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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Peter Langmar on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Peter Langmar on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Peter Langmar on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Share More to Have More — Why Lab.Coop is an employee-owned, holacracy-governed company]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lab-coop/share-more-to-have-more-why-lab-coop-is-an-employee-owned-holacracy-governed-company-c85915ae3168?source=rss-1e18789d1b77------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Langmar]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:18:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-26T14:18:28.787Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Founding Circumstances</strong></h3><p>After pulling the trigger on closing Brickflow, our previous venture with Tamás Kökény, we decided to stick together. “We stood there and knew where we messed up, and there was a team with whom we liked to work. What’s next?” — as <a href="http://www.lab.coop/blog/we-grabbed-a-few-drinks-sometimes-the-end-of-brickflow">I’ve stated in our recent Forbes interview</a>. It was spring of 2015 and we had to reset our professional life.</p><p>Since we had just crashed a company, we had no money to be invested and decided not to raise external funding for the kick-off. This meant two things: we needed a business model which could generate cash in a short time (weeks), but moreover we needed to find a venture with a very <strong>low barrier to entry</strong>. Since the core team of Brickflow was going to stick together, we had all the know-how of an end-to-end digital product agency targeting software startups. This also meant that the first <strong>team members would have to take almost the same risk as the founders</strong>.</p><p>Based on our previous experience, we aimed to bridge the <strong>motivation and commitment gap between owners and employees</strong> as the sense of ownership and risk-taking wasn’t satisfying before. A desperate need appeared to create an environment which attracts and supports growth mindset, entrepreneurial, and full-stack minded people.</p><h3><strong>Market Circumstances</strong></h3><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_war_for_talent">The war for talent</a>: anyone who works in the IT sector knows pretty well that it is close to impossible to be well staffed. The number of open positions in the IT industry in Hungary alone is estimated to be over 20,000, but Europe-wide it is over a million.<strong> We are short of IT professionals</strong>. On the local talent market, beside the huge multinational employers with strong local presence like GE, IBM, Siemens, EPAM, Erricson, etc. there are successful venture-capital-backed startups like Prezi, LogMeIn and Ustream. A brand-new and underfunded company has no chance to compete with the above players in terms of salary, nice offices or free food. On the other hand, we were confident there would be no way we could starve in such a seller’s market. Again, what’s next?</p><h3><strong>The Secret Sauce*</strong></h3><p>*Or at least, as a secret as shared sauce can be.</p><p>We had a gut feeling about possible solutions, but unlike with Brickflow, we started with an in-depth validation process. First, we interviewed about 50 IT professionals, founders and CEOs, then I dived into the alternative models of ownership and management.</p><p>What can we provide that other companies can not?<strong> Ownership! </strong>Both in its sense of stock and influence. Why? So we could build a fast-growing business between the above discussed founding and market conditions. Tamás and I believed that by sharing more with our team, we could both be and own more.</p><h3><strong>Co-Ownership</strong></h3><p>There are numerous different models that companies use to distribute profit and/or ownership among employees.</p><ul><li><a href="http://www.hr-guide.com/data/G444.htm">Profit sharing</a>: the company decides to distribute a portion of the profit among the employees. In this case, the employees do not get a stake in the company, but are motivated to keep the company profitable. <a href="http://www.patagonia.com/">Patagonia</a> is an example of a pioneer of this model.<br><strong>This means no influence on high level decisions, it is solely a financial incentive.</strong></li><li><a href="http://www.hr-guide.com/data/G446.htm">Employee Stock Option Pool (ESOP)</a>: establishing a minority ESOP is a market standard, both at private and public corporations. This includes early stage startups, from Brickflow to Prezi, Matáv, and even Facebook and Microsoft. The employees do not directly get a part of the profit, but gain the right over time (vesting) to purchase shares at a discounted price rather than at the stock or the acquisition-share price.<br><strong>Employees do not significantly influence high level decisions, but can make a good exit.