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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Owen Reynolds on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Owen Reynolds on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Owen Reynolds on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Golden Opportunity in VC]]></title>
            <link>https://owen-reynolds.medium.com/the-golden-opportunity-in-vc-fee32b032128?source=rss-5acb13f8e83c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asset-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Owen Reynolds]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2024 13:29:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-16T15:01:27.478Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Two sets of cycles, one offering unparalleled venture returns</h4><p>In my hometown of Chicago, this spring is a spectacular cacophony, thanks to a variety of cycles clicking at the same time.</p><p><strong>A BIZARRE SPECIES</strong></p><p>Species of <em>Magicicada</em>, commonly known as cicadas, are having a bumper season. These large, winged, red-eyed, though largely harmless species are relatives of grasshoppers and locusts — though thankfully lack the penchant for devouring everything in their path.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/418/0*ImCuT6VDMKnakTRi" /><figcaption>Cicada&#39;s beady red eyes, thanks to <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-are-cicadas-180975009/">Smithsonian</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Cicadas are a bizarre species that spring up from subterranean nests on multi-year cycles following a remarkably precise pattern. In addition to annual cycles, the Midwest has 13-year and 17-year sub-species. Many expect this year to be louder than ever thanks to the secular shift of climate change.</p><p>All these cycles are combining at this very moment — creating a Golden Opportunity for cicada’s to have the most successful reproductive season in centuries. The rhythmic drill will be as loud as a gas-powered lawn mower — or worse.</p><p>The last time these cycles coincided was 1803 — and the next time they will do so again is in 2245.</p><p><strong>EVEN MORE BIZARRE</strong></p><p>There’s another bizarre species I belong to that is equally dependent on macro and micro cycles. This species gets a gut check every quarter and a public reappraisal every year at annual general meetings.</p><p>We reach an existential cliff every 3 years, know success only after 10 years, and forget the lessons of previous generations 25 years on, as wisdom sunsets. And we too are subject to the ebbs and flows of longer secular trends far beyond our control.</p><p>Welcome to the Venture Capitalist species.</p><p>Much like Cicadas, the venture ecosystem is at the juncture of several cycles that have created another Golden Opportunity — in this case for LPs like myself.</p><p>As an LP, I’m not selling anything. You may even ask why I would bother telling you all this? Largely because I want to see a healthy, long-term investable pool.</p><p>As a former GP, I’d long dreamt of true benchmarks for our companies–nascent data-driven investing. As an LP, I get to do exactly that using decades of data. As venture funds benchmark unit economics, LPs benchmark fund performance.</p><p>We benchmark previous fund and individual partner performance by IRR, total value of paid-in capital (TVPI) and distributed to paid-in capital (DPI). We study whether those funds (or synthetic mashups of the partners) were above or below the median and why that happened when it did? Were any of those top quartile, top decile? Is this sustainable?</p><p>We strip out top assets to see whether this was an accident, or whether we expect this to happen again — how “robust” the portfolio is. Were check sizes a help or a hindrance?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*u7gI_QWmFgybE3XQ" /><figcaption>Example of IRR Benchmarking: Global Venture, 2018 Vintage, All Sizes</figcaption></figure><p>The exercise is cold, brutal, and tactical — with no room for fudging the numbers if you want to keep any intellectual credibility. And you may ask why it matters? Persistence.</p><p>Fund managers’ ability to replicate performance has been repeatedly studied by Professor <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304808">Stephen Kaplan</a> at University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business.</p><p>Kaplan looks at how previous performance correlates to future fund performance, by quartile. His team sliced the data in dozens of ways across venture capital and private equity, following individual teams, and their successive funds’ performance.</p><p>They found that top performing funds stay top performing funds. In other words, it’s not an accident and it’s not random (like private equity… but we’ll leave that for another day)</p><p>And it’s not just the Sequoias and the Benchmarks. It’s the industry. According to Kaplan, 45% of today’s top quartile funds are following the top quartile performance of previous funds. This is persistence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*M--MuFF9_DbB6GDB" /></figure><p>Now, there are a thousand variables that can and do disrupt the significance of persistence. There’s a reason that the other 55% can’t replicate that success. But the trend holds water under even the recent tech downturn.