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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kishin InfoSec on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[# Supply Chain Attack: axios Compromised on npm — Active RAT Dropper Confirmed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@packman_19/supply-chain-attack-axios-compromised-on-npm-active-rat-dropper-confirmed-f0d53d498259?source=rss-576523df923e------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kishin InfoSec]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 04:05:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-31T19:12:00.815Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Supply Chain Attack: axios Compromised on npm — Active RAT Dropper Confirmed</h2><p>**Date:** March 31, 2026.</p><p>**Severity:** Critical.</p><p>**Status:** Active / Developing Incident</p><p>— — -</p><p>On March 31, 2026, security researchers at StepSecurity identified two malicious versions of the `axios` HTTP client library published to the npm registry: `axios@1.14.1` and `axios@0.30.4`. Both were pushed using the compromised credentials of a lead axios maintainer, bypassing the project’s standard GitHub Actions CI/CD pipeline entirely.</p><p>If you installed either version, **assume your environment is compromised.** Skip to [Immediate Remediation](#immediate-remediation) now.</p><p>— — -</p><p>## How the Attack Unfolded</p><p>The incident began with account takeover. The attacker compromised the npm credentials of lead maintainer `jasonsaayman` and changed the account’s registered email to `ifstap@proton.me` — an anonymous ProtonMail address. From there, both malicious releases were pushed manually via the npm CLI rather than through the project’s normal release pipeline.</p><p>This is the key bypass: legitimate axios releases use GitHub Actions with npm’s OIDC (OpenID Connect) Trusted Publisher mechanism, which cryptographically ties a published release to a specific, verified workflow run. A manual `npm publish` produces no corresponding GitHub commit, tag, or Actions run. The result is a package on the registry with no verifiable provenance — a release that exists in npm but not in the GitHub repository history.</p><p>### Pre-staging the Dependency</p><p>The attack was not improvised. The malicious payload was pre-staged roughly 18 hours before the compromised axios releases appeared. A second attacker-controlled npm account (`nrwise@proton.me`) first published `plain-crypto-js@4.2.0` — a clean decoy containing a full copy of the legitimate `crypto-js` source with no malicious code and no `postinstall` hook. The purpose was purely to establish npm publishing history and avoid “brand-new package” flags from automated scanners. Shortly before the axios releases went live, the same account published `plain-crypto-js@4.2.1` — the malicious payload. Socket’s automated malware detection flagged it within 6 minutes of publication.</p><p>— — -</p><p>## Technical Deep Dive: The Phantom Dependency</p><p>Neither `axios@1.14.1` nor `axios@0.30.4` contains malicious code within the library itself. A diff between `axios@1.14.0` and `axios@1.14.1` shows a single meaningful change: the addition of `plain-crypto-js` as a dependency. It is never imported in the axios source. Its only function is to trigger a `postinstall` script on `npm install`.</p><p>```</p><p>axios@1.14.0 dependencies: follow-redirects, form-data, proxy-from-env</p><p>axios@1.14.1 dependencies: follow-redirects, form-data, proxy-from-env, plain-crypto-js. ← injected</p><p>```</p><p>### The Dropper</p><p>`plain-crypto-js@4.2.1` ships a `setup.js` that runs automatically on install. The dropper uses runtime deobfuscation — concealing its C2 address and shell commands until execution — and loads sensitive Node.js modules (`fs`, `os`, `execSync`) dynamically at runtime to evade static analysis. It then detects the host operating system and branches into a platform-specific infection chain.</p><p>#### macOS (`darwin`)</p><p>The dropper writes an AppleScript file to the system temp directory and executes it silently. The AppleScript contacts the C2 server and downloads a second-stage binary to `/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond`. The AppleScript is then deleted, leaving only the dropped binary. The path is deliberate: `/Library/Caches/` is a system-owned directory that is rarely inspected during incident response, and the name `com.apple.act.mond` mimics Apple’s reverse-DNS daemon naming convention — likely abbreviating “Activity Monitor Daemon” — to blend in with legitimate Apple background processes.</p><p>#### Windows (`win32`)</p><p>The Windows chain runs three stages:</p><ol><li>Executes `where powershell` to locate the PowerShell binary path.</li><li>1. Copies the PowerShell binary to `%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe`, disguising it as the Windows Terminal executable and providing a persistent, renamed interpreter.</li><li>1. Writes a VBScript (`.vbs`) to the temp directory and runs it via `cscript //nologo`. The VBScript spawns a fully hidden `cmd.exe` window (UI suppressed) to execute a `curl`-based POST to the C2 server and retrieve the second-stage payload.</li></ol><p>#### Linux</p><p>A Python-based dropper is written to `/tmp/ld.py` and executed to fetch and run the second-stage payload from the C2 server.