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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Paul Hunt on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Paul Hunt on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Aliens in the Balcony!]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@paulhunt4929/aliens-in-the-balcony-5e1871fbd52d?source=rss-b370e06695af------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1226/1*9uA9su9aiGOfnY0O_d-bxg.png" width="1226"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Foolish Earthlings Go To the Movies</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@paulhunt4929/aliens-in-the-balcony-5e1871fbd52d?source=rss-b370e06695af------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 20:58:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-07T20:58:47.640Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Men in Black]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@paulhunt4929/men-in-black-7d93721115cb?source=rss-b370e06695af------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2600/0*QdtKkNY6aqwxXTUI" width="5760"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">The Thrills and Frustrations of Untethered Inquiry</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@paulhunt4929/men-in-black-7d93721115cb?source=rss-b370e06695af------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[rationalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moral-philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 04:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-13T04:11:00.610Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logic, Art, and Abduction]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@paulhunt4929/logic-art-and-abduction-cefbc5e0624e?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abduction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[charles-sanders-peirce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 22:18:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-05T22:18:52.084Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Triadic Reasoning and The Integration of Culture</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*4i9fGY7_o6-5FJteBuuzIg.png" /><figcaption>Charles Sanders Peirce | Wikimedia Commons | Public Domain</figcaption></figure><h3><strong><em>Introduction</em></strong></h3><p>Logic is a science, if by “science” we mean something like the German word “<em>Wissenschaft</em>,” which applies to the methodical study of <em>any</em> discipline. Logic is also an art, like the German word “<em>Kunst</em>,” which applies to the skill and craft of <em>any</em> creative endeavor.</p><p>Logic studies the <em>relations</em> among premises and conclusions. In other words, logic studies <em>argument</em>, and it seeks to understand the nature of the <em>inference</em>. What dispositions of the mind, regarding the transposition of premises to conclusions, render arguments <em>valid</em>? More generally, <em>how does human reason work</em>?</p><p>The pragmatic attitude described by the geodetic scientist, logician, and seminal figure in American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) embraces the <em>purpose</em> of valid inquiry, which is the settlement of belief. The logic of an argument <em>justifies</em> belief<em> </em>(our “conclusions”) by means of given premises and valid inferences. Peirce cautions that our power of drawing inferences is “a long and difficult <em>art</em>,” and that every significant <em>scientific</em> advance “has been a lesson in logic.” (Peirce, <em>The Fixation of Belief</em> (1877), pp. 5–6 [emphasis added].)</p><p>The validity of an inference is an appeal to our habits of thinking. We naturally and unconsciously imagine <em>diagrams</em> <em>of cases</em> in the mind’s eye, and the diagrams that serve to settle belief transpose readily into the habits that form the basis of conscious reasoning. A spontaneous, intuitive “<em>Gefühl</em>” <em>a priori</em> has nothing to do with the acquisition of mental habits. (Peirce, <em>The Criterion of Validity in Reasoning</em> (1902), pp. 123–125.)</p><p>If A=B and B=C, then my belief that A=C is absolutely justified, because no reasonable person would ever deny it; that is, nobody has <em>genuinely</em> acquired a contrary habit of mind, whether by evolution, enculturation, or learning. Without objection, A=C is an unquestionably <em>valid</em> inference.</p><p>And it is the business of the logician <em>qua</em> scientist to<em> </em>classify<em> </em>valid arguments. (Peirce, <em>Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis</em> (1878), p. 186.)</p><p>When we say that logic is an <em>art</em>, we mean the art of rhetoric. Formal logic is abstract rhetoric. They are equivalent in that logic and rhetoric share the identical pragmatic purpose of justifying our beliefs. The difference that “makes a difference” is that rhetoric <em>indulges</em> the myriad complexities of valid reasoning, whereas logic <em>classifies</em> valid arguments. They are both ancient <em>Künste</em> and ancient <em>Wissenschaften</em>. Logic and rhetoric enmesh within the fathomless gray area between art and science — the region of human experience that I’ve called, in my poetic moments, “the philosophic.”</p><p>In this article, we’ll seek to clarify Peirce’s fundamental notion that the classification of logic is <em>triadic</em>. That is, logic pertains to deductive, inductive, and <em>abductive</em> inferences. We’ll distinguish induction and abduction (which are often confounded), and we’ll look to <em>the</em> <em>primacy of the abductive </em>in matters of art and science.</p><h3>Truth and Classification</h3><p>I am setting aside, for the purposes of this article, the question of Truth. The usual comment is that <em>true</em> premises yield <em>true</em> conclusions, provided that the inference is logically valid. I don’t much care for truisms about truth, so I’ll leave it at that. Besides, a lot of people get antsy when pragmatists start talking about “the meaning of truth” (I’ve discussed this in other articles), and it would only distract from the present discussion.</p><p>It is also important that we stay focused upon <em>validity</em>, which is the essence of logic, rather than upon the neuroscience of the phenomenal or the psychology of judgment. Our study of logic must not trespass upon the purview of the natural sciences. (<em>The Criterion of Validity in Reasoning</em>, p. 120.) The <em>testing</em> of hypotheses is the business of experimental science, and not of logic. Otherwise, philosophy becomes a comedy. Any philosopher who would proceed by testing hypotheses about hypotheses is certainly no logician. Self-referential methods of logical truth-finding get us quickly mired into spiraling absurdities.</p><p>That said, the <em>impetus</em> for consciously applying logic to inquiry is the psychological state of doubt. My passage from a state of genuine doubt (“I don’t know”) to a state of true belief (“I do know”) is prescribed by <em>inferences</em>, although 99.99% of my inferences (perhaps more) are unconscious. But again, logicians do not study the unconscious, nor the physiological brain states of the psychologically confused. The art and science of logicians is to <em>classify</em> the inferences that justify belief.</p><h3>The Blue Triangle</h3><p>Returning to the previous example, let’s say that I truly don’t know whether or not A=C. But I <em>do</em> know, as a general <em>Rule</em>, that A=B. And in this instance, it also happens to be the <em>Case</em> that B=C. I therefore infer the <em>Result</em> that A=C. When you infer a Result by applying a Rule to a Case, we classify that as a <em>deductive</em> inference.</p><p>Here’s another example of a deductive inference, which is less schematic. Let’s say that at the town meeting, it is the Rule that only the person holding the staff may speak, and it is the Case that there is a woman at the meeting who is holding the staff.</p><blockquote><em>The Rule: The person at the meeting who is holding the staff may speak.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The Case: That woman is holding the staff.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Therefore, </em>the Result<em>: That woman may speak!</em></blockquote><p>But this is my first meeting, and I don’t know the Rule. So, I would need to make another sort of inference:</p><blockquote><em>The Case: That woman is holding the staff.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The Result: That woman is the only one speaking.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Therefore, </em>the Rule<em>: The person at the meeting who is holding the staff may speak!</em></blockquote><p>Actually, I didn’t infer this rule until two or three people had held the staff (multiple Cases), and they were the only ones speaking in each instance (multiple Results), at which point I inferred the Rule.</p><p>When you infer the Rule, following one or more Cases with similar Results, that is an <em>inductive</em> inference.</p><p>Induction typically applies to <em>probabilistic</em> Results. For example, during the town meeting, 1,000 marked ballots were drawn randomly from the ballot box. After 100 ballots had been counted (the Case), the yes votes numbered 75 and the no votes numbered 25 (the Result). At that point, the whole room had inferred inductively the general Rule that the votes were being drawn from a ballot box that contained about 75% yes votes.</p><p>Lastly, during the vote tally, the meeting grew tedious, and I closed my eyes, so I could no longer see who was holding the staff. But then I heard another woman speaking, and I made a third sort of inference:</p><blockquote><em>The Rule: The person at the meeting who is holding the staff may speak.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The Result: I hear a woman speaking.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Therefore, </em>the Case<em>: That woman is holding the staff!</em></blockquote><p>When you infer the Case, based on the Rule and the Result, that is an <em>abductive</em> inference. It is a hypothesis regarding a fact of the Case, which I might “test” by opening my eyes.</p><p>In summary, we deduce the Result, induce the Rule, and abduce the Case. (<em>Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis</em>, pp. 186–189.) The following diagram illustrates the<em> </em>basic classifications of <em>triadic logic</em>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/658/0*EDZCrp8jFiy23EQy.jpeg" /><figcaption>Original figure, by the author.</figcaption></figure><p>We see that a Deduction combines a Rule and a Case (the orange arrow) to produce a Result (the black arrow). An Induction combines a Case and a Result to produce a Rule. And an Abduction combines a Rule and a Result to produce a Case.</p><h3>Points of Purity</h3><p>The pragmatic attitude finds it more “agreeable to reason” to sit upon a three-legged stool, than to tiptoe across a bivalent balance beam. Triadic logic serves to subsume the traditional, rationalist dichotomies, such as appearance vs. reality, mind vs. matter, synthetic vs. analytic, etc.</p><p>This blue diagram (like all representations) is a <em>metaphor</em>. It is not to be regarded as “corresponding” to the “reality” of logic. A pragmatic thinker would find the diagram to be true (as it surely is) only to the extent that it is <em>useful</em> and <em>justified</em>.</p><p>A “pure deduction” (i.e., if A=B and B=C, then A=C) is illustrated by the top vertex of the triangle. However, even my pure deduction is interrelated within webs of inferences, for example, that “=” signifies an equivalence, that the terms of the schema are sequential, that some “I” is inferring something that is “not I,” etc. Actually, a pure deduction infinitesimally approximates the top vertex.</p><p>A “pure induction” would be something like a toddler sticking his finger into a flame, feeling acute pain, and immediately coming up with the hard and fast Rule that he would never do <em>that</em> again! But the toddler had <em>previously</em> inferred “my finger,” “attractive, yellow flickering thing,” undesirable sensation, consequence,<strong> </strong>etc.</p><p>And what is a “pure abduction?” According to Peirce, a pure abduction is the<em> </em>percept of a<em> fact</em>. “[The] abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them … our <em>first premises</em>, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of <em>abductive inferences</em> …” (Peirce, <em>Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction</em>, p. 227 [emphasis added].)</p><h3>The Admixture</h3><p>Nothing in the world is represented by the triangle’s three vertices, nor by any point along the three sides. Our precious reason — beginning with the inference of reality itself — rests upon a blue field of triadic, logical possibilities.</p><p>For example, as a rule, light stimulates receptors on my retina, and following several million cases of such stimuli, I have abduced a percept of “light” from which, following hundreds of billions of <em>similar</em> percepts, I have further induced my probabilistic concept of “redness.” And then, based upon my general (“universal”) concept of this <em>predicate</em> and the infinite other, discrete inductions that have been gathering in my mind over the years (like “table-ness,” “here,” “now,” etc.), I abduce the singular fact that there is a red table in the meeting room. And I further deduce that this object would provide a nice, flat surface upon which to place my cup of coffee.</p><p>Every conclusion is yet another possible premise. Thus, every argument that has ever been present to a mind is <em>pan-related</em> in every direction, like an enormous integrated circuit, where every inference is an interconnecting, microscopic transistor. For a “deductive” transistor, the <em>emitter</em> furnishes the “case,” the <em>base</em> is the “rule,” and the <em>collector</em> is the “conclusion.” (But let’s not torture these metaphors too far, or we may mislead ourselves! By definition, no <em>closed</em> <em>circuit</em> — nor for that matter, the gigantic LLMs of “artificial intelligence” — can<em> abduce</em>.)</p><p>A pleasant afternoon’s meditation might convince us that each and every inference, no matter how schematic or poetic, is an <em>admixture</em> of deductive, inductive, and abductive logic. Peirce gives the example of an astronomer who abduces the presence of titanium in the sun from a spectrograph resulting in characteristic striations, where such a result deductively “fortifies” the believability of the induction. (<em>Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis</em>, p. 192.) Peirce also points out that an induction based on <em>units</em> (such as the individual ballots at the town meeting) is more certain, whereas an induction based on <em>properties</em> (such as the speaker’s politics) requires that we weigh the significance of various predicates (how she dresses, where she sits, what she says, etc.), which is abductive “guesswork.” Peirce (a questionable poet) calls this an <em>abductory induction</em>. (Peirce, <em>Abduction and Induction</em> (1901), p. 152.)</p><p>A lot of abductive guesswork goes into a lover’s deductive analysis of a beloved’s behavior, which soon blends into his inductive certainty that he is loved in return.</p><p>Each admixed, triadic inference is represented by a point upon the blue field. It is a “real inference,” falling somewhere on the field, analogous to the “real numbers” that fall somewhere on a number line.</p><h3>Rationalism and Logic</h3><p>The positivist mindset of the philosophical realist tends to divide logical possibility between the <em>subjective</em> (language-wielding) and the <em>objective</em> (“real”) worlds. Meanwhile, neo-Kantians tend to classify inferences by distinguishing the <em>analytic</em> (intuition-based) from the <em>synthetic</em> (fact-based). They are both enamored with the pure bivalence of mathematics (thus, they are the heirs of Platonic rationalism), and they conceive of validity and Truth accordingly. For rationalists of all stripes, induction and abduction are conflated, because they are both <em>synthetic</em> judgments, which amplify the facts of the world (forming new rules and cases, respectively). Whereas in a deduction, the explanatory facts are already contained in the major and minor premises, and need only be analyzed to form a conclusion. For rationalist thinkers, an inference is either analytic (deductive) or synthetic (inductive).</p><p>A pragmatic philosopher wholeheartedly agrees that abduction and induction are both synthetic judgments. But the pragmatist insists that we also account for the fundamental “difference that makes a difference” between our experience of <em>objects</em>, which may be <em>counted</em> (like the votes at the meeting), thus forming <em>inductive</em> inferences, and our experience of <em>properties</em> (like the voice of the unseen woman at the meeting), which are <em>uncountable</em>, but which congeal into <em>abductive</em> inferences. (<em>Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis</em>, p. 192.)</p><p>What’s Next?</p><p>I wish I were ready to bump up my blue triangle into three dimensions, into a pyramidic <em>tetrahedron</em>, which I vaguely infer would go far to integrate the <em>logical</em> <em>tetralemma</em> of Eastern philosophy into the next epoch of rational, human thought. I’m not even close. But a tetrahedron would make a splendid metaphor.