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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Vaibhav Parakh on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Vaibhav Parakh on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Vaibhav Parakh on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Loaning Conditionality: Tryst with Conditional-Aid]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/thedialogues/loaning-conditionality-tryst-with-conditional-aid-eb44e52a5ea1?source=rss-5e6345908f0c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[imf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[loaning-conditionalities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[loaning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aids]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Parakh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Oct 2016 20:42:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-08T11:40:28.252Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>IMF has often been documented using its influence to promote controversial austerity and liberalisation measures, capable of severely impacting the poorest people around the world.</blockquote><p><strong>By — </strong><a href="https://medium.com/u/5e6345908f0c"><strong>Vaibhav Parakh</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*F12La3all1IDbiGS.jpeg" /></figure><p>Whether it be the prolonged starvation of children in Africa, the Middle East conflict stretching the land mass, and the refugee crisis henceforth, what remains common is the need of aid–­–institutional aid—for the emancipation of those caught in the cross fire, forced under dire circumstances to lead a life they didn’t choose to and thus my essay elaborates how yet again it seems to be the hegemony of the West, to continue nursing the bottlenecks to economic freedom of LDCs. Aid to least developed countries and even developing countries have gone on to be marked as ‘White Man’s Burden’, rather than ‘White Man’s Responsibility’ not forgetting many developed nations do in fact owe to developing nations reparation costs for the damage done, physically as well as psychologically.</p><p>The International Monetary Fund has been the foremost authority on monetary policy moderation in the world, financial stability, fostering international trade, and exchange rate stability along with operating perhaps the most important and arguably the most controversial apparatus of Conditional Loaning mechanism critiqued often on the grounds:</p><p>1.) Not taking into account the status quo domestic economic conditions;</p><p>2.) Being biased against low and middle income countries</p><p>The International Monetary Fund (IMF) issues loans which comes with policy change conditions attached­­ — these conditions that have played a significant role. The nature of Loans being labelled as ‘Excessive Burden’ and ‘Politically sensitive’ has led to several reviews at the IMF and has resulted in the introduction of conditionality-free Facilities, often which are touted as being myopic on the ground for them being limited in scope. IMF claims that they have reduced conditions to critical reforms as agreed by the recipient governments but the IMF has had success in increasing the number of structure conditions that dictate policy changes per loan, and its engagement in highly politically sensitive areas.</p><h3>Nature of Conditionality</h3><p>IMF has often been documented using its influence to promote controversial austerity and liberalisation measures, capable of severely impacting the poorest people around the world.</p><p>This is worrisome for the borrowers belonging to developing countries bracket who seem to have limited voice and stand as minority at the IMF. In 2010, agreements to validate the voting voice of the nation blocs in minority was proposed but the resolution could not see the day of light as the United States which commands the majority voting power—albeit enough to veto all the all these kinds of decision unilaterally—failed to ratify the aforementioned proposal while the European Governments have high hopes from the eight out of the twenty-four seats at the IMF’s executive board.</p><p>According to the study ‘Conditionally Yours’ authored by Jesse Griffiths and Konstantinos Todoulos, they made the following recommendations:</p><p>• IMF should stay true to its mandate which is the ‘Lender of the Last Resort’ to countries facing imminent balance of payment crisis. Such countries are not in need of lengthy programmes that need major policy over haul however are in dire need to shore up public finances.</p><p>• The IMF lending creates a serious problem for a country, if at all it faces protracted and serious debt problems. The solution being fair and transparent debt work-out procedures which needs to be of top priority both at regional and national levels, IMF being the major creditor cannot be staged as a venue for the development of such debt-work out procedure as it would be conflicting with its interests.</p><p>• IMF needs to radically overhaul its governance structure to give developing nations a fair voice and vote, and to radically improve transparency and accountability addressing the crisis of legitimacy it faces.</p><p>The rationale supporting the IMF conditionality is that the country in fiscal crisis should only receive loans if they reform their policies—the precise agreed reforms and microeconomic targets are set out in the conditions attached to the loan. IMF has argued that these are necessary reforms for the borrowing country as it restores macroeconomic stability and growth but often these reforms have come under scrutiny for covering range of policy areas not linked to the core competencies of the IMF. In most cases the IMF loan deal is sealed with the presentation of the letter of intent accompanied by Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies(MEFP). In theory, the onus of drafting and sending the letter of intent lies with the government of the borrowing country.