<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Osamamohamed (db3wy) on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Osamamohamed (db3wy) on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 12:54:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Duplicate Accounts Using the Same Email [BUG]: A Business Logic Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/duplicate-accounts-using-the-same-email-bug-a-business-logic-vulnerability-d1852a589c79?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d1852a589c79</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jan 2025 06:25:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:12:56.527Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>قال تعالى: ﴿فَقُلْتُ اسْتَغْفِرُوا رَبَّكُمْ إِنَّهُ كَانَ غَفَّارًا * يُرْسِلِ السَّمَاءَ عَلَيْكُمْ مِدْرَارًا* وَيُمْدِدْكُمْ بِأَمْوَالٍ وَبَنِينَ وَيَجْعَلْ لَكُمْ جَنَّاتٍ وَيَجْعَلْ لَكُمْ أَنْهَارًا﴾</p><p>اللهم صلّ على محمد، وعلى آل محمد، كما صليت على إبراهيم، وعلى آل إبراهيم، إنك حميد مجيد، اللهم بارك على محمد، وعلى آل محمد، كما باركت على إبراهيم، وعلى آل إبراهيم، إنك حميد مجيد</p><p><strong>whoami:</strong></p><p>Hello, my name is Osama Mohammed, known as db3wy on HackerOne. I am a penetration tester and bug hunter.</p><p><strong>Summary:</strong></p><p>A serious problem was found in the registration system of a crypto platform. Basically, users can make two separate accounts with the same email — one through Google OAuth and another manually.</p><p><strong>What is a Business Logic Vulnerability?</strong></p><p>Alright, so a business logic vulnerability is when the app’s functionality gets abused because the rules (the “logic”) that manage how users interact with the system ain’t implemented properly. So, attackers take advantage of weak spots in these rules to mess with the system.</p><h3>Steps to Reproduce:</h3><ol><li>Register an account using Google OAuth with a specific email address.</li></ol><p>2. Register another account manually using the same email address.</p><p>3. Change the profile picture for both accounts to confirm that they are separate accounts linked to the same email.</p><p>4. Delete one account from the platform.</p><p>5. Observe that the other account remains functional, unaffected by the deletion of the duplicate account.</p><p>The entire <strong>Impact</strong> section is based on my own analysis and assumptions since it’s not possible for me to test all these scenarios directly.</p><h3>Impact of the Vulnerability:</h3><ol><li><strong>Big Financial Losses for the Platform:</strong></li></ol><ul><li>If someone sends money to the email, both accounts can get credited, so attackers can double their profits.</li><li>This could cause the platform to lose a lot of money.</li></ul><p><strong>2. Confusion in KYC (Know Your Customer):</strong></p><ul><li>Having two accounts with the same email can mess things up when uploading ID verification documents (like a passport or national ID).</li><li>This can cause issues with regulations and the company’s verification process.</li></ul><p><strong>3. Overlapping Transactions and Deals:</strong></p><ul><li>Actions on one account (like opening trades) might affect the other account without intention.</li><li>Attackers could take advantage of this to manipulate trades and make double profits.</li></ul><p>the report was marked as a duplicate with just an 8-hour difference between submissions. :)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/207/1*E66NAim9xpcuUcgmQalyYA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/287/1*arV6j9mPEqROdGrTOC0b4A.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">linkedin</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d1852a589c79" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Zero-Click Account Takeover [Critical bug]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/zero-click-account-takeover-critical-bug-ab31f27b8674?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab31f27b8674</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Jan 2025 11:33:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:04:30.430Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>قال تعالى: ﴿فَقُلْتُ اسْتَغْفِرُوا رَبَّكُمْ إِنَّهُ كَانَ غَفَّارًا * يُرْسِلِ السَّمَاءَ عَلَيْكُمْ مِدْرَارًا* وَيُمْدِدْكُمْ بِأَمْوَالٍ وَبَنِينَ وَيَجْعَلْ لَكُمْ جَنَّاتٍ وَيَجْعَلْ لَكُمْ أَنْهَارًا﴾</p><p>اللهم صلّ على محمد، وعلى آل محمد، كما صليت على إبراهيم، وعلى آل إبراهيم، إنك حميد مجيد، اللهم بارك على محمد، وعلى آل محمد، كما باركت على إبراهيم، وعلى آل إبراهيم، إنك حميد مجيد</p><p><strong>whoami:</strong></p><p>Hello, my name is Osama Mohammed, known as db3wy on HackerOne. I am a penetration tester and bug hunter.</p><p><strong>Introduction:</strong></p><p>Hi, welcome back to another blog! In this post, we will explore how I discovered a <strong>Zero-Click Account Takeover</strong> vulnerability in a public program on HackerOne. Before we begin, if you haven’t followed our Medium account, please do so. Now, without wasting any time, let’s dive into the story of the <strong>Zero-Click Account Takeover</strong>.