</p><p>And if I were a theoretical physicist, still struggling with the 10, 11, 26, uncountably infinite, or who-knows-how-many dimensions that are needed to formalize gravitational quantum mechanics, then I’d be wishing for metaphors that also reflected as many dimensions. (Peirce, <em>The Architecture of Theories</em> (1891), p. 288.)</p><p>Bivalent and triadic metaphors are all-too-inadequate. The needed, extra-dimensional metaphors will take the poetic genius of a Parmenides or a Plato to pull off, and then another two or three millennia for philosophers to figure it out. So let’s get going.</p><h3>The Relational Substance of the Quantum Universe</h3><p>I hope you will forgive my poet’s prerogative to bounce around and cut through many important, scholarly steps, especially when I discuss matters touching upon traditional metaphysics.</p><p>However, it comforts me that the pragmatic, pan-relational perspective of triadic logic is fully consonant with the observations of particle physics. The Aristotelian concept of “substance” has been utterly upended. The fundamental particles of the physical universe (electrons, photons, etc.) are<em> not </em>objects. Their objective realness manifests <em>only </em>in relation to other <em>quantum systems</em>, such as carbon atoms, electromagnetic fields, the experimental apparatus, the human experimenter, etc. Furthermore, in this unquestionably quantum universe, <em>non-causal</em> “spooky action at a distance” is also observable. Rationalism was already shaken by non-Euclidean geometry and general relativity. With quantum theory, however, rationalism has been utterly <em>aufgehoben</em>.</p><p>Once again, science takes the lead, and metaphysics must follow.</p><p>From the amazingly predictive, mathematical formalisms of quantum theory, we might deductively fortify the “abductory induction” that the entire universe, with its trillions of galaxies, is pan-relational. Triadic logic underpins a still very difficult, seemingly outlandish inference that reality is fundamentally <em>relational</em>, rather than merely <em>objective</em>. (Rorty, <em>Pan-Relationalism</em> (2021), pp. 84–103.)</p><p>The ancient roots of objective realism, as ingrained as it is, must be overcome by a new course of logic, if the theoretical physicists will ever come to a rational, formal, and settled interpretation of quantum reality.</p><h3>Art and abduction</h3><p>So what does any of this have to do with art? Why should a poet be interested in logic?</p><blockquote>“The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of <em>insight, </em>although of extremely fallible insight.” (Essential Pierce, 2.16, p. 227 [emphasis original]).</blockquote><p>When a four-month-old baby is indulging her primitive sense of awareness, and it suddenly dawns upon her that this feeling of “I” is distinguished from some “not-I,” and she begins to giggle from the excitement of such a monumental inference, now <em>that’s</em> an abduction!</p><p>Or when Niels Bohr hit upon the earthshattering idea that an electron apparently “jumping” from one atomic orbit to another was <em>absolutely</em> <em>incomprehensible</em> in terms of Newtonian mechanics, and then he calmly lit his pipe, now <em>that</em> was abduction!</p><p>Or when Michelangelo meditated for days upon a colossal, but damaged slab of marble, while deeply contemplating everything sacred and beautiful that had ever engaged his genius, and then, in an instant, a <em>complete</em> image of his David materialized magnificently before his eyes, seemingly from within the marble (Michelangelo cried for hours, and then he got to work), now <em>that</em> was an abduction!</p><p>Back in my L.A. days, I was scribbling away at two in the morning, when three words hit me like a ton of bricks: “Language perfects facts.” I knew immediately that these simple words had come from the very core of my philosophic experience, and I knew that they were saying something very real about language, perfection, <em>and</em> facts. It took me years of poetic experimentation to understand it. However, my moment of inspiration was truly heart-stopping. And to this day, the <em>validity</em> of that inspiration has been growing within me, ever more clear and distinct.</p><p>That’s abduction.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cefbc5e0624e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Quantum Poetry]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday/quantum-poetry-3e645910f6c8?source=rss-b370e06695af------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2166/1*CrTUk7VENb8LGuK86uAhrw.png" width="2166"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">The Unfinished &#x201C;Vocabulary&#x201D; of Modern Physics and Ancient Philosophy</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday/quantum-poetry-3e645910f6c8?source=rss-b370e06695af------2">Continue reading on Philosophy Today »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophytoday/quantum-poetry-3e645910f6c8?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[carlo-rovelli]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pragmatism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[panrelationalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[richard-rorty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-mechanics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 26 Oct 2025 00:18:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-26T00:18:52.186Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Existence, Reality, and Quantum Cats]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophytoday/existence-reality-and-quantum-cats-7871b1af5735?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[quantum-physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pan-relationalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paradox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 12:01:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-09T12:01:50.168Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>The Poetic Justification for Pan-Relationalism</strong></h4><figure><img alt="Photo of a sitting cat staring out at you." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AQYzvLRDKMZ7TA8g" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@________________1a?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Welcome</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>In my last article, I began describing pan-relationalism, which is Richard Rorty’s hypothesis that each <em>thing </em>in the universe (every electron, galaxy, neurosynapse, sentience, red chair, hallucination, etc.) exists as an endless web of infinitely related relations. Each and every thing comprises an infinite set of actual relations<em> </em>to other things, and each of those things comprises a further, infinite set of actual relations, <em>ad infinitum</em>. For Rorty, there is nothing to be known about existing things,</p><blockquote><em>“except as an infinitely large, and forever expansible, </em>web of relations<em> … [which goes] all the way down and all the way out in every direction; you never reach something which is not just one more nexus of relations” (Rorty, </em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism<em>, p. 88).</em></blockquote><p>Rorty espouses the worldview of <em>pan-relational existence</em>. It stands in stark contrast to metaphysical realism, which is the worldview of <em>objective reality</em>. For realists, reality simply “is,” it is “given,” and this belief is fully justified by common sense. The reality of any object is <em>independent </em>of whatever anyone might say or think about it. Humans are merely subjective observers, but real objects are predetermined, “out there,” and “cut at the joints.”</p><p>The insurmountable difficulty of using rational arguments to understand the truth of what Plato called “the really real” boils down to the logical need to “correspond” humankind’s error-prone minds and inadequate language to an objectively perfected reality. After 2,500 years of myriad metaphysical theories, realism has yet to close the “<em>ontological gap</em>” between human imperfection and the supposition of a fully independent, objective reality.</p><p>I’ve outlined several shortcomings of the metaphysical tradition (the<em> </em>hypothesis of objective reality) in prior articles, and I’ll continue to do so. Also, in this and in future articles, I’ll outline various justifications for pan-relationalism, which is the neo-pragmatic (anti-realist) hypothesis of actual existence.</p><blockquote>We experience pan-relational existence rather than metaphysical reality.</blockquote><p>Beginning in the 19th Century, science and mathematics have repeatedly undermined our traditional faith in metaphysical reality. From non-Euclidean geometry, to Einstein’s warping of spacetime, to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, the evidence in opposition to objective realism has been mounting relentlessly.</p><p>If I may say so (as a poet who reads philosophy), the most interesting and probative evidence against metaphysical realism is provided by quantum mechanics. As we follow the science, the <em>electron </em>has emerged as the seminal, shining metaphor by which we may approach a description and understanding of pan-relational existence. The salient properties of the electron are pan-relational.</p><p>The electron’s <em>superpositional </em>property (it exists in multiple “states” until it is “observed”), and the <em>waves </em>of interference patterns formed by the trajectories of electron <em>particles </em>(somehow affecting each other), and also the <em>entanglement </em>of electrons at a distance (such that a change in the properties of one electron manifests a change to other electrons in the same quantum system) all point to an intrinsically probabilistic and unfathomably complex “wave function,” which vibrates like “Fourier transformations” and with systematized “tendencies” into variously stable and highly massive, pan-relational things. At the cosmic level, we call this thoroughly entangled sum of quantum wave functions, “the universe.”</p><p>Because we’ll be talking about the commonsense paradox of superpositional, quantum mechanics, we’re implicitly beginning to discuss the <em>logic </em>of pan-relationalism. (From the poetic perspective, logic is the science of imaginative reason.) The strident, neo-pragmatic objections to metaphysical realism do <em>not </em>mold pan-relationalism into some anti-rational and non-philosophical doctrine. Quite the opposite. Unlike realism, pan-relationalism <em>follows the science</em>, come what may. So this article — a small segment of an outline about pan-relationalism — will finish up with logical topics: Russell’s Paradox and Schrödinger’s Cat.</p><h3>Numbers and Electrons</h3><figure><img alt="Graphic of an atom orbited by electrons." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*r4UkInvDlmey-QAb" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@dreamer_89?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Subramanian S</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Rorty used whole numbers to illustrate pan-relationalism. The number 17, for example, is related to 23 minus 6, the square root of 289, and infinite other formulations, and each of these other formulations is related to infinite other formulations, etc. This is an instructive and non-controversial, but unsatisfactory example, because formulations are not properties. In other words, 17 is not actual. A whole number is not an effect, nor does it affect. Of course, a <em>system </em>of whole numbers is an effective, arithmetic language, and real numbers <em>do </em>exist on a number line. But the whole number 17 is a defined term. It is merely a conventionally true idea, expressed in base 10, which is convenient for counting past 16. And it neatly describes seventeen ones in a single term. “Seventeen” per se is purely deductive. It infers nothing actual, it is inferred by nothing actual, and thus, like any other whole number, it does not <em>actually </em>exist (Rorty, <em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, pp. 84–103).</p><p>However, electrons <em>do </em>exist, they have mass, and their quantum mechanical properties are minutely observable. Electrons present a fabulously explicit and fundamental exemplar of pan-relationalism. In some experiments, electrons behave like particles, and in other experiments, they behave like spread-out waves. Common sense tells us that they can’t be both. However the form in which electrons appear and the behavior they display are dependent upon the experimental means of measurement.</p><p>And so “objective reality,” at this most basic level, is truly <em>observation-dependent</em>. The subject-object distinction, which lies at the heart of metaphysical realism, is contradicted by the observation of quantum mechanical behavior. The notion that an objective reality is out there, which is necessarily <em>independent </em>of what anyone might think or believe, is scientifically and mathematically untenable.</p><blockquote>If electrons are superpositional, then so is the universe.</blockquote><p>Beginning with the pre-logical hypothesis of pan-relationalism, as defined by Rorty, we may deduce two axioms: (1) Things exist “actually” (they relate as an effect); and (2) Things exist “continuously” (they interrelate systematically). It is axiomatic that pan-relational existence comprises actual and continuous things. A thing has the property of being <em>actual</em> when it functionally affects and is affected by other existing things, and it has the property of being <em>continuous</em> by exhibiting tendencies related directly or indirectly to the tendencies of all other existing things.</p><p>The actuality of existence implies some essential interaction: my hand presses against the door, my occipital lobe processes retinal data, a photon drives an electron into a conduction band, and a hundred billion stars spiral around a gigantic black hole. That is, each thing affects and is affected by other things. Electrons are quintessentially actual. All across the universe, electrons affect the bonding of each and every atom, and they are forever affected by photons and gravity.</p><p>Also, electrons are directly or indirectly continuous with each and every bit of the universe, from ganglions to galaxies — from raw sensations to the unforgettable phenomena of our soul-defining dreams. Since the Big Bang, each quantum particle in the universe has been “entangled” with every other particle. These wave-particles interfere probabilistically with each other, such that the sum of their tendencies manifests properties, as they mutually “collapse” and aggregate into stable, physical things. By extension, all that exists is continuous.</p><p>In the quantum world, actuality (“observation”) and continuousness (“predication”) perfect “thing-ness.” The thing being observed and the thing doing the observing (whether the experimenter, the apparatus, another electron, or anything else) are inextricably entangled. A thing’s infinite webs of relations manifest infinite properties, and thus the observed, pan-relational thing—from an electron to the universe — is <em>actual </em>and <em>continuously </em>related, rather than independently “real.”</p><p>My mind exists in an ether of electrons. My consciousness congeals out of a pan-relational ocean of electrified phenomena. In a pan-relational web spanning mind and matter, it becomes second-nature to understand that no “ontological gap” arises between some independent, pre-perfected reality of objects and the imperfections of mind and “representation.” The continuous webs of properties (from the atomic to the galactic) and the actualities of the universe (whether of things, thoughts, facts, or language) do not logically require the intervention of “epistemological meaning.” In the age of quantum theory, the scientific facts of actual and continuous existence displace the commonsense assumption of objective reality. And so metaphysical philosophy fades inexorably into history.</p><h3>Heisenberg and Schrödinger</h3><figure><img alt="Werner Heisenberg" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*UQglkF40oXAfcAPw9RekqA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Werner Heisenberg | <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild183-R57262,_Werner_Heisenberg_crop.jpg">Public Domain</a></figcaption></figure><p>The elegant and highly predictive mathematics of quantum theory shows that the primary properties of the infinitesimal electron are its frequency and amplitude (as demonstrated by Erwin Schrödinger’s quantum wave function), rather than its position and momentum (as assumed by Newton’s classical mechanics). In the quantum world, it is only possible to derive position and momentum as <em>secondary </em>properties, by means of an actual measurement. But Werner Heisenberg proved that the better you experimentally measure, for example, an electron’s position, the less you know about its momentum, and vice versa. A quantum system comprises “superpositional” probability functions of position and momentum, which “collapse” upon observation. For example, as the probability curve of an electron’s position collapses into a single point (because its exact position has been definitely observed) the probability curve of its momentum correlatively expands. We can precisely observe an electron’s position or momentum, but we can’t precisely observe both. This is the gist of Heisenberg’s truly earth-shattering Uncertainty Principle.