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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mr. Graves on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[TRV-371 Lesson 4: The Definition of Genus and the Five Words Named]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/trv-371-lesson-4-the-definition-of-genus-and-the-five-words-named-d34a63edaa2e?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[classical-reasoning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[classical-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[porphyry]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 19:08:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T19:08:47.205Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The fourth lesson of forty-seven in TRV-371 Classical Reasoning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*58pLMn8kqqNY1t21" /></figure><h3>Preface</h3><p>In the last lesson, you learned that the word genus is used in three ways. Porphyry showed that it can mean a collection of people from one origin (i.e., one man); the source/origin/principle from which a man is descended/generated; and, in the philosophical sense, that under which a species falls. The third sense is what the philosophers use, and it is the sense used everywhere in this book. Porphyry now gives the description the philosophers themselves give. Learn the description word by word, why Porphyry calls it a description rather than a definition, and how the things that can be said of something are divided.</p><h3>Reading Assigned</h3><p>Porphyry, Isagoge (Introduction, Chapter 2 — “As then, genus is predicated triply,” down to “accident as ‘white,’ ‘black,’ ‘to sit.’”) Use this link to access the work for free: <a href="https://plato-scroll.com/plato-scroll.html#/read/porph-isagoge/s3">https://plato-scroll.com/plato-scroll.html#/read/porph-isagoge/s3</a>.</p><ol><li>“As then, genus is predicated triply, the consideration by philosophers is concerning the third, which also they explain by description, when they say that genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to what a thing is, e. g., animal.</li><li>2. For of predicates some are predicated of one thing alone, as individuals, for instance, “Socrates,” and “this man,” and “this thing;” but others are predicated of many, as genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents, predicated in common, but not peculiarly to any one.</li><li>Now genus is such as “animal,” species as “man,” difference as “ rational,” property as “ risible,” accident as “white,” “black,” “to sit.””</li></ol><h3>Learning Objectives</h3><ol><li>State Porphyry’s philosophical description of genus.</li><li>Explain what it means for genus to be predicated of many things.</li><li>Explain the phrase “predicated of many things differing in species.”</li><li>Explain what Porphyry means by “in answer to the question, What is it?”</li><li>Distinguish difference in species from difference in number.</li><li>Distinguish genus from something predicated of only one individual.</li><li>Distinguish what question genus answers from what question difference answer.</li><li>Give examples of genus, species, difference, property, and accident.</li><li>Explain why animal is Porphyry’s example of genus and man his example of species.</li></ol><h3>Exposition</h3><h4>I. Porphyry’s Philosophical Description of Genus</h4><blockquote>Genus is that which is predicated of many things, differing in species, in answer to the question what a thing is.</blockquote><p>This description is taken according to the third meaning of the term and nothing new is added.</p><p><strong>DESCRIBING</strong></p><p>Porphyry does not say that the philosophers define a genus, and Albert explains why they do not. When you ask what is an animal, and you can answer: a living thing that can sense. When you ask what a genus is, and there is nothing more general than genus to answer with. Instead of saying what a genus is, the philosophers say what a genus does: <strong>it is predicated of many things that differ in species.</strong></p><p>To say what a thing does, rather than what it is, is a description, and Porphyry calls it one.</p><h4><strong>II. Analyzing the Description</strong></h4><p>The first word to settle is <strong>PREDICATED</strong>. St. John says <em>to be predicated is to be affirmed in respect to something.</em> Albert also explains that <em>to predicate one thing of another is to say the one is the other by joining them with the word IS.</em> To deny is to separate them with the same word: man IS NOT a stone. For example, man IS an animal.</p><p>What a sentence like this really is, and what the word IS does in it, fills a whole book of Aristotle, and it is taught in the course on On Interpretation.¹</p><p>The second word to settle is <strong>OF MANY THINGS.</strong> Porphyry settles it in the next paragraph: he does so by dividing all the things that can be said of anything into two.</p><p><strong>Genus is not predicated of only one thing but it is common to several things. </strong>Porphyry gave the example animal which can be predicated of man, horse, ox, dog, and many other things.</p><p>But some things are said of one thing only. For example, Socrates is a man, and this man, and that thing; Porphyry calls these <strong>individuals.</strong> Others are said of many in common and belong to no SINGLE individual as its own. Porphyry puts genera and species, difference, peculiarities and accidents. Not one of them names a single thing but instead many things.</p><p>Caution given: Albert gives a warning about the word “many.”</p><p>What makes something a genus is not <strong>how many things</strong>² it IS said of, but how many it CAN be said of.</p><p>Hypothetical: If there were only one kind of animal in the world and men were the only animals there were. Animal would still be predicated of man as a genus, because animal is still above what falls under it. Being said of one thing only would be a fact about how many animals happened to exist, not a change in the word. This is the principle we must take with ourselves.</p><p>The third thing to settle is <strong>DIFFERING IN SPECIES.</strong> St. John describes Genus as that which is predicated of several things that are specifically different in respect to what pertains to their essence³.</p><p>We said before that Genus is predicated of many things. But the things themselves differ from each other by possessing a specific difference that separates them, yet they are divided under their shared genus.</p><p>Albert gives his reasoning: A genus only reaches a species by being divided, and what divides it is a pair of differences that are opposed to each other. Since they are opposed, there is never just one of them, and what results is never just one species. Porphyry provides the example: animal is divided by the difference between rational and irrational. Every animal is one or the other, and none is both. So whatever falls under a genus is more than one, and <strong>the things that fall under it differ in kind and not merely in number. </strong>This is what is meant by thing “differing in species:” whenever it differs from another thing in kind and not merely in number.</p><p>The fourth thing to settle is <strong>IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WHAT A THING IS.</strong> Ask what Socrates is, and the answer is he is in animal, and you have said what he is. But if you ask what kind of a thing Socrates is, and answer that he is rational, or that he is white, you have not said what he is but answered correctly what kind of a thing he is. <strong>Porphyry uses this difference to separate a genus from three of the other four words.</strong></p><p>While Genus answers the question “what a thing is,” difference answers the question “what kind of a thing it is.”</p><blockquote>St. John says: “Thus, animal, which is a genus, is predicated essentially of man, the horse, the ox, and a number of other things, all of which differ from one another in species. For the species of man is one thing, whereas that of the horse is another, and that of the ox is still another. The genus is predicated as to what something is, for, when we are asked what a man is, we reply that he is an animal. The same is true with the horse, because, when we are asked what it is, we reply that it is an animal.”</blockquote><h4>III. Illustration</h4><p>We will use the following diagram to illustrate the given points. The lesson becomes easy to understand when you draw it out. By drawing out the lesson, you will begin to see the relationships between each term discussed. First, we will lay out a few rules before drawing:</p><ol><li>THE RULE FOR READING A CIRCLE IS THIS: THE NAME ON THE OUTER CIRCLE IS SAID OF EVERYTHING INSIDE IT.</li><li>THE RULE FOR LABELLING A CIRCLE IS THIS: EVERY CIRCLE IS LABELLED WITH A CLASS OF THINGS, NAMED THE WAY WE NAME THINGS</li></ol><p>Now let’s draw. Draw a large circle or box and label it ANIMAL. Inside it, draw two circles and label one RATIONAL ANIMALS and the other IRRATIONAL ANIMALS. This illustrates the relationships between the genus animal and the species under it. By including these two opposing differences inside the circle, we divide the genus into two kinds of species: those animals that are rational and those animals that are irrational. This should give you the second diagram. This example uses differences to divide one thing from another.</p><p>But let’s try another example, this time with color. Draw another large circle and label it again ANIMAL. Inside it, draw two circles and label one WHITE ANIMALS and the other NOT WHITE ANIMALS. By including these two opposing differences inside the circle, we divide animals into two kinds of species: those animals that are white and those animals that are not white. This should give you the third diagram.</p><pre>        ┌───────────────────────────┐<br>        │           ANIMAL          │<br>        │                           │<br>        │     ┌───────────────┐     │<br>        │     │      MAN      │     │<br>        │     │               │     │<br>        │     │   Socrates    │     │<br>        │     └───────────────┘     │<br>        └───────────────────────────┘<br><br>             GENUS → SPECIES → INDIVIDUALS<br><br><br>        ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐<br>        │           ANIMAL                                    |<br>        │                                                     |<br>        │     ┌───────────────┐        ┌───────────────┐      │<br>        │     │   Rational    │        │   Irrational  │      │<br>        │     │    Animals    │        │    Animals    |      |<br>        │     │     (Man)     |        |               |      |<br>        │     └───────────────┘        └───────────────┘      |<br>        │                                                     |<br>        └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘<br><br>             GENUS → SPECIES (Rational and Irrational)<br><br>        ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐<br>        │           ANIMAL                                    |<br>        │                                                     |<br>        │     ┌───────────────┐        ┌───────────────┐      │<br>        │     │     White     │        │   Not White   │      │<br>        │     │    Animals    │        │    Animals    |      |<br>        │     │               |        |               |      |<br>        │     └───────────────┘        └───────────────┘      |<br>        │                                                     |<br>        └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘<br><br>             GENUS → SPECIES (Rational and Irrational)</pre><h4>IV. The Five Universals⁴</h4><p>Porphyry closes with naming the five universals and hanging one example for each.</p><ol><li>Genus is such as animal.</li><li>Species is such as man.</li><li>Difference is such as rational.</li><li>Property is such as risible, which means able to laugh.</li><li>Accident is such as the white, the black, and to sit.</li></ol><p>Porphyry gives them here so that you may see that the five words are five different things and that each has its own kind of example. Each one has its own place in this book.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>We learned that the description the philosophers give genus: that a genus is what is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question what a thing is. Being a genus is not what a thing is, but the position a higher thing has above the things under it. To predicate is to attribute one thing to another by the word IS; what is said of one thing only is an Individual. All five of Porphyry’s words apply to many things. What falls under a genus differs in species because a genus is divided by [specific] differences that are opposed to each other.</p><p>In the next lesson you will learn what distinguishes genus from the other four Predicables and how it differs from a species.</p><h3>Memory Work</h3><ol><li>Genus is that which is predicated of many things, differing in species, in answer to the question what a thing is; as for instance, animal.</li><li>This is a description and not a definition, because being a genus is not what a thing is: substance, living body, and animal are things to which it happens to the genera.</li><li>A genus states an order of the higher to the lower, and animal is called a genus from the way it stands over what is under it.</li><li>To predicate one thing of another is to attribute the one to the other by the mark of joining, which is the word IS; and to deny is to divide the one from the other by that same mark.</li><li>Of the things which are predicated, some are predicated of one thing only, as Individuals — Socrates, and this man, and that thing.</li><li>Others are predicated of many things in common and are peculiar to no individual: genera and species, differences, peculiarities and accident.</li><li>What makes something a genus is not how many things it IS said of, but how many it CAN be said of.</li><li>A genus reaches a species only by being divided, and what divides is a pair of differences opposed of each other. Animal is divided by the difference rational and irrational. So what falls under a genus always differ in species.</li><li>THE RULE FOR READING A CIRCLE IS THIS: THE NAME ON THE OUTER CIRCLE IS SAID OF EVERYTHING INSIDE IT.</li><li>THE RULE FOR LABELLING A CIRCLE IS THIS: EVERY CIRCLE IS LABELLED WITH A CLASS OF THINGS, NAMED THE WAY WE NAME THINGS</li><li>Genus is such an animal; Species, such as man; Difference, such as rational; Peculiarity, such as risible; Accident, such as the white, the black, and to sit.</li></ol><h3>Footnotes</h3><ol><li>On Interpretation is ordered to the second operation or act of the mind: the composing and dividing, by which the mind puts one thing together with another and either affirms it or denies it. There, we will study claims and judge whether something is true or false. From Lesson 0: <a href="https://medium.com/@orthophil/lesson-0-philosophy-dialectic-and-the-pursuit-of-wisdom-7af9df62d080?sharedUserId=orthophil">https://medium.com/@orthophil/lesson-0-philosophy-dialectic-and-the-pursuit-of-wisdom-7af9df62d080?sharedUserId=orthophil</a>.</li><li>This is said because students will start counting when they see the word “many” vs it IS said of, but how the “one.”</li><li>St. John’s ending phrase “what pertains to their essence” will be explained in the fourth description.</li><li>St. John says, “Universal [is that] which signifies several individual things, as do the terms man [species], and animal and substance [genus].”</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d34a63edaa2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Translation of the Complete Works of St. Gennadius Scholarius, Book VII, Pt.5]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/translation-of-the-complete-works-of-st-gennadius-scholarius-book-vii-pt-5-2abe690a60f9?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[orthodox-christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[porphyry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[st-gennadius-scholarius]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aristotle]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 18:01:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T18:01:03.966Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The last of the Byzantines and the first of the Byzantine Thomists (attempt) translated into English for the first time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KfsbwdPcd8HXR4_UNNAwBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Of Georgios Scholarios, Prolegomena to the Logic and to Porphyry’s Isagoge, gathered from various books, with his own remarks. Fourth reading. What the subject of logic is.</p><p><strong>His lecture begins:</strong></p><p>It is further asked concerning the subject of logic, whether the syllogism is its subject. And first it is shown that it is not, because no one and the same thing is both subject and instrument; but the syllogism is an instrument; therefore, and the rest.</p><p>Further, no one and the same thing is the subject of the whole and of the part; but the syllogism is a subject in the part, because it is the subject in the book of the Prior [Analytics]; therefore, and the rest. The major is evident, because then it would follow that the whole and the part are equally delimited, which is absurd. The minor is well known.</p><p>But indeed neither is the mode of knowing the subject there, because [f. 17] the matter and the end do not coincide, as appears in the second [book] of the Physics. But the mode of knowing is an end in logic; for this is the end aimed at in logic, that someone have the mode of knowing in the other sciences; therefore, and the rest.</p><p><strong>But all the commentators are to the contrary, and Albert clearly, in the book of the Prior [Analytics].</strong></p><p>Some say in response to this question that the being of reason is the subject of logic; others say that the syllogism is the subject; others, the mode of knowing. But it makes no difference however it be said, because all the modes of knowing are beings of reason, and the syllogism is more principal than the other scientific modes. And on account of this I say two things to the question: first, that the subject in logic that is common by the commonness of predication is the being of reason, that is, the second notions; but the subject that is common by the commonness of reference is the syllogism.</p><p>The first is shown thus. That is a subject common in logic by the commonness of predication, which can be predicated of all those things that are delimited in logic; but the being of reason, or the second notions, are common to all the things delimited in logic, because the things delimited in logic are notions made concrete with things, as in the book of Porphyry it is delimited concerning the predicative, which is a name of a notion. In the book of the Categories it is delimited concerning the categories, and “category” is a name of the second notion. In the book On Interpretation it is delimited concerning the proposition; in the book of the Prior [Analytics], concerning the syllogism simply; and so inductively in all the logical books. Thus, then, it appears that the second notions are common to all the things delimited in logic through the predication that is per se, even if they are not common to the things delimited there incidentally, because in logic there is treatment also of real beings incidentally, so that the second notions might be founded upon them.</p><p>The second is shown thus. That is a subject common in a science by reference, concerning which the what-it-is and the that-it-is are presupposed, and to which all the things delimited in the science have reference; but concerning the syllogism the what and the that are presupposed in logic, and all the things delimited there have reference to it, since there it is delimited concerning the syllogism and its parts, both the integral ones and those of the subject, as has been said, and all those things have reference to the syllogism, just as the sophistic reasoning is examined there, insofar as it has the appearance and likeness of the dialectical syllogism; further, there is treatment concerning the attributes of the syllogism, such as having three terms, being in one of the three figures; and so whatever is delimited in logic either is the syllogism, or has reference to the syllogism, either as a part, or as an attribute, or as a result of it. The subject, therefore, of logic, the one common by the commonness of reference, is the syllogism.</p><p>To the first: the major is true, if it be considered in the same way. But to the minor I say that the particular syllogism is an instrument; but the syllogism considered in the common, according to every mode of existence which it has in itself and in its own parts, whether the integral ones or those of the subject, and in general in those having reference to it, thus is a subject in logic; therefore, and the rest.</p><p>To the second: the major is true, if it be considered in the same way. But to the minor I say that, as Albert says in the book of the Prior [Analytics], the syllogism is a subject differently in the whole of logic and in the book of the Prior [Analytics]; for considered simply and absolutely according to every mode of existence, it is a subject in the whole of logic; but as regards its matter and form, it is per se and absolutely the subject in the book of the Prior [Analytics]. Whence the syllogism is said universally to be the subject in the whole of logic; but per se and absolutely it is the subject in the book of the Prior [Analytics].</p><p>To the third, in which it was said that neither is the mode of knowing a subject in logic, because the matter and the end do not coincide, I make a distinction concerning matter, because there is a matter “out of which” and a matter “about which.” Concerning the matter out of which, it is true that it does not coincide with the end; but concerning the matter about which, it is not necessary. Thus the scientific mode is a subject in logic. Or I can say: I concede the major; but that the scientific mode is an end in logic, this I say is false; for the knowledge of the scientific mode is the end of this [logic], but the scientific mode itself, the one known, is the subject.</p><p>Note. According to others the subject of logic, in general, is discourse ordered toward the knowledge of the true, and this order is taken analogically. These people divide science according to the real and the logical; for, as Tullius says in the Second Rhetoric, wisdom without the art of speaking is a knife in the hand of a paralytic, and eloquence without wisdom is a knife in the hand of a madman, and on account of this one must have not only real sciences ordered to wisdom, but also logical sciences, that is, speaking ones, ordered to well-ordered converse; which logical sciences they also distinguish according to the distinction of discourse, which can be taken in different ways; for in discourse there are three things: the substance of discourse, the truth, and the goodness, that is, the seemliness; in the first way, then, grammar is about discourse; in the second, logic; in the third, rhetoric. And these same people divide in another way also, saying that of the properties of discourse some are taken from the part of the utterance, that is, of the signified in general, and in this way is grammar; others from the part of the specific signification in the interweaving of the one with the other, when truth or falsehood is signified, and in this way is logic; and others are taken from the signified of discourse as far as it concerns us, which are the persuasive methods, and in this way is rhetoric.