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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by PA on Medium]]></title>
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        <link>https://medium.com/@panosa?source=rss-9df2de8a0744------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by PA on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Precarious by Design: The New Hyper-Gig Economy in an Age of AI]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@panosa/precarious-by-design-the-new-hyper-gig-economy-in-an-age-of-ai-8e28a6377d15?source=rss-9df2de8a0744------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8e28a6377d15</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jan 2025 12:42:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-20T12:42:22.788Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>“They say the gig economy is great for freedom and flexibility. But honestly, how free do you feel when you’re chasing pennies on ten different apps, never sure if your next rent check will be covered?”</blockquote><blockquote>“Just drive more hours,” the platforms say. “Pick up more gigs.”</blockquote><p>Once upon a time, “gig work” conjured images of rideshare drivers, online freelancers, maybe a food delivery hero dashing around on a bicycle. Over the last decade, these platforms managed to transform entire industries — replacing in-house staff with on-demand contractors, paid per job rather than per hour. But what happens when this trend collides with AI that can automate half the tasks we do now?</p><p><strong>That’s the “Hyper-Gig” economy:</strong> the next stage of precarious, piecemeal labor where each “job” is chopped into micro-tasks, available for whoever can complete them fastest and cheapest.</p><h3>Death by a Thousand Micro-Tasks</h3><blockquote>“We used to apply for jobs. Now we look for tasks?”</blockquote><p>AI excels at slicing work into its component parts, then handing those bits to humans only when the machine can’t figure them out. Think data labeling, QA checks, edge-case customer service queries — things that require a pinch of human intuition. Instead of hiring a single customer support agent with benefits and a monthly paycheck, a company can ping out hundreds of five-minute tasks to a global pool of freelancers. The lure for businesses is obvious: <strong>pay only for the exact minutes worked, with no downtime, vacations, or overhead</strong>.</p><p>Sounds efficient, right? From the company’s standpoint, sure. But for the workers, it’s a nightmare of constant hustle. You’ve gone from “I work for X company” to “I do quick tasks for twenty different platforms, each paying pennies per piece.” That’s not career-building — <strong>it’s a digital hamster wheel</strong> where you’re racing people halfway across the globe for the same morsel of pay.</p><p>We saw the earliest hints of this on platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk — a site that’s been around since the mid-2000s. There, workers literally chase tasks like tagging images or transcribing short audio clips. The pay is often laughable (“two cents per tag” anyone?), but it’s a glimpse of how the entire labor market could look once AI automates routine tasks and leaves humans the leftover bits.</p><ul><li><strong>Routine Data Processing</strong>: Automated.</li><li><strong>Software QA</strong>: Mostly machine-checked, with leftover anomalies sent to you in ten-second bursts.</li><li><strong>Content Creation</strong>: AI writes 95% of it, then you’re paid a fraction to “polish” or verify.</li></ul><p>Welcome to the age of sub-divided, ephemeral work.</p><h3>Data: The Unspoken Commodity</h3><p>Here’s the kicker: every micro-task you complete — labeling images, proofreading AI text, or validating supply-chain records — feeds <em>more</em> data into the AI that might eventually replace your role entirely. This dynamic was already happening with rideshare drivers “teaching” self-driving cars. Now it’s seeping into every nook of white-collar work too.</p><p>A translator corrects AI-translated sentences? Boom — the AI gets smarter, your future pay gets slashed. A QA tester clarifies error messages for a software dev tool? The system logs your input, training the algorithm so the next batch of tasks requires fewer humans. It’s the ultimate feedback loop: humans refine the AI that puts them out of work.</p><h3>Survivors and Losers</h3><p>“What about the folks who can’t handle the hustle?” they ask, with a shrug that suggests it’s a personal failing. But in real terms, a huge chunk of middle-income and lower-income workers could be squeezed out.</p><p>You might jump from one micro-task site to another, earn sporadic bursts of pay, and never find a stable footing. No benefits, no sick days, no pension, and an algorithm deciding if your quality score is high enough to stay on the platform. If it dips, you’re booted with no real appeal process. Meanwhile, your mortgage isn’t going away, and your grocery bills don’t magically shrink.</p><h3>The Global Tidal Wave</h3><p>Perhaps the scariest part is how this dynamic bleeds across borders. If local conditions in, say, the U.S. become too dismal, you can’t necessarily “move to where the jobs are,” because the “jobs” are ephemeral tasks. “Escape” is nearly impossible. Now multiply that frustration across continents. “AI can’t handle this edge case yet!” might be the rallying cry of entire communities forced into micro-labor that’s, at best, precarious, and at worst, exploitative.