.</p><p>This is my write up on responding to an alert in Let’s Defend Lab. I am using the Let’s Defend Lab platform to enhance my cybersecurity skills. If you have any feedback or questions, feel free to reach out through my Medium profile.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*KRQDHhTxTLL4lcjt.jpg" /></figure><p>This report outlines the investigation of a security alert indicating suspicious activity involving an Excel file. Upon closer examination, the file was identified as delivering a trojan, leveraging Excel’s capabilities to execute malicious actions. This report details the detection approach, observed indicators of compromise, and mitigation steps taken to prevent further system or network impact. Below is the first look of the alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rxvSmXX12JBtwp7z2MO6Sw.png" /></figure><p>I look for the SMTP Address in the Email Security and I found this email</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hXD3dxL-4mdenL7irxy_HQ.png" /></figure><p>I investigate the sender domain reputation first, by referring to threat intelligence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gq4rYcp_Fc9itH6r8tIlLg.png" /></figure><p>The domain is not registered In the Let’s Defend threat intelligence. So I look up in to Virus Total.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FbsFHtCN354z0os9jAgatg.png" /></figure><p>Based on the Virus Total result, the domain is not detected as malicious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gHa2EztbkftNn1mRI51NBA.png" /></figure><p>I investigate the domain further, and I found this website. In their contact us section they use @gmail.com domain for their email, not @tritowncomputers.com. This website is basically a website for computer repair service. With that being said, I conclude that the email is not related with the tritowncomputers.com I found, which make the email more suspicious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/1*ELPPXUOTpJO6H8bB5cAjOw.png" /></figure><p>Furthermore, when the attachment downloaded, my browser detect it as a dangerous file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*86ztW81LGvpS5vw7M9jCRg.png" /></figure><p>The attachment contains these three files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/705/1*RGCgmZJZLTy3w7LlWWiNHg.png" /></figure><p>I try to analyze the excel file with olevba tools but it detects no macro.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7EpM3ioDrYAyxcgoDSChTw.png" /></figure><p>So I try to find more information using DIE</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/1*uyACR9fiUvGabJLheieTPg.png" /></figure><p>Then I check the hash in VirusTotal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oZAmKwl1Jecw_MZHoWyc-A.png" /></figure><p>Based on the Virus Total result, the excel file detected as Trojan Malware. I don’t do the malware analysis part, but I used this <a href="https://any.run/report/1df68d55968bb9d2db4d0d18155188a03a442850ff543c8595166ac6987df820/ec796440-5ec9-4f72-9e13-94d0f9952ce3">anyrun </a>malware analysis result.</p><p>Since it is a Trojan Malware it should contact a C2 server, and based on the anyrun report I found this C2 domain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/917/1*la6nakIXVG7msWnNMpr_Gg.png" /></figure><p>Knowing that, I look at the log management to find if the malware had been opened or not.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dp0A5nDeh2IrktfJmFi7qQ.png" /></figure><p>I found that a host is communicating with the domain, and the process comes from excel.exe. This means that the user opened the file.</p><p>I put all of the data in the playbook.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/730/1*av-9UOG2-iR7CdxcEnm2-Q.png" /></figure><blockquote>The Answer is <strong>Yes</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*h6B2JYrqwg5kkXlil3V4vg.png" /></figure><blockquote>The Attachment is <strong>Malicious</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/727/1*3UzhdwbC03T6XLqaLvL4Qw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/543/1*SOC1zrB6tMA9IZYWz6p_qA.png" /></figure><blockquote>The email is <strong>Delivered</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/716/1*OSKHLkAEWvqmu1fWgSwU0g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/1*gDU_wAvf8dFppcbpzALWAg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/723/1*TsaITJSXJ4TaulxkQYlV6A.png" /></figure><blockquote>Yes it is <strong>Opened</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/723/1*bsttwdRguolPlC_Tr7LD7A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NpRfAuQ3E_dCWqmiGt8InQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/1*1lmVzGR4rILHxxQ2Ju-Ckg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/729/1*sFo5ugFm5jq5f2EupoHk7A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/552/1*HetTcW-8Bc-zoT8dll2_KQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5eda23ae82ec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Let’s Defend SOC145 — Ransomware Detected Write Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@onle7231/lets-defend-soc145-ransomware-detected-write-up-4d2c2e8e8df0?