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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Park Yeung on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Park Yeung on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Park Yeung on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building on StarkNet: A Primer for New Developers Migrating from Ethereum]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/building-on-starknet-primer-54aa6e5aba22?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[developer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[starknet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cairo]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jul 2022 20:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-05T20:42:21.997Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Understanding sequencers and provers, account abstraction, memory management, and the current state of StarkNet developer tooling.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/795/0*HS0q1ShpTWgQbXRg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>StarkNet is the second ZK rollup solution in development by StarkWare and adds support for general purpose smart contracts and composable ecosystem applications.</li><li>There are a number of important differences between StarkNet and Ethereum that new and aspiring developers should be aware of.</li><li>First, StarkNet is a ZK rollup, meaning it bundles together hundreds, even thousands, of transactions into a single, succinct proof. Sending a transaction or deploying a contract to StarkNet therefore works differently than it does on Ethereum. There is a sequence of operations involving sequencers, provers and verifiers, and transactions must be approved both on Layer 2 (StarkNet) and Layer 1 (Ethereum).</li><li>Second, whereas Ethereum runs on an account-based transaction model, in StarkNet the concept of an ‘account’ is not defined out of the box. This feature, called account abstraction, makes accounts on StarkNet much more customisable, but also harder to grasp and interact with.</li><li>Third, smart contracts on StarkNet are written in Cairo, a low level, assembly-like programming language optimised for use with validity proofs. It has a number of quirks and syntactic features that give it a steeper learning curve than Solidity. These include, for instance, its non-deterministic, read-only memory model, use of recursive functions, implicit arguments, and more.</li><li>Four, because StarkNet is so much newer than Ethereum, it has far less available developer tooling. That said, there is certainly enough to get started, and may even become dangerous with.</li><li>It’s really exciting to see the vibrant and growing community of developers building on StarkNet. If you are a current or aspiring Cairo developer and would like to work together on any problems, please feel free to reach out.</li></ul><p>In an earlier <a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/scale-or-sink-a-review-of-layer-2?s=w">article</a>, I wrote about Layer 2 scaling solutions as a way to offload traffic from Ethereum mainnet and increase the scalability of the network.</p><p>With more smart contract developers migrating to StarkNet (the current leading general purpose ZK rollup), I thought it would be useful to highlight some of the core differences between StarkNet and Ethereum.</p><h3>StarkNet recap</h3><p>StarkNet is the second ZK rollup solution in development by StarkWare, a deeply technical Israeli team comprising some of the most experienced individuals in blockchain scaling.</p><p>An improvement upon StarkEx (its predecessor), StarkNet adds support for general purpose smart contracts and the composability of ecosystem applications. Smart contracts on StarkNet are written in a proprietary language called Cairo, meaning they are not natively compatible with Ethereum. However, developers can use a transpiler known as Warp to syndicate EVM compatibility.</p><p>StarkNet is currently live on mainnet in alpha and looking to scale up its throughput rapidly. A growing ecosystem of applications is already building on StarkNet, including Immutable, Sorare, dYdX and others.</p><p>Let’s break down some of the key differences between StarkNet and Ethereum.</p><h3>Difference 1: Contract deployment</h3><p>StarkNet is a ZK rollup, meaning it bundles together hundreds, even thousands of transactions into a single, succinct proof for publishing to the Layer 1 network. Because of this proving mechanism, deploying contracts and submitting transactions works differently on StarkNet than it does on Ethereum.</p><p>In Ethereum, the process is relatively simple: users submit transactions to validators, who process those and mine them as blocks on the blockchain. In StarkNet, the process is more complex (as shown below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yy7FQrlNcnppCiuA.png" /></figure><p>The sequence of actions (and actors) is as follows:</p><ol><li>A <strong>user</strong> submits a transaction to send ETH, or to call a smart contract function.</li><li>The transaction is received by <strong>sequencers</strong>, who decide on the sequence of transactions for inclusion in the next block.</li><li><strong>Provers</strong> generate a STARK proof of the computational integrity of the block, which encapsulates complete information about the bundle of transactions to be included in it. <em>Note that sequencing and proving are currently centralised and performed by StarkNet only, but there is a roadmap to decentralise these toward community ownership.</em></li><li><strong>Verifiers</strong> validate the computational integrity of transactions, but more importantly registers them back onto the Layer 1 blockchain (Ethereum). This is done to leverage the consensus mechanism of Ethereum and ensure state transitions are correctly registered on both chains.</li><li>Once verified, the transaction is mined as a block on the Layer 2 blockchain (StarkNet) and is considered <strong>accepted on Layer 2</strong>. However, it needs to go through one more step before it is deemed final and immutable.</li><li>Lastly, the transaction, or more accurately the proof of its validity, is <strong>mined on Layer 1</strong> (Ethereum). Once complete, the transaction is considered final on both Layer 1 and Layer 2.</li></ol><h3>Difference 2: Account abstraction</h3><p>Ethereum runs on an account-based transaction model, meaning it represents assets as balances within user-owned accounts. In StarkNet, the concept of an ‘account’ is not really defined out of the box.</p><p>This has two interrelated implications:</p><ol><li>In StarkNet, accounts must first be defined before they can be used. In fact, when setting up a new wallet for the first time, users must first deploy their address to the network using an ‘account’ smart contract, so that it can start sending and receiving funds.</li><li>The abstraction of accounts means that there is much greater flexibility over the way in which transactions are signed and executed. For example, accounts can be upgraded over time to use a different signature validation scheme (rather than being tied to KECCAK-256 as with Ethereum). Accounts can also be customised to allow payments to be made from external wallets / contracts.</li></ol><p>Account abstraction can be hard to wrap one’s head around. A useful analogy is to think about it in the same way as data types in the context of high level and low level programming languages.</p><p>With a high level programming language like JavaScript, data types such as strings are pre-defined and useable out of the box, whereas with a low level programming language like C, strings are simply one-dimensional arrays of characters and must be manipulated manually using bitwise operations. Conceptually, accounts in StarkNet are analogous to strings in C — they need to first be defined in order to be used. In practice, this makes accounts both harder to interact with for developers, but also substantially more customisable. Indeed, companies like <a href="https://www.argent.xyz/blog/wtf-is-account-abstraction/">Argent</a> are now making use of account abstraction to build social recovery and other UX features directly into StarkNet wallets in a way they could not with Ethereum.</p><h3>Difference 3: Cairo</h3><p>Smart contracts on StarkNet are written in Cairo, a low level, assembly-like programming language optimised for use with validity proofs. Cairo is very efficient and well-optimised for the Cairo VM, but its downside is that it has various quirks and syntactic features that give it a (somewhat) steep learning curve. Here are some of the main ones to be aware of.</p><h4>a) Memory management model</h4><p>Like some other functional programming languages, memory in Cairo is read-only. This means that once you have written a value to memory, it can no longer be changed.</p><p>To <a href="https://www.cairo-lang.org/docs/hello_cairo/dict.html">syndicate</a> read-write memory, Cairo uses dictionaries or maps to track the value of variables and record subsequent updates to their value. This works like a set of accounting entries (or indeed Bitcoin’s UTXO model) — the dictionary records a series of credit and debit operations that, when tallied up, derives the current values of the variables.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/0*j1cexo93mcn3Lkpc.png" /></figure><h4>b) Recursion</h4><p>Another consequence of Cairo’s memory system is that it does not allow for the use of loops. Developers normally use loops extensively in their applications, but in Cairo, loops aren’t allowed because memory is immutable (meaning the iterable cannot be properly updated to reflect changes in state).</p><p>To circumvent this, loops are replaced with recursive functions. Unfortunately, recursive functions are less efficient than loops, and can also make basic operations more complicated to perform.</p><h4>c) Non-determinism</h4><p>Another feature of Cairo’s memory system is its non-determinism. Cairo is primarily used for generating proofs — and these can be verified in one of two ways: either by starting with the program output and work backwards to arrive at a valid input, or by starting with an input and showing that it correctly derives the asserted output (a property known as non-determinism).</p><p>Nondeterministic pseudocode, known as <em>hints</em>, are instructions to tell the prover to use a certain input when computing a proof. This is a quirk of Cairo that helps to optimise the proving process.</p><h4>d) Implicit arguments</h4><p>Certain low-level operations are too expensive to perform in Cairo and must be outsourced to the Cairo CPU. This is done by importing builtin modules as implicit arguments, to introduce support for low-level operations like reading and writing. For the end developer, it can mean that the list of arguments imported to a function doesn’t always match with what is actually used in the body of the function (which can be confusing for new developers).</p><p>—</p><p>Cairo is still a relatively new language, and there are ongoing initiatives to abstract away low-level features and improve its friendliness for developers. Until then, the <a href="https://www.cairo-lang.org/docs/">documentation page</a> is a good resource for understanding all of Cairo’s quirks.</p><h3>Difference 4: Developer tooling</h3><p>Ethereum has been around for several years now, and there is an ever-growing set of libraries, frameworks and other tools to help make life easier for devs. StarkNet is still relatively new and there are far fewer tools available. However, there is definitely enough to get started, and maybe even become dangerous with. Below is a non-exhaustive list of essential tools for new builders in this space:</p><ul><li><a href="https://goerli.voyager.online/"><strong>Voyager</strong></a>: a block explorer for StarkNet, similar to Etherscan for Ethereum.</li><li><a href="https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/nile"><strong>Nile</strong></a>: a command line framework for bootstrapping and developing StarkNet projects. Nile is to StarkNet what Hardhat is to Ethereum, and will often be the starting point for new builders.</li><li><a href="https://github.com/Shard-Labs/starknet-devnet"><strong>Starknet Devnet</strong></a>: Starknet Devnet is like Ganache but for StarkNet. It allows users to setup a local instance of the StarkNet blockchain for use in smart contract development and testing.</li><li><a href="https://github.com/0xs34n/starknet.js"><strong>starknet.js</strong></a>: the official JavaScript library for interacting with StarkNet, similar to ethers.js for Ethereum. There is also <a href="http://starknet.py/">starknet.py</a> for Python, and Caigo for Golang.</li><li><a href="https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts"><strong>OpenZeppelin’s Standard Cairo Contracts</strong></a>: a helpful library of audited, reusable Cairo contracts written by OpenZeppelin.</li></ul><p>… and more available here: <a href="https://starknet.io/building-on-starknet/developer-tools/">https://starknet.io/building-on-starknet/developer-tools/</a></p><h3>Let’s connect</h3><p>It’s really exciting to see the vibrant and growing community of developers building on StarkNet. If you are a current or aspiring Cairo developer and would like to work together on any problems, please feel free to reach out!</p><p><em>This article was originally published on </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/building-on-starknet-primer"><em>Open Source Finance</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=54aa6e5aba22" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Decentralised Yield and Embedded Risks]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/decentralised-yield-and-embedded-risks-25df79721860?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/25df79721860</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[yield-farming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Jun 2022 16:32:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-05T16:41:17.776Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Unpacking yield and sources of risk in crypto. Conducting a post-mortem on the LUNA-UST meltdown.</h4><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Technical complexity and tokenomic design can often obfuscate risks borne by crypto investors.</li><li>A corollary in finance is that the yield (or return) from an asset must be commensurate with the risk to its holder.</li><li>Different assets are subject to different types of risks: all traded crypto assets are subject to market and liquidity risk; staked assets are subject to the risk of slashing; dApps are subject to smart contract risk; stablecoins and other synthetic assets are subject to depeg risk; and so on.</li><li>The risks borne by users are virtually endless and highly specific to each protocol and its construction. Users should make their best attempt to understand the mechanics, intricacies and embedded risks of each ecosystem, before apeing in.</li><li>The recent meltdown of LUNA, UST and the Terra ecosystem serves as a good case study for evaluating the risks associated with blockchain protocols. While the core product on the ecosystem, Anchor, offered attractive depository yields of 19.5%, it embedded a package of market, smart contract-related and depegging risks which offset the attractive returns.</li><li>Risks are often difficult to perceive before they fully materialise. Whenever we are drawn by the prospect of high returns, we should be careful to consider fully the counterweighing risks.</li></ul><p>Technical complexity and tokenomic design can often obfuscate risks borne by crypto investors. With the market-wide slump and <a href="https://newsletter.banklesshq.com/p/ust-luna-meltdown-what-happened?s=r">recent meltdown of UST</a>, it is a good moment to pause and reflect on the risks embedded in crypto assets.</p><h3>No pain no gain</h3><p>A corollary in finance is that in an efficient market, the yield (or return) from an asset must be commensurate with the risk borne by its holder. Given two assets with the same return, investors will always choose the one with lower risk, so to attract investors to the riskier product, issuers must offer a higher return.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/605/0*x8dOJUr4IBldW5xr.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.mcapitalmgt.com/portfolio-investments--risk-management.html">Montecito Capital Management</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Not all risk is made equal. Different assets will be exposed to different types of risks. For example:</p><ul><li>Unsecured lending is subject to <strong>default risk</strong>, meaning the risk that the borrower is unable to repay their debt obligations</li><li>Vested shares are subject to <strong>liquidity risk</strong>, meaning the risk associated with the inability to transact the investment for cash</li><li>Tokens are subject to <strong>smart contract risk</strong>, meaning they are vulnerable to hacks and other exploits that could result in the loss of funds.</li></ul><h3>Sources of risk in crypto</h3><p>Layer 1 blockchains form the foundational layer of all decentralised applications. Holding tokens issued by Layer 1s and interacting with their smart contracts exposes users to a plethora of risks. Below is a non-exhaustive list to consider before deploying funds into a new protocol.</p><p><strong>a) Tokens / Market risk</strong></p><p>Tokens issued by Layer 1 blockchains and dApps and traded on public markets are subject to market risk. In particular, the price of these assets fluctuate constantly, exposing holders to market volatility. The realisable value of investments may, as a consequence, be lower than their instantaneous market value.</p><p>Traded assets are also subject to liquidity risk. An asset can only be sold if there is a willing buyer to take the other side of the trade (or in the case of an AMM, a pool of liquidity to transact against). When liquidity dries up, spreads increase and assets can become more expensive to buy or sell, further reducing their realisable value.</p><p><strong>b) Staking / Risk of slashing</strong></p><p>Most native protocol tokens can be staked to earn what is known as a staking yield. In the case of blockchains, this compensates asset owners for validating the network, whereas in the case of protocols, it compensates holders for participating in protocol governance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_BQy19-NlqW0uYc6.png" /><figcaption>Staking yields on popular Layer 1 blockchains (Source: <a href="https://staked.us/yields/">Staked</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>Staking yields are considered to be a relatively ‘risk-free’ type of yield, but even so, validation is not without its risks. In particular, validators are subject to a range of operational and technical risks that can lead to the <em>slashing</em> (i.e. confiscation) of deposited funds — a mechanism designed to punish bad actors in the system, but that may be triggered by non-malicious factors such as server downtime.</p><p><strong>c) Self custody / Risk of human error and hacks</strong></p><p>Participating in a decentralised network means holding your own funds in a self-custodial wallet. However, wallets can be prone to a loss of funds due to hacks, or even just simple human error. Crypto is a <a href="https://medium.com/@danrobinson/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest-ecc5f0505dff">dark forest</a>, and there are infinitely many attack vectors that malicious actors can exploit — from phishing attacks to stray email links. Generally speaking, using a hardware wallet and keeping hot and cold wallets seperate are good practices for safely preserving value.