</p><blockquote>The Uncertainty Principle is not a limitation of observation, it is a fundamental property of existence.</blockquote><p>Heisenberg’s interpretation of quantum mechanics provides that the superposition of an electron’s position and momentum is a definite, physical property of the electron’s kinetic, particle-like <em>actuality</em>. Further, the probabilistic, wave-like interference patterns shown by entangled, scattering electrons demonstrate the fundamental <em>continuity </em>of atomic particles (Heisenberg, <em>Physics and Philosophy</em>, pp. 18–32).</p><p>Schrödinger’s “wave equation” represents the probability that an electron may be observed at a particular place around the atomic nucleus. The wave equation is mathematically equivalent to Heisenberg’s “equation of motion,” and each equation can be easily transformed into the other. However, Schrödinger’s equation describes how the wave function of a quantum system changes over time, whereas Heisenberg’s equation describes how the operators (representing position, momentum, and energy) change over time. (<em>Physics and Philosophy</em>, pp. 18–32)</p><p>Heisenberg’s equation shows that quanta of any kind could be observed as particles, whereas Schrödinger’s equation shows that they could be observed as waves. Waves and particles are distinct types of entities. So how could these mathematically equivalent, distinct types simultaneously constitute the “objective reality” of quanta?</p><p>Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s equations of quantum mechanics fit the experimental observations like a glove, and they still do. However their equations are completely at odds with common sense. For example, an astrophysicist (or an outfielder) predicts the future location of an asteroid (or a fly ball) like Newton did, by first observing the object’s position and momentum. We all make constant, commonsense predictions about the position over time of the objects in our view. The objective, real world, which we all observe at every moment, is based upon the presumed, fundamental properties of position and momentum, rather than upon frequency and amplitude.</p><p>Quantum wave-particles have no <em>intrinsic </em>properties of position and momentum. These probabilistic values are derived, depending upon how the quantum system is experimentally observed. Heisenberg explained, in a well-known thought experiment, that an electron (observed as a “particle”) might be “seen” by a microscope using gamma rays, because the wavelengths of gamma rays are smaller than electrons. However we might say (borrowing the language of classical mechanics) that if the position of the electron were being observed, the energy of the gamma ray bouncing off the electron would change the electron’s momentum, and likewise, observing the electron’s momentum would change its position.</p><blockquote>“The quantum world is not a world of waves and particles, of positions and velocities. Only when we make measurements do those quantities take on their familiar meaning — a meaning, though, that is subject to the restrictions expressed in the Uncertainty Principle.” (<em>Physics and Philosophy</em>, p. xii [introduction by David Lindley].)</blockquote><p>In the quantum world, substantive things have <em>neither </em>intrinsic position nor momentum (and this ubiquitous, fundamental property is represented by the Uncertainty Principle). But in the classical, Newtonian world, they have <em>both </em>intrinsic position and momentum. This paradox may be understood, if at all, tetralemmically.</p><p>Quantum physics has inaugurated a paradigmatic shift in the description of existence. Quantum theory and pan-relational philosophy rhyme, making it easier to understand the neo-pragmatic argument that the traditional, metaphysical distinctions of subjective vs. objective, mind vs. matter, apparent vs. real, etc. are <em>not </em>actual and continuous, and therefore do not exist. It is becoming the new common sense to understand that the certainty of truth is nothing more (nor less) than the adaptive and exceedingly stable conventions of intelligent organisms. And it is becoming second nature to assume that no “real” object has been “given,” but that each humanly observed and unobserved thing is existing pan-relationally.</p><p>This is not a denial of reality, but a denial of metaphysics. It is also a healthy acknowledgement of scientific fallibilism. “We have to remember,” Heisenberg says, “that what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning.” (<em>Physics and Philosophy</em>, p. 32.)</p><p>From the metaphysical realist’s point of view, the superposition of “objective” electrons is an absurd paradox. From the pan-relationalist’s point of view, the ubiquitous existence of electrons is <em>quintessentially </em>probabilistic, actual, and thoroughly continuous. Logically speaking, the electron <em>is </em>“the case.” As such, the realist’s <em>paradox </em>becomes the pan-relationalist’s <em>possibility</em>.</p><h3>Russell’s Paradox</h3><figure><img alt="Photo of Bertrand Russell" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/721/1*FSRafPafll38ZCdIlM6ocg.png" /><figcaption>Bertrand Russell | <a href="https://picryl.com/media/bertrand-russell-cropped-5b05cb">Public Domain</a></figcaption></figure><p>Throughout pan-relational existence, each thing comprises a set of infinite relations, as it also relates as an element in the sets of infinite other things. But does a thing — a particular set of relations — relate to itself? For those who think there is no such thing as a “thing-in-itself,” especially a psychological nominalist like Wilfrid Sellars, the answer would probably be no. But for those who think that the area under a curve is adequately (if not perfectly) described by infinite integrals, the answer would probably be yes. And a lot of us believe both of those things.</p><p>Also, we may define “the universe” as the set of all things, from electrons to galaxies. The universe is “the set of all sets,” so to speak. But then we may ask whether the universe is a member of its own “set.” In other words, does the universe pan-relate to itself? Those who think that the universe will eventually collapse back into itself, in a reverse Big Bang, would probably say yes, that the universe is a member of itself. And those who think that the universe will keep expanding hyperbolically into complete entropy would probably say no, that the universe is not a member of itself. And a lot of us believe neither of those things.</p><p>If you’re familiar with Russell’s Paradox (introduced by the renowned mathematician and philosopher, Bertrand Russell), then you already know where I’m going with this. I have just posited four logical situations:</p><ol><li>The universe is the pan-relational “set of all sets” that is not a member of itself, and it comprises things (other pan-relational sets) that are also not members of themselves.</li><li>The universe is not a member of itself, but it comprises things that are members of themselves.</li><li>The universe is a member of itself, but it comprises things that are not members of themselves.</li><li>The universe is a member of itself, and it comprises things that are also members of themselves.</li></ol><p>Russell’s Paradox arises from the logical possibility that the universe is the set of all things that are not members of themselves, and that the universe is not a member of itself. Therefore, the universe <em>is </em>a member of itself. On the other hand, it is also logically possible that the universe is the set of all things that are not members of themselves, but that the universe is a member of itself. Therefore, the universe is <em>not </em>a member of itself.</p><p>Thus, it appears that the existence of a pan-relational thing may be logically true, false, or <em>neither </em>true nor false. (Priest, <em>Logic</em>, pp. 30–36).</p><p>But there are two more logical possibilities, and so the paradox continues: The universe is the set of all things that are members of themselves, and the universe is also a member of itself. Therefore, the universe <em>is </em>a member of itself. Concomitantly, it is logically possible that the universe is the set of all things that are not members of themselves, and the universe is not a member of itself. Therefore, the universe is <em>not </em>a member of itself.</p><p>And now it appears that the existence of a pan-relational thing may be logically true, false, or <em>both </em>true and false (<em>Logic</em>, pp. 30–36).</p><blockquote>If existence is pan-relational (rather than reality being objective), might Russell’s Paradox be better termed, “Russell’s Possibilities?”</blockquote><p>Russell’s paradox can be “plastered over” by introducing various, limiting axioms into set theory. But it follows from the language of Russell’s common-sensical (aka “naive”) logic that if pan-relational existence is truly actual and continuous (and the superpositional electron gives strong evidence that it is), then existence may be better understood in terms of the tetralemmic, logical possibilities of true, false, both true and false, and neither true nor false.</p><h3>Schrödinger’s Cat</h3><figure><img alt="Photo of Erwin Schrödinger." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/559/1*IbHsRy7_n4b4_L69iL3BdQ.png" /><figcaption>Erwin Schrödinger | <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger_(1933).jpg">Public Domain</a></figcaption></figure><p>During the past century, the quantum mechanics described by Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s equations have consistently proven to be highly predictive and exceedingly, technologically useful. Quantum theory is, without question, scientifically true. But theoretical physicists have, as yet, failed to reach a consensus regarding the proper <em>interpretation </em>of the strange “reality” presented by atomic “particles.” In my view, this is not a failure of science. It is rather a failure of philosophy to provide an appropriate ontological framework, and a failure of poetry to provide an appropriate, descriptive vocabulary for the quantum universe.</p><blockquote>Pan-relationalism is the attempt to remedy a persistent deficiency of interpretational tools.</blockquote><p>The fundamental incompatibility of quantum theory and metaphysical realism is brilliantly illustrated by Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment (“Schrödinger’s Cat”) in which he sealed his cat and a radioactive source in a box, which also contained a device (a geiger counter attached to a bottle of cyanide) that would kill the misfortunate cat, depending upon whether the probabilistic, radioactive decay of an electron happened to occur while the cat was in the box. Upon opening the box, the probability curve would “collapse” — that is, it would only then be “observed” whether Schrödinger’s cat were dead or alive, and thereby it would be observed whether radioactive decay had occurred. Schrödinger argued that, if quantum superposition were real, then his cat would have been neither dead nor alive, until the box was opened and the cat’s condition was observed. But prior to the observation, the condition of both cat-dead and cat-not-dead was an absurd contradiction. Therefore, the related hypothesis that the superpositional, radioactive decay, which might have triggered the cat’s death, had collapsed into either a definite position or momentum, but only upon observation, must be “not real.”</p><p>Schrödinger’s cat has been the touchstone for the various, scientific interpretations of quantum theory that have arisen since the 1920s. These interpretations include the Copenhagen interpretation, Objective Collapse theories, the Many Worlds interpretation, the Pilot Wave theory, Super-Determinism, Quantum Bayesianism, etc.</p><p>Generally, the interpretations of quantum theory have sought various means to accommodate or to obviate the 2,500-year-old conceptual inertia of metaphysical realism — that is, to solve the apparent paradox of the observed superposition of quantum particle-waves with the presumed <em>independence </em>of objective reality. A description of these various interpretations, and how they might be better understood (or not) in light of the neo-pragmatic philosophy of pan-relational existence, will be discussed in future articles.</p><p>A neo-pragmatist poet, struggling to stay rational in a quantum world, might suppose that sealing Schrödinger’s cat in a box was not the relevant experimental or logical situation. Kitty’s actuality was pan-related through segments of spacetime (not restricted to the box), and its existence was continuous with extra-experimental webs of substance. A more poetic cat owner might begin to believe that <em>throughout </em>the universal, pan-relational continuum of superpositional webs, the <em>logical possibilities </em>for the cat would be (1) dead, (2) not-dead, (3) neither dead nor not-dead, and most controversially, (4) both dead and not-dead. How do we understand this?</p><blockquote>Are electrons tetralemmic?</blockquote><p>We cannot overstate the revolutionary import of quantum theory. Since the beginning, humankind has assumed that earthly objects and human experience were identical. But hundreds of millennia later, following the advent of mathematics, we further adapted to the human experience that objective reality is clearly distinguishable from systematic, intellectual forms. However, reality and reason remained joined at the hip, and metaphysical philosophies continued to postulate that reality and reason were proximate representations of the other.</p><p>Now, with the advent of quantum theory, “objective reality” is no longer the logical case. The <em>true</em>, physical world — this superposition of observables, entanglement at a distance, and the transformation of continuous, energetic waves are absolutely alien to the very core of human understanding. And yet, these are scientific facts.</p><p>Such a “quantum paradox” cannot be plastered over with ever more refined, bilemmic presumptions and rationalistic distinctions. And besides, it is <em>not</em> necessary. Humankind’s experience of reality is not going away anytime soon, nor should it. Our <em>mathematically describable</em> common sense — our Newtonian perception of time and space — is literally the culmination of three billion years of natural adaptation and life on Earth. Life is sacred, our planet is precious, and we are newly exposed to the undeniable truth of quantum existence.</p><p>Neither is philosophy’s axiom that “rationality <em>is</em> understanding” going away anytime soon. (Human intelligence is <em>also</em> adaptive!) Philosophers must embrace the paradox of quantum existence, rather than force it into some microscopic or quasi-realist quarantine. Science has discovered a monumental paradox. And philosophers should <em>celebrate</em> that science has thus exposed a fundamental flaw in metaphysical logic — they should take stock, and forge ahead.</p><p>We will further consider the logico-poetic implications of pan-relationalism in future articles. We will also outline Charles Sanders Peirce’s theories of “synechism” (continuity), “tychism” (probabilism), and triadic inference in the context of quantum theory.</p><p>If literary philosophy appeals to you, then you would like my book, <em>Creative Obsession</em>. I hope you’ll take a look! (<a href="http://www.temescalpublishing.com/">www.TemescalPublishing.com</a>)</p><h3>Bibliography</h3><ul><li>Werner Heisenberg, <em>Physics and Philosophy </em>(HarperCollins 1962)</li><li>Graham Priest, <em>Logic </em>(2d ed.), (Oxford Univ. Press, 2017)</li><li>Richard Rorty, <em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism </em>(Harvard Univ. Press, 2021)</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7871b1af5735" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday/existence-reality-and-quantum-cats-7871b1af5735">Existence, Reality, and Quantum Cats</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday">Philosophy Today</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The End of the Ancient Quarell]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophytoday/the-end-of-the-ancient-quarell-04c8672d735e?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/04c8672d735e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pan-relationism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rorty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pragmatism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sellars]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2025 08:22:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-11T22:45:09.736Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The End of the Ancient Quarrel</h3><h4><strong>Mind and Language Dissolved Into Pan-Relational Existence</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vhCFaXOUleGD3bvb" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@themysterycat?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Mystery Cat</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>When I write a poem, I describe my world. It is language at the boundaries of life on Earth–<em>linguistic behavior </em>on the edge of understanding, pure and simple.</p><p>Each poem engenders a continuum of behavior, perhaps continuing for days and months before I commit my poem to the page. Thousands of utterly vague, interrelated images beat about my brain in half-conscious cacophonies, in a spiraling ideation comprising unbounded bits of memory and perception — <em>infinitesimal </em>apparitions casting waves of inferences, from the back of my mind to the tip of my tongue — rhythms, whims, rhymes, and sequences juxtaposing and bouncing throughout my imagination.