<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Irene Smith, JD, PhD on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Irene Smith, JD, PhD on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 03:33:28 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[1031 Your Business to Arlington?]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/1031-your-business-to-arlington-9c3802b91ddd?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9c3802b91ddd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[arlington]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[san-jose]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rent-control]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[over-regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 22:25:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-18T22:25:54.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rent for a studio in a 1970 building in San Jose and Arlington are roughly the same. San Jose with rent control, Arlington without. San Jose in Silicon Valley near San Francisco; Arlington near the DC Metro. Two examples:</p><blockquote><strong>The Grove (San Jose)</strong> — $1,910 and <strong>1500 Arlington Blvd (Arlington) </strong>— $1,935</blockquote><p>But costs tell a different story so if you want to get a profit and reduce risk from the same rent — 1031 to Arlington.</p><h4><strong>San Jose vs. Arlington: Housing Provider Rules Made Simple (1–12)</strong></h4><p><strong>1. Is there a law limiting how much rent can go up? (“Rent control”)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0z0Yk-983DbiedBRiTWEiQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>2. Getting rid of a bad behavior/disruptive tenant (not a nonpayment case)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5pZrAykQI33pB_rLjqIBJA.png" /></figure><p>In San Jose, a housing provider can’t just raise the rent or decline to renew to get rid of a problem tenant — they must prove a specific legal reason, tell the city, and go through court. Even an uncontested case realistically takes 2–3 months once the notice period and mandatory city filing are included, and a contested case commonly runs 6–8 months. In Arlington, a housing provider has a much faster, simpler way to end a bad tenancy.</p><p><strong>3. The two fuzzy words that make this even harder in San Jose: “material” and “habitual”</strong></p><p>To evict someone for bad behavior (not for nonpayment), San Jose’s law says the housing provider needs a “<strong>material</strong>” lease violation or a “<strong>habitual</strong>” (repeated) one. The problem: <strong>neither word is actually defined.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FYhs1e1pFD1J58Z5MsDIjA.png" /></figure><p>Imagine a rule that says “you can get in trouble for a serious enough rule-break, done enough times” — but nobody tells you in advance what number of incidents is “enough,” or which particular facts will make a violation “serious enough.” You only find out by going to court and paying a lawyer to argue about it. That’s exactly the situation a San Jose housing provider is in. Because of this, a small housing provider usually can’t afford to risk going to court over anything except nonpayment of rent — which is the one rule that’s crystal clear (rent wasn’t paid, period). Everything else is a gamble. That means the disruptive tenant often just stays, and it’s the good, quiet tenants nearby who end up moving out instead — because they have no similar protection and just want to escape the situation.</p><p><strong>4. Who must pay for water/utilities under rent control?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iGgj5vO7tZB6D6CwrgWF3Q.png" /></figure><p>In San Jose’s rent-controlled buildings, the housing provider is stuck paying all utilities for master meters no matter how much any one tenant uses — and can’t pass that cost on. In Arlington, tenants can be billed from the housing provider’s meters.</p><p><strong>5. Rent registry (yearly paperwork/fees just to own the building)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n3aQo2IfCF-2OajLKL0qNw.png" /></figure><p>San Jose housing providers have an extra yearly form-and-fee, time-chore just to legally exist. Arlington housing providers don’t.</p><p><strong>6. City inspections of the building</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J3vAogjgH3Dwhrgx6U3SXw.png" /></figure><p><strong>San Jose’s 3 inspection tiers (every building is placed in one but older buildings pay a price)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r2aP8SVb9mcAMMmFX7eV1g.png" /></figure><p>San Jose’s 3 inspection tiers (every building is placed in one but older buildings pay a price)</p><p>A note on Tier 3: the tier system isn’t purely a “good housing provider vs. bad housing provider” scorecard. A building moves to a worse tier when it has uncorrected violations or substantiated complaints — but an older building that’s never been retrofitted (say, one built in 1906) can pick up documented code violations during an inspection just because it doesn’t meet today’s building code, regardless of how well it’s actually run. City inspectors doing a proactive Tier 2/3 inspection are looking for exactly those kinds of issues. So a well-managed older building can still land in the most expensive tier mainly because of its age, not because of poor management.</p><p>Every San Jose rental building is placed into one of three paid inspection tiers, and the fee is higher for a building with more documented violations — which tends to track a building’s age as much as its management quality. A 10-unit building could pay about $354/year in the best tier to about $1,543/year in the highest tier. Arlington housing providers do not face San Jose’s recurring, tiered Multiple Housing inspection fees.</p><p><strong>7. Application fees (when screening a new tenant)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A3gKWDgSN4vXPXp9ZwT6Lg.png" /></figure><p>Refunds actually happen often in San Jose — depending on which of two legal tracks a housing provider uses, refunding every rejected applicant’s fee can be the required default, not a rare exception. San Jose puts more rules around how a housing provider picks a tenant, and in some cases forces the housing provider to eat the cost of a background check on someone they don’t even choose. Arlington gives the housing provider more freedom here. More <a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/small-law-large-costs-a54649d45f2a">costs</a> in CA.</p><p><strong>8. Cost of going through an eviction</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ab4NhkDx9loq0go87yR0zA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Why the cost estimate is so much higher than a generic “$12,000–$40,000” figure you might see elsewhere:</strong> the biggest cost in a contested eviction isn’t the court fee — it’s the rent the housing provider doesn’t collect while the case drags on. San Jose contested cases run 6–8 months, and San Jose’s average rent is roughly $2,850–$3,400/month in 2026 (<a href="https://www.zumper.com/rent-research/san-jose-ca">Zumper</a>; <a href="https://www.apartmentlist.com/rent-report/ca/san-jose">Apartment List</a>; <a href="https://www.doorstead.com/blog/san-jose-rental-market-report">Doorstead</a>). Six to eight months of lost rent alone is about $17,000–$27,000 — before adding attorney fees (~$5,000+), court/process costs (~$1,000–$2,000), and turnover costs (~$2,000–$5,000). Add it up and a realistic total lands around <strong>$25,000–$50,000+.</strong></p><p>Evicting someone in San Jose for nonpayment costs more money and takes longer than in Arlington, even when everything goes the housing provider’s way — and it takes San Jose housing providers longer than 30 days just to get a case into court in the first place.</p><p><strong>9. “Fair Return” — asking the city for a bigger rent increase</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S6_kNwabnJTZ2HIFk6rL9Q.png" /></figure><p>San Jose technically offers an escape hatch from the rent cap, but it’s so much hassle that almost no one uses it — so in practice, the 5% cap is a hard wall.</p><p><strong>10. Other extra rules that cost San Jose housing providers more</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sKkNBmrr0OKpJh0Ko4DI7w.png" /></figure><p>Almost every extra rule on the books costs San Jose housing providers more time or money than the equivalent (often nonexistent) rule in Arlington.</p><p><strong>11. Fair housing / disability rules — a harder-to-see risk</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dtc3SvqZuvDn4XGOiJLxlw.png" /></figure><p>Because California’s enhances the ADA disability standard it’s easier to file a complaint. More tenants and applicants can bring a fair-housing complaint against a San Jose housing provider than an Arlington one could bring under Virginia’s stricter, federal ADA standard. And once a complaint is filed in California, it stays in the state’s system for a minimum of three years even if the housing provider wins — it doesn’t just vanish the day the case is decided.</p><p><strong>12. Free legal help for tenants facing eviction</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JCQtuECUnbDWy0iZKThCQg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Final scorecard: who wins each category?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/784/1*joS6jXwLRrWFTDqRkyti_g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Bottom line:</strong> For the same amount of income, running a rental business is more expensive, slower, and legally riskier in San Jose than in Arlington on almost every measure — and the biggest hidden cost isn’t any single fee, it’s the fact that San Jose’s rules for removing a disruptive (non-nonpayment) tenant are vague, must be argued out in court case-by-case, and take months — which often means the <em>good</em> tenants leave before the <em>bad </em>one does.</p><p><strong>Why this hits small owners hardest:</strong> No single rule in this comparison is impossible to deal with on its own. What makes San Jose genuinely harder is that a housing provider has to stay on top of <em>all</em> of them at the same time — rent-increase math, 13 just-cause reasons with undefined “material”/”habitual” standards, the utility rule, the yearly rent registry, inspection tiers, application-fee limits, a 6–8 month eviction process, disability-complaint exposure, and a legal-aid system that only helps the tenant’s side. Meanwhile the law caps how much rent a housing provider can raise each year, but nothing caps how much insurance, legal fees, or a contested eviction can cost that same year. A big owner with hundreds of units can spread that cost and hire in-house legal and clerical help; a small owner faces the exact same list of rules without extensive staff, so one mistake on any single item lands hard on a much smaller income.</p><p><strong>CA Losing small market providers. </strong>This pattern has been reported at the broader California/LA level — real-estate press describes it as <a href="https://therealdeal.com/la/2026/05/26/small-landlords-sell-off-apartment-holdings/">“death by a thousand cuts” pushing small “mom-and-pop” owners to sell to bigger, better-lawyered buyers</a> (<a href="https://therealdeal.com/la/2026/05/26/small-landlords-sell-off-apartment-holdings/">The Real Deal, May 2026</a>), and one 2025 report described a small California owner’s insurance rising 340% while rent increases stayed capped at 4% (<a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/squeezing-small-guy-mom-pop-151539628.html">Yahoo Finance, April 2025</a>). <a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c?sharedUserId=pathseldomtravelled">Hidden Costs of Housing</a></p><p>Arlington has a bright future.</p><h3>Close to the clean and scenic Potomac River</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2ypuRUsP-g5Ltj04AyTTWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@koff?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Alex Korolkoff</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-street-corner-with-cars-parked-on-the-side-of-the-road-LkNPKb8ILfE?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9c3802b91ddd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Pothole in Every Lease]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/a-pothole-in-every-lease-f3d6cb21bd0f?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f3d6cb21bd0f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[delay-eviction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renter-attorney]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rent-control]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 18:48:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-11T18:48:53.639Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>We share the cost of fixing a pothole because everyone uses the road. San Francisco applies that logic to housing: one renter gets the benefit; everyone else gets the bill.</strong></p><p>Mayor Lurie is about to step into that pothole. Expect a bumpier road — and a higher rent bill.</p><p>When the city delays collection of unpaid rent or funds one-sided legal eviction defense, the expenses remain. Other renters absorb those costs — without receiving any comparable benefit.</p><p><strong>Fund one-sided legal representation and the cost of an eviction does not stay with the renter involved.</strong> Unpaid rent, legal fees, and delay are spread across the rental market. <a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/free-lawyers-higher-rents-1ffdbf0dec50">Free Lawyers, Higher Rents</a>.</p><p><strong>Delay action on unpaid rent and losses accumulate.</strong> Mortgage payments, insurance, maintenance, property taxes, and utilities remain due whether rent arrives or not. Owners price that risk into rents.</p><blockquote><strong><em>San Francisco should be clear about its choices: it is not eliminating costs or expanding benefits. It is shifting costs that benefit a few onto renters who receive nothing in return.</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c"><strong>Hidden Costs of Housing — Increase Rents</strong></a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/free-lawyers-higher-rents-1ffdbf0dec50"><strong>The simplest eviction-prevention program already exists: pay the rent</strong></a><strong>.</strong></blockquote><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><h4>Here’s the full SF list on how to increase rents for all:</h4><blockquote>- When a property owner wants to raise the rent with banked rent increases and capital improvements they will be limited to 10% per year.</blockquote><blockquote>- When renters fall behind by less than one month of rent, they can’t be evicted.</blockquote><blockquote>- When a landlord takes a multi-unit property off the market, we are raising the amount they owe in relocation by 25%.</blockquote><blockquote>- For renters who are at risk of eviction, we are investing more than $54 million in emergency rental assistance, legal defense, and more.</blockquote><blockquote>We are also investing $3 million to expand Tenants Rights to Council and $1 million in a Know Your Rights Campaign.</blockquote><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/10/us/san-francisco-daniel-lurie-rent-emergency.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/10/us/san-francisco-daniel-lurie-rent-emergency.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https://www.sf.gov/news-mayor-lurie-unveils-sweeping-package-with-immediate-actions-to-address-san-franciscos-rent-emergency&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiB9q7PkOeWAxX4EzQIHQXYIekQFnoECCQQAQ&amp;usg=AOvVaw0EqyhKswBedg47zGzqjXuA">Mayor Lurie Unveils Sweeping Package With Immediate …SF.govhttps://www.sf.gov › news-mayor-lurie-unveils-sweepin…</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jFAOSe4To6TqOwAm6_EjcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@acatinabox?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">ACatInABox</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-puddle-of-water-on-the-ground-mk4QsXmOoYU?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f3d6cb21bd0f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CA & SJ Housing Laws Explained]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/ca-sj-housing-laws-explained-cdd2c4368515?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cdd2c4368515</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 20:37:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-28T21:11:16.334Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kn9v2jDi_EBC5aHTurl1Iw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yqRW2AUCqoCZ5GNsyZMhOA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D0HQdACTiz3vc7RHF_O-Lw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_knvycn_H-YeRIpAI76CTw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iYbZibCWZGocAtPnT2rv_w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CX8MLGEWl9iShRRlXHKLvw.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cdd2c4368515" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Free Lawyers, Higher Rents]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/free-lawyers-higher-rents-1ffdbf0dec50?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ffdbf0dec50</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 18:52:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-11T18:09:06.388Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>When a tenant stops paying rent in San Jose, the housing provider can file for eviction; 98% of the time the reason for an eviction is nonpayment. A proposal now before the City Council would provide all tenants a free city-paid attorney to contest the eviction, at a cost of $5.4 million per year. The consultant recommending the free attorneys 1. overstates San Jose evictions fivefold, 2. underestimates legal costs threefold, and 3. excluded housing providers from its stakeholder interviews. Every American city that has tried this — New York, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Louisville — has ended up with longer delays, higher rents, and no drop in evictions.</blockquote><h3>Quick Summary</h3><p><strong>The simplest eviction-prevention program already exists: pay the rent.</strong> In San Jose, 98% of just-cause eviction <em>notices</em> cite nonpayment of rent;¹ the nonpayment share of Santa Clara County UD filings rose from 78.4% in 2019 to 85.5% in 2023.² A free attorney pays no rent and builds no housing.</p><p><strong>The one action that keeps everyone housed: pay the rent. RTC raises rent for everyone else.</strong></p><p>The Draft Study recommends a citywide Right to Counsel (RTC) program — a free, publicly funded attorney for all tenants facing eviction(regardless of ability to pay). It fails on four points:</p><ol><li><strong>Wrong cost number.</strong> HR&amp;A puts a nonpayment eviction at $240–$435 — that’s just the court filing fee. The actual cost is $25,000–$70,000+ per contested case (§1.1), and every added month of delay (#3) drives it higher.</li><li><strong>Wrong stakeholders.</strong> HR&amp;A built its cost estimate from tenants, tenant-based CBOs, and government agencies. The people who pay for evictions were not asked (Appendix A).</li><li><strong>Wrong on delay.</strong> The Kentucky and NYC studies that HR&amp;A cites, both document that RTC extends eviction timelines by months — data HR&amp;A does not report to the Council. Mandatory mediation adds 30–90 more days on top (Section 4).</li><li><strong>Wrong on rent.</strong> Regulations reprice onto rent: NYC’s RTC raised posted rents in Year 1,³⁸ stricter eviction laws raise rents ~6% nationally,³⁷ and the post-moratorium San Jose rent spike was the largest of any large U.S. metro.³² The U.S. rental industry absorbed <strong>$21.3–$57.5 billion</strong> in unrecovered COVID-moratorium losses;²⁹⁻³¹ San Jose housing providers carry a proportional share. RTC would stack on top of that — plus San Jose’s existing rent control,ᴿ⁴ impact fees,ᴿ¹ seismic retrofits,ᴿ² all-electric Reach Code,ᴿ³ and California’s AB 2493 first-come-first-served application rule.⁶²ᵃ (Section 3.)</li></ol><p><strong>Every RTC jurisdiction studied — Kentucky, NYC, Philadelphia, Cleveland — confirms these problems. None demonstrates RTC solves them.</strong> NYC’s 2025 Comptroller report is titled <em>“Evictions Up, Representation Down.”</em>⁶³</p><p><strong>See Appendix A</strong> for why the HR&amp;A Draft cannot be relied on as written — including that independent peer-reviewed research confirms HR&amp;A’s landlord-side finding on tenant-protection laws, which contradicts what HR&amp;A is now telling San Jose, and the question this raises for the City going forward: how San Jose engages HR&amp;A on future work.</p><h3>1. HR&amp;A Used the Wrong Number, the Wrong Data, and Missed the Buyout Economy</h3><p>HR&amp;A’s $240–$435 figure fails on three fronts. It uses the <strong>wrong number</strong> — the court filing fee, not the real cost of a contested case (§1.1). It counts the <strong>wrong thing</strong> — court filings, not evictions (§1.2). And it misses the <strong>buyout economy</strong> — the LA and SF cash-for-keys settlements that never enter the public record (§1.3).</p><h3>1.1. Off by Two Orders of Magnitude</h3><p>HR&amp;A tells the City Council a nonpayment eviction costs <strong>“$240–$435”</strong> (<a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/130204/639110725519370000">HR&amp;A Draft, p. 18</a>). That is the <em>court filing fee alone</em>.³ It ignores months of lost rent, attorney fees, turnover, and uncollectable arrears during a process in which California law forbids collection of rent or re-rental of the unit — costs rebuilt into future rents. HR&amp;A never asked housing providers what an eviction actually costs (Appendix A).</p><p>A realistic San Jose nonpayment timeline — the rent clock starts on Day 1 and never stops:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/836/1*IxTXfefNrKL2oEgF3dn9vw.png" /></figure><p>California industry data confirms the range: uncontested UD ~$5,000–$9,000 all-in; contested $10,000–$27,000+, driven mainly by lost rent.²⁰ San Jose sits above that range because its median rent is roughly twice the U.S. average.