</p><p><strong>d) Centralised providers / Counterparty risk</strong></p><p>A consequence of the risks of self custody is that many users choose to outsource custody to a third party provider. Unfortunately, holding coins in a centralised exchange means trading off self custody risk for counterparty risk. As the saying goes: “<em>not your keys, not your coins</em>”. Frankly, leaving your money with someone else doesn’t insulate you from technical risks either. Centralisation could make those assets more, not less, prone to attack. It also goes against the ethos of decentralisation and permissionless networks.</p><p><strong>e) dApps / Smart contract risk</strong></p><p>Blockchain-based applications are powered by smart contracts which express the application’s functionality in the form of composable blocks of code. As a general rule, anything that involves a smart contract will be subject to smart contract risk.</p><p>Smart contracts power the vast majority of value created on the blockchain, but their expressiveness is a double-edged sword: just as the functionality and use cases they support are virtually infinite, so too are the attack vectors and potential vulnerabilities, many of which are non-obvious even to experienced developers.</p><p>Smart contract risk can be managed through extensive, regular audits and enlisting the help of white-hat hackers. However, they can never be entirely mitigated and must be accepted as a cost of doing business on the blockchain.</p><p><strong>f) Stablecoins and other synthetic assets / Depeg risk</strong></p><p>Stablecoins are on-chain representations of off-chain currencies. They are a family of <em>synthetic assets</em> — derivative instruments engineered to replicate the financial characteristics of an asset without requiring the buyer to hold the underlying.</p><p>Stablecoins and other synthetic assets are subject to depeg risk. This is the risk that the traded value of the instrument fluctuates from the value of the underlying asset, which can lead to a loss of value. Maintaining the peg often involves injecting off-chain data by way of a price oracle, which itself could be subject to the risk of data irregularities and other vulnerabilities, with downstream implications for the robustness of the peg (this is what happened with LUNA, as discussed further below).</p><p><strong>g) Liquidity pools / Risk of impermanence loss</strong></p><p>Assets contributed to a liquidity pool earn yield from trading fees charged on swaps conducted via the pool. However, liquidity providers are exposed to fluctuations in the price of pooled assets, which can affect the asset mix and therefore the value of the assets they hold. This is a form of market risk known as impermanence loss, which liquidity providers need to be compensated for.</p><p><strong>h) Ecosystem incentives / Risk of reversal</strong></p><p>Ecosystem incentives, or ‘bribes’, are additional rewards paid to ecosystem participants to bootstrap the network. While they may appear risk-free on the surface, they are almost always temporary, meaning the stream of incentives will be phased out over time as the ecosystem matures.</p><p>The ‘price’ users pay for these incentives is the risk of reversal. Just as network effects can act as a flywheel for growth, they can also act as a flywheel for decline. When ecosystem incentives run out, you don’t want to be left holding the bag while everyone else has cashed out.</p><p>The risks borne by users are virtually endless and highly specific to each protocol and its construction. The risks listed above are a useful starting point, but they should not be treated as exhaustive. Users should make their best attempt to understand the mechanics, intricacies and embedded risks of each ecosystem, before apeing in with their capital.</p><h3>Case study: A post-mortem on UST, Anchor and the Terra ecosystem</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*b6V_9brxeE22m9SG.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.anchorprotocol.com/">anchorprotocol.com</a></figcaption></figure><p>The recent meltdown of LUNA, UST and the Terra ecosystem serves as a good case study for evaluating the risks associated with blockchain protocols.</p><p>The Terra ecosystem was a bundle of decentralised financial applications running on the Terra blockchain, powered by two interrelated tokens:</p><ol><li><strong>$UST</strong>: an algorithmic stablecoin pegged to the US Dollar, which powered all of the financial applications running on the network</li><li><strong>$LUNA</strong>: a token that serves the dual purpose of decentralisation governance, and maintaining the UST peg. In particular, LUNA can be redeemed for UST (and vice versa) at a guaranteed price of $1, so when the price of UST fluctuates, arbitrage kicks in to bring it back to parity. A portion of all swapped LUNA is burned, introducing inflationary pressure on the price of the token.</li></ol><p>The primary use case for $UST was Anchor Protocol, a lending protocol where depositors could earn a 19.5% annualised yield. This is clearly a highly attractive proposition, so let’s unpack the risks involved:</p><ul><li><strong>Smart contract risk: </strong>as mentioned above, anything that involves smart contracts is subject to smart contract risk. Smart contracts on Terrra are written in Rust, and vulnerabilities in the smart contracts could have unintended consequences for the redemption mechanism and UST peg. The redemption mechanism also relies on oracle smart contracts that can malfunction in the event of volatile market conditions and data irregularities. While smart contract risks did not materialise, these are very real and present considerations in all blockchain applications.</li><li><strong>Ecosystem risk</strong>: the demand for deposits on Anchor was far higher than the supply of deposits (in fact, creditors were paying only around 10% APY on their loans while depositors were earning 19.5%). The differential yield was being paid for with ecosystem incentives. Ecosystem incentives are unsustainable and don’t last forever. Anchor was paying for this yield out of its own reserves, and there was no guarantee that the demand for the platform could be maintained once those incentives dried up.</li><li><strong>Market risk</strong>: the yield earned on deposits to Anchor were partly rendered in the form of $ANC governance tokens, which are publicly traded and therefore subject to market risk.</li><li><strong>Depeg risk</strong>: both principal and interest payments on deposits to Anchor were denominated in UST, making UST the lifeblood of Anchor. A deviation in the value of UST directly affected the value of deposits and loans in the ecosystem. Further, the value of collateral deposited into the protocol was calculated based on the traded value of UST, whereas loan liquidations were calculated on the oracle price of USD. A material depeg could trigger loan liquidations even where there was sufficient collateral to cover the loan (this was exactly what happened when UST lost its peg).</li><li><strong>Death spiral risk</strong>: related to depeg risk, death spiral risk is a risk specific to the Terra ecosystem which relies on investor confidence to maintain its integrity. Once UST lost its peg, it triggered a loss of confidence by investors and a ‘bank run’ ensued, whereby investors redeemed UST for Luna and sold it on the market, further driving down the value of Luna and reducing investors’ confidence. The Luna Foundation Guard spent almost <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/linked/147014/luna-foundation-guard-breaks-silence-on-state-of-terra-reserves-looks-to-compensate-users">$3 billion</a> in Bitcoin reserves to try and prop up to price of LUNA, but was ultimately unsuccessful. At a price of &lt;$0.001 (falling from around $85 mere days earlier), LUNA along with the Terra blockchain halted at block 7607789.</li></ul><h3>Closing thoughts</h3><p>Risks are often difficult to perceive before they fully materialise. Whenever we are drawn by the prospect of high returns and rewards, we should also consider the counterweighing risks, particularly where these sit at the long tail of probable outcomes.</p><p>In this time of market turmoil, we should take the time to fully reevaluate and understand the package of risks we have signed up for. Perhaps when the next LUNA event comes around, we may find ourselves better prepared.</p><p><em>This article was originally published on </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/decentralised-yield-embedded-risks?s=w"><em>Open Source Finance</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25df79721860" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Scale or Sink: A Review of Layer 2 Scaling Solutions for Ethereum]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/scale-or-sink-a-review-of-layer-2-scaling-solutions-for-ethereum-e7d015bcc3db?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e7d015bcc3db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scaling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[layer-2]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Mar 2022 17:20:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-13T17:36:57.623Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Scalability, state channels, sidechains, rollups, Arbitrum, StarkNet, zkSync 2.0 and the blockchain trilemma.</h4><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Technological innovation is often driven by bottlenecks in the capacity of fixed-supply systems.</li><li>In recent years, Layer 1 alternatives like Solana, Avalanche and Terra have taken off rapidly, and are building significant momentum to displace Ethereum from its lead.</li><li>Ethereum strives to compete along all three vectors of the blockchain trilemma (scalability, security and decentralisation), whereas competing ecosystems sacrifice decentralisation to achieve scalability.</li><li>In order to meaningfully compete, Ethereum must find a way to rapidly scale up the throughput of its system.</li><li>Layer 2 scaling solutions are an emerging class of technical upgrades that bring activity off-chain in order to achieve higher levels of scalability. Along with sharding, they are one of the most important ways for Ethereum to achieve mass scalability.</li><li><strong>Arbitrum</strong> is the current leading optimistic rollup solution with over 50% of the Layer 2 Total Value Locked (TVL) and numerous integrations with 1inch, Curve, Hashflow, SushiSwap and other dApps.</li><li><strong>zkSync</strong> is a SNARKs-based ZK rollup solution that will be natively EVM-compatible with the release of zkEVM. It has the potential to leapfrog other Layer 2s in the scalability race and has been aptly described by the team as “the beginning of the end”.</li><li><strong>StarkNet</strong> is a STARKs-based ZK rollup solution that is 10 times faster than SNARKs but less natively compatible with Solidity smart contracts. It runs on a programming language called Cairo, which can be converted from Solidity code using a transpiler to syndicate EVM compatability.</li></ul><p>Technological innovation is often driven by bottlenecks in the capacity of fixed-supply systems. As the activity of a network grows, the demand for transactions begins to outstrip available supply, congesting the network and crowding out lower value use cases.</p><p>To bring the price of transactions back to parity, the operator must implement technical upgrades to expand the system’s throughput. Thus, the capacity of the network grows — not as a linear graduation but as a series of step changes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NW9VJm2NFuNaZi8G.png" /><figcaption>Source: Open Source Finance.</figcaption></figure><h3>Ethereum’s scale or sink moment</h3><p>Ethereum is reaching a pivotal moment in its history. In recent years, Layer 1 alternatives like Solana, Avalanche and Terra have taken off rapidly, and are building significant momentum to displace Ethereum from its lead.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nOdZ2zhjk3geqHBi.png" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama.</figcaption></figure><p>The hotly anticipated ETH 2.0 upgrade will implement Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus to dramatically reduce energy usage and improve network security, but contrary to popular opinion, it will bring about no immediate improvements to scalability:</p><ol><li>For one, the proposed increase in throughput (from 10 tps to 100,000 tps) is only theoretical and will need to be achieved through sharding — an unproven concept that splits a network into smaller partitions to increase throughput. The tech behind sharding is still unclear (the <a href="https://near.org/">NEAR</a> team are furthest ahead in this field), so in the interim, gas costs could in fact rise rather than fall.</li><li>Ethereum’s lead in the Layer 1 race has so far been preserved by its first mover advantage and the moats built up through the ecosystem’s network effects. These exist both on the side of users (in terms of the number of network participants) and on the side of developers (in terms of the available developer tooling and composability of ecosystem applications). The longer the upgrade takes, however, the weaker those network effects become. The ETH 2.0 upgrade is not only technically complex but requires coordination between multiple execution clients (on the ETH 1.0 side) and consensus clients (on the ETH 2.0 side). While the merge is due to take place in August 2022, further setbacks could buy competing ecosystems precious time in building up similar moats.</li></ol><h3>Revisiting the blockchain trilemma</h3><p>The blockchain trilemma is an evaluation framework for blockchains that posits a trade-off between three contending factors: <strong>scalability</strong>, <strong>security</strong> and <strong>decentralisation</strong>.</p><p>While Ethereum is highly focused on all three, a review of today’s top Layer 1 blockchains implies a preference for scalability over decentralisation (see table below):</p><ul><li>The fact that more developers are building on alternative blockchains suggests that <strong>scalability</strong> (assessed as throughput in terms of the number of transactions per second as well as the cost of those transactions) may well be the primary consideration when choosing between Layer 1 alternatives.</li><li>On the other hand,<strong> decentralisation</strong> comes into play only once a network becomes sufficiently scalable. It is less relevant on the margin because participants abandon a network only when it becomes <em>overly</em> centralised.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XQH8GhkXEEudOAQc.png" /><figcaption>Compiled by Open Source Finance.</figcaption></figure><p>In other words, Ethereum is competing with other blockchains on different vectors. While it is pushing the boundaries of both decentralisation and scalability (without compromising security), other Layer 1s are sacrificing decentralisation to outcompete on scalability. In order to remain relevant, Ethereum must find a way to participate meaningfully in the scalability race.</p><h3>Layer 2 scaling solutions for Ethereum</h3><p>Ethereum 2.0 is known as a Layer 1 scaling solution, as it implements technical upgrades to increase the throughput of the blockchain itself. Layer 2 scaling solutions are an emerging class of technical upgrades that bring activity off-chain in order to achieve higher levels of scalability. Along with sharding, they are key to bringing Ethereum to the masses.</p><p>There are currently four main types of Layer 2 scaling solutions, of which rollups are expected to provide the best improvements in terms of throughput and speed (and therefore where most of the developer activity is currently aggregated). These are:</p><ol><li><strong>channels</strong>: where groups of users deposit or lock up a balance on Ethereum to open a payment channel, which allows them to transact off-chain. Only when the channel is closed is the net transaction amount published on-chain. Channels have high throughput and low costs, but can be subject to long exit times and require third party security guarantees.</li><li><strong>custodial sidechains</strong>: sidechains are faster and cheaper blockchains that run parallel to the main blockchain to relieve throughput on the network. Users lock up value on Ethereum and the same amount is credited to their wallet on the sidechain. Sidechains rely on their own consensus mechanism and security guarantees, and are generally considered to be less secure.</li><li><strong>plasma sidechains</strong>: plasma uses sidechains to assist the main network with verification, leveraging its security guarantees.</li><li><strong>rollups</strong>: rollups aggregate bundles of transactions and settle them off-chain, then publish a reduced amount of data to represent them on-chain. There are two types of rollups currently in play:</li></ol><ul><li><strong>Zero-knowledge (ZK) rollups</strong> represent multiple off-chain transactions as a single succinct proof. A validator can infer the validity of these transactions from the validity of the resulting proof.</li><li><strong>Optimistic rollups</strong> take an optimistic view of the world by assuming transactions are correct unless proven otherwise by honest validators. They tradeoff scalability for usability by being Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) compatible — meaning existing Ethereum smart contracts and applications can run without modification on its network.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HeiKg_8vROV5lblq.png" /><figcaption>Source: Decentral Park Capital.</figcaption></figure><p>In most cases, Layer 2 blockchains bifurcate consensus and computation / storage to achieve scalability. Rather than having a single blockchain (i.e. Ethereum) perform every function, Layer 2s move Ethereum toward a modular structure, outsourcing computation and storage to dramatically increase throughput.</p><p>Layer 2 chains, and in particular rollups, will directly benefit Ethereum because they leverage the consensus resources of the main Ethereum blockchain. As new dApps are deployed onto Layer 2 and activity at this layer grows, value accrues back to Ethereum, feeding a virtuous cycle for the Ethereum ecosystem.</p><h3>Emerging Layer 2 winners</h3><p>Rollups are furthest ahead in the Layer 2 race in terms of achieving the desired increase in throughput. Let’s look at some of the emerging winners in this space.</p><h4>Arbitrum</h4><p>Optimistic rollups are far more widely used today than ZK rollups due to their EVM compatibility and friendliness for developers. Their optimistic nature also avoids the need to produce complex cryptographic proofs, which can be computationally expensive.</p><p><a href="https://offchainlabs.com/">Arbitrum</a> is the current leading optimistic rollup solution with <a href="https://l2beat.com/">$2.8 billion</a> in Total Value Locked (TVL), representing over 50% of the Layer 2 ecosystem. Numerous DeFi protocols like 1inch, Curve, Hashflow and SushiSwap have already integrated with Arbitrum, and its ecosystem currently counts integrations with around <a href="https://portal.arbitrum.one/">150 different projects</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*RTEXZx9iJSASfDaq.png" /><figcaption>Source: Eigen Network (<a href="https://ieigen.medium.com/a-brief-introduction-to-the-arbitrum-ecosystem-wallet-34e144974ddc">Medium</a>).