</p><p>Stark reality being, that the IMF is heavily involved in drafting programme documents and the design of the conditions attached. According to IMF’s claim it recognises the ownership of the borrowing governments but on the contrary, the IMF’s own Independent Evaluation Office(IEO) has found that 84% of the staff at IMF recognised that the first draft of the programme and loan conditions was prepared by the IMF and the situation has not changed since 2008. Real ownership should be more than the acceptance of the government but is should be an evolutionary process entered around parliaments and the civil society organisations(CSO).</p><p>The Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenuik who once said,</p><blockquote>“We will meet all IMF conditions…for a simple reason…we don’t have any option.”</blockquote><h3>Two-Pronged Approach</h3><p>The IMF loans come with two different types of conditions attached to it — Quantitate conditions and Structural Conditions.</p><p>• Quantitative Conditions also known as the Quantitive Performance Criteria(QPC) are set of macroeconomic targets which are to be met by the government of the borrowing nation for example the level of fiscal deficit allowed in the government budget.</p><p>• Structural Conditions come in two different forms: -</p><p>• Prior Actions:These are binding conditions which must be fulfilled before the loan is granted.</p><p>• Structural Benchmarks:These are not binding but are influence the performance review of the country carried out by IMF every 6 month, giving the final mood to the approval of the subsequent loan tranche.</p><p>Due to the widespread criticism of the IMF increasing the structural conditionality during the 90s period by the civil society organisations and the borrowing Governments led to the IMF streaming its practices resulting which the first set of conditional guidelines were laid out in the year 2002 setting the template for future loan approvals with the road objectives of:</p><p>• Streamlining Practices</p><p>• Focusing more on the areas of core-competence and expertise</p><p>But according to Eurodad’s (European Network for Debt and Development) research, the IMF has backtracked on some issues and changes in the conditions are slow:</p><p>• The number of conditions per programme actually increased 2005 onwards.</p><p>• 1/3rd of all the conditions belonged to the sensitive areas comprising of liberalisation and privatisation.</p><p>The IMF introduced a new loaning facility by the name of Flexible Credit Line(FCL) programmes, which are primarily loan programmes that come without any conditions attached to it, implying there is no need for changes in the government policy of the countries adjudged as good performers. But unfortunately, the policy is only meant for countries which according to the IMF are considered to have ‘very strong economic fundamentals and policy framework’.</p><p>IMF has cleverly circumvented the criticism attached to imposing conditionality by not imposing it but attaching a pre-condition of ‘very strong economic fundamentals and policy framework’. So far only Mexico, Poland, and Columbia are successful in using the FCL.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Policy reform is a slow and a tedious process and hence, donors can be more effective if they persuade the recipient country rather than forcing the reforms. As explained by Oliver Morrissey, the policy dialogue concept is based on persuasion as opposed to coercion which implies that the recipient is the owner of the policy to be implemented rather than the onus to be on the donors. Also the recipient through policy dialogue would be able to adopt policies at a faster rate keeping in mind the history of policy and how it was adopted by other recipient nations. Thus, opening window to social learning by observing the policies adopted by member nations. For example, Kenya willingly prepared a PRSP (Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper) much influenced by the success of the Uganda’s adoption of the PRSP.</p><p>It’s the need of hour, for the developing countries to reorganise themselves into an effective bloc to push forward for policy initiatives, through state building mechanisms to benefit the masses and to reduce human collateral due to our own endeavours to conquer each other.</p><h3>Bibliography</h3><p>1.) IMF (2012) Enhancing the IMF’s focus on growth and poverty reduction in low-income</p><p>countries. http:// <a href="http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/520a34d709fc3.pdf">www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/520a34d709fc3.pdf</a></p><p>2.) Center for Economic and Policy Research (2013) Macroeconomic Policy Advice and the Article</p><p>IV Consultations: A European Union Case Study http:// <a href="http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/">www.cepr.net/documents/publications/</a></p><p>article- IV-2013–01.pdf, p.5.</p><p>3.) IMF (2013) IMF Resources and the G20 Summit <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/">https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/</a></p><p>sdrfaqs.htm</p><p>4.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Financing the Fund’s Concessional Lending to Low-Income Countries</p><p>http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/concesslending.">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/concesslending.