¹⁷⁻¹⁹ First-hand reporting from San Jose’s eviction courts (2023) puts the typical contested case at ~$60,000.⁵⁶</p><p>Against either benchmark, HR&amp;A’s $240–$435 understates the true cost by one to two orders of magnitude.</p><h3>1.2. Filings Are Not Evictions — The Eviction Debate Is Built on the Wrong Number</h3><p><strong>An Unlawful Detainer (UD) filing is a court complaint. It is not an eviction.</strong> HR&amp;A counts filings and reports them as evictions — the same shorthand used by Princeton’s Eviction Lab, tenant advocacy groups, and news reporting. Peer-reviewed research treats filings and evictions as distinct metrics:</p><ul><li>Princeton’s Eviction Lab distinguishes <em>filing rate</em> from <em>eviction rate</em>, and warns that “serial filing” inflates filing counts without proportional displacement.⁵⁰</li><li>A peer-reviewed critique in <em>Law &amp; Social Inquiry</em> (Cambridge, 2025) documents that even judgment counts overstate actual evictions — cases settle post-judgment, tenants leave voluntarily, cases are dismissed at the courthouse.⁵² California data confirms the same pattern: a 2023 Stanford study of San Mateo County found roughly half of UD filings never resulted in a judgment.⁵¹</li></ul><p><strong>Public data conflates the two — and HR&amp;A did not correct for it.</strong> The City’s COVID-19 dashboard uses the shorthand <em>“Unlawful Detainers (i.e., eviction notices)”</em>⁵³ — an operational label, not a research methodology. Under <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CCP&amp;sectionNum=1161.2.">Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1161.2</a> and <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/asm/ab_2801-2850/ab_2819_cfa_20160424_141543_asm_comm.html">AB 2819 (2017)</a>, a UD record is masked from public view from the moment of filing, and becomes permanently sealed unless the housing provider prevails within 60 days.⁵⁴ Dismissed cases, tenant wins, settlements, and cases running past 60 days never enter the public record. HR&amp;A did not distinguish filings from outcomes.</p><p>Two consequences the Draft ignores:</p><ol><li><strong>HR&amp;A cannot have obtained case-level outcome data from public records.</strong> The Draft must disclose its data source and whether it obtained sealed records under §1161.2’s narrow exceptions.</li><li><strong>The “eviction destroys credit for seven years” harm is largely obsolete in San Jose.</strong> Under California law, sealed UD records do not appear in credit or tenant-screening reports.⁵⁴ That harm assumes a pre-2017 regime that no longer exists here.</li></ol><p><strong>HR&amp;A’s $240–$435 is too low and it counts the wrong thing.</strong></p><h3>1.3. The Buyout Economy Court Data Misses</h3><p><strong>Mediation is where the buyout gets negotiated.</strong> Court-ordered mediation is the default at initial UD appearances in San Jose.⁵⁶ The typical outcome: the tenant vacates, the housing provider forgives some or all of the unpaid rent — and sometimes pays the tenant on top (cash-for-keys). No public filing survives. UD counts <em>undercount</em> mediated displacements and <em>overcount</em> cases that never resulted in displacement.</p><p><strong>The buyout economy is real, documented, and large.</strong> When mediation cannot bridge the arrears, the compromise moves outside the courtroom entirely — the housing provider pays the tenant to leave. The LA Housing Department has logged 5,991 formal Tenant Buyout Agreements from 2019 to 2025, totaling $118.3 million paid by housing providers to tenants to vacate — average buyout ~$24,700.⁵⁷ San Francisco Rent Board records show average buyouts of ~$43,000, reaching $53,828 in 2022.⁵⁸ California legal-practice guidance is explicit: a cash-for-keys settlement requires dismissal of the UD before move-out — meaning no judgment issues, and the case is sealed under CCP §1161.2 even if a UD was filed.⁵⁹ Tenants leave voluntarily. Housing providers pay them, absorb the loss, and rebuild it into rents citywide. No public “eviction” is recorded. Court-filing datasets miss these outcomes entirely.</p><p><strong>The dollars are large enough to shift the debate.</strong> LA alone: $118.3 million in seven years, from a single city’s rent-stabilized stock, that never appears in any eviction count. San Francisco’s average payout runs ~$43,000 per case. Those are absorbed losses, rebuilt into rents.</p><h3>2. RTC Extends Eviction Timelines — a Fact HR&amp;A Cites But Does Not Disclose</h3><p><strong>Longer eviction timelines are the mechanism by which RTC operates — and HR&amp;A does not disclose this to the Council. HR&amp;A cites each study below, but reports only the favorable findings — not the timeline data.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cjDCQXZ2mpShZndDqABvXg.png" /></figure><p>At San Jose’s $3,134 median rent,⁴ every added month of delay is another $3,134 of unpaid rent per case — rebuilt into future rents.</p><h3>RTC Turns Nonpayment Cases Into Attorney-vs-Attorney Cases</h3><p>California UD procedure is technical: a defective 3-day notice, bad service, or missing verification triggers dismissal without prejudice, adding another month of unpaid rent. Once a taxpayer-funded attorney raises these defenses, the responding side has to hire counsel. <strong>RTC does not add one attorney — it adds two.</strong></p><p>Contested Bay Area UD counsel bills at $650–$800+ per hour; published fee schedules raise the rate automatically when the tenant is represented, and a jury-trial demand triggers a separate retainer.¹⁶ A 20-hour contested case at $750/hour adds $15,000 in legal fees on the housing provider side.</p><h3>The Taxpayer-Funded Escalation Point</h3><p>RTC uses public money to hire a $750/hour attorney to litigate a case whose only fact — was the rent paid? — is not in dispute in <strong>98% of San Jose eviction notices.</strong>¹ Taxpayers pay the tenant attorney. Every other renter pays the delay. <strong>The person who owes the rent is asked to pay the least.</strong></p><blockquote><strong><em>A free tenant attorney is not free.</em></strong><em> Attorney hours, months of delay, and unpaid rent are rebuilt into future rents.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>The tenant with the free lawyer does not pay for the free lawyer. The next tenant to sign a lease does.</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>The one action that keeps everyone housed: </em>pay the rent.<em> RTC raises rent for everyone else.</em></strong></blockquote><h3>3. Every Nonpayment Case Becomes a Rent Increase on Every Other San Jose Renter</h3><p><strong>HR&amp;A and its Louisville source measured how RTC affects the tenant in the case. Neither measured what extended cases do to future rents.</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Housing providers absorbed tens of billions in unpaid COVID-moratorium rent</strong> — $21.3–$57.5 billion even after $47 billion in federal Emergency Rental Assistance.²⁹⁻³¹</li><li>San Jose had the largest post-moratorium rent spike of any large U.S. metro: 11% in six months in 2022,³² peaking above 10% annual growth versus a pre-pandemic average of 3.4%.³³ Mid-2026 rents continue to climb at #2 nationally.³⁴⁻³⁵ HR&amp;A concedes San Jose rent now sits ~23% above what the median renter household can afford (<a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/130204/639110725519370000">HR&amp;A Draft, p. 21</a>) but never names the two mechanisms driving it: <strong>cost recovery</strong> (housing providers rebuilding absorbed losses into rents) and <strong>risk pricing</strong> (each new mandate raises the risk of operating a rental, which is priced into rent).</li><li>Peer-reviewed research links eviction restrictions to higher rents. NMHC’s 2025 econometric study finds stricter eviction laws raise rents ~6%.³⁷ NYC’s RTC raised posted rents in Year 1.³⁸</li><li><strong>Free counsel is an operational moratorium.</strong> By extending case duration (Section 2), RTC adds thousands to tens of thousands per contested case. Across San Jose’s ~1,000–2,000 annual UD filings³⁹ that is millions per year of uncollectible rent — repriced onto future leases.</li><li><strong>RTC lands hardest on the housing San Jose says it wants to build.</strong> San Jose voted on August 19, 2026 to quadruple residential density from 8 to 32 units per acre to enable duplexes, triplexes, and fourplexes citywide.⁶⁰ That housing is also least able to absorb a $25,000–$70,000 contested eviction. Individual investors own 70% of U.S. rental properties in 1–4-unit buildings (15.9 million units, Census RHFS);⁶¹ Urban Institute finds 77% of 2–4 unit rentals are individually owned — the mom-and-pop segment.⁶² A single contested case can wipe out a small owner’s annual net income. The pattern repeats across California’s tenant-side mandates: AB 2493’s first-come-first-served application rule shifts weeks of vacancy loss and screening cost onto the smallest providers, who cannot spread it across a portfolio.⁶²ᵃ RTC raises the risk premium hardest on exactly the housing stock the City is trying to expand.</li><li><strong>Moral hazard is priced in too.</strong> Any policy that eliminates legal cost for nonpayment produces more nonpayment. That is not a claim about tenant character — it is standard insurance economics: remove downside risk from a behavior, get more of that behavior. Rental-insurance products price this in as adverse selection. RTC prices it at zero. Housing providers do not.</li></ul><p><strong>Free legal representation for the nonpaying tenant is a rent increase on the paying one.</strong></p><h3>4. Mandatory Pre-Filing Mediation Adds Months of Delay — Paid by Future Renters</h3><p>The HR&amp;A Draft recommends mandatory pre-filing mediation (pp. 41, 62), modeled on Philadelphia’s Eviction Diversion Program (EDP).⁴⁰ Mediation creates no rent. It reallocates the loss.</p><p>Four mechanics from the Philadelphia model move the loss:</p><ol><li><strong>Mandatory 30-day waiting period before filing.</strong> Under Philadelphia Code § 9–811, no UD can be filed until at least 30 days of good-faith EDP participation.⁴⁰ At San Jose’s $3,134 median rent, that adds $3,134 in unpaid rent per case before any court has heard it — and California law forbids re-rental of the unit throughout (CCP §1159 et seq.). Philadelphia practitioners report EDP shifted the total cycle from 6–8 weeks to roughly 4 months.⁴⁰</li><li><strong>Up to three sessions per case, each restart adds weeks.</strong> Missed or rescheduled sessions restart the clock.⁴⁰ The tenant faces no consequence for delay; staying in place rent-free.</li><li><strong>Mediation produces partial-payment agreements, not full recovery.</strong> Reinvestment Fund’s Philadelphia evaluation found most mediated cases end in structured payment plans or partial forgiveness.⁴⁰ Independent research finds evictions “rarely enable landlords to recoup unpaid rent.”⁴¹ The tenant compromises on how much rent is paid, not on possession.</li><li><strong>“Landlord noncompliance” becomes an affirmative defense.</strong> Under the model the Draft recommends (p. 51), a missed portal step, misfiled form, or missed mediation appearance can lose the merits case regardless of unpaid rent. The tenant faces no equivalent forfeiture. The taxpayer-funded attorney’s job is to find that procedural error.</li></ol><p><strong>Every mechanic moves the loss off the person who owes the rent.</strong></p><h3>5. Louisville, KY Is Not the Success Story the Report Suggests</h3><p>The HR&amp;A Draft cites Louisville’s “97% avoided <em>or delayed</em> eviction” figure (p. 51) as proof of concept. <strong>Delay is not prevention.</strong></p><p>What Louisville’s evaluation did <strong>not</strong> measure:</p><ul><li>Change in local rents during and after RTC rollout</li><li>Downstream cost repriced onto other renters</li><li>Taxpayer cost per case over full case duration</li><li>Recidivism: how many “saved” tenancies re-filed within 12 months</li></ul><p>The Kentucky data HR&amp;A cites shows even the longest represented cases end in eviction roughly a third of the time — after 6+ months of unpaid rent.²² NYC’s RTC raised posted rents in Year 1.³⁸ <strong>A program that adds six months and still evicts one in three is not prevention.</strong></p><h3>The NYC Track Record HR&amp;A Does Not Report</h3><p>NYC’s Right to Counsel has been running since 2017. Eight years in, the <a href="https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/evictions-up-representation-down/">NYC Comptroller’s May 2025 report</a> is titled <strong>“Evictions Up, Representation Down.”</strong>⁶³ What it found:</p><ul><li>Active eviction cases rose 440% after the moratorium expired — from ~33,000 to ~177,000.⁶³</li><li>Monthly tenant representation collapsed from 71% (2021) to as low as 30% in March 2025.⁶³</li><li>Nearly 37,000 court-ordered residential evictions since January 2022 — despite the program.⁶³</li><li>A 200,000-case pandemic backlog persists; housing court judges average 2,400 cases each with only 50 judges citywide.⁶⁴</li><li>Case duration extended so much that only 54% of cases are resolved within six months, down sharply from pre-RTC.⁶⁵</li></ul><p>The advocate response is more money. NYC already spends $166 million a year on RTC and still cannot staff it.⁶⁶ The program cannot scale to the demand it creates, and the backlog it generates outlasts each attempt to fund it. San Jose is being asked to import this at ~$5.4 million a year to start.⁶⁷</p><h3>6. The Better Answer: Direct Rental Assistance</h3><p>If the City’s goal is to keep tenants housed, its own EDSP program already provides the mechanism: a month or two of arrears paid directly cures the nonpayment, resolves the case, and keeps the tenant housed.</p><p><strong>One or two months of rental assistance cures the default and closes the case. A lawyer only litigates it — the arrears keep growing, the case drags on, and the tenant still ends up out.</strong></p><h3>7. San Jose’s Real Problem Is Enforcement, Not Tenant Vulnerability</h3><p>RTC assumes San Jose tenants are unprotected. They are not. San Jose already has the Tenant Protection Ordinance (TPO), the Apartment Rent Ordinance (rent control), the Ellis Act ordinance, and state-law protections (AB 1482, AB 2347, §1161.2 record-sealing). What is missing is (a) verification that complaints reflect actual violations, and (b) enforcement when they do.</p><p><strong>Complaint volume is not violation volume.</strong> The Housing Department logs ~1,500 tenant-protection interactions across ~600 properties in 202³⁴³ — contacts (calls, emails, walk-ins, petitions), not substantiated violations. The city publishes no substantiation rate. <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&amp;sectionNum=1942.5.">Cal. Civ. Code §1942.5</a> also creates a rebuttable presumption of landlord retaliation for any complaint filed within 12 months of an eviction attempt, with statutory damages plus attorney’s fees⁵⁵ — rewarding defensive filing regardless of merit.</p><p><strong>Enforcement failure is what the auditor actually found.</strong> In seven years of the TPO:⁴³</p><ul><li>Seven properties have received a formal compliance notice.</li><li>Zero administrative citations have ever been issued.</li><li>Housing Department staff have no formal enforcement process — when violations arise, they “send an informal email or call the offending landlord.”</li><li>The Auditor concluded the TPO <em>“falls short because the city lacks a plan to implement”</em> it.⁴⁴</li></ul><p>San Jose has authority to fine violators up to $2,500/day or $10,000/violation.⁴³ It logs contacts. It does not verify complaints. It does not issue citations. A taxpayer-funded attorney on the tenant side of a UD hearing does not fix any of that.</p><h3>Six Alternatives That Actually Prevent Nonpayment Evictions</h3><ol><li><strong>Stop adding regulation that raises housing-provider cost or risk.</strong> Every new mandate is priced into rent. If the goal is lower rents, stop raising the cost of operating a rental.</li><li><strong>Scale up direct rental assistance (EDSP).</strong> The Fed, HUD, Treasury, and Urban Institute credit Emergency Rental Assistance with preventing a post-moratorium eviction wave.⁴⁵ A 2024 Franklin County OH study found each week of delay in delivery sharply increases filing probability.⁴⁶ Michigan’s statewide EDP distributed $1.1B and kept ~87% of participants housed.⁴⁷ The intervention that works is money, delivered fast. San Jose already has EDSP — scale it up.</li><li><strong>Enforce the laws already on the books.</strong> The City Auditor’s fixes:⁴³ formal enforcement policy with published criteria; centralized violation tracking; an internal portal logging every tenant complaint alongside the substantiation determination and outcome, so the city can distinguish complaint volume from actual violations; use of the administrative-citation authority the ordinance already provides; annual TPO enforcement reporting.</li><li><strong>Fund financial counseling and tenant education.</strong> J-PAL finds emergency financial assistance plus counseling improves rent payment and housing stability.⁴⁸ Reach tenants <em>before</em> an eviction notice.</li><li><strong>Payment-conditioned diversion, not procedure-conditioned.</strong> Arrears paid in full or on a court-supervised plan, in exchange for dismissal. Reinvestment Fund found Philadelphia’s EDP resolved cases without judgment when rental assistance was attached.⁴⁹ Structure mediation around the payment, not the process.</li><li><strong>Keep means-tested legal aid — do not go universal.</strong> HR&amp;A’s own catalog of existing San Jose programs (pp. 29–34) lists the Housing Consortium, weekly Superior Court clinics, day-of-court mediation, the Eviction Prevention Program, and EDSP.⁴² Low-income tenants already have free counsel. The Draft discusses income eligibility (p. 62) but commits to no cutoff. NYC’s RTC has an eligibility cap of 200% of the federal poverty line;⁶⁴ the San Jose Draft names none. Without a cap, taxpayer-funded counsel could go to a tenant earning six figures at the same cost as counsel for a tenant in genuine hardship. <strong>The people who need lawyers already have them.</strong></li></ol><p><strong>San Jose’s problem is not that tenants lack representation. It is that the city cannot tell a complaint from a violation — and cannot enforce laws it cannot measure.</strong></p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Right to Counsel is a compassionate-sounding policy that transfers the price of nonpayment onto taxpayers and every other renter. San Jose should:</p><ol><li><strong>Reject universal RTC.</strong> Preserve the means-tested legal aid already in place.</li><li><strong>Reject mandatory pre-filing mediation.</strong> It adds months of delay for partial recovery at best.</li><li><strong>Scale up direct rental assistance (EDSP)</strong> — the only intervention with peer-reviewed evidence of preventing nonpayment eviction.</li><li><strong>Enforce the tenant-protection laws already on the books.</strong> Zero TPO administrative citations in seven years — and San Jose cannot say whether that means zero violations or zero enforcement, because it counts complaints, not substantiated violations. Build the measurement before adding a new program.</li><li><strong>Learn what HR&amp;A delivers before retaining them again.</strong> The question this raises for the City going forward is procurement: independent peer-reviewed research confirms HR&amp;A’s landlord-side finding that New York’s 2019 tenant-protection law caused disinvestment — which means what HR&amp;A is now telling San Jose (that expanded tenant protections cost housing providers little) fails the same independent-research test HR&amp;A’s landlord-side work passes (Appendix A). Any future engagement should either use a different firm or scope HR&amp;A’s role narrowly, with the client-favorability pattern factored into how the deliverable is read. Any redo of the <em>“Costs of Eviction”</em> chapter must use adjudicated outcomes (not UD filings), timeline data from the studies HR&amp;A itself cites, and post-moratorium rent repricing — not the $240–$435 filing-fee number.</li></ol><blockquote><strong>The one action that keeps everyone housed: pay the rent.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>But RTC doesn’t pay the rent, it raises rent for everyone else.</strong></blockquote><h3>Appendix A: Who Wrote the Report San Jose Is Relying On</h3><h3>1. Who HR&amp;A Is</h3><p><strong>HR&amp;A Advisors</strong> is a real-estate and economic-development consulting firm whose business model expands when the public housing programs it studies are adopted.ᵃᵇ California municipal billing runs <strong>$150–$270/hour</strong>, with a self-described <em>“blended rate … between $260–$270.”</em>ᶜ HR&amp;A previously produced the methodologically identical <strong>San Diego Eviction Study</strong> (2024) that the San Jose Draft mirrors.ᵈ</p><h3>2. Four Problems for San Jose</h3><p><strong>a. HR&amp;A is iterating its recommendations with the client.</strong> The Housing Resource Library lists the document as <em>“DRAFT 2026 HR&amp;A San José Eviction Court Intervention Programs Evaluation.”</em>ᵉ A February 2026 memo confirms HR&amp;A is <em>“refin[ing] recommendations with the target of releasing the report in 2026.”</em>ᶠ An independent evaluation is delivered as-is. A consultant that reshapes its findings until the client is satisfied has not produced independent work.</p><p><strong>b. The methodology excluded every housing provider.</strong> HR&amp;A’s San Diego study — the direct methodological analog — lists stakeholders as <em>“a renter survey, targeted interviews and focus group discussions with subject matter experts, community-based organizations (CBOs), and relevant government agencies.”</em>ᵍ Housing providers, apartment owners, and the local apartment association do not appear. A cost estimate built from renter, CBO, and government inputs alone cannot credibly report what an eviction costs.</p><p><strong>c. HR&amp;A knows what professional labor costs.