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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ondra Rojčík on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ondra Rojčík on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ondra Rojčík on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 01:36:26 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Boosting Your InfoSec Skills with Intelligence Analysis Mindset]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik/boosting-your-infosec-skills-with-intelligence-analysis-mindset-db484e94f02e?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[skills]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cti]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondra Rojčík]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2025 21:43:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-03T21:44:33.819Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vx_vG2mh55HLjCrs1yEhlw.png" /><figcaption>Aesthetics, dancing independent of context by DALL.E (VII.)</figcaption></figure><ul><li><em>Professionals in information security often encounter complex challenges that require more than just technical expertise. Drawing from the discipline of intelligence analysis, I believe, several core traits and skills can enhance the competencies across various information security domains.</em></li><li><em>At its core, intelligence analysis involves working with information and providing objective assessments, even when all necessary facts aren’t available. This approach is not exclusive to intelligence analysis or Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) but is widely applicable to other areas.</em></li><li><em>The core competencies of intelligence analysis and CTI include defining problems through targeted </em><strong><em>questioning</em></strong><em> that helps framing the problem and identifying information gaps. Accepting that information is often </em><strong><em>imperfect</em></strong><em> while still leveraging it to support decision-making is often the next step of the process. When assessing the imperfect information, analysts must address cognitive biases by engaging in </em><strong><em>“slow thinking”</em></strong><em> to form objective assessments. Additionally, analysts must take into account that their role is to serve and support other functions. They must consider their </em><strong><em>customer’s</em></strong><em> specific needs and interests when communicating conclusions.</em></li><li><em>These competencies are critical for analysts to perform effectively and I believe that they can also provide valuable support in other information security operating environments.</em></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bn99MIyskRnjMtWAbIG7xg.png" /><figcaption>The core competencies of intelligence analysis and CTI</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Frame problems with questions</strong></h3><p>Cultivating curiosity and mastering the art of questioning are pivotal skills in intelligence analysis. A structured approach to inquiry allows us to map complex issues. One effective method is the 5W1H framework, which involves posing the following questions:</p><p><strong>What?</strong> Identifies the issue or event.</p><p><strong>When?</strong> Determines the timing.</p><p><strong>Where?</strong> Specifies the location.</p><p><strong>Who? </strong>Recognizes the individuals or entities involved.</p><p><strong>Why?</strong> Explores the reasons or causes.</p><p><strong>How? </strong>Describes the manner or process.</p><p>This technique, widely used by journalists and investigators, facilitates a thorough examination of any situation. By systematically addressing each question, analysts can uncover essential facts and identify any gaps in information. Recognizing unanswered questions is crucial; it prompts further investigation.</p><p>In intelligence analysis, next to the 5W1H, the question <strong>“So what?”</strong> holds paramount importance. Answering “So what?” clarifies the implications of the findings to the audience (decision-makers, stakeholders), conveying the significance and relevance of the information. This perspective shifts the analysis to meaningful insight, addressing the relevancy, impact and consequences of the findings.</p><p><strong>SO WHAT?</strong> &gt; Why the customer should care (Implications for customer)</p><p>After addressing the “So what?” question, it’s worth considering “Now what?” This involves providing recommendations or outlining potential actions based on the analysis. By suggesting actionable steps, analysts guide decision-makers on how to respond to the insights presented, thereby enhancing the practical value of the analysis.</p><p>By embracing a <a href="https://medium.com/%40orojcik/from-descriptions-to-impact-unlocking-the-power-of-basic-cyber-threat-intelligence-questions-e4593ddd98fd">questioning mindset</a>, intelligence analysts can produce comprehensive, insightful, and actionable analyses that effectively inform and support decision-making processes.</p><h3><strong>Embrace the information imperfections</strong></h3><p>In the realm of intelligence analysis, professionals often grapple with incomplete or imperfect information, commonly referred to as “<strong>intelligence gaps</strong>” or “known unknowns.” These gaps are inherent in the field and necessitate the use of judgments, assessments, and assumptions to bridge them. It’s crucial to explicitly acknowledge the uncertainties rather than conceal them; transparency about what is unknown enhances credibility and fosters trust with your audience.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Example: </em></strong><em>The initial access vector is not known to our team at this stage of the investigation…</em></blockquote><p>To effectively communicate the degree of certainty in assessments. Intelligence analysis employs specific terminology known as</p><ul><li>Words of Estimative Probability (WEP) and</li><li>Levels of Confidence in Assessment (LCA)</li></ul><p>WEPs are terms used to express the likelihood of an event occurring, such as “likely,” “unlikely,” or “almost certain.” LCAs indicate the confidence level in the assessment, categorized as “high”, “moderate”, or “low”, based on the quality and corroboration of the information.</p><p>Using formalized language with WEPs (as discussed in the <a href="https://medium.com/@orojcik/the-shades-of-doubt-a-guide-to-estimative-language-and-confidence-levels-in-cti-reporting-1545233f7470">blog post</a> “Communicating Uncertainties: A Guide to Estimative Language and Confidence Levels in CTI Reporting”) can enhance clarity. However, due to the complexity of this standard, adopting such structured terminology isn’t always practical. Stakeholders unfamiliar with it may find it confusing — or worse, disregard your well-intended assessment entirely. The key is to communicate uncertainty effectively, ensuring your audience grasps the inherent imperfections in the information.</p><p>Confidence in assessment addresses the fact that judgments and assessments are based on evidence that varies in quality (see the <a href="https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc381/p814126_A1b.pdf">NATO</a> or the <a href="https://www.first.org/global/sigs/cti/curriculum/cti-reporting">FIRST standard</a>):</p><ul><li><strong>High</strong>: good quality of information, evidence from multiple collection capabilities, possible to make a clear judgment.</li><li><strong>Moderate:</strong> evidence is open to several interpretations, or is credible and plausible but lacks correlation.</li><li><strong>Low:</strong> fragmentary information, or from collection capabilities of dubious reliability.</li></ul><p>Using LCA is the simplest way to communicate uncertainties, as it allows you to express the confidence in your conclusions or the quality of your information without burdening consumers with complicated standards. It does not however address the aspect of probability.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Example:</em></strong><em> Based on the analysis of the malware and intrusion activity, we assess with moderate confidence that the [name of the threat actor] was responsible for the unauthorized access and exfiltration of sensitive data.</em></blockquote><p><em>Source: </em><a href="https://www.first.org/global/sigs/cti/curriculum/cti-reporting">FIRST standard</a></p><h3><strong>Overcome cognitive bias by “slow thinking”</strong></h3><p>When assessing the imperfect information, analysts must address cognitive biases. The first step is to be aware that we tend to have them. Daniel Kahneman, in his seminal work <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thinking,_Fast_and_Slow">Thinking, Fast and Slow</a>, introduces the concept of two distinct thinking systems that govern our decision-making processes and explain the root cause of cognitive biases:</p><ul><li><strong>System 1:</strong> This is our brain’s fast, automatic, and intuitive mode of thinking. It operates effortlessly, allowing us to make quick judgments based on patterns and experiences. While efficient for routine decisions, System 1 is prone to errors due to its reliance on mental shortcuts, known as heuristics, which can lead to cognitive biases.</li><li><strong>System 2:</strong> In contrast, System 2 is slow, deliberate, and analytical. It requires conscious effort and is employed when tackling complex problems that demand logical reasoning. Although more accurate, System 2 is energy-intensive and can be easily fatigued, often leading individuals to default back to the more comfortable System 1 thinking.</li></ul><blockquote><em>“A bat and a ball together cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Many people quickly respond that the ball costs $0.10. This intuitive answer is generated by System 1. This answer is incorrect. To find the correct answer, we need to engage System 2.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The ball costs $0.05, and the bat costs $1.05. This solution requires the analytical processing of System 2, overriding the initial, incorrect response from System 1.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Source: Kahneman, page 44–45</em></blockquote><p>Understanding these systems is crucial as reliance on System 1 can introduce cognitive biases into analysis and decision-making. Some common cognitive biases include:</p><ul><li><strong>Anchoring Bias:</strong> The tendency to rely heavily on the first piece of information encountered (the “anchor”) when making decisions.</li></ul><blockquote><strong><em>Example: </em></strong><em>An incident responder discovers a malicious process and becomes fixated on the assumption that it’s the root cause, neglecting to investigate other suspicious activity on the host that may indicate a larger compromise.</em></blockquote><ul><li><strong>Availability Bias: </strong>Assessing the likelihood of events based on how easily examples come to mind, which can distort perception of risks.