</p><p><strong>BRINGING THE SPECIES TO LIFE</strong></p><p>Coming back to the real world, I’m sure I don’t have to remind you of how tough it’s been to fundraise for companies or venture funds since November 2022 — the previous Nasdaq peak.</p><p>It’s not just a feeling that it’s harder than it’s been in ages. It actually is. LPs are overexposed and illiquid beyond just the impacts of any lingering denominator effect. Many haven’t been able to recycle potential liquidity from two funds ago as public markets have been traded for growth equity and private equity M&amp;A.</p><p>It’s no surprise that funding allocations to GPs reflect that struggle. In 2023, venture GPs raised 55% less capital, and in 60% fewer fund closings than the peak in 2021, according to <a href="https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/2023%20_Annual_Global_Private_Market_Fundraising_Report.pdf">Pitchbook’s</a> figures below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XeWVPYahNg3pXwd2" /></figure><p>Top performing funds across Europe, I can testify, have finally had a wave of closes over the last 6 months. But most funds will struggle or are being left by the wayside.</p><p>One of the quirks of venture that stuck with me from my earliest days is that it’s the only job you need to reapply to every 3 years. No matter how good you are (or you think you are). No matter how strong your track record, your portfolio companies’ references, and your network. No matter what, GPs have to ask for their jobs back every 3 years.</p><p>They have to ask LPs to trust them for another go at the wheel, another few cycles around the sun. And LPs need to decide whether they have the bandwidth, the budget, the risk-tolerance, and the geographic need to give you that job back.</p><p>The tough truth is that as capital flows into GPs has cratered. It’s a stark reminder to all of us in the venture capital species that we’re all out of a job after a cycle if we don’t perform.</p><p>An increasingly consensus conjecture is that this decrease will have a rather mechanical knock-on effect. If only about half the funding is coming through to venture GPs, those below the median are a relic of the last market cycle. If we cut out that bottom half from 2018, the distribution could look something like this…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ysFWJ_7R0uDtyEao" /></figure><p>Half is admittedly a rough estimate — so make up your own minds about what the reduction will be. Pitchbook already estimates that in the US, there were already 38% fewer “active investors” in 2023 than a year before, or 2.725 firms disappearing. I expect the same trend in Europe.</p><p>As a result, the global venture ecosystem is being re-molded in a smaller, tighter, more efficient image. Funds are in flux. Underperforming partners are being cut. Top talent is migrating to where TVPI held up during the market correction. New funds are emerging to take the places of those that could not deliver. And it’s now easy to see which partners’ deals survived the tide going out. Identifying and accessing truly talented teams becomes the trick–not just indexing on the asset class.</p><p><strong>HISTORY RHYMES</strong></p><p>The last market cycle saw the same — an industry culling. Performance stagnated before and hit a trough during the Great Financial Crisis, but was boosted after the dust cleared. Identifying and accessing truly talented teams becomes the trick–not just indexing on the asset class.</p><p>The bottom quartile of funds floated around zero through 2010, about 18 months after the market bottom. That same year saw top decile performance over 40% IRR, which was surpassed again in 2012, as you can see below from Pitchbook data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IrQSI582p6k0mt5y" /></figure><p>Venture funds take 6–18 months to raise and are deployed over 3–4 years. As the Nasdaq low was in February 2009, we can assume funds 12–18 months later, starting in 2010, escaped the impact. Similarly the Nasdaq low this time was in October 2022–19 months ago today.</p><p><strong>ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE</strong></p><p>In the US, everyone from family offices to pension funds are funnelling capital into VC, into innovation, into startups. Their hunger for high returns and wealth generation tilts the capital balance in favour of entrepreneurs.</p><p>In contrast, European funds are often squeamish about investing into these high risk assets.</p><p>On this side of the Atlantic, private funds’ focus remains staunchly on wealth preservation instead of wealth generation. The assumption is often that as long as the family business is producing cash flow, it’s generating wealth so no one else should be worried about doing the same.</p><p>Pension funds have a similar risk tolerance. There has been a lot of ink spilled on speculating why European pension funds don’t invest much in venture either. In 2022, pension funds only allocated 0.01% of their assets under management (AUM) to venture! According to the <a href="https://stateofeuropeantech.com/fundraising#C4-0-portfolio-overview">2023 State of European Tech</a>, pension funds made up 3.3% of total VC funding, down from 4.9% in 2019.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/820/0*9ZzdsWOe1WzGfgWO" /></figure><p>The drop off may still be thanks to the denominator effect, but even the high water mark is a fraction of US pension fund investments. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43503370">US Pension funds</a>, as far back as 2001 provided 50% of venture investors’ capital and accounted for 1.9% of their own pension fund’s AUM.