</strong> Reporting the filing fee alone as the total cost of a 9–16 month legal proceeding is a material omission of the actual costs.</p><p><strong>d. Independent research contradicts what HR&amp;A is telling San Jose.</strong> HR&amp;A concluded for <strong>REBNY and the Rent Stabilization Association</strong> (the landlord industry) that New York’s 2019 tenant-protection law caused disinvestment.ᵍᵍ An independent peer-reviewed study of that same law confirmed it, finding hazardous code violations increased <strong>36%</strong>, tenant complaints rose <strong>13%</strong>, and building permit activity fell <strong>25%</strong>.ⁿⁿ HR&amp;A’s landlord-side finding was correct. Which means HR&amp;A’s tenant-side San Jose finding — that expanded tenant protections cost housing providers little — is contradicted by the same research HR&amp;A’s own landlord-side work is consistent with. <strong>HR&amp;A gets the housing-provider cost right when landlords pay them, and wrong when the City does.</strong></p><p><strong>Net-Net:</strong> The report the City Council is being asked to rely on is (i) an unreleased draft, HR&amp;A is iterating directly with their client the city, (ii) built on stakeholder input that excluded housing providers entirely, (iii) completely miscalculating the costs of an eviction and (iv) produced by a consultant whose landlord-side conclusions on the same policy debate — confirmed by independent research — contradict the tenant-side SJ conclusions the City is now paying for.</p><h3>Appendix A References</h3><p>ᵃ <a href="https://hraadvisors.com/how-we-work/expertise/housing/">HR&amp;A Advisors — Housing Practice</a>; ᵇ <a href="https://hraadvisors.com/how-we-work/expertise/anti-displacement/">HR&amp;A Advisors — Anti-Displacement Practice</a>; ᶜ <a href="https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/10090134-24-p-hranda-advisors.pdf">City of San Diego — HR&amp;A Contract 10090134–24-P (2024)</a>; <a href="https://records.sanjoseca.gov/Contracts/CON667517-000.pdf">City of San Jose — HR&amp;A Contract CON667517</a>; ᵈ <a href="https://sdhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/SDHC_San-Diego-Eviction-Study_01112024.pdf">SDHC — Analysis of Residential Evictions in the City of San Diego (Jan. 2024)</a>; <a href="https://hraadvisors.com/news/san-diego-housing-commission-study-of-residential-evictions-in-the-city-of-san-diego-provides-insights-for-eviction-prevention-efforts/">HR&amp;A Press Release (Jan. 2024)</a>; ᵉ <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/resource-library">City of San José Housing Resource Library</a>; ᶠ <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=15305279&amp;GUID=3B835E37-CDD6-45FE-8BE9-44898F9BA62F">San Jose Legistar Memo 26–294</a>; ᵍ <a href="https://sdhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/107_SD-Eviction-Study_SDHC-Board-2024-Jan.pdf">SDHC HR&amp;A Eviction Study, Jan. 2024, p. iii</a>; ᵍᵍ <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/29/new-york-real-estate-lobby-pushes-to-roll-back-2019-rent-changes-with-new-data-00144003">Politico, Feb. 2024</a>; <a href="https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2024/02/29/2019-rent-law-wrecked-rent-stabilized-buildings-report/">The Real Deal, Feb. 2024</a>; <a href="https://www.rebny.com/reports/hstpa-impacts-study/">REBNY — HSTPA Impacts Study</a>; ⁿⁿ <a href="https://beaubressler.github.io/papers/rent_control_quality/hstpa_investment.pdf">Bressler, “Does Strengthening Rent Control Reduce Housing Quality,” working paper (2026)</a>; <a href="https://localnewsmatters.org/2024/12/06/audit-finds-sj-tenant-protections-fall-short-because-city-lacks-plan-to-implement-them/">City Auditor context: Local News Matters, Dec. 6, 2024</a>.</p><h3>The Case Against Free Tenant Attorneys in San Jose</h3><p><em>Response to HR&amp;A Advisors, </em><a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/130204/639110725519370000"><em>San Jose Right to Counsel Study — March 2026 Draft</em></a> (“HR&amp;A Draft”), commissioned by the <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing">City of San José Housing Department</a> under <a href="https://records.sanjoseca.gov/Contracts/CON667517-000.pdf">Contract CON667517</a>.</p><h3>References</h3><p><em>Note: Reference numbers 21 and 36 are unused. The numbering of surviving references (22–67) was preserved during editing to avoid disturbing citations already anchored in the text.</em></p><ol><li>Nonpayment share of San Jose eviction notices: <a href="https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1957&amp;context=etd_projects">California State University San Jose — <em>Has the Tracking of Tenant Protection Ordinance Eviction Notices Reduced Displacement in San Jose</em> (SJSU ScholarWorks, 2020)</a> citing City of San Jose Housing Department data: “The RSP receives an annual average of 10,000 just cause eviction notices, <strong>98% of which are submitted for tenants’ failure to pay rent</strong> (City of San Jose Housing Department, 2019).”</li><li>Regional corroboration: <a href="https://mtc.ca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2025-09/BAHFA_Court_Eviction_Report_25-09-11.pdf">Metropolitan Transportation Commission / Bay Area Housing Finance Authority — <em>Evictions in the Nine County Bay Area</em> (September 2025)</a> (“inability to pay rent is cited as the legal cause of eviction in 85–97% of eviction notices”; nonpayment share of court filings rose from 78.4% in 2019 to 85.5% in 2023).</li><li><a href="https://courts.ca.gov/system/files/file/statewide-civil-fee-schedule-eff-01012026.pdf">Superior Court of California — Statewide Civil Fee Schedule (eff. 1/1/2026)</a> (UD filing fees $240–$450 by claim amount).</li><li>Median apartment rent, San Jose, CA: $3,081–$3,134/month. <a href="https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-market-trends/us/ca/santa-clara-county/san-jose/">RentCafe — San Jose Rent Market Trends</a>; <a href="https://www.doorstead.com/blog/san-jose-rental-market-report">Doorstead — San Jose Rental Market Report (July 2026)</a>.</li><li>California Code of Civil Procedure §1161; <a href="https://santaclara.courts.ca.gov/system/files?file=civil/packet-3-day-notice-pay-or-quit-post-covid-period.pdf">Superior Court of Santa Clara County — 3-Day Notice to Pay or Quit Packet</a>; <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/Know-Your-Rights-Eviction-Process-English.pdf">California Attorney General — Know Your Rights: Eviction Process</a>.</li><li><a href="https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/eviction-landlord/fill-out">California Courts Self-Help Center — Filing an Eviction</a>.</li><li>AB 2347 (2024), effective January 1, 2025; CCP §1167. <a href="https://sjud.senate.ca.gov/system/files/2024-07/ab-2347-kalra-sjud-analysis_3.pdf">Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis of AB 2347</a>; <a href="https://files.santaclaracounty.gov/exjcpb1571/2025-05/scc-coc-eviction-overview-training-part-3_4.16.2025.pdf">Santa Clara County Continuum of Care — Eviction Overview Training (2025)</a> (confirming 10 court days to respond).</li><li>California Code of Civil Procedure §1170.5(a); <a href="https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/jcc-form/UD-150">Judicial Council Form UD-150 — Request/Counter-Request to Set Case for Trial</a>.</li><li><a href="https://santaclara.courts.ca.gov/divisions/civil-division/setting-trial-date-mandatory-settlement-conference">Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara — Civil Division, Setting the Trial Date &amp; Mandatory Settlement Conference</a> (verbatim: “The judge sets a trial date for sometime in the next 90 days.” This is Santa Clara’s published guidance for civil Trial-Setting Conferences generally; unlawful detainer trials are heard on the dedicated UD calendar in Department 4, Wed–Fri per <a href="https://santaclara.courts.ca.gov/divisions/civil-division/civil-calendar-schedule">Superior Court of Santa Clara County — Civil Calendar Schedule</a>, subject to the 20-day statutory target in CCP §1170.5(a) which is frequently missed — see note 10).</li><li>Documented California UD calendar backlog: <a href="https://bbklaw.com/resources/la-051226-when-summary-proceedings-are-not-so-summary-practical-options-amid-california-unlawful">Ballard Spahr — When Summary Proceedings Are Not So Summary: Practical Options Amid California Unlawful Detainer Delays (May 2026)</a> (“Processing delays, e-filing transitions, staffing limitations, budget constraints and Court backlogs have contributed to significant delays in contested hearings”); <a href="https://www.attorneydavid.com/blog/unlawful-detainer-cases-priority-california-courts-cc-1179a/">Attorney David / CCP 1179a analysis</a> (LA County trial dates routinely exceed the 20-day statutory target); <a href="https://rentlatefee.com/eviction-timeline/california">RentLateFee — California Eviction Timeline 2026</a> (actual trial wait times: LA County 30–60 days, SF County 30–45 days despite the 20-day statute); <a href="https://zakfisherlaw.com/unlawful-detainer-timeline-california/">Zak Fisher Law — California Eviction Timeline</a> (“trial dates land 30 to 75 days after the Answer in most LA County courthouses”).</li><li><a href="https://sheriff.santaclaracounty.gov/services/civil-services/evictions">Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office — Evictions</a>.</li><li>Sheriff queue and 5-day notice: <a href="https://www.wallacelaw.com/blog/how-long-does-it-take-after-an-eviction-trial-for-a-sheriff-lockout-to-occur/">Wallace Law — Sheriff Lockout Timeline</a>; <a href="https://alleastbayproperties.com/alameda-county-sheriff-eviction-queue-timeline-2026/">All East Bay Properties — Alameda County Sheriff Eviction Queue Timeline 2026</a>.</li><li>Uncontested California UD timelines: <a href="https://nlpropertymgmt.com/how-long-does-eviction-take-in-california/">NL Property Management — How Long Does Eviction Take in California?</a>; <a href="https://www.apmhelp.com/blog/evictions/eviction-process-california">APM Help — California Eviction Process</a>; <a href="https://www.stevendsilverstein.com/resources/california-eviction-timeline">Steven Silverstein — California Eviction Timeline 2026</a> (“uncomplicated California eviction… often takes about 5 to 8 weeks from the initial notice to the sheriff lockout”).</li><li>Contested timelines of 3–10+ months: <a href="https://nlpropertymgmt.com/how-long-does-eviction-take-in-california/">NL Property Management</a>; <a href="https://www.stevendsilverstein.com/resources/california-eviction-timeline">Steven Silverstein — California Eviction Timeline 2026</a> (“A defended case may take 3 to 6 months or longer”).</li><li>Turnover and property-damage cost ranges: <a href="https://www.mysmartmove.com/blog/true-cost-eviction">TransUnion SmartMove — The True Cost of Eviction</a> (average turnover $1,750); <a href="https://snappt.com/blog/eviction-cost/">Snappt — The True Cost of an Eviction (2026)</a> (turnover $1,750–$4,000).</li><li>Contested attorney fees on the housing-provider side (California 2026): <a href="https://martinezlawcenter.com/how-much-does-it-cost-to-evict-someone-in-california/">Martinez Law Center — California Eviction Lawyer Cost (2026)</a> (contested trials “can cost a housing provider between $5,000 and $15,000 or more in legal fees”; hourly rates $200–$500); <a href="https://martinezlawcenter.com/how-much-does-a-california-eviction-lawyer-cost-in-2026/">Martinez Law Center — How Much Does a California Eviction Lawyer Cost in 2026</a> (contested cases run $3,000–$10,000+ “on each side”; hourly rates $250–$500); <a href="https://martinezlawcenter.com/costs-associated-with-unlawful-detainer-eviction/">Martinez Law Center — Understanding the Costs Associated with Unlawful Detainer Eviction</a> (contested proceedings $3,500–$10,000; complex litigation $10,000+); <a href="https://sdattorneyfinder.com/cost-guide-landlord-tenant">San Diego Attorney Finder — San Diego Landlord Tenant Attorney Cost 2026</a>(typical range $1,500–$10,000; retainer $1,500–$5,000); <a href="https://sandiegoevictionattorneys.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Residential-Fee-Agreement.pdf">San Diego Eviction Attorneys — 2025 Residential Fee Agreement</a> (trial retainer applies at $400–$500/hour when tenant is represented by counsel); <a href="https://www.clio.com/resources/legal-trends/2024-report/">Clio Legal Trends Report — California hourly rates</a> (California among highest-billing states); <a href="https://tuannlaw.com/real-estate-steps-for-eviction/">Tuann Law — Bay Area UD Retainers</a>($350/hr; $5,000 Contra Costa / $10,000 Alameda County UD retainer).</li><li><a href="https://www.mysmartmove.com/pricing">TransUnion SmartMove — Pricing / eviction cost survey</a>; <a href="https://newsroom.transunion.com/transunion-smartmover-launches-new-eviction-report-solution-to-help-landlords-potentially-save-up-to-10000-in-costs/">TransUnion Newsroom (Dec. 2014)</a>; <a href="https://snappt.com/blog/eviction-cost/">Snappt — True Cost of an Eviction</a> ($2,540 lost rent component).</li><li><a href="https://naahq.org/eviction-federal-cares-act-notice">National Apartment Association — Federal CARES Act Notice / Member Survey</a> ($6,767 average eviction cost).</li><li><a href="https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/643d2ef1-4177-42a3-a638-920c0cf93bef/protecting-renters-from-eviction-can-both-keep-families-housed-and-ensure-an-equitable-economic-recovery.pdf">U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee — Protecting Renters from Eviction (PDF)</a> (housing-provider costs $2,500 — $13,000 per eviction).</li><li><a href="https://evictionriskmap.com/eviction-costs/">Eviction Risk Map — Full 2026 Breakdown by State</a> (California uncontested $5,000–$9,000; contested $10,000–$27,000+).</li><li><a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/25/2025/08/GT-GPLP250013.pdf">Ryan &amp; Chambers Armstrong, “Buying Time: Landlord-Tenant Litigation Duration and the Right to Counsel,” Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law &amp; Policy (2025)</a> (Kentucky data: unrepresented 2.31 months, represented 7.98 months; attorney presence adds 1.4 months after regression controls; eviction rate ~61% in shortest cases, ~33% in longest cases).</li><li><a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w29836/w29836.pdf">Cassidy &amp; Currie, “The Effects of Legal Representation on Tenant Outcomes in Housing Court: Evidence from New York City’s Universal Access Program,” NBER Working Paper №29836 (rev. 2022)</a> (legal representation increases days from filing to judgment by nearly three months).</li><li><a href="https://www.phila.gov/media/20231130151953/Reinvestment-Fund-Right-to-Counsel-preliminary-evaluation-062023.pdf">Reinvestment Fund / City of Philadelphia — Right to Counsel Preliminary Evaluation (June 2023)</a> (52% of represented cases lasted &gt;75 days vs. 12% of unrepresented in matched zip codes).</li><li><a href="https://freeevictionhelpresults.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Stouts-2021-Independent-Evaluation-of-RTC-C_FINAL_1.31.22.pdf">Stout Risius Ross — 2021 Independent Evaluation of the Cleveland Right to Counsel Program (Jan. 2022)</a> (84% of full-representation cases required &gt;8 attorney hours; average ~9 hours per case).</li><li><a href="https://evictionhelpct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Stouts-2022-Independent-Evaluation-of-CT-RTC_REVISED_2023.01.20.pdf">Stout Risius Ross — 2022 Independent Evaluation of the Connecticut Right to Counsel Program (Jan. 2023)</a>(unrepresented tenant cases disposed in average 54 days).</li><li><a href="https://leasebase.ai/ny-erap-right-to-counsel-eviction-delays/">Leasebase — NY ERAP + Right to Counsel Eviction Delays (2026)</a>; <a href="https://www.skybriz.com/insights/nyc-nonpayment-eviction-case-timeline/">Skybriz — NYC Nonpayment Eviction Case Timeline (2026)</a> (contested attorney-vs-attorney NYC cases run 4–8 months; ERAP-flagged cases add 4–6 months).</li><li><a href="https://civilrighttocounsel.org/major_developments/ky-study-longer-cases-which-happens-w-tenant-rep-avoid-eviction/">National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel — KY Study: Longer Cases (Which Happens w/ Tenant Rep) Avoid Eviction</a> (RTC advocacy source framing case-duration extension as the program’s mechanism of action).</li><li><a href="https://fortune.com/2026/05/03/landlords-tenant-eviction-moratorium-covid-pandemic-settlement-talks-justice-department/">Fortune — Landlords seek $1.5B from federal government over COVID moratorium (May 2026)</a> ($57 billion loss estimate); <a href="https://www.multifamilydive.com/news/pandemic-eviction-moratorium-lawsuit-darby/820162/">MultifamilyDive — Darby Development v. United States (May 2026)</a> (tens of billions in industry losses); <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/article/covid-eviction-bans-landlords-tenants-laws-trump">City Journal — The War on Landlords</a> ($17B Goldman Sachs; $27B NAA); <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/supreme-court-could-weigh-landlords-fight-covid-rent-losses-douglas-jtgpc">NAR amicus (via LinkedIn analysis)</a>($21.3–$57.5 billion range).</li><li><a href="https://naahq.org/news/naa-seeks-monetary-damages-unlawful-eviction-moratorium">National Apartment Association — NAA Seeks Monetary Damages from Unlawful Eviction Moratorium (Jul. 2021)</a>; <a href="https://www.badgerinstitute.org/state-landlords-hit-hard-by-eviction-moratorium/">Badger Institute — State landlords hit hard by eviction moratorium</a> ($26.6 billion uncovered).</li><li><a href="https://fox17.com/news/nation-world/eviction-moratorium-gave-renters-relief-but-property-owners-face-billions-in-unpaid-rent">Fox 17 News — Eviction Moratorium Gave Renters Relief but Property Owners Face Billions in Unpaid Rent (Feb. 2021)</a> (Moody’s Analytics: $57B, avg. 4 months / $5,600 per delinquent renter).</li><li><a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2022/07/04/south-bay-rents-surge-back-to-pre-pandemic-levels-as-san-francisco-lags-behind/">Mercury News — South Bay Rents Surge Back to Pre-Pandemic Levels (Jul. 2022)</a> (San Jose metro 11% six-month rent spike, largest of any large U.S. metro).</li><li><a href="https://nainorcal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/San-Jose-CA-MultiFamily-Market.pdf">NAI NorCal — San Jose Multifamily Market Report (2022)</a> (11.1% peak; 3.4% ten-year average); <a href="https://nainorcal.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/San-Jose-CA-MultiFamily-Market-2023-02-03.pdf">NAI NorCal — San Jose Multifamily Market Report (Feb. 2023)</a> (10.8% peak in 2022).</li><li><a href="https://www.apartmentlist.com/rent-report/ca/san-jose">Apartment List — San Jose Rent Report (Aug. 2026)</a> (San Jose rents up 6.5% year-over-year, 9.7% year-to-date through August 2026); <a href="https://www.urbancatalyst.com/san-jose-multifamily-report">Urban Catalyst — San Jose Multifamily Report, June 2026</a> (San Jose apartment rents up 6.8% year-over-year, #2 among major U.S. metros); <a href="https://www.doorstead.com/blog/san-jose-rental-market-report">Doorstead — San Jose Rental Market Report, July 2026</a>(median rent $3,081, +6.2% YoY).</li><li><a href="https://managecasa.com/articles/california-rental-market-report">ManageCasa — California Rental Market 2026 City-by-City Guide</a> (San Jose projected to lead all major U.S. metros at ~4.3% rent growth in 2026 per CoStar/Apartments.com); <a href="https://blog.urbancatalyst.com/downtown-san-jose-in-2026-mid-year-review-and-second-half-outlook">Urban Catalyst — Downtown San Jose 2026 Mid-Year Review</a> (CoStar June 2026: San Jose rent growth 5.6% YoY, #2 among major U.S. markets).</li><li><a href="https://www.nmhc.org/news/press-release/2025/regulation-increases-rent-costs-new-study-finds/">National Multifamily Housing Council — Regulation Increases Rent Costs, New Study Finds (Aug. 2025)</a> (eviction laws increase rents 5.9%–6.3%, or $1,092–$1,224/unit/year).</li><li><a href="https://robcollinson.github.io/RobWebsite/rtc.pdf">Collinson et al., “Equilibrium Effects of Eviction Protections: The Case of Legal Services for Low-Income Tenants” (working paper)</a> (NYC RTC increased posted rents $26–$40 in Year 1).</li><li>San Jose UD filing volume: <a href="https://santaclara.courts.ca.gov/divisions/civil-division">Santa Clara Superior Court — Civil Case Statistics</a>; <a href="https://courts.ca.gov/reference/data/court-statistics-reports">Judicial Council of California — Court Statistics Report 2024</a> (Santa Clara County reports ~4,000 UD filings annually, of which San Jose accounts for a substantial share).</li><li>HR&amp;A Draft Study, pp. 41, 62; <a href="https://www.phila.gov/media/20231130151953/Reinvestment-Fund-Right-to-Counsel-preliminary-evaluation-062023.pdf">Philadelphia Eviction Diversion Program — 2022–2023 Evaluation</a>.</li><li><a href="https://ncnewsline.com/briefs/new-research-finds-evictions-rarely-result-in-wins-for-landlords-or-tenants/">NC Newsline — New research finds evictions rarely result in wins for landlords or tenants (Apr. 2025)</a>.</li><li>HR&amp;A Draft Study, pp. 29–34.</li><li>San Jose City Auditor — TPO enforcement findings, complaint volume, and administrative-citation authority: <a href="https://sanjosespotlight.com/san-jose-needs-plan-for-protecting-renters-audit-finds/">San José Spotlight — <em>San Jose needs plan for protecting renters, audit finds</em> (Dec. 4, 2024)</a> (seven compliance notices in seven years; zero administrative citations ever issued; ~1,500 tenant-protection interactions across ~600 properties in 2023; fines up to $2,500/day or $10,000/violation); <a href="https://publicadvocates.org/news/san-jose-spotlight-san-jose-needs-plan-for-protecting-renters-audit-finds/">Public Advocates — <em>San Jose Needs Plan for Protecting Renters</em> (Dec. 4, 2024)</a>; <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/Home/Components/News/News/6245/4927">City of San José Housing Department — <em>Tenant Protection Ordinance: Housing Should Refine its Fee Calculation Process and Standardize Procedures</em> (Oct. 21, 2024, City Auditor Report announcement)</a>; historical complaint volume: <a href="https://economicrt.org/publication/san-jose-aro-study/">Economic Roundtable — <em>San José ARO Study</em> (2016)</a> (~70 rent-increase complaints/year; 792 petitions 2010–2015).