</strong></li><li><a href="http://www.big4.com/management-and-business/highs-lows-made-partner-money/">Partnership</a>: some companies, like law and consulting firms, rely heavily on the top senior workforce due to their business model. Companies like BCG or the Big Four, with their up or out culture, offer a buy-in for their most valuable employees. This is how someone becomes a partner.<br><strong>This setting gives both financial benefits and influence for the Partners.</strong></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_employee-owned_companies">Majority employee owned corporation</a>: some give shares to their employees. Not options, but real common stock. In some cases, it is only the 49%, while in others all the shares of the company have been distributed among the employee shareholders. We have learned a lot from <a href="https://www.chroma.com/">Chroma</a>’s co-founder Paul Millman in this regard. Chroma has more than 200 owners and over 25 years of experience with the employee-owned model.<br><strong>This is one possible form of liquid ownership, as the number of stocks a person owns will depend on the added value. In such a setting, the employees have real power over the company and they also take part in the risks of ownership.</strong></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooperative">Cooperative</a>: one person, one share, one vote. Total equality. Sounds communistic? Well, there are thousands of companies just killing it in a capitalist competition. Chèque Déjeuner and others in the <a href="http://www.thenews.coop/36622/news/global-affairs/global-300-co-operatives-generate-16-trillion-revenue">top 300</a> have thousands of owners selling your lunch tickets.</li><li><a href="http://www.shareable.net/blog/how-platform-coops-can-beat-death-stars-like-uber-to-create-a-real-sharing-economy">Platform cooperativism</a>: AirBnb, Uber and other sharing-economy companies have been heavily criticized for not rewarding enough of the real value creators: apartment and car owners. Platform cooperatives that involve the community in the ownership could successfully challenge these recent market players.</li></ul><p>After careful consideration we decided to go with the majority-employee-owned corporation model. Imagine that the corporation distributes a certain number of common stocks each month, sold to the employees at nominal price and weighted by their seniority (as an approximation of their added value). In this model, team growth leads to the fast dilution of the original team. Today, I own about 15% of Lab.Coop and it is diluting. Diluting in terms of %, but not in terms of value. <strong>Lab.Coop is a majority-employee-owned corporation</strong>. The compensation or salary formula, inspired by <a href="https://buffer.com/salary">Buffer</a> and others, does not only focus on salary, but includes common and preferred stocks too. The details behind our share distribution will be discussed in a later in-depth post.</p><h3><strong>Self-Management for Evolutionary Purpose</strong></h3><p>We aimed to build a company with strong autonomy for our partners by distributing the power and making decisions with consent (no, we are not a democracy!), but without the unnecessary bureaucracy and Taylorian management. Why? To scale freedom, which we all love at small, early stage companies.</p><p>There are various models of self-management which have been pretty well described in <a href="http://www.reinventingorganizations.com/">Reinventing Organizations by Frederic Laloux</a>, in <a href="https://management30.com/about/">Management 3.0 by Jurgen Appelo</a> and in many other works. (**See a full reading list at the end of the post.) I do not aim to dive into these concepts and practices, but if the below visuals inspire you, please go ahead and read these books. Like Zappos, we chose Holacracy to support our transformation towards a Teal organization. <a href="http://www.lab.coop/blog/holacracy-from-scratch-lab-coop-after-4-months">Adam Banko facilitated</a> this from day one. Holacracy provides an operating system-like <a href="https://github.com/holacracyone/Holacracy-Constitution">sets of rules</a> to kick-off which facilitated experimentation. The power of the CEO is placed into a decision making process, based on the Holacracy Constitution. For our team, it brought the same mindset change as switching from waterfall to agile software development so we could work on our governance in small iterations. By defining these policies together, we were consciously improving the way we worked. Because of that, we now have our own apps on the operating system in the form of a <a href="https://github.com/lab-coop/lab-governance">public governance document</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tyN-ZSe3SbdMm36vDE2XUQ.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="http://fiftyshadesofteal.com/2015/05/25/reinventing-organizations-a-radically-inspiring-way-to-work-together-kevan-lee/">Fifty Shades of Teal</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v0Yb7flo1dY6P-t-TncfxA.