</p><p><strong>Whether it is theoretical or practical.</strong></p><p>Logic is in a certain way theoretical, and in a certain way practical. For insofar as through it we demonstrate the attributes of the syllogism as of its own subject, and further the attributes of its parts, it is theoretical; but if they are considered insofar as it is ordered to the other sciences, it is practical.</p><p>But it is rather practical than theoretical, because that whose end is rather the work than the truth is practical; but logic is such; therefore, and the rest. The major is evident. The minor is shown [thus]: truth is not its principal end, as is its application to the remaining sciences; which is clear from the aim of the one who composed logic; for he made it ancillary to the other sciences by the mode of activity, and by as much as it is better to know both the divine science and the other [sciences] to which logic is applied than to know logic itself, by so much we do not seek it, nor the syllogism itself, except on account of the other sciences. Yet it is not practical in the way the other so-called practical [sciences] are; for the practical [sciences] are threefold according to the Philosopher in the 6th of the Metaphysics. For some pass over into external matter, like building and such as these, which extend to activity by hands; others do not pass over directly into external matter, but are ordered to directing desire in the subject things, such as the ethical ones; and others are called practical because of demonstrating the mode of advance and tracking-down in the remaining sciences; and in this third way logic is practical. It is true that rhetoric and grammar too are practical in this way, and rhetoric more, as being ordered to philosophy, which is practical, not theoretical.</p><p>St. Gennadius II ends his fourth lecture on logic and questions on logic. He begins his next lecture introducing Porphyry’s introduction.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2abe690a60f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[TRV-371 Lesson 3: The Three Senses of Genus]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/trv-371-lesson-3-the-three-senses-of-genus-55388b73a4c3?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[classical-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[classical-reasoning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[porphyry]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:02:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T17:09:07.165Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The third lesson of forty-seven in TRV-371 Classical Reasoning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/533/0*DojnsFBVV3KVoyOi" /></figure><h3>Preface</h3><p>Porphyry wrote this book to explain his five words — Genus, Difference, Species, Property/Peculiarity, and Accident — and he treats them as a logician would, not a metaphysician. He leaves the deeper questions alone and starts with Genus and its senses.</p><p>Learn the three senses in which the word genus is used, which of the three the philosophers use, and why Porphyry begins in this way rather than by telling you at once what a genus is.</p><h3>Reading Assigned</h3><p>Porphyry, Isagoge (Introduction, Chapter 2 — “Neither genus nor species appear to be simply denominated,” down to “in answer to what a thing is, e.g. animal.”) Use this link to access the work for free: <a href="https://plato-scroll.com/plato-scroll.html#/read/porph-isagoge/s1b">https://plato-scroll.com/plato-scroll.html#/read/porph-isagoge/s1b</a>.</p><ol><li>“Neither genus nor species appear to be simply denominated,</li><li>for that is called genus which is a collection of certain things, subsisting in a certain respect relatively to one thing, and to each other, according to which signification the genus of the Heraclidae is denominated from the habitude from one, I mean Hercules, and from the multitude of those who have alliance to each other from him, denominated according to separation from other genera.</li><li>Again, after another manner also, the principle of the generation of every one is called genus, whether from the generator or from the place in which a person is generated,</li><li>for thus we say that Orestes had his genus from Tantalus, Hyllus from Hercules,</li><li>and again, that Pindar was by genus a Theban, but Plato an Athenian, for country is a certain principle of each man’s generation, in the same manner as a father.</li><li>Still, this signification appears to be most ready,</li><li>for they are called Heraclidae who derive their origin from the genus of Hercules, and Cecropidae who are from Cecrops; also their next of kin.</li><li>The first genus, moreover, is so called, which is the principle of each man’s generation, but afterwards the number of those who are from one principle, e. g., from Hercules, which, defining and separating from others, we call the whole collected multitude the genus of the Heraclidae.</li><li>Again, in another way that is denominated genus to which the species is subject, called perhaps from the similitude of these;</li><li>for such a genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seems also to comprehend all the multitude under itself.</li><li>As then, genus is predicated triply, the consideration by philosophers is concerning the third,</li><li>which also they explain by description, when they say that genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to what a thing is, e. g., animal.”</li></ol><h3>Learning Objectives</h3><ol><li>State the three ways Porphyry explains how the word genus is used.</li><li>Explain the first sense of genus.</li><li>Explain the second sense of genus.</li><li>Explain the third sense of genus.</li><li>Explain why Porphyry says the third sense is considered by philosophers.</li></ol><h3>Exposition</h3><h4>I. Porphyry Begins with the Different Uses of “Genus”</h4><p>Porphyry begins Chapter 2 by saying that neither genus nor species appears to be simply denominated. What does “simply denominated” mean? To denominate means to name something or call it something. Porphyry speaks of Genus and Species as terms that do not always have one single meaning whenever used. The genus is used in several senses, and until they are settled, no definition can be formed with it. But since definitions are formed using this term, we must know what genus is before moving on. Therefore, knowing the definitions of these logical terms is our first task in this lesson, starting with genus.</p><p>Porphyry begins by distinguishing three senses in which genus is spoken. The first two are ordinary or broader uses of the word. The third is the philosophical sense that concerns his present investigation.</p><h4>II. A Caution before Studying</h4><p>Albert the Great¹ adds a caution which you will need if you study grammar. The word genus has still other senses that have nothing to do with this study at all. In grammar, a noun has a genus, which is gender: masculine, feminine, and others. These are senses of the same word, and Albert sets them aside as having no bearing here. Set them aside yourself. When this book says genus, it never means gender.</p><p>We will investigate the divisions of genus.</p><h4>III. The First Sense of Genus — A Collection from One Origin</h4><p>The first division of genus refers to a collection of people. Porphyry defines Genus as <strong>“a collection of certain things, subsisting in a certain respect relatively to one thing, and to each other.”</strong> When we speak of Genus, we are speaking of a body of persons standing in a certain way to one man and to each other.</p><p>Porphyry provides the example of the Heraclidae, the descendants of Hercules. Heraclidae are denominated from their “habitude²,” that being Hercules himself. This is called the genus of Hercules, and calling them so marks them off from every other such company descended from some other man. This is the same manner of speech when a man speaks of his family or his house (e.g., the “Graves” or “Graves’s household”).</p><p>Albert also says what makes this company of descendants such a company is that they all come from one man. This is what holds the collection and makes it a genus.</p><p>Genus can mean a family or lineage, understood according to a common origin, that distinguishes from other family lines.</p><h4>IV. The Second Sense of Genus — The Principle of Generation</h4><p>The second division of genus refers to the principle of the generation of a person. Porphyry defines Genus as <strong>“the place in which someone is born.”</strong> He explains that one’s country is in some way a principle³ of one’s generation, just as one’s father is. When we speak of Genus, we mean the beginning from which a man is begotten, and Porphyry says this is taken in two ways:</p><ul><li>from the man who begets him</li><li>from the place where he was born</li></ul><p>He gives examples from ancient history:</p><ul><li>Orestes is said to have his genus from Tantalus.</li><li>Hyllus from Hercules.</li><li>Pindar is a Theban by genus.</li><li>Plato is an Athenian by genus.</li></ul><p>Therefore, a place can be spoken of in this way: a man’s country is a beginning of his birth, as a father is. This common idea is known as one’s origin.</p><p>In the first sense, genus means the<strong> multitude connected</strong> through a common origin. In the second, genus means the <strong>origin itself </strong>to which the multitude is collected.</p><h4>V. The Difference Between the First Two Species</h4><p>In the first sense, genus is understood as the <strong>multitude of people descended from one origin.</strong> For example, the Heraclidae are the descendants associated with Hercules.</p><p>In the second sense, genus is understood as the <strong>principle or origin from which someone is generated.</strong> For example, Hercules is an origin (i.e., genus) of Heraclidae. Athens is a place from which Plato is said to have his genus.</p><p>The source is called the genus first (the second sense); and afterwards the whole company descended from that one source is called the genus (the first sense).<strong><em> The second sense comes first in the order of things, and the first sense follows from it.</em></strong></p><p>Porphyry prepares us for the third sense by identifying this common idea of a principle.</p><h4>VI. The Third Sense of Genus — The Philosophical Definition</h4><p>Porphyry now introduces the sense that concerns the philosophers, and what this course is concerned with also. Porphyry says that genus is also said of that “under which a species falls”.</p><blockquote>“[F]or such a genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seems also to comprehend all the multitude under itself.”</blockquote><p>He doesn’t tell us what species is yet. This will be taught in later lessons.</p><p>The third sense is called by the same name as the other two according to their likeness. There are two kinds of likeness (aka the “similitude”):</p><ol><li>A genus of this kind is a source/principle of the things under it. (ex. Hercules was the source of the Heraclidae)</li><li>A genus takes in the whole multitude under it. (ex. The company of the Heraclidae takes in all of them.)</li></ol><p>So the third sense has both marks: it is a source, and it takes in many.</p><p>Everywhere in this book refers to this sense.</p><h4>VII. Why Does Porphyry Call This a “Principle”?</h4><p>A genus has logical priority over the species beneath it. “Priority” refers to something coming first and acting as a cause for something else. We speak of “logical priority” in making the distinction from “priority ontologically” — in that the classes don’t come first into existence in the world and then the things under them come into existence sequentially — but the genus is common to what’s under it in a logical hierarchy.</p><p>For example, an animal is common to these species — man, horse, and ox. It therefore provides a common starting point from which the species can be distinguished. The species are divided from one another by their differences within the genus in which they are all contained.</p><p>Now we will gather the senses Porphyry gave us.</p><h4>VIII. Three Senses of Genus</h4><p>Genus is understood in three ways:</p><ol><li>of a company or collection of people descended from one man</li><li>of the source/principle from which a man is descended</li><li>of that which a species falls under</li></ol><p>The first two meanings prepare us for the third sense by showing the notion of origin and comprehending multitude. And because this third sense is like the other two in being a source and in taking in many things, it is called by the same name.</p><p>But Porphyry hasn’t yet given the description that the philosophers mean. He only gave us the three senses in which genus is used.</p><h4>IX. Conclusion</h4><p>You have now learned that the word genus is said in three ways: of a collection of people descended from one man, of the source from which a man is descended, and of that which a species falls under. You have learned that the third is the philosophers’ sense, and it is called by the same name as the other two because it is like them in being a source and in taking in many, but the description isn’t given yet. You’ve learned from Albert that the grammarian’s sense of genus, which is gender, has no part in of this study.</p><p>In the next lesson, you will read the description the philosophers themselves give of a genus in this third sense, and Porphyry provides examples for each Predicable.</p><h3>Memory Work</h3><ol><li>Neither genus nor species is said in one way only, but in many.</li><li>To denominate means to name something or call it something.</li><li>In the first sense, a genus is a collection of people descended from one man.</li><li>What makes this sense a company one is that there is one thing present in all of them, coming from the one man they descend from.</li><li>In the second sense, a genus is the source from which a man is descended.</li><li>A man’s country is a beginning of his birth, as a father is.</li><li>The source is called the genus first, and the company descended from it is called then genus afterwards.</li><li>In the third sense, a genus is that which a species falls under.</li><li>The third sense is called by the same name as the other two because it is like them: a genus of this kind is a source of the things under it, and it takes in the whole multitude under it.</li><li>Priority refers to something coming first and acting as a cause for something else.</li><li>When we speak of logical priority, we are speaking about how things are ordered in existence, but not coming into existence in that order.</li><li>Genus is said in three ways, and the third is the sense the philosophers use.</li><li>The word genus has other senses which have no part of this study, such as the gender of nouns in grammar.</li><li>The senses of the name had to be distinguished first, because the logician’s sense of genus cannot be settled until they are.</li></ol><h3>Footnotes</h3><ol><li>Albert the Great, De Praedicabilibus (a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge). <a href="https://classicalliberalarts.com/instruction/st-albert-the-great-de-praedicabilibus-liber-i-tract-iii-ch-01/">https://classicalliberalarts.com/instruction/st-albert-the-great-de-praedicabilibus-liber-i-tract-iii-ch-01/</a>.</li><li>Habitude refers to the relations to a principle, in this case: between certain persons or things (in short, it means relationship).</li><li>A principle is that from which something begins, proceeds, or by which something is established or known. <a href="https://medium.com/@orthophil/lesson-0-philosophy-dialectic-and-the-pursuit-of-wisdom-7af9df62d080?sharedUserId=orthophil">https://medium.com/@orthophil/lesson-0-philosophy-dialectic-and-the-pursuit-of-wisdom-7af9df62d080?sharedUserId=orthophil</a>.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=55388b73a4c3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Translation of the Complete Works of St. Gennadius Scholarius, Book VII, Pt.4]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/translation-of-the-complete-works-of-st-gennadius-scholarius-book-vii-pt-4-4120f69f21ff?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4120f69f21ff</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[st-gennadius-scholarius]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aristotle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[orthodox-christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[porphyry]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:01:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T18:01:05.109Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The last of the Byzantines and the first of the Byzantine Thomists (attempt) translated into English for the first time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KfsbwdPcd8HXR4_UNNAwBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Of Georgios Scholarios, Prolegomena to the Logic and to Porphyry’s Isagoge, gathered from various books, with his own remarks. Third reading. To answering disputations.</p><p><strong>His lecture begins:</strong></p><p><strong>Q1. Whether logic is a science?</strong></p><p>It is asked whether logic is a science. And it seems not, because the mode of knowing is not a science; but logic is a scientific mode; therefore, and so on. The major is shown, that the mode of a thing is not the thing. The minor is shown through the Philosopher, who says in the second [book] of the Metaphysics that logic is a mode of knowing; whence he says there that it is vain to seek the science and the scientific mode at the same time. And Averroes says there that logic is called a scientific mode.</p><p>Further, every science is from proper [principles]; but logic is not from proper [principles]. The major is shown in the first [book] of the Posterior [Analytics]; the minor is shown from logic’s being from common [principles], as appears at the beginning of the Topics, where it is said that it has a way toward the principles of all methods.</p><p>Further, the subject of any science must be intelligible; but the subject of logic is not intelligible; therefore, and so on. The major is clear of itself. The minor is shown in two ways. First, thus: what cannot be sensible is not intelligible, because our intellect is dependent on sensations; but the syllogism, which is the subject of logic, is not sensible; for no one sees the syllogism, nor perceives it by any other sense; therefore, and so on. Second, thus: the object of any power must precede that power; but the beings of logic do not precede the intellect, but rather follow; therefore, and so on. The major is clear. The minor is shown thus: things that are logically beings are built up from the activity of the intellect; for this reason they do not precede the intellect; that, then, about which logic is, is not an object of the intellect, and if it is not an object of the intellect, it is not intelligible either; therefore, and so on.</p><p><strong>Q2. But all the commentators are to the contrary, and all in common who have examined logic.</strong></p><p>To this question some, by reason of the propositions, said that logic is not a science, but only a mode of knowing; but I say briefly that logic is a science, because, as appears in the first [book] of the Posterior [Analytics], science is a habit of the conclusion of the demonstration, because knowing is the result of the demonstration, in which the proper attributes are shown of the subject through the proper principles of the subject itself. This having been taken, I argue thus. The knowledge of some result through its proper principles and causes is science, as is clear from the definition itself of knowing in the first [book] of the Posterior [Analytics], in which it is shown that to know is to know a thing through the cause, and that it is the cause of that, through which the thing is, and that it is impossible for it to be otherwise. Now logic is such a knowledge; for there is something of such a kind that, once it is known, all the logical beings are known through its attributes and proper principles, and this is clear by induction in each logical being; for this reason logic is a science.</p><p>To the first, then, it must be said in general that it is true that the scientific mode is not that science of which it is the scientific mode; yet it can be another science. But this is not strong, because logic is not only a mode of knowing in the other sciences, but rather in itself. Therefore it is better to speak otherwise: that the mode of knowing is said in two ways: in one way, as the instrument of knowing, by which someone knows what he knows, as are demonstration, definition, division; in another way the scientific mode is taken as the habit or cognition in the soul which comes about concerning these instruments of science. In the former way of speaking, then, the mode of knowing is not a science; but insofar as it is a habit concerning these very instruments of science as concerning a subject, it can well be a science because these instruments of knowing, such as the definition and the rest, have causes and principles, like the other beings, and can be known through them; so that logic according to the second way is a science, that is, a habit that comes about or is procured concerning these instruments of knowing through their causes and principles, and it is not the mode of knowing in the first-mentioned way.</p><p>To the second, that every science is from proper [principles], I grant; but concerning logic’s not being from proper [principles], I say that, even if the things about which logic is are common to the other sciences by application, because the beings considered in logic are notions able to be applied to all the sciences and to any matter whatsoever, whether it be physical, mathematical, or divine, like the notion of predicate and subject, and likewise in the case of the other notions, nevertheless these are proper to logic.</p><p>To the third: a thing can be intelligible in two ways, either primarily or secondarily. What is primarily intelligible must be primarily sensible, through itself or through its accidents, such as the dimensions or the sensible qualities, like whiteness, blackness, and the rest. But what is intelligible secondarily, that is, intelligible from the thinking of another, need not be sensible, as privation is intelligible through possession (hexis); for this reason privation need not be sensible. And the notions about which logic is are thought through the thoughts of the things on which they are founded; and for this reason these need not be sensible. And if someone says that everything thought is dependent on sensation, even if it is not necessary that this be sensible; if, then, the second notions are thought, these must be dependent on sensation; I say that it is true that what is thought is dependent on sensation, and for this reason I grant that the cognitions of these notions are dependent on sensation, and for this reason from the first to the last the cognition of these second notions is dependent on sensation. But the requirement that the object of a power precede that power is true of the first and principal object; but the second and non-principal object need not simply precede the power of which it is the object, but only as regards that activity according to which it considers the subject. That the logical beings, then, do not precede the intellect is true absolutely; but as regards the activity itself, which is knowing, the logical beings themselves do precede the intellect, because these logical beings must first exist before someone grasps them and has science about them.