</p><p><strong>An Introduction to Account Takeover Vulnerabilities:</strong></p><p>Account takeover vulnerabilities are among the most critical security flaws as they allow attackers to gain full control over user accounts. There are two main types of account takeover vulnerabilities:</p><ol><li><strong>Zero-Click Account Takeover:</strong> This type does not require any interaction from the victim.</li><li><strong>One-Click Account Takeover:</strong> This type requires minimal interaction, such as clicking a link.</li></ol><p>Both types are considered severe vulnerabilities with significant security implications.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/367/1*4fdf1HvDvAp3UguWls60FA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Compromising User Accounts:</strong></p><p>There are numerous scenarios through which user accounts can be compromised, depending on the various functions available within a web application. Without diving into additional details, let’s move on to explaining the vulnerability and how it can be discovered.</p><p><strong>The Discovery Process:</strong></p><p>The story began when I chose a public target on HackerOne. The selected target was an online banking platform that allowed users to receive and transfer money between banks globally. For this discussion, let’s refer to the website as <strong>app.exam.com</strong>.</p><p>I started exploring the site by simply interacting with it, without analyzing the requests in Burp Suite, as I prefer this approach when beginning work on a new target. After a short period of exploration, I decided to start testing the site’s functionalities.</p><p>As usual, I began by checking for CSRF vulnerabilities due to their simplicity and the limited effort required for testing. However, as expected, this approach ended in failure.</p><p>Next, I attempted to find <strong>IDOR</strong> vulnerabilities. During this process, I discovered that a unique token was generated for each account and updated with every session. This token was the sole controller of the account and allowed full control over its functionalities. In summary, this token was the key to managing everything in the account, but unfortunately, it was impossible to brute-force or guess. Consequently, the possibility of exploiting the <strong>Change Password</strong> functionality was ruled out.</p><p><strong>Testing the Forgot Password Functionality:</strong></p><p>Now, I decided to take a break before testing the <strong>Forgot Password</strong> functionality. This feature usually requires significant effort, and I prefer to approach it with a calm and focused mind due to the detailed work involved. After returning from the break, I began exploring how this functionality works.</p><p>It involved two endpoints:</p><ul><li><strong>v1/password_reset/start</strong></li><li><strong>v1/mfa/generate</strong></li></ul><p>Both endpoints operated through a subdomain of the website called <strong>auth.exam.com</strong>. The endpoint <strong>v1/password_reset/start</strong> does not contain the parameter <strong>state_token</strong>, while the endpoint <strong>v1/mfa/generate</strong> does.</p><figure><img alt="v1/password_reset/start without google captcha" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gqfSv2Ic7NUVVnLWO0GyAQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Intercepting the Requests:</strong></p><p>Additionally, when intercepting the request, the response also included another <strong>state_token</strong> that was different from the one in the request. Furthermore, an <strong>OTP (One-Time Password)</strong> consisting of 6 digits was sent as part of the process.</p><p><strong>Brute-Force Attempts:</strong></p><p>I started by testing brute-forcing the OTP, but this approach failed. I then moved on to testing for <strong>race conditions</strong>; however, the application had a restriction that allowed a maximum of 200 OTP attempts at a time, including the correct OTP.</p><p>This raised a question: how can I extract 200 OTPs out of 100,000? I believed that if I reported this vulnerability, it would likely be marked as <strong>Informative</strong>, so I decided to ignore it.</p><p><strong>Further Testing:</strong></p><p>I then decided to go back and test these endpoints again:</p><ul><li><strong>v1/password_reset/start</strong></li><li><strong>v1/mfa/generate</strong></li></ul><p>I hoped that the <strong>state_token</strong> parameter found in these requests might have some leak. At first, I tried to take all the <strong>state_token</strong> parameters from the victim’s account requests and replace them in the attacker’s account, hoping that the OTP would also be sent to the attacker’s account.