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="http://ffluid.de/blog/warum-es-kuenftig-keine-stellenanzeigen-mehr-braucht/">Ffluid.de</a>)</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Looking Back</strong></h3><p>We started by experimenting with a model to scale the team and freedom. Our aim was to find a financially sustainable, fair, scalable and long-run-motivating approach. Maybe — especially in Hungary due to our history with socialist cooperatives — we might sound out of touch. Our ownership and management system were not a brand-new invention, but a combination of existing practices. In just 10 months we tripled the team (to about 20 shareholders), became profitable, and launched an IT school (<a href="http://www.greenfoxacademy.com/">GreenFox Academy</a>) alongside the product agency. Even if all of the above was not perfect in practice yet, even if we had a lot to work on, we felt unstoppable. It was good, albeit early, proof that our hypothesis regarding co-ownership and self-management were right. <strong>Lab.Coop is scaling.</strong></p><h3><strong>Annex: Our reading list while doing our initial research for this venture</strong></h3><ul><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6JxQVzWxgy4Y3Z4R2JEU0hlaTQ/view?usp=sharing">Reinventing organisation</a></li><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B6JxQVzWxgy4bkFqaHBsYlIxYkE&amp;usp=sharing">Management 3.0</a></li><li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Open-Organization-Leadership-Organizational-Development/dp/1472440110/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1422994029&amp;sr=8-11&amp;keywords=holacracy">The Open Organization: A New Era of Leadership</a></li><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6JxQVzWxgy4Vjh5NWxtZVZfZ3M/view?usp=sharing">Liquid Organisation</a></li><li><a href="http://www.holacracy.org/constitution40">Holacracy Constitution</a></li><li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Holacracy-Management-System-Rapidly-Changing/dp/162779428X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1422993232&amp;sr=1-1&amp;keywords=holacracy">Holacracy: The New Management System</a></li><li><a href="https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/hardware_software_human_resources_code_wars_all_industry_competition_software_talent/">Code Wars: The All-Industry Competition for Software Talent</a></li><li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-War-Talent-Ed-Michaels/dp/1578514592">The War for Talent</a></li><li><a href="https://www.tinypulse.com/resources/employee-engagement-survey-2013">7 Vital Trends Disrupting Today’s Workplace</a></li><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B6JxQVzWxgy4T21pV21yXy1MNzg&amp;authuser=0">The Tipping Point</a></li><li><a href="http://firstround.com/article/How-Medium-is-building-a-new-kind-of-company-with-no-managers">How Medium Is Building a New Kind of Company with No Managers</a></li><li><a href="https://hbr.org/2015/03/corporate-governance-2-0">Corporate Governance 2.0</a></li><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6JxQVzWxgy4b2VUOWRrbVROSlk/view?usp=sharing">Remote</a></li><li><a href="https://open.buffer.com/">Open Buffer</a></li><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6JxQVzWxgy4cl92TjU3Mk1aY1U/view?usp=sharing">Wikinomics</a></li><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6JxQVzWxgy4MmRJZ0o2S1JwMXc/view?usp=sharing">Freakonomics</a></li><li><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6JxQVzWxgy4QVdCZjZNYUlTaDA/view?usp=sharing">The Wealth of Networks</a></li><li><a href="http://bollier.org/sites/default/files/misc-file-upload/files/Open%20Co-operativism%20Report%2C%20January%202015_0.pdf">Toward an Open Co-Operatism</a></li><li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Humanizing-Economy-Co-operatives-Age-Capital/dp/086571651X/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1422993408&amp;sr=1-2&amp;keywords=cooperative">Humanizing the Economy: Co-operatives in the Age of Capital</a></li><li><a href="http://learningstore.uwex.edu/assets/pdfs/a1457.pdf">Cooperatives: Principles and practices in the 21st century</a></li></ul><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lab.coop/blog/share-more-to-have-more-why-lab-coop-is-an-employee-owned-hol"><em>www.lab.coop</em></a><em> on Feburary 17, 2016</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c85915ae3168" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lab-coop/share-more-to-have-more-why-lab-coop-is-an-employee-owned-holacracy-governed-company-c85915ae3168">Share More to Have More — Why Lab.Coop is an employee-owned, holacracy-governed company</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lab-coop">Lab.Coop</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The 20+1 Takeaways I’ve Learned From My Failed Startup]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lab-coop/the-20-1-takeaways-ive-learned-from-my-failed-startup-23cd6c45649b?source=rss-1e18789d1b77------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Langmar]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:11:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-26T14:11:46.633Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We have just <a href="http://www.lab.coop/blog/we-grabbed-a-few-drinks-sometimes-the-end-of-brickflow">announced in a Forbes interview that Brickflow</a>, our startup, had to be closed down because we could not raise the next round of $1m. We faced the fact that this venture was among the 9 out of 10 that fail. <strong>On the other hand building it was the best investment of my life.