</p><p>A global race for the same limited scraps. If that doesn’t sound bleak, consider what happened in Greece when unemployment hit nearly 30% — young people flooded out, entire industries collapsed. Now picture a large-scale version of that with no single place for young people to flee to, because the entire planet is competing on the same hyper-gig platforms.</p><h3>Final Thoughts: A Warning Shot</h3><p>The Hyper-Gig economy is already creeping in around the edges, with micro-task websites, AI-checking side hustles, and piecemeal freelance platforms promising “flexibility.” If left unchecked, it could swallow significant portions of the labor market — white-collar, blue-collar, no-collar. While mainstream media touts the “efficiency” of these developments, many workers smell a trap. “Efficient for whom?” they ask.</p><p>Ultimately, if we don’t confront the forces driving this fragmentation — corporate obsession with short-term cost savings, investor pressure to show perpetual growth, and the absence of strong worker protections — then the “Hyper-Gig” future might be less a hypothetical scenario and more our collective reality, looming just over the horizon. Because once the tasks get parceled out and the wages drop to cents, you can’t pay your bills in “micro-dollars,” no matter how many platforms you sign up for.</p><p><em>This is an AI generated article — with human guidance.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e28a6377d15" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Technological Unemployment :: Societal Collapse]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@panosa/technological-unemployment-societal-collapse-29fed1b2a17e?source=rss-9df2de8a0744------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/29fed1b2a17e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[singularity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unemployment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jan 2025 11:19:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-13T11:19:52.851Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Technological Unemployment :: Societal Collapse</h3><p><em>A 20% increase in unemployment can trigger societal collapse</em></p><blockquote><strong><em>“They say the answer is ‘just move to where the jobs are.’ But I’ve got a family, a mortgage, and a life rooted here. I can’t uproot everything overnight.”</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>“They promise that ‘new jobs will appear’ once AI takes over. I’m still waiting to see these magical replacements — and I can’t pay my bills with promises.”</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>“They keep calling it ‘progress.’ I just call it a paycheck I can’t depend on anymore.”</em></strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KpoU9VT_2NEbRGY8hK4dMA.png" /></figure><p>The current hype over artificial intelligence has moved from idle tech futurism to everyday headlines. One reads puff pieces proclaiming that “robot assistants” will usher in a new era of abundance; another warns about the “end of white-collar work.” In the frenzy, it’s hard to separate hyperbole from genuine risk.</p><p>Still, there’s a common refrain: “<strong>Don’t be scared, because new technology <em>always</em> creates new jobs.</strong>” Pundits repeat this the way they once chastised laid-off factory workers in the 1990s — if you can’t keep up, that’s your fault. What they fail to address is the rate at which AI is already displacing jobs. Historically, major shifts like the <strong>Industrial Revolution took place over a century, giving multiple generations time to adapt.</strong> But if partial automation — say 20–30% of jobs — happens in a single decade, there’s no built-in cushion for workers.</p><p>We’ve seen before that when <strong>unemployment hovers around 25%</strong>, entire national economies buckle. Think about Greece in 2013: unemployment spiked to nearly 28%. The result wasn’t some sudden impetus to “learn new skills.” <strong>It was chaos — emigration, bankruptcies, and an unraveling of social safety nets</strong>. When Greece’s unemployment rate shot up to nearly 30% in 2013, it wasn’t just a momentary shock — it tore through the country’s social fabric. Stores and small businesses shuttered in droves: by some estimates, <strong>over 100,000</strong> small and medium-sized enterprises closed their doors between 2008 and 2013. Youth unemployment soared above <strong>50%</strong>, forcing thousands of young people with college degrees to pack up and leave. In total, between <strong>300,000 and 500,000</strong> Greeks — many of them skilled professionals — emigrated in the early years of the crisis, causing a “brain drain” that still reverberates. <strong>A global automation crisis will not allow the ‘pressure valve’ of emigration. </strong>Meanwhile, the public safety net began to unravel under the pressure of austerity: <strong>pensions were slashed</strong> multiple times, <strong>hospitals struggled </strong>with staffing shortages, and funding for <strong>schools hit rock bottom.