</p><p><strong>Q3. Whether the science of logic is real (of things) or logical.</strong></p><p>It is further asked whether the science of logic is real, or logical, that is, [a science] of the being of reason. And it seems to be real, because that science is real which considers real beings, that is, things subsisting outside the soul; and logic is such; therefore, and so on. The major is clear. The minor is shown: because in logic treatment is given of the categories, that is, of substance, of quantity and the rest, and these categories are truly beings subsisting outside the soul, as the Philosopher holds in the sixth [book] of the Metaphysics; for he divides being into that in the soul and that truly being outside the soul, and this [part] outside the soul again he divides into the ten categories, which are the ten principles of things.</p><p>Further, if someone says against this that the logician does not consider the categories according to their real being, but considers them insofar as the second notions are founded upon them, one must say in reply that the Philosopher determines about them in the same way in which the properties in being are assigned to them and in which these properties fit them. But the properties determined about them in the book of the Categories are those owed to them according to their real being. The categories, therefore, are considered, as regards their real being, in the book of the Categories, and not according to their being of notion; and thus they pertain to the logician as regards their real being, and not according to the being of notion. The major is clear. The minor is shown by this: that the property of receiving contraries is owed to substance according to its real being, and [so is] the not receiving more and less, and the other properties of substance likewise; and in the same way also in the other categories, as in the category of quantity it befits quantity not to have a contrary according to its real being, and to quality that the like and unlike are said according to it, and so by induction in all the other categories.</p><p>Further, science is not of greater entity than its own knowable. But logic is a true thing subsisting in a category. The knowable of logic must therefore subsist in a category. But such a science, which is about a knowable that is a true thing subsisting in a category, is a real science. Therefore, and so on. The major is clear, because science is dependent on its proper knowable, and for this reason is not of greater entity than its knowable. And the minor is shown thus: Logic is a science; but science is a true thing existing in a category, that of quality; if, then, the knowable of logic were not a true thing existing in a category, the science would already be of greater entity than its knowable.</p><p>Further, it is commonly said that logic is the science distinguishing the true from the false; but he who distinguishes these knows in himself the true and the false; but he who knows in himself the true and the false is able to consider the things themselves, because from the thing’s being, or not being, the statement is called true, or false; therefore, and so on.</p><p>After these things it is shown that logic is by itself verbal (λεκτική), because that science is by itself verbal which considers certain things in whose definitions speech falls; and logic is such, because it considers the syllogism, the proposition, the assertion, and the like; therefore, and so on.</p><p><strong>Q4.? But all the commentators, who examine such matters logically in common, say the contrary: that logic is a logical science, and not a real nor a verbal one. And they show this by argument, saying that that science is logical which is about the notions, which are beings of reason.</strong></p><p>To this question it must be said that logic is a logical science; and the cause of this is twofold. This is the first: that science is logical which is directive of speech or of the intellect in reasoning; and logic is such; therefore, and so on. The major is clear, because in one way a science is called logical which is directive of speech or of the intellect in reasoning. And the minor is clear, because through logic the intellect is directed as it advances, in reasoning, from the propositions to the conclusion.</p><p>Further, that science is logical which is about the beings dependent on speech and intellect; but logic is such; therefore, and so on. The major is clear, because just as a science is called real which is about the beings of the thing and is not dependent on the intellect, so, from the object, that science is logical which is about the beings dependent on the intellect. The minor too is itself clear, that logic is about the second notions; and the second notions have their being from the intellect only, because, even if they have being efficiently from the thing itself, that is, as from a more remote efficient cause, yet the intellect that makes is a more proximate cause of these; and about this more will be shown in what follows.</p><p>To the first, then, it must be said that the major is true if the science considers the things under their real being; but if it should consider the things insofar as the second notions are founded upon them, it is not true. And as to the logician’s considering true things, namely the categories, I say that this is only insofar as the second notions are founded upon them, like the notions of the most general and the most specific.</p><p>And to what was said, that it is determined about the categories in that way in which the properties of being are assigned to them, I say that, whenever some knowable is considered by some craftsman according to one mode of being, that craftsman can consider many things about the knowable itself according to another of being according to which he does not propose to consider, and this accidentally, provided it only contributes to the knowledge of it according to that mode of being according to which he considers it. Now the knowledge of the categories, insofar as the notions are founded upon them, is dependent on the knowledge of the predicated things in themselves, absolutely, because in general the knowledge of any second notion is dependent on the knowledge of the thing upon which such a notion is founded. And for this reason the Philosopher considers the categories in the book about them as [those] upon which the second notions are founded; and he determines about these categories also insofar as they are certain things in themselves and absolutely, and this accidentally, and in order that he may enter easily upon the knowledge of the second notions. These things having been determined, I say as to the form of that argument, that when he says, “In that way it is determined about the categories,” and so on, it is true if the properties are considered in themselves; but if they are considered accidentally, it is not necessary. And again, when he says that the properties determined about the categories must be assigned to them according to their real being, I say that in the Categories the assigned properties are not considered in themselves, but rather toward a greater knowledge of the categories, as [those] upon which the second notions are founded.</p><p>To the second. Some, because of this argument, are compelled to say that logic is not a habit from the first species of quality, nor a science; this, however, one need not say, because, as the Philosopher holds in the second [book] of the Ethics, habit is generated in the soul from activity, as is clear in the arts by induction. So then also from frequently considering some knowable and turning about it there comes about, in the soul of the one considering, a habit of that knowable; whence from continuous contemplation about the knowable the habit in the soul about that knowable is founded. So I say also about the matter at hand. Whenever someone often reasons syllogistically or contemplates about the syllogism, from the continuous activity itself of contemplating, science is generated in his soul. Then to that argument which says that science is not of greater entity, and so on, I say that this is not necessary, because science does not take on its own reality or entity from its own knowable, but rather from its object and from the immediate cause by which it is built up in the subject, just as the accident takes its entity from its own subject and from the immediate cause by which it is built up. Now the subject of logic is a true thing, namely the soul itself, in which it is as in a subject; and the immediate cause of logic itself, from which it comes about in the soul itself, is a true thing, such as reasoning syllogistically, which is a certain real activity, just as also sensing, because it is an activity of a real species; and for this reason those activities from which science is immediately built up are true things, being in a category. For this reason, since logic is immediately built up by them, it will be a true thing existing in a category; it takes, however, its name and is named by derivation from its own subject, even if not the reality. And for this reason it is called logical, just as its subject is a being of reason.</p><p>To the third. This must be understood [thus]: not that through logic the true is distinguished from the false in each science, but only in this respect, that in logic are determined the second notions, which are common to all sciences by application to all the specific beings about which the specific sciences are. Whence he who has the habit of logic, in applying certain notions to the other specific sciences, readily knows what the true is and what the false in each specific science. Whence the science of logic alone would not suffice to distinguish the true from the false in some specific science unless together with some specific science, such as geometry or arithmetic, because one could not apply the universal to the particular unless one knew each; and what has pure logic does not know the particulars, but from such application of the common notions to the specific sciences truth is obtained; and for this reason according to pure logic the true is not distinguished from the false.</p><p>To the fourth. One must understand that logic considers the mode, that is, the instrument of knowing, and you ought not to understand that it considers speech, because speech is an instrument of teaching, as the Philosopher says in the book On Sensation and the Sensible. Then to the major of the argument I say that it is true if that science were to consider those things according to that which is in them of verbal speech but if it does not consider them so, but according to that which is in them from reason and insofar as they are of reason, directive [of it], as was said before, such a science need not be verbal. But the things considered in logic are not considered according to that which belongs to verbal speech, but rather insofar as they are from the intellect and from reason, and insofar as they are directive of reason.</p><p>St. Gennadius II ends his third lecture on logic and questions on logic. He begins his next lecture on what the subject of logic is.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4120f69f21ff" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[TRV-371 Lesson 2: Porphyry’s Plan and Purpose]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/trv-371-lesson-2-porphyrys-plan-and-purpose-62c1cf453856?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/62c1cf453856</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[porphyry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[classical-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[classical-reasoning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:09:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T23:57:44.707Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The second lesson of forty-seven in TRV-371 Classical Reasoning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/396/0*6a4UOkUpkeHICuFQ" /><figcaption>An icon of Porphyry of Tyre, the Platonic Philosopher</figcaption></figure><h3>Preface</h3><p><strong><em>Logic is the art which directs the act of reasoning itself, so that a man may reason in an orderly way, easily, and without error, and the study of it is carried on through seven books</em></strong>. This is what we learned in the last lesson. Porphyry’s Introduction is the first of them, and you now begin the reading of it. In this lesson you will read his first chapter, in which he states why the five words he is about to explain must be known, and how he means to explain them. You will learn the four things that cannot be done without those five words; the difference between what is necessary because it cannot be avoided and what is necessary because it is useful; and the three things Porphyry says about the manner in which he will write.</p><h3>Reading Assigned</h3><p>Porphyry, Isagoge (Introduction, Chapter 1 — “Object of the Writer, in the Present Introduction.”) Use this link to access the work for free: <a href="https://plato-scroll.com/plato-scroll.html#/read/porph-isagoge/p5">https://plato-scroll.com/plato-scroll.html#/read/porph-isagoge/p5</a>.</p><ol><li>“Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, both to the doctrine of Aristotle’s Categories, to know what genus, difference, species, property, and accident are, and also to the assignments of definitions, in short, since the investigation of these is useful for those things which belong to division and demonstration,</li><li>I will endeavour by a summary briefly to discuss to you, as in the form of introduction, what on this subject has been delivered by the ancients, abstaining, indeed, from more profound questions, yet directing attention in a fitting manner, to such as are more simple.</li><li>For instance, I shall omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles, and subsist about these, for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation.</li><li>Nevertheless, how the ancients, and especially the Peripatetics, discussed these and the other proposed subjects, in a more logical manner, I will now endeavour to point out to you.”</li></ol><h3>Learning Objectives</h3><ol><li>Explain why Porphyry says knowledge of genus, species, difference, property, and accident is necessary for the study of Aristotle’s Categories.</li><li>Explain how the five Predicables are connected with <strong>definition</strong>, <strong>division</strong>, and <strong>demonstration</strong>.</li><li>Distinguish between something being <strong>necessary </strong>because it <strong>cannot be avoided</strong> and something being <strong>useful </strong>because it contributes to another task.</li><li>Explain why Porphyry calls his work an <strong>introduction </strong>rather than a complete treatment of every philosophical question concerning universals.</li><li>State the deeper questions concerning genus and species that Porphyry deliberately sets aside.</li><li>Explain why Porphyry says those deeper questions would require a more extensive investigation.</li><li>Explain his stated intention to follow what the ancient philosophers taught, especially the Peripatetics.</li><li>Identify the three principal methodological limitations Porphyry places upon his treatment.</li><li>Understand why Porphyry’s first task is preparatory rather than exhaustive.</li><li>Reconstruct the argument of Chapter 1 in your own words.</li></ol><h3>Exposition</h3><h4>I. Porphyry Begins with a Question of Necessity</h4><p>Porphyry names his five words right off the bat: Genus, Species, Difference, Peculiarity, and Accident. But he doesn’t define any of them immediately in this chapter. The goal of this course is to learn each one as one works through the entire course. This requires patience and discipline of the student.</p><p>The five words/terms:</p><ol><li><strong>Genus </strong>— γένος (genos)</li><li><strong>Species </strong>— εἶδος (eidos)</li><li><strong>Difference </strong>— διαφορά (diaphora)</li><li><strong>Property </strong>— ἴδιον (idion)</li><li><strong>Accident </strong>— συμβεβηκός (symbebēkos)</li></ol><p>These words are not arbitrary. These five concepts that Porphyry describes are what the mind uses to distinguish, classify, define, and reason about things. You will see how as you move on throughout this course.</p><h4>II. The Four Things Connected with the Five Predicables</h4><p>He names four things that cannot be done without them — this is why they are worth learning,</p><ol><li><strong>Doctrine of the Categories of Aristotle is understood. </strong>The reason Porphyry writes the introduction is to prepare the reader for the Categories. We already said what the Categories teach in previous lessons.¹</li><li><strong>Formation of Definition. </strong>A definition is saying what a thing is. St. John of Damascus writes, “A <strong>definition</strong> is a concise statement setting forth the <strong>nature of the thing in question</strong>, that is to say, such statement as expresses in brief the nature of the thing in question.” For example, if someone asks you what a man is, and you answer that it is a rational mortal animal, you have given the definition of man. You didn’t reply with what he looks like, his build or size, nor provide lengthy descriptions of what a man may be. You gave a simple and concise definition of what man is.</li><li><strong>Division</strong>. To divide something is to identify the classes contained within it. St. John writes: “That is by <strong>division </strong>which divides the genus into species by means of the intermediate <strong>specific differences.</strong>” (Don’t worry about the terminology right now. You’ll pick it up over time.) For example, every number is either odd or even, and saying so divides number. Every animal is either rational or irrational, and saying so divides animals. In each case, the classes are divided by a pair of opposites, and everything contained in that one class falls into one of those opposites.</li><li><strong>Demonstration</strong>. To demonstrate is to argue from true premises to a conclusion that follows necessarily from them. St. John writes, “That is by <strong>demonstration</strong> which proves the matter at hand by means of something <strong>intermediary.</strong>” You’ll learn much of what demonstration means in Aristotle’s Analytics. Demonstration requires a clear understanding of definition and division, and neither of these is possible without a clear understanding of the five words listed by Porphyry.</li></ol><h4>III. Necessary and Useful Are Not the Same</h4><p>Porphyry says that knowing these five is NECESSARY, and then that the theory of them is USEFUL (in sentence 1). The wording allows us to distinguish the two senses, and these senses are explained by Albert the Great,</p><blockquote>“Since however there is a twofold necessary, <strong>namely unavoidable</strong>, and <strong>useful</strong>, for that doctrine of predicaments [aka Categories] which is among the books of Aristotle (by which it is more-excellent than the other doctrines of predicaments) to know what genus is, what difference, what species, what property, and what accident, according-to that these universals have the account of predicables, it-is-necessary to-treat concerning these.”²</blockquote><p>Albert explains that necessary is said in two ways:</p><ol><li>A thing may be necessary because it is UNAVOIDABLE so that without it you can go no further at all.</li><li>A thing may be necessary because it is USEFUL so that without it you could go on, but only with difficulty.</li></ol><p>What Porphyry means here is in both senses necessary: you cannot begin the Categories at all without these five words; and having them ready beforehand in your mind makes everything else you study go more easily. Albert says applies this to understanding definitions, demonstration, and division, too,</p><blockquote>“It is however necessary and useful for the assigning of <strong>definitions</strong>: which all, according-as they are predicables, are constituted from genus and differences, in which it-is-necessary to-take-care lest something accidental be posited….</blockquote><blockquote>Altogether also necessary for <strong>demonstration</strong>, of which the middle according-to the most-powerful mode of demonstrating is definition saying what and on-account-of-what.</blockquote><blockquote>Necessary it is also and useful for the knowledge of <strong>divisions</strong>: because every division either is of genus into species, or of whole into parts, or of accident into accidents, or of subject into accidents, or of accident into subjects, or of word into significations.”</blockquote><h4>IV. Porphyry’s Methodology — What He does and avoids</h4><p>Porphyry says how he will write. He tells us three things:</p><ol><li>He’ll be brief, providing a summary on this matter, “as in the form of [an] introduction.”</li><li>He’ll set out what “has been delivered by the ancients.” The ancients, Porphyry means here, are the philosophers who came before him, and in the fourth sentence he names explicitly who: the Peripatetics. Peripatetic is the name given to Aristotle and to the men who taught in his school after him. The name comes from a Greek word meaning to walk about, because those men taught while walking in the peripatoi (covered walkways) of the Lyceum at Athens. So as St. John takes and transmits the teachings of those in the past to us, Porphyry intends to do the same thing with this work.</li><li>He’ll abstain “from more profound questions,” keeping to the simpler ones. He lists them in the third paragraph:</li></ol><ul><li>whether genera and species exist in reality or are only concepts of the mind;</li><li>whether genera and species exist in things that are corporeal or incorporeal (aka bodily, or not bodily);</li><li>whether genera and species exist separate from sensible things (i.e., things we see and touch) or exist in sensible things.</li></ul><p>All of these questions concern the ontological³ status of universals (aka classes).⁴</p><p>Porphyry says that a discussion of this kind — the philosophical kind — is too deep for this kind of book, and requires a greater investigation of its own.</p><h4>V. Porphyry’s Source</h4><p>Porphyry concludes by explaining what his investigation will be: a discussion of how the Peripatetics treated the Predicables and other subjects in a logical manner. This is his focus in writing this work. Again, he presents himself as transmitting and organizing an existing philosophical tradition that came before him, rather than giving his own ideas. And these ideas will help us understand the rest of Aristotle’s writings. Obviously, those from the Aristotelian tradition will help us learn what Aristotle says.</p><h4>VI. Conclusion</h4><p>A student cannot study Aristotle’s Categories, cannot frame a definition, cannot divide, and cannot demonstrate unless he learns the five Predicables. The five words are necessary in both ways — unavoidable and useful — to these four things or ends. Porphyry promises to be brief, to hand down the teaching of the ancients rather than giving his opinions, and to leave deep philosophical (particularly metaphysical) questions alone. Instead, he will stick with logical investigations. But with all of this said, the five words haven’t been defined yet by Porphyry, at least in this chapter. As we read further, the definitions will be determined.