</strong> During these two and a half years I have made friends for life but more importantly went through a pretty steep learning curve. Here are the takeaways.</p><h3><strong>1. Theory vs. practice</strong></h3><p>We have read all the important books, watched all the recommended videos and got great mentor feedback. However, it took us a good year to learn how to execute on the theory. <strong>Practice is above theory, so try instead of reading.</strong></p><h3><strong>2. Experience</strong></h3><p>It is surprising that, as juniors with no relevant experience, we made it so far. This says a lot about the <strong>importance of courage.</strong></p><h3><strong>3. Talent</strong></h3><p>I do not believe in that anymore. <strong>You can learn whatever you want, </strong>just do not hesitate to jump into greater and greater challenges all the time. Ideas do not matter, if you do not build them.</p><h3><strong>4. Team</strong></h3><p>Now we are building a new business with the same team, which is growing faster than Brickflow ever did. (Yes, a typically non-scalable business can grow faster than a potentially scalable one if you have the right setting.) Instead of spending half a year in cafés, meeting random people to establish a team, we already have a proven bunch of great people. This proves that the team is the <strong>biggest asset of an early stage startup. </strong>Now I understand why investors invest in people instead of ideas.</p><p>On the other hand, we <strong>should have hired more experienced people. </strong>A co-founder or early stage partner becomes your life partner for the venture, so pick wisely. It is hard to execute on the “hire slow, fire fast” approach, but do not forget how poisoning the wrong people can be.</p><h3><strong>5. Governance</strong></h3><p>We had no clear decision making processes and governance structure. A startup is unstable enough in terms of product market fit, so do not make your own life harder through a weak governance structure. Our new venture, <a href="http://www.lab.coop/">Lab.Coop</a>’s first hire (also partner) was an organization developer and now <a href="http://www.lab.coop/blog/holacracy-from-scratch-lab-coop-after-4-months">we are implementing holacracy</a> to <strong>have an iterative, teal and purpose driven organization with motivated partners.</strong></p><h3><strong>6. Marketing, targeting, product focus</strong></h3><p>Until the last few months we always had several products and target groups at the same time. Obviously, this was a mistake, as did not have one properly working product for too long. This resulted in wasted time and decreased our chance to reach product-market fit. <strong>You need to have a single target and validate an MVP on that market. </strong>If needed, iterate. This made the content-discovery iteration work.</p><h3><strong>7. MVP vs. vision</strong></h3><p>We mixed these up several times until the last iteration. It is key to have long term vision, but your first steps, the MVP might have little to do with that. By having a <strong>simple first product for a niche market </strong>you do not lose the big picture.</p><h3><strong>8.</strong> <strong>Product development</strong></h3><p>The biggest step forward was when we finally started to make <strong>decisions based on hard data </strong>instead of fighting with each other in front of a whiteboard. Looking back, we started to validate our assumptions in the second year of the company.</p><h3><strong>9.</strong> <strong>Public and corporate funding</strong></h3><p>Startup Chile was life saving and helped us a lot; it is an exception. On the other hand we wasted months by waiting for a potential Hungarian public grant. This was a huge mistake, along with counting on getting paid after being accepted to a startup program of Microsoft. <strong>I’m not sure if governments or corporations are more dangerous for startups.</strong></p><h3><strong>10. Growth vs. cash-flow business</strong></h3><p>Brickflow was a consumer facing, growth business. As such had a hard time raising funds in Europe due cultural and financial differences compared to the US. European consumer trends are led by the US market, but European VCs take less risk, so the US is the home of consumer facing growth businesses. <strong>Next time, with this location and funding environment, I’d focus on a cash-flow startup.