</p><p>### Self-Destruction</p><p>After infection, the malware deletes `setup.js` and overwrites `plain-crypto-js`’s own `package.json` with a clean stub. Any post-install audit of `node_modules` will see what appears to be a legitimate package with no `postinstall` hook. By the time a developer inspects their dependency tree, the evidence is gone.</p><p>— — -</p><p>## Indicators of Compromise</p><p>### Malicious Packages</p><p>|Package. |Version. |</p><p>| — — — — — — — — -| — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — |</p><p>|`axios`. |`1.14.1`. |</p><p>|`axios`. |`0.30.4`. |</p><p>|`plain-crypto-js`|`4.2.1`. |</p><p>|`plain-crypto-js`|`4.2.0` (clean decoy, still attacker-controlled)|</p><p>### Network Indicators</p><p>|Type. |Value. |</p><p>| — — — — -| — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — -|</p><p>|C2 Domain|`sfrclak.com`. |</p><p>|C2 IP. |`142.11.206.73`. |</p><p>|C2 URL. |`http://sfrclak.com:8000/6202033`|</p><p>### Filesystem Indicators</p><p>|Platform|Path. |</p><p>| — — — — | — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — |</p><p>|macOS. |`/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond`|</p><p>|Windows |`%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe`. |</p><p>|Linux. |`/tmp/ld.py`. |</p><p>### Attacker-Controlled npm Accounts</p><ul><li>`jasonsaayman` — compromised legitimate maintainer account, email changed to `ifstap@proton.me`</li><li>- `nrwise` — attacker-owned account, `nrwise@proton.me`, used to publish `plain-crypto-js`</li></ul><p>— — -</p><p>## Immediate Remediation</p><p>### 1. Roll Back and Pin</p><p>Downgrade to a known-safe version immediately. Do not leave this for the next sprint.</p><p>Commit the resulting lockfile and verify `plain-crypto-js` does not appear anywhere in `package-lock.json` or `yarn.lock`.</p><p>### 2. Rotate All Secrets</p><p>Any machine or CI/CD runner that executed `npm install` against the affected versions should be treated as fully compromised. Rotate:</p><ul><li>All environment variables and secrets stored on the machine</li><li>- API keys and tokens accessible from the environment</li><li>- SSH keys and deployment credentials</li><li>- Cloud provider credentials (IAM roles, service accounts)</li></ul><p>### 3. Hunt for IOCs</p><p>Check network egress logs and the filesystem for the indicators listed above. On macOS, inspect `/Library/Caches/` for any file matching `com.apple.act.mond`. On Linux, check `/tmp/ld.py`. On Windows, look for `wt.exe` in `%PROGRAMDATA%` and correlate against process creation logs.</p><p>Block `sfrclak.com` and `142.11.206.73` at the network perimeter.</p><p>### 4. Audit Postinstall Hooks Going Forward</p><p>In CI environments, consider running `npm install — ignore-scripts` to prevent `postinstall` scripts from executing automatically. This is a meaningful mitigation for this class of attack:</p><p>```bash</p><p>npm install — ignore-scripts</p><p>```</p><p>— — -</p><p>## The Bigger Picture: What This Attack Reveals</p><p>This incident follows a pattern that is becoming a reliable playbook for supply chain attackers: compromise a trusted maintainer account, bypass automated security controls by publishing out-of-band, and bury the payload in a transitive dependency rather than the target package itself.</p><p>A few structural observations worth internalizing:</p><p>**Manual publishes are a detection signal.** Legitimate releases from well-maintained projects follow automated pipelines. A package that appears on the registry without a corresponding commit, tag, or Actions workflow run is an anomaly worth investigating. Tools like StepSecurity’s npm security monitoring and Socket’s automated detection both flagged this attack precisely because the release was anomalous, not because the code was obviously malicious.</p><p>**Transitive dependency injection is specifically designed to avoid review.** Most developers scrutinizing `axios` would look at the axios source. Nobody audits `plain-crypto-js@4.2.1` unless they are doing a full dependency tree inspection. The 18-hour pre-staging of a clean `4.2.0` version was a deliberate attempt to defeat “new package” heuristics. It nearly worked.</p><p>**OIDC Trusted Publishing raises the bar significantly.** The attack succeeded because the attacker only needed stolen credentials — no code review approval, no branch protection, no signed commit. OIDC-based publishing binds a release to a cryptographically verified workflow run, meaning stolen credentials alone are insufficient. Prioritize packages and internal tooling that enforce this.</p><p>**Lockfiles are not optional.** Using `package-lock.json` or `yarn.lock` and pinning exact versions rather than semver ranges limits exposure to this class of attack. A pinned lockfile would not have automatically pulled `1.14.1` on the next install.</p><p>This is an active incident. Follow StepSecurity and Socket for updates as the full malware analysis continues to develop.</p><p>— — -</p><p>## Sources</p><ul><li>StepSecurity: [axios Compromised on npm — Malicious Versions Drop Remote Access Trojan](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/axios-compromised-on-npm-malicious-versions-drop-remote-access-trojan)</li><li>- Socket: [Supply Chain Attack on axios Pulls Malicious Dependency from npm](https://socket.dev/blog/axios-npm-package-compromised)</li><li>- GitHub Issue: [axios/axios #10590](https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10590)</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f0d53d498259" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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