</p><blockquote>And then, perhaps, the cogitations congregate into tempestuous pictures. Inscrutable ideas congeal seamlessly into words, and I begin to write.</blockquote><p>It is continuous, linguistic behavior also when I read my emerging poem silently to myself, or I conjure it out of memory, word for word, over and over, re-thinking and re-writing compulsively throughout the twisting threads of successive approximation (into the labyrinthian, descriptive reductions of an unfinishable integration).</p><p>And at last, if I should read my poem aloud to you, that is yet another practice of language along the ever-morphing paths of our shared, linguistic behavior.</p><p>Years later, if you should read my poem aloud to another or silently to yourself, or if you recite it from memory or keep thinking about it (or something like it), again and again, it is all still more linguistic behavior, and related inexorably to my first, vague imaginings.</p><blockquote>A poet sees no difference in practice that follows a metaphysician’s distinction of mind and language.</blockquote><h3><strong>Existence and the determinant</strong></h3><p>An assiduously creative person of our time, whether a poet, scientist, jurist, or educator, would chafe at a metaphysician’s insistence that “the mind” is one thing, and that “language” is another.</p><p>From amoebas to humans, from archaea to humpback whales, the intellect of living things congeals out of naturally induced continua of descriptive behavior. Organic understandings of every description, the substance of memory, comprise the adaptive uses of a pan-relational existence.</p><p>The intellect, in turn, is the determinant of living activity. It contours the earthly environment, and it manifests the meaning of all worlds.</p><h3><strong>Rationalism and pan-relationalism</strong></h3><p>In my recent articles, I contrasted the rationalist notion that truth is whatever corresponds to reality with the pragmatist notion that a true statement is a justified affirmation of belief. Pragmatism seeks to fashion a more trenchant “vocabulary” that might usefully serve the aspirations and needs of human self-realization and enculturation.</p><p>In this article, I contrast the rationalist notion of an objective reality with the “neopragmatist” notion of a <em>pan-relational </em>existence. The contrast underscores a continuing paradigm shift in philosophy. Pan-relationalism dissolves the metaphysical distinction between “the really real” and mere appearance. The strictures of “dualism” and the primacy of the “necessary” simply wither into dust.</p><blockquote>In a pan-relational world, the traditional metaphysical distinctions will be regarded as so many ancient gods.</blockquote><h3><strong>An impediment to logic</strong></h3><p>The dissolution of modern metaphysics has been brewing for more than two centuries. Also in this article, I claim that the continuing separation of the intellect into intrapersonal <em>thinking </em>and interpersonal <em>language </em>is a vestige of the bilemmic, rationalist era and the last of the metaphysical distinctions.</p><p>As we move further into a post-metaphysical, pan-relational world, the mind-language distinction will be exposed as an impediment to logic and irrelevant to the needs of the Third Millennium.</p><p>And finally, pan-relationalism is itself the basis of an implicit paradox, which will require more encompassing, fully integrative modes of logical description and valid understanding.</p><h3><strong>Metaphysical distinctions</strong></h3><p>The neo-Kantian and positivist philosophers of metaphysics (the “rationalists”) believe that the <em>true </em>world is already out there, “fully baked and cut at the joints,” and waiting to be discovered by means of stable, rational <em>foundations</em>, such as the eternal revelations of “reason,” the indubitable “intuitions” of the mind, or by an unfiltered, non-linguistic “experience” of the world.</p><p>However, faced with the inevitable imperfections of perception and the vagaries of language, yet in order to isolate the foundations of truth, rationalists have posited <em>hierarchical</em>, ontological distinctions within the fabric of existence. For example, in various permutations, rationalists have distinguished the really real from mere appearance, the indubitable mind from the dubious body, hard objectivity from squishy subjectivity, and the essential (the necessary) from the accidental (the contingent).</p><h3><strong>Endless disputations</strong></h3><p>But rationalists have never been able to agree among themselves, as to which distinction truly underpins the metaphysical truth. Rationalist theorizing is inherently unstable because it tends toward the circular. The hierarchical stratification of existence generally insinuates “rationalities regarding the rational.”</p><p>For example, <em>realism </em>gravitates around the claim that anything that exists independently of mind and language is thereby elevated to the status of “real,” and therefore, reality exists independently of mind and language.</p><blockquote>Over the centuries, rationalism has led to various, self-referential dead ends.</blockquote><p>It is akin to the Kantian regret that the “thing-in-itself” is <em>necessarily </em>unknowable because, by definition, it is unknowable. (Rorty, <em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, p. 93.)</p><p>Pragmatists believe that anything posited to be absolutely and necessarily <em>unknowable</em> is, at best, a theoretical gap-filler. No non-theoretical <em>difference in practice </em>could possibly result from an unknowable thing-in-itself (or similar fiction), and so for pragmatists, it holds no philosophical interest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SL3pF5zS8_cb5gZj" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jdbanks?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">John Banks</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Intellectual “epicycles”</strong></h3><p>In light of the theoretical instability, and especially since the days of Kant, rationalists have compounded ever more refined ontological distinctions. Previous permutations have been displaced by increasingly incisive “intensions” of the mind that nevertheless have consistently failed to penetrate the “veils” of an increasingly analyzed language.</p><p>Like the old astronomers who kept layering tighter, ever more complex epicycles upon the cosmos, rationalism has devolved into a morass of ever more esoteric, impractical distinctions.</p><blockquote>Pan-relationalism is to philosophy what heliocentrism was to astronomy.</blockquote><h3><strong>What is Pan-Relationalism?</strong></h3><p>Pan-relationalism is the doctrine that each and every knowable thing in the universe (every table, atom, galaxy, neurosynapse, sentience, etc.) is “predicated” (structured descriptively) as a fluxing set of infinite relations, while each and every such relation is <em>also </em>a predication of infinite <em>other </em>relations, <em>ad infinitum</em>.</p><blockquote>For example, orangutans are related to largeness, orangeness, hairiness, long arms, etc.</blockquote><p>The infinite relations, predicates, and properties of orangutans and of infinite other things fan out infinitely in infinite directions. For another example, a basketball is round, etc. And roundness relates to <em>pi</em>, <em>pi</em> is mathematical, so is poker, Fred plays poker, Fred is large and hairy, etc.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/393/1*lsDYTVHj0Bo8EYsnbMlZCw.png" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@augie_ph?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">August Phlieger</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a> | Modified by author</figcaption></figure><p>Pan-relationalism holds that nothing is knowable about an existing thing, “except as an infinitely large and forever expansible, <em>web of relations</em>… [which goes] all the way down and all the way out in every direction; you never reach something which is not just one more nexus of relations” (<em>Pragmatism As Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, pp. 88 [emphasis original]).</p><h3><strong>Hubs and spokes</strong></h3><p>A knowable thing is a set of predicating and predicated, pan-relational points. Each point is an infinitely connected hub, and each point is an infinitely connecting spoke. Every thing in the universe is a universe of things. Like the calculus of integration, every infinite set of definite (useful) interrelating relations <em>approximates </em>a specific thing.</p><blockquote>All the things of our world comprise the enmeshed, approximating, and probabilistic continua of infinite predication.</blockquote><p>For a pan-relationalist, no bit of the universe is any more “essential” or “necessary” to existence than any other bit.</p><p>Pan-relationalists do not believe that common sense reality has been pre-formed by some external force, nor that it arrived with a convenient, rational basis for itself. They do not believe in the truth of a monolithic, objective universe, but rather they recognize infinite webs of relations, forming and dissolving as infinitudes of things that infinitely approximate a <em>dimensionless </em>(we may plausibly suppose) cosmos.</p><h3><strong>Pan-rationalism and pragmatism are joined at the hip</strong></h3><p>Pan-relationalist philosophers are anti-rationalist, anti-foundationalist, and anti-essentialist. That is, they are <em>pragmatists</em>. They see no point in positing a knowledge of something real, except to assuage an immediate need for specific, useful action.</p><p>In a pan-relational world, the truth is whatever webs of relations are <em>useful </em>to our understanding of existence and <em>justifiable </em>with reference to cohesive, other webs of relations.</p><blockquote>For pragmatists, it makes no difference to the <em>practice</em> of science, art, or life, whether or not our true beliefs are based upon timeless, indubitable foundations and irreducible essences.</blockquote><p>Pragmatists do not find the traditional distinctions of metaphysics to be false, but they do regard them as very questionable <em>premises</em>, if not useless in practice, and therefore thoroughly, philosophically uninteresting.</p><h3><strong>Examples of pan-relational objects</strong></h3><p>Richard Rorty (1931–2007) is the evangelist of pan-relationalism. He uses whole numbers as an uncontroversial example of pan-relational existence. The number 17 clearly has infinite properties: it is the square root of 289, the difference between 1,021 and 1,004, less than 23, etc.</p><p>Of course, some of the infinite relations of 17 may be more <em>familiar </em>than others: By definition, the whole number that is “17” may be expressed as a single term. 17 is also the whole number between 16 and 18, and it is the sum of seventeen 1s. But there is no intrinsically “seventeenish” thing out there, that is, no <em>essential </em>seventeen-ness behind the infinite mathematical expressions of 17.</p><p>As another example, my table is small, brown, ugly, made of wood, it has a flat top, etc. These relations exist. But for a pan-relationalist, an intrinsic, essential “tableness” does <em>not </em>exist. There is no nonlinguistic “thing-in-itself” out there that allows me to know non-descriptively that I’m sitting at a table, and that in this instance, the table comes with a lot of extra “accidents,” i.e. it is brown, ugly, hard on top, made from atoms…</p><blockquote>The struggles of a “strong poet,” described at the beginning of this article, is a study of the pan-relational attitude.</blockquote><p>Pan-relationalists “brush aside” the useless, metaphysical questions of whether the hardness of a table top is more intrinsic to its tableness than its molecular structure, or where the <em>necessary </em>nature of its tableness stops and its merely <em>accidental </em>properties (especially its ugliness) start. (<em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, pp. 84–103.)</p><h3><strong>How pan-relational webs “hang together”</strong></h3><p>Pan-relationalism is Rorty’s continuation of the “psychological nominalism” of Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989). Psychological nominalism is the doctrine that there is nothing to be <em>known </em>about any <em>thing</em>, except for what may be stated in <em>sentences </em>(subjects and predicates) describing it.</p><figure><img alt="Photo of Wilfred Sellers in 1936, wearing academic robes." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/1*knK4Drgx4Sziro4dALgGTw.png" /><figcaption>Wilfrid Sellars in 1936, Wilfrid S. Sellars Papers, ASP.1991.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives &amp; Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System, SELLARS S03 | Used with permission</figcaption></figure><p>The thing might be a hard table top or a hopeless hallucination, but in all cases, the thing consists of infinite sets<em> </em>of infinitely relating and relatable, linguistic <em>predicates</em>, which get <em>hypostatized</em> (get “realized”) into various relating and relatable <em>properties</em>.</p><p><em>Predication </em>is the intelligible means by which each knowable thing is related within and throughout infinite webs of pan-relational things. The webs of predication hypostatize into the infinitely integrating properties of each approximately existing thing, and each thing concomitantly provides an infinitude of predicates comprised of and comprising existing (knowable) things.</p><blockquote>Each thing is a set of things, and so each thing is a set of sets. Is the universe <em>also </em>a thing? The set of all sets?</blockquote><p>In a pan-relational universe, is each thing a member of its own set of relations, or is it not? Is it neither, or both? (In light of Russell’s Paradox, the logical implications of pan-relationalism will be discussed briefly below.)</p><blockquote>“Whether you think of those relationships realistically, as somehow there before the inventions of the predicates, or whether you think of them anti-realistically, as coming into existence along with such inventions, is a matter of complete indifference” (<em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, p. 86).</blockquote><h3><strong>Objections to pan-relationalism</strong></h3><p>Like any other earth-shattering idea, from the beatitudes to heliocentrism, pan-relationalism flies in the face of common sense realism. The realist objects, first and foremost, that you cannot have <em>any </em>relations at all, without there first being something hard and substantial out there that is being related.</p><p>A pragmatist would not question the logical structure of this argument, but he or she would find very dubious the proposition, inherent in the premise, that there <em>must </em>be a distinction made between hard objects and descriptive existence, or between reality and mere appearance. For a pragmatist, all that is <em>knowable </em>about the existence of a hard table top is that infinitely integrating properties (<em>qua </em>hypostatized predicates) are true about it. Whether or not there is a further reality behind this “mere description” <em>makes no difference in practice</em>.<em> </em>(I’m still going to put my coffee mug on top of this flat, ugly thing.) For a pragmatist, a distinction without a difference is like an unknowable concept–it is devoid of philosophical interest. (<em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, pp. 85–86, 89–91.)</p><blockquote>The realist distinction between the thing being related and its relations is merely another way of distinguishing what we are talking about from what we say about it.</blockquote><h3><strong>The hand slaps the table</strong></h3><p>A realist calls this “linguisticism” and “subjectivism,” and insists upon the primacy of objective reality over the fuzziness of a “linguistic construct.” So, in order to prove the existence of <em>non-linguistic </em>knowledge, the realist John Searle (1932– ) famously slaps his hand on the table, experiences the “raw feel,” and claims that he has thereby become better acquainted with reality itself, with the very “essence of table-ness,” with its “thereness,” and <em>without </em>the mediation of mere language.</p><p>The pan-relationalist, anti-essentialist reply is that if you want to know what a table intrinsically “<em>is</em>,” then the most efficient answer you’ll ever get are the infinite, hypostatizing, and integrating relations that are true about it. It’s brown and ugly, it has a hard top, it’s made of atoms, it belongs to nobody, it was here an hour ago, it’s still here now, etc. <em>And </em>it’s painful to slap your hand on it.</p><h3><strong>Pain, representation, and the causal power</strong></h3><p>For Rorty, the realist’s pain “is on all fours” with the table’s brownness, ugliness, etc.</p><blockquote>“Just as you do not get on more intimate terms with the number 17 by discovering its square root, you do not get on more intimate terms with the table, closer to its intrinsic nature, by hitting it than by looking at it or talking about it. All that hitting it (…) does is to enable you to relate it to a few more things. It does not take you out of language into fact, or out of appearance into reality (…).” (<em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, p. 91).