</li><li><a href="https://localnewsmatters.org/2024/12/06/audit-finds-sj-tenant-protections-fall-short-because-city-lacks-plan-to-implement-them/">Local News Matters — <em>Audit finds SJ tenant protections fall short because city lacks plan to implement them</em> (Dec. 6, 2024)</a> (verbatim City Auditor conclusion).</li><li>Emergency Rental Assistance program effectiveness: <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2024055pap.pdf">Federal Reserve Board — <em>Geography and Timing of Emergency Rental Assistance</em> (2024)</a> (ERA1 and ERA2 provided ~$45B, largely reaching neighborhoods at highest risk of eviction); <a href="https://evictionresearch.net/hud-era/">Eviction Research Network — <em>Keeping People in Their Homes: The Impact of ERA on Eviction Filings</em> (2026)</a> (“counties and neighborhoods that received more ERA saw the biggest drops in eviction filings”; funded LA families 53% less likely to move, 65% less likely to end up on the street); <a href="https://nlihc.org/resource/emergency-rental-assistance-reduced-eviction-filings-vulnerable-neighborhoods-during">NLIHC / UC Berkeley — <em>Emergency Rental Assistance Reduced Eviction Filings in Vulnerable Neighborhoods</em> (May 2026)</a>.</li><li><a href="https://appam.confex.com/appam/2024/mediafile/ExtendedAbstract/Paper53753/PRC_11122024.pdf">Preston, Ruth-Anne Chambers-Armstrong, et al. — <em>Can Rapid Rental Assistance Avert Evictions?</em> Franklin County OH study (APPAM 2024)</a> (each week of delay in delivering rental assistance increases eviction-filing probability by 31–47% for eligible applicants without a pre-existing case).</li><li>Michigan statewide Eviction Diversion Program: <a href="https://evictionresearch.net/research.html">Eviction Research Network — <em>Michigan EDP: Distributed $1.1B, Kept ~87% of Participants Housed</em> (2023, cited in Research &amp; Publications overview, updated 2026)</a>.</li><li>Emergency Financial Assistance evidence review: <a href="https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publication/EFA-Policy-Brief.pdf">Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) — <em>Emergency Financial Assistance Policy Brief</em> (2026)</a> (“emergency financial assistance averts evictions and episodes of homelessness in standard housing market conditions”; short-term payments improve rent-payment and housing-stability outcomes).</li><li>Philadelphia Eviction Diversion Program — payment-conditioned mediation outcomes: <a href="https://www.reinvestment.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Eviction-Diversion-Brief-11.29.23.pdf">Reinvestment Fund — <em>Eviction Diversion in Philadelphia: Evaluation of Efforts to Prevent Court Filings</em> (Nov. 2023)</a> (rental assistance combined with mediation reduced court filings; ~half of mediated cases resolved without judgment when rental assistance was attached).</li><li>Eviction Lab methodology — filing rate vs. eviction rate; serial filing: <a href="https://evictionlab.org/methods/">Princeton Eviction Lab — <em>Methods</em></a> (“An ‘eviction filing’ does not necessarily mean that the threatened household leaves its home. A common practice is what is known as ‘serial filing’”); <a href="https://evictionlab.org/docs/Eviction%20Lab%20Methodology%20Report.pdf">Princeton Eviction Lab — <em>Methodology Report</em></a>.</li><li>Stanford Law School — dismissal-rate rise on UD filings: <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Evictions-in-SMC-2019_2023-FNL.pdf"><em>Evictions in San Mateo County 2019 &amp; 2023</em> (Stanford Law School, 2025)</a> (in 2019, 51.3% of filings ended in judgment; 31.4% in dismissal; by 2023 the dismissal rate rose significantly).</li><li>Peer-reviewed critique of eviction-count methodologies: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-social-inquiry/article/pathways-to-eviction/988B03BBD83ADAE68947FC1157992188">Cambridge — <em>Pathways to Eviction</em>, <em>Law &amp; Social Inquiry</em>(Feb. 2025)</a> (“not all judgments result in actual eviction, and some court-approved move-out agreements may not be included in the possessory judgments counted”; forced tenant moves defined by court-ordered vacate requirements, not filing or judgment counts).</li><li>City of San José — UD filings labeled as “eviction notices”: <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/data/covid-19-eviction-data">City of San José Housing Department — <em>COVID-19 Eviction Data</em></a> (“The Rent Stabilization Program has analyzed and mapped the Unlawful Detainers (i.e., eviction notices) that were submitted to the Housing Department”).</li><li>California UD record-sealing statute and credit-report effect: <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CCP&amp;sectionNum=1161.2.">Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1161.2</a>; <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/asm/ab_2801-2850/ab_2819_cfa_20160424_141543_asm_comm.html">AB 2819 (2016, eff. Jan. 1, 2017)</a>; <a href="https://bornstein.law/california-eviction-records-sealed/">Bornstein Law — <em>California Eviction Records Sealed</em> (Feb. 2026)</a> (“Most eviction filings never show up in public court searches anymore”; sealed records do not reach tenant-screening or credit reports); <a href="https://zakfisherlaw.com/sealing-eviction-record-cc-1161-2-california/">Zak Fisher Law — <em>Sealing an Eviction Record in California (CCP 1161.2)</em> (May 2026)</a> (records permanently sealed unless housing provider prevails within 60 days); <a href="https://tenant-rights.org/2026/08/03/eviction-records-and-the-masking-rule-why-most-ud-filings-stay-invisible/">Tenant Rights — <em>Eviction Records and the Masking Rule</em> (Aug. 2026)</a>.</li><li>California retaliation presumption on tenant complaints: <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&amp;sectionNum=1942.5.">Cal. Civ. Code §1942.5</a>; <a href="https://www.lcbh.org/sites/default/files/resources/crrg-ch10-landlord-retaliation-English.pdf">Lawyers’ Committee for Better Housing — <em>California Rent Regulation Guide, Ch. 10: Landlord Retaliation</em></a> (rebuttable presumption of retaliation triggered by any tenant complaint within 12 months of eviction attempt; damages of two months’ rent or actual damages, whichever is greater, plus attorney’s fees).</li><li>First-hand reporting on San Jose eviction-court procedure, cost, and record-of-filing: Irene Smith, JD, PhD, <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/evictions-increase-the-cost-of-housing-reduce-supply-cause-displacement-a4e00ce0df1"><em>Evictions: A Game No One Can Win — Evictions Increase the Cost of Housing, Reduce Supply, and Cause Displacement</em></a> (Feb. 7, 2023) (contemporaneous account of San Jose UD procedure: initial-appearance mandatory mediation via Project Sentinel; Law Foundation free tenant representation on filing; jury-trial demand used as tactical stall; 6–9 month total process; ~$60,000 typical all-in cost including jury-trial expense &gt;$30,000; mediated resolutions leave no public eviction filing in the record; the Housing Department’s assistance program conditions rental help on an eviction being filed first).</li><li>Los Angeles tenant buyout data: <a href="https://controller.lacity.gov/landings/cash-for-keys">Los Angeles City Controller — <em>Cash for Keys Dashboard (Jan. 2019 — Jul. 2025)</em></a>(LA Housing Department logged 5,991 formal Tenant Buyout Agreements from January 2019 through July 2025); <a href="https://www.mosescastilloinvestigations.com/news/cash-for-keys-vs-eviction">Moses Castillo Investigations — <em>Cash for Keys vs. Eviction: A California Landlord’s 2026 Guide</em> (May 2026)</a> (LA rent-stabilized average buyout $24,704 across 4,869 filed agreements totaling $118.3 million, 2019–2023; statewide non-RSO buyouts $3,500–$10,500); <a href="https://la.myneighborhooddata.org/2024/07/tenant-buyouts/">LA Neighborhood Data / USC — <em>Tenant Buyouts</em> (Jul. 2024)</a> (average buyout ~$25,000 through the LA program, 2019–2024).</li><li>San Francisco tenant buyout data: <a href="https://bornstein.law/tenant-buyouts-in-sf/">Bornstein Law — <em>Tenant Buyouts in SF</em> (Jul. 2023)</a> (San Francisco Rent Board records: 2022 average payout $53,828); <a href="https://bornstein.law/tenant-buyout-agreements-in-california/">Bornstein Law — <em>Tenant Buyout Agreements in California</em> (May 2025)</a>(San Francisco Rent Board multi-year average buyout ~$43,000).</li><li>California cash-for-keys legal mechanics and UD record sealing: <a href="https://zakfisherlaw.com/cash-for-keys-eviction-california/">Zak Fisher Law — <em>Cash-for-Keys Settlement in California Unlawful Detainer Cases</em> (May 2026)</a> (“A properly drafted agreement requires dismissal of the unlawful detainer before the move-out, which means no judgment, and the case is sealable under CC § 1161.2 even if it was filed”); <a href="https://zakfisherlaw.com/settlement-stipulated-judgment-eviction-california/">Zak Fisher Law — <em>Settlement &amp; Stipulated Judgments in California UD</em> (May 2026)</a> (California UD settlements may include dismissal, sealing under CCP §1161.2, waiver of past-rent claim, and cash-for-keys relocation payment).</li><li>San Jose missing middle housing / quadrupled density vote: <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2026/08/15/san-jose-considers-quadrupling-housing-density-in-single-family-neighborhoods/">Mercury News — <em>San Jose considers quadrupling housing density in single-family neighborhoods</em> (Aug. 15, 2026)</a> (Council vote to raise residential-neighborhood density from 8 to 32 units per acre; final zoning changes expected late 2027); <a href="https://www.kqed.org/news/12095568/san-jose-leaders-eying-more-multifamily-homes-in-single-family-neighborhoods">KQED — <em>San José Leaders Eying More Multifamily Homes in Single Family Neighborhoods</em> (Aug. 19, 2026)</a> (Council voted 8–3 on Aug. 19, 2026 to direct staff to craft zoning changes enabling duplexes, triplexes, and fourplexes in low-density single-family neighborhoods); <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/planning-building-code-enforcement/planning-division/citywide-planning/opportunity-housing">City of San José — Opportunity Housing</a> (“Opportunity Housing” concept: up to four units per parcel plus ADUs on properties with Residential Neighborhood General Plan designation).</li><li>Individual investor ownership of 1–4 unit rental properties: <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47332">Congressional Research Service — <em>Ownership of the U.S. Rental Housing Stock by Investor Type: In Brief</em> (R47332, 2022 analysis of 2021 Rental Housing Finance Survey)</a> (“Individual investors owned 37.6% of rental units, but owned 70.2% of rental units located in properties with four or fewer units”); <a href="https://archives.hud.gov/news/2022/pr22-242.cfm">HUD — <em>2021 Rental Housing Finance Survey Findings</em> (2022)</a> (“For these small rental properties, 70 percent (15.9 million) are owned by individual investors”).</li><li>Small landlord share of 2–4 unit rentals: <a href="https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/owners-and-renters-62-million-units-small-buildings-are-particularly-vulnerable-during-pandemic">Urban Institute — <em>Owners and Renters of 6.2 Million Units in Small Buildings Are Particularly Vulnerable During the Pandemic</em> (Aug. 2020)</a> (“Individual investors (sometimes called mom-and-pop landlords) make up 77 percent of small-building units”); <a href="https://cameonetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/AFN_Small-Independent_Landlords-Brief.pdf">CAMEO Network — <em>Small Independent Landlords</em> (2024)</a> (small independent landlords own ~16 million units in 1–4-unit properties, or 70% of all such rental stock).</li></ol><p><strong>62a.</strong> Small-provider disproportionate cost from procedural mandates — AB 2493 first-come-first-served application processing: Irene Smith, JD, PhD, <a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/small-law-large-costs-a54649d45f2a"><em>Small Law — Large Costs</em></a> (Jul. 19, 2026) (California Civil Code §1950.6 as amended by AB 2493 requires housing providers to process applications in strict order received and offer the unit to the first applicant meeting written screening criteria; “a rule that appears simple and fair can have disproportionately large consequences for providers with only a few units”; effects include weeks of lost rent, absorbed screening/credit-check costs, application-fee return obligations, and heightened legal exposure — a single empty month has a much larger effect on a small provider than on a large one); <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240AB2493">California AB 2493 (2024, eff. Jan. 1, 2025)</a>.</p><ol><li>NYC eviction data and representation collapse: <a href="https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/evictions-up-representation-down/">NYC Comptroller Brad Lander — <em>Evictions Up, Representation Down: How New York City is Failing Its Right to Counsel Mandate</em> (May 2025)</a> (active eviction cases rose 440% from ~33,000 to ~177,000 after moratorium; monthly representation collapsed to 30% in March 2025; nearly 37,000 court-ordered residential evictions since January 2022); <a href="https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-lander-uncovers-plummeting-tenant-representation-in-housing-court-as-adams-admin-fails-to-meet-right-to-counsel-mandate-for-tenants-facing-eviction/">Comptroller press release (Jul. 2026 update)</a> (nearly 34,000 families evicted since 2022).</li><li>NYC housing court backlog and per-judge caseload: <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/article/new-yorks-housing-court-hell">City Journal — <em>New York’s Housing Court Hell</em> (Jul. 2024)</a>(backlog of more than 200,000 cases accumulated Mar. 2020–Jan. 2022; only 50 housing-court judges citywide, unchanged in 25+ years); <a href="https://queenseagle.com/all/2025/11/3/advocates-demand-overhaul-of-struggling-right-to-counsel-program">Queens Eagle — <em>Advocates demand overhaul of struggling Right to Counsel program</em>(Nov. 2025)</a> (each housing court judge oversees average 2,400 cases per year; RTC eligibility cap: 200% of federal poverty line).</li><li>NYC RTC case-duration extension: <a href="https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/community-and-social-services/2025/2025-september-what-is-rtc.pdf">NYC Independent Budget Office — <em>IBO Explains: What is Right to Counsel?</em>(Sept. 2025)</a> (“From 2023 through 2024: Only 87% of cases had a first major decision within a year, and 54% within six months. Fewer cases are resolved within a year, and many more cases are taking longer than they used to”).</li><li>NYC RTC annual expenditure and staffing crisis: <a href="https://citylimits.org/nycs-floundering-right-to-counsel-fails-to-keep-pace-with-eviction-cases/">City Limits — <em>NYC’s Floundering ‘Right to Counsel’ Fails to Keep Pace With Eviction Cases</em> (Jan. 2023)</a> (annual expenditure exceeds $166M; 10,000+ cases declined and 12,000+ with only limited participation since March 2022 due to legal-service-provider capacity constraints); <a href="https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/community-and-social-services/2025/2025-september-the-expansion-of-nyc-right-to-counsel-program.pdf">NYC IBO — <em>The Expansion of NYC’s Right to Counsel Program</em> (Sept. 2025)</a> (over half of eligible tenants not receiving full representation despite expansion).</li><li>HR&amp;A San Jose RTC cost estimate: <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/130204/639110725519370000">HR&amp;A Draft Study, p. 62</a> (initial program cost ~$5.4 million annually, scaling with caseload). Compare NYC’s ~$166M/year for a program that still cannot staff itself.⁶⁶</li></ol><p><strong>R1.</strong> California development impact fees on multifamily housing: <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3700/RRA3743-1/RAND_RRA3743-1.pdf">RAND Corporation — <em>The High Cost of Producing Multifamily Housing in California: Evidence and Policy Recommendations</em> (April 2025)</a> (“Municipal impact and development fees are less than $1,000 per unit on average in Texas… [and] much more in California, averaging $29,000 per unit”); <a href="https://www.hcd.ca.gov/policy-research/plans-reports/docs/impact-fee-study.pdf">California Department of Housing and Community Development — <em>Residential Impact Fees in California</em>(Aug. 2019, HCD official study)</a> (multifamily impact fees per unit ranged from ~$4,900 in Imperial to $24,000 in Oakland across ten case-study localities); <a href="https://naahq.org/news/affordable-housing-impact-fees-limit-supply-growth">National Apartment Association — <em>Affordable Housing Impact Fees Limit Supply Growth</em> (Jan. 2026)</a> (average ~$20,000 per unit across projects studied).</p><p><strong>R2.</strong> Soft-story seismic retrofit costs, California: <a href="https://www.laconstructioncompliance.com/los-angeles-soft-story-retrofit-deadline-april-2026/">LA Construction Compliance — <em>Los Angeles Soft-Story Retrofit Deadline: April 2026</em> (March 2026)</a> (“On a per-unit basis, most soft-story retrofits cost between $10,000 and $25,000 per apartment unit”); <a href="https://www.spur.org/news/2023-08-07/multifamily-seismic-retrofit-program-secures-15-million-state-more-investment">SPUR — <em>Multifamily Seismic Retrofit Program Secures $15 Million from State</em> (2023)</a> (average cost of a seismic retrofit is $104,000 for buildings with 5–14 units, $152,000 for 15–20 units; per-unit ~$14,000 in Berkeley and San Francisco data); <a href="https://abag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/mountainviewsoftstorystudy_2018.pdf">ABAG — <em>Mountain View Soft Story Study Report</em> (2018)</a> (2000 San Jose study estimated $9,000–$20,000 per unit in 2018 dollars).</p><p><strong>R3.</strong> San Jose all-electric Reach Code: <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/environmental-services/climate-smart-san-jos/san-jos-reach-code">City of San José — San José Reach Code (Municipal Code Chapter 17.845)</a>; <a href="https://www.nrdc.org/bio/maria-stamas/san-jose-adopts-strongest-building-code-among-large-cities">NRDC — <em>San José Adopts Strongest Building Code Among Large Cities</em> (2019)</a>; <a href="https://www.aedisarchitects.com/choosing-mixed-fuels-or-all-electric-under-san-joses-reach-code/">Aedis Architects — <em>Choosing Mixed Fuels or All-Electric Under San Jose’s Reach Code</em> (2021)</a> (all new San Jose residential construction all-electric after Aug. 1, 2021; higher baseline energy performance standard imposes 6% cost margin above California Energy Code).</p><p><strong>R4.</strong> San Jose “rent stabilization” = rent control: <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?division=3.&amp;part=4.&amp;lawCode=CIV&amp;title=5.&amp;article=&amp;chapter=2.7.">Cal. Civ. Code §1954.50 et seq. — Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act</a>(state statute governing “residential rent control,” applying uniformly to local rent-stabilization and rent-control ordinances); <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/tenants/learn-about-rent-stabilization">City of San José — Apartment Rent Ordinance (Municipal Code Ch. 17.23)</a> (administered by the “Rent Stabilization Program”; caps annual rent increases at 5%); <a href="https://www.sanjoseinside.com/news/audit-san-joses-rent-control-ordinance-undermined-by-lack-of-oversight-enforcement/">San Jose Inside — <em>Audit: San Jose’s Rent Control Ordinance Undermined by Lack of Oversight, Enforcement</em></a> (the City Auditor and local reporting refer to San Jose’s ARO as its “rent control ordinance”).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h56u01Q_6LR7u6opYnpO5Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@introspectivedsgn?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Erik Mclean</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-law-office-sign-on-the-side-of-a-building-24ZOFLNY4hA?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ffdbf0dec50" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A nonprofit failed and no one told you]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/a-nonprofit-failed-and-no-one-told-you-ad739419e50d?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ad739419e50d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 17:58:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-26T17:58:51.562Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your money failed three separate times: building it, running it, and taxing it. We argued about what Housing First supportive housing (PSH) cost to <em>build</em>. A million dollars a door. Excellent outrage. Also a distraction — construction is a one-time fixed cost. The variable operation costs are what keep the doors open.</p><p>Every decision described here was made between 2015 and 2023, under a housing director who sat as a board member and secretary of one of the nonprofits receiving city money — an organization that took $22.5 million of it — and who retired in July 2023 (<a href="https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/823353174">ProPublica board listing</a>, <a href="https://records.sanjoseca.gov/Contracts/CON667369-000.pdf">city contract signed as Director of Housing</a> <a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/money-flow-from-sj-to-nonprofits-9baba78542b2?sharedUserId=pathseldomtravelled">Money flow from SJ to NonProfits</a>.)</p><h3>2021 warning</h3><blockquote><em>The first warning on operational costs came with the 2021 </em>Incremental Ladder of Housing Success <em>— The variable costs would </em>“add up to much more over the long run.” <em>(</em><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/incremental-ladder-of-housing-success-5cebce8a88f7"><em>link</em></a><em>)</em></blockquote><p>In the articles <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/financial-analysis-large-scale-shelter-tiny-homes-permanent-supportive-housing-8bcacf90b2e8">Financial Analysis of Shelter, Tiny Homes and Permanent Supportive Housing</a> (March, 2025), <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c">Hidden Costs of Housing</a> (June, 2026), and <a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/why-san-joses-math-doesn-t-work-f10dc36bd888">Why San Jose’s Math Doesn’t Work</a> (August, 2026) we look again at operational costs.