</a> htm</p><p>5.) Eurodad (2011) Critical Conditions — The IMF maintains its grip on low-income countries http://</p><p>eurodad.org/ uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/critical_conditions. pdf, p. 15.</p><p>6.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Financing the Fund’s Concessional Lending to Low-Income Countries</p><p>http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/concesslending.">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/concesslending.</a> htm</p><p>7.) IMF (2014) Factsheet: Extended Credit Facility http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/</a></p><p>ecf.pdf</p><p>8.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Standby Credit Facility http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/scf.htm">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/scf.htm</a></p><p>9.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Rapid Credit Facility http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/rcf.htm">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/rcf.htm</a></p><p>10.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Standby Arrangements http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/</a></p><p>sba.htm</p><p>11.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Extended Fund Facility http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/</a></p><p>eff.htm</p><p>12.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Policy Support Instrument <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/">http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/</a></p><p>psi.htm</p><p>13.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Financial Credit Line http:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fcl.htm">www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fcl.htm</a></p><p>14.) Change this to IMF (2013) Factsheet: Precautionary and Liqidity Line (PLL) http://</p><p><a href="http://www.imf.org/external/">www.imf.org/external/</a> np/exr/facts/pll.htm</p><p>15.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: Rapid Financing Instrument <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/">http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/</a></p><p>rfi.htm</p><p>16.) IMF (2013) Factsheet: IMF Lending <a href="http://www.imf./">http://www.imf.</a> org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm</p><p>17.) Financial Times (2014). <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/">http://www.ft.com/intl/</a> cms/s/0/75cde896-</p><p>a300–11e3–9685–00144feab7de. html#axzz2v4KIeMlM</p><p>18.) IEO (2005) Evaluation of structural conditionality in IMF supported programmes http://</p><p><a href="http://www.ieo-imf.org/">www.ieo-imf.org/</a> ieo/files/issuespapers/051805.pdf, p.6.</p><p>19.) IMF (2002) Guidelines on conditionality https:// <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/">www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/</a></p><p>guid/092302.htm</p><p>20.) Eurodad (2008) Critical Conditions. The IMF maintains its grip on low-income governments</p><p>http:// eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/ critical_conditions.pdf</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eb44e52a5ea1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/thedialogues/loaning-conditionality-tryst-with-conditional-aid-eb44e52a5ea1">Loaning Conditionality: Tryst with Conditional-Aid</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/thedialogues">The Dialogues</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fractional Reserve Banking: A Century Old Fraud]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/thedialogues/fractional-reserve-banking-century-old-fraud-4c57ef1610af?source=rss-5e6345908f0c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fractional-reserve]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[articles]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Parakh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2016 05:10:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-17T17:21:48.077Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><em>“Monetary System requires deliverance, not a reprieve”</em></blockquote><blockquote>Robert K. Landis</blockquote><p>Critics of Fractional Reserve and related Fiat Paper Monetary System may refer it to by the term, ‘Debt Based Monetary System’ or ‘Credit Based Monetary System’. They also refer to money created in parallel with debt as ‘Debt Money’ or ‘Endogenous Money’ reflecting the fact that money is created either to facilitate the needs of individuals, business or governments further in indebting themselves to banks. The credit has been termed as endogenous money because the money supply is flexible, expanding in parallel with the demand for debt and stalling and contracting when the demand for debt declines. It’s also connoted as a perverse and a dysfunctional way of expanding the monetary base of any economy.</p><p>To avoid mainstream hysteria amongst the general populace, the term ‘Debt’ has been replaced with the term ‘Credit’ and is only practically distinguishable after the money is created. Most mainstream economists rarely discuss about debt being referred to as credit or vise-versa and hardly bother with the original money as it is to their staunch believe that the origin of money or the volume of their insurance don’t really matter in the long run as propounded by another theory, ‘Money Neutrality’. But the whole idea behind not considering alternatives to fractional reserve banking doesn’t augur well with me, It could be perhaps the mainstream economists and banking moguls are too reluctant to change the system which so set up eludes from the very premise of trickling down effect, or the people are so conditioned that they may never question themselves.