</strong></p><p>To cut ourselves some slack, this time we founded not even a cash-flow, but a non-scaleable consulting service business, <a href="http://www.lab.coop/">Lab.Coop</a>.</p><h3><strong>11. Location</strong></h3><p>Because of #10, we made the mistake of putting too much energy into the European market and fundraising. When we raised the first round or at least after the launch of the content-discovery iteration, I should have moved to the USA. <strong>We wasted lots of time by talking to the wrong potential investors and business partners.</strong></p><h3><strong>12. Timing</strong></h3><p>When starting-out the social media market was still up and coming, way before its peak or saturation. Two years later, at the time of raising the second round, the early stage social media companies were not sexy anymore. <strong>Follow the trends and make sure you execute before it’s too late.</strong></p><h3><strong>13. Speed</strong></h3><p>If you look at Q3-Q4 2014 (see timeline below), you can see a very clear path, potentially leading to success. Well, for all the above reasons it came too late and we ran out of money. The same growth could have been reached within one year after the kick-off. Of course, being slow impacted timing too. <strong>Learn and iterate as fast as possible!</strong></p><h3><strong>14. Capital</strong></h3><p>In case of a growth business fundraising is a must, but the time when you are in need of capital and the right momentum for making it rarely collide. Because monetization is possible at later stages (once you have millions of users), you rely too much on funding, which is even harder in Europe. <strong>You have better chances to raise money when there is momentum for your business, than when you are in desperate need.</strong></p><h3><strong>15. Investors</strong></h3><p>As people, our investors are lovely and open minded. On the other hand they never really ran a startup and did not have domain knowledge in our specific industry.<strong> You need investors who have more experience than you</strong>, otherwise they cannot help you.</p><h3><strong>16. Transparency</strong></h3><p><strong>We have always been very transparent within the team. </strong>It was worth the effort and I’d never do it differently. This is true regarding financials, strategy and also technology. For example I’m not tech savvy, nor is my partner a business person, so we rely on each other, and transparency to each-other is key. Our employees stayed loyal and motivated even after salary cuts, and decided to join our next venture after Brickflow.</p><h3><strong>17. Learning curve</strong></h3><p>Most of our previous decisions seemed to be wrong within 3 months. This shows how much we learned.<strong> Challenge yourself every day to keep the learning curve steep</strong> enough to enjoy the journey.</p><h3><strong>18. Motivation</strong></h3><p><strong>Learning was the team’s greatest energizer</strong>: the only way to keep growth mindset people motivated.</p><h3><strong>19. Ownership</strong></h3><p><strong>The team never pushed it as hard as the founders. </strong>Partly this is why Lab.Coop is an employee owned corporation. Today, I see partners around me, instead of employees, and are able to hire partners who would have never joined Brickflow.</p><h3><strong>20. Startup bullshit</strong></h3><p>Huge growth, Silicon Valley, startupper-is-the-new-rockstar-dream had been sold to us by those who have never been there. (Yes, the young European startup scene is full of opinion leaders, VCs and founders, who have no relevant first hand experience.) Learning things the hard way will help us build much more solid ventures in the future instead of focusing on events, articles or ideas without any direct added value. It is cool to ‘pitch all the time’, <strong>but never lose focus on your users.</strong></p><h3><strong>+1. I’ve learned a lot about myself too</strong></h3><ul><li>I’m not a lone wolf, but a team player,</li><li>Single focus is the only way I can properly function, and</li><li>Being an entrepreneur is what absorbs me and makes me happy.</li></ul><p>This end is a new beginning: with Tamas Kokeny, my co-founder we have decided to launch a new business together. We have been able to convince almost the whole core team (7/8) to stick together and now we are investing all this learning into <a href="http://www.lab.coop/">Lab.Coop</a>. It was an amazing ride, <strong>thanks for all the supporters!</strong></p><h3><strong>Annex: Detailed Timeline</strong></h3><p><strong>Date: </strong>2010–2011</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>Two friends aimed to make an associative <em>brick movie</em>. Ernő sent a few second sound piece (a brick) to Mihály, who reflected with an overlapping but longer video piece, and so on. This is where the name, Brickflow originates.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>Collaborative multimedia editor to handle such a workflow. Wordpress based, Facebook sharing.