</p><p>At the same time, COVID lockdowns and a temporarily flat world only disconnected by time zone levelled up everyone. Each founder and venture investor was immediately compared to their best global (often US) counterparts, raising the bar ever higher for the next generation.</p><p><strong>THE GOLD</strong></p><p>Like the Cicada my Midwestern roots, this season is a rare combination of several critical cycles for the venture ecosystem.</p><ul><li>We’re ending the 3 year cycle of managers who will sadly not be able to raise again, leaving only the hardiest of the species.</li><li>The average 10-year economic cycle (this one, sadly, way less precise than the Cicada) which came to an end made those left standing the clear next generation.</li><li>While the 25-year generational cycle saw partners sunset before the recent bubble, reminders of unit economic negligence will stay with the generation for decades.</li><li>European family funds and pension funds are leaving even the best venture investors underfunded, despite clear comparables to global funds during Covid.</li><li>A secular, 700-year-long trend of lower interest rates leaves everyone not guessing <em>if</em> central banks will lower interest rates, but <em>when</em>. (We’ll leave this for a future post).</li></ul><p>What that receding tide has left LPs in Europe is a Golden Opportunity to invest in venture. Unit economics and unit profitability matter again. Fund performance can be faithfully measurable for the first time in a decade.</p><p>The funds that are left in the market are being reshaped, cut apart, or self-shaping to be the leanest, highest performing vehicles in decades. Funds are formally leveraging their networks, sharing meaningful carry-on-interest portions with venture partners, scouts, and advisors.</p><p>And these funds are accessible in Europe. The supply-demand mismatch is large enough that there is plenty of room for family offices to get into not good funds, not great funds, but <em>the best funds</em> in Europe.</p><p>So why would I would share all of this?</p><p>The last market cycle ended badly — for everyone. I understand the funding environment in Europe completely dried up much more so than today. It killed off firms, leaving only those who could cling to the coattails of banks, but not necessarily entrepreneurs to guide the next generation.</p><p>While this time around is different, and we’re already out of the worst, I want a robust ecosystem. I want a competitive, aggressive ecosystem that replenishes itself naturally. So take advantage of this window of opportunity.</p><p>I cannot imagine a better time to be a venture capital LP.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fee32b032128" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SEC’s Private Funds Overhaul]]></title>
            <link>https://owen-reynolds.medium.com/secs-private-funds-overhaul-1b42211a3c07?source=rss-5acb13f8e83c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b42211a3c07</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startupş]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Owen Reynolds]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Sep 2023 07:30:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-15T07:33:31.421Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>&amp; ITS MESSAGE TO EUROPE</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*eWPg9lHLpZwbqaeW.jpg" /></figure><p><em>I originally published this </em><a href="https://www.eu.vc/p/what-secs-private-funds-overhaul#details"><em>article</em></a><em>, alongside a Podcast, with my good friends at the EUVC on August 24th, 2023.</em></p><p>The U.S. SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), which regulates the country&#39;s financial markets, just changed the game for private equity, hedge fund, private credit, and venture capital funds registered in the U.S.</p><p>Yesterday, SEC Chairman Gary Gensler (above) announced the commission <a href="https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-155">Enhances the Regulation of Private Fund Advisers</a>, a set of rules originally proposed in <a href="https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-19">February 2022</a>. And Europe would never be “out-regulated”, so…</p><h3>Backdrop</h3><p>Private markets are, by their nature, opaque. Participants in these markets are not (and in most cases cannot) market to the general public. As such, U.S. regulated funds do not have to conform to the SEC’s regulations for most publicly traded companies.</p><p>From your local bakery to the (theoretically) billion-dollar companies touted in TechCrunch, none of them are going to share their financials. They often arbitrage that information to beat out competitors.</p><p>The general partners (GPs) managing the private funds that invest into these private companies do the same thing — even to their <em>own</em> investors. This next level of investors, the limited partners (LPs), are the big capital allocators like pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and endowments, as well as family offices and other funds.</p><p>In the relentless pursuit of leveraging every informational disequilibrium for their (our) benefits, GPs have indeed created some odd informational gaps. This leaves even the biggest capital movers and shakers (LPs) with less insight than you’d think. To the point that sometimes co-investing LP interests are not even necessarily aligned because of some odd trade-offs, unequal (non-<em>pari passu</em>) rights, and a mesh of side letters.