</p><p>In August 2004, four years before the Global Financial Crisis of September 2008 and the ongoing financial crisis in Europe and elsewhere, Austrian commentator Robert K. Landis stated the following:</p><blockquote><em>“No, the die is cast: we shall have the catastrophe. Our fiat monetary system got a reprieve in the 1980’s, not a deliverance, all that has happened since, with the fantastic mis-pricing of credit the Greenspan Fed has engineered, and the massive global malinvestment this has endangered, is that the dimension of the unravelling has become direr.”</em></blockquote><p>Before we delve into further arguments, let’s first learn what exactly Fractional-reserve banking Implies: -</p><p>It is a widespread banking practice in which only a fraction of bank’s demand deposit are kept in reserve and available for immediate withdrawal, whilst the remaining deposits are immediately lent out to borrowers ( and so is never actually available for immediate withdrawal by the legitimate depositors).The bank in effect lends out most or even all of the funds it receives in demand deposits, whilst at the same time guaranteeing that all deposits are available for immediate withdrawal upon demand. The practice of Fractional Reserve Banking expands credit and so does money well beyond what it would be in a stable money system. So how does it work?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WKXfG96mF0fK6x6x.png" /></figure><p>Let’s say government for-sees a credit crunch in the economy and to alleviate any signs of early on recession it borrows money from a central bank or a reserve bank as against promissory notes, promising to return the money back to central bank with due interest but the time period may not be specified. Voila and like magic we have an expanded money supply, but wait, the promissory notes or the money never existed in the first place. Only 3% of money supply is fiat and the rest 97% is electronic. The government does expand the money supply but without any sovereign instrument backing it; not only does it lead to devaluation of currency effectively decreasing your real income implying rise in the domestic prices. Case in point: Value a rupee in 1966 (7.5 rupees = 1 dollar); Inflation can never be stopped and more so is interesting how the government pays back money to the central bank. <strong>It never does</strong>. Money borrowed, itself is non-existent, the promissory notes only exist theoretically but practically they too are non-existent. The borrowed money (debt) can never be repaid. Debt in case of an individual to bank or government to its central bank, can never be repaid. What more interesting is so the whole of money supply is just the principle amount but banking is done on the premise of interest, so logically next pertinent question is, how to repay the loan with interest? <strong>We cannot</strong>. There is nothing to show for interest.</p><p>According to Murray Rothbard of Ludwig von Mises, fractional reserve banking should be considered as an embezzlement, but it is legal now. The bank is technically insolvent, because it cannot pay debt as and when they fall due-the deposit being due instantaneously at any time, however, unless the customers(depositors) demand too much money at once-or too many loans fail-it can continue running without the customers ever noticing that their money was gone. If the bank’s customers lose confidence in the chances if the bank’s repayment, they van decide, en masse to cash the deposits in. The loss of confidence, if it spreads from a few to a large number of bank depositors is called a bank run. Unless the central bank intervenes or the bank comes to its rescue, a bank run is always fatal, because by the very nature of the Fractional Reserve banking, the bank cannot honour all of its contracts.</p><p>To put forward historical perspective, under the leadership of Andrew Jackson, the 7th president of United States of America, USA was the only economy that was debt ridden from 1835–1913 until the tabulation of Federal Reserve Act which then succeeded the Central Bank.</p><blockquote><em>“If there were no debt in our money system, there wouldn’t be any money”</em> — Marriner Eccles, Governor of the Federal Reserve (September 30th 1941, House Committee Hearing on Banking and Currency)</blockquote><p>Fast-forward to 21st century, there is now a growing a voice of dissent against the fractional reserve banking. Positive money in the UK is such a movement which aims to outstrip private bankers of the banking mechanism called ‘Quantitative Easing’ which is employed to bolster the money supply by having interest rates in the negative in the short-run, and tending to 0% in the long-run.</p><p>In the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, with the resurfacing of the ‘Chicago Plan’ of 1933 titled ‘Chicago Plan Revisited’ proposed by Jaromir Benes and Michael, endorsing the original ‘Chicago Plan’ — two economists at the IMF — Switzerland will hold a referendum — popularly known as ‘Vollgeld’ (Full money initiative) — to consider ending the practice of fractional reserve banking. The father of the original Chicago Plan, Irwin Fischer had reiterated the following benefits of non-fraction reserve banking:</p><p>· Greater control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, including the unpredictable expansion and contraction of banks’ credit and, consequently, the supply of banks’ created money.