</p><p>I attempted to manipulate the response and break the token, but all attempts failed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a1nB4t8-kH1WS6loXo5VbA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HfnmzU9mT-5xQDEp5OCVFw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Discovery of the Endpoint:</strong></p><p>However, what I discovered after all this is that the endpoint <strong>v1/password_reset/start</strong> behaves differently based on whether a captcha is requested. When the site requested a captcha, it contained a leaked <strong>state_token</strong>; however, if the site did not request a captcha, it did not contain one.</p><p>As I mentioned, due to the numerous attempts, Google’s captcha appeared on this page. After solving the captcha and sending the request to this page, the <strong>state_token</strong> appeared different in size and even in the data.</p><p><strong>Keeping Track of Tokens:</strong></p><p>In any case, I couldn’t reach any conclusion, but I decided to keep all these <strong>state_token</strong> values from all the requests and responses for the victim’s account.</p><p>I then decided to enter the password recovery process normally for the attacker’s account, receive the OTP, and enter it correctly before sending the request.</p><p><strong>Identifying the Parameters:</strong></p><p>Next, I needed to see what parameters were present in this request and identify the name of the endpoint. The endpoint was named <strong>v1/account/password/set</strong>. I also noticed a parameter called <strong>state_token</strong>. :)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o85zLrKNaZ-oGHfQ7i9D0w.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Moment of Truth:</strong></p><p>Ready, heroes? :)</p><p>Without thinking about anything, I extracted the entire list I had recorded, which contained all the <strong>state_token</strong> values from the victim’s account parameters collected from these endpoints:</p><ul><li><strong>v1/password_reset/start</strong></li><li><strong>v1/mfa/generate</strong></li></ul><p>I replaced them one by one, and <strong>BOOM!</strong> The site accepted one of the tokens belonging to the victim’s account.</p><p><strong>The Successful Token:</strong></p><p>Guess which token from which page worked? Indeed, it was the token that was leaked when the site asked me to enter the Google captcha.</p><p>I don’t know why a token was leaking at this point when the site requested the captcha, while it wasn’t leaking if it didn’t ask for it. But what I confirmed from that day is that I love Google’s captcha. :)</p><p>And that was the story of this endpoint.</p><p>Steps To Reproduce:<br>1 — — -Go to the Password Reset Page:<br>2 — — -Navigate to the “Forgot Password” or “Reset Password” section on the website.<br>Initiate Password Reset for Both the Victim and the Attacker Account:<br>3 — — Enter the victim’s email address in the password reset form.<br>Also, enter your email address (attacker’s email) to initiate a password reset.<br>Capture the Password Reset Request:<br>4 — — -Intercept the HTTP request using a proxy tool like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP when submitting the password reset request.<br>Analyze the Leaked Information:<br>To clarify:<br>Endpoint: /orchestrator/v1/password_reset/start<br>You need to obtain the JWT token from this specific endpoint.<br>The endpoint includes a JWT token, which is necessary for the attack.<br>Make sure to target the correct endpoint that provides the JWT token during the password reset process.<br>Any JWT token belonging to the victim from any other endpoint will not work.<br>Download a tool for Burp Suite called JSON Web Token. It will make your work easier as it highlights the requests containing the JWT token in green, helping you easily identify the correct endpoint<br>Only the mentioned<br>endpoint /orchestrator/v1/password_reset/start is valid and works for obtaining the necessary JWT for the attack.<br>This endpoint may not appear on the first attempt; you may need to repeat the process.<br>Check the intercepted request and identify sensitive parameters such as:</p><p>JWT: JSON Web Token containing the user’s email and other information.<br>save this paramter<br>5 — — — Enter the One-Time Password (OTP) received on your email or phone to proceed with the password reset. →&gt; attacker account<br>Modify the HTTP Request:<br>6 — — — Before sending the password reset request, replace JWT””””” values with the victim’s values obtained from the leaked request.<br>7 — — — — — Send the Modified Request:<br>8 — -Access the Victim’s Account:<br>If successful, you will be able to reset the victim’s password without any interaction from the victim.<br>Log in using the victim’s email address and the new password you have set.</p><p>Done<br>Thank you for watching.</p><p>“Don’t hesitate if you have any questions about anything.<br>I will leave my account for contact.<br>Follow me.”</p><p>LinkedIn Profile :</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy</a></p><p><a href="https://x.com/osamamo23301263">https://x.com/osamamo23301263</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab31f27b8674" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Open Redirect via Image Upload]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/open-redirect-via-image-upload-bf6f87f8d447?