</p><p>The army of financial and legal professionals safeguarding the industry have cordoned it off from the public. To some degree for good measure.</p><p>As this financial enclave’s rites and mores have solidified, so too have the legal docs. As a result, the industry standard for a private market transaction has blossomed to include a series of complex moving parts. Negotiations weigh a “schedule” worth of side letters, preferred treatments, reverse client relationships, and otherwise obscure terms that can mean significant percentages at exit time — in addition to squabbling over share price and vesting timelines.</p><p>The Wild West of private investors rhymes with the pre-1929 public markets in the pre-regulation era. Interests range from truly protecting the retail investors from this web of complexities to pure rent seeking. It&#39;s this former economist’s worst nightmare.</p><p>Almost every GP uses these tools (including this one). It does allow for more nuanced dealmaking, letting both GPs and LPs stack different needs and negotiate to the best of their ability for an efficient outcome. But it ultimately leaves interests in incongruous alignment to say the least.</p><p>Over-performing GPs are perhaps best able to play these games. And because they’re over-performing financially, even some of the world’s largest LPs may have to just accept it to keep their allocation. And despite <em>individual</em> efficient outcomes, the macro transaction costs are enormous.</p><h3><strong>What is in the SEC’s ruling?</strong></h3><p>The SEC ruling changes private funds. The commission aims to level the playing field, especially for small(er) investors, and make it more transparent for all. The new rules will require funds to behave more transparently and treat their LP investors with more uniformity. The LP side of me jumps for joy.</p><p>There are several different “rules” wrapped up in this “ruling” bundle. It includes individual rules on:</p><ul><li><em>Quarterly Statements</em></li><li><em>Private Fund Audit</em></li><li><em>Adviser-led Secondaries</em></li><li><em>Books &amp; Records</em></li><li><em>Prohibited Activities</em></li><li><em>Preferential Treatment</em></li><li><em>Legacy Status</em></li><li><em>Compliance</em></li></ul><p>At first blush, the list looks like a no-brainer. Right? Quarterly statements, annual audits, solid records, and full compliance with authorities are a low bar. (Of course, some funds still don’t do even this.) Still, the majority of the industry is pretty unanimous about pushing for these sorts of good governance practices.</p><p>However, it’s the limits to advisers, prohibition of some &quot;industry standard&quot; activities, and limitations of preferential treatment listed above that has gotten the industry in an uproar. <a href="https://www.pionline.com/washington/republicans-propose-removing-sec-chairman-gary-gensler-restructuring-agency">Republicans reacted</a> to the original proposal by pushing to remove Chairman Gensler and restructure the agency altogether.</p><p>The SEC ruling aims to correct for the industry calcifying around these norms, while making what is already considered “best practices” a “must”. But the nuanced parts of the ruling may risk throwing away the baby with the bathwater.</p><p>On some of the less obvious rules above, the adviser-led secondaries rule forces funds to use a &quot;valuation opinion&quot;. It also requires the fund to disclose relationships with the buyer or seller, and any other material that could impact the value of the sale of those secondaries.</p><p>Prohibited activities primarily prohibits funds from charging fees for all manner of operational items unfairly. It also limits &quot;claw-back&quot; clauses from excluding taxes without justification, and select reverse-client lending without other LP approval.</p><p>Preferential treatment reads as if designed to curb the practice of side letters. The summary concisely states, that the ruling will &quot;prohibit all private fund advisers from providing preferential terms to investors regarding [redemptions and information rights]&quot;… &quot;if the adviser reasonably expects that providing the information would have a material, negative effect on other investors&quot;.</p><p>A lot of that will be picked apart by lawyers much savvier than this writer for years to come. But what most investors used to say was &quot;let&#39;s just put it into a side letter&quot;, and now that practice comes with a raft of other risks.</p><p>Legacy status just helps &quot;grandfather&quot; in funds currently being raised&quot;. And the compliance rule requires all funds, big and small, to write an annual compliance report.</p><h3><strong>What would the SEC’s Private Fund ruling mean to the tech ecosystem?</strong></h3><p>The majority of the ruling aims at providing transparency on performance. As both a GP and LP (at a family office with a dual mandate), transparency is again, a no-brainer. Market participants want to partner with people and firms who are willing to speak openly and open their books — perhaps not to the public, but to investors and potential investors.