</p><p>In the next lesson, you will begin to read Porphyry’s Introduction, Chapter 2, and learn what Genus is — the class that prepares us for logical discussions.</p><h3>Memory Work</h3><ol><li>Porphyry names five words: Genus, Difference, Species, Property/Peculiarity, and Accident.</li><li>These five concepts that Porphyry describes are what the mind uses to distinguish, classify, define, and reason about things.</li><li>Porphyry does not say in this chapter what the five words mean; the whole course is spent on them.</li><li>Porphyry names four things that cannot be done without the five words: the doctrine of the Categories of Aristotle, the forming of definitions, divisions, and demonstration.</li><li>The Categories is a book by Aristotle and is the next course after this one.</li><li>A definition is the saying of what a thing is.</li><li>To divide something is to identify the classes contained within it, separated by a pair of opposites: every number is either odd or even, and every animal is either rational or irrational.</li><li>To demonstrate is to argue from true premises to a conclusion that follows necessarily from them.</li><li>Demonstration requires a clear understanding of definition and division, and neither of those is possible without a clear understanding of the five words.</li><li>A thing may be necessary because it is unavoidable, or because it is useful; these are not the same.</li><li>Porphyry says he will be brief, will hand on what the ancients delivered, and will abstain from the more profound investigations.</li><li>The investigations Porphyry sets aside are these: whether genera and species exist in reality or are only concepts of the mind; whether genera and species exist in things that are corporeal or incorporeal; whether genera and species exist separate from sensible things or exist in sensible things.</li><li>Porphyry will not ask what a genus is in the nature of things. He will show how the word genus is used when a man reasons.</li><li>The Peripatetics are Aristotle and those who taught in his school after him.</li></ol><h3>Footnotes</h3><ol><li>“Predication. We study Aristotle’s Categories here. The Categories are ordered to the first operation or act of the mind: the understanding of simple things, by which the mind conceives what a thing is. There, we will study Aristotle’s Ten Categories, which are the only things you can say about a subject.” <a href="https://medium.com/@orthophil/lesson-0-philosophy-dialectic-and-the-pursuit-of-wisdom-7af9df62d080?sharedUserId=orthophil">https://medium.com/@orthophil/lesson-0-philosophy-dialectic-and-the-pursuit-of-wisdom-7af9df62d080?sharedUserId=orthophil</a>.</li><li>St. Albert the Great, Of Universals — Chapter 1. <a href="https://classicalliberalarts.com/instruction/st-albert-the-great-of-universals-chapter-1/">https://classicalliberalarts.com/instruction/st-albert-the-great-of-universals-chapter-1/</a>.</li><li>Ontology is the study of being, from the Greek <em>ontos</em>, “being,” and <em>logos</em>, “science”; [it is] related to the field of metaphysics. (Definition from Fieser &amp; Stumpf, <em>Philosophy: A Historical Survey with Essential Readings</em>. Ninth Edition).</li><li>The ontological status of universals is a philosophical discussion that led to various disputes in the medieval era. This resulted in three main traditions of understanding universals: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism. These accounts are very influential to various religious and philosophical traditions in the West. But we won’t get into any of these disputes in this course. We will talk about universals only as classes (i.e., genera and species) we discuss in a logical manner, as Porphyry says.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=62c1cf453856" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Translation of the Complete Works of St. Gennadius Scholarius, Book VII, Pt.3]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/translation-of-the-complete-works-of-st-gennadius-scholarius-book-vii-pt-3-1e44640946a1?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e44640946a1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aristotle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[porphyry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[orthodox-christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[st-gennadius-scholarius]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T17:31:01.795Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The last of the Byzantines and the first of the Byzantine Thomists (attempt) translated into English for the first time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*Xi_Ilih9HHu7Vpga.jpeg" /></figure><p>Of Georgios Scholarios, Prolegomena to the Logic and to Porphyry’s Isagoge, gathered from various books, with his own remarks. Second reading. To how is logic divided.</p><p><strong>His lecture begins:</strong></p><p>The division of logic</p><p>Leaving aside, then, all the others, let us now consider only logic; and for this reason it is necessary to divide it according to the distinction of its principal subject. Now the subject in logic is the scientific mode, insofar as it is an instrument by which someone knows what he knows, as are the definition, or the division, or the demonstration. And I say “insofar as it is an instrument,” because the scientific mode, in another way, is a habit procured from these instruments, of which kind logic is; in which sense the Philosopher says in the second [book] of the Metaphysics that it is not possible to seek at the same time the science and the mode of knowing. And since every mode of knowing is ordered toward the syllogism, for this reason it is said that the syllogism is the subject in logic, as the principal mode of knowing, toward which all the other scientific modes are ordered. Therefore, according to the division of the scientific mode, which is the subject in the whole of logic, of which kind the syllogism is, the whole of logic is divided.</p><p>Now the syllogism can be considered in two ways: either in itself and absolutely, and so the science about it belongs to the book of the Prior Analytics; or insofar as it has being in its own parts, namely of the subject and of the whole; and this is twofold, because the parts of the syllogism, which are understood according to the subject of the syllogism, are in the drawing-together toward the specific and determinate matter. And this specific matter is double, either necessary or reputable; and for this reason there are two parts of the subject. For if the syllogism is drawn together toward the necessary matter, this is the syllogism with which Aristotle deals as with a subject (we taking “subject” in place of “object”) in the book of the Posterior [Analytics]; but if it is drawn together toward the reputable matter, this is the dialectical syllogism, about which it is determined in the book of the Topics. But about the sophistical syllogism it is determined in the book of the Refutations, not insofar as it is a syllogism or part of a syllogism, but because it has some likeness or appearance of the syllogism, in the manner in which we can make determinations about the dead man, not because he is a man, but because it has the appearance and likeness of a living man. But if the syllogism is considered as it has being in the whole [integral] parts, this is twofold: for it has being either in the proximate parts or in the remote ones. If in the remote parts, thus is the book of the Categories; if in the proximate ones, it is the book of On Interpretation, in which it is determined about assertion and proposition and the others, which are proximate parts of the syllogism, because from two propositions arranged in a mode and figure the syllogism comes about. And the remaining books are ancillary to the aforesaid books, such as that of Porphyry and [that] of the Six Principles; for these are ordered to the book of the Categories, though in different ways, because in the book of the Categories treatment is given of the non-combined terms, and thus mention is made of the most general and the most specific, of genus and species, and of the others likewise; and for this reason, for a more complete teaching or knowledge of the book of the Categories, Porphyry made the book about the five predicables; and the book of the Six Principles is ordered toward the book of the Categories, through the Philosopher’s having determined in the Categories narrowly and briefly about the last categories; and for this reason Gilbert Porretanus [aka Gilbert de la Porrée], as Albert [the Great] says, composed the book of the Six Principles, in which he treats of those six categories for a fuller teaching of the book of the Categories; in which book the form coming in from outside is the subject.</p><p>And since Aristotle in the Topics determines about the topic (place), that is, about the dialectical syllogism, as regards its use and handling, and not according to the essence (for he does not determine definitionally what the topic is, nor how many there are, but says how, from the distinguished topics, the argument could be preserved and demonstrated), for this reason Boethius determines about the topic according to its essence, showing what the topic is, and not handling it toward determining some problem; and this he has done for a more complete teaching of the book of Aristotle’s Topics, and it is a true and excellent distinction, in which it is said that Aristotle determines about the topics as regards use and handling, but Boethius as regards their essence and existence.</p><p>Further, the Philosopher in the second [book] of the Posterior [Analytics] teaches to seek the “what it is,” that is, the definition, which is a middle [term] in the demonstration, by the way of the syllogism and of the division. And since he handed down to us no science concerning division, Boethius composed the book of the Divisions for a more complete knowledge of the second [book] of the Posterior Analytics. And so these four books, namely the book of Porphyry, [that] of the Six Principles, [that] of the Topics of Boethius, and that of the Divisions by the same, concern the well-being of logic, because they provide us with the more complete teaching of the second notions, which are beings of reason (ὄντα τοῦ λόγου), about which logic is; because, as Avicenna says, logic is about the second notions laid upon the first.</p><p><strong>On first and second notions.</strong></p><p>For the clarification of which it is necessary to know that the second notions are certain cognitions, that is, accounts of the thing itself, taken from certain more common modes of its existence, and they presuppose the first cognition of the thing, just as relative cognition presupposes the absolute.</p><p>Now the first cognition of the thing is called a first notion, that is, the first account or mode of conceiving the thing, taken from the proper mode of its existence; for example, as I can conceive man first insofar as he is reasoning or thinking, and this cognition is called a first notion, that is, the first account of conceiving man, taken from the proper mode of man’s existence, which is reasoning; and the thing thus known is called a first notion in the concrete. Further, when we have thus first known man insofar as he is rational or thinking, we can thereafter conceive him insofar as he can be found in several things differing in number, being able to be predicated of them; and man thus known is called a second notion by abstraction, such as are specificity (εἰδότης) [particularity] or universality, which are accounts of conceiving the thing absolutely, as it is in several [things] differing in number, or in species; and likewise in the case of the others. And thus such notions are taken from the more common modes of the thing’s existence, as from the mode of being in several [things] differing in number with respect to the species, or differing in species with respect to the genus; and likewise concerning the others. And the thing thus conceived is a second notion concretely; and so it is clear that these modes of existence are cognitions, that is, notions differing from one another, as has been said.</p><p>These things having been considered, let us look at logic according to the division of the second notions in the concrete, about which logic is. Now the second notions ought to be divided according to the activities of the intellect, since they are beings dependent on the intellect. Now the intellect has a threefold activity, that is, cognition: the first is the apprehension of simples; the second is the composition or division of the simples apprehended; the third is the inference, or the passage from one thing to another, as from cause to effect, or from antecedent to consequent. The second notions, then, about which logic is, are attributed to the thing thought, according to the activities of the intellect. Either, then, they are attributed to the thing simply grasped and known through the first activity of the intellect, as to an object; or to the thing known by the intellect through the second activity, which is to compose and divide the things simply grasped; or to the thing known according to the third activity of the intellect, which is to pass through; and so on.</p><p>If, then, the second notions were attributed to the thing known through the first activity of the intellect, there is the book of the Categories, which is about simple terms simply grasped; for it is about the predicative non-complex. About the same things are also the book of Porphyry and the book of the Six Principles, which serve the book of the Categories, though differently, as was said before.</p><p>But if the second notions were attributed to the thing known through the second activity of the intellect, these are treated in the book On Interpretation, in which it is determined about assertion and proposition and opposition and the others likewise, which are second notions attributed to things insofar as they have been wrought through the second activity of the intellect; for the proposition is an activity of the intellect, or a notion attributed to some object interwoven out of subject and predicate; and likewise in the case of the others.</p><p>And if the second notions are attributed to a thing known through the third activity of the intellect, which is the passage of the intellect from one interwoven [thing] to another, then it is determined about these in the remaining parts of logic, in which treatment is given of the syllogism, which is a second notion attributed to things according to the third activity of the intellect; for in the syllogism there comes about a passage from one composite to another, as from the propositions to the conclusion; and about this composite treatment is given in the remaining parts of logic, as was said, but differently, because about the syllogism in itself it is determined in the book of the Prior [Analytics]; but about the syllogism insofar as it is drawn together toward reputable matter, it is determined in the book of the Topics; about the sophistical, in that of the Refutations; and about the demonstrative syllogism, that is, the one drawn together toward necessary matter, it is determined in the book of the Posterior [Analytics]; and the Divisions of Boethius exist on account of the second [book] of the Posterior [Analytics], and the Topics of the same [Boethius] on account of the book of Aristotle’s Topics.</p><p>But lest anyone suppose that the syllogism, which is the subject in the book of the Prior [Analytics], is the subject in the whole of logic, it is necessary to know that the syllogism can be considered in two ways: either as regards every mode of its own existence which it has in itself, both absolutely and in its parts, both those of the subject and the integral ones, the proximate and the remote, and all the others that have an assignment or reference to the syllogism, and so the syllogism is the subject in the whole of logic; or it can be considered as regards one mode of existence only, namely as regards this mode of being which is by itself and absolutely only, namely as regards the matter and the form owed to it according to mode and figure, and not as in this part or in that, and so the syllogism is a part of the syllogism considered in the first way, and it is the subject thus in the book of the Prior [Analytics]; and so the subject differs in the whole of logic and in the book of the Prior [Analytics].</p><p>Likewise the book of the Phonai (Voices)¹ [aka Porphyry’s Introduction] and the [book] on the Categories and the Six Principles are not superfluous, as it might seem, on account of the fact that in the book of the Prior [Analytics] it is determined about the non-combined terms insofar as they are parts of the syllogism; because to the book of the Prior [Analytics] belongs the study of the parts of the syllogism insofar as they are parts entering into the syllogism, but to the other books [it belongs] in another way, namely to the book of Porphyry as regards the mode of being said of several [things] that differ in species or in number, and to the Categories as regards the account of being subject and being predicated and being said of others; likewise also for the book of the Six Principles.</p><p><strong>Another division of the books of logic.</strong></p><p>It must be known that, according to Thomas of Aquino, since man in his own activities is directed by the rule of reason, and this is peculiar to man as against the remaining animals, which are led to their activities by some stimulus and natural impulse, whereas reason can direct not only the activities of the lower parts of the soul but is also directive of its own activities, there had to be found, in addition to the other arts discovered by reason, through which man acts in an orderly way in all matters, some art directive of the very activity of reason; and this is the science of logic, which not only because of [its being] according to being according to reason is logical, which is common to all the arts, but also because it is concerned with the very activity of reason as with its own matter; and for this reason it seems to be the art of arts, because it directs us in the activity of reason, from which all the arts proceed. Hence the parts of logic are taken according to the difference of the activities of reason, which are three: two of reason in itself, that is, insofar as it is intellect, namely the thinking of indivisibles or non-combined things, to which the book of the Categories is ordered, and the composition or division, to which [the book] On Interpretation [is ordered]; and the third is according to the proper [feature] of reason, that is, according to passing over, to which the remaining books of logic are ordered. And since the activities of reason are somewhat like the activities of nature, and in the activities of nature a threefold difference is found (for in some things nature acts from necessity and without failure, in others it acts for the most part, though it might sometimes fall short of its proper activity and fail, so that hence there is a double activity, one that comes about as in the majority, as when a perfect animal is born from seed, the other by some failure, as from seed there comes about some monstrosity through the corruption of some principle), reasonably such a difference is found also in the activities of reason. For there is a certain progression of reason which brings necessity and is without failure, which produces science; there is another, in which, as in several cases, the true is concluded, yet without necessity; a third, in which reason falls short of the true through the lack of some principle that ought to be guarded in the passage of reasoning. Now the part of logic that serves the first progression is called critical and analytic, as proceeding by analysis and producing sure judgment; and this is divided into the Prior Analytics, as regards the form only of the syllogism, and into the Posterior, as regards the matter together with the form; for there the discourse is about necessary propositions. But to the second progression of reason there is subordinate what is called the inventive [part]; and this is divided into three: into dialectic, to which the Topics have been assigned, and rhetoric and poetics; for just as in nature, among things acting for the most part, a certain gradation is found, because the stronger the power of nature is, the more rarely it fails, so too in this second progression of reason a certain gradation is found, according as it tends more and less toward certainty. Therefore, when belief or supposition of the propositions comes about, though not science, reason inclining wholly toward one part though with some hesitation toward the other, there is the dialectical syllogism; but when there comes about not belief or opinion but some suspicion of reason, [reason] not inclining wholly toward either side of the contradiction, though it may incline more toward this one than that, there is rhetoric; and when supposition comes about of the one part only of the contradiction through some manifestation, there is poetics, leading toward something serious through some familiar likeness. And all these belong to logical philosophy; for leading from one thing to another belongs to reason. And to the third progression of reason sophistic is subordinate, which is the part of logic concerning refutations.</p><p>St. Gennadius II ends his second lecture on logic and the divisions of logic. He begins his next lecture on various questions that come about when discussing logic.</p><p><strong>Notes</strong></p><ol><li>The Phonai or Voices refers to Porphyry’s Predicables which are taught in his Introduction. The fives phonai or voices are genus, species, difference, property/peculiarity, and accident.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e44640946a1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lesson 0: Philosophy, Dialectic, and the Pursuit of Wisdom]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/lesson-0-philosophy-dialectic-and-the-pursuit-of-wisdom-7af9df62d080?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7af9df62d080</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:45:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T16:26:03.136Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>TRV-371 Lesson 0: Philosophy, Dialectic, and the Pursuit of Wisdom</h3><p>The systematic isagoge of the Isagoge. Our light for the entire course laid out ahead.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MybOSnrem48IY5PH.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Preface</h3><p>Before beginning the study of logic, we must first understand why logic is worth studying. Logic does not exist in itself as a discipline, nor is it the highest intellectual discipline. Logic belongs to a larger pursuit: philosophy. Philosophy has a purpose, and that purpose determines why we need to learn how to reason well.</p><figure><img alt="Icon of St. John of Damascus" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*X03OdoEClFvlo66i" /><figcaption>An icon of St. John of Damascus</figcaption></figure><p>This lesson therefore comes before our formal introduction to logic.</p><h3>Objective</h3><p>You will learn what philosophy is, what philosophy is concerned with, what St. John means by wisdom, how philosophy is ordered into its various branches, and why the study of dialectic or logic belongs to the philosophical pursuit. At the end of the lesson, we will see why Porphyry’s Isagoge is an appropriate place to begin the technical study of reasoning.