</figcaption></figure><h4>zkSync</h4><p><a href="https://zksync.io/">zkSync</a> is a ZK rollup solution in development by Matter Labs since 2019. To say that ZK rollups will become successful understates their significance both in the context of blockchains and the wider computer science space.</p><p>Two teams are building at the bleeding edge of this technology: StarkNet and zkSync. zkSync runs on SNARKs technology, which is slower than STARKs (discussed below) but more natively EVM-compatible, meaning Solidity smart contracts can be run directly using its compiler.</p><p><a href="https://blog.matter-labs.io/zksync-2-0-public-testnet-is-live-de870ba9632a">zkSync 2.0</a> has just been launched on public testnet, which brings to the table zkEVM — a turing complete, EVM-compatible ZK rollup capable of general computation. Once released, this technology has the potential to leapfrog others in the Layer 2 race. The team aptly describes zkSync 2.0 as “the beginning of the end”.</p><p><a href="https://www.angle.money/">Angle</a>, <a href="https://ramp.network/">Ramp</a>, <a href="https://1inch.io/">1inch</a>, <a href="https://thegraph.com/en/">The Graph</a>, <a href="https://www.argent.xyz/">Argent</a>, <a href="https://aragon.org/">Aragon</a> and <a href="https://ecosystem.zksync.io/">many other dApps</a> are beginning to actively migrate to Layer 2 via zkSync. zkSync last raised a $50 million <a href="https://blog.matter-labs.io/funding-ea89c1fa731e">Series B round</a> from Andressen Horowitz and Consensys in November 2021.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CmEM64KAGrZevsWN.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: zkSync Daily (<a href="https://twitter.com/zksync_daily">Twitter</a>).</figcaption></figure><h4>StarkNet</h4><p><a href="https://starkware.co/starknet/">StarkNet</a> is Starkware’s ZK rollup solution that has been in development since 2018. StarkNet uses STARKs technology, which is 10 times faster than SNARKs (the previous iteration of ZK rollups).</p><p>It runs on a newly developed, Turing complete programming language known as <a href="https://github.com/starkware-libs/cairo-lang">Cairo</a>, which is capable of deploying smart contracts on StarkNet. Cairo is not natively compatible with Ethereum smart contracts, but the team behind the project (StarkWare) is developing a Solidity to Cairo transpiler known as <a href="https://github.com/NethermindEth/warp">Warp</a>, to syndicate EVM compatability.</p><p>A small but growing <a href="https://starkware.notion.site/Projects-Building-on-StarkNet-a33dee55778a4515a9be9bdae02ee682">ecosystem of applications</a> is now building on the StarkNet platform, including <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/zkxprotocol">ZKX</a> (decentralised derivatives exchange), <a href="https://www.immutable.com/">Immutable X</a> (feeless blockchain for gaming NFTs) and <a href="https://briq.construction/">Briq</a> (a composable NFT project). Argent has also developed the first wallet solution, <a href="https://github.com/argentlabs/argent-x">Argent X</a>, for interacting with tokens and dApps in the StarkNet ecosystem.</p><p>StarkNet last raised a $50 million <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/business/2021/11/16/blockchain-firm-starkware-raises-50m-series-c-funding-round-at-a-2b-valuation/">Series C round</a> from Sequoia and Paradigm. They are rumored to be raising <a href="https://www.fxempire.com/news/article/starkware-reportedly-raising-100-million-at-6-billion-valuation-930626">another $100 million</a> at $6 billion valuation.</p><p><em>Note: Some of the projects mentioned in this article are part of the portfolio of Fabric Ventures, with which the author of this article is affliliated.</em></p><p><em>This article was originally published on </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/scale-or-sink-a-review-of-layer-2?s=w"><em>Open Source Finance</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e7d015bcc3db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Musings on the Metaverse: What Facebook’s Rebrand May Mean For the Future of the Decentralised Web]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-kickstarter/musings-on-the-metaverse-what-facebooks-rebrand-may-mean-for-the-future-of-the-decentralised-web-a8125523cb40?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a8125523cb40</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaverse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Nov 2021 20:09:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-04T09:55:58.422Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Facebook’s move signals positive momentum for the Metaverse, but users should consider how design choices today may shape the course of the platform’s future evolution</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Iqc_0YdoCNCyIj6f.png" /></figure><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>The Metaverse describes a live, synchronous virtual reality that is linked to — and interoperable with — physical space, in which billions of people can transact and interact.</li><li>It seeks to become the next major iteration of the Internet, transposing content from flat, two-dimensional screens into three-dimensional, shared virtual spaces.</li><li>The Metaverse has the potential to provide Facebook (now Meta) with new models of user engagement and revenue capture. It may be exactly the ‘Second Act’ that the company needs to reexert its market leadership.</li><li>Two competing approaches to the Metaverse are now emerging: one centralised at the hands of Meta (and other companies like it), and another based on an open source and interoperable set of protocols, emphasising the decentralised creation and ownership of content.</li><li>That said, Facebook has an opportunity to embrace open source principles and work with the wider community to build a truly open Metaverse.</li><li>While the Metaverse may seem far off, design decisions made early on in the development of complex systems are often persistent and difficult to reverse. Choices made today as to its governance structure will likely shape the course of its development far into the future.</li></ul><p>In a bold move this week, Facebook <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/facebook-company-is-now-meta/">announced</a> a rebrand of its company to ‘Meta’, casting the company’s vision for the future in new focus. The announcement comes shortly after <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/creating-jobs-europe-metaverse/">earlier news</a> that the company would be hiring 10,000 employees in Europe alone to build out its Metaverse ambitions.</p><h3>What is the Metaverse?</h3><p>The Metaverse describes a live, synchronous virtual reality that is linked to — and interoperable with — physical space, and in which billions of people can interact and transact. Coined originally in the novel Snow Crash by Neal Stephenson, it has since been portrayed in cinema and television, for example in Stephen Spielberg’s Ready Player One and Charlie Brooker’s Black Mirror.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*awZdqYmuFDjppPTM.png" /><figcaption>Travis Scott performing live in 2020 on Fortnite, a video game with Metaverse ambitions. (Source: WNYC Studios / Youtube)</figcaption></figure><p>Here’s the idea: put on a pair of virtual reality (VR) goggles, and you will be instantly transported to a virtual world with unlimited potential for invention and interactivity. Go play golf with your dad from halfway across the world; shop for clothes virtually and get them shipped to your house; tour the new apartment you’ve been interested in, all without leaving your seat.</p><p>The Metaverse may not be here yet, but fiction could be closer to reality than we believe. In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOn2CZWnxxY">video</a> released alongside Facebook’s announcement, Mark Zuckerberg demoed his vision for what these new models of social interactivity could look like. Facebook is mobilising significant capital to bring its plans to fruition, with plans to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/facebook-revenue-misses-estimates-apples-privacy-rules-bite-2021-10-25/">invest over $10 billion</a> in the technology over the next decade — a measure of its tall ambitions for the space.</p><h3>Facebook’s ‘Second Act’: a renewed model for value creation and value capture</h3><p>Why is Facebook racing to build out the Metaverse and to become the leading operator in the space? To understand its potential value, it is helpful to see the Metaverse through the dual lenses of <strong>value creation</strong> and <strong>value capture</strong>.</p><p>The Metaverse seeks to create value by serving as the next major iteration of the Internet. The original Internet facilitated an evolution from physical books to web pages, allowing content to be stitched together through digital hyperlinks, made indexed and searchable, profoundly changing the way we consume content. The advent of mobile technology and cloud computing has further enabled the instantaneous sharing and consumption of photos, videos and other rich content. <a href="https://www.domo.com/news/press/domo-releases-annual-data-never-sleeps-infographic">2.5 quintillion</a> ($2.5 x 10¹⁸) bytes of data are now created every single day, yet all of this content remains bound to flat, two-dimensional screens.</p><p>The Metaverse proposes to carve out a new paradigm for the distribution and consumption of content: by transposing the web onto three-dimensional virtual space, it seeks to bring user immersion to a whole different level, fundamentally redefining the meaning of digital experiences and of virtual interactivity.</p><p>For Facebook, the Metaverse — as a new content medium and computing platform, will likely create significant new avenue for value creation and capture. Just as the Internet created a new class of unicorns and decacorns (<a href="https://fxssi.com/top-10-most-valuable-companies-in-the-world">6 of the 10</a> most valuable companies in the world today are now Internet companies), the Metaverse will mint a new generation of business leaders.</p><p>The Metaverse is likely to create significant value for companies like Facebook in at least four ways, by:</p><ol><li><strong>enabling new ways to engage users</strong>: Facebook’s users have been spending <a href="https://techjury.net/blog/time-spent-on-social-media/#:~:text=2.%20Facebook%20users%20spent%2038,on%20the%20platform%20in%202020.&amp;text=People%20are%20spending%20less%20and,focus%20to%20other%20social%20media.">less and less time on its platform</a> as other services have increasingly competed for user attention. Porting its significant user base to the Metaverse could be exactly the ‘Second Act’ that the company needs to re-engage its users, and re-exert itself as the leading social network.</li><li><strong>creating new categories of products and services</strong>: just as video games are increasingly generating revenue through in-game microtransactions, the Metaverse unlocks potential for new categories of virtual goods and services (as well as new business models to bring them to market). Adjacent to this is the new class of service applications (ranging from digital authentication to payments processing) that will need to be introduced to support the growth of the ecosystem.</li><li><strong>providing new opportunities for monetisation and revenue capture:</strong> Facebook and other social media companies have historically monetised their user base through advertising, but in the Metaverse, they could earn revenues by offering digital experiences, curating exclusive content or providing platforms for the transaction of rare digital goods. As the Metaverse grows, so too will its avenues for revenue generation, allowing Facebook to dramatically diversify and grow its top line.</li><li><strong>unlocking new channels for economic transaction</strong>: digital experiences, in the form of video games, are already providing unprecedented avenues for trade and the allocation of capital. As an example, <a href="https://axieinfinity.com/">Axie Infinity</a>, a crypto-based video game, allows individuals to breed ‘Axies’, compete in PvP battles, and earn prizes in Ethereum (which can then be traded for dollars or other fiat currencies). This is an early glimpse at the types of economic systems that could become possible with the Metaverse.</li></ol><h3>Competing models of governance: centralised versus decentralised Metaverses</h3><p>While it seems inevitable that Facebook (now Meta) will play a major role in shaping and building the Metaverse, it is worth taking a step back to consider the following question:</p><blockquote>If Facebook (or another company like it) is allowed to architect and exert unilateral control over such a vital platform as the Metaverse, what will be the downstream implications for users and other ecosystem players?</blockquote><h3>udiverse on Twitter: &quot;1/ apple, google, and facebook are turning into governmentsthey control everything on their platforms (ios/android/oculus) including speech, payments, taxationso an open metaverse can only exist on the web - the only platform that has no dictators 🧵👇 / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>1/ apple, google, and facebook are turning into governmentsthey control everything on their platforms (ios/android/oculus) including speech, payments, taxationso an open metaverse can only exist on the web - the only platform that has no dictators 🧵👇</p><p>The Internet today can be broadly understood as a set of protocols governing how data is transmitted between peers on a decentralised network. The topology and flow of data itself is maintained by millions of independent actors, meaning the network does not belong to any single party. As the potential successor to the Internet — the Metaverse, too, ought to be built on the same principle of decentralisation. After all, one only needs to look at China’s version of the Internet to realise that centralised systems often resolve to censorship, mass surveillance and unilateral control.</p><p>Matthew Ball, an influential venture capitalist who first wrote about the Metaverse in 2018, defines <a href="https://www.matthewball.vc/all/themetaverse">seven core features</a> for (his vision of) the Metaverse. Of these, the last two are particularly pertinent. He posits that:</p><ol><li>the Metaverse will be populated by content and experiences <strong>created and operated by an incredibly wide range of contributors</strong>, including individuals, informally organised communities and commercially-minded enterprises</li><li>the Metaverse will offer <strong>unprecedented interoperability of data, digital items / assets, content</strong> and so on across different experiences, rather than be bound to a particular game (e.g. Fortnite) or platform (e.g. Facebook).</li></ol><p>The first of these features is important because it subverts the creator-consumer model of content distribution popularised by massively multiplayer video games, the closest available comparison to the Metaverse today. Matthew’s vision of the Metaverse envisions, differently, a widely distributed set of actors that will both create and consume content. Companies like <a href="https://www.roblox.com/">Roblox</a> are already creating ways for regular users to easily produce 3D interactive content. The point is, in a truly decentralised Metaverse, anyone can become a creator if they want — unlike in platform ecosystems, content does not pass through a centralised moderator or gatekeeper.</p><p>The second point is more subtle and addresses the <em>ownership</em> of data. In order for digital assets to be truly interoperable and transactable across different platforms and experiences, <strong>their ownership must be defined independently of the platforms in which they exist.</strong></p><p>For example, if I were to create an account with Riot Games (developer of League of Legends) and buy a skin for my favourite champion, under the open Metaverse paradigm, I should be able to bring that skin elsewhere, use it in other virtual settings, or even trade it for other digital assets. This is not currently possible because my account, along with the skins tied to it, live on servers controlled and moderated by Riot. Making my skin truly portable would require an accounting system for ownership that is seperate from Riot, or any other central platform.</p><p>That is precisely the use case for NFTs (and why the crypto community is so excited by it). By creating a distributed ledger for ownership that does not live or rely on any particular company’s servers, we can start to create new models of ownership and interoperability, and <strong>eventually circumvent platforms entirely</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DZA2o5pOmkkT-B1r.png" /><figcaption>A framework for the software stack underlying the Metaverse (Source: <a href="https://outlierventures.io/research/the-open-metaverse-os/">Outlier Ventures</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>Decentralising the creation and ownership of content is hugely important, because in their absence, platforms are left with the ability to arbitrarily censor users over their (often subjective) interpretations of published content. Facebook and other social media platforms have been in the press a lot lately over this exact issue (see my related article <a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/beyond-defi-nfts-decentralised-social">here</a>). In a centralised Metaverse, many of these same concerns could carry over in magnified proportion.</p><h3>Facebook’s opportunity to chart a new course</h3><p>That is not to say, however, that a Metaverse built and maintained by Facebook cannot be consistent with the principle of decentralisation.</p><p>If Facebook were to work with the wider community to develop open source protocols that vest ownership toward users rather than platforms, it could be an influential and hugely positive driver of a truly open Metaverse. The React / React Native libraries developed by Facebook are great examples of the company’s efforts in working with developer communities to build open source technologies. Porting these design principles over to the Metaverse could be extremely positive for the space and simultaneously allow Facebook to regain trust from users and the wider community.</p><h3>Closing thoughts</h3><p>Facebook’s bet on the Metaverse has generated significant positive momentum in building this new future into reality. Yet, users should remain cautious of the company’s ambitions and constantly reassess the downstream implications of its design choices in building the Metaverse.</p><p><strong>Decisions made early on in the development of complex systems are often persistent and difficult to reverse.</strong> While the Metaverse may seem far off, choices made today as to its governance and architecture will likely shape the course of its evolution far into the future.</p><h3>Subscribe to the blog</h3><p><strong>Hi, I’m Park!</strong></p><p><strong>Open Source Finance</strong> is a blog to document my journey into the complex and fast-moving world of fintech. In this blog, I share ideas, insights and key learnings about companies, technology, entrepreneurship, innovation and more.</p><p>Finance is better when it’s open source. If you enjoy <strong>Open Source Finance</strong>, please consider subscribing and sharing it with your social network to help me build my profile!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/musings-on-the-metaverse"><em>https://opensourcefinance.