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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by RemaininEU on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by RemaininEU on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by RemaininEU on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:17:22 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[MP’s need to force Theresa May into giving the people a Ratification Referendum]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/mps-need-to-force-theresa-may-into-giving-the-people-a-ratification-referendum-cd788a753c32?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd788a753c32</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Jan 2017 22:04:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-22T22:04:01.507Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They can do this as the “price” for agreeing to trigger Article 50. This would clearly be DEMOCRACY IN ACTION.</p><p>Once the Supreme Court, as anticipated, confirm that parliament must sanction the triggering of Article 50 I expect Theresa May to quickly present a Bill to allow Article 50 to be triggered. If I am right it will be a simple Yes/No question forcing MPs into a corner — it would be a brave MP that voted NO (there are a few and they are brave).</p><p>The Government are now saying that MPs will get a vote on the deal but their plan is for MPs to have a choice between the deal as negotiated or leaving the EU without a deal — really no choice at all.</p><p>Obviously Mrs May has to appear to accept the “nuclear option” of leaving without a deal — but her <em>clever ruse</em> is unlikely to fool any of the EU negotiating team. We will end the process with a poor deal and everyone knows it.</p><p>The Brexit extremists want to leave at any cost and it is up to those opposing such a catastrophe to ensure that the UK has a way back from disaster.</p><p>I suggest that instead of trying to vote the A50 bill down MPs should instead extract a price for voting Yes and the price should be a new referendum to ratify the exit terms. Have the Bill amended to include this ratification step at the end of negotiations.</p><p>If a ratification referendum becomes part of UK law it will be very difficult for the EU to argue against the UK’s right to this option. This is explained in the blog: “<a href="https://medium.com/@peterc0206/uk-dont-trigger-article-50-without-ability-to-stop-the-process-b22e884b253d#.c5jcr4rjy">UK don’t trigger Article 50 without ability to stop the process</a>”.</p><p>Jolyon Maugham is currently seeking confirmation from the European Court of Justice that the UK can indeed unilaterally stop the withdrawal process triggered by the Article 50 (2) notification.</p><p>A number of eminent individuals are of the opinion that the process can be stopped. <em>Jean-Claude Piris, </em>a former director-general of the Council of the European Union’s Legal Service, maintains that <em>“</em><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b9fc30c8-6edb-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926">Article 50 is not for ever and the UK could change its mind</a>” (FT 01/09/2016).</p><p>The steps would be:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*ZveiBlZMqSGPeA0t7Hbq6w.jpeg" /></figure><p>If positioned correctly a referendum at the end of the process would give legitimacy to the deal if MrsMay really can get “all of our favorite things” in a new deal but, and this is key, would also allow the UK to stop the Article 50 exit process and stay in the UK if the deal is not acceptable.</p><h3>It is time for our MPs to step up and fight for our country.</h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd788a753c32" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[MPs are “demanding” the wrong thing. We need a vote AFTER we know what the exit terms are.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/mps-are-demanding-the-wrong-thing-we-need-a-vote-after-we-know-what-the-exit-terms-are-dd7178c50128?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd7178c50128</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Dec 2016 22:38:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-08T22:38:53.639Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*25vH5oYWUL1f3BmpCSNKHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>MPs must demand a ratification vote</figcaption></figure><p>It is looking like MPs will get a vote on whether or not to trigger Article 50. Good, but I worry they will squander this gift from Ms Miller and the Law Lords.</p><p>MPs need to use this as their opportunity to fix the Brexit mess once and for all. The real key is to insist on having a vote to ratify the exit terms. It is only then that the real mess will be laid bare and only the extremists will be left wanting out of the EU.</p><p>This blog describes how everyone (Leavers, Remainers, HMG and Parliament) can have a say.</p><p>It is massively important to ensure that the UK has a way of stepping back from the EU exit process, even after the EU has been properly notified of the UK’s intention to leave through Article 50 (2).</p><p>The UK can do this by enshrining a democratic withdrawal process into law. Once we have this it will be very difficult for the EU to argue against the UK’s right to this option. This is explained in the blog: “<a href="https://medium.com/@peterc0206/uk-dont-trigger-article-50-without-ability-to-stop-the-process-b22e884b253d#.c5jcr4rjy">UK don’t trigger Article 50 without ability to stop the process</a>”.</p><p>The steps would, in summary, be:</p><ol><li>Act of parliament — setting out the exit process</li><li>Checkpoint 1 before A50 notification — is there really a deal? If not then STOP the exit process at this point</li><li>A50 notification followed by Exit negotiations</li><li>Checkpoint 2 — is the deal acceptable to the UK? if Yes the continue to Exit</li><li>If not acceptable to UK (or indeed the EU) then Stop the exit process</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*2R239T0e8glVOmlY1TWqeg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>It may be necessary for us to get to the brink, look over the edge and only then realise what a stupid leaving the EU would be.