</li></ul><blockquote><strong><em>Example: </em></strong><em>A threat hunter, having just completed a detailed investigation into Cobalt Strike beacons, starts interpreting any anomalous network traffic as Cobalt Strike activity, rather than considering less common tools or custom implants.</em></blockquote><ul><li><strong>Confirmation Bias: </strong>The inclination to search for, interpret, and remember information that confirms one’s preexisting beliefs, while disregarding contradictory evidence.</li></ul><blockquote><strong><em>Example: </em></strong><em>An incident responder believes that a particular server was the entry point and primarily reviews data from that system, overlooking logs from other endpoints that could reveal a different initial vector.</em></blockquote><p>To mitigate the influence of these biases, we should consciously engage System 2 thinking during analysis. This involves:</p><ul><li><strong>Awareness:</strong> Recognizing the potential for cognitive biases to affect judgments.</li><li><strong>Deliberate Analysis: </strong>Taking the time to methodically evaluate information, question assumptions, and consider alternative perspectives. This is where Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) come to play (see Pherson, Heuer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis).</li><li><strong>Adaptability:</strong> Being willing to re-examine and adjust conclusions in light of new evidence or insights (topic of Adam Grant’s book <a href="https://adamgrant.net/book/think-again/">Think Again</a>).</li></ul><p>Cognitive biases are not exclusive to intelligence analysis, they impact various aspects of our daily and professional lives including social interactions, workplace dynamics or financial decisions. The concept is, however, crucial to the development of the field of intelligence analysis. Richards Heuers, a CIA veteran, introduced the concept to the field in his seminal work, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Pyschology-of-Intelligence-Analysis.pdf">Psychology of Intelligence Analysis</a>.</p><p>In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman offers strategies beyond SATs and Intelligence Analysis to address cognitive biases. These include fostering awareness, slowing down decision-making, using structured tools like checklists or statistical models and seeking diverse perspectives. He stresses the importance of engaging deliberate, System 2 thinking for complex or high-stakes decisions, acknowledging that while biases can’t be fully eliminated, they can be effectively managed for better outcomes.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Pre-Mortem Technique</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>One practical tool that you find in both Kahneman’s and Pherson-Heuer’s books is the pre-mortem — a strategy for anticipating potential failures in decision-making (or analysis). Before committing to a decision, imagine that it has failed spectacularly and then work backward to identify what could have gone wrong. This technique helps uncover hidden risks and counteracts overconfidence.</em></blockquote><h3><strong>Adopt customer-focused approach</strong></h3><p>In intelligence analysis, the value of your work is determined by its relevance to your audience — primarily decision-makers and stakeholders. As emphasized by Steven Pressfield in <strong>“</strong><a href="https://stevenpressfield.com/books/nobody-wants-to-read-your-sht/"><strong>Nobody Wants to Read Your Sh*t</strong></a><strong>”</strong> readers are not inherently interested in your writing; it’s your responsibility to engage them by addressing their needs and concerns.</p><p>Analysts often possess a deep passion for their subjects, delving into intricate details with enthusiasm. Assuming that your audience shares this level of interest can be a misstep. Decision-makers typically seek brief, relevant information that directly informs their actions. Therefore, it’s crucial to not “admire the problem”, but to provide relevant insights tailored to their priorities.</p><p>One effective strategy is to preemptively address the “So what?” question already mentioned above. By clarifying the implications of your analysis, you help your audience understand its significance and applicability to their objectives.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Example: </em></strong><em>The ongoing phishing campaign targeting financial credentials poses a significant risk to [your organisation] financial systems, potentially leading to unauthorized transactions or exposure of sensitive financial data.</em></blockquote><p>Whether you’re a security architect identifying risks, or a SOC analyst making sense of vast amounts of data, the principles of structured questioning, critical thinking, and customer-focused analysis can elevate your effectiveness. Intelligence analysis isn’t just about gathering information — it’s about making sense of it in a way that truly matters. By embracing these core competencies, security professionals can improve their ability to assess threats, reduce biases, and provide meaningful insights.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db484e94f02e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The XZ Backdoor: Unveiling the Elaborated Social Engineering Tactics of a Persistent Threat Actor]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik/the-xz-backdoor-unveiling-the-elaborated-social-engineering-tactics-of-a-persistent-threat-actor-95fa8311ea09?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[social-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[adversarial-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source-software]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondra Rojčík]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 20:11:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-20T09:39:36.110Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The XZ Backdoor incident highlights a significant infiltration of a critical open-source project through sophisticated social engineering tactics. The threat actor gained trust within the community by posing as a helpful contributor, manipulating the project maintainer to establish influence. Over several years, they gradually introduced subtle changes that ultimately led to the inclusion of malicious code in the software’s upstream version. The backdoor was disclosed on March 29, 2024, by Andres Freund, a software developer who discovered and reported the malicious activity. Evidence points to a state-sponsored operation given the attackers’ disciplined operational security, long-term strategy, and lack of financial motives. This incident emphasizes the need for enhanced security measures in open-source projects, including greater transparency and financial support for under-resourced maintainers. It serves as a reminder of the vulnerabilities in open-source ecosystems and the potential consequences of exploitation.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0yQLDimtBb2dYnciRrqROA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aesthetics, dancing independent of context by Midjourney (VI.)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>What Do We Know About the XZ Backdoor Threat Actors?</strong></p><p>The answer, paradoxically, is both “not much” and “a lot.” While the identity of the perpetrators remains unclear, the XZ Backdoor incident offers rare insights into the tactics of threat actors targeting software supply chains. This breach is a stark reminder of the vulnerabilities in open-source ecosystems and the lengths attackers will go to exploit them.</p><p><strong>The Incident: A Brief Overview</strong></p><p>On March 29, 2024, software engineer Andres Freund discovered a malicious backdoor in the XZ Utils library, a component widely used in Linux and Unix-like operating systems. The backdoor enabled remote code execution during software configuration, exposing potentially millions of Linux and Unix-like systems to attack.</p><p><strong>The Social Engineering Playbook</strong></p><p>The XZ Backdoor campaign demonstrated meticulous planning and execution. The attackers infiltrated the project not through exploiting a software vulnerability or compromising a server, but by manipulating trust within the open-source community. They identified a crucial project that lacked sufficient support, with the maintainer publicly disclosing mental health issues. The threat actor began subtly by contributing to the project, being supportive, and portraying their main persona as cooperative, communicative, and polite. This approach helped them gain the trust of both the maintainer and the open-source community.</p><p>Later, the threat actor adopted a more aggressive strategy by using additional personas to complain about the perceived inactivity of the xz project. This created pressure to successfully manipulate the maintainer into giving a bigger role to ‘Jia Tan,’ the main persona of the operation.</p><p><strong><em>Phase 1: Gaining Trust (2021–2022)</em></strong></p><p>The operation began in 2021 with a persona named Jia Tan, who contributed innocuous patches to the project — such as changing tabs to spaces. Over time, Jia built a reputation as a cooperative and polite contributor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QZPaZJbSqHb-mZyw" /><figcaption><em>Figure 1: the threat actor started small [</em><a href="https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00512.html"><em>1</em></a><em>]</em></figcaption></figure><p>By February 2022, Jia had gained enough trust to have their first commit merged by the project’s maintainer, Lasse Collin. Shortly thereafter, additional personas joined the fray, including Jigar Kumar, Dennis Ens, and Hans Jansen. These personas, posing as globally distributed contributors [<a href="https://securelist.com/xz-backdoor-story-part-2-social-engineering/112476/">2</a>], actively engaged with the project. They praised the community while pressuring Lasse to delegate responsibilities, citing slow progress and the project’s inactivity.</p><p>Lasse’s candid admission of mental health struggles and the unpaid nature of maintaining the XZ library provided the attackers with an opening. By May 2022, Jia Tan was being positioned for a larger role in the project.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KY3hW3kjKJ_cqbEp" /><figcaption><em>Figure 2: 2022–06–08 — Lasse Collin reveals psychological issues [</em><a href="https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00567.html"><em>3</em></a><em>]</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Phase 2: Escalation (2022–2023)</em></strong></p><p>The attackers’ persistence paid off. By late 2022, Lasse began sharing more responsibilities with Jia, even updating the project’s bug report email to include Jia. In June 2023, Hans Jansen — a new persona — submitted patches that eventually laid the groundwork for the malicious backdoor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*k2x-3R2OT16DMt3N" /><figcaption><em>Figure 3: 2022–05–27 and 2022–06–07 — Jigar Kumar sends pressure email [</em><a href="https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00566.html"><em>4</em></a><em>]</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Jia Tan’s supporting cast.