</p><h3>A negative example</h3><p>First Community Housing developed 2,000 SJ apartments and took nearly $87 million in city money. Its 2024 tax filing reports: <strong>negative revenue</strong> of $994,215, <strong>negative net assets</strong> of $23.2 million, and one sentence: “no employees of FCH remained after 12/31/24” (<a href="https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2025/2025_TEOS_XML_09A.zip">Form 990</a>).</p><p>It had no income except taxpayer money. (See financial charts below)</p><p>On November 18, 2024 First Community Housing’s had a new address <strong>505 West Julian Street</strong>, the Authority’s headquarters (<a href="https://clpha.org/members/272">CLPHA</a>). No council vote, no hearing, no public notice. No bankruptcy either, because bankruptcy would have been public. Its audits are not public and our subsidies never paused.</p><p>In the 2024 <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/nonprofit-accountability-registry-c41e648abd34">NonProfit Accountability Registry</a>, more was paid in salaries than collected in revenue. Six weeks later it had zero employees.</p><p>More are coming. This one just went first.</p><h3>What you lose next</h3><p>Every stage below has already happened in California in the last four years, for this reason.</p><p>95 percent ran a deficit from 2020 to 2024 across 39 California supportive housing properties (<a href="https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/2025-SRO-Portfolio-Assessment-Final.pdf">Enterprise Community Partners</a>). Then service is cut. Then the operator disappears. Then the buildings leave public hands: Skid Row Housing Trust dissolved by January 2025, and seventeen of its 29 Los Angeles buildings sold to a private investor for $10 million, whose first move was cutting 24/7 security because it cost more than the buildings’ entire rent revenue (<a href="https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2024-11-05/new-owner-cuts-security-janitors-at-skid-row-homeless-housing-as-tenants-fear-worsening-conditions">LA Times</a>).</p><p>Then demolition. My prediction: by 2035 San Jose tears down supportive housing. San Jose properties drew mold and habitability complaints within four years of opening (<a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2023/08/14/mold-roaches-security-issues-at-san-jose-homeless-housing-heighten-broader-concerns/">Mercury News</a>).</p><p>Insurance also calls out the alarm. CA multifamily buildings over 50 years old are denied standard coverage and forced into the state FAIR Plan — some at a 300 percent increase (<a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c">Hidden Costs of Housing</a>, June, 2026). Operational costs will soar when these buildings move over to the Fair Plan and remain under covenant, rent control and future eviction moratorium&#39;s.</p><p>Another alarm. Both California Medi-Cal housing waivers expire December 31, 2026, and Medi-Cal was never allowed to fund building operations.</p><p>Final alarm for the community. Affordable and supportive housing doesn’t pay property taxes. <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/draft-for-review-purposes-0aaf08bf6eab?sharedUserId=pathseldomtravelled">Property Tax Shelter — Public Housing</a></p><h4>What to demand</h4><p>San Jose budgets $94 million a year for interim housing and is $56 million short. That gap is a yearly inheritance. What needs to change? Ask for the following in a yearly public portal:</p><ol><li>What it costs to run.</li><li>What pays for it.</li><li>When each of those funding sources expires.</li><li>Who protects the residents, and the building, if the money stops.</li></ol><p>Once First Community Housing lost every employee the 4th question was an afterthought. There was no anticipation, financial forecasting, or practical planning.</p><p>You are not being asked to trust that these buildings work. You are being asked to trust that somebody checked. Nobody has.</p><h3>Second Street Studios</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9rFMqFB30HV-58OKkjsHzQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8Rrab5mLWnbPtvf14Yc0Vw.png" /><figcaption>Sources: <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=11496107&amp;GUID=298468FA-89B5-461D-9180-85B9CBC88519">city staff memo</a>; <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=11498172&amp;GUID=8129A826-7EA8-4939-B568-5BD6A4AD2350">council resolution</a>; <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2023/07/27/did-san-jose-give-a-26-million-bail-out-to-a-struggling-affordable-housing-developer/">Mercury News</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>SJ’s $37.5 million to 2nd St. Studios</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ndk3cRFIj_ECefIiH8yqMw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=11496107&amp;GUID=298468FA-89B5-461D-9180-85B9CBC88519">city staff memo, file 22–1863</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Stats: <strong>433 lease violations and 8 evictions</strong> in ten months, <strong>500+</strong> police and medical calls in year one, four preventable deaths, ten fires (<a href="https://sanjosespotlight.com/formerly-homeless-residents-fear-eviction-from-san-jose-affordable-housing-project/">San José Spotlight</a>, <a href="https://sanjosespotlight.com/eckhart-second-street-studios-one-year-later-what-has-changed/">again</a>). By 2023: mold, roaches, <strong>180+</strong>emergency calls, a cooking-appliance explosion (<a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2023/08/14/mold-roaches-security-issues-at-san-jose-homeless-housing-heighten-broader-concerns/">Mercury News</a>). The county opened an <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/santa-clara-county-investigates-south-second-street-studios-permanent-supportive-housing-5102349f09b9">investigation</a>. Tenants at another First Community Housing building, Donner Lofts, <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/tenant-letter-lived-experience-in-donner-lofts-affordable-housing-9538aa79d393">described the same pattern from inside</a>.</p><h3>References</h3><p>My prior reporting</p><ul><li>“Incremental Ladder of Housing Success,” written 2021, published Mar. 15, 2022 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/incremental-ladder-of-housing-success-5cebce8a88f7">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/incremental-ladder-of-housing-success-5cebce8a88f7</a></li><li>“Money flow from SJ to NonProfits,” Feb. 7, 2025 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/money-flow-from-sj-to-nonprofits-9baba78542b2">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/money-flow-from-sj-to-nonprofits-9baba78542b2</a></li><li>“Why San Jose’s Math Doesn’t Work,” Aug. 19, 2026 — <a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/why-san-joses-math-doesn-t-work-f10dc36bd888">https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/why-san-joses-math-doesn-t-work-f10dc36bd888</a></li><li>“Financial Analysis — Large Scale Shelter, Tiny Homes, Permanent Supportive Housing,” Mar. 10, 2025 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/financial-analysis-large-scale-shelter-tiny-homes-permanent-supportive-housing-8bcacf90b2e8">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/financial-analysis-large-scale-shelter-tiny-homes-permanent-supportive-housing-8bcacf90b2e8</a></li><li>“Hidden Costs of Housing,” June 11, 2026 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c</a></li><li>“NonProfit Accountability Registry,” Dec. 2024 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/nonprofit-accountability-registry-c41e648abd34">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/nonprofit-accountability-registry-c41e648abd34</a></li><li>“Nonprofit affordable housing blunders with tenants &amp; neighborhoods,” May 2024 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/nonprofit-affordable-housing-blunders-with-tenants-neighborhoods-64d69b4a28fd">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/nonprofit-affordable-housing-blunders-with-tenants-neighborhoods-64d69b4a28fd</a></li><li>“Santa Clara County Investigates South Second Street Studios” — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/santa-clara-county-investigates-south-second-street-studios-permanent-supportive-housing-5102349f09b9">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/santa-clara-county-investigates-south-second-street-studios-permanent-supportive-housing-5102349f09b9</a></li><li>“Tenant Letter: Lived Experience in Donner Lofts Affordable Housing” — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/tenant-letter-lived-experience-in-donner-lofts-affordable-housing-9538aa79d393">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/tenant-letter-lived-experience-in-donner-lofts-affordable-housing-9538aa79d393</a></li><li>“Looking back — to change course,” Sept. 22, 2022 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/looking-back-to-change-course-ae9fb4b155ea">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/looking-back-to-change-course-ae9fb4b155ea</a></li><li>“Housing advice from 8 downtown neighborhoods” — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/advice-from-8-downtown-neighborhoods-d49e6d520249">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/advice-from-8-downtown-neighborhoods-d49e6d520249</a></li><li>“Lawsuit to end homeless crisis” — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/lawsuit-to-end-homeless-crisis-b39833728786">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/lawsuit-to-end-homeless-crisis-b39833728786</a></li></ul><h4>Where the money went, and what it does not tell you</h4><ul><li>I reported San Jose’s payments to homelessness nonprofits — $225,432,904 from FY2018 to FY2024, obtained through Public Records Act request #24–033 — in <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/money-flow-from-sj-to-nonprofits-9baba78542b2">Money flow from SJ to NonProfits</a>. Read it for the agency-by-agency and year-by-year detail. One caution about that table, including my own use of it: it records amounts the city handed out, not what the money was used for. And don’t assume those funds covered all costs. The city returned nothing for the three columns I also requested — success metrics, fixed costs and variable costs — for any agency in any year. That absence is the point of the present article.</li></ul><h4>Condo comparison and property tax</h4><ul><li>California Civil Code §5550, Davis-Stirling Act reserve study requirement — visual inspection of major components at least every three years, replacement cost estimates, a 30-year funding plan, and annual disclosure to owners — <a href="https://www.davis-stirling.com/HOME/Statutes/Civil-Code-5550">https://www.davis-stirling.com/HOME/Statutes/Civil-Code-5550</a></li><li>Silicon Valley / Santa Clara County July 2026 market report — condominium and townhome median $904,500; median price per square foot $673 — <a href="https://lisamlum.com/blog/july-2026-silicon-valley-housing-market-report">https://lisamlum.com/blog/july-2026-silicon-valley-housing-market-report</a></li><li>City of San Jose quarterly Housing Market Report (median sale prices; the city publishes the series but not the underlying figures on the landing page) — <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/data/housing-market">https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/data/housing-market</a></li></ul><h4>Operating cost sources</h4><ul><li>Los Angeles Housing Department, Housing for LA NOFA underwriting guidelines, 2025 — $14,000/unit/yr minimum operating assumption — <a href="https://housing.lacity.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/H4LA-NOFA-External-Underwriting-Guidelines-FINAL-1.xlsx">https://housing.lacity.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/H4LA-NOFA-External-Underwriting-Guidelines-FINAL-1.xlsx</a></li><li>California HCD, Administrative Notice 24–05, Oct. 7, 2024 — $10,000/unit/yr services cap, up from $4,080 in 2017 — <a href="https://www.hcd.ca.gov/sites/default/files/docs/grants-and-funding/supportive-services-costs-memo.pdf">https://www.hcd.ca.gov/sites/default/files/docs/grants-and-funding/supportive-services-costs-memo.pdf</a></li><li>Yardi Matrix metro apartment operating expense data, 12 months ending June 2023 — San Jose $11,863/unit, San Francisco $12,468, national average $8,694 — reproduced by Pension Real Estate Association — <a href="https://www.prea.org/publications/quarterly/multifamily-property-expenses-rising-rapidly-led-by-insurance/">https://www.prea.org/publications/quarterly/multifamily-property-expenses-rising-rapidly-led-by-insurance/</a></li><li>SF Mayor’s Office of Housing, 53 Colton LOSP contract evaluation, June 24, 2022–32 supportive housing projects averaged $15,600/unit/yr, range $9,200–$26,600, services excluded entirely — <a href="https://sfmohcd.org/sites/default/files/Documents/MOH/Loan%20Committee/Approved%2053%20Colton%20LOSP%20Contract%20Evaluation%20-%20Loan%20Committee%206-24-2022.pdf">https://sfmohcd.org/sites/default/files/Documents/MOH/Loan%20Committee/Approved%2053%20Colton%20LOSP%20Contract%20Evaluation%20-%20Loan%20Committee%206-24-2022.pdf</a></li><li>SF Mayor’s Office of Housing, Hotel Diva LOSP contract evaluation, Mar. 19, 2021 — front desk and alarm monitoring alone, $1,145/unit/yr — <a href="https://sfmohcd.org/sites/default/files/Documents/MOH/Loan%20Committee/Approved%20Hotel%20Diva%20LOSP%20Contract%20Evaluation%20-%20Loan%20Committee%203-19-2021.pdf">https://sfmohcd.org/sites/default/files/Documents/MOH/Loan%20Committee/Approved%20Hotel%20Diva%20LOSP%20Contract%20Evaluation%20-%20Loan%20Committee%203-19-2021.pdf</a></li><li>SF Budget and Legislative Analyst, audit of permanent supportive housing funds, May 3, 2024 — $28,424/unit/yr projected for new units, which the auditor says still “underestimate[s]” the cost — <a href="https://sfbos.org/sites/default/files/050324_PA_of_Permanent_Supportive_Housing_Funds_Admin_by_DH_SH.pdf">https://sfbos.org/sites/default/files/050324_PA_of_Permanent_Supportive_Housing_Funds_Admin_by_DH_SH.pdf</a></li><li>Enterprise Community Partners, 2025 SRO Portfolio Assessment — 95% of 39 properties in operating deficit; $24,289,004 in owner advances 2020–2024; per-unit advances tripled from $971 to $2,866; 20% average vacancy; 43% of units with no long-term rent subsidy — <a href="https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/2025-SRO-Portfolio-Assessment-Final.pdf">https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/2025-SRO-Portfolio-Assessment-Final.pdf</a></li><li>California Labor Code §1720 — prevailing wage applies to construction, alteration, repair and demolition paid for in whole or part with public funds, not only original construction — <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=LAB&amp;sectionNum=1720">https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=LAB&amp;sectionNum=1720</a></li><li>California State Coastal Conservancy, summary of prevailing wage law and covered work — <a href="https://scc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/forms/prevailingwage.pdf">https://scc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/forms/prevailingwage.pdf</a></li></ul><h4>Other California operators that failed the same way, since 2022</h4><p>One failure is a management problem. This many, in every major California city, in the same decade, for the same reason, is a design flaw.</p><ul><li>Skid Row Housing Trust, Los Angeles — 2,000 units in 29 buildings; receiver April 2023, dissolved January 2025; 17 buildings sold to a private investor for $10 million; receivership cost nearly $40 million and itself ran out of cash, holding $336,000 against $1.7 million in bills. Rent subsidies ran as much as $1,058/unit/month below market; identical buildings received amounts differing by up to $600/unit/month; portfolio security spending went from under $50,000/yr to $9 million in 2023 — <a href="https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2023-06-14/skid-row-receiver-financial-collapse-danger,">https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2023-06-14/skid-row-receiver-financial-collapse-danger,</a> <a href="https://www.hiltonfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Skid-Row-Report-250512.pdf,">https://www.hiltonfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Skid-Row-Report-250512.pdf,</a> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2025-05-21/failure-of-skid-row-landlord-canary-in-the-coal-mine-for-other-homeless-housing-in-los-angeles-report-says">https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2025-05-21/failure-of-skid-row-landlord-canary-in-the-coal-mine-for-other-homeless-housing-in-los-angeles-report-says</a></li><li>HomeRise, San Francisco — 17 buildings housing more than 1,500 residents; $48,393,367 revenue against $61,264,796 expenses in calendar 2023, a deficit of $12,871,429, per its own audited statements — <a href="https://homerisesf.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/CHP-and-Affiliates-Audited-FS-2023.pdf.">https://homerisesf.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/CHP-and-Affiliates-Audited-FS-2023.pdf.</a> Ten of its sixteen properties ran an operating deficit in 2022, from $13,000 to $917,000; the Senator Hotel and Edward II were negative all four audited years. City audit found $2.1 million in misused funds still unpaid as of August 23, 2023, $6.37 million in vacancy-driven lost rent 2019–2022, and $240.6 million in active city funds as of October 2022 — <a href="https://www.sf.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/HSH-MOHCD%20HomeRise%20Audit%20Report%2004.02.24.pdf.">https://www.sf.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/HSH-MOHCD%20HomeRise%20Audit%20Report%2004.02.24.pdf.</a> San Francisco declined to renew $39 million in service contracts on July 22, 2026; $22.6 million in contracts remain and begin expiring in summer 2027 — <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/homerise-homeless-housing-san-francisco-22348377.php,">https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/homerise-homeless-housing-san-francisco-22348377.php,</a> <a href="https://nypost.com/2026/07/22/us-news/san-francisco-cuts-off-homelessness-nonprofit-homerise/">https://nypost.com/2026/07/22/us-news/san-francisco-cuts-off-homelessness-nonprofit-homerise/.</a> HomeRise still owns every building; the city terminated services, not ownership.</li><li>SRO Housing Corporation, Los Angeles — 30 supportive housing buildings. In 2019, ten of its fifteen SROs were operating at a loss and five properties were placed in the city’s problem-landlord program; a December 2024 tenant lawsuit alleged vermin, broken elevators and sewage leaks — <a href="https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2025-05-21/failure-of-skid-row-landlord-canary-in-the-coal-mine-for-other-homeless-housing-in-los-angeles-report-says,">https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2025-05-21/failure-of-skid-row-landlord-canary-in-the-coal-mine-for-other-homeless-housing-in-los-angeles-report-says,</a> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2024-03-19/the-end-of-skid-rows-cheap-hotels-l-a-leaders-want-to-replace-last-resort-homeless-housing">https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2024-03-19/the-end-of-skid-rows-cheap-hotels-l-a-leaders-want-to-replace-last-resort-homeless-housing</a></li><li>Step Up on Second, Santa Monica — with for-profit partner Shangri-La Industries, took more than $114 million in Homekey funds for seven California motel conversions. Shangri-La borrowed privately on top of the grants and defaulted; the properties went into foreclosure and were taken over by lenders, four still empty and unfinished. Attorney General Rob Bonta sued both in January 2024 demanding the money back; Step Up’s outside accountants then quit, delaying its required audits. Ventura County alone: $26.7 million for a 78-room motel, now vacant — <a href="https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2024-09-17/non-profit-helped-conceive-californias-homeless-housing-program-then-left-string-of-failed-projects.">https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2024-09-17/non-profit-helped-conceive-californias-homeless-housing-program-then-left-string-of-failed-projects.</a> Step Up itself remains in operation. The defaults were the for-profit partner’s, not Step Up’s.