</strong> Far from sparking a wave of “job retraining,” these conditions left many Greeks in survival mode, with <strong>entire families depending on a single pension or turning to charity for basics like food and medication</strong>. Instead of a chance to “learn new skills,” the crisis became a test of endurance — pushing Greek society to its limits.</p><p>Now imagine a wave of automation that doesn’t just sweep through American offices, but also zeros in on call centers in the Philippines, financial hubs in Frankfurt and London, retail floors in Brazil, and manufacturing lines across Southeast Asia. <strong>If 20–30% of those workers become redundant in a few short years, the desperation we saw in Greece in 2013 could replay on a planetary scale.</strong> Supply chains would be rocked — companies that once relied on human labor in Vietnam or Mexico might suddenly run automated factories closer to home. Meanwhile, weaker social safety nets in places like India or parts of Africa would be overwhelmed by mass job losses, driving people to migrate or accept ever-lower wages. Instead of a push for “upskilling,” many communities might find themselves in pure survival mode, much like Greeks did — except this time, <strong>there’s no single country left unscathed to offer the lifeboats.</strong></p><p><strong>We cannot just hope and pray that “the benefits will trickle down,”</strong> and that the cost of goods will drop so low we can all live more comfortably. This same promise was made in past waves of automation, from the mechanized factories of the Industrial Revolution to the digital boom of the 1990s. Yet while certain goods became cheaper, wages for the average worker often stagnated — or fell behind the cost of living. Productivity soared, but wealth concentrated in fewer hands. If history teaches us anything, it’s that <strong>lower prices don’t automatically compensate for lost jobs</strong>. A laid-off accountant still has rent or a mortgage, groceries, and healthcare to worry about. Even if the price of, say, clothes or electronics goes down, those savings mean little if you no longer have a steady paycheck. At the national level, <strong>shrinking tax bases and ballooning welfare costs can squeeze public services like education and infrastructure</strong> — right when people need them most.</p><p>Look to the 2008 recession for a glimpse of the broader consequences: as millions lost work, consumer spending collapsed, triggering a domino effect of bankruptcies and foreclosures. <strong>Now scale that to a global workforce where AI accelerates job cuts from Southeast Asian factories to American insurance firms to African telemarketing centers.</strong> Even if certain goods become cheaper, entire industries — along with local communities — could be hollowed out, unable to “buy into” this allegedly brighter, cheaper future. <strong>Meanwhile, giant corporations remain mostly insulated, scooping up the market share of local competitors who fold under pressure.</strong> This isn’t just theory; it’s exactly what happened in the so-called “retail apocalypse” of the 2010s. As consumers shifted en masse to convenient one-stop giants like Walmart and Target — and particularly to online behemoths like Amazon — mom-and-pop shops, department stores, and small retail chains in towns across America were left struggling to survive.<strong> Thousands of physical stores shuttered: </strong>well-known brands that had been around for decades suddenly vanished, leaving behind empty storefronts on once-thriving main streets. Take a stroll through any suburban strip mall of that period, and you’d find <strong>more “For Lease” signs than open cash registers</strong>. The local hardware store that used to sponsor Little League teams was replaced by an Amazon warehouse miles away — good for fast deliveries, but devastating for the neighborhood economy. Without foot traffic from those smaller retailers, nearby businesses — like coffee shops and barber shops — lost customers too.<strong> Local tax revenues plummeted just as social services and unemployment claims began to climb.</strong> In short, it wasn’t just about e-commerce “winning” over brick-and-mortar; it was about entire communities watching their economic ecosystems unravel. Now, with AI accelerating automation in finance, healthcare, and even creative sectors, we risk seeing the same pattern repeated at a broader scale. <strong>The largest corporations, able to absorb the costs of new tech and weather any short-term turbulence, stand to grow bigger and richer </strong>— while smaller players, who can’t adapt as quickly or invest as heavily in AI, may well face the same fate as those small retailers of the 2010s.