</blockquote><p>Realists often charge pan-relationalists with “idealism” and “losing touch with the world.” But any poet or philosopher worth his or her salt will surely know what a hard rock feels like, and how an absolutely stunning view can permanently bend the soul.</p><p>True reality is not a matter of <em>representing </em>nature, but the knowledge of existence is a matter that is <em>caused </em>by nature. And the inference of causation is the engine of understanding:</p><blockquote>“(…) once we cease to describe knowing about something as representing its intrinsic nature accurately, and thereby break representational links to the world, we still have causal links. Anybody who grants that <em>the world has causal power to change our descriptions of it (…) </em>should be immune from accusations of subjectivism and relativism.” (<em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, p. 86 [emphasis added]).</blockquote><blockquote>The natural environment causes our hypostatizing, pan-relational predication that congeals into descriptions of a knowable existence.</blockquote><p>A pan-relationalist is not “anti-reality.” He or she is simply a pragmatist who has stopped taking the realist vs. anti-realist debate seriously.</p><h3><strong>Pan-relationalism obviates metaphysical distinctions</strong></h3><p>I have touched upon the dissolution of metaphysical distinctions throughout this article. A panoply of “modal distinctions” becomes fully immaterial in a pan-relational world. Pan-relationalists work to replace a world-picture made from various metaphysical distinctions, dualisms, and hierarchies of reality, with an alternative world-picture of the continually changing flux of a pan-relational existence.</p><p>In particular, pan-relationalism denies any privileged, ontological status for “the real.” Pan-relationalism “shakes off” the persistent inertia of Plato’s appearance-reality distinction. When the knowledge of a thing’s <em>existence </em>(its “thereness”) comprises a pan-relational web of descriptions, no description of it embraces a “real thing” as opposed to an “apparent thing.”</p><p><em>Everything </em>is pan-relational, and so pan-relationalism obviates the need to distinguish between <em>non-relational </em>properties (deemed intrinsic, necessary, essential, etc.) from <em>relational </em>properties (deemed extrinsic, conditional, accidental, etc.). Accordingly, there is no longer any point in drawing a line between the “conditions of possibility” and the “conditions of actuality” (<em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, p. 85).</p><p>When knowledge merely utilizes a seamless web of relations, there is no theoretical distinction to be made between the elements of knowledge contributed by a person and the elements contributed by the world. The distinction between subject and object (in particular, the elevated status of “the objective”) is dissolved by pan-relationalism.</p><p>And finally, there is nothing metaphysically privileged about either the interpersonal relations of language nor the intrapersonal relations of the mind. Anti-representationalism, taken at face value, is the end of the mind-language distinction. Life on Earth is a <em>continuum of intellect</em> (rather than a dualism of representation), which <em>adapts </em>to the webs of pan-relational effects in an infinitude of worlds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*RjD4qwyHvWYMEQIg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@dimitry_b?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Dimitry B</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><blockquote>It’s a story 3 billion years in the making–of a thoroughly <em>linguistified</em>, pan-relational<em> </em>existence–that surely does not start nor stop with us.</blockquote><p>And if there is no mind-language distinction, then no knowledge-existence distinction of any sort may be entertained. In other words, without some “representation” of “reality,” the epistemological-ontological mode of inquiry (the structure of metaphysics) can only dry up and blow away.</p><h3><strong>Pan-Relational Logic</strong></h3><p>Metaphysics is dissolving. Plato and Aristotle are fading. The Gordian Knot of philosophy is unraveling. But another epic knot may be cinching up to take its place.</p><p>How do we understand pan-relational existence cosmically? Does it make sense anymore to speak of a “universe?” Every approximating, pan-relational thing is as non-singular as any other, forever expansible and forever reducible. Perhaps, in a pan-relational existence, there is no “set of all sets,” the universe is not “One,” <em>and nothing is</em>.</p><blockquote>Maybe Parmenides should get kicked out of the Pantheon, also.</blockquote><p>And the soup just keeps getting thicker…</p><p>For an anti-essentialist psychological nominalist like Sellars, nothing can be a set of descriptions that is also describing itself–that is, there can be no description that attains its own essence. <em>Nothing is a member of its own set</em>.</p><p>But for mathematicians, 17 is the set of all of the formulations of 17. (Every point on a number line is another “line,” another set in another dimension.) And so, each pan-relational, mathematical formulation, including 17 (and by implication, everything that is numerated) <em>is a member of its own set</em>.</p><p>Or perhaps not. And what of the “universe?” Is this putative “set of all sets” a pan-relational member of itself, or is it not? Is it both, is it neither? Pan-Relationalism implies a jarring instantiation of Russell’s Paradox. It implies a logical <em>tetralemma </em>of far-reaching consequence, which I will explore in future articles.</p><p>Russell’s Paradox may have been the pivot, all along, to the new Gordian Knot of pan-relationalism. Perhaps Rorty’s turn to a pan-relational existence may be better understood by means of a <em>non-bilemmic </em>theory of causation and <em>tetralemmic logic</em>. Perhaps the knowable, pan-relational “universe” is merely a <em>dimensional </em>manifestation–an infinite approximation–suspended in a <em>dimensionless</em>, unknowable, and philosophically irrelevant cosmos. (Priest, <em>Logic </em>(2d ed.) pp. 30–36.)</p><p>I’m a poet who reads philosophy. If you’re reading this, you might really like my recently published literary philosophy (an “apomary”), <em>Creative Obsession</em>. (It’s highly accessible and unapologetically entertaining.)</p><p>More is coming.</p><h3><strong>Bibliography</strong></h3><ul><li>Graham Priest, <em>Logic </em>(2d ed.), (Oxford Univ. Press, 2017)</li><li>Richard Rorty, <em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em> (Harvard Univ. Press, 2021)</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=04c8672d735e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday/the-end-of-the-ancient-quarell-04c8672d735e">The End of the Ancient Quarell</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday">Philosophy Today</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Truth, Reality, and Richard Rorty]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophytoday/truth-reality-and-richard-rorty-3eae537f6f0a?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3eae537f6f0a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[reality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[richard-rorty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pragmatism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[truth]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Apr 2025 00:01:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-09T00:01:43.060Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The Metaphysical Tradition In a World of Poets and Scientists</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-fxj3pHyDyE21GZ8" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@dr1n1?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Drini Teta</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>For 2,500 years, Western philosophy has been, above all, the search for truth. It began with the magnificent inspiration of Parmenides, the presocratic philosopher, whose poetry spoke of “being,” and who saw all things as “one.” His unbridled creativity embraced a world-shattering wisdom beyond the gods, where a disciplined and enlightened thinker might attain knowledge of the unchanging, universal Nature — the <em>true </em>reality.</p><p>Parmenides greatly influenced Plato, who decried the inferior belief in ordinary things as “<em>doxa</em>,”<em> </em>as mere appearance, like the illusory shadows of objects projected on a cave wall. But Plato extolled “<em>episteme</em>,” the higher knowledge of “the really real” — it is a knowledge of the perfect existence, the privileged realm of “forms” (Plato’s ideal archetypes for imperfectly perceived, material things). This higher knowledge of reality<em> </em>is revealed only to those who escape the cave and bask in the sunlight of pure reason. For Plato, the rational apprehension of the eternal forms is knowledge of the truth (Rorty, <em>Philosophy as Poetry</em>, pp. 1–4).</p><p>The ancient and venerable idea that reality is the object of truth — the tradition of <em>metaphysics </em>— has been exemplified over the millennia by the towering figures of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant. However, by the 19th Century, a gnawing frustration with the tradition was seeping into Western culture. Growing doubts regarding the continued usefulness of the “<em>appearance-reality distinction</em>”<em> </em>had become palpable.</p><blockquote>In the 19th Century, an imaginative, new respect for humankind and a non-reductive understanding of the natural world were transforming art and science.</blockquote><p>The Romantic movement signaled that the whole of metaphysics was questionable, and that something truly revolutionary was afoot in philosophy. A few decades later, existentialists such as Friedrich Nietzsche, and pragmatists such as William James, had become openly critical of the notion that the essence of philosophy is the discovery of reality and the unveiling of truth itself.</p><p>By the end of the 20th, and into the 21st Century, a remarkably radical critique of Platonism and its progeny had become explicit in the vigorously “neopragmatic” philosophy of Richard Rorty (1931–2007).</p><p>This article summarizes Rorty’s notion of truth, which stems from his criticism of the <em>epistemological </em>Truth (which he spells with a capital “T”) and the <em>ontologically privileged </em>Reality (spelled with a capital “R”). Rorty’s aim was to liberate philosophy from the stultifications of metaphysical Philosophy (spelled with a capital “P”). His work describes a more culturally and intellectually <em>useful </em>philosophy, better adapted to humanity’s extraordinarily impermanent worlds (Rorty, <em>Consequences of Pragmatism</em>, pp. xiii–xvii).</p><h3>The Correspondence Theory of Truth and its vagaries</h3><p>Rorty’s rejection of Plato’s appearance-reality distinction was, in effect, his denial of <em>The Correspondence Theory of Truth </em>— a fundamental philosophical notion that began with Aristotle’s dictum, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.”</p><p>For example, metaphysical philosophers say that the kinetic-molecular theory of matter is True, because it “<em>corresponds</em>”<em> </em>to the Reality of atoms. And so, atoms <em>do </em>exist. And “<em>correspondingly</em>” (they continue in circles), the theory that atoms exist is True!</p><p>For millennia, philosophers have never agreed for long about the kind of line, nor where to draw the line, between the merely apparent and the really Real. To paraphrase Rorty, the modern proponents of Truth-affirming “essentialism”<em> </em>and Reality-based “fundamentalism”<em> </em>(empiricists, positivists, realists, etc.) knowingly<em> </em>know, in various ways, that a proposition<em> </em>(any true-false statement) is eternally, truly<em> </em>True<em> </em>when it “corresponds” (whatever <em>that </em>means) to some object or idea that is immutably, really<em> </em>Real<em> </em>(from Forms to facts), and is not “<em>mere</em> appearance” — again, whatever <em>that </em>means (Rorty, <em>Consequences of Pragmatism</em>, pp. xxi–xxxvii).</p><h3>An extraordinary and controversial career</h3><p>Rorty began his studies at the University of Chicago at age 14. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Yale in 1956. In 1961, he began his long tenure at Princeton.</p><p>Rorty’s repudiation of the Correspondence Theory was the outrageous underpinning of the book that made him the most well-known American philosopher of his generation: <em>Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</em> (1978).</p><p>Not surprisingly, Rorty’s wholesale rejection of the metaphysical tradition — the very legacy of Plato — scandalized the philosophy faculty at Princeton, and Rorty left for the University of Virginia in 1982. His unwavering descriptions of <em>neopragmatism</em> (as he called it) generated strident objections from other analytic philosophers (notably, the realists John Searle and Thomas Nagel). But Rorty, always a lightning rod for reactionary criticism, remained characteristically “insouciant.” In 1998, he became professor of comparative literature at Stanford. He remained prolific in later life, and his most fully formed philosophy was published posthumously, in <em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism </em>(2021).</p><figure><img alt="Photo of philosopher Richard Rorty" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zFRhbI1IrKpu0eygJwmzFw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Richard Rorty | <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Una_foto_en_la_ventana_de_Rorty_en_Barcelona.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a> | CC BY-SA 4.0</figcaption></figure><h3>Rorty’s truth is made, not found</h3><p>Rorty questions the ancient foundations of Platonic philosophy (the tradition of “Philosophy” with a capital “P”), but not because he is a “subjectivist” and a “relativist,” who “denies the existence of Truth” (the usual detractions leveled against Rorty). His fellow analytic philosophers and realist (or more generally, “rationalist”) critics complain that Rorty’s approach is “not really Philosophy.” They are frustrated that Rorty offers no rationalistic argument couched in a rationalistic “vocabulary” to demonstrate a rational contradiction to the rationalist concept of Truth. (Rorty, <em>Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity</em>, pp. 73–78).</p><p>For Rorty, the self-referential tendencies of modern Philosophy have become an impediment to further inquiry. Rorty deliberately sidesteps such implicitly circular polemics. He unapologetically dismisses realist and transcendental “intuitions” (those special, self-proving concepts, supposedly free from the errors of perception and the “veils of language”), from which we may supposedly, unerringly deduce the existence and nature of Truth-laden things.</p><blockquote>Of course Rorty believes in true ideas, true objects, and true propositions. (He was not schizophrenic.) But he carefully avoids slipping into any traditional, metaphysical description of “the Truth.”</blockquote><p>Rorty’s truth is <em>not </em>shaped by Truth. It is an unceasing movement of infinite, true beliefs, and it is <em>made by humans</em>. It is <em>not </em>something “out there,” predetermined by the gods, eternal, immovable, and waiting to be discovered. A true belief is more humanistic and much more profound than that. Rorty greatly admired the pragmatic philosopher, John Dewey, for whom a “warranted” truth is an aesthetically coherent <em>judgment</em>, which is “the goal of inquiry” (i.e. the logically structured result of any cognitive “disequilibrium”).</p><p>An <em>inquiry </em>is not simply a philosophical talking-point, but it is the very essence of intelligent life. It is our personal and societal will to survive — <em>to adapt </em>and hopefully to thrive on an increasingly inhospitable planet.</p><h3>Do not expect a theory of Truth</h3><p>Rorty sincerely doubts that any Truth is “out there” because, since antiquity, philosophers have yet to discover the definite criteria that “make”<em> </em>propositions true. The Truth has spawned millennia of philosophical dithering, and Rorty has no use for the interminable disputations of the metaphysical tradition. “They might have found something interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they haven’t” (Rorty, <em>Consequences of Pragmatism</em>, p. xiv).</p><p>An idea interests Rorty if it captures the imagination with endless possibilities, like the brilliant poems and great literature, which Rorty unabashedly praises.</p><blockquote>In place of Truth, Rorty describes humanity’s dynamic, “pan-relational,” and infinite repertoire of true beliefs.</blockquote><p>Rorty is an intellectual historian and decidedly “historicist,” but he is repulsed by all the stifling notions of an ultimate, <em>teleological </em>“end of inquiry,” “end of history,” “end of the universe,” etc. Rorty’s truth is an interim “judgment call,” which aims at continuing the infinite inquiry, rather than bringing it to an indisputable and final end (Rorty, <em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em>, pp. 84–103).