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a8125523cb40" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-kickstarter/musings-on-the-metaverse-what-facebooks-rebrand-may-mean-for-the-future-of-the-decentralised-web-a8125523cb40">Musings on the Metaverse: What Facebook’s Rebrand May Mean For the Future of the Decentralised Web</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-kickstarter">The KickStarter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Decentralised Finance (DeFi): Crypto-backed Financial Services with Recurring Cash Flows and…]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/decentralised-finance-defi-crypto-backed-financial-services-with-recurring-cash-flows-and-9797c8b807c0?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9797c8b807c0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jun 2021 18:51:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-12T07:27:07.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Decentralised Finance (DeFi): Crypto-backed Financial Services with Recurring Cash Flows and Measurable Value</h3><h4>It’s time to debunk the myth that crypto has no fundamentals.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qZEUY_OCzWVJFPN_.png" /><figcaption>Source: Gemini.</figcaption></figure><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Decentralised Finance (DeFi) is a class of applications built on top of the blockchain that extends the concept of cryptocurrencies (i.e. decentralised money) to the rest of the financial services stack, providing an open-source, decentralised alternative to conventional financial services</li><li>DeFi protocols are two-sided markets-parties on one side of the market provide liquidity, while parties on the other side of the market consume liquidity (e.g. borrow funds, exchange assets). The exchange of services happens without intervention from a centralised intermediary.</li><li>DeFi applications are built on smart contract-based platforms, with the most popular being Ethereum. However, there are other competing ecosystems being developed concurrently.</li><li>The sector has grown at an unprecedented rate, particularly since 2020. The total value of assets locked in Ethereum-based DeFi protocols alone has increased to USD 80 billion in 2021.</li><li>The technical limitations imposed by build on blockchain have brought about a number of unique and interesting financial innovations in the DeFi space-including Automated Market Makers (AMMs), flash loans, amongst others.</li><li>DeFi protocols can be studied with conventional valuation metrics because they are cash flow positive and generate consistent, positive cash flows.</li><li>The implied P/E multiples of the most popular DeFi protocols today are broadly in line with those of blue-chip FinTech companies. The estimated PEG ratios of these protocols is signicantly lower than those of the wider market.</li></ul><p>I’ve been speaking to a lot of people about crypto lately, and in my observation, those who do not fully understand the technology nonetheless associate it far more with its negative aspects than its positives.</p><p>In this article, I examine an emerging vertical within crypto known as Decentralised Finance (or DeFi) to de-bunk some common myths about the asset class. In particular, I hope to show that:</p><ol><li>cryptocurrencies have broad utility beyond their role as digital money</li><li>there are blockchain-based applications being deployed today by real market participants committing substantial pools of capital. These protocols provide utility and generating positive, recurring cash flows for their users.</li><li>contrary to popular belief, it is possible to apply traditional financial metrics to assess the fundamental value of decentralised applications built on top of the blockchain.</li></ol><h3>So, what is DeFi?</h3><p>The traditional financial system is comprised of a network of banks and other financial service providers that store money, underwrite loans, provide insurance and other services for customers. Customers wishing to access these services must go through one (or often more) intermediaries, incurring fees and adding incremental complexity and inefficiency at each step.</p><p>DeFi is a class of applications built on top of the blockchain that extends the concept of cryptocurrencies (i.e. decentralised money) to the rest of the financial services stack. It presents a open-source alternative to conventional financial services in which the middle-man is removed and the same services are provided in a trustless, and often lower-cost manner.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zUbZSmIkuL1brQeg.png" /></figure><p>Imagine you are taking out a mortgage from the bank. A typical underwriting process could last several weeks, maybe more. The lender first needs to appraise the value of the property you are pledging as security. It then needs to assess your personal income and wealth, in addition to other background checks and due diligence. To obtain the best rates, you might engage a broker to source the cheapest possible rates, who will charge a broker fee. Legal contracts will need to be drawn up, perhaps with assistance from a conveyancing solicitor, before details are authenticated and the loan is (finally) disbursed.</p><p>Taking out a secured loan on a DeFi lending protocol is a far simpler process. After connecting your digital wallet to the online interface and depositing funds, the loan proceeds are automatically disbursed to your wallet. The assets you provide as security are automatically locked into a smart contract and returned when you repay the principal (with interest). This all occurs without intervention from a bank or any other centralised intermediary.</p><p>So who provides the loan principal if no banks are involved? Well, the same protocol allows users to deposit assets and earn interest. In other words, DeFi lending protocols are a <strong>two-sided market</strong> -they facilitate borrowing by parties on one side of the transaction and provide yield on the other. In some cases, the protocol charges zero fees: all interest paid by borrowers is disbursed to lenders, returning full value to platform users.</p><p>Of course, this is only one example of what DeFi can do. There are other protocols that provide asset management services, facilitate decentralised asset exchange, amongst many other applications. Before reviewing these, I briefly describe the underlying suite of technologies that enable DeFi.</p><h3>Technology stacks used by DeFi applications</h3><p>Although describing the underlying tech is not the purpose of this article, I think a brief explanation is helpful for:</p><ol><li>placing DeFi in context of the wider cryptocurrency space; and</li><li>understanding the different blockchain ecosystems that DeFi protocols can be deployed upon.</li></ol><p>DeFi protocols, like all other blockchain-based decentralised applications, run on smart contracts enabled by supporting Layer 1 blockchains such as Ethereum, Polkadot and Cardano. Not all Layer 1 blockchains are smart contract-based. For example, you cannot run a DeFi protocol on Bitcoin because it does not support smart contracts. In particular, whereas Bitcoin runs on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unspent_transaction_output">unspent transaction output</a> (UTXO) model, smart contract blockchains such as Ethereum are far more complex and support the embedding of pieces of self-executing code into its blocks. This provides a level of interactivity and composability that forms the basis of decentralised applications such as those in the DeFi space today.</p><p>While most DeFi protocols today run on Ethereum, there are a number of emerging competitors to that ecosystem. For example:</p><ul><li>Binance Side Chain (BSC) is an independent blockchain developed by Binance that is compatible with Ethereum’s smart contract functionality, but is able to execute transactions at far lower cost and higher speed due to its use of Binance Chain. DeFi protocols built on BSC have exploded in popularity recently due to the high gas fees charged by Ethereum.</li><li>Other blockchains such as Polkadot and Avalanche boast the same backward compatibility with Ethereum applications, and are built with financial applications in mind (for instance because they allow for much higher throughput). This makes them better suited to DeFi, however as second movers they have yet to gain the same traction and adoption that Ethereum has benefited from.</li></ul><h3>The current state of play</h3><p>The DeFi ecosystem did not even exist three years ago, yet the sector has grow at an unprecendented rate (particularly since 2020). The total market capitalisation of DeFi protocols stands today at around USD 100 billion. According to Defi Pulse, the total value of assets locked on Ethereum-based DeFi protocols alone has increased from only c. USD 600 million in 2019, to USD 15 billion 2020, to a peak of over USD 80 billion in May 2021. The upward trend is apparent (albeit to a lesser extent) even after adjusting for the price appreciation of crypto assets in USD terms over the intervening period (see the second chart below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MWRwLvFcSYalg6id.png" /><figcaption>Total USD value of assets locked in Ethereum-based DeFi protocols (<a href="https://defipulse.com/">Defi Pulse</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qNPcEAZ66igNhuDR.png" /><figcaption>Total ETH value of assets locked in Ethereum-based DeFi protocols (<a href="https://defipulse.com/">Defi Pulse</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Just as in the traditional economy, most of the current activity on DeFi focuses on the lending and borrowing of assets. There are, however, a wider class of applications supporting other financial activities, as summarised in the table below. I compare these to traditional finance service / fintech companies to better place them into context.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2CBi9h86eOp7gKLM.png" /></figure><p>To highlight a few examples:</p><ul><li><strong>Compound</strong> is a decentralised lending protocol that facilitates lending and borrowing of crypto assets (as already described above). Deposited assets are converted into ‘cTokens’ that automatically accrue interest and can be redeemed at any time. The interest rate earned on each asset is floating, and is calculated as a function of the supply and demand for loaned funds.</li><li><strong>Uniswap</strong> is a decentralised, non-custodial asset exchange protocol that enables trading of assets via liquidity pools (also known as Automated Market Makers, as described further below). Users can either trade assets via the protocol or participate as a market maker and supply assets to the protocol to earn transaction fees.</li><li><strong>Nexus Mutual</strong> is a decentralised insurance provider that allows users to purchase insurance cover as well as participate in claims assessment. Currently, users are allowed to purchase insurance against technical failure and custody risks (e.g. wallet hacks).</li><li><strong>Set Protocol</strong> is a decentralised asset management protocol that allows for the create or invest in sets, which are a portfolio of basket of underlying assets, including other cryptocurrencies and tokenised equities (e.g. <a href="https://www.tokensets.com/portfolio/faang">FAANG stocks</a>), with more to come.</li></ul><h3>Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and other DeFi innovations</h3><p>The limitations imposed by building on blockchain have brought about a number of unique financial innovations in the DeFi space.</p><p>One example of these is Automated Market Makers (AMMs). In the early days of Ethereum-based decentralised exchanges, developers trying to replicate the conventional order book-based system of exchange quickly realised that this was not a workable solution. Whereas web-based applications are fast, low-cost and support high throughput, decentralised applications can be slow and computationally expensive-every interaction with a smart contract (i.e. the process that enables interactive blockchain-based web applications) incurs gas fees and can take several minutes (and often more) to confirm.</p><p>AMMs replace the traditional order book system of exchange with liquidity pools. A liquidity pool holds a stock of two assets, say Bitcoin and Ethereum, which users can trade between. Liquidity pools determine price algorithmically with formulas that vary in complexity. For example, Uniswap uses the formula:</p><blockquote>x * y = k</blockquote><blockquote>where x and y are the value of the stock of two assets held on in the pool, and k is a constant.</blockquote><p>AMMs set prices based on the relative supply and demand for each asset held in the pool. They do so programatically and without the computational burden of a live order book, making them much better suited for deployment on the blockchain.</p><p>Like DeFi lending, AMMs are a two-sided market. The liquidity (i.e. stock of assets) held in the pool is contributed to by other users, who earn a return from transation fees charged on the exchange of assets. As discussed above, some protocols (such as Uniswap) pay out all transaction fees to liquidity suppliers, returning full value to market participants.</p><h3>Valuation analysis of DeFi protocols</h3><p>It may be surprising to some, but DeFi protocols can be studied with conventional valuation metrics because they:</p><ol><li>are cash flow positive and generate consistent, maintainable earnings today, and</li><li>have transparent and publicly auditable “accounts”. Unlike the financial accounts of a company, DeFi protocols are hosted on the blockchain and publicly accessible by anyone.</li></ol><p>To put this to the test, I have considered nine of the most popular DeFi protocols built on the Ethereum blockchain, and compiled data on their market capitalisation, cash earnings and earnings growth (in the case of the latter, applying subjective assumptions about future growth prospects).</p><p>To promote open source contribution and encourage public discourse, I have hosted the underlying analysis on <a href="https://github.com/yeungparkhay/Open-Source-Finance-DeFi-Valuation">Github</a>. Please feel free to audit my findings or overlay it with your own analysis. My work is meant as a conversation starter and any constructive feedback and suggestions are welcome.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ofhW5OGvOHSORtgL.png" /></figure><p>The table above shows that DeFi protocols have a wide range of P/E multiples, from 18x to 197x, with a median of 57x. This is <strong>higher than the multiples of the broader market and large financial services organisations, but broadly in line with the multiples of blue chip Fintechs.</strong></p><p>P/E multiples express a company’s value as a multiple of current earnings. All else equal, companies that are expected to grow faster will have a higher P/E multiple (to reflect that a higher proportion of a company’s earnings potential being realised in the future). A PEG ratio re-bases P/E by the expected earnings growth of a company to adjust for this difference.</p><p>The PEG ratios in the table above are calculated on necessarily subjective assumptions about the growth prospects of DeFi. These assumptions embed significant uncertainty, and this limitation should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.</p><p><strong>The estimated PEG ratios of the DeFi protocols are significantly lower than those of traditional financial service providers and the wider market</strong>. That is, the protocols are significantly cheaper on a per-unit earnings and growth-adjusted basis than traditional financial services companies. This could reflect a couple of things:</p><ol><li>the protocols are inherently more risky-i.e. they are not bound by the same risk management and governance functions of traditional companies. Further, liquidity flows freely between protocols, and any combination of operational or technical risk factors could trigger an outflow of capital overnight.</li><li>investors are expressing different views about the earnings growth prospects of these protocols. The uncertainty in growth prospects itself embeds modelling risk.</li><li>investors are not well-informed about DeFi protocols and the cash flows they are generating today. Given the value of DeFi protocols is contingent on their wider adoption by both investors and users alike, this could be depressing their values relative to the wider market.</li></ol><h3>Closing thoughts</h3><p>The crypto space is maturing rapidly, and market participants should seek to continuously evolve their perception and understanding of the asset class, revisit the facts and stay abreast of latest market developments.</p><p>DeFi is only one example of the multiple classes of applications being built on top of the blockchain today-it is providing financial services in an open and decentralised way, democratising access and reducing fees. As this diverse ecosystem grows, it will be incredibly exciting to see what other use cases emerge next.</p><h3>Subscribe to the blog</h3><p><strong>Hi, I’m Park!</strong></p><p><strong>Open Source Finance</strong> is a blog to document my journey into the complex and fast-moving world of fintech. In this blog, I share ideas, insights and key learnings about companies, technology, entrepreneurship, innovation and more.</p><p>Finance is better when it’s open source. If you enjoy <strong>Open Source Finance</strong>, please consider subscribing and sharing it with your social network to help me build my profile!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/decentralised-finance-defi-crypto"><em>https://opensourcefinance.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9797c8b807c0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coinbase Deep-dive and Investment Thesis: Part 3]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-3-132f20d2654c?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/132f20d2654c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coinbase]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Apr 2021 20:05:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-29T20:22:02.293Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Coinbase valuation and investment thesis.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WhCtaupt_sCAqDKj.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Key takeaways (spoiler alert)</h3><ul><li>Based on the results of my <a href="https://github.com/yeungparkhay/Open-Source-Finance-Coinbase-Valuation">valuation model</a> (and reserving some allowance for modelling uncertainty), Coinbase shares appear to be priced at or below fair value as of the writing of this article.</li><li>The current share price of Coinbase reflects only the value of its existing transaction and custody / staking businesses, and disregards the potential revenues from the expansion of its institutional and subscription-based services.</li><li>If I were to believe in Coinbase’s ability to successfully scale its recurring revenue businesses, there could be significant upside to my valuation.</li></ul><p>In the <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-1-528b0a9dac90">first</a> and <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-2-6f1dfc170980">second</a> parts of this deep-dive series, I looked at Coinbase’s value proposition and went under the hood to dissect the operational and financial aspects of its business. In this third and final part, I tie everything together to build an investment thesis for the company.