</strong></p><p>There are notable similarities in how the participating personas formatted their emails. Another connection between them is that, since the information about the XZ backdoor was revealed, we have not received any communication from any of them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/1*j1m2dt3rqabXNoc3MsiDXQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*EAyUCPRyEAjgH8s_" /><figcaption><em>Figure 4: 2022–06–21 — Dennis Ens sends pressure email [</em><a href="https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00569.html"><em>5</em></a><em>]</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Phase 3: Exploitation (2024)</strong></p><p>In early 2024, the attackers activated their plan. Using previously gained access, they introduced the backdoor and worked to ensure its adoption by Linux distribution maintainers. The operation ended abruptly after its discovery, with all involved personas vanishing from the open-source ecosystem.</p><p><strong>The Motivation Analysis</strong></p><p>Was this operation the work of a lone wolf researcher, financially or strategically motivated threat actor? The evidence suggests that it was a strategic state-sponsored threat actor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/464/1*CEqotvyf4XWUr0duhHkrAQ.png" /><figcaption>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/bkrebs_some-thoughts-about-attribution-in-the-xz-activity-7180632334503677953-GXhb/">6</a>] [<a href="https://rheaeve.substack.com/p/xz-backdoor-times-damned-times-and">7</a>]</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Technical complexity of the backdoor: the malware itself and the obfuscated build is highly elaborate and the approach so novel, that it seems more likely, that this would be a project by a state actor or a very dedicated researcher.</li><li>In-depth understanding of the open source ecosystem and ability to monitor upstream projects: the threat actor positioned the malicious code cleverly in the XZ release packages to obfuscate its presence. They also speed up in the moment, when they realize that the project could be jeopardized by changes in other dependencies — to monitor for this requires time and dedication beyond individual capabilities.</li><li>A group, most likely state sponsored, would be motivated more to be engaged in a long term project that started in 2021.</li><li>Judging from the lack of traces left behind the threat actor discovered by the open source community, this demonstrated disciplined and rigorous operational security (OPSEC).</li><li>The threat actor was committing code also during weekends — this could be consistent with individual after hours “hobby project”. But professionals can work shifts, be “oncall” or set up automation to do the commits automatically at a certain time. This piece of evidence doesn’t lend much weight to either hypothesis.</li><li>The fact that this is not the most straightforward way to monetization indicates a state sponsored rather than criminal threat actor.</li><li>There was not any communication from any of the personas once the malicious activities were uncovered. This is more consistent with a failed effort of a state-sponsored group than cybercriminals, who often publicly air grievances and prosecute disputes or an individual researcher motivated by an effort to point out the weaknesses of the open source ecosystem.</li><li>Another potential hypothesis is that the account was either breached or voluntarily handed over. In my opinion, this is merely an operational detail and does not significantly impact the underlying motivation of the threat actor.</li></ul><p><strong>Review of evidence on the origin of the threat actor</strong></p><p>There are numerous speculations and unconventional interpretations of the data pointing towards Israel, China, the West, and others. But does the attribution really matter? I believe it does, significantly. And not only due to my professional curiosity. Identifying the threat actor behind this backdoor is important, as it would be reassuring to confirm that governments from “my part of the world” were not involved in messing around with the open-source ecosystem.</p><p>The operation has not been publicly attributed to any threat actor by government institutions or private companies with access to relevant data. The following Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) is <strong>not an effort to attribute the operation</strong>.It is an analytical exercise that utilizes publicly available information to examine known facts and evaluate underlying assumptions. These elements are systematically compared against multiple hypotheses to identify the one that is least inconsistent with the available evidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/826/1*IacST9WbX3CslusxLjQWiA.png" /><figcaption>[<a href="https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/10/9">8</a>] [<a href="https://rheaeve.substack.com/p/xz-backdoor-times-damned-times-and">9</a>] [<a href="https://rheaeve.substack.com/p/xz-backdoor-times-damned-times-and">10</a>]</figcaption></figure><ul><li>The facts provided in the discussions around time stamps analysis and working hours analysis are inconclusive and offer interpretations supporting several of the hypotheses.</li><li>Public holidays are from the same category of facts, but they are less prone to competing interpretations.</li><li>“Language patterns and proficiency analysis” refers to the outcomes of my analysis conducted using multiple LLMs, based on all available emails authored by Jia Tan.</li><li>Strategically motivated threat actor in 2021 refers to the “Motivation of the threat actor” ACH above.In my assessment, North Korea, Iran, and Israel in 2021, at the start of the operation, were not as strategically motivated as the other three actors involved.</li><li>The number of countries involved in a publicly known sophisticated state sponsored supply chain compromise is relatively short.</li><li>In my assessment, most Western governments would view the abuse of the open-source ecosystem as a significant political risk. However, other governments considered in this analysis may not share the same level of sensitivity to this issue.</li><li>Understanding of social dynamics within the OS ecosystem: North Korean society is significantly more isolated compared to the other nations and operates under a unique set of norms and values. Consequently, I believe it would be far more challenging for individuals or groups from North Korea to develop the level of social skills demonstrated by Jia Tan.</li><li>An Australian digital newspaper reported in May 2024 that the son of a Chinese government official claimed responsibility for the XZ operation [<a href="https://thenightly.com.au/world/chinese-government-officials-son-gloats-about-multi-year-hack-on-australian-intelligence-agencies-c-14617200">11</a>]. This statement may simply reflect self-aggrandizing rhetoric or an attempt to exaggerate personal importance. Based on available information, there is no corroborating evidence to substantiate this claim. For that reason the information is not included in the ACH analysis.</li></ul><p><strong>Implications for Open-Source Security</strong></p><p>The group responsible for the XZ backdoor is likely refining their strategies, adjusting potential parallel ongoing operations and preparing for future attempts with the insights gained from this operation. Their next attempt could exhibit greater sophistication and be even more challenging to detect. Despite the limited immediate damage, the XZ Backdoor is a great case study highlighting some of the options persistent threat actors have within the open-source ecosystem. The operation exemplifies an advanced level of both technical and social engineering sophistication. While the immediate impact might seem less dramatic than initial reactions suggested, several areas of significance have emerged.</p><ol><li><strong>Erosion of Trust:</strong> The infiltration of a widely trusted utility illustrates that similar vulnerabilities could exist in other projects, especially those with under-resourced maintainers. This realization has led to calls for more rigorous security practices, such as</li><li><strong>Better Vetting of Contributors:</strong> While essential, vetting contributors remains a challenge given the open and collaborative nature of the open source software ecosystem. It would also be at odds with many recent efforts in open source communities to be more inclusive and welcoming for new developers.</li><li><strong>Increased Awareness: </strong>One positive outcome is the increased awareness and prioritization of open-source project security. Software developers may now face greater demands for transparency about the origins of the upstream code incorporated into their products, prompting calls for best practices, such as the use of Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs).</li><li><strong>Financial Pressures: </strong>Additionally, there may be financial implications for companies relying on open-source software. Agencies like CISA are advocating [<a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/lessons-xz-utils-achieving-more-sustainable-open-source-ecosystem">12</a>] for more significant contributions — whether through financial support or developer time — to bolster the resilience of key open-source projects.</li></ol><p><em>Special thanks to Rob Lowe and Ilin Petkovski for their constructive feedback, which helped refine and enhance this post.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=95fa8311ea09" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why a Non-Technical Background Does Not Prevent You from Succeeding in Cyber Threat Intelligence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik/why-a-non-technical-background-does-not-prevent-you-from-succeeding-in-cyber-threat-intelligence-09b41194ee8c?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/09b41194ee8c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondra Rojčík]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 May 2024 11:13:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-28T21:18:50.420Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Intrusions, cyber attacks and adversarial operations are often seen as technical events best described by the deployed malware, leveraged C2 domains, connected IP addresses, hash values of files and multiple other indicators. However, these activities are not mere spontaneously occurring technical phenomena, a misconception held by many outside of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) and Information Security. The Diamond Model, a fundamental framework in CTI, highlights the human element in these activities: threat actors with their motivations and objectives, and victims with their vulnerabilities and impact.