</p><p>Even if Philosophers were someday to discover something indisputably, really Real, that discovery’s concomitant “Truth” wouldn’t help to integrate our “hermeneutic” <em>understanding</em>, for example, of geometric proofs, the facts of history, and our unerring opinions (Rorty, <em>Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</em>, pp. 315–322). For Rorty, such an <em>unuseful </em>Reality-in-itself would simply not be philosophically interesting. If we fervently continued to believe that “the Truth is out there,” Rorty would only shrug (he reputedly shrugged a lot). He presumably would have responded politely, “So what?”</p><p>For Rorty, the search for the Truth just hasn’t “paid.” Twenty-five centuries of inconclusive disputations is more than enough. “The Truth” is no longer “the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about” (Rorty, <em>Consequences of Pragmatism</em>, p. xiii).</p><p>Rorty wants “to change the subject.” He wants philosophy to stop being Philosophy, and to “move on” (Rorty, <em>Consequences of Pragmatism</em>, pp. xxxvii–xliv).</p><h3>Ontological soup</h3><p>A theory of Truth–even if we could expect to have one–would not be a true theory, unless it generally and rationally explains<em> </em>how it is that true things are determined by Truth.</p><p>For example, what is it about Truth that makes it true that:</p><ul><li>Vertical angles have the same measure;</li><li>Two plus two equals four;</li><li>This distinct thing that I’m sitting on is clearly a chair;</li><li>Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States;</li><li>Tomorrow is Tuesday;</li><li>The universe has four fundamental forces;</li><li>Love is better than hate; <em>and</em></li><li>Willie Mays was the greatest of all time.</li></ul><p>Does a geometric proof “adequately describe” something really Real? Platonists think so. What sort of Truth corresponds to either an arithmetic equation, my “extension” of “chair-ness,” or a historical fact? What concept of Reality manifests such disparate truths as the conventional seven-day week, a scientific theory, an intuitive moral certainty, and the ultimate opinion of any well-informed baseball fan?</p><p>Not surprisingly, in view of the potpourri of true beliefs (from common sense to Pythagorean voodoo), Plato’s appearance-reality distinction has spawned a plethora of interpretations. Throughout the millennia, analytic philosophers and charlatan sages alike have described various “ontologies,” that is, descriptions of “the higher Reality,” each of which offers reasons for how we might grasp (or conveniently ignore) such an impressive variety of truths (Rorty, <em>Consequences of Pragmatism</em>, pp. xiii–xvii).</p><p>Some philosophers (starting with Parmenides) explain that the Oneness of Reality is proof that the Truth is eternally inexplicable and ineffable, beyond our capacity for knowledge or language. These philosophers espouse some variation on the theme that “Nature makes it so.” But Rorty asks, what kind of an <em>explanation </em>is that?</p><blockquote>Ontology is like Molière’s doctor who, when asked why opium causes sleep, replied in all seriousness that it is because opium has a “dormitive virtue.”</blockquote><p>Many proffered ontologies and epistemologies have had their day: the One and the many; the universe of Knowledge vs. our lowly opinions; form and substance; the objective and the merely subjective; mind and body; materialism vs. idealism; <em>a priori </em>or <em>a posteriori</em> ; science and everything else, and so forth.</p><p>It is a smorgasbord of various, philosophical “temperaments” (as the pragmatist William James would say). Rorty calls it an “ontological playground,” and the result over the ages has been pure, <em>ontological soup</em> (Rorty, <em>Truth and Progress</em>, pp. 1–9).</p><blockquote>For Rorty, metaphysics is the history of philosophers giving some higher “ontological status” to something supposedly really Real.</blockquote><p>Rorty is exasperated that Philosophers have espoused such a long series of distinctions between the “higher and lower divisions” of Reality, for the sake of isolating and ossifying Truth. Metaphysics carelessly covers-up the marvelous <em>univocity </em>of truth. (Every human society has had an <em>expression of affirmation—</em>their own, unbounded word that means “true.”)</p><figure><img alt="A drawing of Richard Rorty in profile." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*S7FeIWBdm_h23X-t8M6Npg.png" /><figcaption>Richard Rorty | <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Richard_McKay_Rorty.png">Wikimedia Commons</a> | CC BY-SA 3.0</figcaption></figure><h3>Perilous polemics</h3><p>Rorty complains that since the days of Kant, philosophy has become hyper-professionalized. It has fallen into an insular rut, while rationalists continue their endless, minute parsing of intuitions, realities, and whatever linguistic syntax we use to communicate such things. (It is <em>scholasticism</em>, all over again! Useless “angels and pins.”)</p><p>Rationalist philosophers continue to wage Plato’s “quarrel with the poets,” thereby safeguarding the tradition against humanity’s <em>expansive </em>creativity or anything else beyond the Philosophers’ esoteric authorities (Rorty, <em>Philosophy as Poetry</em>, pp. 1–4).</p><p>The higher Reality is presented as “essential,” “foundational,” and wholly based on pre-evidentiary “intuitions.” The Philosophy of the philosophers blithely casts off the presumed vulgarity of our perceptiveness, language, and human creativity (Rorty, <em>Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity</em>, pp. 6–9).</p><p>For Rorty, the question of the Truth is not only interminable and tedious, it has become rather ridiculous (and sometimes ominous). And so, Rorty wants to “change the subject.”</p><p>It begs the question, change the subject to what?</p><h3>Usefulness and justification</h3><p>Rorty’s truth is not another “mirror of nature.” He simply has no <em>use </em>for “representationalism” and the appearance-reality distinction. The <em>pragmatic </em>notion of truth is a post-ontological paradigm shift that has nothing to do with “the really Real.”</p><blockquote>“We have no idea what ‘in itself’ is supposed to mean in the phrase ‘reality as it is in itself.’ So we suggest that the appearance-reality distinction be dropped in favor of the distinction between less useful and more useful ways of talking.” <em>(</em>Rorty, <em>Truth and Progress</em>, p. 1<em>)</em></blockquote><p>For Rorty, “truth” is an expression that affirms <em>useful </em>concepts and things. He asks, what <em>pragmatic difference </em>would a particular belief make, for example, to settle our doubts, adjudicate our disputes, adapt us to our worlds, or guide our actions?</p><blockquote>A philosophical “theory-not-making-any-practical-difference” would be, as the <em>original pragmatist </em>Charles Sanders Peirce liked to say, uselessly “idle.”</blockquote><p>The appearance-reality <em>distinction </em>is replaced by the “useful-useless” <em>continuum</em>. Rorty wants us to stop discussing the Reality-determined <em>nature </em>of Truth. He wants us instead to discuss the pragmatic <em>justifications </em>for true beliefs (Rorty, <em>Truth and Progress</em>, pp. 1–4).</p><p>What <em>justifies </em>our true belief that Willie Mays was great? (Was it the will of the baseball gods?) What <em>justifies </em>our true belief that tomorrow is Tuesday? (Is “Tuesday-ness” really Real?) And does anyone over the age of 3 sincerely doubt the <em>useful </em>idea that 2+2 <em>must equal </em>4? To put it crudely, a belief is <em>justified </em>— that is, we call it “true” — because nobody in our world (<em>especially </em>our moral and intellectual selves), will let us get away with espousing a contradictory belief (Rorty, <em>Truth and Progress</em>, pp. 2–13).</p><p>As Rorty explains, the truth is an <em>absolute </em>term. <em>Of course</em> it is “pointlessly paradoxical” to <em>relativize </em>“truth” to the various modes of true-or-false propositions.</p><blockquote>“Granted that ‘true’ is an absolute term, its conditions of application will always be relative.” <em>(</em>Rorty, <em>Truth and Progress</em>, p. 2<em>)</em></blockquote><p>My belief that I’m sitting on a chair is either true or false. As Rorty asserts, it would be a “pointless locution” for me to say that my sitting on a chair is “true for me, but relatively less true for you.” And who (except a charlatan) says, “It is a chair, and yet, it is not <em>really </em>a chair.”</p><p>To ask, with insincere seriousness, “But what <strong><em>is</em></strong><em> ‘</em>chair<em>’</em>?” or “But what <strong><em>is</em></strong> ‘Truth’?” is <em>more </em>than implicitly relativistic. It borders on decrepit, rank solipsism.</p><blockquote>But it is <em>not</em> pointlessly paradoxical (perhaps it is approaching a <em>logical tetralemma</em>) to say, “this truth is <em>justified</em> (it is <em>useful</em>) in <em>my </em>world, but not in yours.”</blockquote><p>(As Western logic moves past its binary roots, and follows science and mathematics into <em>extradimensional</em> (“non-Euclidean”) descriptions of reality, the truth is understood to stand upon infinite, pan-relational continua, rather than upon simple, immutable distinctions. The logical form of such post-metaphysical knowledge is <em>tetralemmic</em>. It is our necessary, useful, and ever-more justified <em>adaptation</em> to monumental and threatening change— it is human intelligence at its best — and Rorty is showing the way.)</p><p>For example, an antebellum slaver’s racist beliefs about black Americans were <em>justified to him</em>. He certainly believed<em> </em>they were true. But such beliefs are <em>not </em>justified to an ACLU lawyer. We can hope to persuade<em> </em>a vicious racist to change his unjustified beliefs, but not by a rational argument derived from the “eternal Truth” about universal human rights. A slaver would merely wonder how such a categorical, eternal Truth could have <em>possibly </em>existed before there were any black people, or in the 1830s, or even today.</p><p>Similarly, the astronomer Ptolemy’s belief in geocentrism<em> </em>was a justified truth in the 2nd Century, because his geometric cosmology was confirmed by complex mathematics, based on perfect<em> </em>circles, which roughly fit his observations of planetary motion. It was “true enough” then. But this was not<em> </em>the case by the early 17th Century, after Kepler came up with a simpler and more elegant mathematical explanation, which fit the latest data exactly<em> </em>and made more accurate astronomical predictions. After that, a belief in the truth of heliocentrism<em> </em>became indisputably justified among astronomers.</p><p>But Kepler’s work wasn’t “the Truth.” And Hubble’s much later discovery of a multi-galaxy, expanding universe was not some ultimate confirmation that “the Truth is out there.” And who today would be <em>justified </em>in believing that the Big Bang theory is the last word — <em>the Final Truth</em>?</p><blockquote>For a pragmatist, an <em>authentic </em>belief in the truth is <em>also </em>a belief in <em>human fallibility </em>— Peirce’s famous “fallibilism.”</blockquote><p>Rorty fervently espoused that it is the first duty of the poet, the scientist, and the philosopher to justify the truth, to facilitate further inquiry, and “to keep the conversation going.” This is <em>not </em>“relativism.” It is the post-ontological, neopragmatic philosophy of Richard Rorty.</p><p>Speaking of Rorty’s truth, my newly published book, <em>Creative Obsession</em> is about <em>the death of ontology</em>, among several other subjects. (It is the “second edition” of a lengthy outline that I published several years ago.) <em>Creative Obsession</em> delves into <em>the postulate of dimensionless-ness</em>. It is jargon-free and <em>fascinating </em>(as I hope you will agree!), literary philosophy. <a href="https://www.temescalpublishing.com/">Temescal Publishing</a></p><h3><strong>Bibliography</strong></h3><ul><li>Rorty, <em>Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature </em>(Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).</li><li>Rorty, <em>Consequences of Pragmatism</em> (Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1982).</li><li>Rorty, <em>Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity</em> (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).</li><li>Rorty, <em>Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3</em> (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).</li><li>Rorty, <em>Philosophy as Poetry </em>(Univ. of Virginia Press, 2016).</li><li>Rorty, <em>Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism</em> (Harvard Univ. Press, 2021).</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3eae537f6f0a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday/truth-reality-and-richard-rorty-3eae537f6f0a">Truth, Reality, and Richard Rorty</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday">Philosophy Today</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Pragmatic Meaning of Truth]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophytoday/the-pragmatic-meaning-of-truth-0a988d172f35?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0a988d172f35</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pragmatism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[william-james]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[charles-sanders-peirce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[richard-rorty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Mar 2025 11:02:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-14T11:02:27.557Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>A Paradigm Shift In Philosophy</strong></h4><figure><img alt="Duck-ness" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*W1KlNH8V0Na4lEpJ" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@ross_sokolovski?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Ross Sokolovski</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Not long ago, a young existentialist (who is also a gifted artist) asked me what book she should read, in order to get her arms around “pragmatic” philosophy. I had no difficulty recommending William James’s seminal, 1907 work, aptly named <em>Pragmatism</em> and his 1909 sequel, <em>The Meaning of Truth</em>. I was also at that time renewing my old struggle to understand the burgeoning, <em>non-rationalist </em>(aka pragmatic) thinking in advanced science and mathematics. So it occurred to me, as a poet who reads philosophy, that a succinct description of “pragmatic truth” could be useful to artists and scientists alike. Such a description might illustrate the ever-evolving place of philosophy <em>throughout </em>human culture.</p><p>In this article, I’ll discuss the concept of truth, as espoused by the “classical pragmatists,” Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. It is important that we understand the basis provided by these philosophers for the current, cultural “backlash” against the “Platonic tradition” and the Kantian “synthesis of the empirical and the rational” — and the strong objections that this still-burgeoning, cultural trend has provoked from many academic philosophers.</p><h3><strong>Charles Sanders Peirce and the Pragmatic Maxim</strong></h3><p>“Pragmatism” was coined by James’s prickly contemporary and friend, the über-scientific Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). Unfortunately, like many terms of art employed by professional philosophers, “pragmatism” misleads the public. Peirce’s use of “pragmatism” suggests a philosophical outlook that is businesslike, worldly, and anti-intellectual — merely practical and common-sensibly “pragmatic.”</p><p>But pragmatism is far from this. Peirce is naming a truly revolutionary, slow-moving, yet accelerating paradigm shift in philosophy, which he traced to Medieval <em>nominalism </em>(the notion that universal ideas are merely names we apply, rather than actual features of reality). It is a shift away from the orthodox, Aristotelian conception of truth as a timeless, changeless <em>relationship </em>between something <em>possessing </em>truth and something <em>providing </em>truth, which is traditionally articulated as the theory that true beliefs <em>correspond </em>to reality.</p><p>Instead, for Peirce, truth is a function of <em>human practices</em>. It is the result of our epistemic <em>behavior</em>, that is, our human need to solve problems, make assertions to others, and conduct inquiry (especially scientific inquiry). This pragmatic conception of truth is a radical departure (2,400 years in the making) from the persistent, ancient notion that “Truth” is revealed in its fullness to any sufficiently rational mind that is adequately in touch with the higher, universal aspects of “Reality” (<em>Philosophical Writings of Peirce</em>,<em> </em>pp. 23–41).</p><p>Peirce’s truth is <em>not </em>something “given” nor pre-placed by Neo-Olympic gods at the pinnacle of the epistemological pyramid. It is <em>not </em>an eternal, transcendental connection between an <em>immovable </em>concept and a higher, universal reality. Instead, “the truth,” for Peirce, means the <em>practical </em>(useful) result of a <em>process of inquiry</em>, which takes us from a state of doubt to a state of stable (if not extremely stable) belief. For Peirce, truth follows the processes that yield consistent <em>results</em>. In very complex cases (like the transit of Mars or the geometry of gravitational fields), the truth is more obviously <em>fallibilistic</em>, that is, it is approached by correcting error, patient experimentalism, and successive approximation (“The Pragmatic Theory of Truth”).