</p><p><strong>Target: </strong>Artists</p><p><strong>Users: </strong>0</p><p><strong>Team:</strong> Mihály Borbély and Ernő Zoltán Rubik, a filmmaker and a musician kicked it off as a hobby project beside work.</p><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q4 2011</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>With me coming on board, the focus starts to shift towards social media and user generated content. This showed the clear difference between ideas of the two founders. A tool for artists vs. a tool for mass consumers.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>We researched the possibility to build a zoom interface (ZUI).</p><p><strong>Target: </strong>Hard core social media users</p><p><strong>Users:</strong> 0</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>I’ve joined the team remotely from Paris. Only a hobby project beside work.</p><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q1-Q2 2012</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>Beside work, the team tries to build a prototype, but we could not deliver in part time. We pitched <a href="http://www.kitchenbudapest.hu/">Kitchen Budapest</a>, but got rejected due to the lack of a prototype. This was the key trigger to start working in full time.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>First ZUI demo of the multimedia editor.</p><p><strong>Target: </strong>Hard core social media users, media professionals</p><p><strong>Users: </strong>0</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>After 6 months of intense search, Tamás Kökény (Eggdice) joins the project as technical co-founder. Only a hobby project beside work.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FJpVurNFiq-8%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DJpVurNFiq-8&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FJpVurNFiq-8%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c4786352492468f57ac9e6daf06b825f/href">https://medium.com/media/c4786352492468f57ac9e6daf06b825f/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q3 2012</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>This was the real beginning! Mihály, Tamás and I decide to dedicate the summer to Brickflow. We moved into the apartment of my grandmother in Budapest, Hungary, borrowed a laptop (as the only developer didn’t have one), asked for the WiFi code of the neighbor and started to build. The goal of the summer was to complete a prototype and to conduct a <a href="https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/brickflow-shared-playground-for-multimedia-storytelling#/story">crowdfunding campaign</a>. True #startuplife.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>ZUI multimedia content editor, using social media APIs. We had a basic demo, but not a functioning app.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>Beside the 3 core members, Ernő was still around, but started to slowly move away from the project.</p><p><strong>Funding: </strong>$10,000 on Indiegogo from FFF, but no real reach of target audience.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F46307426&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F46307426&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F322450420_1280.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f152772590e41bd6167172deee699cd4/href">https://medium.com/media/f152772590e41bd6167172deee699cd4/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F0DULbk49Qvw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D0DULbk49Qvw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F0DULbk49Qvw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d71d9cc5c1dc79769e5a55c26a91c5c4/href">https://medium.com/media/d71d9cc5c1dc79769e5a55c26a91c5c4/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q4 2012</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>The focus is get into an accelerator to learn and get some money. Pitch, pitch, pitch! The team needs to handle huge personal and financial pressure as the project did not seem to get further. After 3 months we made it into Startup Wise Guys and Startup Chile.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>Just before the accelerator we decided to create a video-like output for the editor.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>Tamás works for Prezi, while Mihály and I focus on Brickflow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/730/1*Ml2krQrYkKTGs8EvpX4DgA.jpeg" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FqP09RCKuNzk%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DqP09RCKuNzk&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FqP09RCKuNzk%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c8e3176ec1cbb151670f303cf5967e01/href">https://medium.com/media/c8e3176ec1cbb151670f303cf5967e01/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q1 2013</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>Estonia, Tallinn: <a href="http://startupwiseguys.com/">Startup Wise Guys</a>. We went there to learn. About 80 in-person mentor meetings, cool vertical networking. It was like a school, which we needed very much. However, beside learning there was no room to build or sell. The first angel, Hardi Kampus decided to invest.