</p><p>· The complete elimination of bank runs.</p><p>· A dramatic reduction — if not complete elimination — of net government debt.</p><p>· A dramatic reduction in private debt since money creation is no longer tied to debt creation.</p><p>Iceland the only country where private bankers are cuffed, upped the ante by publishing a report commissioned by the prime minister entitled, <em>“Monetary Reform: A better monetary reform for Iceland”</em> which studied in depth the feasibility of the end of fractional reserve banking. According to the author ­of the paper, Frosti Sigurjonsson:</p><blockquote><em>“[The report] proposes a radical structural solution to the problems we face. The feasibility of and merits of that specific solution need to be debated. But whatever the precise policies pursued, they must be grounded in the philosophy which the report proposes — the money creation is too important to be left to bankers alone.”</em></blockquote><p>Iceland being smaller nation than Switzerland can contain the ramification if the suggestions of the report were to be implemented, but if the practice of fractional reserve banking were to come to an end in Switzerland, there will be a spill-over effect affecting the way money is being created.</p><p>After 171 years, Andrew Jackson might turn in his grave in hopes of his dream of public instead of private money to be fulfilled again.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c57ef1610af" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/thedialogues/fractional-reserve-banking-century-old-fraud-4c57ef1610af">Fractional Reserve Banking: A Century Old Fraud</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/thedialogues">The Dialogues</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Conundrum of Welfare State]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@parakhdvaibhav/conundrum-of-welfare-state-2b01960f3448?source=rss-5e6345908f0c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b01960f3448</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-fundamentalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[white-elephant]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[welfare-state]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[greece]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Parakh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2016 04:55:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-12T20:43:49.338Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>“Tussle of power between the precariat and the plutocrats”</blockquote><p>By — Vaibhav Parakh</p><p>Welfare state as opposed to a socialist state endeavours to secure ‘welfare’ of its population by not just conforming to the fundamental principle of a sovereign state — A state which through its machinery, the government seeking to provide justice, affirmative action, rule of law and a laundry list of ‘public goods’ — but unlike any other socialist state, working on the premise of ‘utilitarian approach’, doesn’t seem to direct or control all the production units but affords direct state intervention in policy decisions providing social security, education, medical care, transfer payments; often monopolising or dominating unlike the classical liberal state which contents itself with the creation of peaceful conditions, abolishment of conventional inequalities, for its population to naturally endeavour and secure their welfare. But the ‘welfare state’, in the name of bridging the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, plunges itself to secure welfare, often redirecting the course of wealth from the ‘have nots’ to ‘haves’ than the other way around. Quite similar to ‘tragedies of the common’, the constituents of the population want to take as much as they can from their neighbour and vice versa, triggering a nationwide extortion of benefits they are not entitled to though given the premise, the benefits are coming out of their taxes but taking back from society more than they give back.</p><p>The utopian world as idealised by Sir Thomas More is a testament to the burgeoning gap between the ideal and reality and how the gap has been failed to bridge even with the turn of the century. At the root of it lies the <a href="https://javedjamil.com/the-devil-of-economic-fundamentalism-d27df083105a#.jqx6t42ws">economic fundamentalism</a> that drives the states and international organisations to pursue policies that maximizes the gains of few elites and takes care of their vested interests over the needs of the masses. Relying on the concept of the moral hazard, it begs to explain the activities private entrepreneurs undertook to maximise their gains with potential of huge loss working on the premise of disbursement of funds by the international organisations to bail them out. Owing to studies on the Asian Crisis, the concept of white elephants gain prominence where state would rally behind such entrepreneurs.