</p><h3>Primary Reading</h3><p>St. John of Damascus, Philosophical Chapters (Dialectica). For this lesson, you are primarily concerned with St. John’s account of:</p><ul><li>knowledge</li><li>the purpose of the Fount of Knowledge</li><li>philosophy</li><li>wisdom</li><li>the divisions of philosophy</li><li>and the place of reason and dialectic in philosophical study</li></ul><p>The principal English edition of St. John’s works we will use for this course is: St. John of Damascus, Writings, trans. Frederic H. Chase, Jr., Fathers of the Church 37 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1958).</p><p>The Philosophical Chapters are the first part of St. John’s Fount of Knowledge. This volume of the Fathers of the Church contains the Philosophical Chapters, On Heresies, and, famously, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. (This volume can be found online on Internet Archive.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/534/0*afuA3JMlo2wL57TX" /><figcaption>Digital image of St. John of Damascus’s work On the Orthodox Faith</figcaption></figure><p>St. John of Damascus will be the primary reference used to understand the various works involved in the study of Classical Reasoning: Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s logical works — Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations.</p><p>Other commentators — saints and the Latins alike — will be used sporadically, referenced only for us to gain any benefit, not to be our main guide. St. John Damascene will guide us into the study of Porphyry as giving us the Orthodox philosophical paradigm and transmitter of this logical tradition. The rest of the course and its primary readings will be about Porphyry and Aristotle’s works.</p><h3>Exposition</h3><h4>I. Why Begin With Philosophy?</h4><p>Our first question of a cause in logic ought to be a fundamental one, for in answering it we order our attention to the thing proper to our pursuits, “Why do we reason?” The answer we can easily throw out is that reasoning is useful for itself. Because if reasoning is learned for reasoning’s sake, then it would be the greatest and final object of the intellectual life. Rather, reasoning is useful for seeking something else. And within the classical education tradition, we seek truth and wisdom.</p><p>Under this order, logic has a better role to play. We do not study arguments merely so that we can construct arguments. In another way, reasoning is not an end in itself but an end to something else. We study reasoning because the human intellect seeks to know.¹</p><p>St. John begins his Fount of Knowledge by emphasizing knowledge itself. He reveals the purpose of his work is to make “a beginning of philosophy and to set down concisely in the present writing, so far as is possible, every sort of knowledge.”² He therefore calls the work a Fount of knowledge.</p><p>With this, we reach the first principle of our course: Logic is ordered toward knowledge, not the final object. And knowledge itself is ordered toward wisdom.³</p><h4>II. Knowledge of the Rational Soul</h4><p>St. John begins with the importance of knowledge.⁴ He opens his work with a few propositions:</p><blockquote>“Nothing is more estimable [or esteemed] than knowledge, for knowledge is the light of the rational soul.”⁵</blockquote><p>He then gives us the contrary:</p><blockquote>“The opposite, which is ignorance, is darkness.”</blockquote><p>How he relates these two contraries is by including an analogy that combines them⁶:</p><blockquote>“Just as the absence of light is darkness, so is the absence of knowledge a darkness of the reason.”</blockquote><p>St. John is not presenting knowledge as an arbitrary accumulation of information. He tells us that knowledge belongs properly to rational beings. Rational creatures possess the capacity or power to know things. And with this capacity, they are able to apprehend reality. The mind can distinguish:</p><ul><li>truth from falsehood,</li><li>sound reasoning from unsound reasoning,</li><li>knowledge from opinion,</li><li>definition from descriptions or mere association,</li><li>and demonstration from sophistry.</li></ul><p>Logic functions under the presupposition that the intellect is capable of knowing.</p><p>But another presupposition that the study of logic is governed by is that reality is intelligible, meaning capable of being understood. The human intellect is capable, in a finite and imperfect way, of knowing reality. But this doesn’t mean human beings can know everything. There exist, within human understanding, limits of what can be known, and these limits don’t destroy knowledge. They shift our attention to what kind of knowledge is possible, what its object is, and what its limits are.</p><p>The nature and limits of knowledge will remain important throughout this course.</p><h4><strong>III. The Purpose of the Fount of Knowledge</strong></h4><p>St. John explains the purpose of his work.</p><p>He says that his purpose is to make a beginning of philosophy and to set down, as far as possible, every kind of knowledge. He also reveals his methodology:</p><blockquote>“I shall say nothing of my own, but I shall set down things which have been said in various places by wise and godly men.”</blockquote><p>The material he will cover originates from both Aristotle and Porphyry, and the structure of his work is substantially based upon Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories.⁷ He will quote from the Holy Fathers when it is necessary, like when he gives the meaning of terms, but will not cite them explicitly.⁸ This will not be our concern since our study will be on Porphyry’s Isagoge, and what St. John receives he’ll transmit to us.</p><h4>IV. What is Philosophy?</h4><p>Several definitions of philosophy are given. Each one approaches philosophy from a different angle.</p><blockquote>The first definition given: “Philosophy is knowledge of things which are in so far as they are, that is, a knowledge of the nature of things which have being.”</blockquote><p>Philosophy is concerned with what things are. “What things are” will be the term used to speak about things that have being. It asks questions such as:</p><ul><li>What is being?</li><li>What is substance?</li><li>What is nature?</li><li>What is man?</li><li>What is change?</li><li>What is motion?</li><li>What is knowledge?</li><li>What is goodness?</li><li>What is truth?</li><li>What is God?</li></ul><p>These questions ask about each thing’s nature and being. This is why the logical study of definitions will become important.</p><ul><li>Whenever philosophy asks what a thing is, we need to know what a definition is.</li><li>Whenever philosophy distinguishes one thing from another, we need to know what difference is and how it is being used.</li><li>Whenever we classify things according to common and proper characteristics, we need to know the Predicables.</li></ul><p>With just this first definition of philosophy, we see all of Porphyry’s terminology being used.</p><blockquote>The second definition given: “Philosophy is knowledge of both divine and human things, that is to say, of things both visible and invisible.”</blockquote><p>Along with what Philosophy is concerned with — what things are by nature and being — Philosophy considers various classes of objects:</p><p><strong>Visible things or objects</strong></p><ul><li>bodies</li><li>animals</li><li>plants</li><li>physical things</li><li>man</li><li>mathematical objects as found in physical things</li></ul><p><strong>Invisible or immaterial things or objects</strong></p><ul><li>God</li><li>angels</li><li>souls</li></ul><p>These are not all known in exactly the same manner. The investigation one takes of God is not in the same way one investigates a stone. Nor do we know mathematical objects in precisely the same way that we know a physical animal. Aristotle gives this principle in his work on ethics, where he talks about how precise an investigation belongs to the study of Politics:</p><p>“Now our treatment of [Politics] will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and crafts.”⁹</p><p>Aristotle provides three examples to illustrate this point:</p><ul><li>A mathematician is concerned with each definition and demonstration across many mathematical proofs.</li><li>A rhetorician is concerned with persuasive speech or probable reasoning appropriate to the subject at hand.</li><li>A student of ethics and politics is concerned with conclusions proportionate to the variability of human affairs (whether it be to a single individual or a whole city).</li></ul><p>We would agree with Aristotle that it would be “equally reasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.”</p><p>So we can move on with the principle at hand: any inquiry about an object and the precision required must fit that object.</p><blockquote>“For it is the mask of an educated mind to expect that amounts of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits.”</blockquote><p>In conclusion, the object of knowledge affects the manner of investigation. This moves us toward the division of philosophy. But we have more definitions to go through.</p><blockquote>The third definition given: “Philosophy is a study of death, whether this be voluntary and natural.”</blockquote><p>St. John makes two distinctions for both life and death:</p><ul><li>The first is natural life, or living by which we live.</li><li>The second is voluntary life, which we choose to be attached to our present life and the various pleasures.</li><li>The first death, however, is natural: the separation of the soul and body.</li><li>The second is voluntary death, which we choose to reject, to be attached to our present life [lit. to disdain this present life] and orient ourselves toward what life is to come.</li></ul><p>Here, philosophy takes a practical approach — concerning the way we live day to day.</p><p>The principle here to take away: To know truth while refusing to order one’s life according to truth would be a contribution to the practical life of the philosopher. This becomes clearer in our definition.</p><p>The fourth definition given: “Philosophy is the making of one’s self like God.”</p><p>St. John clarifies:</p><blockquote>“Now, we become like God in wisdom, which is to say, in the true knowledge of good; and in justice, which is a fairness in judgment without respect to persons; and in holiness, which is to say, in goodness, which is superior to justice, being that by which we do good to them that wrong us.”</blockquote><p>We have several attributes of God listed:</p><ol><li>Wisdom is described as true knowledge of the good.</li><li>Justice concerns fairness in judgment (and not showing partiality).</li><li>Holiness is identified with goodness, including doing good to those who wrong us.</li></ol><p>Holiness is said to be superior to justice because it concerns giving mercy and grace to those who don’t deserve it, rather than strictly giving punishment to those who deserve it.</p><p>Therefore, philosophy can be understood as neither encyclopedic learning, nor the acquisition of correctly chosen abstract propositions, nor a concern of being able to argue cleverly. Therefore, and the rest.</p><p>The philosophical life involves the transformation of the person according to truth and goodness. And in the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Holy Fathers call this transformation of a man traditionally as “Theosis”, or deification.¹⁰</p><p>So the principle we take away: the philosopher seeks not merely to know about the good but to become good.</p><blockquote>The fifth definition given: “Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of science.”</blockquote><p>St. John explains: “This is because philosophy is the principle of every art, since through it every art and science has been invented.” Unfortunately, he doesn’t define what art is or what science is. But where St. John lacks, we gain from other commentators, the Scholastic Thomas Aquinas.¹¹ We will benefit from Aquinas by taking his definition from his commentary on Aristotle’s logical works.</p><p>ON ART</p><p>Aquinas opens his own commentary¹² on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics with a saying of Aristotle: “the human race lives by art and reasonings.”¹³ He then points out that this identifies the very thing by which a man differs from the other animals, “For the other animals are prompted to their acts by a natural impulse, but man is directed in his actions by a judgment by reason.”</p><p>Yet man may judge badly, but he must judge as it is according to his nature. Art serves to help man. Arts exist for that reason, so that what a man does may be done readily and in good order.</p><p>With all of this setup, Aquinas defines what art is,</p><blockquote>“An art is a fixed and orderly procedure worked out by reason, by which what a man does reaches its proper end through the means that suit it.”</blockquote><p>This will be the definition we will use throughout this course.</p><p>We now know what art is. What about science? We just read further down Aquinas’s commentary.</p><p>ON SCIENCE</p><p>What does it mean to know scientifically? Aquinas says that to know scientifically is to know something perfectly, and perfect knowledge requires knowing the cause of the thing known.</p><p>Aquinas references Aristotle’s Metaphysics,</p><blockquote>“For the principles of a thing’s being are the same as those of its truth.”</blockquote><p>Aquinas defines science as (perfect) knowledge through causes. To have scientific knowledge is to have certain knowledge; that is, it cannot be otherwise known. Because it cannot be otherwise known, the object of science must be necessarily the cause.</p><p>The complete definition we will follow in this course goes as follows: Science is certain knowledge of what is necessary, acquired through demonstration from its causes.</p><p>St. John’s reasoning for his fifth definition of philosophy was that it was a principle of every art, since through it every art and science has been invented. Let’s learn his reasoning.</p><p>We understand a principle as follows:</p><blockquote>“A principle is that from which something begins, proceeds, or by which something is established or known.”</blockquote><p>St. John usually uses the Greek word ἀρχή (archē) to refer to that from which something derives its being, becoming, knowledge, or demonstration.¹⁵</p><p>So whenever you see the word “principle” in this course, we will use this definition.</p><p>Philosophy is the beginning art of every art because it concerns the rational ordering of human activity and the principles by which the various are understood and properly exercised.</p><p>Let’s consider the definition of art:</p><p>An art has</p><ol><li>A proper end,</li><li>An established procedure,</li><li>Rationally ordered operations,</li><li>and suitable means by which its end is accomplished.</li></ol><p>Now let’s consider the Liberal Arts¹⁶:</p><ol><li>Grammar orders speech.</li><li>Rhetoric orders persuasive discourse.</li><li>Logic orders reasoning.</li><li>Arithmetic orders numerical relations.</li><li>Geometry orders the understanding of magnitude.</li><li>Music orders sounds and proportions.</li><li>Astronomy orders the understanding of celestial or astronomical phenomena.</li></ol><p>Each art has its own particular subject matter (or object), operations, and end.¹⁷ Since philosophy investigates the principles of reasoning, knowledge, nature, being, and human conduct, it provides the foundation by which every particular art can be understood, examined, and properly directed.</p><p>Philosophy is the beginning science of every science because it investigates the nature of knowledge, demonstration, causes, principles, and the conditions under which something can be known scientifically.</p><p>Let’s consider each particular science:</p><ol><li>A proper subject,</li><li>Principles from which it proceeds,</li><li>Demonstrations by which it establishes conclusions</li><li>and causes through which it understands its subject.</li></ol><p>Now let’s look at some Quadrivium examples:</p><ol><li>Geometry investigates magnitude and establishes conclusions through mathematical principles from principal axioms.</li><li>Physics investigates natural things and their causes.</li><li>Arithmetic investigates number and its properties.</li></ol><p>Each science employs demonstration in order to get from what is known to what is unknown. But philosophy investigates demonstration itself and examines what makes scientific knowledge possible. Therefore, we see:</p><ol><li>Geometry demonstrates geometrical conclusions.</li><li>Physics demonstrates conclusions concerning physical, natural things.</li><li>Arithmetic demonstrates arithmetical conclusions.</li></ol><p>But philosophy investigates the nature and principles of demonstration and scientific knowledge.</p><p>Therefore, philosophy is the principle through which every art and science has been invented. Therefore, and the rest.</p><blockquote>The sixth definition given: “Philosophy is a love of wisdom.”¹⁸</blockquote><p>Out of all of St. John’s definitions, this is the simplest and most eye-opening definition. St. John argues</p><p>P1. Philosophy is [the] love of wisdom.<br>P2. But the wisdom of God.<br>P3. Therefore, the love of God; this is the true philosophy.</p><p>This definition is the last and greatest kind toward which this course is oriented.</p><p>We are not studying logic merely to become clear.¹⁹ We are not studying Aristotle merely because Aristotle is historically important.²⁰ We are not studying Porphyry merely because medieval schools study and use his Isagoge.²¹ We study the rational discipline because it serves the pursuit of truth and wisdom, whose ultimate end is God Himself.</p><h4>V. The Order of Philosophy</h4><p>We now move to St. John’s division of philosophy. Philosophy is divided into Speculative Philosophy and Practical Philosophy. He further divides each into three:</p><p><strong>Speculative Philosophy</strong></p><ul><li>Theology</li><li>Natural Science</li><li>Mathematics</li></ul><p><strong>Practical Philosophy</strong></p><ul><li>Ethics</li><li>Domestic Economy</li><li>Politics</li></ul><p>Any speculative discipline concerns knowledge and contemplation. Any practical discipline concerns action and the ordering of life. Logic does not appear in any branch or alongside any branch because St. John is going to treat logical study differently.</p><h4>VI. What Does Philosophy Investigate?</h4><p>St. John explains each discipline according to its object.</p><ol><li>Theology considers incorporeal and immaterial things, especially God. God, angels, and souls are examples St. John gives.</li><li>Natural science considers material things. Animals, plants, and stones are examples St. John gives.</li><li>Mathematics considers things that are themselves incorporeal but can be found in corporeal things. Number is an example St. John gives. The number ten is not itself a physical object, yet we can speak of ten measures of grain or ten measures of wine.</li><li>Ethics lays down laws and shows how an individual man behaves.</li><li>Domestic economy lays down laws and shows how an entire household behaves.</li><li>Politics lays down laws and shows how cities and countries behave.</li></ol><p>A principle that can be given: Different sciences have different objects. And logic has a peculiar object of concern.</p><h4>VII. Where, Then, Does Logic Exist?</h4><p>If St. John divides philosophy into speculative and practical branches, where is logic located? As we said before, logic does not appear in any branch or alongside any branch. Why doesn’t he locate where the study of logic is? We see that the answer he gives is subtle. Immediately after establishing the existence of philosophy, St. John says that he is beginning with the part of philosophy concerned with reason, which is a tool of philosophy rather than one of its divisions, because it is used for demonstration.</p><p>Philosophy is the pursuit. And logic is a tool used in that pursuit. Just because it doesn’t appear as a branch of philosophy, it doesn’t mean logic isn’t important. A tool can be indispensable without itself being the final purpose of an activity. A carpenter, as an analogy, does not build a house for the sake of possessing a hammer. But appropriate tools are needed for the work of building, and it becomes difficult to build anything without them.</p><p>But philosophical inquiry requires the ability to:</p><ul><li>form concepts,</li><li>define terms,</li><li>distinguish things,</li><li>divide genera into species,</li><li>construct propositions,</li><li>reason from premises,</li><li>and demonstrate conclusions.</li></ul><p>All of these are logical operations. And all of these operations can be put into three classes of operations²²:</p><ol><li>The operation of understanding simple things.</li><li>The operation of composing and dividing.</li><li>The operation of proceeding from one thing to another.</li></ol><p>We won’t get into these now, but we will explain these operations later.</p><h4>VIII. Why Does Philosophy Need Logic?</h4><p>Suppose someone gave the following argument:</p><p>P1. All human beings are mortal.<br>P2. Socrates is a human being.<br>P3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.</p><p>We need to distinguish two things:</p><ul><li>What is said (individual statements)</li><li>How it is reasoned (the argument itself)</li></ul><p>We also need to ask: “How does an argument establish its conclusion?” If we can’t answer how, how can we know if what is being said is right or wrong? How can we discern or judge if a reasoning is defective? This is why, in the study of logic, definitions, divisions, predication, propositions, syllogisms, demonstrations, dialectical arguments, and fallacies become objects of study, especially objects of study in this course.</p><h4>IX. The Study of Logic</h4><p>With everything said before, we can see why the study of Porphyry becomes important. Porphyry begins his work, Isagoge, with the following words: “Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, both to the doctrine of Aristotle’s Categories, to know what genus, difference, species, property, and accident are, and also to the assignments of definitions, in short, since the investigation of these is useful for those things which belong to division and demonstration[.]”²³</p><p>Porphyry tells us we need to study the Predicables, the most fundamental logical terms, so that we can learn the basic objects of logic and logical reasoning.</p><p>Before we can reason about complex propositions, we need to understand the terms that enter into those propositions. Before we can understand terms, we need to understand the concepts they signify. Before we can properly define things, we need to understand genus, species, difference, property, and accident.</p><p>St. John even says, as he ends his discussion of what philosophy is and the division of philosophy and moves to dialectic, “So, for the present, we shall discuss simple terms which through simple concepts signify simple things.”</p><p>A term is a word that signifies a concept. And the concept refers to something intelligible (or able to be understood) to human beings. By these simple things, we reason to everything else. If we don’t start with them and instead jump right into other acts of reasoning, as found in Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation, or even get into argumentation in structure and discerning what fallacies are in Aristotle’s later works,²⁴ we are more likely to be confused and disordered in our thinking than to grow in understanding.