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bf6f87f8d447</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-zero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Sep 2024 00:19:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:14:05.408Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Open Redirect Via Image Upload</h3><p>Hello, my name is Osama Mohammed, and I am a penetration tester and bug hunter.</p><p>Hi, welcome back to another blog. In this blog, we’re going to know how I found my (Open Redirect)in the external program. So, before starting, if you haven’t followed our medium account, do follow, guys. So without wasting time let’s get into the story of the (Open Redirect).</p><p>After thoroughly inspecting and exploring the website, I found the function responsible for changing the profile picture. This is one of my favorite functions because it can lead to the discovery of multiple vulnerabilities.</p><p>The first thing I attempted was uploading a shell.php file instead of a profile picture. However, I was unable to obtain a shell despite trying again and using every bypass technique I knew. In the end, I couldn’t succeed.</p><p>At that point, I didn’t give up. I took a few hours to rest due to my continuous efforts to get the shell.</p><p>Later, I tried uploading an image in SVG format, which was accepted by the website. This led me to consider four potential vulnerabilities: <strong>XXE</strong>, <strong>Stored XSS</strong>, <strong>SSRF</strong>, and <strong>Open Redirect</strong>.</p><p>I first attempted to find an <strong>XXE</strong> vulnerability but, unfortunately, I could not exploit it.</p><p>Then I focused on finding a <strong>Stored XSS</strong> vulnerability and was successful. You can find the report in my profile. :)</p><p>Next, I searched for an <strong>SSRF</strong> vulnerability and was also successful in finding it. You can find the report in my profile. :)</p><p><strong>Steps to find the vulnerability:</strong> <br>I uploaded an SVG image, intercepted the request, injected my payload,</p><pre>&lt;?xml version=&quot;1.0&quot; encoding=&quot;UTF-8&quot; standalone=&quot;yes&quot;?&gt;<br>&lt;svg onload=&quot;window.location=&#39;http://0vwsb0oeappr3l1za7as1agllcr3fy3n.oastify.com/&#39;&quot; xmlns=&quot;http://www.w3.org/2000/svg&quot;&gt;&lt;/svg&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WdYTMPbb2ETKC2vVdcMhHw.png" /></figure><p>and completed the image upload process. Then I opened the image I had uploaded in a new tab.</p><p>And BOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOM!</p><p>I successfully triggered <strong>Open Redirect</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZlMzGbLqqpUOIiD83PmeoQ.png" /></figure><p>Done<br>Thank you for watching.</p><p>“Don’t hesitate if you have any questions about anything.<br>I will leave my account for contact.<br>Follow me.”</p><p><strong><em>LinkedIn Profile :<br></em></strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bf6f87f8d447" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Stored XSS via Image Upload]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/stored-xss-via-image-upload-b75edecf1e54?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b75edecf1e54</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-zero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2024 23:38:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:14:37.469Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello, my name is Osama Mohammed, and I am a penetration tester and bug hunter.</p><p>Hi, welcome back to another blog. In this blog, we’re going to know how I found my( Stored XSS) in the external program. So, before starting, if you haven’t followed our medium account, do follow, guys. So without wasting time let’s get into the story of the (Stored XSS ).</p><p>After thoroughly inspecting and exploring the website, I found the function responsible for changing the profile picture. This is one of my favorite functions because it often allows me to discover multiple vulnerabilities.</p><p>The first thing I attempted was uploading a shell.php file instead of a profile picture. However, I was unable to obtain a shell, despite trying again and using all the bypass techniques I knew. In the end, I couldn&#39;t succeed.</p><p>At that point, I didn’t give up, but I took a few hours to rest due to my continuous efforts to get the shell.</p><p>Afterward, I tried uploading an image in SVG format, and it worked. The website accepted images in this format. At that moment, I thought of three potential vulnerabilities I could exploit: <strong>XXE</strong>, <strong>Stored XSS</strong>, and <strong>SSRF</strong>.</p><p>I first attempted to find an <strong>XXE</strong> vulnerability, but unfortunately, I couldn’t exploit it either.