</p><p>The valuation model I built is hosted on <a href="https://github.com/yeungparkhay/Open-Source-Finance-Coinbase-Valuation">Github</a> and made freely available for download and (non-commercial) use. I invite you to go through my work, test out different assumptions, and overlay it with your own analysis. Valuation is a necessarily subjective exercise — so if you think that your version improves upon mine, please do share your ideas and findings in the comments below. I’d love to hear them.</p><h3>Motivation</h3><p>Coinbase’s direct listing has proliferated wide speculation over the ‘correct’ value of its shares. A cursory review of headlines from major news outlets suggests that Coinbase may be overvalued by media consensus — but what evidence exists to support their assertions?</p><ul><li>“ <em>Why you can expect Coinbase to have a very hard time justifying its $61 billion market cap</em>” — <a href="https://fortune.com/2021/04/15/coinbase-market-cap-direct-listing-valuation-coin-share-price-stock-brian-armstrong/">Fortune</a>, 15 April 2021</li><li>“ <em>Coinbase is Not Worth $100 Billion But Its Stock Could Double On Direct Listing</em>” — <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2021/04/13/coinbase-is-not-worth-100b-and-its-stock-could-double-on-its-ipo/">Forbes</a>, 13 April 2021</li><li>“ <em>Opinion: Should you buy Coinbase? The valuation is ridiculous, based on this math</em>” — <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/should-you-buy-coinbase-the-valuation-is-ridiculous-11618254467">MarketWatch</a>, 12 April 2021</li></ul><p>As a financial analyst by training, I was naturally curious to put my understanding of the company to the test.</p><p>In the remainder of this write-up, I discuss my valuation approach and step through my modelling assumptions. I then explain the results of my valuation (highlighting a few important caveats), before finally setting out my investment thesis for Coinbase.</p><h3>Valuation approach</h3><p>Analysts normally rely on one of two approaches when valuing a company:</p><ol><li>the <strong>comparables approach</strong>, which looks at the value of similar, publicly listed companies and scales this by some fundamental measure of size (for example, financial earnings or the number of accounts). The resulting multiple is then applied to the subject company to derive an estimate of its value. The comparables approach should only be used where the subject and comparable companies share similar growth and risk characteristics.</li><li>the <strong>discounted cash flow (DCF)</strong> approach, which models the expected future cash flows of a business and discounts them back to the present date, is a more explicit valuation method. The discount rate used in a DCF reflects the time value of money and non-diversifiable risks that a company faces.</li></ol><p>Coinbase is a market leader in an emerging sector. While it is comparable to other businesses in the crypto asset exchange space (e.g. Binance, Kraken), none of these companies are publicly listed and so I am unable to derive comparable multiples using them.</p><p>Some analysts compare Coinbase to other non-crypto asset exchanges or financial service companies. I believe this is an apples-to-oranges comparison and should not be done. As I explain in <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-1-528b0a9dac90">Part 1</a> and <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-2-6f1dfc170980">Part 2</a> of this series, Coinbase is exposed to materially different risk characteristics and revenue drivers to a conventional company. Therefore, I do not rely on any valuation metrics based on this group of companies either. Instead, I explicitly model Coinbase’s cash flows using a DCF.</p><h3>Modelling assumptions</h3><p>One of the first conscious decisions I made when building the valuation model for Coinbase was to avoid expressing a view on the price of Bitcoin — I thought that, tethering my valuation to such a speculative and dubious assumption would surely undermine the credibility of my analysis from the outset.</p><p>Yet, as I started to write <a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/coinbase-deep-dive-part-2">Part 2</a> of this series, it dawned on me that Coinbase’s revenues are inextricably tied to the price performance of the underlying crypto assets (at least over the short- to medium-term, and possibly beyond). This meant that any robust forecast of revenues would need to be based, at least in part, on a forecast of Bitcoin’s price. This presented the first major modelling challenge in my analysis.</p><p>A second challenge came in the form of modelling the growth of retail and institutional transactions. In <a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/coinbase-deep-dive-part-2">Part 2</a> of this series, I identified that institutional trading volumes have (historically) been less reactive to price volatility. I would expect this trend to continue over time, and so I needed to allow for greater volatility in retail transaction revenues without explicitly working out the price volatility of Bitcoin. This, too, informed certain design choices with respect to the modelling of revenues.</p><p>A third and final challenge came in the form of estimating revenues from Coinbase’s early-stage services, which do not currently generate a meaningful level of sales on which I can base my forecast. Brian Armstrong has stated that subscription-based revenues could eventually make up <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/101579/coinbase-ceo-expects-50-future-revenues-non-trading-businesses">around half of Coinbase’s revenues</a>, meaning the revenues from these services could be very material if Coinbase is able to execute on its vision. As I explain below, I ultimately do not forecast these revenues because there is simply no reliable way for me to do so. This is a key limitation to my analysis, and affects how my valuation results should be interpreted. I discuss this in more detail toward the end of this article.</p><p>Taking into account the above issues, my key modelling assumptions with respect to forecasting Coinbase’s revenues are as follows. I assume that:</p><ol><li>the <strong>price of Bitcoin</strong> will grow in line with the Stock-to-Flow (S2F) model (a popular asset pricing model), adjusted for the extent of over-/under-valuation and allowing for diminishing volatility over time (more on this later).</li><li>Coinbase’s <strong>Monthy Transacting Users (MTUs)</strong> will grow in line with the price of Bitcoin, as per my forecast. This growth reflects the onboarding of new users to the cryptoeconomy, as well as increased levels of engagement for existing users, over the forecast period.</li><li>Coinbase’s <strong>average revenue per transacting user (ARPTU) </strong>will remain broadly constant at its historical 2019–2020 level. To the extent that Coinbase is able to continue to scale its revenue capture per user, this is likely to be a conservative assumption.</li><li>a <strong>fee compression factor </strong>will kick in from Q4 2023 (shortly before the next halving of Q1 2024) as activity in the cryptocurrency market picks up again. Starting with a fee compression factor of 100% (no reduction) in Q3 2023, I reduce this factor by 5 percentage points per quarter until it reaches 35% in Q4 2026. At this point, the margin between Coinbase’s retail and institutional users is mostly eroded.</li><li>Coinbase’s <strong>institutional transaction revenues</strong> will grow in line with the <em>unadjusted </em>S2F model (i.e. without applying an adjustment for over-/under-valuation). This is because I assume that institutions invest across the market cycle and represent a more stable source of revenues for Coinbase.</li><li>Coinbase’s <strong>custodial fee</strong>, <strong>staking revenue</strong>, <strong>Earn revenue</strong> and <strong>interest income</strong> will grow in line with Assets on Platform, which in turn will grow with the price of Bitcoin.</li><li><strong>other revenue</strong> (comprising sales of Coinbase’s own crypto assets and interest income) will remain broadly at the same level, growing only by inflation. In effect, I assume that the amount of cash needed to run Coinbase’s business will not change substantially over time.</li><li><strong>other subscription and services revenue</strong> are non-recurring (i.e. will fall to zero). As explained above, I am unable to estimate future revenues from Coinbase’s Analytics, Commerce and other subscription-based services because Coinbase does not currently report revenues from these segments, and I have found no reliable indicators on which to tether my forecast. To the extent that Coinbase is able to scale these businesses in the future, there is likely significant upside to my valuation.</li></ol><p>To forecast costs, I assume that:</p><ol><li><strong>transaction expenses</strong> will be 12.5% of net revenues. This is based on <a href="https://s27.q4cdn.com/397450999/files/doc_downloads/Q1&#39;21-Coinbase-Earnings-Call-Transcript.pdf">management expectation</a> that these expenses “<em>will be in the low-to-mid teens as a percent of revenue in 2021”</em>.</li><li><strong>sales and marketing costs</strong> will be 14% of net revenues. This is higher than historical levels and is based on the mid-point of the 12–15% range provided by management.</li><li><strong>technology and development costs</strong> and <strong>general and administrative expenses</strong> will total $1.5 million in 2021, based on the mid-point of the range quoted by management. I assume that these costs will then grow at 5% per annum, to allow Coinbase to continue to scale its business (particularly its institutional offering).</li><li><strong>other operating expenses</strong> (comprising costs from the sale of Coinbase’s own crypto assets) will remain broadly at the current level, growing only by inflation.</li><li>pre-tax profits will be <strong>taxed </strong>at a rate of 21% (the US corporate tax rate)</li><li><strong>depreciation and amortisation </strong>will be roughly offset by<strong> capex </strong>in each period. This is reasonable because most of Coinbase’s capital investments are in technology assets that have a relatively short duration.</li><li><strong>working capital </strong>needs will grow in line with revenues as the company builds up a net receivables balance with its customers. To calculate working capital as of end-2020, I assume half of the cash and equivalents held by Coinbase at that date was surplus to its operations.</li></ol><p>I model Coinbase’s revenues and costs over an explicit forecast period up to 2026, and calculate a terminal value to reflect cash flows thereafter. To do so, I use a <strong>terminal growth rate</strong> of 2% (in line with inflation). Given the cyclical nature of Coinbase’s business, it is important that the terminal period reflects cash flows generated in a representative year over the market cycle, rather than a peak or trough. 2026 lies between two halving dates and satisfies this condition, based on my analysis.</p><p>Before presenting my results, I discuss two further aspects of my valuation in detail: how I forecast the price of Bitcoin, and how I estimate a discount rate for Coinbase.</p><h3>Bitcoin price forecast</h3><p>Bitcoin as a unique asset in that its monetary policy (i.e. the distribution of new supply) is pre-programmed into its code. Approximately every four years, a ‘halving’ event occurs in which the block reward distributed to miners (i.e. the rate of supply) is cut in half, increasing the scarcity of the asset. The table below summarises past halving events and the dates at which future halvings are expected to occur, assuming the duration in days between halvings remains constant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AFW22hxX8A3PU94Z.png" /></figure><p>One of the best-known asset pricing models in the crypto industry is the <a href="https://medium.com/@100trillionUSD/modeling-bitcoins-value-with-scarcity-91fa0fc03e25">Stock-to-Flow (S2F) model</a> developed by PlanB, an anonymous former institutional investor based in the Netherlands. The S2F model is based on the theory that the scarcity of an asset can be quantified by the ratio of its stock (in terms of the amount of available supply) to its flow (the annual rate of production). The S2F model has been successfully applied to other scarce commodities like gold and silver, and has done a surprisingly good job of modelling Bitcoin’s past price action.</p><p>The figure below shows that, on a logarithmic scale, the stock-to-flow value of Bitcoin is linearly correlated with its market capitalisation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/987/0*cuAB040adTsICXWk.png" /></figure><p>A simple linear regression of the logarithmic value of Bitcoin’s market cap (y) to the logarithmic value of its S2F value (x) provides the following model:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f7OoTZf97vtTnpRFBkUmOA.png" /></figure><p>(For statisticians, the model is robust with an R-squared value of 0.916.)</p><p>Using the model above, and assuming a block is mined every nine minutes (the historical average rate), it is possible to calculate the expected future S2F value of Bitcoin and construct a price forecast for Bitcoin. The forecast results are shown below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1009/0*gMADRodaN0or5Eub.png" /></figure><p>A couple of observations:</p><ul><li>over the long term, the model has done a relatively good job of predicting the price of Bitcoin</li><li>after each halving event (as shown by a vertical increase in the S2F value), there has always been a subsequent but more delayed increase in the price of Bitcoin</li><li>the grey bars show the extent of over- and under-valuation relative to the S2F model. If we believe the S2F model to be fundamentally sound (i.e. reflecting the fair value of Bitcoin), it can be seen that Bitcoin often enters periods of excessive exuberance whereby asset prices rise significantly above the level predicted by the model.</li><li>the extent of over- and under-valuation is not constant, however. As shown by the peaks and troughs of the grey bars, the extent of over and under-valuation (i.e. volatility) has been reducing over time.</li></ul><p>In my experience, the peaks and troughs of Bitcoin’s price, however interpreted, are important characteristics of the market cycle that cannot be ignored. The S2F model does not capture these peaks and troughs. Therefore, in my price forecast I have applied an additional adjustment for the extent of over- and under-valuation, assuming past cycles repeat but allowing for diminishing volatility over time. In particular, I assume the extent of over-/under-valuation follows the level observed 46 months (i.e. one halving) prior, but reduce this level by 10% for each subsequent halving.</p><p>My adjusted S2F forecast is shown in the figure below, superimposed on the S2F price forecast.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1001/0*smxy48zLBSLoJwrt.png" /></figure><h3>Discount rate</h3><p>The discount rate for a company is often calculated as a weighted average of the return on its equity and debt. Coinbase does not hold any debt on its balance sheet, so I am only required to estimate its cost of equity.</p><p>A common framework used to estimate the cost of equity is the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capm.asp">capital asset pricing model (CAPM)</a>. It looks at the sensitivity (or beta) of a company to the broader market to estimate a discount rate based on non-diversifiable risk.</p><p>Coinbase has only traded for around a month as of the writing of this article. That is not enough data to derive a robust estimate of beta. While it is normally possible to use the returns of a portfolio of Coinbase’s listed comparable companies to proxy Coinbase’s returns, as explained above it does not have any suitable comparators. Therefore, I have used Bitcoin’s price as a proxy for Coinbase’s.</p><p>The 5-year monthly returns from April 2016 to March 2021 imply a beta for Coinbase of 1.30. This is in line with my expectation that the company is more exposed to market volatility than the average company.</p><p>At the current 10-year treasury yield of around 1.5%, and assuming an equity risk premium of 5.5%, I estimate a cost of equity for Coinbase of 8.7%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S6_6X1vq7Dc3Nd74cnVY6g.png" /></figure><h3>Valuation results</h3><p>Bringing everything together, the table below summarises my forecast of Coinbase’s revenues and costs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*EYnOIAmEBa40KUx-.png" /></figure><p>After discounting these cash flows back to present value, my model values Coinbase at around <strong>$81 billion</strong> at the current date. This is equivalent to a fully diluted share price of <strong>$405</strong>, or around 35% higher than the current share price of <strong>$298</strong> as of the writing of this article.</p><p>There are a number of caveats to this figure:</p><ul><li>the results of my model are highly sensitive to the modelling assumptions I have used, many of which are subjective. For example, if I were to reduce the extent of over-/under-valuation in my adjusted S2F price forecast by 20% (rather than 10%) for each subsequent halving, my valuation would fall to $74 billion or $372 per share. If I were to increase my discount rate to 10%, my valuation would fall to $65 billion or $325 per share.</li><li>my model assumes that, from 2027 onwards, the price of Bitcoin will remain fixed at $375,000, growing only by inflation. If Bitcoin’s price continues to rise over each subsequent halving, my model is likely to understate the value of Coinbase.</li><li>my model crucially omits revenues from Coinbase’s subscription-based products, because I am unable to build a reliable forecast of these revenues. To the extent that Coinbase is able to scale its revenues from these income streams, there is likely substantial upside to the value I have estimated.</li></ul><p>In light of all my findings, I summarise my investment thesis for Coinbase in three points:</p><h3><strong>Investment thesis</strong></h3><ol><li>Based on the results of my valuation model (and reserving some allowance for modelling uncertainty), Coinbase shares appear to be priced at or below fair value as of the writing of this article.</li><li>The current share price of Coinbase reflects only the value of its existing transaction and custody / staking businesses, and disregards the potential revenues the expansion of its institutional and subscription-based services.</li><li>If I were to believe in Coinbase’s ability to successfully scale its subscription-based businesses, there could be significant upside to my valuation.</li></ol><p>That brings us to the end of this three-part deep-dive on Coinbase. If you enjoyed the article, please consider subscribing to get notified whenever I publish a new deep-dive.</p><p>Til next time!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/coinbase-deep-dive-part-3"><em>https://opensourcefinance.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><h3>Subscribe to the blog</h3><p><strong>Hi, I’m Park!</strong></p><p><strong>Open Source Finance</strong> is a blog to document my journey into the complex and fast-moving world of fintech. In this blog, I share ideas, insights and key learnings about companies, technology, entrepreneurship, behavioural sciences, policy design, macroeconomics and more.</p><p>Finance is better when it’s open source. If you enjoy <strong>Open Source Finance</strong>, please consider subscribing and sharing it with your social network to help me build my profile!