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/786/1*pT4QIrUsVJ-rSqV50YMnxQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aesthetics, dancing independent of context by Midjourney (V.)</figcaption></figure><p>In between the Adversary and Victim lies the <strong>axis of the human dimension</strong> of cyber attacks — called Social-Political in the original model. This is a large area where professionals with non-technical background can provide valuable perspectives. This human dimension of the adversarial operations, cyber attacks and intrusions is what opens the door of the CTI world to specialists with non-technical background.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5t8GfG-QeS0VMUK_gUFBoQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Diamond Model and the Human Axis that opens CTI to non-technical specialists</figcaption></figure><p>The CTI field will likely remain the domain of technically focused experts. However, it is growing and opportunities for specialists with non-technical or non-traditional backgrounds are increasing. Be aware, however, that not all organisations that have the CTI function have the appetite for non-techies. There are also significant regional differences. In the US and a few other English-speaking countries with strong intelligence analysis culture, this career path is becoming more common, but the situation varies in other parts of the world.</p><p>In what specific ways can specialists with non-technical background enhance CTI? I will mainly focus on social science graduates as this is my personal background and experience, but the following is applicable to many other non-technical backgrounds, such as business studies, linguistics, area studies, communication and journalism, anthropology, legal studies or education to name a few.</p><p><strong>Complex Problem Solving and Pattern Recognition</strong></p><p>Social science graduates are trained to analyze complex social, political, and economic systems and can provide the broader context of cyber threats. Social scientists are skilled in identifying patterns and trends within large sets of qualitative and quantitative data.</p><p><em>Application examples: correlating seemingly unrelated data points to detect sophisticated cyber threats, threat landscape reports highlighting identified patterns, predictive models.</em></p><p><strong>Threat Actor Profiling</strong></p><p>Social sciences graduates can provide insights into the psychological and sociological aspects of threat actors, including their motivations, decision-making processes, and social dynamics. This can enhance the profiling of adversaries and improve threat anticipation.</p><p><em>Application examples: creating comprehensive threat actor dossiers with detailed profiles, including motivations, likely targets, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), threat actor prioritization exercises and their applications in overall risk management</em></p><p><strong>Effective Communication and Interdisciplinary Collaboration</strong></p><p>The best technical knowledge and insights are worthless if they are not effectively communicated to stakeholders and decision-makers. Social science graduates can translate complex technical information into language that is accessible across an organization. Also, their training in working across various disciplines can make social science graduates adept at collaborating with technical experts, business leaders, and other stakeholders.</p><p><em>Application examples: writing clear and concise threat intelligence reports tailored for different audience levels, executive summaries and briefings that translate technical jargon into actionable insights, presenting complex technical findings to non-technical stakeholders, facilitating workshops and meetings to bridge the gap between technical teams and business units, communication plans and templates for disseminating threat intelligence across the organization.</em></p><p><strong>Global Context and Strategic Intelligence</strong></p><p>Cyber threats often have geopolitical dimensions. Social science graduates bring an understanding of international relations, regional politics, and cultural dynamics, which can be critical in assessing the origins and potential impacts of cyber threats on a global scale. They can contribute to strategic intelligence by analyzing how geopolitical events might influence cyber threat landscapes.</p><p><em>Application examples: monitoring international relations and regional conflicts to predict cyber threat activities, highlighting potential impacts of geopolitical developments, briefings for senior leadership on the intersection of geopolitical events and cyber threats.</em></p><p><strong>Critical Thinking, Research and Methodological Rigor</strong></p><p>Social scientists are trained in critical thinking and qualitative and quantitative research methods. This allows them to objectively assess available data, conduct investigations into cyber incidents, combining data analysis with qualitative insights. They understand the limits of various data types and are capable of adjusting the assessment language to the nuances of intelligence gaps that are typical for CTI analysis.</p><p><em>Application examples: research studies on cyber threats using mixed-methods approaches, designing and implementing research methodologies that combine qualitative and quantitative data, conducting surveys to gather insights from various stakeholders.</em></p><p><strong>Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)</strong></p><p>OSINT is an increasingly popular discipline among social-science graduates. OSINT investigations in CTI have specific focus, but they can be fascinating adventures that stimulate our curiosity and bring value to threat research and hunting activities of CTI teams.</p><p><em>Application examples: developing OSINT strategies to gather actionable intelligence from publicly available sources, OSINT investigations to track emerging threats and gather intelligence on threat actors, OSINT investigations in connection to ongoing incidents, regular bulletins and alerts on emerging threats identified through OSINT activities.</em></p><p><strong>Policy Development</strong></p><p>Understanding of policy-making processes can be instrumental in developing internal policies and procedures. CTI is traditionally not the core function responsible for formulation of security policies, but good policies should be threat informed. You might as well be soliciting inputs from others for the mitigation (now what?) part of your threat reports or other deliverables.</p><p><em>Application examples: development of internal security policies and procedures in conjunction with other teams, analyzing existing policies to identify gaps and areas for improvement based on CTI findings, providing inputs to threat driven enhancement of existing security policy frameworks.</em></p><p><strong>Continuous Learning and Cross-Disciplinary Knowledge in CTI</strong></p><p>Nothing of the above is exclusive knowledge to the non-techs. CTI attracts a lot of technical folks who have an appetite for the social-science frameworks and global context and are willing to educate themselves further in these areas. There is a broad field of non-technical concepts, mainly in the area of intelligence analysis tradecraft, that should become part of every CTI analyst’s mental processes to become an effective CTI practitioner.</p><blockquote>Also, having a non-technical background doesn’t mean remaining non-technical for the rest of your CTI career. To paraphrase what Joe Slowik recently said at 2024 FIRST CTI Conference in Berlin “…there is no such thing in CTI as being non-technical. If you are not willing to embrace a technical mindset… then I don’t see how one can reasonably succeed in CTI…”. Even the social concepts such as “adversary motivations” or “intentions” are deeply intertwined with technology. Be ready to keep learning. The deeper you are willing to go, the better.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BnVu2kBiLmReBFlSoXErLg.jpeg" /><figcaption>CTI is a melting pot of diverse career paths and knowledge</figcaption></figure><p>At the same time, bring in your non-technical expertise to CTI! International security context, research methodologies, and intelligence analysis were my things. Maybe yours are behavioural economics, communication theory, social engineering indicators, area studies, or risk assessment methodologies. CTI is still an evolving field — not as much is codified as we would like. This provides vital opportunities to enrich and cross-pollinate it with new perspectives that you could be bringing. Review your university textbooks; you might find plenty of concepts, frameworks, and methodologies waiting to be adopted in CTI. Integrating diverse perspectives and expertise can enhance CTI and deliver tangible value to our stakeholders.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=09b41194ee8c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Communicating Uncertainties: A Guide to Estimative Language and Confidence Levels in CTI Reporting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik/the-shades-of-doubt-a-guide-to-estimative-language-and-confidence-levels-in-cti-reporting-1545233f7470?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1545233f7470</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uncertainty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondra Rojčík]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2023 14:34:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-15T08:56:04.196Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Intelligence analysis is a word of uncertainties. Although we have established tools to overcome them, even reputable Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) teams and vendors have occasionally hard time to consistently communicate uncertainties; sometimes even in a single report. Communicating uncertainties can be difficult, but understanding the level of uncertainties by consumers can occasionally be even more challenging. Recipients of threat intelligence reports may be confused by ambiguous words such as “certainly”, “we believe”, “even chance”, “with moderate confidence” and so on used by the CTI analysts. This blog post attempts to call out the bad practice and offer possible solutions to the CTI teams at various levels of maturity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/788/1*XgMiSC9fG76WXTWw3SUZeA.png" /><figcaption>Innocent aesthetics, dancing independent of context by Midjourney (IV.)</figcaption></figure><p>Where do the uncertainties in CTI reports actually come from? The starting point is that when analyzing any topic, we almost never have all the facts that we need. Information is basically always imperfect. We call these imperfections Intelligence gaps. Luckily, there are analytical tools that can help us to overcome the intelligence gaps such as assumptions, judgements and assessments. Another source of uncertainties is the fact that in CTI we assess and factor in human behavior which add a substantial level of complexity. And the final source of uncertainties is that in some types of deliverables we occasionally do outlooks — or predictive analysis if you like.