</li><li>C.C.O.A. Housing Corporation, Los Angeles — Los Angeles Superior Court appointed a regulatory receiver on March 16, 2026 in People of the State of California v. C.C.O.A. Housing Corporation, №24STCV33886, suspending the authority of its officers and directors — <a href="https://natlawreview.com/press-releases/california-court-appoints-stephen-j-donell-receiver-over-housing-corporation">https://natlawreview.com/press-releases/california-court-appoints-stephen-j-donell-receiver-over-housing-corporation</a></li><li>Sacramento Self-Help Housing — closed May 2023 with roughly 700 people housed, and filed bankruptcy two days later. Interim CEO Jeremy Baird named the cause: “numerous financial errors,” and “the most obvious one, spending more than they brought in.” SHELTER, Inc., which took over the wind-down, said it would lose money because it was contractually required to accept vacant, deteriorated properties — <a href="https://californialocal.com/localnews/sacramento/ca/article/show/133539-after-sacramento-self-help-housingwhat-happens-now/">https://californialocal.com/localnews/sacramento/ca/article/show/133539-after-sacramento-self-help-housingwhat-happens-now/</a></li><li>Bay Area Community Services — revenue grew roughly tenfold in a decade to $98 million in 2023. It housed 30 percent of clients at the Salinas SHARE Center against a 70 percent contract goal, lost that contract, and lost more than $10 million in other state grants, including $8 million rescinded and a $2.6 million property left empty — <a href="https://calmatters.org/housing/2025/02/california-homeless-shelters-purgatory/">https://calmatters.org/housing/2025/02/california-homeless-shelters-purgatory/</a></li><li>LAHSA, the regional agency — HUD immediately suspended its funding on June 11, 2026 after an Inspector General investigation, citing a 2025 assessment that could not verify the existence of nearly 2,300 housing sites, no conflict-of-interest policy until September 26, 2025, and a former CEO who committed more than $2 million to her husband’s employer. The Los Angeles Continuum of Care had received nearly $1 billion over five years; permanent debarment is “on the table” — <a href="https://www.hud.gov/news/hud-no-26-048">https://www.hud.gov/news/hud-no-26-048</a></li><li>Downtown Streets Team — founded in Palo Alto in 2005, headquartered in San Jose, served 16 California cities; received $50,000 from San Jose per the city’s own PRA #24–033 response. All operations ceased October 31, 2025, San Jose’s last service day October 17. CEO Julie Gardner: it “lost several significant contracts and grants, creating a multi-million-dollar loss in overall funding. When combined with other factors, including rapidly rising operational costs, these losses made it impossible to continue running the organization in a financially sustainable way.” — <a href="https://www.streetsteam.org/dst-closure,">https://www.streetsteam.org/dst-closure,</a> <a href="https://calmatters.org/housing/homelessness/2025/09/ca-homelessness-funding-population/,">https://calmatters.org/housing/homelessness/2025/09/ca-homelessness-funding-population/,</a> <a href="https://www.ktvu.com/news/downtown-streets-team-shuts-down-after-20-years">https://www.ktvu.com/news/downtown-streets-team-shuts-down-after-20-years</a></li></ul><h4>First Community Housing and Second Street Studios</h4><ul><li>IRS Form 990, FY2024, First Community Housing (EIN 77–0119210) — <a href="https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2025/2025_TEOS_XML_09A.zip">https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2025/2025_TEOS_XML_09A.zip</a></li><li>ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, FY2022–2023 — <a href="https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/api/v2/organizations/770119210.json">https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/api/v2/organizations/770119210.json</a></li><li>City of San Jose staff memo, file 22–1863 — <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=11496107&amp;GUID=298468FA-89B5-461D-9180-85B9CBC88519">https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=11496107&amp;GUID=298468FA-89B5-461D-9180-85B9CBC88519</a></li><li>City of San Jose council resolution, $13M loan, Dec. 13, 2022 — <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=11498172&amp;GUID=8129A826-7EA8-4939-B568-5BD6A4AD2350">https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=11498172&amp;GUID=8129A826-7EA8-4939-B568-5BD6A4AD2350</a></li><li>City of San Jose loan contract CON662015–002 — <a href="https://records.sanjoseca.gov/Contracts/CON662015-002.pdf">https://records.sanjoseca.gov/Contracts/CON662015-002.pdf</a></li><li>City of San Jose, city-funded asset management policy — <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/developers/asset-management/city-funded">https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/developers/asset-management/city-funded</a></li><li>City of San Jose original funding memo, Second Street Studios — <a href="https://sanjose.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=&amp;event_id=1464&amp;meta_id=532364">https://sanjose.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=&amp;event_id=1464&amp;meta_id=532364</a></li><li>Santa Clara County Housing Authority, affiliate corporation boards — <a href="https://www.scchousingauthority.org/affiliate-corporations-boards-of-directors/">https://www.scchousingauthority.org/affiliate-corporations-boards-of-directors/</a></li><li>Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, member listing — <a href="https://clpha.org/members/272">https://clpha.org/members/272</a></li><li>First Community Housing, Second Street Studios — <a href="https://www.firsthousing.org/sss">https://www.firsthousing.org/sss</a></li><li>Mercury News, “Did San Jose give a $26 million bail-out to a struggling affordable housing developer?”, July 27, 2023 — <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2023/07/27/did-san-jose-give-a-26-million-bail-out-to-a-struggling-affordable-housing-developer/">https://www.mercurynews.com/2023/07/27/did-san-jose-give-a-26-million-bail-out-to-a-struggling-affordable-housing-developer/</a></li><li>Mercury News, “Mold, roaches, security issues at San Jose homeless housing,” Aug. 14, 2023 — <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2023/08/14/mold-roaches-security-issues-at-san-jose-homeless-housing-heighten-broader-concerns/">https://www.mercurynews.com/2023/08/14/mold-roaches-security-issues-at-san-jose-homeless-housing-heighten-broader-concerns/</a></li><li>San Jose Spotlight, “Formerly homeless residents fear eviction,” June 2020 — <a href="https://sanjosespotlight.com/formerly-homeless-residents-fear-eviction-from-san-jose-affordable-housing-project/">https://sanjosespotlight.com/formerly-homeless-residents-fear-eviction-from-san-jose-affordable-housing-project/</a></li><li>San Jose Spotlight, “Second Street Studios one year later,” Nov. 2020 — <a href="https://sanjosespotlight.com/eckhart-second-street-studios-one-year-later-what-has-changed/">https://sanjosespotlight.com/eckhart-second-street-studios-one-year-later-what-has-changed/</a></li></ul><h4>San Jose costs and revenue risk</h4><ul><li>City of San Jose, Public Records Act request #24–033, Housing Department distribution of funds to nonprofits, FY2018–FY2024 ($225,432,904) — obtained by the author</li><li>San Jose Spotlight, “San Jose looks to cut homeless shelter operating costs,” Apr. 8, 2026 — $94 million a year, $56 million short — <a href="https://sanjosespotlight.com/san-jose-looks-to-cut-homeless-shelter-operating-costs/">https://sanjosespotlight.com/san-jose-looks-to-cut-homeless-shelter-operating-costs/</a></li><li>Silicon Valley / Mercury News, Rue Ferrari expansion, Apr. 4, 2024 — one site, $3.7 million to $5.2 million a year — <a href="https://www.siliconvalley.com/2024/04/04/san-jose-invests-30-million-to-double-capacity-at-tiny-home-site-for-the-homeless/">https://www.siliconvalley.com/2024/04/04/san-jose-invests-30-million-to-double-capacity-at-tiny-home-site-for-the-homeless/</a></li><li>California Board of Equalization, SB 336 revenue analysis — statewide property tax exemption loss $93–151 million a year — <a href="https://boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/0336sb021225rd.pdf">https://boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/0336sb021225rd.pdf</a></li><li>Insurance: California multifamily buildings older than 50 years denied standard coverage and forced into the CA FAIR Plan at a 300 percent increase; average California premiums up 84 percent from late 2020 to March 2026, deductibles from $1,813 to $2,553, and a 29.1 percent average increase approved effective October 2026 — documented in “Hidden Costs of Housing,” June 11, 2026 — <a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c">https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c</a></li><li>California DHCS, CalAIM 1115 demonstration and 1915(b) waiver, both expiring Dec. 31, 2026 — <a href="https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/providers-partners/calaim-1115-demonstration-1915b-waiver/">https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/providers-partners/calaim-1115-demonstration-1915b-waiver/</a></li><li>California DHCS, Community Supports Policy Guide, Vol. 2 — housing benefits “do not include the provision of Room and Board or payment of rental assistance” — <a href="https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/file/dhcs-community-supports-policy-guide-volume-2-pdf/">https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/file/dhcs-community-supports-policy-guide-volume-2-pdf/</a></li><li>CalMatters, Medi-Cal losses, Mar. 2026 — <a href="https://calmatters.org/health/2026/03/homeless-health-work-rules-medical/">https://calmatters.org/health/2026/03/homeless-health-work-rules-medical/</a></li><li>CalMatters, California homelessness funding, June 2025 — <a href="https://calmatters.org/housing/homelessness/2025/06/california-homelessness-funding-budget/">https://calmatters.org/housing/homelessness/2025/06/california-homelessness-funding-budget/</a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*At2ybeN8MYhuYi3e7qALlw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@mirandanef?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Pedro Miranda</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-construction-truck-is-parked-in-front-of-a-building-U29uV_QaGSo?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ad739419e50d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Property Tax Shelter — Public Housing]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/draft-for-review-purposes-0aaf08bf6eab?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0aaf08bf6eab</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 14:48:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-26T17:35:40.750Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>San Jose taxpayers pay for nonprofit housing three times: to build it, to operate it, and through property-tax exemptions.</p><p>After construction costs, taxpayers fund roughly $94 million a year in operating support plus an estimated $15.7 million–$28.4 million in foregone property taxes on nonprofit-owned properties — a combined annual cost of about <strong>$109.7 million–$122.4 million</strong>. Nonprofit-owned property generally does not contribute to the local property-tax base.</p><h4>Use these numbers as safety rails</h4><p>Multiple charts below to support the data. These figures are estimates, not audited financial conclusions. But your iwatch isn’t perfect either, yet it is useful for showing trends, warning signs, or a problem worth investigating.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ntuqjw_qn8RWYaMAwisAA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z3NJ1tiuLSelMqGRI7p6aA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pvUSI4svMBH19Zw0JzUxHA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aIGoa4EKXmBz8rY-h7mFUw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6iv65rpfH6cVui_Kot7iCQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eGV2kfCgKji2a-dcAwqQ6A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ufePc1lzzXDIF5pNOdALfw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ctD5n-ioMU5IQk7uZUvb3Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ToSTTxlemGPMKUPoMl1nIg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JEJF6jvi0P22zf_2q-n0Lw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@markuswinkler?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Markus Winkler</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-close-up-of-a-typewriter-with-a-tax-return-sign-on-it-Ber3q-zEhd4?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0aaf08bf6eab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why San Jose’s Math Doesn’t Work]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/why-san-joses-math-doesn-t-work-f10dc36bd888?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f10dc36bd888</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[affordable-housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing-density]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 21:24:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-19T21:24:36.133Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>San Jose’s answer to homeownership is to cement in more rental units — because nothing builds generational wealth like re-signing a lease every twelve months. They’ve got the rebar ordered, the permits stamped, but somehow nobody priced out the one line item that actually decides who moves in: who will pay. You can frame it and pour it but if it doesn’t pencil out, you haven’t built housing — you’ve built a very expensive, very vacant amenity space.</p><p>San Jose loves to talk about “unlocking” housing by loosening zoning, as if the city’s real problem is finding a key to a permit-form nobody filled out. It isn’t. Run the actual numbers on a 1-acre lot and 32 units and you get a $33.4 million bill for a building that, once finished, would appraise for about $14.8 million — a $18.6 million hole. That’s not a rounding error, that’s the entire business plan drowning before it clears the foundation.</p><blockquote>(Just remember I’m a numbers-nerd and there’s lots more detail and charts galore after the first few summary paragraphs. And you’ll find some interesting questions worth considering at the end).</blockquote><p>The lender math is worse than the investor math. At today’s rents the project doesn’t generate enough income to cover its own mortgage. To make this thing actually cash flow at a normal market cap rate, rents would need to roughly 2.3x overnight — not because anyone’s greedy, but because that’s what it costs to break even on $1.04 million per apartment.</p><p>So naturally, the reflex is: build it smaller, strip it down, cut the frills. Fine — shrink every unit to a 350-square-foot micro-studio, gut the finishes, trim the fees, and total cost falls 41%, to $19.8 million. Except the value gap is still 56%. Because the rent a tiny cheap unit commands falls right alongside the cost of building it — you haven’t fixed the deal, you’ve just built a smaller version of the same failure. Density and austerity aren’t the cure; they’re a magic trick that leaves the patient exactly as sick.</p><p>Meanwhile the “just build more” crowd never had a permission problem for building more. Nobody is stopping anyone from building dense. What’s stopping them is that dense, in this cost environment, means expensive, not affordable — and California/San Jose keep writing zoning reform bills like a doctor prescribing more vitamins for a broken leg.</p><p>The financial bottom line: this project doesn’t need a variance, it needs roughly <strong>$580,000 of taxpayer subsidy per unit </strong>to exist. If it subsidized, it doesn’t pay property taxes. San Jose keeps leaping toward density mandates as the fix for its housing crisis without once running a pro forma to see if the units it’s mandating can actually be built for anything close to what people want to pay. The zoning was never the load-bearing wall. The cost structure is — and nobody downtown seems to have checked.</p><p>And now for the very detailed nitty gritty financials …</p><h4>Should You Build 32 Apartments on a San Jose Acre?</h4><p>A cost, income, and return analysis for a 3-story, 32-unit development on a ~1-acre San Jose, CA lot — and why higher density alone doesn’t solve affordability.</p><h4>The Financial Bottom Line</h4><p>Buying and building this project would cost roughly $33.4 million (about $1.04 million per unit). Once built and rented at today’s San Jose market rents, the building would only be worth about $14.8 million to a buyer. That’s a $18.6 million gap (56% of cost) between what it costs to build and what it’s worth — the project loses money for its investors at every realistic rent level, and it cannot even qualify for a normal bank loan.</p><p>This is not a story about not enough units. San Jose’s own zoning already allows far more than 32 units on this size lot with no density cap at all — the constraint is cost, not permission. The sections below walk through the numbers in plain language, then explain why building more densely does not, by itself, make housing cheaper.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tvEI32awwCI9zjqYfXt1Kw.png" /></figure><p>1. <strong>The Lot:</strong> What It Costs to Buy and Build A real, currently-listed comparable helps ground this analysis: 2570 Senter Rd, San Jose, CA 95111 is a 1.0-acre parcel (zoned MUN — Mixed Use Neighborhood, which allows multifamily) listed at $4,250,000 on Homes.com. The site has existing miscellaneous structures on it, matching the scenario of buying an already-occupied lot and folding the acquisition and removal cost into the total project price. Other San Jose land comparables (Zillow, LoopNet, Compass) for roughly 1-acre multifamily-eligible sites range from about $2.5 million to $5.0 million per acre depending on location, topography, and whether existing entitlements come with the land (2,3,4)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9BwV8BQccztHD5vVoWN-Vw.png" /></figure><p>Construction hard costs are anchored to the City of San Jose’s own official cost estimate for a Type V (wood-frame) low-rise apartment prototype: about $563,000 per unit in hard costs, plus roughly $73,000 per unit in municipal permits and impact fees, plus about $130,000 per unit in other soft costs (design, legal, insurance, contingency) — a total of $765,000 per unit before land5. Because that city figure is from 2023 and Bay Area construction costs have risen roughly 4–5% per year since (6,7) this analysis inflates those figures by about 10% to better reflect 2025–2026 pricing.</p><p>San Jose’s own impact fees are a meaningful share of the bill on their own: the Affordable Housing Impact Fee runs $43.00 per square foot for rental projects, the Park Impact In-Lieu Fee runs roughly $21,400–$22,600 per unit, and school, construction-tax, and inclusionary-housing fees add several thousand dollars more per unit (8,9,10). Maybe that gets waived? A statewide RAND Corporation study found California’s average municipal impact fees run about $29,000 per unit — compared to under $1,000 per unit in Texas (11).</p><p><strong>Financing costs and how long it takes</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wMR0c1IoBZePucUj836wzw.png" /></figure><p>This kind of project typically takes about 12 months for design, plan check, and permits, another 14–18 months to physically build a 3-story, 32-unit wood-frame building, and 4–8 months to lease it up to a stable occupancy — call it 34 months, or about 2.8 years, from the day you buy the land to the day the building is fully rented. During that entire time, a construction loan is accruing interest.</p><p>Current California construction loan rates for a market-rate apartment deal run roughly 7–8.5%, typically at 60–70% of project cost (12,13). On this project, that works out to roughly $1.9 million in interest plus about $0.3 million in loan origination fees — about $2.2 million (7% of the total budget) spent before a single tenant has ever paid rent.</p><p>2. <strong>What the Building Would Actually Earn</strong></p><p>Assume a realistic unit mix of 6 studios, 14 one-bedrooms, 8 two-bedrooms, and 4 three-bedrooms (32 units total). Using current San Jose asking rents from Zillow, RentCafe, Zumper, Apartments.com, and Apartment List (studio ~$2,300, 1BR ~$2,850, 2BR ~$3,550, 3BR ~$4,350 permonth)(14,15,16,17,18,) the building would generate about $1,194,000 a year in rent before any vacancy.</p><p>Net Operating Income (NOI) is simply the money left over after collecting rent and paying the bills to run the building — before the mortgage. It’s the number investors and lenders use to judge whether a property is worth owning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m8-9Gosk0qPjrHk-Qx2RvA.png" /></figure><p>That $703,000 a year in NOI sounds like real money — until you compare it to the $33.4 million it cost to build. That ratio (NOI ÷ total cost) is only 2.10%. Investors buying stabilized San Jose apartments today expect roughly 4.5–5.0% on that same basis (19,20,21). In other words, this building earns less than half of what a rational buyer would require.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RYZ2q8dYfTZSwcCUE9YLkg.png" /></figure><p>That gap is not a rounding error — it means that on the day the building is finished and fully rented, it would be worth about $18.6 million less than it cost to build. No investor, bank, or developer builds a $33 million asset on purpose to end up with a $15 million asset.</p><p>3. <strong>Why a Bank Won’t Even Finance This</strong></p><p>Lenders don’t just look at cost — they size the long-term (“take-out”) loan off the building’s appraised value, and require the building’s income to comfortably cover the mortgage payment. That coverage ratio is called DSCR (Debt Service Coverage Ratio): NOI divided by the annual loan payment. Most lenders require at least 1.20–1.25x — meaning the building needs to earn at least 20–25% more than the mortgage payment each year (13).</p><p>At a 70% loan-to-value permanent loan against the building’s real (income-based) value of $14.8 million, at today’s ~6.25% multifamily mortgage rate13, the annual mortgage payment would be about $765,749. Against an NOI of $703,266, that’s a DSCR of only 0.92x — below 1.0, meaning the building’s income doesn’t even cover its own mortgage payment, let alone the 1.25x cushion a bank wants to see. Cash flow after debt service would run about negative $62,483 per year. And because the construction loan (about $20,288,580) is larger than what the take-out loan will actually provide, the developer would need to find roughly $9,924,660 in additional cash just to pay off the construction lender when the building is done — on top of the $13,122,550 of equity already invested.</p><p>This holds up across a range of cost assumptions. Even in a deliberately optimistic “low cost” scenario — cheaper land, no further construction-cost inflation, and more favorable loan terms — the project still costs about 49–60% more than it would be worth once rented. There is no combination of realistic land price and construction cost, at today’s rents, where this pencils out for a private investor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q9Tu-ponEuCWqrnEwhrzIw.png" /></figure><p>4. <strong>What Rents Would Actually Have to Be</strong></p><p>If you insist on building this project anyway and want it to earn a normal market return (4.75% return on the $33.4 million cost), rents would have to rise to roughly 2.3 times today’s asking rents — averaging about $7,000 per unit per month across the building.