</p><p>Changing the unique GP-LP norms that have been built up over the years could have a range of consequences. Some of the following levers are likely to be pulled to one degree or another:</p><ol><li>Power Shift to LPs: This seems obvious as information is power. The balance of power over the next cycle on pricing and decision-making would lean in the favour of LPs. That does some limited good for pensioners and sovereign wealth funds who are already (perhaps the most) sophisticated actors. But it will also increase the inclusion of and returns to (often) semi-sophisticated high-net-worth-individuals who can now more-easily compare across plain vanilla rules.</li><li>Decreased GP Democratization: Without tranches for fund size, the bar will be raised for new GPs to raise capital — which could mean fewer, more concentrated GPs. Emerging GPs used to be able to make promises, concessions, etc. (no matter how painful) via side letters to raise their first fund or two. LPs could make these otherwise “on-the-fence” transactions feasible by getting extra security or negotiating for what really matters to them and forgoing what does not. These new rules limit the very flexibility the private capital markets are known for, making new firms less likely to emerge — and a pain in the @$$ for emerging GPs.</li><li>Increased Economic Efficiency: Once the terms and rules are more standardised, one would expect the time and complexity of transactions to be lower. This would drive down the expenses of running a fund, and is designed to trickle down to LPs.</li><li>Entrepreneurial Calculus: More concentrated GPs and power shifting towards LPs could increase the pressure on and the power concentrated into GPs. In turn, GPs may extract returns any way possible, perhaps even at the growing expense of entrepreneurs.</li><li>Regulatory Expansion: Side letters are rife in GPs’ individual investments into companies and projects, leading to similar market dynamics. You can bet that once regulators get a taste for “fixing” this problems, they probably won’t stop there (re: <a href="https://www.amazon.com/You-Give-Mouse-Cookie-Book/dp/0060245867"><em>If You Give a Mouse a Cookie</em></a>). Future rules could even implement the same rules on investments in underlying portfolio companies.</li></ol><p>This former economist loves the prospect of increased economic efficiency and lower transaction costs. Music to my ears. Though if you’re a reader of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_in_the_Twenty-First_Century">Picketty</a>, you’ll recognise that <em>r &gt; g </em>(rate of return to capital is greater than growth, i.e, returns to labor) implies that <em>perfectly</em> efficient long-term macro markets may not benefit the greater good.</p><p>More practically, as a former full time GP (and now on both sides of the table), I am worried about the higher bar to creating new organisations and the consequent concentration of GP capital.</p><p>To be clear, the SEC’s job is investor protection. Their website summarises the commission&#39;s 80+ years of accumulated regulatory oversight as:</p><blockquote>Since our founding in 1934 at the height of the Great Depression, we have stayed true to our mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation</blockquote><p>In that context, the commission&#39;s push for market efficiency, increased information, and a “level playing field” for LPs is no surprise.</p><p>They would have been asleep at the wheel if they didn’t push for more standardisation in the blossoming private capital industry filling the gap left behind the increasingly concentrated public markets. And the mission of facilitating capital formation could be measured by funds raised as easily as number of funds raised. This writer would wager the former.</p><p>The ruling is also consistent with a separate <a href="https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-86">May 2023 ruling</a> aiming to strengthen reporting at the largest private investment firms.</p><p>However, this level playing field could allow more concentrated capital to easily reach GPs while at the same time making GP creation harder. This opens the risk to increased capital accumulation while taking away one of the ladders towards capital distribution available to up-and-coming talent.</p><p>For investment companies (PE- and VC-backed companies are easiest to identify), it may also make the outcomes more binary. If GP capital is more concentrated and the nucleus of power shifts to LPs, bigger GPs will both be able to and be incentivised to exert more power on the majority of their portfolio companies at exit relative to today.</p><p>The most successful companies will remain untouchable. But the range of middling outcomes may become less attractive to entrepreneurs. This could change the calculus of &quot;should I start a company or go into banking/consulting/corporate finance?&quot;</p><p>In effect, the SEC risks helping investors while stagnating innovation and social mobility — maybe even changing the risk balance of entrepreneurship.</p><p>Before you yell &quot;libertarian&quot; for this concern: when an economist, this writer was at the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, writing regulation. Regulators grapple with both power and limitations.</p><p>U.S. regulators are hamstrung by mandates that can be agnostic to, or even get in the way of the public good. Look at this clip from recent documentary, <a href="https://www.netflix.com/title/81460481"><em>Poisoned: The Dirty Truth About Your Food</em></a>, where top US food regulators debate (or neglect to debate) their mandate vs. what’s best for the consumer.