</p><p>Question concerning the stature of modern welfare state is Greek in nature. Modern Greece according to political theorists is a melting pot of economic disaster — an economic bomb which went off in 2015 when Greece missed the IMF (International Monetary Fund) payment. Greece then shall serve as a precautionary tail for years to come. Post World War II, it was one of the most devastated nations solely in terms of human casualty and it wasn’t until 1974 that Greece was successful in establishing itself as a liberal democracy. Seven years down the line, it got its membership into the European Community (EC), the then nine member states organisation adopting the currency euro in 2002. During that period within which Greece got into the EC, public debt stood at the tune of 28% of the GDP; budget deficit standing at meagre 3% of the GDP; and the unemployment rate stood between 2–3%. In 1981, the Socialist Party of Andreas Papandreou (PASOK) was at the helm of political affairs; reigning in the destiny of Greece to an economic turmoil three decades later. The economic crisis as a well-founded feature of the welfare state isn’t unwarranted but has deep ideological roots and in the case of Greece, it was well rooted in the events which transpired after the World War II. Post 1945 event, all the European nations vied to create a welfare society, an egalitarian approach to creation of wealth, distribution and subsequent allocation of wealth. But owing to the welfare policies formed by PASOK — a complete disaster on the economic front — succeeded in formation of welfare state exuding over bearing presence in the economic activities, practically intruding and arbitrarily intervening in private economic affairs and the continuing political legacy built upon the defunct policies offering no respite but welfare populism and cronyism.</p><p>Creation of wealth in principle is supposed to be a positive-sum gain as opposed to zero-sum game, that is, the gains are not balanced by losses but the former outweighs the latter and as such a state’s primary responsibility is to form policies for a regulated trade if not completely free trade — as proposed by the laissez faire ­– to avoid exploitation of the workers at the hands of those who command political or financial power. But in the case of Greece, the government in a bid to become a welfare state, discouraged private entrepreneurship, heavily regulated private affair and with the social security polices at work, discouraged individuals with any incentive to innovate. According to the statistics<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> published by the World Bank, Greece stood at 109th out of 183 countries in ease of doing business. Greece doesn’t fare well in starting a business, employing workers, protecting investors with 140th,147th and 154th rank respectively. Greece does have acquired a high rank, standing at 43rd when it comes to closing a business. The macroeconomic adjustment programmes (MAP), formulated by the Troika (International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, European Commission) blew the lid on the social security measures ushering in waves of reforms broadly consisting of fiscal reforms to generate savings; structural reforms to generate growth and competitiveness such as privatisation of public assets and deregulation of labour market; and banking reforms calling for banking recapitalisation and resolution mechanism. The three decades the Greek public enjoyed resulted in accumulation of 177% of the GDP in 2014 and subsequently the GDP came down to about 27%, unemployment stood above 25%, youth unemployment above 60%. The very welfare schemes to aid the public now came to be akin to albatross hanging around the neck. In the case of Greece, wealth wasn’t created but borrowed, with the inclusion in the EU, credit became cheap and plentiful with stabilised euro. In 1980, the public debt stood at 28% of the GDP which grew to 89% by 1990 which then ballooned to 140% of the GDP by 2014. Exclusion of social policies was considered a political suicide and these then in turn became rights fundamental to all the citizens of Greece.</p><p>To add to the miserable failure of the Greece government, the in-house IMF study marked ‘strictly confidential’, IMF had disclosed that the shutdown of Greek bank and impositions of capital controls had taken a heavy toll on the banking system and the economy leading to a further deterioration in debt sustainability. According to the IMF study Greek debt would now peak at close 200 percent of the economic output in the next two years, compared to a previously forecast high of 177 %. Even by 2022, the debt would stand at 170% of gross domestic product, compared to an estimate of 142%. Gross financing needs would rise to above 15% of GDP threshold deemed safe and continue rising in the long term.</p><p>The sorry state of Greece was a consequence to the inefficiency of the Greek government mired in corruption and welfarist interventions which robbed the nation state of any recovery. After the two bailout packages announce in 2014, the European Central Bank imposed capital controls on the banks of Greece which impeded the day-to-day banking activities, to this end people were only allowed to withdraw fifty euros, constraining their finances. At the thick of it was Germany and other plutocratic nations that made sure the bailout packages bailed their banks out and not the Greek economy itself. It would require basic understanding of economics to ascertain the fact that with decrease in household spending due to capital controls in place, economic growth cannot be spurred in the private industry, thereby dooming the economy for a considerable time. Not only it’s a testament of how through banks and not tanks, sovereignty of a nation can be compromised but it’s the economic slavery that is pointed out to which will act as retelling of how the welfare state failed to secure welfare of its subjects despite all efforts.</p><p>This article <a href="http://theindianeconomist.com/conundrum-welfare-state/">“Conundrum of Welfare State”</a> appeared first on The Indian Economist</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Data.worldbank.org, data set belonging to 2014–15</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b01960f3448" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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