</p><p>For Peirce, “truth” is known by its <em>effects</em>. The <em>pragmatic </em>meaning of truth comprises the sum of its practical <em>consequences</em>. This is the essence of our understanding of truth. And more generally, the effects of <em>any </em>object of a conception is what is essential to our understanding. Peirce’s well-known <em>pragmatic maxim</em>, stated in his 1878 article, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” declares the subordination of conceptions, <em>including our conception of truth</em>, to the conception of their <em>effects</em>:</p><blockquote>“Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”</blockquote><p>For example, I have often observed certain creatures having shiny feathers, flat bills, and webbed feet, which waddle on land, and go “quack.” My concept of <em>duck-ness</em> follows the various qualities of such a creature. But in this abstract case of “truth,” what are the <em>effects </em>that inform my <em>concept of truth</em>?</p><p>Peirce states that the most salient effect of the concept of truth is that <em>it </em>finally brings all inquiry to an end:</p><blockquote>“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth.”</blockquote><p>A true belief holds up to <em>sustained inquiry </em>(especially scientific inquiry). A true belief is a belief that is dependable, and therefore remains a <em>basis for action</em>, regardless of all future challenges.</p><p>The view of the younger Peirce is strikingly teleological, that is, he believed that the attainment of the Final Truth could mark the “end of science,” if scientific inquiry were allowed to proceed indefinitely. The older Peirce was less strident. His concept of truth became thoroughly fallibilistic (<em>always </em>subject to error and revision). The progress of truth is not fated to attain our unanimous, final agreement, but it is something less grandiose — it is a matter of scientific investigation leading only to a <em>general consensus</em> — the less ethereal notion that he had always discussed.</p><p>Peirce’s “pragmatism” was the work of a genuinely <em>original </em>philosopher and an incredibly <em>bad</em> poet. Later in life, he preferred the equally odious term, “pragmaticism.” However, back in the 1870s, he gave us the term “pragmatism,” James followed suit, and now we’re stuck with it.</p><figure><img alt="Photo of Charles Sanders Peirce as a young man." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/1*n6A6UmVTjOchTqO_Mb_zfg.png" /><figcaption>Charles Sanders Peirce | <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charles_Sanders_Peirce_posture.png">Wikimedia Commons</a> | Public Domain | Modified by the author</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Rationalism, Empiricism, and The Meaning of Truth</strong></h3><p>Especially since the days of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), many academic philosophers presume that they may “step outside of their own skins” when they contemplate truth and reality. They believe that they are beginning from purely objective, presuppositionless, and self-evident foundations, from which they deduce logically valid solutions to textbook, philosophical problems. They deem such timeless, deductive finalities to be the meaning of “Truth.” This perfervid <em>rationalism </em>dominates the post-Kantian academy. For more than 200 years, the systematizing professionals of philosophy have been more or less on the same page methodologically. But as Peirce wryly remarks, “They can agree on little else.”</p><p>For James, the academic philosophers’s persistent disagreements and politicized polemics are a result of their various <em>temperaments</em>. By way of illustration, he contrasts the “tender-minded” and the “tough-minded” philosophical attitudes. This contrast reflects Kant’s synthesis of the <em>idealist </em>philosophy (exemplified by Gottfried Leibniz) and the <em>empiricist </em>philosophy (exemplified by John Locke).</p><p>The idealist attitude follows <em>indubitable </em>mental foundations (e.g. I cannot doubt that I exist), whereas the empiricist attitude, although it is also foundational and methodologically rationalistic, embraces <em>realism</em>, and thus holds that we begin with directly perceived, mind-independent, <em>immutable facts </em>(e.g. the observed epicycles of planets across the sky).</p><blockquote>Tender-minded idealists tend to be mind-oriented, religious, and monistic, whereas tough-minded empiricists tend to be materialistic, irreligious, and pluralistic. The tender-minded are more dogmatical, and the tough-minded are more skeptical.</blockquote><p>Of course, these are generalizations, and “every sort of permutation and combination is possible in human nature” (<em>Pragmatism</em>, pp. 1–16).</p><p>James takes the “undignified” position that “[the] history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments.” But modern, professional philosophers assume that human temperament has nothing to do with human reason, and that only impersonal reasons support their conclusions.</p><p>For James, this is unconscious prevarication. “There is no reason to suppose that this strong temperamental vision is from now onward to count no longer in the history of man’s beliefs.” A philosopher’s idiosyncratic temperament “really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe (…)” (Id.).</p><p>In this regard, the pragmatism of James echoes Nietzsche’s existentialist idea that “the prejudices of the philosophers” is a fundamental problem to be faced, rather than an unscientific irrationality to be denied. James (who before he turned to philosophy, gained fame as ‘the father of American psychology’) laments that “a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions” exists, so that “the <em>most potent</em> of our premises” is rarely mentioned. Such unaddressed bias “breeds antipathies of the most pungent character” (Id<em>.</em>).</p><p>In his <em>Pragmatism</em>, James addresses the educated public of Boston and New York at the turn of the 20th Century. He acknowledges the public’s “repugnance” and growing disdain for the “dilemma” being imposed by the academics, which is their sharp, <em>idealist </em>(<em>also </em>called “rationalist”–more confusing nomenclature!) vs. <em>empiricist </em>polemics:</p><blockquote>“You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific loyalty to facts (…) the spirit of adaptation and accommodation [i.e. empiricism] (…) but also the old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type [i.e. idealism/rationalism].” (<em>Pragmatism</em>, p. 8)</blockquote><p>James offers pragmatism as the means to attain both of these genuine, intellectual needs. However, James’s pragmatism does not merely reiterate Kant’s synthesis of Leibniz’s idealism and Locke’s empiricism into a single system.</p><blockquote>With Peirce and James, the very ground of philosophy is shifting, as the concept of truth itself is being remade.</blockquote><p>The Truth is no longer an eternal agreement between enlightened humans and a pre-created, rationally structured <em>Reality</em>; it is no longer an intractable, <em>ontological certainty</em>. As James elegantly describes it, the <em>pragmatic </em>truth is more modest, yet more profound than this.</p><figure><img alt="Photo of William James as a young man." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/354/1*rfqMzgk1knyd-ilkdU9efA.png" /><figcaption>William James | <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Houghton_MS_Am_1092_(1185)_-_William_James_in_Brazil,_1865.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a> | Public Domain | Modified by the author</figcaption></figure><h3>James’s Concept of Truth As a “Useful” Agreement With Reality</h3><p>For William James (1842–1910), the concept of truth, like any other concept of the human mind, is <em>known </em>to us by means of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. The truth or falsity of any belief, James famously states, is a function of its underlying “cash value.”</p><blockquote>“Grant an idea or belief to be true (…) what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone’s actual life? (…) What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false?” (<em>Pragmatism</em>, p. 77)</blockquote><p>James immediately answers himself that <em>true </em>ideas are the ideas that humans assimilate, validate, corroborate, or otherwise <em>verify</em>. Ideas <em>become </em>true through a variety of verification processes. And in turn, James <em>also </em>treats the concept of <em>verification </em>pragmatically — the <em>consequence </em>of verification is a belief that the idea is <em>agreeing with reality</em>.</p><p>James’s answer shows that he is still paying respect to the correspondence theory of truth–that the Truth is whatever is agreeing or <em>corresponding </em>to<em> </em>Reality.</p><blockquote>Later in the 20th Century, the more radically anti-rationalistic, “neo-pragmatic” philosophy breaks completely with the correspondence theory.</blockquote><p>Nevertheless, James’s “<em>agreement with” </em>reality is a much broader concept than the traditional “<em>correspondence to” </em>reality. Correspondence generally suggests a <em>discrete </em>relation between an object (or idea) and some universal aspect of reality. For example, a rationalist might say it is true that I’m sitting on a chair, because this object beneath me corresponds to chair-ness.</p><p>However, for James, myriad context-dependent, truth-reality agreements are <em>also </em>in play. Our repertoire of true agreements participate in various, <em>virtually infinite networks </em>of “connections.” We act upon fleeting, human-made webs of <em>useful </em>(need-fulfilling)<em> </em>ideas.</p><p>For example, I have frequently heard the word “chair” in numerous conversations and in various contexts and circumstances, and in conjunction with my full <em>repertoire </em>of contextually relevant beliefs, this word has almost always referred to any manufactured thing intended to be sat upon, and possesses a peculiar size and shape. This object presently before me ‘fits the bill’ of all the relevant particulars. I thus verify my belief that it is truly a chair, and I behave accordingly — I <em>use </em>this belief to assuage my desire to sit down.</p><p>The <em>vast, shifting networks of useful ideas</em> are the basis of James’s pragmatic understanding of truth. The ideas and objects of reality might be useful to us or harmful. Streaming networks of applicable, <em>true </em>ideas are <em>useful</em>, because in various contexts, they underwrite the <em>behavior </em>that <em>fulfills </em>the human needs and desires at issue.</p><p>It is true, for another example, that if I go into this grocery store, I can fulfill my desire to buy milk. But my belief that I could get milk from the hardware store is false. Under these circumstances, the “practical importance” of my network of <em>true </em>beliefs (regarding milk, types of stores, purchasing, etc.) is that it is <em>useful</em>, that is, my desire for milk can be, through such a network of contextually relevant, verified ideas, acted upon and “satisfied” (<em>Pragmatism</em>, pp. 76–91).</p><p>James claims, in summing up, that<em> </em>“You can say of [a belief] either that ‘it is useful because it is true’ or that ‘it is true because it is useful.’ Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified” <em>(Ibid.</em>, p. 79)<em>.</em></p><p>James’s succinct claim invites misinterpretation, particularly from dismissive rationalists. They typically imagine that James is merely saying: ‘P is true if and only if it is useful to believe that P.’ By such superficiality, rationalism exposes its congenital inability to hypothesize independently of the traditional, Platonic notion that “Truth” is an <em>ontologically determined endpoint</em>, whereas James’s notion is addressing Peirce’s radical paradigm shift, and it is more elaborate than most rationalists would care to imagine.</p><p>For James, truth is the consequence of a <em>verificatory process</em>–it is the context-relative process within the relevant milieu of infinitely interconnected, true ideas, by which we <em>successfully adapt </em>to an ever-changing reality (our natural environment), and which has “cash value” to the extent that a practical need or desire is thereby usefully fulfilled (<em>Pragmatism</em>, pp. 76–91).</p><p>Later in the 20th Century, pragmatists such as John Dewey (1859–1952) and Richard Rorty (1931–2007) continued to advance the paradigm shift. Dewey essentially ignores “the truth,” by subordinating truth to the processes of logic. He speaks instead of “warranted assertibility.” Rorty, in turn, completely <em>rejects </em>the notion of any correspondence between the ‘truly True’ and the ‘really Real’ as a circular, tautological, and thoroughly uninteresting idea.</p><p>And now, in the 21st Century, this still-burgeoning <em>non-rationalism</em> is being led by the hyper-dimensional geometries and quantum mechanics of the theoretical physicists.</p><blockquote>Once again, science leads the way, and metaphysics follows.</blockquote><p>Our century’s ever more pragmatic philosophies, which I would describe as “the death of ontology,” is the implicit subject of my forthcoming book (literary philosophy as philosophical literature), <em>Creative Obsession — Philosophic Life in Broad Daylight</em>. Stay tuned!</p><h3>Bibliography</h3><ul><li>James, W., <em>Pragmatism </em>(Dover, 1995), pp. 1–16 [“The Present Dilemma in Philosophy”], pp. 76–91 [“Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth”].</li><li>Buchler, J. (ed.), <em>Philosophical Writings of Peirce </em>(Dover, 1955), pp. 23–41 [“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”].</li><li>Capps, J., “The Pragmatic Theory of Truth”, <em>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy </em>(Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta &amp; Uri Nodelman (eds.)</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0a988d172f35" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday/the-pragmatic-meaning-of-truth-0a988d172f35">The Pragmatic Meaning of Truth</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday">Philosophy Today</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pragmatic Distinctions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophytoday/pragmatic-distinctions-1ae2de7cdde5?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ae2de7cdde5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pragmatism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rationalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[peirce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[richard-rorty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 15 Feb 2025 01:28:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-15T01:28:34.611Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Are individual self-creation and social justice reconcilable without rationalism?</h4><figure><img alt="Photo of graffiti on brick wall, “Together We Create!”" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AqnmYW0gDDv-oZfz" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@bamagal?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">“My Life Through A Lens”</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Pragmatic philosophy, which aims to describe the “post-metaphysical” world, is characterized by its many denials of traditional, metaphysical distinctions. For pragmatists, the form-substance distinction of Plato, the mind-body distinction of Descartes, and the analytic-synthetic distinction of Kant dissolve into inconsequence, under <em>relentless</em>, philosophical questioning concerning what <em>difference in practice</em> such ongoing, theoretical distinctions might make.</p><p>The Plato-Descartes-Kant axis is the story of <em>rationalism</em>. It’s a long story, so today we are merely discussing an interesting twist. The strong, “distinction-denying” proclivity of pragmatic philosophy has a <em>notable exception</em>,<em> </em>which is that pragmatism <em>continues </em>to make the traditionally sharp distinction between the <em>private</em> and the <em>public</em> aspects of human culture.</p><p>The individual’s quest for economic, spiritual, and intellectual self-creation, finds itself in frequent opposition to the societal interest in solidarity, justice, and peace. This opposition has been a human concern for untold millennia. Surely, Neanderthal communities once faced this concern. Certainly, freedom vs. justice was not Plato’s invention.</p><p>For the pragmatist, if there is <em>anything </em>permanent or otherwise philosophically relevant about “the essence of human nature,” it is that by random mutation and natural selection, we striving humans are continuing to evolve as <em>social</em> <em>organisms</em>.</p><h3><strong>Universal human nature</strong></h3><p>The archetypal rationalist (the “metaphysician”) fundamentally believes that the contrasting interests of the individual and the community are reconciled by means of a permanent, unchanging, <em>universal human nature</em>. A dyed-in-the-wool, true rationalist seeks a timeless, <em>conclusive</em> argument that whatever fulfills a person’s “human essence” necessarily fulfills the community, and vice versa. We see this in the Platonic ideal of the honorable guardian, or in Catholicism’s faith in the communion of saints. We also see it in the unerring narcissism of Ayn Rand’s objectivism.