</h4><h4>However, if we position things correctly, when the time came, the UK would be able to step back from the brink.</h4><h4>Articles in support of Article 50 being reversible:</h4><ol><li>Richard Corbett MEP @rcorbettmep in his excellent and thought provoking blog : <a href="http://www.richardcorbett.org.uk/truths-myths-fabians/">Truths and myths about the months to come </a>says:</li></ol><blockquote>It is unclear whether the article 50 process can be revoked once it is triggered. The treaty is silent on the question. But the balance of legal opinion is that it can be, provided it is before the two-year deadline. It must also be a genuine request, and not a device to re-set the two-year countdown.</blockquote><blockquote>Similarly, if an article 50 agreement reached in 2019 sets a date of, say, 2022, for departure, can the UK change its mind between those two dates? There is greater legal uncertainty here, but politically it is likely that a change of mind about leaving would be accepted, whereas change of mind simply on the terms or timetable would not.</blockquote><blockquote>This is important in the event of a rethink by the UK. Any referendum on the outcome of the Brexit deal, and any decision to remain, should take place before the date of Britain formally leaving the EU. Afterwards, any desire to remain in the EU would have to be pursued through an application to join afresh, under entirely different procedures and facing the standard expectations of any new member state, including, in principle, acceptance of the euro. Any accession treaty, of course, requires the unanimous consent of every member state.</blockquote><p>2. <em>Jean-Claude Piris, a former director-general of the Council of the European Union’s Legal Service, is author of ‘If the UK Votes to Leave’ maintains that “</em><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b9fc30c8-6edb-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926">Article 50 is not for ever and the UK could change its mind</a>” (FT 01/09/2016).</p><p>He argues that:</p><blockquote>… the Article 50 procedure provides for notification by the interested state only of its “intention” to leave. Formal notification of that intention would be made to the European Council, comprising the heads of government of the other 27 member states. In law, the word “intention” cannot be interpreted as a final and irreversible decision. Legally, you may withdraw an intention, or change it, or transform it into a decision. …</blockquote><blockquote>by: <a href="https://www.ft.com/stream/authorsId/OTdmYzA2OTgtOGRiZS00NjYxLTllOGEtZThlYmMyNjFmY2Mw-QXV0aG9ycw=="><strong>Jean-Claude Piris</strong></a></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd7178c50128" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What should happen now -after historic court decision?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/what-should-happen-now-after-historic-court-decision-2c1eeb6a8752?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c1eeb6a8752</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Nov 2016 14:32:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-04T18:14:16.103Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*iVhJL-fy8Yv2HokS2K9VxA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Steve Bell 30–9–16</figcaption></figure><p>After the historic court decision saying that parliament must sanction the triggering of Article 50 I would like to describe a method whereby everyone (Leavers, Remainers, HMG and Parliament) all get a say.</p><p>I still think it is massively important to ensure that the UK has a way of stepping back from the EU exit process, even after the EU has been properly notified of the UK’s intention to leave through Article 50 (2).</p><p>This approach is to enshrine a democratic withdrawal process into law. Once we have this it will be very difficult for the EU to argue against the UK’s right to this option. This is explained in the blog: “<a href="https://medium.com/@peterc0206/uk-dont-trigger-article-50-without-ability-to-stop-the-process-b22e884b253d#.c5jcr4rjy">UK don’t trigger Article 50 without ability to stop the process</a>”.</p><p>The steps would, in summary, be:</p><ol><li>Act of parliament — setting out the exit process</li><li>Checkpoint 1 before A50 notification — is there really a deal? If not then STOP the exit process at this point</li><li>A50 notification followed by Exit negotiations</li><li>Checkpoint 2 — is the deal acceptable to the UK? if Yes the continue to Exit</li><li>If not acceptable to UK (or indeed the EU) then Stop the exit process</li></ol><h3>Good News:</h3><p>In the feedback from “UK don’t trigger…” I had had a more positive outlook for the chances of the UK being able to withdraw it’s notification.</p><p>These have been from 2 sources:</p><ol><li>Richard Corbett MEP @rcorbettmep in his excellent and thought provoking blog : <a href="http://www.richardcorbett.org.uk/truths-myths-fabians/">Truths and myths about the months to come </a>says:</li></ol><blockquote>It is unclear whether the article 50 process can be revoked once it is triggered. The treaty is silent on the question. But the balance of legal opinion is that it can be, provided it is before the two-year deadline. It must also be a genuine request, and not a device to re-set the two-year countdown.</blockquote><blockquote>Similarly, if an article 50 agreement reached in 2019 sets a date of, say, 2022, for departure, can the UK change its mind between those two dates? There is greater legal uncertainty here, but politically it is likely that a change of mind about leaving would be accepted, whereas change of mind simply on the terms or timetable would not.