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d2c2e8e8df0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Oct 2024 06:52:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-18T06:52:26.151Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Let’s Defend SOC145 — Ransomware Detected Write Up</h3><p>Critical <strong>Avaddon </strong>ransomware alert on SIEM</p><p>This is my write up on responding to an alert in Let’s Defend Lab. I am using the Let’s Defend Lab platform to enhance my cybersecurity skills. If you have any feedback or questions, feel free to reach out through my Medium profile.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8DF_ys9Vb5NAs5BB8rapnA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In this report, I will act as the security analyst responsible for detecting an alert that identified suspicious ransomware activity. Upon further investigation and analysis, it was determined that the ransomware in question is <strong>Avaddon</strong>. This particular strain of ransomware is known for encrypting files and demanding a ransom payment in exchange for the decryption key. The alert provided critical information, including the source of the attack, affected files, and malicious actions taken by the ransomware. As part of the response, I will outline the detection process, the indicators of compromise, and the steps taken to contain the threat, ensuring no further damage to the system or network occurred.</p><p>In this challenge given an alert that detected ransomware. Below is the first look of the alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sBSNz8eShSiCAyAksq2c4w.png" /></figure><p>Based on that alert, I checked the source address in the endpoint security. The alert was coming from Windows 10 host.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GwsmjjfOO2VJP7QYBfVjfw.png" /></figure><p>I then verified the file on VirusTotal, and it was confirmed to be malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/662/1*p_7p27MWPxgga4JQ2_L10g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*afUVOJzIlZ_NTKM06qNsiw.png" /></figure><p>After some investigation, I found that the host ran the malicious file, leading me to conclude that the host has been infiltrated. Therefore, I have contained the host to prevent any further exploitation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/979/1*DPHEfS143FU7dvZQuPdHjg.png" /></figure><p>In the endpoint management Its really weird that all the event time is Null. Maybe its the effect from the ransomware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/947/1*jNgUE__SROaxGSzOe3gG6Q.png" /></figure><p>I then checked the log management system and searched for the source address 172.16.17.88. As a result, I found the following two logs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uN5QdzYUXCgHb_FPWrgrsQ.png" /></figure><p>However, neither of the two alerts is related to this specific challenge alert, as they do not share the same timestamp.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/598/1*2sr_V_SflfWDaz_6QVvW1A.png" /></figure><p>I compiled all of these findings into the playbook for documentation and further analysis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/604/1*2NM9hde3PrqXDT4Z0c0HJw.png" /></figure><blockquote>Since I don’t find any IOC that indicates outgoing internet traffic, anti virus program disabled, and application set to automatically launch. So I conclude that this Thread Indicator is from <strong>other</strong>.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Answer : other</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/603/1*D5t7nSqQf454vdWVRX2Y7g.png" /></figure><blockquote>The malware is not quarantined/cleaned yet.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Answer : Not Quarantined</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/599/1*7ngd_gO5OuRpDu5XIVjQ2w.png" /></figure><blockquote>Based on the VirusTotal result, the file detected as a malware.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Answer : Malicious</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/597/1*khzsUn-zGX9tfD9uxMxXbw.png" /></figure><blockquote>I can’t find any IOC in the log management, that indicates a traffic of C2 that related to this alert. So the answer is Not Accessed</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Answer : Not Accessed</strong></blockquote><p>Below are the artifact that I sent to SOC L2 :</p><ol><li>172.16.17.88, Ransomed Endpoint, IP address</li><li>0b486fe0503524cfe4726a4022fa6a68, Ransom File hash, MD5</li></ol><p>Then I put this as the analyst note.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*sG-gd3bNplHUfEiKx0Gywg.png" /></figure><p>I close the alert as true positive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/452/1*d7fB0UeQXvPrB7dDtNB39w.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d2c2e8e8df0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Let’s Defend SOC239 — Remote Code Execution Detected in Splunk Enterprise Write Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@onle7231/lets-defend-soc239-remote-code-execution-detected-in-splunk-enterprise-write-up-9d6dbf18747a?