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SY6YyfQXuEtjBHh7pSZ7A.png" /><figcaption><em>Examples of not-standardized estimative language</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Assumptions:</strong> accepted as true or certain to happen, without proof.</p><p><em>“We assume the observed inconsistencies in attack patterns suggest the involvement of multiple, independently operating threat actors.”</em></p><p><strong>Judgements:</strong> sentence that includes facts and analysis; “because” is often an indicator of a judgment.</p><p><em>“The recent cyberattack on the energy sector is attributed to Group X, because the malware used shares unique signatures previously identified in their known operations.”</em></p><p><strong>Assessments:</strong> judgements about unknowns; distinguish what is fact (reporting) and what is analysis (judgment &amp; assessment) by using vocabulary that clearly indicates that you are not presenting facts.</p><p><em>“Given the increase in data breaches involving ransomware, we assess that threat actors are likely to continue favoring extortion attacks due to their high profitability and relative ease of deployment.”</em></p><p>We previously claimed that judgements and assessments are the right tools to overcome uncertainties. But at the same time they are also a source of uncertainties. When we make judgements and assessments most of us have a natural urge to soften the language that we use in these circumstances. The way we do it is by using words such as might, could, probably, we believe etc. The problem here is that these words can be very misleading and as <a href="https://waf.cs.illinois.edu/visualizations/Perception-of-Probability-Words/">multiple researches</a> proved they very much depend on interpretation.</p><p>The Intelligence Analysis discipline developed over time multiple standards for these words. We call them <strong>Words of Estimative Probability</strong> and they express how likely we think our judgment is right. Almost every intelligence community has its own standard.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*1FvBnk095poLV96jFTyD6w.png" /><figcaption><em>The UK Probability Yardstick</em> (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-intelligence-communicating-probability">GOV.UK</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*3Wi5AVK2YS_wj4brLHZ8YA.png" /><figcaption><em>US Intelligence Community Standard (ODNI — </em><a href="https://irp.fas.org/dni/icd/icd-203.pdf"><em>ICD 203</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>To discuss here all the standards would not be practical. I’ll just highlight that the main difference among them is the number of levels they use and presence or absence of ambivalent terms such as “even chance”, “roughly even odds”, or “we can’t exclude”. Consider how practical they are for your analytical and communication needs.</p><h4>Levels of Confidence in Assessments communicates the quality of supporting information</h4><p>To complicate things further, there is also a concept called levels of confidence in assessment. Luckily AFAIK there is just one standard which distinguishes three levels of how supported are your judgements and assessments by information that varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Low indicates significant problems with the sources, moderate says that sources are ok, but not great and there is the high level for high-quality information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/569/1*M-xK-O08YqWcmnpll-guLg.png" /><figcaption><em>US National Intelligence Council</em></figcaption></figure><p>Unfortunately many analysts and CTI vendors have a tendency to interchange the concept of words of estimative probability and levels of confidence in assessment. And I don’t blame them.</p><h4>CTI industry issue</h4><p>Let’s have a look at how these standards are applied in CTI reports that are published by information security vendors. Here is a little comparative study of how four different, major, CTI vendors approach communication of uncertainties.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AyRGR8X4cCXzCkzzAFE8vQ.png" /></figure><p>Vendor A and Vendor B have only one expression for communicating uncertainty — in case of Vendor A it is “likely” for one report and “we believe” for another and nothing more. In case of Vendor B it is “with high confidence” and nothing else. In report one from Vendor C there is a mix of WEPs and LCA, but there is no clear reason why that is — what different concepts they express. Such an approach is confusing for me as an intelligence analysis professional. My ambition here is not to do a comprehensive comparative study of all the approaches or to name and shame otherwise respected organizations, but to point out that we could do better as an industry.</p><h4>Three basic options to communicate uncertainties</h4><p><strong>WEP &amp; LCA</strong></p><blockquote><em>“Based on the analysis of the malware and intrusion activity it is </em><strong><em>likely (55–70%)</em></strong><em> that the APTx was responsible for the unauthorized access and exfiltration of sensitive data from the organization. We have a </em><strong><em>moderate level of confidence</em></strong><em> in this conclusion.”</em></blockquote><p>The example refers to the likelihood of attribution (“likely that”) and the level of confidence in this conclusion (“moderate level of confidence in”). This might be great, it is very logical if you have time to think about the reasoning that drives these concepts.</p><p><strong>Only WEP</strong></p><blockquote><em>“Based on the analysis of the malware and intrusion activity it is </em><strong><em>likely (55–70%)</em></strong><em> that the APTx was responsible for the unauthorized access and exfiltration of sensitive data from the organization.”</em></blockquote><p>From the intelligence analysis tradecraft perspective it is still ok, but it lacks the confidence in the assessment part.</p><p><strong>Only LCA</strong></p><blockquote><em>“Based on the analysis of the malware and intrusion activity we assess with </em><strong><em>moderate level of confidence</em></strong><em> that the APTx was responsible for the unauthorized access and exfiltration of sensitive data from the organization”</em></blockquote><p>This is the most imperfect example from the tradecraft perspective. You basically present an assertion — almost authoritatively you claim it a fact, but you add how confident you are in this assessment to acknowledge that it actually isn’t fact. Although this might be the least desirable approach from the tradecraft perspective, it communicates a similar “vibe” as the first two examples to the consumer. They will understand that the analysts have some indicators pointing to APTx but also some unknowns.</p><h4>Not one “right” solution</h4><p>Approaches that combine WEPs and LCI are complex and difficult to comprehend for untrained recipients. Your CTI team may come to the conclusion that you prefer a method that deviates from canonical intelligence analysis tradecraft of combining the WEPs and LCI for each judgment or assessment. Such an approach might be a good option for mature CTI teams — mainly in the government sector — if you share your reports with the stakeholder often. You may have a chance to educate them, explain how these standards work.</p><p>If you don’t have this level of access, you may try something less challenging such as just the three levels of confidence in assessment. You will not provide the likelihood but this can be a more approachable way to communicate uncertainties.</p><p>What the CTI stakeholders expect from us is not rigorous application of intelligence analysis tradecraft standards, but effective delivery of the message. If we overwhelm them by demanding reading, we don’t deliver. It is important to find the right balance between professionalism and consumable reports.</p><h4>Explore — Consider — Decide</h4><p>My main message is that individual CTI teams need to be consistent in their reporting and transparent towards their customers. Start by making the effort and consider the options you have to communicate uncertainties. Try to explore the options and discuss them within your team. Consider the pros and cons of each approach for your situation, which is mainly defined by the type of your analytical deliverables, your consumers, how often you have a chance to communicate with them through your products and so on. Once you consider all these aspects, decide which approach to communication of uncertainties you want to adhere to.</p><h4>Provide Guidance — Be Consistent — Be Transparent</h4><p>Once you decide, integrate the standard to your analytical processes and deliverables and provide guidance to your analysts. This will allow you to be consistent across your production. The consistency will lower the risk of not being understood and delivering an unclear message to your consumers.</p><p>Lastly, you should be transparent and clearly tell your readers what you are doing, what approach you are applying, and how the words that you use compare to each other. If possible, providing justification for the particular level of WEP or confidence for your main analytical points would be even better. Although I’m aware that this might be impossible in some cases.</p><p><strong>In conclusion</strong>, the effective communication of uncertainties in CTI is crucial for clarity, accuracy, and reliability in intelligence reports. While Words of Estimative Probability and Levels of Confidence in Assessment provide structured approaches to articulate uncertainties, their practical application often varies among CTI teams and vendors. The challenge lies not only in choosing between WEP, LCA, or a combination of both but also in consistently applying these standards to ensure transparency and comprehensibility for consumers. The ultimate goal for CTI professionals should be to balance technical accuracy with accessible communication, while aiming to reduce ambiguity and misinterpretation. By doing so, they can significantly enhance the value and effectiveness of the CTI outputs.</p><p><em>I recently </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ud2op0mWSgs&amp;t=258s"><em>discussed this topic</em></a><em> at CTI Summit 2023 in Luxembourg</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1545233f7470" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Developing Priority Intelligence Requirements for your Cyber Threat Intelligence Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik/developing-priority-intelligence-requirements-for-your-cyber-threat-intelligence-program-fab25bf414ff?