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TpPVa12DKxNzCTKnjiW7Kw.png" /></figure><p>A 2-bedroom apartment renting near $8,000 a month, or a 3-bedroom near $9,800 a month, is not “missing middle” or “affordable” housing by any common definition — it’s luxury pricing available only to the highest earners. This is the central problem with assuming density alone creates affordability: the land, labor, materials, and government fees required to produce a new unit in San Jose cost roughly $1 million per door before it houses anyone. Charging enough rent to justify that cost puts the unit permanently out of reach of the “missing middle” households that density advocates say new supply is supposed to help.</p><p>5. T<strong>he Bad Assumption: More Density Doesn’t Mean Cheaper Housing</strong></p><p>San Jose’s R-M zoning already has no density cap — 32, 60, even 150+ units on this same acre are legally achievable today, and the city eliminated minimum parking requirements citywide in 2022, ahead of most of the state (22,23). Yet, as shown above, even at the modest end of that density range, the project loses money at every realistic rent. Adding more units to the same acre would lower the land cost per door, but it would not touch the two costs that actually dominate the budget: construction (59% of cost) and government fees and soft costs (21% of cost) — both of which scale roughly with the number of units, not down with density.</p><p>In a market where the true, unsubsidized cost to produce a unit is roughly $1 million, “affordable” housing is only possible when someone other than the tenant pays part of that cost. A CalMatters analysis found the average California apartment costs about $430,000 to build versus roughly $150,000 in Texas — nearly 3x more — almost entirely due to land, fees, and process costs, not unit size or density (24). The California Legislative Analyst’s Office and the state Senate Housing Committee both note plainly that producing housing affordable to low- and moderate-income households in California “almost always requires some amount of public investment” — tax credits, grants, fee waivers, or low-cost public land — because the market cost of construction alone makes below-market rent mathematically impossible (25,26). Removing zoning and parking barriers can help at the margin, but it does not erase a $1-million-per-unit cost structure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bM8UXPk6K9mMZfx5uUffVQ.png" /></figure><p>Hidden costs that density mandates don’t address</p><p>• Insurance: California multifamily property insurance premiums have risen 75–119% since 2019, driven by wildfire risk and reinsurance costs, and continue to rise sharply into 2025–2026 (27,28)</p><p>• Utilities: PG&amp;E’s residential electric rates have risen roughly 166% since 2006, with further increases anticipated through 2030 — a direct hit to a landlord’s operating expenses and a resident’s total housing cost (29,30)</p><p>• Eviction risk and cost: Even routine evictions cost $3,500–$10,000 in lost rent, legal fees, and turnover costs, and contested cases in expensive jurisdictions like California can exceed $15,000–$20,00031,32. Pandemic-era eviction moratoriums left Southern California housing providers alone with an estimated $3.8 billion in unpaid, uncollectable rent33 — a risk landlords now price into every rent-setting and tenant-screening decision, raising effective costs further.</p><p>• Government fees: As shown above, San Jose-specific impact fees, construction taxes, and affordable-housing in-lieu fees can add $75,000–$150,000 or more to the cost of every single unit— fees that exist regardless of how many units share the lot (8,9,10,11).</p><p><strong>Density without infrastructure planning creates real costs for neighbors</strong></p><p>• No parking, more street congestion: San Jose’s citywide elimination of parking minimums means a developer can build 32 units with zero on-site parking spaces (23,34). If even half those households own a car, that’s 15–30+ additional vehicles competing for existing street parking in a neighborhood that was never designed for it — a real, uncompensated cost pushed onto existing residents, not the developer’s pro forma.</p><p>• Sewer and water capacity are not automatically expanded: Adding 32 (or more) units to a lot increases demand on local sewer laterals, water pressure, and treatment capacity. San Jose’s own environmental review processes have been challenged in court over exactly this issue — a 2026 lawsuit contests the city’s finding that existing sewer infrastructure is adequate to serve a nearby 126-unit apartment project (35). Impact fees are supposed to fund this expansion, but the fee schedules are calculated citywide and don’t guarantee dollar-for-dollar local capacity upgrades at each specific site.</p><p>• The unit-size trade-off: This analysis assumes realistically-sized market apartments (480–1,330 sq ft). San Jose’s zoning envelope on this lot could physically accommodate two to three times as many, much smaller units — which is one way developers try to make the per-unit economics work, but it trades away the family-sized, 2–3 bedroom housing this market is short of in favor of smaller, less livable units.</p><p>6. <strong>Is This a Feasible Investment?</strong></p><p>Under every scenario tested — low cost, base case, and high cost — buying and building 32 apartments on a 1-acre San Jose lot costs 49–60% more than the finished building would be worth at today’s market rents. The project cannot service a normal construction or permanent loan, generates a negative cash-on-cash return once leveraged, and would require rents roughly 2.3x today’s market rate — or a taxpayer-funded subsidy of roughly $580,000 per unit — just to reach a normal private investor’s required return.</p><p>For a non-investor: think of it like buying a car for $50,000 that you could only resell for $22,000 the moment you drove it off the lot. No amount of “but there could be more parking spots” or “but the neighborhood needs more cars” changes the fact that the price you’d have to charge to break even is far more than anyone is willing to pay. The same math applies here: this deal doesn’t fail because of a lack of density allowed by the city — it fails because land, labor, materials, and fees in San Jose already cost more than the housing market will pay to rent it.</p><p>Practical takeaway: as a private, market-rate investment, this project is not feasible today. It would only become viable with either 1. a substantial reduction in construction and fee costs, 2. rents far above what most renters can afford, or 3. a public subsidy (tax credits, fee waivers, low-cost public land, or below-market financing) covering roughly half the total cost — which is precisely why almost all deeply affordable housing built in California today is publicly subsidized rather than privately financed.</p><p>This analysis uses current market data as of August 19, 2026, and reasonable industry-standard planning assumptions. Actual results for any specific parcel will vary with exact location, entitlement status, final unit mix, and financing terms available at the time of underwriting.</p><h3><strong>A FEW QUESTIONS YOU SHOULD HAVE ANSWERED</strong></h3><h3><strong>What happens if we super-cut costs?</strong></h3><h4>It still doesn’t pencil</h4><p>That’s the key finding: cutting cost this hard doesn’t fix the economics, because smaller units also rent for proportionally less at the same market $/sq ft rate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SD9v73i45_1iSMARJ7rKEA.png" /></figure><p>The gap percentage, the DSCR, and the rent multiple needed are all essentially unchanged. Cost and revenue shrink together — you’re just building a smaller, cheaper version of the same failing deal. That’s a fairly strong data point for your original argument: cost-cutting design choices (smaller units, no elevator, no parking, minimal finishes) don’t create affordability, because the things you can’t design away — the land price, the statutory city fees, and financing on a lot this expensive — are the actual constraint.</p><h3><strong>Does this mean nothing pencils in San Jose?</strong></h3><p>No — it means this specific configuration doesn’t: ground-up new construction, standard market-rate units, on land priced at today’s comp levels, at today’s interest rates. It’s a statement about this deal, not a permanent law of physics. Feasibility exists in other lanes: value-add acquisitions of existing buildings priced below replacement cost (you’re buying at a discount to what it would cost to build new, so the math starts positive instead of negative), subsidized affordable housing where LIHTC or city subsidy dollars directly fill the exact value gap calculated, premium/luxury product in submarkets where achievable rents are meaningfully higher, or simply a future with lower rates and higher rents. What was modeled is the mainstream case — plain-vanilla new multifamily construction — and that case is broken across the wider Bay Area right now, not uniquely in San Jose; multifamily starts have slowed statewide for the same cost-vs-rent reason.</p><h3>Should we build even more density — is the problem we’re not thinking big enough?</h3><h4>Scale Doesn’t Save You — It Just Changes Which Problem You Have</h4><p>False — “must be subsidized or must be huge — density is our salvation”. Look at what’s actually breaking ground: 575 units at Stevens Creek Blvd, 345 units on Capitol Avenue, 737 units at River Oaks Parkway, 258 units at Lot 12, 136 units on a half-acre downtown parcel (Mercury News, The San Jose Blog, The Real Deal). Nobody’s quietly building a clean, unsubsidized 32-unit garden building — because the ones that get proposed at that scale don’t survive the pro forma.</p><p>Here’s the part that should annoy you: “economies of scale” is mostly a myth as a rescue plan. California’s own housing agency ran the numbers and found that for every 10% increase in unit count, cost to build per unit falls by about 1.7% — going from 70 to 77 units saves roughly $5,000 a door. That’s not a rescue. You are not going to close a 56%, $18.6 million value gap by adding a few more units to spread the architect’s fee around. <a href="https://www.hcd.ca.gov/policy-research/plans-reports/docs/finalaffordablehousingcoststudyreport-with-coverv2.pdf">hcd.ca</a></p><p>What actually moves the needle when projects go big isn’t fixed-cost dilution, it’s land-cost dilution: spread that same $4.25 million land basis over 150 units instead of 32 and your land cost per door drops from roughly $133,000 to about $28,000. That’s real money. But it comes with a trap — to fit 150+ units you usually have to go taller than 4 stories, which means trading cheap wood-frame garden construction ($160,000–$250,000/unit) for concrete-podium construction with elevators ($240,000–$380,000/unit). You’re paying more per unit to build, in exchange for paying less per unit for dirt. Scale doesn’t eliminate the cost problem — it just trades one line item for another and hopes the math nets out better in a premium-rent location. <a href="https://buildermuse.com/residential/podium-apartment-construction-cost-2026/">buildermuse</a></p><h3>If it’s not density as a salvation, is the only way to build through subsidies?</h3><p>And subsidy isn’t the cheat code you’d hope, either — California’s own state-commissioned RAND study found that publicly subsidized affordable housing actually costs 1.5 times more per unit to build than market-rate housing in the same state, thanks to prevailing union wage mandates and heavier design requirements. Subsidy doesn’t make the building cheaper to build; it just means taxpayers write the check that tenants can’t, instead of the developer eating the loss. <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3700/RRA3743-1/RAND_RRA3743-1.pdf">rand</a></p><p>Want the smoking gun that scale alone doesn’t fix this? A 272-unit downtown San Jose project — nearly nine times the 32 unit count example, well past any “too small to pencil” excuse — just abandoned its market-rate plan and switched to 100% subsidized affordable, with total development costs still landing around $580,000 per unit. If a developer with nearly nine times the scale, professional financing, and a downtown address still couldn’t make the market-rate version work, “just build bigger” was never the fix. Scale plus a subsidy check is the fix. Scale by itself is a bigger version of the same broken spreadsheet.</p><h3>Should nonprofits and subsidized housing pay their fair share of property taxes?</h3><h4>You’ve Basically Diagnosed the Real Catch-22</h4><p>You’re right, and it’s worse than you think. California’s welfare exemption (Revenue &amp; Taxation Code §214) lets any nonprofit-owned rental property that gets government financing or federal/state low-income tax credits skip property tax entirely, or proportionally by the share of units that are income-restricted. And the exemption isn’t capped at some modest amount for the projects that actually use this — if the property has government financing or LIHTCs, the exemption is unlimited in assessed value. Build a $50 million affordable complex, structure the ownership through a nonprofit general partner (the standard LIHTC playbook), and the city can collect zero property tax on it forever, while still running the fire trucks, sewer lines, and school buses that building requires. <a href="https://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/welfarelowinc.htm">boe.ca</a></p><p><strong>LIHTC — Low-Income Housing Tax Credit</strong>. It is the primary federal financing tool used to build and preserve income-restricted affordable <strong>rental</strong> housing — typically apartment developments — not a tenant voucher and not a direct tax break for a renter.</p><p>Here’s the twist that makes this a genuine trap and not just a tradeoff: cities used to be able to charge PILOTs — “payment in lieu of taxes” — to claw back some partial compensation from exempt affordable properties. California banned that in 2014. Local governments may no longer impose PILOTs on welfare-exemption properties, full stop (<a href="https://www.manatt.com/insights/newsletters/real-estate-and-land-use/real-estate-and-land-use-(1)">Manatt</a>). So the state didn’t just create the exemption, it took away the one tool cities had to soften it. Every fully subsidized unit built is a permanent hole in the tax base, not a temporary one.</p><p>Compare that to the other side of the ledger: under Prop 13, new construction gets reassessed to full current market value the moment it’s completed, which is a real, immediate revenue gain for the city — that’s exactly why cities theoretically like market-rate development. So the fiscally “clean” outcome for a city is market-rate housing that gets built without subsidy: the city gets both the housing and the growing tax base, no exemption, no PILOT ban to worry about. The fiscally “expensive” outcome is subsidized affordable housing: the housing gets built, but the city eats a permanent, uncompensated tax hole to make it happen. There is no version where subsidized housing “pays for itself” through property tax — that math doesn’t exist by design; the exemption’s entire legal purpose is to redirect what would’ve been the tax bill into rent relief instead. <a href="https://www.sccassessor.org/faq/understanding-proposition-13">sccassessor</a></p><p>So is there a financially sound way out that isn’t dreaming? Not through more subsidy — subsidy is a transfer, not a cost cut, and per RAND, California’s subsidized affordable housing actually costs 1.5x more per unit to build than market-rate, thanks to prevailing union wage and heavier design mandates (<a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3700/RRA3743-1/RAND_RRA3743-1.pdf">RAND</a>) — so you’re not even buying efficiency with that money. The one lever that’s actually a free lunch for a city, not a wash, is cutting the cost and time that the city itself controls: local impact fees (San Jose’s own fees run $10,000–$70,000 per unit, and that’s a city council decision, not a state mandate), and entitlement/permitting delay (every extra year in review is another year of financing carry cost baked into the project, which our own model showed matters). Shrink those enough and a market-rate project might pencil on its own — no exemption, no PILOT ban, full ongoing tax revenue forever. There’s also a real middle path worth knowing: the §214 exemption is calculated proportionally, so a mixed-income building with 20% deed-restricted units only loses tax value on that 20% slice — the other 80% stays fully on the rolls. That’s the version of “affordable housing” that doesn’t quietly bankrupt the city’s own budget while it’s trying to solve the housing crisis.</p><h3>Did the cost figures assume union/prevailing wage labor?</h3><p>Not as a separate line item — the hard cost figure came from the City of San Jose’s own Type V development-cost prototype study, a blended $/unit number reflecting real Bay Area contractor bids, not a legally-mandated wage schedule. That distinction actually matters here: under California Labor Code §1720(c)(1), a purely private, non-subsidized residential project on private property is exempt from prevailing wage requirements entirely — unless it’s built under an agreement with a public agency, or unless the developer opts into the SB 35 streamlined ministerial approval pathway, which does require prevailing wage on any project over 10 units (SCAG — SB 35 summary, San Jose — Affordable Housing Ministerial Approvals). At 32 units, this project would clear that threshold if it used SB 35’s fast-track approval — but nothing forces it down that path; it could go through conventional entitlement and legally use open-shop labor. Industry estimates put the prevailing-wage cost premium anywhere from $46–77/sq ft to 5–40% of total cost depending on region (BuilderOnline, CP&amp;DR) — so if this project skipped SB 35 and went fully open-shop, costs could come in somewhat below what’s modeled. It wouldn’t close a 56% value gap, but it’s a real, uncounted lever worth flagging.</p><h3>Does SJ really NOT have a unit density restriction?</h3><p><strong>NO CAP CURRENT SJ ZONING:</strong> The city’s R-M (Multiple Residence) District — the zoning type intended for exactly this kind of multifamily infill — has no numerical density cap at all. Height and floor-area ratio govern intensity, not a units-per-acre ceiling. That’s stated explicitly in the city’s own state-filed Housing Element:</p><p>“<strong>As of 2012, the City’s R-M Multi-Family Residential District has no density limit and provides for building height exceptions, and can thus accommodate development of higher density, lower income housing… without the need for a PD zoning/permit.</strong>”</p><p>The accompanying zoning table lists R-M’s net density simply as “No Limit”. <a href="https://www.hcd.ca.gov/housing-elements/docs/san_jose_5th_draft100314.pdf">hcd.ca</a></p><p>This is corroborated by two more sources:</p><ul><li>San Jose’s current Municipal Code Chapter 20.30 sets numeric per-acre caps for R-1 (1–8 du/ac) and R-2 (8–16 du/ac), but lists no density number at all for R-M — only setback and height standards. <a href="https://www.municode.com/library/ca/san_jose/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT20ZO_CH20.30REZODI_PT3DERE_20.30.230LOARXC">municode</a></li><li>A zoning-standards summary of the same code confirms R-M’s “Max FAR / du-ac” field as “N/A” — height (45 ft, or higher under Chapter 20.85 exceptions) is the only real ceiling. <a href="https://gocodebook.com/us/california/san-jose/development-standards">gocodebook</a></li></ul><p>Even setting R-M aside, San Jose is actively debating raising density further still: a 2026 proposal would lift the Mixed-Use Neighborhood designation from 30 up to 20–50 du/ac and the base Residential Neighborhood cap from 8 all the way to 32 du/ac (Mercury News, KQED) — and separately, California’s state Density Bonus Law already lets any project add bonus units above its base zoning cap in exchange for affordable set-asides, with no city veto. <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2026/08/15/san-jose-considers-quadrupling-housing-density-in-single-family-neighborhoods/">mercurynews</a></p><p>So the permission to build well beyond 32 units on a 1-acre lot already exists today in the zoning code itself — what’s missing isn’t a zoning entitlement, it’s an economic one: the numbers show the building would cost far more than it would be worth at any density, because land, fees, and financing don’t get cheaper per unit just because the code allows more units.</p><p><strong>RESOURCES</strong></p><p>1. 2570 Senter Rd, San Jose, CA — 1-acre listing, Homes.com, <a href="https://www.homes.com/san-jose-ca/land-for-sale/">https://www.homes.com/san-jose-ca/land-for-sale/</a></p><p>2. 995 E Santa Clara St, San Jose — LoopNet listing, <a href="https://www.loopnet.com/Listing/995-E-Santa-Clara-St-San-Jose-CA/35586790/">https://www.loopnet.com/Listing/995-E-Santa-Clara-St-San-Jose-CA/35586790/</a></p><p>3. 529 &amp; 541 Page St, San Jose — Compass listing, <a href="https://www.compass.com/listing/529-page-street-san-jose-ca-95126/1761941928430417169/">https://www.compass.com/listing/529-page-street-san-jose-ca-95126/1761941928430417169/</a></p><p>4. Zillow San Jose land/lot listings, <a href="https://www.zillow.com/san-jose-ca/land/">https://www.zillow.com/san-jose-ca/land/</a></p><p>5. City of San Jose — Legistar presentation 23–1470 (development cost prototypes), <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=12396982&amp;GUID=021ED09C-3683-471C-9DDE-9F205E72CE89">https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=12396982&amp;GUID=021ED09C-3683-471C-9DDE-9F205E72CE89</a></p><p>6. RLB Construction Cost Report, West Region, Q4 2025, <a href="https://www.rlb.com/americas/insight/rlb-construction-cost-report-west-q4-2025/">https://www.rlb.com/americas/insight/rlb-construction-cost-report-west-q4-2025/</a></p><p>7. Turner Building Cost Index, Q2 2026, <a href="https://www.constructionowners.com/news/turner-building-cost-index-climbs-in-second-quart">https://www.constructionowners.com/news/turner-building-cost-index-climbs-in-second-quart</a>er-as-high-demand-sectors-sustain-construction-activity</p><p>8. City of San José — Development &amp; Construction Taxes, <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/planning-">https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/planning-</a>building-code-enforcement/building-division/building-permit-fees/development-construction-taxes</p><p>9. City of San José — Inclusionary Housing Programs, <a href="https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/developers/inclusionary-housing-programs">https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/housing/developers/inclusionary-housing-programs</a></p><p>10. San Jose Legistar CC 18–442 — Park Impact In-Lieu Fee, <a href="https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=7043060&amp;GUID=B8B5E791-8C3F-419E-BA68-BC5661D56F48">https://sanjose.