</p><p>Then, I moved on to the <strong>Stored XSS</strong> vulnerability. I uploaded the SVG image, intercepted the request, injected my payload,</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dmch4XNRj6s0W_A30hD3Ig.png" /></figure><p>and continued with the image upload process. Afterward, I opened the image I had uploaded in a new tab.</p><p>And BOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOM!</p><p>I successfully triggered <strong>Stored XSS</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pKnJLW81UpwdPXYPhq3GAA.png" /></figure><p>Done<br>Thank you for watching.</p><p>“Don’t hesitate if you have any questions about anything.<br>I will leave my account for contact.<br>Follow me.”</p><p><strong><em>LinkedIn Profile :</em></strong></p><h3><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy</a></h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b75edecf1e54" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[IDOR in Bug Bounty Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/idor-in-bug-bounty-program-8fbbffe32f6e?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8fbbffe32f6e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-zero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2024 23:15:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:14:51.510Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello, my name is Osama Mohammed, and I am a penetration tester and bug hunter.</p><p>A vulnerability has been discovered on the targeted website that allows users to delete documents without permission by exploiting the IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs because the website does not properly verify user permissions when processing document deletion requests. Additionally, the risk is compounded by the failure to verify the important security header “Authorization” on the server side.</p><p>Detailed Description:<br>This vulnerability allows an attacker to delete documents belonging to other users by exploiting a weakness in user authentication. The website relies on two parameters stored in user cookies to identify the document and authorize the deletion, but does not properly verify that the user attempting to delete the document has the appropriate permissions.</p><p>Relying on these cookie parameters poses a security risk, as they can be exploited if an attacker obtains these cookies (via attacks such as XSS or social engineering). Even though direct access to them is currently not possible, this vulnerability poses a significant risk.</p><p>I was also able to delete the Authorization header successfully and the server did not object to this.<br>The two parameters through which I was able to delete other people’s documents are<br><strong>grauth</strong><br><strong>csrf-token<br></strong>They were also fixed values ​​that are never changed for the user<br>This is a greater risk because if I get them, I can delete any file for the victim<br>After I get the ID of his file</p><h3>My journey to find IDOR Vulnerability:</h3><p>I created two accounts on the infected site for example<br>ttps://app.eaxmple.com/</p><p>Then I created a document on the victim’s account so that I could delete it with the attacker’s account</p><p>I deleted a document on the hacker’s account and intercepted the requests using Burp Suite or a similar tool.</p><p>Then I extracted the grauth and csrf-token parameters from the cookies of the victim’s account</p><p>Then I added the values ​​of the two parameters with the document identifier and deleted the document. In the hacker’s account that was obtained from<br>the victim’s account<br>The deleted document will be moved to the “Recycle Bin” folder and you can delete it permanently by following the same steps</p><p>Done<br>Thank you for watching.</p><p>“Don’t hesitate if you have any questions about anything.<br>I will leave my account for contact.<br>Follow me.”</p><p><strong><em>LinkedIn Profile :</em></strong></p><h3><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy</a></h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8fbbffe32f6e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[My first Account-take-over]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/my-first-account-take-over-f6590c4a3a54?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f6590c4a3a54</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-zero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2024 17:58:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:15:31.985Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello, my name is Osama Mohammed, and I am a penetration tester and bug hunter.</p><p>Hi, welcome back to another blog. In this blog, we’re going to know how I found my (Account — take — over)) in the external program. So, before starting, if you haven’t followed our medium account, do follow, guys. So without wasting time let’s get into the story of the (Account — take — over)) .</p><p>“I explored the website’s functions until I found the one responsible for ‘edit-emil.’