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=132f20d2654c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coinbase Deep-dive and Investment Thesis: Part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-2-6f1dfc170980?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6f1dfc170980</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coinbase]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Apr 2021 23:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-29T20:22:58.474Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The build-up of Coinbase’s revenues, its key drivers and the cost structure of the business.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1ltGPwALAw_OOhXJS90kgw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Substantially all (96%) of Coinbase’s revenues are earned from transaction fees</li><li>Of this, retail transactions comprise a relatively small proportion (38%) of trading volume but a disproportionately large proportion (95%) of transaction revenues</li><li>Retail transactions are more reactive to asset price volatility than institutional transactions, and are driven by the number of Monthly Transacting Users (MTUs) on Coinbase; MTUs are in turn highly correlated with crypto asset prices</li><li>Institutional transaction are correlated with crypto asset prices but to a lesser extent than retail transactions; this is because institutions tend to invest over the market cycle and for the long term</li><li>Key elements of Coinbase’s subscription and services revenue are earned on the value of the assets held on its platform, which are highly correlated with crypto asset prices</li><li>In other words, Coinbase remains heavily exposed to market risk in the cryptoeconomy. Its shares represent a (levered) bet on the price appreciation of underlying crypto assets because its significant operating leverage (i.e. high fixed costs) magnifies earnings volatility</li><li>To mitigate these risks, Coinbase will need to it demonstrate that it can scale its institutional and subscription-based service offerings to generate recurring revenues for its investors.</li></ul><p>In the <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-1-528b0a9dac90">first part</a> of this deep-dive series, I covered the high-level stuff, looking at Coinbase’s business proposition, product market fit, competitive position, and the key risks to its business.</p><p>In this second part, I take a closer look at the financial and operational aspects of the business. In doing so, I try to answer one of the key fundamental questions facing a prospective investor in Coinbase:</p><blockquote>Does an investment in shares of Coinbase represent a (levered) bet on the price appreciation of Bitcoin and other crypto assets, and if so, why not just invest in the underlying assets?</blockquote><p>The analysis I set out here lays the crucial groundwork for <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-3-132f20d2654c">Part 3</a> of this series, in which I attempt to value the company using conventional valuation methods.</p><p>Let’s dive in!</p><h3>Build-up of Coinbase’s revenues</h3><p>Before we begin, it may be helpful to first explain the <em>why </em>of what we discuss in this section.</p><p>Unpacking the build-up of Coinbase’s revenues is helpful in two ways: first, it allows us to better understand the composition of Coinbase’s customer base, and second, it allows us to dissect Coinbase’s business model in terms of the services it offers to its customers. These two pieces, put together, are a helpful first step to answering the question above.</p><p>Coinbase reports its revenues across multiple revenue streams. These include:</p><ul><li><strong>Transaction revenues</strong>: earned from transaction fees charged to customers for the purchase, sale and trading of crypto assets. As discussed in <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-1-528b0a9dac90">Part 1</a>, crypto purchases are charged a base transaction fee of 4% (potentially lower depending on <a href="https://help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/trading-and-funding/pricing-and-fees/fees.html#variable-fees-by-location-and-payment-method">payment method and location</a>). Retail transactions are charged a further 0.5% spread and a ‘<a href="https://help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/trading-and-funding/pricing-and-fees/fees">Coinbase Fee</a>’.</li><li><strong>Custodial fee revenue: </strong>revenue from the dedicated cold storage solution provided by Coinbase to its customers. The custodial fee is calculated as a percentage of the value of assets held under Coinbase’s custody.</li><li><strong>Staking revenue:</strong> revenue from staking rewards earned on proof-of-stake assets, which are calculated as a percentage of the total value of assets staked.</li><li><strong>Earn campaign revenue</strong>: revenue from Coinbase’s ‘Earn’ programme, a platform for retail users to learn about new crypto assets through educational content. Retail users are eligible to earn rewards denominated in the crypto asset upon completion of pre-determined tasks. Coinbase earns a commission from the crypto asset issuer on these distributed assets.</li><li><strong>Interest income</strong>: interest earned on customer custodial funds and cash and cash equivalents deposited with third-party banks.</li><li><strong>Other subscription and services revenue</strong>: one-off, non-recurring revenue from “<em>early stage services being offered by the Company, such as subscription license revenue</em>”. I suspect that this includes revenues from services such as Coinbase Analytics and Coinbase Commerce that have yet to be monetised at scale.</li><li><strong>Crypto asset sales revenue: </strong>revenue from the sale of crypto assets owned by Coinbase itself. At times, Coinbase uses its own assets to accommodate transactions that do not meet the minimum trade size, or otherwise to maintain customer trade execution during system disruptions. The cost of these sold assets is recognised under ‘other operating expenses’.</li></ul><p>The table below summarises Coinbase’s different revenue streams. As shown, substantially all of its revenues are generated from transactions — particularly those conducted on behalf of its retail users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/924/0*1Tc-phmnuthi4QeY.png" /></figure><p>Coinbase earns a far higher margin on its retail customers than it does on its institutional customers. In fact, the majority of trading activity taking place on Coinbase’s platform, as measured by volume, is conducted on behalf of <em>institutional </em>investors (e.g. hedge funds, financial institutions, and institutional market makers). The fact that retail trading generates much higher revenues for Coinbase reflects the significant premium levied by Coinbase on its retail customers. I explained in <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-1-528b0a9dac90">Part 1</a> why I would expect this premium to become eroded by competition over time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/841/0*tqF4n8R4LtBYI8fA.png" /></figure><p>The interim takeaway is that:</p><ul><li>at present, a large majority of Coinbase’s revenues are earned from transaction fees charged on the purchase and sale of crypto assets, mostly from retail user.</li><li>the other sources of income, reported under ‘subscription and services revenue’, are mostly a function of the total assets held on Coinbase’s platform. I would expect the value of these assets to remain highly correlated with the price of crypto over the short to medium term, but for the correlation to reduce over time as Coinbase scales its recurring revenue streams.</li></ul><h3>Revenue drivers</h3><p>Next, taking a closer look at the sensitivity of Coinbase’s revenues to market prices, there are a number of business metrics reported by Coinbase that are helpful for understanding the major revenue drivers of the business.</p><p><strong>Monthly Transacting Users (MTUs)</strong></p><p>The largest component of Coinbase’s revenues — retail transaction revenues — is generated from its transacting base of retail users, referred to as Monthly Transacting Users (MTUs). The chart below shows that MTUs have generally been correlated with the price of Bitcoin in the recent past.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/852/0*y7gGaD9XiqzMoQ7S.png" /></figure><p>The sensitivity of MTUs to asset prices shows that retail users tend to vary their participation in crypto markets on a pro-cyclical basis (i.e. increasing investment when asset prices are high and reducing investment when asset prices are low).</p><p><strong>Trading volume</strong></p><p>Trading volume is correlated with crypto asset prices as one would expect, but there is an interesting bifurcation between retail and institutional trading activity over periods of high price volatility.</p><p>For example, in Q1 2018 (shortly after the previous market cycle top), retail trading volumes fell far more rapidly than institutional trading volumes, and at a rate that outpaced the rate of price decline. The growth of institutional trading volumes has since outpaced that of retail, with a more pronounced increase over the recent period of price movement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/753/0*EfbA1F6fhAvkTeom.png" /></figure><p>Coinbase does not report the number of institutional investors transacting on its platform, but it does note that:</p><ul><li>c. 7000 institutions have accessed Coinbase’s services in the past</li><li>in 2020, there was an acceleration of institutional investment into Bitcoin, as a hedge against inflation</li><li>retail trading volume has been more influenced by volatility in crypto asset prices than institutional trading volume.</li></ul><p>This last point makes sense: from Coinbase’s perspective, institutional investors are likely to represent a more stable (albeit lower margin) source of revenues because institutional investors tend to invest for the long-term and over the course of the market cycle. Institutions also tend to trade on behalf of other investors, meaning they must comply with strict procedures with respect to the measurement, allocation and monitoring of risk. These factors all come into play in shaping the sensitivity of trading volume to macro volatility.</p><p><strong>Average revenue per transacting user (ARPTU)</strong></p><p>ARPTU is not a business metric reported by Coinbase, but I have calculated it as it is helpful for understanding the directional movement of transaction revenues. Average revenue per transacting user (or ‘ARPTU’) is calculated by dividing total retail transaction revenues by the number of MTUs over a given period. In effect, it models Coinbase’s fee structure without going into onerous detail.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/902/1*nQOmYVZIEeFWsO89ifp8AA.png" /></figure><p>The figure above shows that ARPTU is somewhat sensitive to crypto asset prices, but to a much lesser extent than MTUs. This is likely because:</p><ol><li>elements of the transaction fees charged by Coinbase are fixed fees that would not scale with the notional size of an order</li><li>Coinbase operates a <a href="https://help.coinbase.com/en/pro/trading-and-funding/trading-rules-and-fees/fees">regressive fee model</a> that charges lower variable fees on orders of larger size</li><li>while the volume of a particular user’s trading activity may increase as the notional value of their portfolio rises, at a certain point this becomes capped by their investment risk appetite in fiat terms — e.g. I may be comfortable with trading 20% of my portfolio at any given time, but that is subject to 20% being no more than $10,000.</li></ol><p><strong>Assets on Platform</strong></p><p>Lastly, much of the subscription and services revenues generated by Coinbase is earned on the value of crypto and fiat monetary assets held on its platform (Coinbase calls this ‘Assets on Platform’). The figure below plots the correlation between Assets on Platform and Bitcoin price. My sense is that the observed correlation reflects a combination of two effects:</p><ol><li>the direct effect of fluctuation in the dollar value of crypto-denominated assets held with Coinbase</li><li>an indirect effect whereby asset price fluctuation causes capital to flow in and out of the platform.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/0*IJldjIel9umxPVuP.png" /></figure><p>Of course, not all subscription and service revenues are a function of Assets on Platform:</p><ul><li><strong>Other subscription and services revenue</strong> are one-off in nature and relate to early-stage services that Coinbase has yet to scale. I would expect these services to be recurring in nature and far less exposed to asset price volatility.</li><li><strong>Earn campaign revenue</strong> is a function of the partnerships formed between Coinbase and asset issuers and the extent of users’ participation in Earn activities. While I am not aware of any metrics relating specifically to Earn activities, I would expect user participation in these services to be less correlated to market prices than other aspects of Coinbase’s ecosystem.</li></ul><h3>Cost structure</h3><p>Let’s now turn to the costs side of the business to answer the second part of our question: whether (and to what extent) Coinbase shares represent a <em>levered </em>bet on the price of the underlying crypto assets.</p><p>As a primer, an analysis of costs normally proceeds on two bases:</p><ol><li>an assessment of the extent to which a business’s costs are variable (i.e. correlated with revenues) as opposed to fixed</li><li>relatedly, the level of its fixed costs relative to its revenues (also known as operating leverage).</li></ol><p>Coinbase, like other technology companies, incurs a high proportion of fixed costs and relatively low variable costs. That is, it commits high periodic spending to things like R&amp;D and general overheads that are relatively insensitive to revenue, but can on-board new users relatively inexpensively.</p><p>In the table below, I summarise the costs incurred by Coinbase in 2019 and 2020.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/807/0*WTcmccCdAl8Sprtt.png" /></figure><p>The following costs incurred by Coinbase vary directly with the level of platform activity and have historically summed to around 20% of total costs (or 15–20% of revenues):</p><ul><li><strong>transaction expenses</strong>: account verification fees, payment processing fees and fraud loss expenses</li><li><strong>sales and marketing expenses</strong>: costs related to customer acquisition, advertising and marketing programs and sales and marketing personnel</li></ul><p>The other costs incurred by Coinbase are generally less correlated with revenues, but may still be varied at the discretion of Coinbase:</p><ul><li><strong>technology and development expenses: </strong>the cost of developing new products and services, operating and maintaining Coinbase’s platform and network, and acquriing developed technology.</li><li><strong>general and administrative expenses: </strong>legal, finance, compliance, human resources, general overheads and other operational costs. Also includes depreciation and amortisation, amongst other costs.</li><li><strong>cost of crypto asset sales: </strong>the cost of sold crypto assets owned by Coinbase itself (see ‘revenues from crypto asset sales’ above).</li><li><strong>other income and expenses: </strong>gains and losses on investment and realised impacts of foreign exchange</li><li><strong>taxes: </strong>corporate income taxes levied in the US (at the federal and state levels) and internationally.</li></ul><p>The high operating leverage of Coinbase — a symptom of its high fixed costs, has meant that the company has experienced relatively volatile earnings in the past. I would expect that, as Coinbase continues to scale its business, the level of its operating leverage and earnings volatility will fall over time.</p><h3>Wrap up</h3><p>Taking into account all the above, it is clear that the equity of Coinbase <em>does</em> represent a levered bet on the price of the underlying crypto assets traded / held on its platform.</p><p>Whether that changes in the future will depend on Coinbase’s ability to scale its institutional and subscription-based service offerings and generate recurring revenues for its investors. One reason an investor may wish to buy Coinbase shares today in favour of the underlying crypto assets may be a belief that Coinbase can successfully execute on this aspect of its business.</p><p>That’s it for Part 2! In the <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-3-132f20d2654c">next and final part</a>, I use what we have compiled so far to build an investment thesis for Coinbase. See you all there!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/coinbase-deep-dive-part-2"><em>https://opensourcefinance.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><h3>Subscribe to the blog</h3><p><strong>Hi, I’m Park!</strong></p><p><strong>Open Source Finance</strong> is a blog to document my journey into the complex and fast-moving world of fintech. In this blog, I share ideas, insights and key learnings about companies, technology, entrepreneurship, behavioural sciences, policy design, macroeconomics and more.</p><p>Finance is better when it’s open source. If you enjoy <strong>Open Source Finance</strong>, please consider subscribing by heading over to the link above. Please also consider sharing it with your social network to help me build my profile!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6f1dfc170980" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coinbase Deep-dive and Investment Thesis: Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-1-528b0a9dac90?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/528b0a9dac90</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[coinbase]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 13:17:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-29T20:23:22.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The company’s mission, the problem it solves, its competitive position, and the key risks to Coinbase’s business.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1ltGPwALAw_OOhXJS90kgw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Key takeaways</h3><ul><li>Coinbase’s mission is to become the most trusted and easy-to-use provider of financial services in the cryptoeconomy.</li><li>Coinbase removes friction in two ways, by abstracting away the technical complexity of interacting with the blockchain (simplifying use) and acting as a trusted intermediary (providing trust).</li><li>Coinbase has built a strong reputation as one of the most user-friendly and trusted exchanges in the US, but it faces substantial competition abroad and from alternative on-ramps to the cryptoeconomy.</li><li>Most of the revenues generated by Coinbase today derive from transaction fees charged on the exchange of crypto assets, particularly by retail customers. This makes Coinbase highly exposed to market volatility in terms of asset prices. It is also subject to fee competition over the longer term.</li><li>To mitigate these risks, Coinbase will need to scale its institutional business and transform its revenue structure — by moving away from transaction-based revenues and toward monetising its asset base.</li></ul><p>Earlier this month, Coinbase completed the direct listing of its Class A common shares, ushering in a new era for crypto and solidifying its legitimacy within traditional finance spheres.