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>We started to rebuild everything from scratch. We wanted to launch by the end of the program, but could not release by the demo day.</p><p><strong>Target: </strong>Mentors convinced us for a while to become B2B, so we moved towards agencies and edu-tech.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>Tamás, Mihály and I moved to Tallinn and worked on Brickflow full time. We made our first hires ever: a developer and a designer.</p><p><strong>Funding: </strong>€15,000</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dKhUDuej7cJV4AuNg9B9Xg.jpeg" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FX9iQQd7GOsQ%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DX9iQQd7GOsQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FX9iQQd7GOsQ%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0ec4d6b783534ae060df8566de61a1b4/href">https://medium.com/media/0ec4d6b783534ae060df8566de61a1b4/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q2-Q3 2013</p><p><strong>Story:</strong>Santiago, Chile: <a href="http://www.startupchile.org/">Startup Chile</a>. This is a big startup program that provides a huge horizontal network of fellow early stage startuppers. We had time to execute. We made business connections and friends for life. Three other angels decided to join our seed-round: Steve Taylor, Andras Reti and Tobias Hegel. We still needed a lead investor by autumn.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>At last the social media storytelling tool was launched in August. Mainly B2C, but also targeted event organizers.</p><p><strong>Target: </strong>B2C again, using the buzz around Vine and Instagram Video. Any social media savvy, in any segment. No detailed metrics, as we were weak on measuring.</p><p><strong>Users: </strong>Gained about 10k users in the first two months.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>The designer was replaced with an outsourced team, <a href="http://uxstudio.hu/">UX Studio</a>.</p><p><strong>Funding: </strong>$40,000</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z2BEMXpV38W23RYmv0kw9A.jpeg" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FGsPcFO7WEgw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DGsPcFO7WEgw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FGsPcFO7WEgw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1bbeb5a21182c81732d6897b0349a521/href">https://medium.com/media/1bbeb5a21182c81732d6897b0349a521/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q4 2013</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>Back to Budapest to participate in <a href="http://www.icatapult.co/">iCatapult</a>’s training program, and we convinced them to invest. In October we signed the term sheet and vent to NYC with Imre Hild. By the end of the year we realized that we do not have a product market fit, so we had to iterate.</p><p><strong>Users: </strong>User growth slowed down.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/612/1*yLz-n4boEf46F8dg3tzcGw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*uPnFVyXEbRcyOlKZydPiTw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q1-Q2 2014</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>In January 2014 the investment agreement was signed. We got the resources to try new product approaches. This was the first time when we made data driven decisions, which sped us up and eliminated lots of tension within the founding team. Explaining all the iteration and the pivot to the board was not easy.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>As the social media storytelling narrative was too complex for consumers, and we wanted to stick to that market, we needed to find a much simpler case. We changed for a clearer usecase: visual content discovery. Based on the users’ previous activity, we provided them relevant content to consume and to feed their Tumblr blogs.</p><p><strong>Target: </strong>US teenagers, who have visual blogs. As first niche market, we only targeted Tumblr users.</p><p><strong>Users: </strong>Basically no new users in this period.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>First, we have hired a marketer, later on two junior developers and a financial / admin professional. Except the financial person, we failed to hire more experienced people than us.</p><p><strong>Funding:</strong> €240.000 for a one year roadmap</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*OpeRdxPbsp2niDRBjggujA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*9gAlMg5vapQfevcHoElfbg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q3 2014</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>We set up proper lean and agile product discovery and delivery process, which increased our output speed and quality. Weekly sprints with</p><ul><li>qualitative tests: A/B, copy, fake buttons, targeting;</li><li>quantitative tests: UX tests, interviews;</li><li>new releases.