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9d6dbf18747a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[it]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[splunk]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 29 Sep 2024 09:11:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-29T09:11:01.978Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Let’s Defend SOC239 — Remote Code Execution Detected in Splunk Enterprise Write Up</h3><p>This is my write up on responding to an alert in Let’s Defend Lab. I am using the Let’s Defend Lab platform to enhance my cybersecurity skills. If you have any feedback or questions, feel free to reach out through my Medium profile.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/0*7y7yXOgp7Z_TQdnj.png" /><figcaption>Source : <a href="https://www.splunk.com/content/dam/splunk-blogs/images/2018/12/splunklogo.png">https://www.splunk.com/content/dam/splunk-blogs/images/2018/12/splunklogo.png</a></figcaption></figure><p>Splunk is a widely-used Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool. SIEM platforms are designed to collect, store, and analyze logs from various sources to help monitor and manage security incidents. In this challenge, I will take on the role of a security analyst. My task is to investigate an alert that has been triggered, indicating a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability on a Splunk server. Below is the alert that was generated for this incident.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*19PryzNs0djUVRmibR8EZw.png" /></figure><p>Based on Virus Total the source IP 180.101.88.240 is malicious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NQcVrGGbAq0L4IGQrzo8GA.png" /></figure><p>I look further about the source IP address, the IP is based on China and its not detected as a proxy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/665/1*D1nHWZtuBD5LTlMs4U_htw.png" /></figure><p>Then I checked for log management. For the log investigation I used the basic view so I can sort the logs by date to get more clearer context.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VGnzU_Ps6AUgtcAre_ysYg.png" /></figure><p>Based on the raw logs, the threat actor do these 3 things :</p><ul><li>The threat actor, input “shell.xsl” file to the Splunk Server</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*PujWjWDgwcdiPiQ8JeSSQA.png" /></figure><ul><li>The threat actor logged in to the Splunk by using python script, and the response was 200 OK, which mean the request sent by the threat actor was success.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/547/1*ocjpMer7YKVE9osYH0bfoQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>The threat actor managed to get secure shell.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/542/1*Nx81N1DvK-WhdmP6yadGlw.png" /></figure><p>Based on the logs only I didn’t really understand how come the threat actor got the secure shell. After deeper investigation turns out this attack was a <strong>CVE-2023–46214</strong>. I found the IoC in these resources.</p><ul><li><strong>CVE-2023–46214 Report</strong></li></ul><p><a href="https://www.uptycs.com/blog/threat-research-report-team/splunk-vulnerability-cve-2023-46214">CVE-2023-46214: the Splunk Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability</a></p><ul><li><strong>CVE-2023–46214 PoC</strong></li></ul><p><a href="https://github.com/nathan31337/Splunk-RCE-poc?tab=readme-ov-file">GitHub - nathan31337/Splunk-RCE-poc</a></p><p>Based on the resources, the key points I got are:</p><ul><li>The threat actor need to have at least one account to login to the Splunk SIEM</li><li>The threat actor uploaded a file named “shell.xsl”. Which is related to the alert I did. In the file it contains a reverse shell code.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*WL69Gua8shnOqH0tn1BIcA.png" /></figure><p>The act of putting the reverse shell is also shown in the <strong><em>generate_malicious_xsl()</em></strong><em> </em>function.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/1*C-MVwsyaBBu6-c4DA8YJTw.png" /></figure><ul><li>The threat actor used <strong>t<em>rigger_xslt_transform()</em></strong><em> </em>function to do <strong>XSLT Injection Attack.</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*uWW0JtgZTJoIrFhxmlPzCg.png" /></figure><ul><li>Then the threat actor find a way to run the reverse shell code, while listening using netcat in the threat actor device, resulting the threat actor got the reverse shell (shell.sh) using <strong><em>trigger_reverse_shell()</em></strong> function.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/718/1*H9lAiJ9L-eGTme2WX9WADQ.png" /></figure><p>After get the access to the server shell, the threat actor created a new account to remain persistence to the server.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/732/1*8l_u0v1sG2gb93AFMXb0ag.png" /></figure><p>Since the attack was succeed I contained the host.