</p><p>By contrast, a pragmatically-oriented philosopher would insist that there is no <em>practicable, </em>ahistorical commonality of human nature. It is dubious, for example, that any <em>effective </em>community of interest exists between the experiences and perspectives of a neolithic root-digger and a Renaissance sculptor. And whatever “human nature” a Roman widow and John D. Rockefeller might conceivably share, it is not<em> philosophically </em>relevant. So let’s not pretend that it is.</p><figure><img alt="Photo of hiker at sunset looking out over the mountains." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PvssmKh3G-FhgkIR" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@adcastaway3?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Allen Daryl Zamora</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Habermas</strong></h3><p>Contemporary philosophy has a strong, liberal-rationalist viewpoint, as exemplified by Jürgen Habermas (1929 — ). The liberal-rationalist, like the metaphysician, claims that there is an immutable, ahistorical, and universal human nature. They believe that we are capable of applying the Enlightenment concept of Reason<em> </em>to this eternal, human nature, in order to determine inalienable, universal human rights. Habermas seeks an immutable, rationalistic foundation, from which universal ideas of social justice, justice as fairness, non-cruelty, and liberation may be <em>conclusively </em>deduced, regardless of the cultural or historical context. He would assume that Attila the Hun himself must yield to the force of such a well-grounded moral philosophy.</p><p>For laudable, political reasons, Habermas embraces a lot of “ism’s” — the foundationalism, essentialism, universalism, and ahistoricism of rationalism. The liberal-rationalist fear is that moral philosophy, unless it is based on the pretension of a permanent foundation, a solid argument, and sound conclusions, must decay into “relativism,” and thereby lead all of society inexorably down with it, into outright, totalitarian evil.</p><h3><strong>Hegel</strong></h3><p>The first modern crack in the rationalist armor was the <em>historicism </em>of Hegel (1770–1831). For historicists, human beings do not exist within a permanent, moral and intellectual <em>stasis. </em>We have a <em>contingent</em> nature — we are on a historically and culturally determined journey.</p><p>Hegel was still highly rationalistic because, although he did <em>not </em>believe in the immutable, ahistorical universality of human nature, he <em>did </em>believe that there was a “World Spirit” hovering over all of humanity and <em>determining</em> history. For Hegel, the relations between the individual and the community are seen as the inevitable unfolding of the unstoppable, <em>teleological</em> World Spirit of human history.</p><h3><strong>Peirce</strong></h3><p>After Hegel’s historicism, more cracks in the armor came from mathematicians (i.e. hyperbolic geometry and the incompleteness theorem) and from physicists (i.e. quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle). Not surprisingly, the seminal figure of pragmatic philosophy was <em>also</em> a world-class <em>scientist</em>, Charles Peirce (1839–1914). Peirce worked for decades at the very edge of 19th Century gravimetrics, specifically, the geometric description of the Earth’s gravitational field and spatial orientation. (His academic career, however, was famously disastrous.)</p><p>For Peirce, “the Truth” is no longer based on the immutable certainty of a logical deduction, drawn from a rationally “existing” foundation (i.e. universal human nature, analytic judgments, “the mind,” World Spirit, etc.). Instead, pragmatically, the Truth is whatever the relevant community (i.e. scientists) come collectively and sincerely to <em>believe</em> is the truth of the matter (for example, that the Earth orbits the Sun).</p><p>Of course, having <em>certainty</em> in “the Truth” might rightly provide the comforts and spiritual repose, especially for people who are grieving or terrified. But for Peirce, who overcame 2,400 years of Platonic inertia, <em>certainty</em> is not the <em>essence</em> of truth.</p><p>Pragmatic philosophy is linguistic to the core. For pragmatists, the truth is formed out of linguistic descriptions, <em>individual and communal</em>. Throughout history, <em>adaptive</em> human <em>behavior</em> has been the <em>function</em> of such firmly attained, true beliefs. Human truth is described exclusively by human <em>language.</em></p><p>Peirce’s philosophy was still rationalistic, however, to the extent that he espoused, like Hegel, that human inquiry must someday come to a teleological endpoint. Sooner or later, all reasonable scientists will come to believe unanimously in The Final Truth. Then all of society, duly impressed by the scientists’ authoritative pronouncements, will come to share a <em>fully</em> perfected truth — that is, an <em>infallible </em>“theory of everything” will have finally been “discovered.” At last, humanity has reached “the end of science” (or the end of history, or the end of philosophy) <em>forever</em>!</p><h3><strong>Rorty</strong></h3><p>Richard Rorty (1931–2007) is the most well known, contemporary pragmatic philosopher. He explicitly did <em>not</em> attempt to synthesize individual self-creation with social justice. In all of his major works, he described the individualistic and societal notions of truth as separate, linguistic “<em>tools</em>” which were “in as little need of synthesis as are paintbrushes and crowbars.”</p><p>As much as I respect Rorty, I regret his frequent claim that the individual and the societal aspects of philosophy are theoretically irreconcilable.</p><p>Human <em>creativity</em> (that is, our naturally selected obsession to <em>adapt</em>, if not to <em>thrive — </em>what Nietzsche melodramatically called “will to power”) stems from our logical ability and willingness <em>to conjoin and synthesize</em> original ideas.</p><p>My reply to Rorty’s version of a “distinction” is that <em>human creativity</em> is <em>the</em> “cross-over” idea, which embraces both individual self-creation <em>and</em> social justice. But that’s another story.</p><p>In any case, Rorty would say that humanity has <em>barely scratched the surface </em>of our philosophical and historical possibilities.</p><h3><strong>The “Ontological Gap”</strong></h3><p>Rorty’s lifelong denial of even the <em>possibility</em> of a synthesis of the individual and the societal may have been the consequence of his day job as a professional, analytic philosopher. Like Hume and Kant before him, Rorty explained the <em>circularity</em> that inevitably erupts whenever people attempt “to step outside of their own skins,” in order to observe <em>intuitively</em> the existence of a non-humanly created and perfectly authoritative, rationalistic “Reality.”</p><p>Whenever I jump outside of my skin, in order to “see” the rationalists’ world of reason clearly and distinctly, then the “me” that’s jumped also needs to jump out of <em>its</em> skin, so that I can <em>also</em> be completely objective about <em>my </em>objectivity, <em>ad infinitum</em>.</p><p>Rorty’s argument is that this all-too-obvious circularity results in “ontological gaps,” which over the millennia, have been conveniently “filled in” by philosophers, without any need for data. For millennia, rationalists have persistently offered notions that multiple, wholly separate realities <em>must </em>exist, such as the eternal <em>forms</em> and the earthly <em>substance</em>, or that “<em>the mind”</em> is the sole engine of knowledge, fully separate from the world of “<em>the body</em>,” or that logical judgments exist both analytically <em>and</em> synthetically.</p><p>It seems that as long as I’m careful, when I jump out of my skin, that I land in the Reality of forms, rather than plop back down into the Reality of substance, then I can know that, whatever it is I’m seeing, I’m seeing it with an <em>absolute certainty </em>of its truth, or so the metaphysician tells me.</p><p>(Rorty the anti-metaphysician can be wry, but sometimes Rorty is too polite. That is why, if you’ll excuse me, I’m being a bit rude. All this metaphysical “gap-filling” and rationalistic curve-fitting is unacceptable, <em>voodoo ontology</em>. It’s like playing God. When you think about it, it’s nuts.)</p><figure><img alt="Is it what it is" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ReKAPw-nmGbelu6B" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jannerboy62?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Nick Fewings</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>What’s next?</strong></h3><p>Rorty was a 20th Century, analytic pragmatist. His implicit challenge to 21st Century poets and philosophers, of all stripes, is that they gamely attempt to <em>describe</em> philosophical hypotheses that conjoin self-creation and social justice upon <em>effective (</em>pragmatic) criteria, <em>without </em>resorting to rationalistic and teleological phantasms. My forthcoming book, <em>Creative Obsession</em> suggests <em>how</em> philosophy’s historical chain of “ontological gap-filling” might be overcome by simple and disturbingly <em>un-Platonic</em>, ontological postulates.</p><h3>Bibliography:</h3><ul><li>Rorty, R., <em>Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity</em> (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989) pp. xiii — xvi.</li><li>Peirce, C. S., <em>Philosophical Writings of Peirce </em>(J. Buchler, ed.) (Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 23–41 [<em>How to Make Our Ideas Clear</em>].</li><li>Hegel, G. W. F., <em>The Philosophy of History </em>(Dover Philosophical Classics, 2004).</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ae2de7cdde5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday/pragmatic-distinctions-1ae2de7cdde5">Pragmatic Distinctions</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophytoday">Philosophy Today</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[After Epistemology]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/original-philosophy/after-epistemology-d0d2dbe91c4d?source=rss-b370e06695af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d0d2dbe91c4d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rené-descartes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[montaigne]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pragmatism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jan 2025 15:16:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-27T15:16:07.095Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>The Viewpoint of Pragmatism in 800 Words</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*657Zp3jZ_TWAphpN" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@polarmermaid?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Anne Nygård</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h4>A Turning Point</h4><p>Philosophy is at a turning point. On the one hand, there is the “epistemological tradition,” the philosophical attitude that began with Descartes, and was then fully integrated by Kant, and whose adherents claim is the <em>sine qua non</em> of any cognitive and rational philosophy. It is the conviction that the <em>essence of humanity </em>is to seek the <em>essence of things</em>. In its purest form, the epistemologists’ project is to discover a scientifically based, objective theory of knowledge that is derived from a foundation of <em>a priori</em>, synthetic judgments of fact (self-proving categories, such as time, space, and causation) rigorously applied and rationally expanded into grandiose systems of strictly discursive (<em>logico philosophicus</em>) descriptions. Following this method, philosophers might also construct a perfect picture of the mind that molds human consciousness into the ultimate, true mirror of the whole universe. And finally, they would expect to deduce, sooner or later, perfect algorithms providing instant answers to all future questions about reality and morality.</p><h4>The Pragmatic Philosophy</h4><p>On the other hand, there is the supposedly unobjective, unscientific, <em>pragmatic</em> philosophy, which stems from the conviction that human beings are essentially <em>life-seeking organisms</em> — that we stand upon three billion years of random mutations affecting myriad, restless, earthly adaptations. The pragmatic, Darwinian view of humanity — ironically, more scientific (evidence-based) than the epistemological view — is rooted in the anthropocentric, Renaissance humanism and nominalism of the 14th Century. Pragmatic philosophy was also anticipated, in the early to mid 19th Century, not only by the historicism of Hegel, but also by European romantics and American transcendentalists in their resistance to <em>deterministic</em>, neo-Kantian philosophies. This persistence of contingent, <em>literary</em> philosophies bolsters the lingering suspicion that epistemological philosophy, since Hume, has grown increasingly useless to describe humanity’s raging compulsion to <em>understand</em> fully our environments and to nurture our cultures. Later in the 19th and into the 20th Centuries, existentialism, phenomenology, and post-modernism were also invigorated (and frequently repulsed) by the discomforting strictures and the growing tedium of “foundational epistemology.” After that, Gadamer’s hermeneutics (a <em>method of understanding</em>, rather than a metaphysical theory) and Rorty’s neopragmatism (a linguistic philosophy that politely eviscerates the correspondence theory of truth) were also reproached for their supposed relativism, subjectivism, irrationalism, and for being (which they are) anti-metaphysical, anti-foundational, anti-essential, and anti-authoritarian. For centuries, epistemological puritans have disparaged the pragmatic-humanist insistence that humanity’s journey <em>cannot</em> be relegated to a Pandora’s box of epistemological truth, beyond which we need not stray forevermore, because someday soon, epistemology will have finally been built upon an “eternal foundation” of history-free and context-free, “clear and distinct” ideas about the “essence of things.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xJyXYrWpkzFNKsyb" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@themysterycat?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Mystery Cat</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Epistemic Hopes</h4><p>In the 21st Century, the impending demise of the Kantian, epistemological philosophy has become palpable. But hardcore, radicalized epistemologists are steadfast that there might yet be a “permanent neutral framework.” They hope to demonstrate how <em>any</em> object or question (if<em> already</em> deemed, somehow, to be <em>rationalizable</em> — whether a chair, an electron, or the last logical choice) might be resolved in <em>the same</em> perfectly abstract language, so that all Truth shall be adjudicated “<em>commensurately</em>.” They believe that we might find the <em>correct</em> structure or the <em>one set</em> of rules that will tell us how the <em>final</em> Truth can be reached <em>programmatically</em> by all <em>rational</em> people hearing only the <em>appropriate</em> questions (i.e., only those concerning scientific theorizing and the categorical imperatives of morality). This myopic belief spawns a professional insularity, which denies the holism and dynamism of the authentically human, philosophic experience. Epistemologists are rightly criticized for seeking an ahistorical, absolutely complete, and immovable structure for truth, and their adherence to a theory of knowledge that is rooted in the perfect universality of Euclidean geometry and the unerring predictions of Newtonian mechanics. All those other sorts of theoretical explanations that do not fit the paradigmatic, epistemological structure of truth (especially those of psychology, art, and rhetoric) they regard as “noncognitive” or “not really philosophy.”</p><h4>History is Repeating Itself</h4><p>Montaigne, Descartes, and Galileo were heroic. They anticipated modernity and the demise of scholasticism. They envisioned our culture of science, and they worked to fortify this new sort of thinking against the dismissive (if not brutal) reaction of ecclesiastic and academic censors. Scholasticism had come of age during the Aristotelian revival and optimism of the High Middle Ages. But by the mid-16th Century, it had become ossified and riddled by politicized polemics. The heroes of modernity ushered in the <em>irrelevancy</em> of scholasticism. (It was never actually “<em>aufgehoben</em>.” People simply stopped taking Aristotle seriously.) And now, history is repeating itself. The demise of epistemological philosophy, and the growing effectiveness of <em>pragmatic</em> discourse, is largely an American and democratic project, led by Peirce, James, Dewey, Davidson, Rorty, et al., yet it is gaining traction more quickly in Europe, where the romantic, existentialist, postmodern, and hermeneutic traditions have softened the conservative, Anglophone backlash. My forthcoming book, <em>Creative Obsession</em> (blatantly literary philosophy) illustrates <em>how</em> these monumental trends might unfold through the 21st Century.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d0d2dbe91c4d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/original-philosophy/after-epistemology-d0d2dbe91c4d">After Epistemology</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/original-philosophy">Original Philosophy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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