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fab25bf414ff</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondra Rojčík]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Dec 2023 22:41:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-05T22:41:12.209Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In the rapidly evolving landscape of cyber threat intelligence (CTI), the formulation of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) stands as a crucial component of your CTI program and the planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle. As a cyber threat intelligence analyst, you are likely familiar with the challenge of balancing limited resources within small CTI teams against the colossal task of delivering relevant, actionable information to decision-makers and stakeholders. This dilemma often leaves teams grappling with a choice: should they adopt a reactive stance, responding to emerging threats as they arise, or should they lean towards more proactive long term priorities. Integration of PIRs as a guiding principle will assist your program to pursue proactive strategic priorities more confidently without abandoning your reactive capabilities. This approach doesn’t just enhance traditional functions like research, investigation, analysis, and reporting but also elevates advanced practices such as threat-informed defense, including threat hunting and detection engineering.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zNbnOS27PCi95rwqJcQBcw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Innocent aesthetics, dancing independent of context by Midjourney (III.)</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>This is a copy of the Red Hat PIR development process v1.1 blog post. You can find the canonical version including templates at </em></strong><a href="https://github.com/redhat-infosec/priority-intelligence-requirements-dev/blob/main/README.md"><strong><em>GitHub</em></strong></a></p><p>In this blog post, we delve into this pivotal process as we unravel the significance of PIRs in shaping a more effective and strategic CTI function, thereby enabling your team to make a more substantial impact within your organization.</p><p><strong>Retired v1.0</strong><br>The original Red Hat process was structured around two distinct risk assessment exercises, one focusing on internal factors and the other on external ones. These exercises were then combined into a mapping exercise, from which we derived a cohesive set of PIRs. The goal was ambitious: to address the ‘What’, ‘Who’, and ‘How’ of the threat landscape. ‘What’ referred to the data and infrastructure of our organization; ‘Who’ encompassed high-level descriptions of threat actors like state actors, organized crime, or hacktivists; and ‘How’ partly included types of initial access vectors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TG-_HEpGqEylCOEe1B2d5g.png" /><figcaption>Red Hat PIR process v1.0</figcaption></figure><p>On paper, the threat actor (TA) categorization and initial access vectors (IAV) presented well, offering a seemingly comprehensive story when presenting PIRs to stakeholders. However, as we repeatedly scaled this exercise across organizations, we encountered significant challenges. The process was labor-intensive, adding weeks of work and dozens of hours for the team, yet it didn’t yield the expected value in operationalization. We also found that the general categorization of threat actors and initial access vectors lacked the depth needed for operationalization. What was missing was a finer granularity, like Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and associated MITRE ATT&amp;CK categorization. Recognizing this gap, we shifted our focus to aspects that provided more substantial inputs for the operationalization of PIRs.</p><p><strong>Overview of the updated process (v1.1)</strong><br>This is a five-step process: Step 1, identifying key organizational elements from strategic documents; Step 2, mapping these elements to supporting assets; Step 3, linking elements with types of adversarial operations using a custom classification; Step 4, assessing risks using a likelihood/impact matrix to determine the appeal of elements to attackers; and finally, Step 5 customizing PIRs into actionable intelligence requirements.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mKAkDhkZxb1Q_XWe_RArQA.png" /><figcaption>Red Hat PIR Process v1.1</figcaption></figure><p><strong>A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE</strong></p><p><strong>STEP 1: Extracting Organizational ELEMENTS</strong><br>The initial step involves identifying the core elements of your organization. These elements are not directly related to information security but are crucial in defining your organization’s identity. They are derived from high-level strategic documents, such as annual reports, business strategies, senior leadership communications , and even the ‘About’ section of your website. These documents contain keywords, topics, or short sentences that encapsulate your organization’s strategy, mission, and vision.</p><p><strong>Questions that can help you to define ELEMENTS of your organizations:</strong><br>- What features define your organization?<br>- What makes your organization unique?<br>- What are the most important aspects of your strategy?<br>- Why is anyone buying your products or services?<br>- What is your competitive advantage? How do you compare to your competitors?<br>- Are certain products or services more important than others?<br>- What valuable data do you have? Is there data that keeps you ahead of competitors, proprietary information, R&amp;D, data on relations with partners or customers, or data that would cause damage if released?</p><p>These elements should describe the essence of your organization, including both obvious and subtle aspects. They define what makes your organization unique, why customers choose your products or services, and what sets you apart from competitors. This also includes valuable data like proprietary information, R&amp;D, partner relationships, and sensitive corporate information.</p><p><strong>Examples of the elements for a fictitious electric vehicle producer </strong><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gJ9s6ergncUr5LK_6s8HUwtQJOksD_lq/view"><strong>Stellar Electric</strong></a><strong>:</strong><br>- EU-based, electric vehicle industry company with revenue over 1 billion EUR<br>- Research and Development in EU and China drives the company success<br>- Car production in EU and China<br>- Limited battery production capacity<br>- Supply chain spans multiple countries, including China and Chile. <br>- Proprietary range-boosting technology: 20% longer range compared to competitors<br>- Public perception of Stellar environmental impact is vital to the brand reputation <br>- Software-first approach; proprietary In-vehicle software<br>- Advanced safety features</p><p><strong>Sub-STEP: FUNCTION</strong><br>Linked to these elements is a sub-step called ‘Function.’ It ties the elements back to information security by clarifying what needs to be protected from an information security standpoint. For example, if an element is ‘limited battery production,’ its function might be ensuring continuous battery production. This context helps in understanding the element from an information security perspective and guides the subsequent risk assessment exercise.</p><p><strong>Output:</strong> Sheet listing the ELEMENTS and FUNCTION of the ELEMENTS of your organization</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hq7KKH1u7TNJsOJ8nNLo3w.png" /><figcaption><em>Examples of the Elements and Function for Stellar Electric</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>STEP 2: ASSETS Mapping to Elements</strong><br>Once you have defined your organizational elements, the next step is to map the supporting technology, data, or information to these elements. This step can be high-level or detailed, depending on your approach. For instance, if your element is operational technology supporting battery production, the key asset might be the Operational Technology and Industrial Control Systems that keep the production running. For proprietary technologies, the critical asset could be the documents containing proprietary information.</p><p>This step is about linking the abstract elements of your organization to tangible assets. It’s a crucial bridge between the theoretical understanding of your organization and the practical aspects of protecting it. When developing PIRs at Red Hat, we kept this high-level, avoiding overly specific details from Configuration Management Databases or similar documentation, which can be overwhelming and too detailed for this exercise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/888/1*ak9pzbJ8qWcQnJoISGRVAQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Examples of high-level description of the Supporting Assets</em></figcaption></figure><p>These two steps form the foundation of a robust CTI process, aligning your organization’s essence with its security needs, and setting the stage for mapping of adversarial threat operations and risk assessment in the next steps.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nSXGM_H5vnbuyN_iiFzbOA.png" /><figcaption><em>Examples of the Elements, Function and Assets for Stellar Electric</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Output:</strong> “Supporting ASSETS” column in the Sheet listing the ELEMENTS of your organization</p><p><strong>STEP 3: Linking ELEMENTS with Types of Adversarial Operations</strong><br>This step involves connecting the previously identified organizational elements with specific types of adversarial operations. We found that existing classifications of cyber attacks didn’t quite fit our needs, leading us to develop our own classification. This classification focuses on the impact of cyber attacks on business operations and also on applicability of the terms used in the classification in threat intelligence platforms (TIPs), which is vital for operationalization. So for example, we use the relatively vague term “ransomware” instead of more precise variants, because that is a term that will more likely provide search results in TIPs. Types of operations in our classification include ransomware, espionage, financial fraud, denial of service, and “downstream” supply chain attacks where your organization is a target rather than supply chain as an initial access vector.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*etA3dTYE0cNYZ6z6tcyAbw.png" /><figcaption><em>Types of Adversarial Operations, corresponding MITRE ATT&amp;CK techniques and keywords</em></figcaption></figure><p>If this classification doesn’t suit your needs, existing frameworks like MITRE ATT&amp;CK, STRIDE, VERIS Framework, CAPEC, or ENISA and FIRST taxonomies can be utilized. Alternatively, attacks can be categorized based on their impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.