</p><p>At this point, I realized there was a high likelihood of finding a Account-take-over vulnerability. I needed to confirm two critical things:</p><p>Referrer: I had to make sure the website allowed email changes from different sources. In other words, I needed to check if I could change the email with a referrer that’s different from the original website.<br>For example:<br>Referrer: <a href="https://www.target.com/edit-emil">https://www.target.com/edit-emil</a><br>I confirmed I could change it to anything, such as:<br>Referrer: <a href="https://www.attacker.com/edit-emil">https://www.attacker.com/edit-emil</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sTpXrRPb9KVhhEe6E_ugkA.png" /></figure><p>I succeeded! :)</p><p><strong>We were now 50% closer to confirming the vulnerability.</strong></p><p>Token: This was the hardest part since most websites thoroughly verify it. However, there are various ways to bypass token validation if the site checks it. Now it was time for exploitation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QcTEVEpXZHZwlKa0t_10Kw.png" /></figure><p>response:<br>200 ok</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WRwRUG-8OERbEOWe5zx-UQ.png" /></figure><p>“I quickly created the HTML page, wrote the code, and confirmed the vulnerability.”</p><p>“I know it resembles the CSRF vulnerability I published earlier, but that’s how it is. You can extract multiple vulnerabilities from the same function and with similar steps, sometimes with very slight changes, and they can be even more dangerous. :)”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1KRp8NobFgc-TFHPvvSFWQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rYKGUdvb-F2PBsLhc51deA.png" /></figure><p>Done<br>Thank you for watching.</p><p>“Don’t hesitate if you have any questions about anything.<br>I will leave my account for contact.<br>Follow me.”</p><p><strong><em>LinkedIn Profile :</em></strong></p><h3><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy</a></h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6590c4a3a54" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[My journey to find CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery )]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/my-journey-to-find-csrf-cross-site-request-forgery-ddf1e1bd579d?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ddf1e1bd579d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-zero]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2024 17:29:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:15:53.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello, my name is Osama Mohammed, and I am a penetration tester and bug hunter.</p><p>Hi, welcome back to another blog. In this blog, we’re going to know how I found my CSRF in the external program. So, before starting, if you haven’t followed our medium account, do follow, guys. So without wasting time let’s get into the story of the CSRF .</p><p>until I found the function responsible for ‘Forgot Password.’<br>Fortunately, this website did not require the current password before changing it to a new one.”</p><p>“I realized here that there was a high chance to find a CSRF vulnerability.<br>I just needed to confirm two important things:</p><p>Referrer: I had to ensure that the website allowed password changes from different sources or, in short, that I could change the password with a referrer different from the original website.<br>For example:<br>Referrer: <a href="https://www.target.com/reset-password">https://www.target.com/reset-password</a><br>I confirmed that I could change it to anything, like:<br>Referrer: <a href="https://www.attacker.com/">https://www.attacker.com/</a><br>I succeeded in that! :)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q_Q1JMsXe_ny9pssgJ8z-w.png" /></figure><p>response:<br>200 ok</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HngtPWBY6KdQ6BFCrGpvww.png" /></figure><p><strong>Now we are 50% closer to finding the vulnerability.</strong></p><p><strong>Token</strong>: This is the most difficult part because most websites verify it very well, but there are many ways to bypass it if the site checks the token.<br>Now it’s time for exploitation!<br>I confirmed all the previous steps.<br>The only thing left was the token.<br>I changed my password, intercepted the request, manipulated the token value, and even deleted it, and I successfully changed the password.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r8HbeMkGdtLTbWcvO7nXpw.png" /></figure><p>and BOOOOOOOOOOOOOM <br>CSRF</p><p>“I quickly created the HTML page, wrote the code, and confirmed the vulnerability.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O5UAUcj7MF2RLTzNJdxvMw.png" /></figure><p>Done<br>Thank you for watching.</p><p>“Don’t hesitate if you have any questions about anything.<br>I will leave my account for contact.<br>Follow me.”