</p><p>And don’t get confused, the majority of the things in this SEC ruling are, in fact, no brainers. No honest GP managing anything more than the most micro- of micro-funds could argue that they shouldn’t be reporting quarterly financials and audited accounts to their LPs. And negotiating dozens of terms until the day the money is wired is efficient in the macro sense. But it gets deals done and helps GPs raise funds — and the same goes for underlying portfolio companies.</p><h3><strong>What would this mean for Europe?</strong></h3><p>For the moment, very little.</p><p>However, the U.S. looms large over the daily operations and market movements of European private (and public) capital markets.</p><p>But European regulators do not easily let themselves be “out-regulated”. And as providers of follow-on and public capital for many of Europe’s star tech firms in particular, U.S. investors and new rules they rely on may effect broader compliance even without regulation.</p><p>The same increased reporting, compliance, and term trends are likely to come to European shores in some form, as well. Applause for the drive towards better reporting and compliance, but beware of the fine print.</p><p>I hope that I’m wrong, that the SEC knows exactly what they’re doing, and that they are aligned with the global optimum of the public good. I’m also hoping that the risks pointed out here are far outshined by the power to pensioners, endowments, and true retail access to private market growth.</p><p>But I would encourage European regulators to take pause before doing a copy-and-paste of all of the SEC’s new rules. The mandate those rules cater to provide a unique context that may not easily translate.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b42211a3c07" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Innovation Is Reshaping Everything]]></title>
            <link>https://owen-reynolds.medium.com/innovation-is-reshaping-everything-eae186663996?source=rss-5acb13f8e83c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eae186663996</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[future]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Owen Reynolds]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2023 13:11:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-28T13:11:40.642Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OyjJPuLUp4SF8zLy" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@bloodbrother?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Ilia Zolas</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h4>The Supply-Side Shock Defining the Human Experience</h4><p>The once microcosmic world of startups has grown to shape our reality, in spite of market crashes and banking crises. This is the story of how the once-niche industry will continue to reshape <em>everything </em>— our human experience and our economic fabric. So we&#39;d better make it better rather than worse.</p><h4><strong>In The Beginning</strong></h4><p>Technological evolution has marked almost every turning point in history. From fire and animal husbandry to semi-dwarf wheat and the internet, innovations demarcate distinct epochs our species.</p><p>Despite despots and maniacs who try to throw off the course of change and innovation, human curiosity and optimism prevail. After the dust settles (and oftentimes thanks to the dust), technological development follows.</p><h4><strong>Venture Capital Boosts Tech Trend</strong></h4><p>Innovation, and most recently, venture-backed startups, have begun to reshape the face of our collective reality. This process has fuelled four trillion-dollar companies and a fat tail of change enduring the current market downturn behind them. Taken together, they are shaping our world, our lives, and our interactions.</p><p>As a good proxy, venture capital financing has exploded since the Great Financial Crisis. VC investment in the <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=VC_INVEST#">OECD</a> has grown by 230% from 2007 to 2019. While the US made up 42% of that in 2019, the world is catching up.</p><p>The blossom of this historically niche investment sector has had a ripple effect that&#39;s turned into a tidal wave. Like all innovation, it is compounding — despite the bumps along the way.</p><p>By 2015, Stanford Professor Ilya A. Strebulaev <a href="https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/how-much-does-venture-capital-drive-us-economy">found</a> that 57% of the US stock market&#39;s capitalization was originally venture-backed. The same research found that this wave also accounted for 32% of employees and a whopping 82% of R&amp;D in publically-traded companies.</p><p>Anecdotes from Silicon Valley to Berlin to Bengaluru indicate that the rank and file shed during the market turn is <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/02/17/tech-layoffs-new-founders/?cx_testId=6&amp;cx_testVariant=cx_1&amp;cx_artPos=3#cxrecs_s">only furthering</a> the innovative cycle.</p><h4>The Human Experience</h4><p>That visceral feeling that the venture-backed startup industry is also molding the world is spot on. And new opportunities have always come with new dangers. But no matter how terrifying, humanity&#39;s ingenuity adapts.</p><p>For example, railroads that multiplied across every inhabited landscape pushed productivity to a new level. They rebooted our species&#39; concepts of distance and time. To this day, rail remains the most effective transportation method on land.