</p><p>Aquinas tells us also that confusion comes from the ambiguity of language, that is, a single term having various meanings and even being used in contrary senses. People who use a single term but constantly change the term’s meanings in various sentences and arguments in hopes of winning a debate and not for getting to the truth of things commit what is known by the Ancients²⁵ as Sophistry.</p><p>Sophistry is known by them as the use of reasoning to make weak arguments appear strong. A sophist is one who imitates the wise person, who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom.</p><p>This harmful act can be used in any field — both art and science — for the purpose of getting people to believe in something other than truth. We see this occur in Theology, too, particularly among those using Scripture to persuade others. This is why St. John, after finishing his writing on the beginning of philosophy, writes an immediate work titled “On Heresies,” where he lists all of those who misuse Scripture and equivocate simple terms to garner a following.</p><p>St. John writes in his preface the following words:</p><blockquote>“In imitation of the method of the bee, I shall make my composition from those things which are conformable with the truth and from our enemies themselves gather the fruit of salvation. But all that is worthless and falsely labeled as knowledge I shall reject. Then, next, after this, I shall set forth in order the absurdities of the heresies hated of God, so that by recognizing the lie we may more closely follow the truth. Then, with God’s help and by His grace I shall expose the truth-that truth which destroys deceit and puts falsehood to flight and which, as with golden fringes, has been embellished and adorned by the sayings of the divinely inspired prophets, the divinely taught fishermen, and the God-bearing shepherds and teachers-that truth, the glory of which flashes out from within to brighten with its radiance, when they encounter it, them that are duly purified and rid of troublesome speculations.”</blockquote><p>And he does so by using logic as a tool. And the point that should remain with you throughout the entire course: Logic is a servant, not a master. It is not something absolute, and there are limitations to the art. Logic orders the mind’s activity of reasoning, which is known under various names: discursive reasoning, syllogistic reasoning, demonstrative reasoning, and so on.</p><p>Although we speak of reasoning as an activity or operation of the mind, we, as Orthodox Christians, don’t confuse this faculty with the greater and highest faculty in man: the Nous (intellect).²⁶ Whereas the West, following the medieval educational and philosophical method known as Scholasticism²⁷, confuses these faculties as one single faculty, and ends up confusing contemplation and reasoning to God as under the practice, and even goes so far as to argue that the mind (i.e., the operation of the mind that performs mathematical deduction) can not only see God, but God’s very essence.²⁸</p><p>In this course, we will not use logic to see God’s essence. Reason is a gift from God and the instrument of knowledge. After all, God made man rational, but not simply rational; rather, He made him contemplative. Reasoning, as we said before, operates according to the object it investigates and within the limits of our creaturely intellect.</p><p>It is a tool of philosophy, used for demonstration in argumentation.</p><h4>X. Philosophy, Logic, and Theology</h4><p>We spoke a little of philosophy and logic’s relationship to theology. Here, we’ll try to expound upon it a little more — particularly the approach of philosophy to theology.</p><p>As you may remember, theology is one of the speculative philosophies that branches from the first division of philosophy. St. John taught that theology considers incorporeal and immaterial things, especially God. Philosophy can investigate being, causation, nature, truth, and other objects of similar inquiry. But Christian theology (i.e., Orthodoxy) involves the investigation of what is received from divine revelation. These two arts are therefore not the same activity. But they are not contrary. In fact, logic is used to help theology by clarifying:</p><ul><li>what is being asserted (ex., Jesus is God and man),</li><li>what terms mean (ex., Hypostasis),</li><li>what distinctions are being made (ex., Nature vs. Person)</li><li>what follows from a premise (ex., argument for the deity of Christ²⁹),</li><li>whether a conclusion actually follows from its premises,</li><li>and discerning where contradiction appears.</li></ul><p>This is why the Philosophical Chapters precede both On Heresies and An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. Granted, as we said, logic’s limit of use is that, in one way, it can’t independently reveal the mysteries of God and the faith. And an argument can be made that it cannot be the means to know revealed mysteries at all. After all, one does not partake of God or participate in Him by having the mind collect enough correct propositions, or building within himself an encyclopedic knowledge of the Unknowable³⁰.</p><p>The principle we can take away: Logic disciplines our reasoning about revealed truth without becoming the source or measure of revelation itself.</p><p>Keep this in mind whenever you come across any theological terms and argumentation.</p><h4>XI. The Order of Logical Study</h4><p>We will now learn how the traditional logical curriculum proceeds.</p><ol><li>Terms and Concepts. We study here Porphyry’s Isagoge. There we will study Porphyry’s five words because without them, no definition can be framed.</li><li>Predication. We study Aristotle’s Categories here. The Categories are ordered to the first operation or act of the mind: the understanding of simple things, by which the mind conceives what a thing is. There, we will study Aristotle’s Ten Categories, which are the only things you can say about a subject.</li><li>Propositions. We study Aristotle’s On Interpretation here. On Interpretation is ordered to the second operation or act of the mind: the composing and dividing, by which the mind puts one thing together with another and either affirms it or denies it. There, we will study claims and judge whether something is true or false.</li><li>Syllogistic Reasoning. We study Aristotle’s works on the third operation or act of the mind (and everything else will be in accordance with this operation): proceeding from one thing to another, so that through what is known a man arrives at what he did not know. We study here Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. There we will study the art of syllogism and syllogism-making.</li><li>Demonstration. We study Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics here. There we will study the forms of arguments.</li><li>Dialectic Reasoning. We study Aristotle’s Topics here. There we will study a different kind of reasoning, a reasoning based on response from the other side and used for later arguments.</li><li>Fallacious reasoning. We study Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations. There we will study reasoning that falls away from the truth.</li></ol><p>The entire course can be summarized in answer to one question: How does the (rational) intellect proceed from what it knows toward what it does not yet know without falling into error? But the answer is not quick and easy: you have to know the contents of these books.</p><h4>XII. Conclusion</h4><p>You have now learned why the study of logic begins with philosophy. St. John of Damascus begins his Philosophical Chapters not with syllogisms, but with knowledge and philosophy — explaining what they are. He describes philosophy as knowledge of things insofar as they are, knowledge of divine and human things, a study of death, a becoming like God, the art of arts and science of sciences, and finally a love of wisdom. And because true wisdom is God, he concludes that the love of God is true philosophy.</p><p>St. John divides philosophy as a broad scope into two kinds: speculative and practical philosophy, and he further divides these into theology, natural science, mathematics, ethics, domestic economy, and politics. Logic is not another branch of philosophy but a tool of philosophy, because it is used for demonstration.</p><p>This gives us a reason to study logic. We study logic because the human mind seeks knowledge and because philosophical inquiry requires disciplined reasoning.</p><p>We therefore need to learn how the intellect handles concepts, how concepts are expressed in terms, how terms are predicated, how propositions are formed, how arguments are constructed, how conclusions follow from premises, how demonstrations differ from dialectical arguments, and how fallacies deceive the mind. This is the word of the lessons ahead.</p><p>We study Porphyry’s Isagoge first in preparation to learning and understanding Aristotle’s Categories. We will end our discussion of philosophy and begin our discussion of logic: What is logic, and why is there an art of reasoning?</p><h3>Memory Work</h3><ol><li>There are six definitions of philosophy, according to St. John of Damascus.</li><li>Philosophy is knowledge of things which are insofar as they are.</li><li>Philosophy is knowledge of both divine and human things.</li><li>Philosophy is a study of death.</li><li>Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences.</li><li>Philosophy is a love of wisdom.</li><li>True wisdom is God; therefore, the love of God is true philosophy.</li><li>An art is a fixed and orderly procedure worked out by reason, by which what a man does reaches its proper end through the means that suit it.</li><li>Science is certain knowledge of what is necessary, acquired through demonstration from its causes.</li><li>A principle is that from which something begins, proceeds, or by which something is established or known.</li><li>Philosophy is the beginning art of every art because it concerns the rational ordering of human activity and the principles by which the various art are understood and properly exercised.</li><li>Each art has its own particular subject matter (or object), operations, and end.</li><li>Philosophy is the beginning science of every science because it investigates the nature of knowledge, demonstration, causes, principles, and the conditions under which something can be known scientifically.</li><li>Philosophy is the principle through it every art and science has been invented.</li><li>The two divisions of philosophy are Speculative Philosophy and Practical Philosophy.</li><li>Any speculative discipline concerns knowledge and contemplation.</li><li>Any practical discipline concerns action and the ordering of life.</li><li>The three branches of speculative philosophy are theology, natural science, and mathematics.</li><li>The three branches of practical philosophy are ethics, domestic economy, and politics.</li><li>Logic or dialectic is a tool of philosophy rather than one of its divisions.</li><li>A term is a word that signifies a concept.</li><li>A concept refers to something intelligible (or able to be understood) to human beings.</li><li>Sophistry is the act of using reasoning to make weak arguments appear strong.</li><li>A sophist is one who imitates the wise person, who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom.</li><li>The mind’s activity of reasoning is also known as Discursive Reasoning, Syllogistic Reasoning, and Demonstrative Reasoning.</li><li>Reason is a gift from God and the instrument of knowledge.</li><li>Reasoning operates according to the object it investigates and within the limits of our creaturely intellect.</li><li>Christian theology involves the investigation of what is received from divine revelation.</li><li>Philosophy investigates being, causation, nature, truth, and other objects of similar inquiry.</li><li>Logic disciplines our reasoning about revealed truth without becoming the source or measure of revelation itself.</li><li>The seven books studied in the traditional logical curriculum are Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations.</li><li>The study of logic serves the philosophical pursuit of wisdom.</li></ol><h3>Footnotes</h3><ol><li>Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 1, Chapter 1, 1.980a.</li><li>St. John of Damascus, Philosophical Chapters, Chapter 2. <em>Saint John of Damascus: Writings</em>, trans. Frederic H. Chace, Jr., Fathers of the Church 37 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1958), p.10.</li><li>This will be more prevalently known as St. John’s definitions of philosophy are revealed.</li><li>St. John of Damascus, Philosophical Chapters, Chapter 1. Chase, Writings, p.7.</li><li>Ibid.</li><li>Ibid. John explicitly compares ignorance to darkness and the absence of knowledge to the darkness of reason.</li><li>Andrew Louth, <em>St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology</em> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).</li><li>For example, in chapter 42, where he gets into defining what hypostasis means, he quotes Cyril of Alexandria but says, “certain of the holy Fathers have said.” This isn’t an issue for us, and dwelling on it will distract us from the main lesson itself. But whenever I find this, I will cite who he references.</li><li>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 3, 1094b11–27.</li><li>On theosis (θέωσις), St. John will speak of this in his work, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, particularly Book II and Book III, Chapter 17. The Orthodox Study Bible has a section on Deification (1692pg) where it defines it as: “Deification means we are to become more like God through His grace or divine energies.” In other places, “it means that through union with Christ, believers share by grace in the glory and immortality of God, and in that sense become divine — ‘partakers of the divine nature’ (2 Pet. 1:4), as found in Needham’s <em>2000 Years of Christ’s Power </em>(452 pg.). This is simply what it means. Further discussion will be made later as one progresses in understanding.</li><li>Thomas Aquinas is being introduced here as a supplementary commentator rather than as the guide of our studies like St. John. You’ll see him, along with commentators throughout history, provide definitions to articulate truths throughout time, provide examples of teachings given either by Porphyry or Aristotle, and clarify terms that are used by the two philosophers that St. John doesn’t explicitly define or clarify himself.</li><li>Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Book I, Lecture I (A.1, 71a1–71a11). <a href="https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Post.Bk1.L1.v71a9">https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Post.Bk1.L1.v71a9</a>.</li><li>Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter 1, 980b26–27.</li><li>Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Book I, Lesson 4 (A.2, 71b8–72a7). <a href="https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Post.Bk1.L4">https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Post.Bk1.L4</a></li><li>This language of principle as a source of something else will be used by St. John throughout his works, especially and more explicitly in his work, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.</li><li>The seven Liberal Arts are the traditional <em>artes liberales: </em>grammar, rhetoric, dialectic/logic, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. These were taught by the Greeks, Romans, and later the Christians in schools as their main education curriculum until major key events — the fall of Constantinople, the Protestant Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution — prevented and replaced the model from continuing in the West.</li><li>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 1.</li><li>St. John of Damascus, Philosophical Chapters, Chapter 3. This definition is the most commonly known amongst people. But within the Orthodox paradigm, it gains a deeper meaning.</li><li>This attitude of studying logic, which in most cases only fallacies are studied, is prevelant amongst modern sophists under a different name: Pseudo-Intellectuals.</li><li>Aristotle is being studied as a principal source in the philosophical and logical tradition that the saints, including St. John, appropriates and transmits.</li><li>Porphyry became so foundational in logical studies in the medieval period that when Aristotle’s logical works got compiled into a single text called the Organon Porphyry’s Isagoge were stapled at the front of it. We still carry this tradition on today.</li><li>Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Book I, Lecture 1. Aquinas divides the acts of reason into three modes, which are compatible to Orthodoxy by sentences alone. We differ from the West by not confusing the intellect (nous) to reasoning (dianoia).</li><li>These are Porphyry’s Predicables taught in his Isagoge: Genus, Species, Difference, Property/Peculiarity, and Accident.</li><li>Fallacies are taught in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations.</li><li>The “Ancients” are Plato and Aristotle and the traditions after them.</li><li>Hieromonk Gregorios work titled<em> Orthodox Faith, Worship, and Life </em>defines nous as: “The highest faculty in man, through which — provided it is purified — he knows God or the inner essences or principles of created things by means of direct apprehension or spiritual perception. Unlike the dianoia or reason, from which it must be carefully distinguished, the intellect does not function by formulating abstract concepts and then arguing on this basis to a conclusion reached through deductive reasoning, but it understands divine truth by means of immediate experience, intuition or simple cognition. The intellect dwells in the depths of the soul; it constitutes the innermost aspect of the heart. The intellect is the organ of contemplation, the eye of the heart.” (268pg)</li><li>Scholasticism is the application of demonstrative reasoning to what Aquinas called “sacred doctrine of theology”.</li><li>Aquinas answers the question “ Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God” under “How God is Known by Us”: “Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.” <a href="https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I.Q12.A1.C.2">https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I.Q12.A1.C.2</a>. Also search: <strong><em>Beatific Vision. </em></strong><a href="https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02364a.htm">https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02364a.htm</a>.</li><li>Argument (something simple from CrossExamined): (P1) God is the only Savior of mankind (e.g., Isaiah 43:11). (P2) Jesus is the savior of mankind. (P3) Therefore, Jesus is God or the Bible contradicts itself. (P4) The Bible cannot contradict itself. (P5) Therefore, Jesus is God.</li><li>“Unknowable” meaning God’s essence being incomprehensible. St. John says in various places, “There is nothing created, nothing of the first and second order, nothing of lord and servant; but there is unity and trinity~there was, there is, and there’ shall be forever-which is perceived and adored by faith-by faith, not by inquiry, nor by searching out, nor by visible mani festation: for the mOre He is sought out, the more He is unknown, and the more He is investigated, the more He is hidden;” and “Thus, it is clear that God exists, but what He is in essence and nature is unknown and beyond all understanding.”</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7af9df62d080" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Translation of the Complete Works of St. Gennadius Scholarius, Book VII, Pt.2]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/translation-of-the-complete-works-of-st-gennadius-scholarius-book-vii-pt-2-0ca67fe2e275?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0ca67fe2e275</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[porphyry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aristotle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[orthodox-christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[st-gennadius-scholarius]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:03:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-17T15:03:09.059Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The last of the Byzantines and the first of the Byzantine Thomists (attempt) translated into English for the first time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*vuLuNeIDgsfkYpmo.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image of St. Gennadius (II) Scholarius, Patriarch of Constantinople</figcaption></figure><p>Of Georgios Scholarios, Prolegomena to the Logic and to Porphyry’s Isagoge, gathered from various books, with his own remarks. First reading. To how many things philosophy is useful.</p><h4>His lecture begins:</h4><p>Of Thomas, this. — The pursuit concerning wisdom is, of the other human pursuits, more perfect, loftier, more useful, sweeter. More perfect, indeed, since in so far as the human being adds to the pursuit concerning wisdom, in so much already he reaps a part of true blessedness. Wherefore also the wise Solomon in the 14th [chapter] of Ecclesiasticus says, &quot;Blessed is the man who spends his time in wisdom.&quot;¹ Loftier, however, because through this the human being most attains to the divine likeness, which made all things in wisdom. And since likeness is a cause of friendship, the pursuit concerning wisdom most of all joins to God through friendship. Wherefore also in the 7th [chapter] of his Wisdom the Wise One says, &quot;Wisdom is an infinite treasure for human beings, which those who use have become partakers and friends of God.&quot;² More useful, since through this wisdom we arrive at the immortal kingdom: &quot;For the desire of wisdom leads to the eternal kingdom,&quot;³ the same wise one says in the 6th of his Wisdom. “Sweeter, however, because the time spent with her has no bitterness, nor is her company anything unpleasant, but gladness and joy,&quot;⁴ the same wise one says in the eighth of his Wisdom.</p><p>Four certain things accrue to the human being from philosophy: salvation, blessedness, security and, the greatest, freedom. And this can be shown thus.<br>For that is said to be saved which arrives at the due end, all hindrances having been removed, just as a ship is then said to have been saved when it comes down to the last harbour, no hindrances having stood in its way. But through philosophy the human being arrives at the fitting end, the human, that is, and proper one. Through philosophy, therefore, the human being is saved. The major [premise] is evident of itself. The proof of the minor [is] that the proper end of the human being is knowing, because the human being is [what he is] through the intellectual soul, and the intellect is for the sake of knowing, according to the Philosopher, in the 6th of the Ethics⁵ and the third of On the Soul.⁶ The same also Boethius says in the book On Consolation.⁷ But through philosophy the human being arrives at this end, which is knowing. Therefore, and the rest.</p><p>And the hindrances by which one can be shut out from arriving at that end are all cast out through philosophy, such as the sensible pleasures and the charms, because through these many are hindered, so that they cannot have leisure for knowledge and the contemplation of truth. And Ammonius too intends this in the epitome of the book of the Ethics, saying thus in between: &quot;One must leap away from desiring; for the desires, that is the sensible pleasures, swallow up, or rather sink, the activity of reason; for such human beings, those namely who pursue the sensible pleasures, are cattle-like, choosing the life of beasts.