</p><p><strong>Output:</strong> Types of adversarial operations linkend to the ELEMENTS of your organization</p><p><strong>STEP 4: Risk Assessment Using Likelihood/Impact Matrix</strong><br>The fourth step involves a risk assessment exercise using a likelihood/impact matrix. This step aims to foster a specific mindset towards risk assessment. We refer to ‘likelihood’ as ‘appeal,’ especially when communicating with non-InfoSec personnel, as it aids in understanding the exercise. The focus is therefore on determining the attractiveness of an element or asset to attackers and the potential consequences of a compromise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0Oq8Eh5fHLlqJwyNyGEDpA.png" /><figcaption><em>The options for likelihood (appeal) and impact questions</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Output:</strong> Scored and ranked ELEMENTS, FUNCTIONS, ASSETS and Types of Adversarial Operations</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QjpAOIISMpWCEyqTlK3hTw.png" /><figcaption><em>The final risk score for each ELEMENT will assist you in ranking of the PIRs</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>STEP 5: Customization of the PIRs<br></strong>At the end of the risk assessment exercise, you’ll have a ranked list of the top five or top ten elements — depending on your appetite for a number of PIRs — along with the mapped types of adversarial operations. This last step involves determining the format of the final PIRs. Will they be short statements, intelligence questions, requests for information, or something else? We opted to keep it straightforward at Red Hat and use the ranked elements in their original form.</p><p>Occasionally, you may need to rephrase results into more actionable statements. For instance, an element like “EU-based, electric industry company with revenue over 1 billion EUR” might be translated into a more intelligible PIR, such as “Threats to STELLAR based on its revenue, geography, industry, and market position.”</p><p>This comprehensive process ensures that PIRs are not only tailored to the specific needs and characteristics of your organization but also actionable and relevant in the context of your security posture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5kLwnrjL81eAXxV9hyUqCw.png" /><figcaption><em>Examples of PIRs of Stellar Electric</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Output: </strong>PIRs</p><p><strong>Scaling the process to multiple respondents</strong><br>If you want to ensure objectivity and limit the bias by individual analysts or individual teams, you will prefer to conduct the exercise on a larger scale. You should ideally engage multiple CTI stakeholders, including respondents with good knowledge of the business side of your organization in the mapping (STEP 3) and risk assessment exercise (STEP 4). The sheet for PIR development is designed for a single respondent, so in case of multiple respondents it’s necessary to calculate median or average scores and manually rank the PIRs.</p><p>None of the subjects of the risk assessment exercises, such as your organization’s strategy, the threat actors or initial access vectors, are immutable. Periodical review of the PIRs is a necessary part of the process. On the other hand, even though the threat environment is highly dynamic and ever changing, your high-level PIRs should be relatively stable unless your organization is undergoing a major transition. <br> <br><strong>Process of iterations and gradual improvement</strong><br>To define the ELEMENTS and pose the right question that can be understood the same way across multiple stakeholders is not trivial. It is rather difficult to achieve the perfect PIRs process in year one. You might prefer to see the first attempt as a trial and seek inputs only from a selected number of stakeholders across your organization. Make sure they understand the questions and the risk assessment exercises the way you intended and try to collect as much feedback as possible. Use the lessons learned during the next iteration and engage a broader spectrum of people from your organization to get new perspectives and to avoid bias that your team could have.</p><p>PIRs will offer you not only a tool for your Cyber Threat Intelligence program, but the process of developing them will provide you and your team a great learning opportunity to explore your organization, engage with multiple teams across it, and investigate the relevance of a wide spectrum of threats to your attack surface and industry.</p><p><strong><em>Canonical version of the Red Hat PIR development process v1.1 including the templates: </em></strong><a href="https://github.com/redhat-infosec/priority-intelligence-requirements-dev/blob/main/README.md">https://github.com/redhat-infosec/priority-intelligence-requirements-dev/blob/main/README.md</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fab25bf414ff" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Descriptions to Impact: Unlocking the Power of Basic Cyber Threat Intelligence Questions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik/from-descriptions-to-impact-unlocking-the-power-of-basic-cyber-threat-intelligence-questions-e4593ddd98fd?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e4593ddd98fd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-analysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondra Rojčík]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jun 2023 11:57:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-19T06:45:41.782Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A common shortcoming of CTI reports is the tendency to admire the problem instead of delivering explanations, implications, and mitigation strategies.</em></p><p><em>The primary question in the realm of cyber threat intelligence teams who answer to specific stakeholders is SO WHAT. Before we delve into this critical query, it is essential to address a series of fundamental problem-solving questions. Failing to cover these questions in our CTI reports will lead our audience to ask, “Why don’t I see X here?” rather than focusing on the key message of the report.</em></p><p><em>Based on my experience as a CTI analyst, I have noticed a tendency among us to overlook the importance of the SO WHAT question— something I’m guilty of myself. We are often fixated on admiring the problem. Our fascination with the topic and its intricacies can cause us to lose sight of the report’s purpose and its stakeholders. Instead of merely providing descriptions, CTI analysts should prioritize delivering explanations (WHY), implications (SO WHAT), and mitigation strategies (NOW WHAT); in some cases also outlook (WHAT’S NEXT). It is important to note that this is the ideal to which we should aspire, if the expectations are not set by the stakeholders differently. It primarily applies to CTI analytical pieces, with preset requirements and expectations, and catering to the needs of specific stakeholders, as opposed to publicly available reports by security vendors who typically have a broad reader audience in mind.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vytyu20TtJ5GOdsaJy6Zqg.png" /><figcaption>Innocent aesthetics, dancing independent of context by Midjourney (II.)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>5W1H — The Fundamental Problem Solving Questions</strong></h4><p>WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHO, WHY and HOW (5W1H) constitute the fundamental set of problem-solving questions frequently used by journalists and criminal investigators. Answering these questions enables us to gather all the essential facts related to any cyber event, whether it’s an incident, a series of incidents or an external threat.</p><p>WHY is generally regarded as the most analytical question on this list. When it comes to attribution analysis, the ultimate and most challenging question is WHO. Analyzing an incident we typically begin with incident timelines covering WHAT and WHEN. At the same time we cover WHERE to establish the foundational facts, and later delve into HOW. Answering any of these questions is often far from trivial. WHO is typically not explicitly addressed in day-to-day incident analysis. However, during an investigation, we gather data on the attacker, even if our goal is not to attribute the attack to a particular individual or group. The Diamond Model is the CTI framework that is best positioned to answer all of these questions, except for WHY. This is a significant reason why this framework is unlikely to go out of fashion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/416/1*nwq2bJ5Fphxqz7xEWfqi5Q.png" /></figure><p>WHO &amp; WHY = attribution &lt; based on WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW</p><p>Attribution is usually not a priority for IR teams, but provides important context for possible future attacks.</p><p><em>*Motive refers to the underlying reason or purpose that drives a threat actor to carry out an attack. Motives may include financial gain, political goals, revenge, or curiosity. Objective, on the other hand, refers to the specific goal that a threat actor aims to achieve through an attack. For example, an attacker’s objective might be to steal sensitive data, disrupt a network or service, or gain unauthorized access to a system. Intent delves into the purpose or desired outcome that drives the attacker’s actions and what they hope to accomplish. It might be to steal an organization’s proprietary technology and research advancements TO gain a competitive advantage or sell the stolen information to a rival company or foreign entity.</em></p><h4><strong>Moving to general intelligence analysis questions</strong></h4><p>Once we have tackled the straightforward yet occasionally arduous fundamental questions, we can move on to the inquiries that hold utmost importance from the perspective of our stakeholders or customers. What they genuinely seek to understand is what lies ahead, the implications for their organization, and the necessary actions to be taken: WHAT’S NEXT, SO WHAT, NOW WHAT</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KMQLdHynb88IWLER" /><figcaption>Data to Intelligence continuum and the changing scope of the intelligence questions</figcaption></figure><p>Stakeholders comprehend that you don’t possess a crystal ball, however, as a subject matter expert or someone who has dedicated time to contemplate the matter, you are in the best position to assess future occurrences — WHAT’S NEXT or the outlook. Predictive analytic techniques offer valuable tools in this regard. While “WHAT’S NEXT” may not be essential for all forms of CTI reporting, it’s important to acknowledge that stakeholders may expect your understanding of future developments.</p><p>SO WHAT is the paramout question in general intelligence analysis. Once you have addressed the 5W1H and explored potential WHAT’S NEXT, it becomes crucial to investigate the significance of your findings for stakeholders and the resulting IMPLICATIONS for them. To deliver a precise and impactful SO WHAT, it is essential to understand the interests of your stakeholders. Acquiring knowledge about the attack surface and critical data assets is often a challenging task in large organizations.