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/771/1*xDNK8exIk7pi7hsxVWZW3g.png" /></figure><p>I reported all the findings in the playbook</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/727/1*Nq_qisly0HJ-xUfyQES7gg.png" /></figure><blockquote>Since the traffic is a real attack, then yes it is <strong>Malicious</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*Lv1BubbqNfHe5371iQA52A.png" /></figure><blockquote>Since the attack is RCE that works on XSLT Injection, by changing the XML document, so the answer is <strong>XML Injection</strong></blockquote><p>You can read more about XSLT Injection here</p><p><a href="https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/xslt-server-side-injection-extensible-stylesheet-language-transformations">XSLT Server Side Injection (Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations) | HackTricks</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*DEblrXdaLWDzjRYvO2ee4A.png" /></figure><blockquote>No email related to this alert in the email management, and the source IP is malicious so the its <strong>Not Planned</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*w--dXfnWEwp3WMrJlO7iDQ.png" /></figure><blockquote>The traffic comes from the <strong>Internet -&gt; Company Network</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/726/1*bKehmhhbMHVxG-RVlvBA8w.png" /></figure><blockquote>The threat actor get the reverse shell so <strong>Yes</strong></blockquote><p>As the artifact I put these :</p><ul><li>172.16.20.13 — targeted server — IP Address</li><li>180.101.88.240 — Threat actor IP — IP Address</li><li><a href="http://18.219.80.54:8000/en-US/splunkd/__upload/indexing/preview?output_mode=json&amp;props.NO_BINARY_CHECK=1&amp;input.path=shell.xsl">http://18.219.80.54:8000/en-US/splunkd/__upload/indexing/preview?output_mode=json&amp;props.NO_BINARY_CHECK=1&amp;input.path=shell.xsl</a> — Requested url — URL</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/724/1*PkqFTI7JadCj_SR7VndiEA.png" /></figure><blockquote>The attack was success so <strong>Yes</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*rjYE0OwCHYoPvJrfYUuVtw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/560/1*8pzZh9CzafKz4FbDpK0RaQ.png" /></figure><p>Close the alert with <strong>True Positive</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9d6dbf18747a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Let’s Defend SOC210 — Possible Brute Force Detected on VPN Write Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@onle7231/lets-defend-soc210-possible-brute-force-detected-on-vpn-write-up-ed2c4620af23?source=rss-5ba42c8d0880------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed2c4620af23</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vpn]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Ryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Sep 2024 10:16:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-26T10:16:28.348Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Let’s Defend SOC210 — Possible Brute Force Detected on VPN Write Up</h3><p>This is my write up on responding to an alert in Let’s Defend Lab. I am using the Let’s Defend Lab platform to enhance my cybersecurity skills. If you have any feedback or questions, feel free to reach out through my Medium profile.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e30cp7XCWEj6qUZ_OL5VDQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>A <strong>VPN (Virtual Private Network)</strong> is used to mask your ip address by routing your internet traffic through a VPN server, which assigns you a new ipaddress. While a VPN provides privacy by encrypting your data and hiding your online activity from your ISP, it does not guarantee complete anonymity, as the VPN provider can still see your activity. Additionally, a VPN can be used to extend a private LAN over the internet, allowing remote access to resources as if you were on the same local network.</p><p>As a SOC L1 analyst, I received an alert escalated from another security analyst. This alert indicates a successful VPN login that is suspected to have been achieved through a brute force attack. Below are the details of the alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rzqg3qnsqv3A1QYVYfTwqQ.png" /></figure><p>First thing first, I checked the source and destination ip address reputation, by using VirusTotal, since both of the ip is not listed in the Let’s Defend Threat Intelligence.</p><p>Ip <strong>33.33.33.33 is safe</strong> based on Virus Total</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*emULO6coPAF6WGcJKoEsLw.png" /></figure><p>The source ip <strong>37.19.221.229</strong> detected as <strong>malicious </strong>by SOCRadar in VirusTotal. <strong>37.19.221.229 </strong>is the <strong>threat actor ip.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kY-OJk6m1qkGkdJ5KLRQ5g.png" /></figure><p>Since the ip is detected malicious by SOC Radar, I investigated why does SOCRadar detect it as malicious. By using one of Threat Intelligence that created by SOCRadar. I put the result of the ip reputation below.</p><p><a href="https://socradar.io/labs/ipreputation/results/cd010d32ab9f41ca98a6faaf00a90d41">IP Reputation</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/1*4iA007YLPjWbnZiqLCOYgA.png" /></figure><p>Ip <strong>37.19.221.229</strong> known as a malicious ip because of spamming attack, spamming attack can be an indication of brute forcing attempt, but from those description none of it tells me about brute forcing or spamming a VPN.</p><p>I used another tool AbuseIPDB. In this tool more reports was found.