</p><p>Critics accuse those who question AI’s promises of “fearmongering” or “resisting progress,” in much the same way they wrote off the white working class that voted for Trump in 2016 and 2024. They said those voters were “stupid” or “privileged,” without engaging the underlying economic dread felt across demographics. Today, the same cavalier attitude is directed at the possibility of mass displacement by AI: <strong>if you’re worried, you must be ill-informed or just not tech-savvy enough</strong>. But people are simply tired of being told by mainstream media that the <strong>market will sort things out</strong>, tired of hearing that<strong> they can “upskill”</strong> when they’re one missed mortgage payment away from homelessness. And if the big players (those with the political and economic clout) remain dismissive of these realities, don’t be surprised when the electorate lashes back in ways that so-called experts fail to predict yet again. Ultimately, the conversation around AI must shift from lofty rhetoric about “societal progress” to pragmatic policies ensuring that <strong>when 20–30% job displacement comes, we don’t face yet another wave of despair</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=29fed1b2a17e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Change we can believe in]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/life-after-neoliberalism-popomo/change-we-can-believe-in-55ba58ed38ef?source=rss-9df2de8a0744------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/55ba58ed38ef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Dec 2016 14:47:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-01T17:45:26.842Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><em>“The liberal media keep telling the majority of Americans who voted for Trump that they are stupid. We’re not stupid, just mad and tired of the media’s lies. We want our country back.” — </em>Ron Marol (Moxham, PA)</blockquote><p>The 2016 presidential election was nothing short of a disaster: the “Trump effect” has emboldened the far right-wing, and given rise to a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38149406">startling rise in hate crimes</a>. Trump may have lost the popular vote, but how was he able to even come so close in the first place?</p><p>There’s been <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/krugman-white-working-class-2016-11">a lot of talk</a> about how the white working class “stupidly” voted against its own “interests.” It seems like a plausible theory; for one, how is it in the “interest” of the economically downtrodden to elect an ostentatious billionaire? Most pundits structured their argument around a single (stated or unstated) premise: these people were too stupid to know what was good for them. Whenever pundits were not outright condescending, they allowed the white working class some sort of agency, usually by saying that it did go along with its “interests” by electing someone who appealed to their “white” or “male privilege.” This election, in other words, was won by racism and misogyny.</p><p>Both of these approaches are almost entirely incorrect.</p><p><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/11/debunking_myths_about_trump_voters_with_exit_polls.html">To start, exit polls have shown that white voters shifted towards Trump (from Romney in 2012) by one percentage point</a>. It seems that if racism has reared its ugly head, it is doing so in incremental amounts. In fact, the key (electoral) shift was when whites went from being +12% Republican in 2008 to +20% Republican in 2012. In 2016, however, the Republicans’ lead had only climbed by one percentage point to +21%. The supposed tidal wave of racism that catapulted Trump to office is hard to find.</p><p>On the other hand, one hears little talk about the startling shifts among non-white voters. Black voters, while solidly Democratic (88%), saw a 7% change towards Trump. This is perhaps to be expected, with the historical aberration of Barack Obama’s presidency. Less expected are the significant changes in Asian and Latino voters, who respectively shifted 11% and 8%. This relative lack of enthusiasm for Hillary Clinton on the part of non-white voters was a big factor in her loss.</p><p>So why did ~60,000,000 Americans decide to vote for Trump? Was it because they didn’t care about his misogyny? This definitely applies to 55% of Trump voters who said that his “treatment of women” bothered them not much or at all. But the other 45% of Trump voters who said that it bothered them “some” or “a lot”, were not saying that his sexism didn’t exist. Nor were they saying that it didn’t trouble them. They were saying that other factors were more important.</p><p>So what, then, was more important to voters?</p><p>One clue is provided by an exit poll that asked voters, “‘Which one of these four candidate qualities mattered most in deciding how you voted for president?’ The options were ‘has the right experience,’ ‘has good judgment,’ ‘cares about people like me,’ and ‘can bring needed change.’ 56% of voters picked one of the first three categories, and Clinton won these voters handily. But 39% of voters picked the fourth quality — ’can bring needed change’ — and Trump got 83% of those votes. <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/11/debunking_myths_about_trump_voters_with_exit_polls.html">The ‘change’ factor overrode everything else.”</a></p><p>But what does ‘change’ mean? Some might intuitively think that people wanted, first and foremost, the economic situation to change. In a way, they are correct in thinking so: “The economy was the big issue — […] a majority (52 percent) of voters said the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/10/the-13-most-amazing-things-in-the-2016-exit-poll">economy was the most important issue facing the country.”