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&amp;ID=7043060&amp;GUID=B8B5E791-8C3F-419E-BA68-BC5661D56F48</a></p><p>11. RAND Corporation (2025) — Cost to Build Multifamily Housing in California, <a href="https://www.rand.org/news/press/2025/04/cost-to-build-multifamily-housing-in-california-more.html">https://www.rand.org/news/press/2025/04/cost-to-build-multifamily-housing-in-california-more.html</a></p><p>12. LA Multifamily Realtor — Construction loan interest rates 2026, <a href="https://losangelesmultifamilyrealtor.com/construction-loan-interest-rates-multifamily-los-angeles-2026/">https://losangelesmultifamilyrealtor.com/construction-loan-interest-rates-multifamily-los-angeles-2026/</a></p><p>13. Apartment Loan Store — San Jose cap &amp; loan rates, <a href="https://apartmentloanstore.com/san-jose/california/cap-loan-rates">https://apartmentloanstore.com/san-jose/california/cap-loan-rates</a></p><p>14. RentCafe — San Jose / Santa Clara County average rent trends, <a href="https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-market-trends/us/ca/santa-clara-county/san-jose/">https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-market-trends/us/ca/santa-clara-county/san-jose/</a></p><p>15. Zumper — San Jose rent research, <a href="https://www.zumper.com/rent-research/san-jose-ca">https://www.zumper.com/rent-research/san-jose-ca</a></p><p>16. Apartments.com — San Jose rent market trends, <a href="https://www.apartments.com/rent-market-trends/san-jose-ca/">https://www.apartments.com/rent-market-trends/san-jose-ca/</a></p><p>17. Apartment List — San Jose rent report, <a href="https://www.apartmentlist.com/rent-report/ca/san-jose">https://www.apartmentlist.com/rent-report/ca/san-jose</a></p><p>18. Zillow Rental Manager — San Jose market trends, <a href="https://www.zillow.com/rental-manager/market-trends/san-jose-ca/">https://www.zillow.com/rental-manager/market-trends/san-jose-ca/</a></p><p>19. CBRE data via Nick Delis — Santa Clara County multifamily trends, <a href="https://nickdelis.com/blog/rental-and-investment-trends-in-santa-clara-county">https://nickdelis.com/blog/rental-and-investment-trends-in-santa-clara-county</a></p><p>20. Marcus &amp; Millichap — San Jose Multifamily Market Report 2026, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/marcus-millichap-california_san-jo">https://www.linkedin.com/posts/marcus-millichap-california_san-jo</a>se-q2–2026-multifamily-market-reportpdf-activity-7481410322495578112-RtnV</p><p>21. Matthews — Top 10 Multifamily Markets in 2026, <a href="https://www.matthews.com/insights/top-10-multifamily-markets-in-2026">https://www.matthews.com/insights/top-10-multifamily-markets-in-2026</a></p><p>22. HCD Housing Element — San Jose R-M zoning density, <a href="https://www.hcd.ca.gov/housing-elements/docs/san_jose_5th_draft100314.pdf">https://www.hcd.ca.gov/housing-elements/docs/san_jose_5th_draft100314.pdf</a></p><p>23. San José Spotlight — San Jose eliminates parking minimums citywide, <a href="https://sanjosespotlight.com/following-san-jose-state-califor">https://sanjosespotlight.com/following-san-jose-state-califor</a>nia-tosses-parking-requirements-near-transit-public-transportation-development/</p><p>24. CalMatters (2025) — Why is it so expensive to build affordable homes in CA?, <a href="https://calmatters.org/commentary/2025/04/california-affordable-housing-costs-time/">https://calmatters.org/commentary/2025/04/california-affordable-housing-costs-time/</a></p><p>25. California Legislative Analyst’s Office — Helping Low-Income Californians Afford Housing, <a href="https://www.lao.ca.gov/Publications/report/3345">https://www.lao.ca.gov/Publications/report/3345</a></p><p>26. CA Senate Housing Committee — Affordable Housing Finance Overview, <a href="https://shou.senate.ca.gov/system/files/2024-11/housing-finance-oct-updated-2024.pdf">https://shou.senate.ca.gov/system/files/2024-11/housing-finance-oct-updated-2024.pdf</a></p><p>27. Matthews (2025) — Rising Multifamily Insurance Costs, <a href="https://www.matthews.com/insights/rising-multifamily-insurance-costs-in-2025">https://www.matthews.com/insights/rising-multifamily-insurance-costs-in-2025</a></p><p>28. LA Multifamily Realtor — Rising Insurance Costs 2026, <a href="https://losangelesmultifamilyrealtor.com/rising-la-multifamily-insurance-cost/">https://losangelesmultifamilyrealtor.com/rising-la-multifamily-insurance-cost/</a></p><p>29. California Public Advocates Office — Q4 2025 Electric Rates Report, <a href="https://www.publicadvocates.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cal-advocat">https://www.publicadvocates.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cal-advocat</a>eswebsite/files/press-room/reports-and-analyses/260210-public-advocates-office-q4–2025-rates-report.pdf</p><p>30. MyHomeSolution — California Utility Rates 2026, <a href="https://myhomesolution.org/2026-california-utility-bill-changes">https://myhomesolution.org/2026-california-utility-bill-changes</a></p><p>31. Snappt — The True Cost of an Eviction (2026), <a href="https://snappt.com/blog/eviction-cost/">https://snappt.com/blog/eviction-cost/</a></p><p>32. SmartScreen — Average Cost to Evict a Tenant, <a href="https://smartscreen.clearscreening.com/average-cost-to-evict-a-tenant/">https://smartscreen.clearscreening.com/average-cost-to-evict-a-tenant/</a></p><p>San Jose 32-Unit Development Feasibility Analysis Page 1133. Southern California Rental Housing Association — $3.8B in Unpaid Rent Since Pandemic, <a href="https://www.socalrha.org/news/southern-californiahousing-providers-lost-38billion-in-unpaid-rentsincethestart-of-pandemic">https://www.socalrha.org/news/southern-californiahousing-providers-lost-38billion-in-unpaid-rentsincethestart-of-pandemic</a></p><p>34. Mercury News (2022) — San Jose becomes largest US city to abolish parking minimums, <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2022/12/0">https://www.mercurynews.com/2022/12/0</a>7/bye-bye-parking-requirements-san-jose-becomes-largest-city-to-abolish-minimum-parking/</p><p>35. Local News Matters (2026) — Willow Glen lawsuit over sewer capacity, <a href="https://localnewsmatters.org/2026/05/06/willow-glen-lawsuit-stop-sewer-capacity-apartment-project/">https://localnewsmatters.org/2026/05/06/willow-glen-lawsuit-stop-sewer-capacity-apartment-project/</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LmPpxErS8wNisC74UY1nIA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jpvalery?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Jp Valery</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/burning-banknotes-hfrDZAXwb5c?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>RELATED STORIES</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/lose-one-affordable-gain-one-costly-6cfd31492ead">Lose One Affordable, Gain One Costly</a></li><li><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c">Hidden Costs of Housing</a></li><li><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/4-means-4-right-ab808ebbf540">4 means 4, right?</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f10dc36bd888" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[4 means 4, right?]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/4-means-4-right-ab808ebbf540?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab808ebbf540</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 17:51:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-19T17:51:10.978Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Maybe not when we compare SB9 to SJCC Zoning Proposal</h4><p>Last night at the SJCC meeting it was mentioned that SB9 four-plexes mandated from the State is the same or substantially similar to the new 32 units per acre. These are apples and oranges and they do not taste the same.</p><p>On an average 5,000-square-foot San José lot, they can both yield a similar headline number — about four homes — but they are not the same legal entitlement and can create very different developments.</p><p>Breaking the 32-units per acre down to units per 5,000 sqft for comparison, the SJ proposal can create approximately 4 units for that 5,000 sqft. SB 9 can also produce up to four homes, BUT <strong>only if the site qualifies and the owner can use the urban lot-split pathway to </strong>build up to two primary dwelling units on each. <strong>Otherwise it would only be 2 units. </strong>In the majority of cases comparing SB9 to the new SJ Zoning Proposal is comparing 2 units to 4 units; double the amount.</p><p>Now we start to get technical, but hang in there because SJCC depends on you getting lost in the muck.</p><h3>Why SB 9 is not identical</h3><p>SB 9: a conditional, parcel-specific state pathway</p><p>The 4-unit result is not for all parcels. It depends on statutory eligibility, including location and property-history restrictions, tenant-protection restrictions, objective development standards, and (for an urban lot split) an owner-occupancy affidavit subject to limited statutory exceptions.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Why “four units” does not make the programs the same:</em></strong><em><br>SB 9 can create up to four primary units from one former single-family parcel, but only through a qualifying two-lot urban split, with no more than two units per resulting lot. The applicant must attest to an intent to occupy one unit as a principal residence for three years. SB 9 also permits one on-site parking space per unit. In contrast, San Jose’s proposed 32–36 DU/acre framework is a broader local density framework; its final unit rounding, lot-size rules, parking, height, setbacks, and building forms will determine what can actually be built.</em></blockquote><h3>San Jose proposal: a broader local zoning framework, still unfinished</h3><p>SB 9 and San Jose’s proposed density are comparable only on the narrow arithmetic of a typical 5,000-square-foot lot: both may result in approximately four homes. They are not the same program. SB 9 is a conditional state-law lot-split program with a two-units-per-resulting-lot cap, an owner-occupancy attestation for splits, statutory exclusions, and limited parking authority. The San Jose proposal would be a broader local zoning regime, and its final dimensional and parking standards — not density alone — will determine its real neighborhood impact.</p><p>The City proposal would regulate many more lots than SB9.</p><p>Below see the list of all current CA housing regulations; when someone tells you there all the same — look it up here.</p><p><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/an-office-of-public-outreach-improving-citizen-input-city-outreach-and-trust-in-government-f8996e8c0241?sharedUserId=pathseldomtravelled">An Office of Public Outreach: Improving citizen input, City outreach, and trust in government</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/762/1*8L86IN4f2Y3DkrN0OsyP3g.png" /><figcaption>SJ Families &amp; Homes</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kn9v2jDi_EBC5aHTurl1Iw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yqRW2AUCqoCZ5GNsyZMhOA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D0HQdACTiz3vc7RHF_O-Lw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_knvycn_H-YeRIpAI76CTw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iYbZibCWZGocAtPnT2rv_w.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab808ebbf540" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Small Law — Large Costs]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/small-law-large-costs-a54649d45f2a?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a54649d45f2a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 01:46:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-19T03:52:21.669Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>First come, first served. Sounds fair enough. But in the real world of housing applications? For a small market provider with one empty unit and a mortgage due tomorrow, “fair” can mean weeks of lost rent and a screening rule that turns simple math into a legal gamble.</p><p>Under California’s amended Civil Code Section 1950.6 (via AB-2493), housing providers must now review applications strictly in the order received and offer the unit to the first applicant who meets their written screening criteria — no cherry-picking, no skipping the line. It’s a simplified selection process designed to eliminate bias, but for small market housing providers, this first-come, first-served mandate and managing the return of application fees collides head-on with the messy realities of vacancies, fees, and legal exposure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eLtrjeMoeuOxvDGuMm8bfQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>What this table shows</strong><br>The rule does not just affect who gets an apartment, returning the fees from those applicants not selected, and eating the costs of applicant investigation and credit checks. It can ripple outward into vacancies, delayed leasing, more admin work, greater legal exposure, and a bigger financial hit when the property only has a few units. For a small provider, a single empty month or a single hard-to-remove tenant can have a much larger effect than it would for a larger landlord.</p><p><strong>The core consequence</strong><br>The central problem is that the provider must balance two risks at once: renting too slowly and losing income, or renting too quickly and risking a difficult tenancy that may be costly to end later. That is why even a seemingly small regulations can have a much larger operational and financial effect for a small-market housing provider.</p><h4>Suggestions for future uses of first come, first serve</h4><p>Consider the impacts if all businesses were required to accept their first qualified applicant without considering all their employee options. Or apply it to auctions where the first bid must be accepted. Or apply it to venture capital where investors would have to invest in the first startup to clear the minimum diligence bar, and every unicorn discovered later goes unfunded.</p><p>Or our favorite — Government contracts. Most procurement laws already resist first come first serve. A first-qualified-bid rule, instead of best value, would let underqualified low-effort vendors lock out far better ones just by submitting first. At taxpayer expense.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-BXF1VrrtG7cLUc2VhArhw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@walls_io?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Walls.io</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-group-of-people-sitting-around-a-wooden-table-osBG9xNipQQ?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a54649d45f2a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dear Attorney General Bonta,]]></title>
            <link>https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/dear-attorney-general-bonta-9f3f1cde07a5?source=rss-ae24deecb075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9f3f1cde07a5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Irene Smith, JD, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 17:00:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-26T17:00:42.137Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Unexplained spikes in rent, housing, and household bills are no accident; they’re the predictable outcome of well-engineered policies. We urgently need formal investigations into the organizations hard‑wiring these cost increases. Thank you for creating an Affordability Response Team. (LAIST Article below)</p><blockquote>1. We ask that ART investigate the Bay Area Air Quality Management Team for unabashedly increasing the cost of housing and rents for decades to come.</blockquote><h4><strong><em>Gas conversion costs on housing and rents</em></strong></h4><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/pull-one-string-unravel-new-costs-5c5419c0562b">More housing expenses — gas conversion</a> 6/2026</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/got-gas-in-your-sfh-50c91321a5cf">Got Gas? (in your SFH)</a> 6/2026</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/san-jose-burn-out-ordinance-3c315f876b53">SJ Burn out ordinance to increase housing costs</a> 2/2023</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/electrical-mandates-short-circuit-common-sense-a67ca604e3d0">Electrical mandates short circuit common sense</a> 3/2023</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/moms-on-fire-f417d8006726">Moms on Fire — getting clean air for D3 children, leading Defenders of Clean Air eQuality</a> 3/2022</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/open-letter-to-the-board-of-directors-bay-area-air-quality-baaqmd-ae64e56427d5">Open Letter to the board of directors Bay Area Air Quality Management</a> 2/2023</blockquote><blockquote>2. We ask that ART investigate agencies whose policies increase rents.</blockquote><h4><strong><em>Rental Cost Increases</em></strong></h4><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/obscured-housing-costs-increase-322-a69317328987">Multifamily Insurance Cost Increases</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/excessive-regulation-punishing-for-sv-housing-providers-d76c311ee9fe">Increasing the Costs of Housing with Regulation</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/list-of-inspections-for-small-market-housing-providers-5b6b2687865b">List of Housing Inspections</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/hidden-costs-of-housing-de1cd89dfb8c">Hidden Costs of Housing</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/lose-one-affordable-gain-one-costly-6cfd31492ead?sharedUserId=pathseldomtravelled">Lose One Affordable, Gain One Costly</a></blockquote><blockquote>3. And we ask that ART investigate NPOs, NGOs, and agencies that have substantial funding for the unsheltered and have little results.</blockquote><h4>Homelessness funding accountability</h4><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@pathseldomtravelled/incremental-ladder-of-housing-success-5cebce8a88f7">Want to solve homelessness?</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/register-nonprofits-as-lobbyists-3c29ce09fd71">Register non-profits as lobbyists</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/nonprofit-accountability-registry-c41e648abd34">NonProfit Accountability Registry</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/lawsuit-to-end-homeless-crisis-b39833728786">Lawsuit to end homelessness</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/san-jose-lacks-guardrails-for-sanctioned-encampments-f32b4c98c5f1">SJ lacks guardrails for sanctioned encampment</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/nonprofit-affordable-housing-blunders-with-tenants-neighborhoods-64d69b4a28fd">Nonprofit affordable housing blunders with tenants &amp; neighborhoods</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/tenant-letter-lived-experience-in-donner-lofts-affordable-housing-9538aa79d393">Tenant Letter: Lived Experience in Donner Lofts Affordable Housing</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/santa-clara-county-investigates-south-second-street-studios-permanent-supportive-housing-5102349f09b9">Santa Clara County Investigates South Second Street Studios — Permanent Supportive Housing</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/11/us/trump-los-angeles-homeless.html">HUD suspends LA homeless funding — mismanagement</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article316091055.html#storylink=cpy">Audit — Use large scale housing</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://pathseldomtravelled.medium.com/looking-back-to-change-course-ae9fb4b155ea">Housing First failures</a></blockquote><p>________________________</p><h3>REFERENCES:</h3><blockquote>Affordability Response Team to target practices making life unaffordable</blockquote><p><a href="https://laist.com/brief/news/ca-department-of-justice-launches-task-force-to-target-affordability-crisis">California DOJ</a></p><ul><li>The California Department of Justice says it plans to go after people and businesses illegally making life more expensive for residents, launching an Affordability Response Team to investigate potential offenders.</li><li><strong>What did the Attorney General say?</strong> Bonta said this is an “all hands on deck” moment. <strong>“We’re thinking about your bills,”</strong> Bonta added.</li><li><strong>What will the team be focused on? </strong>The group is expected to target eight main focus areas, including household essentials, like groceries, gas and utilities, housing, healthcare, wages and scams. Another focus area includes the “high cost of enjoying life.” The team, for example, will go after hidden fees and business practices that hike up prices for entertainment and travel.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s7JKkRO29Em_fARtpyfLAg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@reganography?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Samuel Regan-Asante</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-red-and-white-sign-on-a-brick-wall-VDBBWi9UrXw?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplas</a>h</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9f3f1cde07a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>