</p><p>I have been a user of Coinbase since 2017. It was my first on-ramp to the cryptoeconomy, at a time when not many options existed. I still remember opening the Coinbase app after work every day to purchase crypto (the purchase limits refreshed every hour or so, and by day’s end I would have amonther £50 or so in my allocation). Since then, Coinbase has evolved into an ecosystem of services that facilitates broad access to the cryptoeconomy for retail investors, institutions and merchants alike.</p><p>In this three-part series, I do a deep dive on Coinbase’s business and present my investment thesis for the company. My analysis has been enabled in large part by the <a href="https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001679788/cbfab060-8271-48dc-a12e-54b7416a71f9.pdf">S-1 form</a> filed by Coinbase with the SEC this February, a document containing a detailed overview of Coinbase’s business, its financial position, and other useful information. As a financial analyst, I was naturally curious to dissect that document and understand more about the company:</p><ul><li>in this first part, I review the business case for Coinbase. I try to understand its mission, the problem it solves, its competitive position, and the key risks to its business.</li><li>in <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-2-6f1dfc170980">Part 2</a>, I conduct a financial and operational review of the company, looking at the build-up of its revenues, the key drivers of those revenues, and its cost structure.</li><li>in <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-3-132f20d2654c">Part 3</a>, I attempt to value the company using conventional valuation methods. I set out my investment thesis for Coinbase and close with some thoughts for the future.</li></ul><p>If you are already familiar with Coinbase, please feel free to skip ahead using the links provided above.</p><h3>Purpose and mission</h3><p>Coinbase’s goal is to become the most trusted and easy-to-use provider of financial services in the cryptoeconomy, allowing anyone to buy, sell, spend, save and earn in cryptocurrency.</p><p>In doing so, its mission is to reduce the frictions associated with participating in the cryptoeconomy and build a fairer, decentralised and more transparent financial system.</p><h3>Product</h3><p>Coinbase was founded in June 2012 by Brian Armstrong. The company first launched its service to allow customers to buy and sell Bitcoin through bank transfers in October 2012. It has since launched several other products as part of a comprehensive, full-stack offering:</p><ul><li><strong>Coinbase</strong>: a retail-focused product that allows users to buy, sell and store cryptocurrencies</li><li><strong>Coinbase Pro</strong>: a trading product targeted toward professional traders</li><li><strong>Coinbase Wallet</strong>: a mobile application that allows users to access decentralised applications built on Ethereum and other blockchains</li><li><strong>Coinbase Card</strong>: a debit Visa card that allows customers to spend their cryptocurrency</li><li><strong>USD Coin (USDC)</strong>: a digital stablecoin launched as part of a consortium comprising other investors called Centre</li><li><strong>Coinbase Prime</strong>: a prime brokerage platform for institutional investors</li><li><strong>Coinbase Custody</strong>: a custodian service with dedicated cold storage solution for institutional investors</li><li><strong>Coinbase Commerce</strong>: a service that allows merchants and payment service providers to accept cryptocurrency payments</li></ul><h3>Value proposition</h3><p>Coinbase serves as a crucial on-ramp for retail investors, institutional investors and e-commerce partners seeking to participate in the cryptoeconomy. It does so by providing the necessary infrastructure to allow for frictionless participation, in two ways:</p><ol><li>by abstracting away the technical complexity of interacting with the blockchain (i.e. simplifying use). Coinbase has achieved this by re-investing heavily in technology and building out its suite of products.</li><li>by acting as a trusted intermediary to which users can delegate their assets (i.e. providing trust). It continues to seek regulatory compliance and consumer protections across the geographies in which it operates.</li></ol><p>Most of the revenues generated by Coinbase today derive from transaction fees charged on the purchase and sale of crypto assets, particularly by retail customers. This is a substantial and growing market, but is likely exposed to volatility across the market cycle and, more importantly, fee competition from other service providers.</p><p>To offset this risk, Coinbase has continued to invest in its institutional product offering and other services that generate recurring revenues. The ability of Coinbase to scale its revenues over the long term will depend on whether it is able to transition away from short-term trading activities (i.e. fees earned on transaction volumes) and toward long-term investment activities (i.e. fees charged on assets under its management) and its recurring revenue businesses.</p><p>There are emerging opportunities, for instance in the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus and DeFi space, that could shift the focus of users towards investing for the long term. These could present interesting revenue opportunities for Coinbase.</p><h3>Addressable market</h3><p>The addressable market for Coinbase is tied to the wider adoption of cryptocurrencies and the demand for crypto-based financial services. Today, Coinbase serves over 43 million retail users and 7000 institutions, and it is likely that these number will continue to grow. A 2020 <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/18345/crypto-currency-adoption/">survey</a> conducted by Statista found that only 6% of US respondents had ever used or owned cryptocurrencies. That proportion is higher in countries like Nigeria and the Phillipines where existing payment rails are weak, but even there the scope for continued adoption remains significant.</p><p>Coinbase’s aspiration is to “<em>bring crypto-based financial services to anyone with a smartphone, a population of approximately 3.5 billion people today</em>”.<a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/coinbase-deep-dive-part-1#footnote-3">3</a> With its range of products catered to both new and sophisticated users, Coinbase has the unique opportunity to take on a massive and rapidly growing market.</p><p>Of course, there are risks to adoption which could lead to a narrowing of the addressable market. I discuss these and other risks in more detail below.</p><h3>Competitive position</h3><p>Coinbase has built a strong reputation as one of the most user-friendly and trusted exchanges in the US, but it faces substantial competition from rival exchanges and alternative on-ramps to the cryptoeconomy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tLFNQhTFlK-dRnelWywu1A.png" /></figure><p>As shown above, Coinbase leads the US market in terms of its popularity, despite having support for relatively few cryptocurrencies. This speaks to the strong brand value and customer relationships it has maintained in the market. The international market is larger and dominated by Binance, which leads on liquidity, popularity and the breadth of its product offering.</p><p>Other non-exchange services like PayPal and Cash App in the US and Revolut in the UK have gradually added cryptocurrency offerings, which compete against Coinbase as alternative on-ramps to the crypto market. Investment vehicles like the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust and other Bitcoin ETFs also provide alternative avenues for retail and institutional investors to invest in crypto. That said, some of these providers are likely to be clients of Coinbase (for instance, <a href="https://www.microstrategy.com/content/dam/website-assets/collateral/bitcoin-downloads/MicroStrategy-Bitcoin-Summit_Coinbase-Institutional-2020-in-Review.pdf">Grayscale Investments relies on Coinbase’s institutional brokerage product</a> to provide its asset management services). This creates synergistic opportunities for revenue capture, offseting some of the competitive risk.</p><p>Lastly, Coinbase competes against the ecosystem of decentralised exchanges that have come onto the market recently, including Automated Market Maker (AMM) based exchanges which are noncustodial and offer alternative investment products such as liquidity pools.</p><p>Despite the threat of competition, Coinbase has built important competitive advantages that allow it to maintain its market leading position. It continues to hold the largest share of total crypto market capitalisation on its platform. Coinbase’s key competitive advantages include:</p><ul><li><strong>regulation and compliance</strong>: Coinbase is a <a href="https://help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/privacy-and-security/other/coinbase-regulatory-compliance">regulated entity</a> and has obtained licences to operate in most US states, as well as countries internationally. It complies with customer due diligence / anti-money laundering regulation, reporting requirements and other laws and regulations in the US.</li><li><strong>insurance and security</strong>: Coinbase holds the majority of its crypto asset deposits in cold storage and has secured <a href="https://www.coinbase.com/legal/insurance">insurance</a> over the full value of these assets. It has never been the subject of a security breach.</li><li><strong>investment in technology</strong>: Coinbase has continued to expand its service offerings and integrate a growing ecosystem of blockchains, while maintaining the simple, intuitive UX layer that it is known for.</li><li><strong>service offering</strong>: Coinbase has built innovative products and created a differentiated service offering, for instance focusing on products that promote financial education.</li><li><strong>partnerships: </strong>Coinbase has partnered extensively with merchants, asset issuers, developers and other stakeholders to build its ecosystem of services and create lasting moats.</li></ul><p>The figure below attempts to summarise the competitive matrix for Coinbase, in light of the service offerings discussed above.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3Hxg-4YVBmmeAyjzmDjkaw.png" /></figure><h3>Risks</h3><p>As a business that generates most of its revenues from transactions in crypto assets, Coinbase is exposed to significant <strong>market risk </strong>in terms of the price volatility of assets traded on its platform. In the <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-2-6f1dfc170980">next part</a>, I will discuss how asset price volatility is an important driver of both Monthly Transacting Users (MTUs) (which drive transaction revenues) and Assets on Platform (which drive subscription-based revenues).</p><p>Coinbase also faces the <strong>risk of external competition</strong> from alternative on-ramps to the cryptoeconomy, as already discussed. The transaction fees that Coinbase is able to charge its retail customers will likely erode over time as competitors grow their service offerings and consumers become more price sensitive.</p><p>In particular, crypto purchases made on Coinbase are charged a base transaction fee of 4%, with various reductions <a href="https://help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/trading-and-funding/pricing-and-fees/fees.html#variable-fees-by-location-and-payment-method">depending on payment method and location</a>. Retail users are further charged:</p><ol><li>a 0.5% spread on the quoted price of crypto assets, and</li><li>a ‘ <a href="https://help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/trading-and-funding/pricing-and-fees/fees">Coinbase Fee</a> ‘ that varies by order size and region. For example, in the US, the Coinbase Fee ranges from $0.99 for transactions worth $10 to $2.99 for transactions worth between $50 and $200.</li></ol><p>This two-tiered model is most likely unsustainable over the long-term as it becomes subject to: (1) internal competition from Coinbase’s Pro product, which can be accessed at no further charge; and (2) external fee competition from other exchange providers.</p><p>Brian Armstrong has <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/101579/coinbase-ceo-expects-50-future-revenues-non-trading-businesses">recently acknowledged</a> that competition could result in “<em>fee compression” </em>over the long-term.</p><p>In terms of diversifying its market exposure, Coinbase faces substantial risk in terms of its <strong>ability to scale its institutional business and generate recurring revenues</strong>. While Brian Armstrong expressed his expectation for Coinbase to derive <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/101579/coinbase-ceo-expects-50-future-revenues-non-trading-businesses">50% of its revenues from its non-trading businesses</a> in five to ten years’ time, this remains aspirational as Coinbase’s subscription and service-based revenues are currently subscale. To transform its revenue structure, Coinbase will need to not only influence the behaviours of its customers, but also reinvent itself as more than just an asset exchange.</p><p>Of course, there is also the risk that crypto assets will <strong>not be widely adopted enough</strong> to allow Coinbase to continue to scale its business. Setting aside a black swan event, there are a number of technical, governance-related and regulatory risks that could foreseeably affect the level of adoption of cryptocurrencies. Some of these are idiosyncratic risks specific to each project / blockchain protocol. Maintaining a broad portfolio of crypto assets will allow Coinbase to diversify its exposure.</p><p>In the <a href="https://parkyeung.medium.com/coinbase-deep-dive-and-investment-thesis-part-2-6f1dfc170980">next part</a>, we dive into a financial and operational review of Coinbase and look at the build-up of its revenues, key drivers and its cost structure. I’ll see you there!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://opensourcefinance.substack.com/p/coinbase-deep-dive-part-1"><em>https://opensourcefinance.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><h3>Subscribe to the blog</h3><p><strong>Hi, I’m Park!</strong></p><p><strong>Open Source Finance</strong> is a blog to document my journey into the complex and fast-moving world of fintech. In this blog, I share ideas, insights and key learnings about companies, technology, entrepreneurship, behavioural sciences, policy design, macroeconomics and more.</p><p>Finance is better when it’s open source. If you enjoy <strong>Open Source Finance</strong>, please consider subscribing by heading over to the link above. Please also consider sharing it with your social network to help me build my profile!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=528b0a9dac90" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Your Next Bank Could Be a Big Tech Company]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/your-next-bank-could-be-a-big-tech-company-2dcb7fc73c50?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2dcb7fc73c50</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[big-tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2021 18:28:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-21T18:28:35.514Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Big Tech’s foray into financial services has significant potential for innovation and disruption. Yet, without proper regulation, it may create material risks for fair competition and financial stability.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f6req9MWPWXKHN-JjqQ6Cw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Apple Card, launched in partnership with Goldman Sachs in 2019. (Source: Unsplash)</figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of ’08, FinTech startups took the financial services industry by storm. More agile and technologically advanced than their incumbent counterparts, these companies accelerated the digitisation and unbundling of financial services, spurring innovation by competing and collaborating with banks.</p><p>The next wave of disruption, led by Big Tech, is likely to augment the roles of both traditional financial institutions and FinTech companies. Whereas FinTech startups have so far focused on employing technology to address particular deficiencies in the traditional financial services stack, Big Techs have the potential to re-build financial services from the ground up.</p><p>So, what are the reasons behind Big Tech’s coordinated move into financial services, and what opportunities and threats exist for a finance industry dominated by Big Tech?</p><h3>Big Tech’s big competitive advantages</h3><p>Technology companies hold four important competitive advantages that make them ideal candidates as financial service providers.</p><p>The first advantage relates to the way in which technology companies operate and create value — almost all Big Tech companies operate through a platform model, meaning they attract users through the ecosystem of services they provide (often for free), and collect fees from advertisers and merchants in exchange for access to their user base. In economic terms, this is known as a <strong>two-sided market</strong>. The growth of participants in one side of the platform increases its value to those on the other. This symbiotic relationship creates a positive feedbook loop that enables important network externalities and promotes rapid growth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/505/0*UPE5pGAynDu4nYWp.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: Muzellec, Ronteau and Lambkin.</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3457777">Platforms</a> that provide a broad range of services are able to better capitalise on the externalities of network effects. As technology companies diversify their businesses (e.g. towards finance), the richness and variety of the data they are able to collect on their users grows. These new datasets, used in combination with existing user data, have significant potential for unlocking fresh insights and creating new opportunities for monetisation.</p><p>A second competitive advantage held by Big Techs over banks is their brand value. Financial services are built on trust — and the Global Financial Crisis is only one of a string of financial crises that have proliferated widespread public mistrust in the banking sector. A 2019 <a href="https://www.bain.com/insights/many-consumers-trust-technology-companies-more-than-banks-snap-chart/">survey</a> conducted by Bain of 151,894 consumers in 29 countries found that 54% of respondents consider at least one technology company to be more trustworthy than banks in general. When compared to banks, Big Techs tend to take a more consumer-centric approach to business, offering superior user experiences and maintaining better relationships with its customers. By leveraging their brand image, technology companies have the potential to rapidly steal market share from incumbents in finance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*Ma-rwZyt9B_JwrFb.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: Visual Capitalist.</figcaption></figure><p>A third competitive advantage held by Big Tech relates to the benefits of diversification and scale. By expanding into financial services, technology companies have the opportunity to diversify their existing businesses and seek new prospects for growth. The <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/">number of global smartphone users</a> is growing by hundreds of millions each year, driven in particular by growth in emerging markets, where mobile banking services likely to comprise a substantial portion of this activity. Platforms that provide a comprehensive and integrated range of services have the best chance of capturing this growth.