</p><p>But the invention came with challenges. Every town and neighborhood all of a sudden had the fastest-moving vehicle pummeling straight down its center.</p><p>Our brains were not evolved to account for that kind of a parameter. So parents adopted the behavior to teach children not to cross them and bureaucrats invented rules to govern them. Humans are the only species that does not rely on adapting our brains, but on adopting behavior to manage new circumstances. Old wives&#39; tales grow into chiseled tablets, grow into books, grow into institutions.</p><p>Today&#39;s venture-backed innovators are doing the same — inventing new parameters to shape the human experience. Social media has become both a boon for grandparents and a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/77d06d3e-2b9f-4d46-814f-da2646fea60c">scourge</a> to their very grandchildren. Craft videos on YouTube can quickly turn to body image-defining content. As a parent, we’ve sworn ourselves to flip phones and limit social media unless we’re there — adopting new behavior instead of assuming our monkey brains will ever adapt.</p><p>For every change, humanity will learn, parents will adapt, regulators will challenge, and we&#39;ll adopt new social behaviors. The same will certainly be true of the generative AI, genome editing, and novel energy generation technologies on the horizon. Each at once enables humanity and poses an existential threat. We should focus our efforts not on stalling that innovation, but on co-creating the support behavior to absorb it into the mundane backdrop of human productivity.</p><h4><strong>Economic Playing Field</strong></h4><p>Another lens shows just how impactful technology actually is. The startup world usually lies in stark contrast to the austere, leather-bound book-clad offices of academic economics. However, the latter offers a good way to measure the impact innovation has our ability as a species, our productivity.</p><p>The classic microeconomic theory graphs supply and demand. The downward-sloping demand curve models the general rule that higher prices for a single good will see fewer buyers chasing it. In contrast, the upward-sloping supply curve models more sellers enter a market, the higher prices go.</p><p>If we bundle all the goods in an economy together, we get the same downward-sloping aggregate demand curve and upward-sloping aggregate supply curve. They tell the same stories at the whole-economy level: the higher the prices, the fewer buyers and the more sellers will show up.</p><p>Shocks to demand or supply at the economy-wide level push those curves out or pull them in. These shocks are constantly coming from different directions.</p><p>For example, on the demand side: more cash &gt;&gt; more aggregate demand &gt;&gt; <em>pushes the downward-sloping demand curve out </em>&gt;&gt; higher prices &gt;&gt; higher quantity sold. This models the inflationary impact of the pandemic-related savings glut that consumers continue to spend down into 2023. In addition to consumer spending, government spending, investment, and net exports all have the same directional impact.</p><p>An example on the supply-side: less natural gas &gt;&gt; limits industrial output &gt;&gt; less aggregate supply &gt;&gt; <em>pulls the upward-sloping supply curve in</em> &gt;&gt; higher prices &gt;&gt; lower quantity sold. This models the impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the global (esp. European) shortage of natural gas.</p><p>Both supply and demand shocks can move those curves in our out. And both are eventually absorbed — often painfully — on the road to a new long-term equilibrium.</p><h4>Innovation as a Constant Supply Shock</h4><p>The &quot;innovation industry&quot;, driven by R&amp;D, venture capital, and the like, also has an aggregate, economy-wide impact. It has the opposite effect of the shortage of natural gas in the example above. It is pushing the supply curve out.</p><p>Imagine the upward-sloping aggregate supply curve pushing, like the prow of a ship on a graph. With prices on the vertical y-axis and quantity on the horizontal x-axis, the intersection with any single demand curve pushes prices ever lower and quantity ever higher.</p><p>This is the implicit impact of innovation over history. In recent history, think of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_law">Moore&#39;s Law</a>, derived from a storied co-founder of Intel, the recently deceased <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/intel-co-founder-gordon-moore-dies-94-2023-03-25/">Gordon Moore</a>. He observed that the number of transistors (and thus computing power) doubles every two years over several generations. More transistors &gt;&gt; more productivity &gt;&gt; pushes the supply curve outward &gt;&gt; lower prices &gt;&gt; higher quantity.</p><p>Innovation as an industry drives economic growth, progress, and the story arc of humanity. The recent innovation industry has added computing power per price point to make humanity more productive. And venture-backed biotech and life science investments are similarly saving lives (and extending lives) worldwide.</p><p>We all know how this has played out in the technology space as we all carry around in our pockets what would have been, in living memory, the world&#39;s most powerful computers. But has it played out everywhere else? Are we really getting more for less?