</li></ul><p><strong>Product: </strong>The Tumblr focused web app worked and we launched on iOS too.</p><p><strong>Users: </strong><a href="http://www.lab.coop/blog/lean-marketing-how-brickflow-made-weekly-10-growth">Weekly 10+% growth</a>, 10–20% weekly retention.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-rHaDBT_lkl2njIUfRI7sA.jpeg" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FXvDTD54l64g%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DXvDTD54l64g&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FXvDTD54l64g%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c14251b4259fd8eb2d8013b18f2667e9/href">https://medium.com/media/c14251b4259fd8eb2d8013b18f2667e9/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q4 2014</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>Even though the user acquisition and product development had never gone better, we were under huge time pressure to raise the second round of funding by December. I’ve started fundraising in Europe in September, once we have seen the hockey stick. In short: it didn’t go well, we have only convinced one German angel.</p><p><strong>Product: </strong>We tested out monetization, but an agency pilot would have required 1m+ users.</p><p><strong>Users: </strong>Ongoing growth until we ran out of money.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>The founders had strong issues with working together. Mihály, the original founder, decided to leave for good.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FJLo8QrAlZjc%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DJLo8QrAlZjc&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FJLo8QrAlZjc%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6d25aaf762cbefe7419baaedb8c4a7f2/href">https://medium.com/media/6d25aaf762cbefe7419baaedb8c4a7f2/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FAg3qa2o-r-M%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DAg3qa2o-r-M&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FAg3qa2o-r-M%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ca35c833d6e39bd34576d5bdc2abc550/href">https://medium.com/media/ca35c833d6e39bd34576d5bdc2abc550/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q1 2015</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>To keep our biggest asset, the team, we had to stop working on Brickflow and started to work for clients. It was not hard to sell our services on such a seller’s market. I was the only one, who continued with Brickflow and tried to close the open investor leads. As time passed our chance to raise the round decreased to zero. Moreover, as our lead investor was out of money, there was no chance for a follow-up investment. Also the fact that the CEO left our VC, was not a good sign for our prospect investors.</p><p><strong>Users: </strong>No more new users, increasing churn.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>Everybody stayed around, which was a pretty good feeling.</p><p><strong>Date: </strong>Q2 2015</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>Even though we survived and kept the team together, we realized that Brickflow is over. We had no chance to reboot. Our investors were understanding. We decided to go public with the story.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*XuSC7osfH7AmMSsRBnTifw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Date: </strong>Every Since</p><p><strong>Story: </strong>A product startup failed. With Tamas we decided to continue to work together and came up with the concept of a service company. <a href="http://www.lab.coop/">Lab.Coop</a> is an end-to-end product agency with inhouse UX, UI, marketing, data and software professionals. Co-ownership and holacracy enables us to bring experienced and entrepreneurial partners on board on a market that is in shortage of IT talents. We target foreign startups, as we know their problems and culture well. At the moment we make €55.000 / month.</p><p><strong>Team: </strong>From the 8 core, inhouse team members 7 decided to stick together and kick-off a new venture. Just in 5 months we have doubled the team.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1004/1*wKsbk9vIWulxRaLfIGnaSA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lab.coop/blog/the-20-1-takeaways-i-ve-learned-from-my-failed-startup"><em>www.lab.coop</em></a><em> on October 7, 2015</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=23cd6c45649b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lab-coop/the-20-1-takeaways-ive-learned-from-my-failed-startup-23cd6c45649b">The 20+1 Takeaways I’ve Learned From My Failed Startup</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lab-coop">Lab.Coop</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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