&quot;⁸ And through philosophy this hindrance is removed; for philosophy teaches to flee these charms of the senses, and the philosopher is simply virtuous, as would become clear by induction in each of the virtues. But such a philosopher is separated from such sensible pleasures. Therefore, and the rest.</p><p>There are still some others who are shut out from this end proper to the human being, which is knowing, through care for worldly matters or for external goods, as someone somewhere says: &quot;That man is wiser who cares least, in whose hand the world is.&quot;⁹ But through philosophy the human being is freed from this care of worldly matters. And some are hindered from such an end, which is knowing, through despair; for they themselves despair and believe themselves to know nothing. But this hindrance is removed through philosophy, because it is necessary that the one experienced in philosophy know that the knowledge of truth is not impossible for anyone, and on account of this, through philosophy, the human being arrives at the fitting end, the hindrances being removed, and thus through philosophy the human being is saved.</p><p>Second, philosophy makes the human being secure, because security is a certain steadfastness or immobility. And the philosopher, toward all things alike, whether the fortunate or the contrary, is steadfast, that is immovable, being disposed courageously, according to the Philosopher in the third of the Ethics. For he intends the philosopher to be serious, courageously disposed toward every fortune. And just as the square, wherever and however it is thrown, always stands in the same way, so too in the case of the serious human being: both in good fortunes and in misfortunes he is unshaken and remains the same. Of this thought too is Boethius in the third [book] of On Consolation, who intends the wise man not to be vexed at misfortunes; for he must be disposed equally, that is, neither to be elated in good fortunes nor to be humbled and crushed in the contrary. Whence of a certain philosopher it is said in that very book of the Consolation that, having been seized by a tyrant and being compelled to tell the secrets of the city, since he did not wish to do this on account of the common good, he spat into the face of the tyrant. Thus then it is shown that through philosophy the human being is established secure.</p><p>Further, philosophy makes the human being blessed, because, according to the Philosopher in the 6th [chapter] of the Ethics, human happiness consists in the activity according to intellect; and the activity according to intellect is philosophy itself, which is knowledge of beings, and especially of the first beings. On account of this philosophy makes the human being fortunate and blessed. On account of this too a certain wise man says: &quot;This philosophy promises me, that she will make me equal to God.&quot; The same Boethius also says in the On Consolation, that &quot;all the knowledgeable and philosophers are in a certain way gods.&quot;</p><p>Further, philosophy makes the human being free, because, as is clear in the proem of the Metaphysics, free is that which exists for its own sake and not for the sake of another. And the theoretical sciences, according to the Philosopher, are for their own sake, that is, on account of the perfection of the human being in the knowledge of truth and on account of the flight from ignorance. On account of this these make the human being free.</p><p>Further, that makes the human being free which makes him worthy to direct all the others; and the philosopher is such, as he says: &quot;If you wish all things to be subjected to you, first subject yourself to reason; for you will rule over many, if your reason reigns first.&quot; And on account of this philosophy makes the human being free, and, on the contrary, ignorance makes human beings slaves.</p><p><strong>Division of philosophy.</strong></p><p>This philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical, of which the theoretical is ordered toward knowing, and the practical toward acting, according to the Philosopher in the 2nd [book?] of the Metaphysics. The theoretical sciences are twofold: some are ancillary, others principal. The principal theoretical sciences are three, namely physics, mathematics and divine; the ancillary, two, grammar and logic.</p><p><strong>Concerning the theoretical principal sciences.</strong></p><p>Physics. — Physics is the science concerning moving beings, such as are the human being and the animal and the like, not under the disposition by which, in activity, they move and perceive (since so they are particulars, and there is no science of them), but there is a science concerning them, as they are considered in themselves and in abstraction as regards every inquiry into the movable sensible. And so concerning them in physical science it is considered as much as concerns the things inherent in them according to the said inquiry.</p><p>Mathematics. — Mathematics is the science dealing with those beings which according to their own nature are from abstraction, or can be abstracted from sensible qualities, like number and magnitude. And I say well &quot;according to their own nature,&quot; on account of those things which can be thought through the intellect alone, no sensible qualities being thought, as the substances, the human being and the animal, can be thought, no sensible qualities being thought; and colour likewise can be thought without being thought to be sensible, because being sensible is not from the existence or the substance of colour. Nevertheless these physical beings, in themselves or according to their nature, mark off for themselves a determinate combination of sensible qualities for being preserved in matter, so that in another combination they cannot be preserved. But the mathematical beings, even according to their own nature, were it granted that there is no intellect, are abstractable from the sensible qualities through marking off for themselves no [such] nature, just as number and magnitude do not mark off for themselves any sensible matter, but can be found in any matter whatever and however disposed. But it is not so in the case of the physical: just as the human form, for being preserved in matter, seeks a determinate combination of sensible qualities.</p><p>Theological; the [science] after the physical. — The divine science is that concerning the separate beings, or rather those separated from motion and from matter in being, like God and the intellections. For even if in the Metaphysics being, qua being, is the subject, nevertheless all the things determined there are ordered finally toward the knowledge of the 12th [book], in which it is determined concerning the separate substances.</p><p><strong>The same division, more broadly. </strong>— Beginning then from above, one must say that, as the Philosopher says in the 6th [book] of the Metaphysics, there are three principal parts of theoretical science, namely the physical, the mathematical, and the divine, that is, the one after the physical. And the reason of this proposition is that the sciences are distinguished according to the distinction of their objects, about which they are, as is clear in the third of On the Soul. But the things contemplated by us are threefold, namely the physical, the mathematical, and the divine. There will therefore be three principal theoretical sciences, namely physics, mathematics and divine. The minor is shown thus: that some of the things are sensible and movable and changeable, or having a certain order toward motion, and concerning these is the physical science, which contemplates the movable being qua movable, and the sensible, qua sensible, in itself, like hot and cold, and moist and dry, and likewise also concerning similar things. &quot;Having order or assignment&quot; is said because there is a certain substance which, according to its own existence, is ordered toward being preserved in being by a determinate combination of sensible qualities, so that in another disposition the form is not preserved, like the human being and all the forms of sensible substances. Another being is the mathematical, and this is conjoined in being with sensible matter; but according to its own nature it does not mark off for itself any combination of sensible qualities so as to be preserved in the subject, like number and magnitude. And concerning these beings are the mathematical sciences, which are four, namely arithmetic and geometry, which are purely mathematical, and music and astronomy, which are in part mathematical and in part physical. And because these mathematical beings are conjoined in being with the sensibles, but according to their own nature do not mark off for themselves any sensible quality, as has been said, for this reason they are in themselves abstractable by the intellect from the sensibles, because abstraction by the intellect is nothing other than thinking something prior in being that is conjoined with another, without thinking the posterior. And the mathematicals are conjoined with the sensibles, and are prior to them by nature through not marking off for themselves sensible qualities. They are therefore abstractable by the intellect from the sensibles.</p><p><strong>In how many ways &quot;from abstraction.&quot;</strong> — But in this part one must note what abstraction is. For one is that of the universal from the particular, and this is common to every substance. Another abstraction is that of some subject from the accidents, of a subject, that is, which marks off for itself certain accidents; and such abstraction can be in the sensible substances, because the human being, or the horse, being prior by nature to the sensible qualities, can be thought, the sensible qualities not being thought.</p><p>Another abstraction is that of something prior from the posteriors, which in being is conjoined with accidents, yet does not mark off for itself in being that posterior; and this is mathematical abstraction. For the line and number and the other mathematicals are conjoined in being with the sensible qualities and are prior to them by nature, and do not mark these off for themselves.</p><p>Another being is the divine, which in being has been separated from the sensibles, and concerning this divine being, as are the separate substances, the [science] after the physical, that is the divine science, contemplates. And if you should say that there many things are determined about the other beings, it must be said that that science contemplates about being qua being, and consequently has it archetypally to contemplate, and primarily, about the first beings, which are the separate substances. And on account of this it is named &quot;divine&quot; or &quot;theological,&quot; because it contemplates about divine being, while all the other things which it examines it contemplates finally on account of the separate substances.</p><p>Thus then it is clear that there are three principal theoretical sciences. And they are called theoretical sciences because they are about the beings contemplated by us, and because they are for the sake of knowing only, and not for the sake of any activity.</p><p><strong>Concerning the practical and the productive.</strong></p><p>But the practical are said with a view to the activity of the end; for of the theoretical [science] the truth is, but of the practical the work, as the Philosopher says in the 2nd of the Metaphysics.</p><p>Of the practical sciences, some are practical, others productive. And they differ in that productive are those whose activities pass over into external matter and do not remain in the doer, like the mechanical sciences, such as building and such as are like these; practical are the ethical, whose activities do not pass over into external matter, but remain in the doer. And this distinction the Philosopher sets down in the 6th of the Metaphysics.</p><p><strong>Concerning the theoretical ancillary [sciences], that is, grammar and logic.</strong></p><p>And there are other theoretical sciences, serving the principal ones, and these are two, grammar namely and logic. That they are serving the other principal sciences can be shown thus. And first concerning logic.</p><p>Since every science has a certain mode of knowing, in order that the same thing not be sought continually in every science, there had to be some science which would teach us the properties and the affections of the scientific mode in each science (α), so as to demonstrate concerning it its proper affections through its own principles. And this is logic, being ancillary to the other, archetypally theoretical sciences, and consequently to all the other sciences.</p><p>Further, this very thing is shown also concerning grammar, that it is ancillary to the other sciences, both the theoretical and the others, because what one finds out from the science is little, but much is what is procured from another by teaching and learning, as is said in the second of the Metaphysics (β). And the instrument of dialectic is significant speech, as is said in the book On Sense. For this reason there became necessary the science that was to teach the properties of significant speech; and this is grammar. For this reason grammar is necessary on account of the punctuation and the distinction in all the other sciences, since every science is recognized by punctuation or by distinction, of which significant speech is the instrument; about which grammar contemplates, since little is what each finds out from himself, but almost everything we have through learning.</p><p>(α) Note that logic serves the other sciences as far as knowing, but grammar as far as teaching.<br>(β) Note that grammar teaches us the instrument of teaching; and teaching is most necessary for the acquisition of science. And since the instrument of teaching is intelligible speech, as is said in On Sense and the Sensible, for this reason grammar, being about this speech, the significant one, has become necessary for us.</p><p>St. Gennadius II ends his first lecture on logic and the utility of philosophy. He begins his next lecture on Porphyry’s Isagoge and the division of logic.</p><h4>Verses Cited</h4><ol><li>This verse comes from Sirach chapter 14, verse 20, but it is also known as Ecclesiasticus.</li><li>This verse comes from the Wisdom of Solomon chapter 7 verse 14.</li><li>This verse comes from the Wisdom of Solomon chapter 6 verse 20–21.</li><li>This verse comes from the Wisdom of Solomon chapter 8 verse 16.</li><li>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI.</li><li>Aristotle, On the Soul, Book III.</li><li>Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy.</li><li>Ammonius’s commentary on Ethics Book I, Chapter 5.</li><li>Byzantine or Renaissance Proverb?</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0ca67fe2e275" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[TRV-371 Lesson 1: Introduction to Logic]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/lesson-1-introduction-to-logic-5970c79cdf66?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5970c79cdf66</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[classical-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[classical-reasoning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[christianity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:12:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T16:37:06.589Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The first lesson of forty-seven in TRV-371 Classical Reasoning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*B4-CZAkCERVYByRt45ZLdw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Preface</h3><p>In this lesson, you will learn what logic is, why an art of reasoning exists at all, and how the seven courses of this study are divided among themselves. There is no reading assigned with this lesson. You will begin reading Porphyry in the next lesson. What you are given here is the map of the whole study, and you should come back to it whenever you lose your place.</p><h3>Learning Objectives</h3><p>By the end of this lesson, you should be able to:</p><ol><li>Define logic.</li><li>Explain why reasoning requires art as a discipline.</li><li>Distinguish the natural ability to reason from the logical art that directs reasoning.</li><li>Explain the relationship between logic, dialectic, and philosophy.</li><li>Explain the three fundamental operations of the intellect used in traditional logical study.</li><li>Distinguish simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning.</li><li>Explain why logic must begin with terms and concepts before proceeding to propositions and syllogisms.</li><li>Explain the traditional seven-part order of Classical Logic.</li><li>Explain why Porphyry’s Isagoge comes before Aristotle’s Categories.</li><li>Understand what logic can establish and what it cannot establish by itself.</li></ol><h3>Exposition</h3><h4>I. What is Logic?</h4><p>We will use the following definition of logic throughout this course:</p><blockquote>Logic is the art that directs the act of reasoning itself, so that it may reason in an orderly way, easily, and without error.</blockquote><p>This definition comes from the Scholastic, Thomas Aquinas. He begins with why there are arts at all. Aquinas begins in his own commentary on the books of Aristotle with a saying from Aristotle:</p><blockquote>For other animals live by their imaginings and recollections, with only a small share of experience, <strong>whereas mankind lives by art and by reasonings.</strong></blockquote><p>The last clause is what Aquinas sets his focus upon. He points out that reasoning identifies the very thing by which man differs from other animals: “Man is an artistic and rational animal,” Aquinas says. Animals, however, are merely driven to do what they do by a natural impulse.</p><p>Aquinas then asserts that man is directed to do what he does by a judgment of reason, expanding upon Aristotle’s words. When man lives by reasoning, he is peculiarly directed by his judgment of reason. Yet, the Scholastic adds a qualification: man may judge badly, but he must judge. Man has a capacity to judge, but when he actualizes it, he may make poor judgments. Because a man must judge, he may judge badly. Thus, Aquinas concludes, art exists for that reason, so that what a man does may be done readily and in good order. This first conclusion allows us to know what it means by “mankind lives by art.”</p><h4>II. What is art?</h4><p>Aquinas defines art, which we will use throughout this course,</p><blockquote>“An art is a fixed and orderly procedure worked out by reason, by which what a man does reaches its proper end through the means that suit it.”</blockquote><p>He provides an example of a skilled carpenter. He does not grab pieces of wood at random, but he orders his steps, and by following them he completes his product.</p><h4>III. Natural Reasoning</h4><p>Aquinas moves on to reasoning:</p><blockquote>“Now, reason is not only able to direct the acts of the lower powers, but is also director of its own act, for what is peculiar to the intellective part of man is its ability to reflect upon itself; for the mind knows itself.”</blockquote><p>What’s even more special about man, besides the fact that man reasons about other things, is that he can reason his own reasoning. A man can think about his own thinking. <strong><em>This is the peculiarity of the art of logic.</em></strong></p><blockquote>“Therefore, just as the art of building or carpentry, through which man is enabled to perform manual acts in an easy and orderly manner, arose from the fact that reason reasoned about manual acts,…”</blockquote><p>If reason, by reasoning about what the hand does, discovered the art of building, then there must be an art which directs the art of reasoning itself, so that a man may reason in an orderly way, easily, and without error. <strong>Aquinas predicates this to logic, “or the science of reason.”</strong></p><h4>IV. Why Does Reasoning Need an Art?</h4><p>Every art is carried on according to reason. It is the common art to all arts because no matter what the subject is, logic remains the same in process, even though our knowledge of a particular subject will prevent us from reasoning on that subject well if we don’t know that subject well.</p><p>Furthermore, following the premise given by Aquinas — that men are directed to do what they do by a judgment of reason and they may judge badly but they must judge anywaypeople may be naturally inclined to do one thing without possessing the art corresponding to that natural capacity. Various examples can be given:</p><ul><li>A person may have a natural ability to draw without possessing the developed art of painting.</li><li>A person may naturally speak without possessing the art of rhetoric.</li><li>A person may naturally reason without possessing the art of logic.</li></ul><p><em>The distinction made is that </em><strong><em>possessing a natural ability</em></strong><em> is not the same thing as </em><strong><em>possessing a disciplined skill</em></strong><em>.</em> For logic, in particular, we can misunderstand terms, confuse one thing with another, draw conclusions that do not follow, contradict ourselves, and give arguments that seem strong but are weak. This act is known as Sophistry but those who commit this are not by nature sophists. <strong>Therefore, logic becomes the discipline that orders our natural intellectual abilities and perfects their use.</strong></p><p>Therefore, logic applies to all subjects, and in that respect every art might be called rational. But logic is rational in a unique way, because reasoning is the very thing it works upon, whereas in every other subject, reasoning works upon a certain object. Since every other art proceeds by reasoning, logic directs them all. Aquinas concludes,</p><blockquote>“Therefore, it seems to be the art of the arts, because it directs us in the act of reasoning, from which all arts proceed.”</blockquote><h4>V. The Three Operations of the Intellect</h4><p>There are seven courses divided by Aquinas into the acts of reason — there are three acts or operations:</p><ol><li>The first act is understood as Simple Apprehension: “One action of the mind is the <strong>understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this action it conceives what a thing is.</strong> This operation is called by some the ‘informing of the mind,’ or ‘representing by means of the mind.’ To this operation of the reason is ordered the teaching which Aristotle hands down in the book of <em>Categories</em>.”</li><li>The second act is understood as Judgment: “The second operation of the mind is <strong>its act of combining or dividing, in which the true or the false are for the first time present.</strong> And this act of reason is the subject of the teaching which Aristotle hands down in the book entitled <em>On Interpretation</em>.”</li><li>The third act is understood as Reasoning: “The third act of the reason is concerned with that which is peculiar to reason, namely, <strong>to advance from one thing to another in such a way that through that which is known a man comes to a knowledge of the unknown. </strong>And this act is considered in the remaining books of logic.”</li></ol><p>These operations are of one intellectual power, rather than three separate faculties of the mind. Each operation simply acts as a mode of the mind’s activity: simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning.</p><p>Simple apprehension is the mind’s grasping of whatever is presented to it, without yet affirming or denying it.</p><p>Judgment is the mind’s ability to compose and divide something of something, and either affirms it or denies it.</p><p>Reasoning is the movement of the mind, proceeding from one thing (i.e., a judgment) to another.