</p><p>Well yes, on average, but that doesn&#39;t mean it works as equitably as you&#39;d think. So not everyone gets to benefit.</p><h4><strong>The Other Side of Supply-Side</strong></h4><p>It&#39;s a good chance to clarify the effects technology has on the supply and demand balance by calling out one false cognate. Years back, the era of Thatcher and Reagan tried out supply-side economics. The idea was that tax cuts on capital owners would spur investment, increasing the size of the economy, and boosting aggregate supply.</p><p>Economic theory relies on natural experiments, and this spurred a global experiment. The assumption was that the jobs created by additional investment and added disposable income would drive an increase in demand. That also assumes the supply curve is vertical, such that there are no higher prices in the long run after adjusting for inflation. This would also mean that temporary increases in supply would create long-term increases in demand — sometimes derided as the “trickle-down effect” from rich to poor.</p><p>After decades, of the experiment, most supply-side pushers have died from holding their breath or changed their tune. The trickle-down effect was expected to take a generation or two in the first place. And a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ser/article/20/2/539/6500315">recent analysis</a> of 50 years of data confirms it exacerbates inequality without any meaningful increase in productivity. If innovation continues, the trickle-down is always a drop behind.</p><p>Tax cuts were lauded as the way to juice the aggregate supply curve. Direct technological investment skips the dilutive effect and does just that — move the supply curve out. It&#39;s not as easy as tax cuts, but whoever said that laying golden eggs would be easy?</p><h4><strong>The 2023 Backdrop</strong></h4><p>Any outward pressure on the supply curve from the innovation industry is even more desirable than usual given today&#39;s backdrop. Supply constraint hangovers from the pandemic and supply chain reorganization thanks to newfound global protectionism have been putting the opposite inward pressure on the aggregate global supply curve.</p><p>Demand has simultaneously been pushed out thanks to a global savings glut — as modeled above — also a hangover of the fiscal and monetary stimulus during the pandemic. These factors basically created our current inflationary environment. Real supply-side pressure can help reduce that inflationary gap over the long run.</p><p>Once inflation begins, we see both excess savings and the boost to the working classes from the pandemic quickly eroded by the rise in prices. It’s so well ingrained in economics, it’s dubbed “<a href="https://www.studysmarter.co.uk/explanations/macroeconomics/macroeconomic-policy/inflation-tax/">the inflation tax</a>”. Taken in a vacuum, it is the primary reason that policymakers often call inflation regressive, or bad for the poor.</p><p>Inflation is anchored as wage inflation follows, which is initially a good thing for workers, though eventually pulls aggregate supply back in. The Fed also reacts to reign in inflation through increased interest rates, pulling aggregate demand back in, as well. Wages rarely keep up with prices, and as aggregate demand and supply contract, economies usually go into a recession, hurting everyone.</p><p>However, capital holders are more protected from inflation than consumers. When most of your money is invested (and diversified), inflation will be offset in the long run by the companies in your portfolio increasing their sticker prices first to reflect new costs (like wages). The empirical evidence is coming in as I write this, with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-25/us-corporate-profits-soar-taking-margins-to-widest-since-1950">record corporate profits</a> continuing deep into the worst inflationary period of the current generation.</p><p>In contrast, when most of the money you own is used in daily transactions, inflation eats away at your purchasing power, making you less wealthy. While high inflation like 2022/23 has other negative consequences, it&#39;s hard to say that the families whose cash flows go straight to survival were in a better place than those depending on corporate profits either directly or indirectly.</p><h4>Back to Innovation</h4><p>Thanks to the recent splurge in innovation, the world’s quality of life is better and longer on average. And we could obviously use the downward pressure on prices in the current environment.</p><p>But it&#39;s not all sunshine and rainbows. Children&#39;s suicide rates have multiplied in a decade, as has methamphetamine use, all in the name of innovation. And it is hard to ignore that these uber-productive industries have created more outsized winners — and left many losers in the dust between countries as well as within them.</p><p>Technology is humanity&#39;s curiosity at its apex. To ask us to stop inventing is to stop our species from being. However, tech creators and funders need to be cognizant of their impact on society and the economy. Not doing so risks exposing another defining human characteristic — mob mentality and backlash against change.</p><p>Let&#39;s rather nurture our innovation and our potential. Let&#39;s co-create the structure and behavior to help us cross ever-further frontiers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eae186663996" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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