</p><p><strong><em>LinkedIn Profile :<br></em></strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ddf1e1bd579d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[My first XSS: Reflected XSS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/my-first-xss-reflected-xss-0949992b94ab?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0949992b94ab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-zero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2024 16:22:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T06:16:12.395Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/677/1*rnapvFIhl_eZI9bzadV1bA.png" /></figure><p>Hi, welcome back to another blog. In this blog, we’re going to know how I found my first XSS in the extrnal program. So, before starting, if you haven’t followed our medium account, do follow, guys. So without wasting time let’s get into the story of the XSS.</p><p>During testing, I tried to find an XSS vulnerability in each input, but nothing worked every time I tried. I completely lost hope in finding this vulnerability. However, after taking some time off, I returned and remembered that I can also inject XSS into the URL path of the website.”</p><p>BOOOOOOOOOOM :)</p><h3>Reflected XSS</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D187gUAl7WCey1pwYeLRWA.png" /></figure><blockquote>https://example.com/dashboard.php?user_id=111111<br>I removed ?user_id=111111<br>so the final form became like this</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://example.com/dashborad.php/z%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22osam/a_mohamed%22)%3C/script%3E">https://example.com/dashborad.php/z%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22osam\a_mohamed%22)%3C/script%3E</a></blockquote><p>Done <br>Thank you for watching.</p><p>“Don’t hesitate if you have any questions about anything.<br>I will leave my account for contact.<br>Follow me.”</p><p><strong><em>LinkedIn Profile : <br></em></strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy">https://www.linkedin.com/in/osama-mohamed-db3wy</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0949992b94ab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The first $100 from Bug Hunter]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@osamamohamed21212121/the-first-100-from-bug-hunter-aaee9a0ac547?source=rss-54fa31d6f36a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aaee9a0ac547</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osamamohamed (db3wy)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 03 Aug 2024 20:05:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-03T20:05:12.487Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>0 click acount take over</h3><p><strong>Hello,</strong></p><p><strong>My name is Osama.</strong></p><p><strong>I work at Bug Hunter.</strong></p><p><strong>This is the first vulnerability I have found in an external program.</strong></p><p><strong>I cannot attach images or videos due to the privacy of the programs and to avoid legal issues.</strong></p><p><strong>The steps to find the vulnerability were very easy, and it was due to an error in the server itself.</strong></p><p>let’s goooo</p><p>— — The first $100 from Bug Hunter 0 click account take over Hello, My name is Osama.<br>I work at Bug Hunter.<br>This is the first vulnerability I have found in an external program.<br>I cannot attach images or videos due to the privacy of the programs and to avoid legal issues.</p><p>— — The steps to find the vulnerability were very easy, and it was due to an error in the server itself.</p><p>— — let’s goooo — — I started working on the site and began testing several vulnerabilities, but I wasn’t able to find anything. This was in the early stages of my use of the site. I created multiple accounts on the site to test vulnerabilities.<br>One vulnerability I found was related to broken access control. <br>I started creating multiple accounts on this site to test vulnerabilities related to broken access control. As with any site, after registering an account, a confirmation email is sent to the email address. The email contains a link in this format:</p><p><a href="http://www.example.com/confirm_account.php?key=dsfdaklcdc87d9scsdcs">www.example.com/confirm_account.php?key=dsfdaklcdc87d9scsdcs</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1LhQfxK5pnvCIvskcVem5g.png" /></figure><p>After registering 7 accounts on this site, I attempted to confirm one of these accounts using the following link:</p><p><a href="http://www.example.com/confirm_account.php?key=dsfdaklcdc87d9scsdcs">www.example.com/confirm_account.php?key=dsfdaklcdc87d9scsdcs</a></p><p>BOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOM<br>, I was redirected to another user’s account instead of my own.</p><p><strong>Thank you for listening.</strong></p><p><strong>I wish you a nice day.</strong></p><p><strong>Vulnerability Report Date: 10/7/2024</strong></p><p><strong>Reward Date: 19/7/2024</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aaee9a0ac547" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>