</p><p><a href="https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/37.19.221.229">https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/37.19.221.229</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/531/1*FJj6f4W4v7nXPDBDQvNW9g.png" /></figure><p>Based on AbuseIPDB, the ip mostly reported because of brute force attempt, where it is related with the case in the alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y1jm87rWLm85U4loDGY7tg.png" /></figure><p>After checking for the ip reputation, I looked into the log management to find more information. I put this as the query</p><blockquote>Source Address equals “37.19.221.229” and Destination Address contains “33.33.33.33”</blockquote><p>With that query I got 10 logs, this 10 logs are basically the logs from firewall where it shows the attempt from the threat actor to get initial access to the VPN. I will summarize the logs below.</p><p>First the threat actor at <strong>01:43 PM</strong> starts trying multiple username starting from<strong> sane@letsdefend.io</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/379/1*vtRW6-bWKvU6jfYeWuxTuQ.png" /></figure><p>The threat actor keep on trying multiple username until the threat actor found <strong>mane@letsdefend.io</strong> at <strong>01:47 PM.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/503/1*nyG8gGkiRuHYnznYSomp3A.png" /></figure><p>Then the threat actor brute forced the password of mane@letsdefend.io and at <strong>01:51 PM</strong> the threat actor successfully get an initial access to the VPN.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/378/1*NGpXipXzwKC_QqkH5CA2xg.png" /></figure><p>From the investigation I conclude that :</p><ol><li>Threat actor comes from an external ip and since no announcement given in the email about a vulnerability assessment, Its not a planned attack.</li><li>Threat actor used brute force to get initial access to the VPN, by getting the user <strong>mane@letsdefend.io</strong> and it’s password.</li></ol><p>With those result I put these report in the playbook.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/735/1*zAixC6hKwO2-wf5F_vaxbQ.png" /></figure><p>The ip comes from <strong>external</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/719/1*_7PMnsAH7bW0S21krE6sEA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Yes </strong>the attacker ip is suspicious</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*Xx6amLxYhONDksesbAn8pg.png" /></figure><p>None of the logs specifically targeted SSH or RDP; instead, they focused on the VPN, utilizing port 443, which is likely associated with OpenVPN (using HTTPS).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/1*jzR5owZWY5btPvIWSkE3pA.png" /></figure><p>From the Mane host on 172.16.17.210, all of the logs used port 53, 80, and 25 none of them are RDP or SSH, even though all of Mane’s logs none of it are related to this alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1013/1*EPnZ5e3V7D0aq1icxYlXXA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/925/1*3RXVeTfX76IjfSyvUzgWDA.png" /></figure><blockquote>I ininially answered this question incorrectly. However, the official writeup doesn’t clarify why the answer is “yes.” After the threat actor compromised Mane’s credentials, they took no further action. Therefore, I can’t assume that the SSH or RDP traffic is masked by the VPN since VPN authentication doesn’t use SSH or RDP.</blockquote><p>The answer is <strong>Yes</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/723/1*2ljaYVfdFoMDjm-N2YSF_g.png" /></figure><p>The attack tried multiple user account first not only Mane, so the answer is <strong>Yes</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/726/1*yUZ8vv5eiQGugEHC6yudIA.png" /></figure><p>The attack was not specifically aimed at SSH or RDP, but the brute force attack was successful. This question in the playbook is somewhat confusing, but in a real scenario, since the brute force attack succeeded, I need to escalate the alert to SOC L2. According to the Let’s Defend system, successful attacks must be escalated. At least I need SOC L2 to investigate it, so my answer is <strong>Yes</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/1*GwikD9uosMVFQrhVpcBkHg.png" /></figure><p>To answer this playbook I look back to the mane’s endpoint. The attacker gained the access to the VPN at 13.51 PM but there is no single process, network action, terminal history, and browser history accessed during or after 13.51 PM. Meaning that the threat actor haven’t logged in yet to the mane host. Since the credential of mane got compromised, we need to contain the endpoint first, to prevent the threat actor from accessing the host. So the answer to this playbook is <strong>Yes</strong></p><p>As the artifact I put these :</p><ol><li>mane@letsdefend.io — Compromised credential — Email domain ( since no category suited for this artifact, I choose email domain)</li><li>33.33.33.33 — Targeted VPN— Ip address</li><li>37.19.221.229 — Attacker ip — Ip address</li></ol><p>As analyst note I wrote this :</p><blockquote>Attacker from 37.19.221.229 attacked 33.33.33.33 VPN, successfully compromising <a href="/service/mailto:mane@letsdefend.io">mane@letsdefend.io</a> credential. Please check.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/549/1*EcA2Qa7SjDykMIyuVQMN2g.png" /></figure><p>I closed the alert with<strong> True Positive</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed2c4620af23" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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