</p><p>The remaining books are numbered four, and Aquinas explains why by comparing reason with nature so far as he can.</p><blockquote>“It should be noted that the acts of reason are in a certain sense not unlike the acts of nature. Thus, art imitates nature as far as it is able. Now, in the acts of nature we observe a threefold diversity. For in some of them nature acts from necessity, namely, in such a way that it cannot fail; in others, nature acts so as to succeed for the most part, although now and then it fails in its act. Hence in this latter case there must be a twofold act: one which succeeds in the majority of cases, as when from seed is generated a perfect animal; the other when nature fails in regard to what is appropriate to it, as when from seed something monstrous is generated owing to a defect in some principle.”</blockquote><p>Nature works in three ways:</p><ol><li>Nature works out of necessity and cannot fail.</li><li>Nature succeeds for the most part and now and again falls short.</li><li>Nature fails outright, as when a seed is spoiled, and something misshapen grows from it.</li></ol><p>St. John of Damascus makes a similar division in his work Philosophical Chapters: “Now, according to some, <strong>art is what errs in some people</strong> and <strong>science what errs in no one</strong>, whereas <strong>philosophy alone does not err. </strong>According to others, art is that which is done with the hands, whereas science is any art that is practiced by the reason, such as grammar, rhetoric, and the like.”</p><p>This division matches nature as follows:</p><ol><li>Philosophy is what is worked out of necessity and does not err.</li><li>Science succeeds for the most part and now and again falls short.</li><li>Lastly, art fails outright, as when a seed is spoiled, and something misshapen grows from it when it defects at some principle.</li></ol><p>But this distinction isn’t necessary — neither useful nor needed to understand anything else — for us to study the rest of this course. So we move on.</p><p>Reason proceeds in the same three ways, and the four remaining answer to them.</p><p>The first process of reason: “For there is one process of reason which induces necessity, in which it is not possible to fall short of the truth. By such a process of reasoning, the certainty of science is acquired.” This part of logic is called <strong>Judicative</strong> because <em>it arrives at a certain judgment.</em> It is also called <strong>Analytical</strong>, which means resolving, because <em>a judgment is made sure only by resolving it back into the first principles it rests upon.</em></p><p>When certainty comes from the form of the argument by itself, this is studied in Prior Analytics. When certainty comes from the matter along with the form of the argument, this is studied in Posterior Analytics.</p><p>The second process of reason: “Again, there is a process of reason in which something true in most cases is concluded, but without producing necessity.” This part of logic is called <strong>Inventive</strong> because what is found this way still needs judging before it can be called certain. This is studied in the Topics, or dialectics, because dialectical syllogism is taught here.</p><p>Dialectical reasoning is a different kind of reasoning. It is a reasoning based on the response of the other side and used for later arguments. Although modern Classical Education circles use the word “dialectic” when speaking about logic as part of the Trivium, dialectic is not understood as being the same as logic. They point to saints of the past who do this thing: “Dialectic is the science of arguing well.” But logic is broadly concerned with being the tool or instrument of philosophy — which is the art of arts and science of sciences — and an art that disciplines or corrects man’s reasoning. Dialectic, on the other hand, is a kind of reasoning; through generally accepted or probable premises one reasons to a conclusion that is probable.</p><p>The third process of reason: “But the third process of reason is that in which reason fails to reach a truth because some principle which should have been observed in reasoning was defective.” This part of logic is called Sophistic. This is studied in Sophistical Refutations.</p><p>But why study Porphyry’s Isagoge before Aristotle Categories? The Latin, Albert the Great, answers that the subject of the whole of logic is argumentation, and words taken singly are treated only for the sake of argumentation. Porphyry’s five words, called the “predicables” (things that may be predicated), are therefore not studied for their own sake. The five words (aka the terms and their concepts) are studied because without them no definition can be framed, and an argument that rests on a faulty definition has nothing sound to work upon.</p><p>In the next lesson, you will begin to read Porphyry’s Introduction Chapter 1, learn Porphyry’s plan and purpose of writing, and pick up the five words he lists that are essential for the rest of this course.</p><h3>Memory Work</h3><ol><li>Logic is the art which directs the act of reasoning itself, so that a man may reason in an orderly way, easily, and without error.</li><li>The other animals are driven to their acts by a natural impulse; a man is directed in what he does by a judgment of reason.</li><li>An art is a fixed and orderly procedure worked out by reason, by which what a man does reaches its proper end through fitting means.</li><li>Nature gives us the capacity, not necessarily the perfection of its use.</li><li>Possessing a natural ability is not the same thing as possessing a disciplined skill.</li><li>Reason can direct not only the work of the lower powers but its own work because the mind can turn back upon itself.</li><li>Logic is the discipline that orders our natural intellectual abilities and perfects their use.</li><li>Logic is called the art of arts, because every other art proceeds by reasoning, and logic directs the act of reasoning.</li><li>Logic teaches the principles by which, through what is known, a man comes into the knowledge of what is unknown.</li><li>Grammar, poetics, rhetoric and logic all use speech, and each uses it differently. The logician alone uses speech as part of an instrument by which belief about what is not known is produced out of what is known.</li><li>There are three acts of reason: the understanding of simple things, composing and dividing, and proceeding from one thing to another.</li><li>In the first act, the mind conceives what a thing is, and there is neither truth nor falsehood; in the second act the true and the false are for the first time present; in the third the mind arrives through what is known at what it did not know.</li><li>The Categories is ordained to the first act, On Interpretation to the second, and the four remaining books to the third.</li><li>The four remaining books are divided as nature is divided. The judicative or analytical part serves reasoning that carries necessity, and to it the Prior Analytics is ordained by the form of the argument and the Posterior Analytics by its matter. The inventive part serves reasoning true only for the most part, and to it the Topics is ordained. The sophistic part serves reasoning that falls away from the truth, and to it the Sophistical Refutations is ordained.</li><li>Logic is a tool for philosophy, the art of arts and science of sciences.</li><li>Dialectical reasoning is reasoning based on the response of the other side and used for later arguments.</li><li>The subject of the whole of logic is argumentation, and words taken singly are treated for the sake of it.</li><li>Porphyry’s five words are studied because without them no definition can be framed.</li></ol><h3>Recommended Reading</h3><ol><li>Commentary on Posterior Analytics by Aquinas, Book 1, Lecture 1, A.1, 71a1–71a11. — The Need for Preexistent Knowledge in All Learning.</li><li>On the Nature of Logic by Albert the Great, Chapter 5.</li><li>St. John of Damascus, Philosophical Chapters, trans. Frederic H. Chase, Jr., Fathers of the Church 37 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1959), Chapters 1–3.</li><li>Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Alpha (or One), Chapter 1.</li><li>Porphyry, Isagoge, Chapter 1. Note: In preparation for the next lesson, read this chaper. Use this link to access the work: <a href="https://plato-scroll.com/s/porph-isagoge/">https://plato-scroll.com/s/porph-isagoge/</a>.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5970c79cdf66" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Translation of the Complete Works of St. Gennadius Scholarius, Book VII, Pt.1]]></title>
            <link>https://orthophil.medium.com/translation-of-the-complete-works-of-st-gennadius-scholarius-book-vii-3c1176c1b98c?source=rss-b551f35ce182------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c1176c1b98c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[translation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[st-gennadius-scholarius]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aristotle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[orthodox-christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mr. Graves]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:48:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-10T00:49:15.102Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The last of the Byzantines and the first of the Byzantine Thomists (attempt) translated into English for the first time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KfsbwdPcd8HXR4_UNNAwBQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image of St. Gennadius (II) Scholarius, Patriarch of Constantinople</figcaption></figure><p>His letter begins:</p><p>To the most exalted and most fortunate despot, lord Constantine Palaiologos.</p><h4>Dedication</h4><p>If to anyone else, then to you I owe the firstfruits of our works, O soul best in everything and most kingly, to you who have prayed much for our advancement in letters, and done not a few things, and laid down for us noble starting-points, at least from your available means. For the honor and the goodwill, through which you have bound [me] to yourself and give [me] much to hope for, I pass over. [Here is] a work made by me for philosophy, and the best part of philosophy, not simply my first; for I have already published many such, apart from those composed on other subjects; but [it is] first among those most worthy of discussion and zeal, which, God cooperating, I have chosen to write, and through these to help the nation. This I offer to you, passing over the rest of my friends. For I praise this too in our guide, whom I think I would not greatly shame by such an address, since, sending many of his writings up to Alexander, he thought to adorn and honor that man with philosophy and himself with the goodwill from the king; which I know many everywhere both have emulated and still now emulate.</p><h4>You as Alexander</h4><p>Neither did Aristotle, then, have anyone he was going to prefer to Alexander, and you now are, to all who have in any way tasted philosophy, outright an Alexander, yielding to him only the tilt that came from the times, and in virtue failing short of none of the eminent, while sharing in the common fortune of the Romans. And yet one would call Alexander above all a hearer of philosophy, but not very much a philosopher; but you have heard little of philosophy, yet in deeds you show in yourself the image of the philosopher, pure and clear. For you appear to have shared quite a lot not only in the products and fruits of philosophy, about which I am about to speak as I begin, that is to say, of all virtue fitting both a man and a ruler, but you also both know and attend upon its lovers, and consider them worth much, both to yourself and to all who have intelligence and wish to acquire it. Nor do you err in your judgments of them, but it is clearer to you than anything who knows and who seems to know, and among those who know you again discern the differences. No passion at all stands in the way of sound judgment for you, neither self-love nor envy of those who excel in noble things. This I count a great sign of precision in your other judgments, or rather from it I divine that philosophy itself and the rest of the good things will flourish, whenever it comes about that they revive through you, and you prosper through virtue, and virtue obtains what is fitting, so that we may fare better. The book, then, is offered to you for these reasons; and it is divided into three, for it is an exposition of the first three parts of logic, as the titles of the books show.</p><h4>How the book came to be</h4><p>How the writing of this book came upon me now, I think it right that neither you nor those who read it be ignorant. For in me a violent love of philosophy arose, when I happened to have attended sufficiently to poetry and rhetoric. But since, examining carefully, I found nothing great among those who then had a reputation for philosophy among us, but they even knew [how] to teach far less than what I myself discerned through abundance of nature and zeal (for honor nourishes the arts, says Cicero, but here for a long time there was neither pay nor art, and because of this, neglected little by little, the brilliant [doctrines] of philosophy were finally extinguished altogether, so that it seemed then a marvel if anyone could understand even the Aristotelian diction itself, and this sufficed for that man toward a reputation in philosophy), I turned to the ancient teachers and their writings. I sought not the simplest, those who have examined the Aristotelian husk, so to speak (for I thought these suited rather those who take up the philosophy causally and for reputation alone, and who have thus laid hold of the subject from such reasonings), but the wisest and most exact, who themselves extracted the pith and the fruit and gave it to others to use. I mean Theophrastus and Alexander, or the circle of Porphyry and Syrianus and Simplicius. And I stopped not even at these, but supposing that foreign wisdom, I mean that of the Latins, would contribute most to my aim, since I happened to understand the Latin tongue, I went through not a few Latin books: many of the older school, no fewer of the middle, and most of this newer and more exact school. For the Latin teachers were ignorant neither of the works of Porphyry and Alexander and Ammonius and Simplicius and Themistius and such, and furthermore I read through all the writings of Averroes and Avicenna and many other Arabs and Persians on the whole of philosophy, translated into their own tongue. No one among the commentators, I think, is ignorant that Averroes is the best of Aristotle’s commentators, and not only a commentator but also the author of many books worthy of discussion and zeal. Since, then, they gathered the finest things from varied wisdom and discovered many things of their own, as is likely (for what other gain could there be than learning many things or being able to discover many fine ones?), they enlarged Aristotelian philosophy with many additions, and with more and loftier problems and theorems and the most subtle divisions they obscured the expositions of our own, the first commentators. And they themselves have suffered the same among themselves, for the later ones, even among them, have for the same reasons surpassed the earlier.</p><p>Having gone through all this, then, if I gained anything more myself than those who set before themselves in such matters only Magentenos, or Psellos, or Philoponos, thanks be to God for the gift, for this is indisputably his gift. But if nothing more has come to me from handling many books, I would justly count this as due to my own laziness and perhaps to the times, which have hardly permitted philosophizing.</p><h4>His reputation and his students</h4><p>And if I myself have become the cause of good repute for many of those now thought to be something, having taught some things and moved others by zeal toward me, and if I have happened to become for all in my times an example of philosophy as of rhetoric, then may there be, O God and King, very many better than the example. They themselves would say so, and God from above will bear witness and refute those who speak against it; and as I myself would pray, may he assent.</p><p>I also desired to leave my studies on Aristotle to some disciples, and indeed I opened the door of a school to those willing to hear me. And there are, alas, in the whole city three or four who are able to receive the doctrines of philosophy, and not even these genuinely able, because of poverty, and of being occupied with the cares of necessities, and because the prizes of education here are paltry for a laborious business, while most win repute from the opposite and easiest things. I myself, however, for my part, neither shrinking nor hoping for pay, but even being plotted against, go on. I said that only three or four are able to hear me, the young, not those supposedly advanced. For of these too, being few, some regard philosophy as a superfluous thing, and others think it shameful to attend, since they have already gained the reputation of teachers, and the prizes of philosophy in words, even before philosophizing well, having received them by I know not what chance, they think it henceforth vain to philosophize.</p><h4>Why logic, and Thomas Aquinas</h4><p>But since they were not going to meet my expressions anywhere else, which are foreign and from beyond the borders for the most part, and in no small number my own, they had to come to themselves and go over again what they had heard and lay it up in the storehouses of memory. So as I lectured I also noted down in writing what was said. I began from logic. How much, and in what way, it contributes to the acquisition of the other sciences (and that, when it is unknown or not known as it should be, it is impossible to grasp and hold any science whatever well) would become clear from what is said beforehand about it in the present treatise.</p><p>Now of four parts of the old logic especially requiring exact exposition (the first three at once, and a fourth, the Posterior Analytics, which treats the syllogism specifically insofar as it is drawn into necessary matter, that is, insofar as it is demonstrative; for the rest, being technical, need little attention), the exposition on the fourth I yielded to Thomas Aquinas. This was not so much out of goodwill toward him as out of sparing of labor, and so as not to make vain the zeal which I had put into the translation of his exposition. For I had already translated the man’s exposition of this treatise, one worthy of mention, I myself having contributed not a few things to its ornament, as far as befitted a translator. Thinking that this exposition belongs to Thomas as father and maker but to me as translator (at least for those unable to understand his tongue), and at the same time knowing that it would suffice for those first approaching the matters about demonstration by syllogisms, and knowing set forth brief problems and theorems for beginners, I did not wish to choose a not very necessary labor and, as I said, to show that effort vain. [This is so] though all would reasonably have assented to the expositions which I intended to make, gathering from him and from many others and adding from my own resources, much more brilliant and more exact and clearer still than his.</p><h4>How the commentary works</h4><p>For these reasons, then, as I said, I did not choose to expound this part of logic. But on Porphyry’s Isagoge and the book of the ten Categories and the On Interpretation, which seem to be like a kind of foundation of the treatise on syllogisms and of all philosophy, I have published this exposition, divided into three, as has been said. Each of these I divided into readings, that is, lectures. In these readings there is, in most, a certain preliminary survey, and the division of the text is added in general terms. Then the text is divided in detail and interpreted. Then certain questions within the text are investigated. Then, where it is necessary, some questions outside the text too, and this we do not neglect either. And toward these questions we proceed in the Latin manner, setting down the problem and, in most cases, arguing to the contrary, then determining the truth and resolving the objections. This, as far as I know, none of our commentators has dared up to this very day.</p><p>In a few places, then, we do set out differences of opinion and our own judgments about them and private views. But in most, avoiding vainglory and least of all affecting a reputation for wisdom, we have thought fit neither to refute others nor to show off ourselves. We were content to set down those expositions among the known ones that seemed truer, specifying nothing further about whose they are and why they were approved above the others. And if we have been concerned not only for exactness but also, as far as possible, for concision and clarity, since [had we] not aimed at the capacity of those who will read, and the present times having altogether taken away such an art, we would have composed voluminous books on these three treatises, this need not even be insisted on to the quarrelsome. But to the wise and friends of truth, the nature of the present work itself will make it clear.</p><h4>Closing appeal and signature</h4><p>Be assured, O soul best in everything and most kingly, that although I have taken the greatest care in these [matters] for clarity and readiness, I fear it may be unintelligible at least to those who have not heard me, because for a long time now the studies here have not been well supplied with such books and discourses.</p><p>I think, then, that the work will appear worth not a little both to our own people and to the Latins themselves, on account of what has been said, and to you yourself, most mighty despot, if you should have leisure to take hold of Aristotelian philosophy, for you have the desire. But if, attending to greater matters more profitable to the common good, you will not be able (which indeed I rather pray for and counsel, both for you and for everyone who wishes to rule fittingly), by gifts and honors you will make many, helped both by this treatise and by many others and acquiring true prudence, become useful to you and to fatherland and nation and to themselves. And we, as long as we live, seeing this, will not cease issuing more and better writings. Since, after all, wisdom and letters are so terribly despised, I fear I may come to regret even what I have published; for the misfortune of affairs and the daily drift toward the worse leave one to hope for nothing good.</p><p>But may you prosper and come to the aid of affairs as you yourself may wish, and may we be seen cooperating with you, so to speak, in the revival of letters, just as others are in what each has busied himself with. And as for the unadorned and plain character of this preface, and its being far short of the ambition that is possible to me and customary in such matters, making that defence, if you were to lay the blame on the subject matter and on the whole plan of the book, which admits nothing superfluous or ambitious even in prefaces, you will say things true and just and pleasing to me, and none of those with sense will contradict.</p><p>St. Gennadius II ends his opening treatise to the king and begins his lecture on Porphyry’s Isagoge titled: The Prolegomena to Porphyry’s Logic and Isagoge.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c1176c1b98c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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