</a></p><p>It is puzzling that Clinton captured 10 percent more than Trump among these voters; if Hillary Clinton represented the established way of doing things, why would voters choose her to change our economic situation, when she is promising more of the same policies that got us here in the first place?</p><p>When one examines the exit polls a little more, things get even more surprising; there was a clear shift (16%) towards Trump (from 2012) among people making under $30,000 a year. Amongst those making $30,000 to $49,000 there was a 6% shift. Then, the numbers start to move towards Clinton. Those making $50,000 — $99,999 saw a 2% shift in Clinton’s direction, and by the time one gets to the $100,000 — $200,000 range, one sees a 9% shift in Clinton’s favor.</p><p>Another key figure is among whites with college degrees, Clinton saw a 10% swing; among whites without a college degree, Trump gained 14%. These figures seem to indicate that something important is happening:<em> there was a shift of most of the working class, as a whole (including blacks, whites, latinos, women, men, etc), towards Trump</em>. Trump represented change; not from our current (neoliberal) order as a whole, but from certain aspects of it. These “aspects” were the symptoms of a much larger revolt against the system. As one commentator put it, “the election was a referendum on globalization and demographics; it was not a <a href="http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2946-bill-fletcher-jr-quick-reflections-on-the-november-2016-election">referendum on neo-liberalism</a>.” This means that Trump’s appeal to whites was “around their fear of the multiple implications of globalization. This included trade agreements AND migration. Trump focused on the symptoms inherent in neo-liberal globalization, such as job loss, but his was not a critique of neo-liberalism. He continues to advance deregulation, tax cuts, anti-unionism, etc. He was making no systemic critique at all, but the examples that he pointed to from wreckage resulting from economic and social dislocation, resonated for many [working class people] who felt, for various reasons, that their world was collapsing.” Trump’s solution was “protectionism plus firm borders.”</p><p>Clinton appeared in many ways the stronger candidate when it came to the economy, with strong ties to Wall Street. The Clinton campaign’s choice to not press the subject of the economy, instead resorting to the ‘no alternative’ narrative, seems questionable in hindsight. Beyond that, ignoring a large part of her constituency that demanded radical economic change towards social democracy proved to be a losing strategy. After the debates, voters were asked to rate two separate messages: one attacked Trump for his extreme attitudes and behavior. The other demanded <a href="http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Dcor_PE_RTR_Ealert_11.15.2016_for-release.pdf">“big economic changes and [attacked Trump] for supporting trickle-down and protecting corporate special interests.”</a> They found “that the tough economic message performed dramatically better in consolidating millennials, white unmarried women and white working class women.” Instead, Hillary Clinton only gained one percentage point among women (from 2012), while losing five percentage points (among men) to Trump.</p><p>In the end, Clinton tried to win on the basis of identity politics; she calculated that if only white males favored Trump, she could coast to victory. She also assumed that she would get similar turnout numbers that looked, more or less, like Obama’s; pulling the “Trump monster” card was supposed to bring hordes of scared voters to the polls. This was a fatal miscalculation; unlike Barack, who represented “change,” Hillary had only fear to peddle. And even though she had a positive margin among voters primarily concerned about the economy, she could almost have certainly won more. The strategic choice of ignoring economic reform in favor of trying to win on the basis of identity cost her the election.</p><p>Overall shifts in voter attitudes show that the platform of identity politics (and neoliberal economics) failed miserably, their net result being to give fuel to the reactionary fire; <em>it not only failed to do what it set out to accomplish, but helped to bring about its exact “opposite.”</em> This ultimately means that fighting for the things that identity politics wants (an end to sexism, racism, etc) will have to entail some sort of radically different economic program. In other words,<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html"> “those who [can only] play the identity game should be prepared to lose it.”</a> With a far right on the rise, both around the world and in the US, this is not on a game that we can afford to play.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=55ba58ed38ef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/life-after-neoliberalism-popomo/change-we-can-believe-in-55ba58ed38ef">Change we can believe in</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/life-after-neoliberalism-popomo">Life After Neoliberalism: PoPoMo</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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