</p><p>Fourth, and from a financial standpoint, technology companies hold important advantages over the competition in terms of their ability to <a href="https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P091219-1.pdf">raise capital</a> — their cost of borrowing is lower than that of banks (as a result of their greater profitability) as well as nascent startups (given their scale and deep entrenchment in the market). This allows technology companies to take on greater risk and provide outsized returns to investors.</p><h3>Not all entrants are motivated by the same strategic considerations</h3><p>While there are similarities in the competitive advantages enjoyed by Big Techs, not all companies that seek to enter into finance are motivated by the same strategic considerations.</p><p>A review conducted by <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2019e3.pdf">BIS</a> of the competitive landscape of Big Tech’s financial services reveals that players are split between two camps:</p><ol><li>Those seeking to expand into financial services with the aim of diversifying their business lines and enhancing existing service offerings. These are often companies operating in developed, Western markets building services overlaid on traditional financial infrastructure.</li><li>Those seeking to provide financial services to fill crucial gaps in existing infrastructure. These are, most commonly, tech companies operating in emerging markets characterised by poor financial infrastructure and low levels of financial inclusion.</li></ol><p>In China, for example, Alipay started in 2004 as a simple escrow service to address the issue of a <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2019e3.pdf">lack of trust between buyers and sellers</a> on Alibaba, but has since evolved to encompass a full range of financial products across the consumer finance stack, serving as a conduit between China’s underbanked population and its financial markets. In Africa, M-Pesa was launched in 2007 by Vodafone as a peer-to-peer payment services to allow users to deposit and send money using their mobile phones by way of text message. The service grew quickly and, by 2010, became the largest mobile financial service platform in the developing world, dramatically transforming financial participation in the region.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TUf3Ggnp0ZwFx1Sb.jpg" /><figcaption>Money being sent over M-PESA on a feature phone in Kenya. (Source: Forbes)</figcaption></figure><p>A key reason why these companies were so successful is that they happened to operate in regions characterised by large underserved populations with high demand for more accessible financial services. In the West, the competitive landscape can be quite different — financial services tend to be more immune to disruption in these markets because of their maturity and high levels of market penetration. The existence of complex regulatory frameworks can also pose significant barriers to entry, an issue we will return to later. This may explain why Western Big Techs have so far focused on less <a href="https://www.imperial.ac.uk/business-school/blogs/executive-education/fintech-techfin-and-the-challenge-bigtech/">disruptive</a> auxiliary services (such as digital wallets) that serve as an interface to, rather than a replacement for, existing financial infrastructure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/0*vbAQ0fKB8aBhlZFV" /><figcaption>Source: Norman Alex.</figcaption></figure><p>That is not to say that Big Tech will continue to play a superficial role in financial services. Behind the scenes, Google and Amazon have been steadily acquiring a string of financial service startups to bolster their capabilities, while Facebook is now seeking to leverage its social network and blockchain expertise to build Libra, a global payments processing system.</p><p>One reason why Big Techs have so far preferred to work under the radar may be to avoid provoking regulatory retaliation. Technology companies thrive on innovation and agility, and the compliance requirements associated with today’s highly regulated finance sector stand at odds with these objectives. By working at a slower pace, Big Techs have a better chance of working around regulatory hurdles and working out how best to play its hand over the long term.</p><p>Clearly, significant potential exists for technology companies seeking to enter the financial services market. Let us now turn to some of the <em>challenges </em>that Big Techs can expect to face, to understand the case against disruption by Big Tech.</p><h3>It all comes down to regulation</h3><p>The regulatory fabric that governs financial services is incredibly complex and varies substantially by region. Policy initiatives are often mandated by organisations operating at different levels of government, and not always aligned towards consistent objectives.</p><p>In the EU, for example:</p><ul><li><strong>Open banking regulation </strong>known as Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2), introduced in 2018, seeks to place ownership of personal financial data back in the hands of customers, while making such data more easily shareable through the use of open-source APIs. Aimed at promoting innovation and disruption, PSD2 reduces barriers of entry for new entrants to the finance sector and is likely to benefit Big Tech companies.</li><li><strong>General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), </strong>also implemented in 2018, seeks to apply sweeping restrictions over the right to use or share customers’ personal data. In addition to requiring customer consent, GDPR sets limitations on the ways in which personal financial data can be used and shared.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XztWPNiEv3_4YUJ5.jpg" /><figcaption>Differences between GDPR and PSD2 as they relate to issues of consumer consent. (Source: EY)</figcaption></figure><p>The overlap in scope and potential discrepancies between these two pieces of regulation (e.g. as identified by <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/legal/deloitte-nl-psd2-and-gdpr-an-awkward-match.pdf">Deloitte</a> and other consulting companies) may increase compliance costs and ultimately hamper innovation. Regulatory authorities need to provide clearer direction as to the interactions between conflicting directives.</p><p>In the US, federal law mandates the seperation of banking and commercial activities, limiting the scope for non-bank Fintech companies to offer financial services. As embedded finance (the vertical integration of financial services into e-commerce and other non-financial services) increasingly blurs the line between financial and non-financial activities, regulators will need to adapt their frameworks to stay apace of innovative business models in ensuring that innovation is encouraged, not stifled.</p><p>Of course, innovation should not be heralded as an over-riding objective at the expense of other policy considerations. Big Techs’ monopolistic or oligopolistic hold over user data has important antitrust implications that must be balanced against the potential benefits of disruption. Recent concerns over the ownership rights and misuse of personal data culminated in a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tech-congress-idUSKCN24T2VE">congressional hearing on antitrust</a> on July 2020, during which the CEOs of Facebook, Apple, Google and Amazon gave evidence on the business practices of the companies they lead. How technology companies manage consumer data will ultimately determine whether they are able to sustain their competitive advantage in the market. Just as financial institutions have lost consumers’ trust over the management of their finances, technology companies may stand to lose the trust of consumers over the management of their data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*4Xb2KeL2GxBgcX65.jpg" /><figcaption>Sundar Pichai (Google), Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), Tim Cook (Apple) and Jeff Bezos (Amazon) were summoned to give evidence over conference call during the antitrust hearing that happened in July. (Source: Wall Street Journal)</figcaption></figure><p>In the finance sector, the centralisation of power amongst a small number of decision-makers was a major catalyst for past crises. If Big Tech comes to dominate financial services, these risks have the potential to replicate and transfer across to technology companies in ways we don’t yet fully understand. Morever, as new forms of finance proliferate, regulators may become less well-equipped to regulate Big Tech’s financial activities over time.</p><p>Finally, there is a potential for the deepening of <a href="https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P091219-1.pdf">systemic risks</a> as technology companies move into more complex avenues of finance. As Big Tech become increasingly important providers of financial services — whether in managing customer relationships, providing the underlying infrastructure or underwriting the products themselves, new propagation mechanisms are likely to materialise that magnify shocks and increase the complexity of our financial system. Without the appropriate risk management functions in place, the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317999278_From_FinTech_to_TechFin_The_Regulatory_Challenges_of_Data-Driven_Finance">next financial crisis</a> may well originate from a player such as Google or Facebook.</p><h3>Our future in the balance</h3><p>Big Tech’s recent decision to deplatform Trump and the millions of conservative voices on social network Parler have elevated concerns over the dangers of its unchecked power.</p><p>As Big Tech moves further into financial services, we should recognise that disruption is a double-edge sword: technological innovation and financial inclusion will no doubt lead to benefits for consumers, but the flipside is that it affords Big Tech the opportunity to further consolidate power and amass influence over yet another aspect of our lives.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2dcb7fc73c50" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How (Not) To Behave In a Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://parkyeung.medium.com/how-not-to-behave-in-a-crisis-14b1b9e9e041?source=rss-262112c18961------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/14b1b9e9e041</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[behavior-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Park Yeung]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2020 22:30:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-02T18:51:51.424Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Panic buying, face masks and other irrational ways we have behaved in this crisis—why we do it and what we can do about it.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wpODtpuX5thd9fXUStQ0uQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by @markusspiske on Unsplash.</figcaption></figure><p>Panic buying was a widespread phenomenon observed of buyers at the start of the COVID-19 crisis. With food supplies and household products being in particular demand (<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01836-1">toilet paper sales</a> skyrocketed by a shocking 700% between February and March!), many supermarkets were forced to impose limits on the number of items shoppers can buy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*AF-45yxkrwhu_j6isEwYXg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A selection of photos of shoppers stockpiling. Images by <a href="http://twitter.com/abewitchedangel">@abewitchedangel</a> on Twitter (top left); <a href="http://twitter.com/tinik972">@tinik972</a> on Twitter (top right); Forbes (bottom left); and Telegraph (bottom right).</figcaption></figure><h4>Why do we panic buy?</h4><p>Some people may panic buy as a form of forward planning. However, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20200304-coronavirus-covid-19-update-why-people-are-stockpiling">more often</a> than not it is a way we cope with our fears and anxieties during times of uncertainty. When things appear out of our control, taking bold, decisive action may help us to re-exert control over a situation, even if these actions reduce our risk in one respect but are largely ineffective for solving the problems we face (e.g. buying massive amounts of toilet paper in response to a pandemic).</p><p>Panic buying may also be triggered, and reinforced, by herding behaviour. Seeing other shoppers empty shelves and prices rise in response may spur our own sense of urgency to buy. “<em>It’s already sold out in three supermarket chains, if I don’t buy now I will miss out…</em>” FOMO — the fear of regret, or of missing out — can provide a strong motive for herding, allowing the behaviours of others to reinforce our own.</p><h4>The ‘rationality’ of panic buying</h4><p>Although panic buying is dismissed by some as irrational, it accords with a ‘rational’ outcome in behavioural game theory — the prisoner’s dilemma. The analogy proceeds as follows — two members of a criminal gang are arrested and seperately interrogated. The prosecutor does not have sufficient evidence to prosecute both, so he offers each gang member a bargain. If they testify on the other gang member, they receive a lighter sentence. If they do not, they receive a full sentence.</p><p>The well-publicised outcome of this experiment (that each gang member will testify on the other) suggests that two agents, each acting ‘rationally’ and in their own best interests, will settle for outcomes that are worse off for both parties.</p><p>The prisoner’s dilemma is in some ways analogous to the dilemma faced by shoppers in a supermarket. Consider the following stylised example involving two shoppers:</p><ol><li>In this scenario, each shopper can choose only to stockpile (‘S’), or not to stockpile (‘NS’).</li><li>If neither shopper stockpiles, the supermarket functions as normal and each shopper successfully purchases the goods they need.</li><li>If only one shopper stockpiles, but the other does not, then only the shopper that stockpiles is able to purchase any goods.</li><li>If both shoppers stockpile, then only one shopper successfully purchases any goods, i.e. it is equally likely for either shopper to get nothing.</li></ol><p>Both shoppers realise they can achieve the same or a better outcome by stockpiling (represented by the upper-left quadrant in the matrix below). Comparing the first row with the second, Shopper 1 always achieves the same or a better ‘payoff’ by stockpiling, irrespective of Shopper 2’s actions. The same is true vice versa. In other words, they settle for the worst combination of outcomes possible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/409/1*o1Km0pUkp2J0WKiKoiVuhw.png" /><figcaption>A COVID-19 shopper’s dilemma. (x, y) denotes outcome x for Shopper 1 and outcome <em>y</em> for Shopper 2<em>.</em> <em>I represent the outcome for each shopper as a figure between ‘1’ and ‘5’, with ‘1’ being the worst outcome and ‘5’ being the best outcome. If neither shopper stockpiles, they each maximise their payoff at ‘5’. If one shopper stockpiles but the other does not, the shopper that stockpiles has a payoff of ‘5’ and the other has a payoff of ‘1’. If both shoppers stockpile, they are each equally likely to receive nothing and I represent this as an average payoff of ‘3’. </em>Comparing the first row with the second, Shopper 1 always achieves the same or a better outcome by stockpiling, irrespective of Shopper 2’s actions. If Shopper 2 stockpiles, then by also stockpiling he is better off (3 &gt; 1). If Shopper 2 does not stockpile, then he is no worse off (5 = 5).</figcaption></figure><p>The prisoner’s dilemma is not isolated to our supermarkets. It also arises in other contexts relevant to this crisis:</p><ul><li>Wearing a face mask is known to stop the transmission of viral particles, but is less effective for preventing users from contracting the virus. In other words, people may choose not to wear a face mask because this is the most rational (albeit least socially optimal) outcome that minimises personal cost while overlooking the associated benefits that (mostly) accrue to others.</li><li>Businesses eager to restart their operations may be motivated by commercial considerations and the <a href="https://ey-parthenon-consumerinsights.passle.net/post/102g393/pausing-fashion-a-covid-19-catwalk-prisoners-dilemma">actions of their competitors</a>. While an extension to lockdown may be the most sensible solution from a public health standpoint, business owners who have suffered months of losses may be eager to reopen with the intention of recovering these losses, or even gain an edge on their competitors. Yet, if all businesses reopen prematurely and a resurgence of the virus transpires, none will benefit and almost certainly all will suffer.</li></ul><h4>What can we do to resolve this?</h4><p>Acting in our own best interests but ignoring those of others is clearly not the way to navigate this crisis. When facing the prisoner’s dilemma, coordination and cooperation (with some degree of altruism) are necessary as a cure<strong>. </strong>Self-serving individuals are simply not predisposed to comply with crisis management and public safety measures, which require collective effort.</p><p>The silver lining is that most people are not selfish, ‘utility-maximising’ agents as classic economic models of decision-making often assume. Rather, we are <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ9DylkccHA">conditional cooperators</a>, and we care deeply about others. We also often care about what others think of us (more on the importance of this later).</p><p>It is crucial that we share the right information to create the necessary incentives for cooperation. While strict rules (such as limits on the number of items shoppers can purchase) are effective, it is helpful also to understand the ‘why’ of these policies and to have in place a clear mental framework of how our actions contribute to the wider strategy.</p><p>Often, simple enforcement mechanisms such as social disapproval can be powerful, cost-effective ways of shaping behaviour. Just as ‘herding’ reinforces undesirable behaviours, so it can be used to encourage desirable practices and deter non-compliance. Many low-cost ‘<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nudge_theory">nudges</a>’ have already been deployed during this crisis to promote public health, including:</p><ul><li>the 2-meter rule (or 1.5-meters in some countries), to encourage social distancing</li><li>the elbow bump, to reduce physical contact</li><li>singing the ‘Happy Birthday’ song to prolong hand-washing</li><li>placing hand sanitiser dispensers in visible public locations with clearly marked signs.</li></ul><p>Similar measures can be put into place to encourage social consciousness and promote empathy.</p><p>As we slowly emerge from our homes and readjust to our old routines, we would do well to consider how our actions affect the social collective. With a bit of care, and a little nudge, we are well placed to overcome our irrational ways.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=14b1b9e9e041" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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