</p><blockquote>Analysts occasionally underestimate the significance of the SO WHAT question. Once they have compiled all the fundamental facts pertaining to an incident, threat, or any other subject of analysis, they may assume that their job is done and that the customer will naturally understand how it relates to them because “it’s obvious.” This assumption is flawed. If you genuinely aim to deliver a compelling message, it is your responsibility to provide the “obvious” to the customers. You must strive to be as explicit as possible. While they may possess insights or perspectives that you do not, you should consistently present the most critical implications that you and your team have identified. Your stakeholders may be able to identify other implications or disagree with your assessment, which hopefully leads to feedback, alignment and a more complete analysis overall.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*uur0zhSXllLm7E1v" /><figcaption><strong>Even with limited space, good reporting can answer most of the basic IA questions</strong> | <em>Source: </em><a href="https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments-cert-authority"><em>Symantec</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Mitigations or NOW WHAT represents a valuable and often included component in CTI reporting by analysts today. The NOW WHAT section can foster collaboration since, as a CTI analyst, you may not always possess a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities and the implications of mitigating a threat within your environment. While you should have a basic idea, it is expected that you engage in discussions with system owners or individuals responsible for specific technologies, applications, or services. This collaborative approach gives you the best chance to select the most optimal and well-rounded mitigation strategy.</p><p>There exists a distinct order in which these questions should be addressed. Without the fundamental data on what happened (5W1H), it is not possible to delve into discussions about implications or mitigation strategies. Throughout your analytical journey, you will progress from working with raw data, which is necessary to answer the 5W1H, to analyzing more processed information and conclusions that are relevant to the WHAT’S NEXT, SO WHAT, and NOW WHAT aspects.</p><blockquote><strong>While not all of the basic intelligence analysis questions are a good fit for all types of reporting, it is important to keep the entire framework in mind. When considering which questions to drop, evaluate each one individually and determine whether it adds value to the specific deliverable for your stakeholder. Think twice before dropping the SO WHAT. [1]</strong></blockquote><h4>Closing it Out</h4><p>This blog post aims to offer you a framework for conducting an intelligence analysis of any topic. It’s important to note that the complete set of these questions is not mandatory for every type of reporting. The set presented here represents the comprehensive range of general intelligence analysis questions, but the specific questions to include or omit may vary based on the intended purpose or audience.</p><p>We may potentially be the final generation of analysts who engage in the traditional, labor-intensive process of analysis. Before the AI chatbots turn all of us into CTI editors and fact checkers, it might be helpful to know the principles of intelligence analysis and be exposed to the “old way” of doing things. Moreover, mastering the skill of formulating effective questions is crucial if we aim to generate high-quality prompts for AI-based outputs. The content discussed here forms the foundation that should guide the formulation of more specific and targeted questions that are relevant for your stakeholders.</p><p>…</p><p>[1] More on the types of analysis and the corresponding questions see Katherine &amp; Randolph Pherson, Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence 3rd Edition, 2020, p. 61–68</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e4593ddd98fd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Defining the intelligence requirements — what does the CTI community know about the process?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@orojcik/defining-the-intelligence-requirements-what-does-the-cti-community-know-about-the-process-58d2df0d7c62?source=rss-9aea6c63a407------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/58d2df0d7c62</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-modeling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[resources]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondra Rojčík]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2023 14:19:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-14T13:09:36.329Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Defining the Intelligence Requirements: What Does the CTI Community Know about the Process?</strong></h3><p><em>Below is a literature review of resources that inspired the </em><a href="https://github.com/redhat-infosec/priority-intelligence-requirements-dev"><em>Red Hat Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) development process</em></a><em>. Please let me know if you are aware of other relevant resources on PIRs in CTI not mentioned in this blog post.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/558/1*8LppqOF-FN_CFPhR_p2jLA.png" /><figcaption>Innocent aesthetics, dancing independent of context by Midjourney (I.)</figcaption></figure><p>The PIRs have been in the information security domain for more than 10 years. Surprisingly, the literature review that preceded the development of the Red Hat process suggests that there is only a limited number of existing approaches to the PIRs development that is specific enough to allow an actual establishment of the PIRs.</p><p>The Red Hat PIRs development process is based on two risk assessment exercises divided into internal and external focus. The ranked results of the two exercises are then merged in a mapping exercise and translated into a coherent text of the actual PIRs. This process was inspired by an existing body of knowledge which was linked as far as we are aware in a novel way. It also includes a detailed guide and templates for the whole process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LC2BRGWmEnKOoOFm" /></figure><p>There are many white papers, blog posts and other sources that we reviewed before developing the Red Hat process. Below are the ones that were the most detailed and relevant to our effort.</p><p>The Priority Intelligence Requirement is originally a <a href="https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp2_01.pdf">military intelligence concept</a>. A good example of an in-depth explanation of the original concept is provided by James King in the 2018 Small Wars Journal article <a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/importance-priority-intelligence-requirements-army-service-component-command-ascc-and">The Importance of Priority Intelligence Requirements to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and the Intelligence Apparatus</a>.</p><p>PIRs have been later adopted by the information security and cyber threat intelligence (CTI). The first article I’m aware of that describes application of PIRs in CTI is from Matthew Stern from 2012 (<a href="https://www.securityweek.com/cyber-intelligence-identifying-threat-and-understanding-terrain-cyberspace">Cyber Intelligence: Identifying the Threat and Understanding the Terrain in Cyberspace</a>). This inspirational text suggests that we need to understand both our technical assets and the threat actors to develop the PIRs. This is also a cornerstone of the Red Hat PIR development process.</p><p>A 2018 blog post by Flashpoint Team (<a href="https://flashpoint.io/blog/three-things-you-need-for-effective-intelligence-requirements/">Three Things You Need for Effective Intelligence Requirements</a>) discusses critical and business assets instead of just technical assets for the INTERNAL FOCUS part of the PIR process. This is substantial from the Red Hat point of view as we struggled to work only with the technical asset classifications, which in our view tend to be too detailed, especially in larger organizations, and don’t provide a good perspective on what organizations really care about and where a potential attack would hurt the most.</p><p>Detailed conceptualization of the PIRs in the CTI domain offers Jared Ettinger (2019,<em> </em><a href="https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Collection/2019_300_001_546590.pdf">Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Report, The State of Cyber Intelligence Practices in the United States</a>) which discuss operationalization of concepts such as higher level Intelligence Requirements (IR) and Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR) in organizations.</p><p>Jody Caldwell (2020, <a href="https://sector.ca/sessions/priority-intelligence-requirements-pir-are-not-just-for-threat-intel-analysts/">Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) Are Not Just for Threat Intel Analysts</a>, from 10:49) suggests working with mission statements derived from higher level documents for the INTERNAL FOCUS part. Unfortunately, we weren’t aware of this presentation before developing our process. It would have saved us a lot of time, because it derives the WHAT part of the PIRs from documents on the same level as the Red Hat process.</p><p>The only full CTI PIRs development process described in open information sources we are aware of is offered by <a href="https://intel471.com/resources/cu-girh-download-request">Intel471</a>. The foundation of the process is a list of General intelligence requirements (GIRs). This is a list of threat landscape items ranging from malware types to adversary tactics and activities, but it also catalogs industries and regions. The PIRs are based on ranked stakeholder survey answers. The Red Hat approach is not focusing exclusively on the threat landscape, but also includes a risk assessment exercise focusing on the “crown jewels” of your own organization.</p><p>The threat actor risk assessment exercise (EXTERNAL FOCUS) of the Red Hat process was inspired by the semi-quantitative risk assessment approach developed by Andy Piazza (2020, <a href="https://klrgrz.medium.com/quantifying-threat-actors-with-threat-box-e6b641109b11">Quantifying Threat Actors with Threat Box</a>)</p><p>…</p><p>If you are aware of other PIRs development processes or other relevant PIRs sources available to the CTI community I would be happy if you reach out to me in Respond below this blog post, on TW @orojcik or <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ondrejrojcik/">LinkedIn</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=58d2df0d7c62" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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