</blockquote><blockquote>This is important in the event of a rethink by the UK. Any referendum on the outcome of the Brexit deal, and any decision to remain, should take place before the date of Britain formally leaving the EU. Afterwards, any desire to remain in the EU would have to be pursued through an application to join afresh, under entirely different procedures and facing the standard expectations of any new member state, including, in principle, acceptance of the euro. Any accession treaty, of course, requires the unanimous consent of every member state.</blockquote><p>2. <em>Jean-Claude Piris, a former director-general of the Council of the European Union’s Legal Service, is author of ‘If the UK Votes to Leave’ maintains that “</em><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b9fc30c8-6edb-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926">Article 50 is not for ever and the UK could change its mind</a>” (FT 01/09/2016).</p><p>He argues that:</p><blockquote>… the Article 50 procedure provides for notification by the interested state only of its “intention” to leave. Formal notification of that intention would be made to the European Council, comprising the heads of government of the other 27 member states. In law, the word “intention” cannot be interpreted as a final and irreversible decision. Legally, you may withdraw an intention, or change it, or transform it into a decision. …</blockquote><blockquote>by: <a href="https://www.ft.com/stream/authorsId/OTdmYzA2OTgtOGRiZS00NjYxLTllOGEtZThlYmMyNjFmY2Mw-QXV0aG9ycw=="><strong>Jean-Claude Piris</strong></a></blockquote><h3>It may be necessary for us to get to the brink, look over the edge and only then realise what a stupid idea it is. Both of these articles give me much more hope that, when the time came, the UK would be able to step back from the brink.</h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c1eeb6a8752" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Update on “Can the UK cancel Article 50 notification once given”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/update-on-can-the-uk-cancel-article-50-notification-once-given-1fcc62e2f1c1?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1fcc62e2f1c1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2016 18:11:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-30T18:11:20.483Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*iVhJL-fy8Yv2HokS2K9VxA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Steve Bell 30–9–16</figcaption></figure><p>I still think it is massively important to ensure that the UK has a way of stepping back from the EU exit process, even after the EU has been properly notified of the UK’s intention to leave through Article 50 (2).</p><p>The approach I have been pushing since June 24th has been to enshrine a democratic withdrawal process into law. Once we have this it will be very difficult for the EU to argue against the UK’s right to this option. This is explained in the blog: “<a href="https://medium.com/@peterc0206/uk-dont-trigger-article-50-without-ability-to-stop-the-process-b22e884b253d#.c5jcr4rjy">UK don’t trigger Article 50 without ability to stop the process</a>”.</p><p>The steps would, in summary, be:</p><ol><li>Act of parliament — setting out the exit process</li><li>Checkpoint 1 before A50 notification — is there really a deal? If not the STOP the exit process at this point</li><li>A50 notification followed by Exit negotiations</li><li>Checkpoint 2 — is the deal acceptable to the UK? if Yes the continue to Exit</li><li>If not acceptable to UK (or indeed the EU) then Stop the exit process</li></ol><h3>Good News:</h3><p>In the feedback from “UK don’t trigger…” I had had a more positive outlook for the chances of the UK being able to withdraw it’s notification.</p><p>These have been from 2 sources:</p><ol><li>Richard Corbett MEP @rcorbettmep in his excellent and thought provoking blog : <a href="http://www.richardcorbett.org.uk/truths-myths-fabians/">Truths and myths about the months to come </a>says:</li></ol><blockquote>It is unclear whether the article 50 process can be revoked once it is triggered. The treaty is silent on the question. But the balance of legal opinion is that it can be, provided it is before the two-year deadline. It must also be a genuine request, and not a device to re-set the two-year countdown.</blockquote><blockquote>Similarly, if an article 50 agreement reached in 2019 sets a date of, say, 2022, for departure, can the UK change its mind between those two dates? There is greater legal uncertainty here, but politically it is likely that a change of mind about leaving would be accepted, whereas change of mind simply on the terms or timetable would not.</blockquote><blockquote>This is important in the event of a rethink by the UK. Any referendum on the outcome of the Brexit deal, and any decision to remain, should take place before the date of Britain formally leaving the EU. Afterwards, any desire to remain in the EU would have to be pursued through an application to join afresh, under entirely different procedures and facing the standard expectations of any new member state, including, in principle, acceptance of the euro. Any accession treaty, of course, requires the unanimous consent of every member state.</blockquote><p>2. <em>Jean-Claude Piris, a former director-general of the Council of the European Union’s Legal Service, is author of ‘If the UK Votes to Leave’ maintains that “</em><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b9fc30c8-6edb-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926">Article 50 is not for ever and the UK could change its mind</a>” (FT 01/09/2016).</p><p>He argues that:</p><blockquote>… the Article 50 procedure provides for notification by the interested state only of its “intention” to leave. Formal notification of that intention would be made to the European Council, comprising the heads of government of the other 27 member states. In law, the word “intention” cannot be interpreted as a final and irreversible decision. Legally, you may withdraw an intention, or change it, or transform it into a decision. …</blockquote><blockquote>by: <a href="https://www.ft.com/stream/authorsId/OTdmYzA2OTgtOGRiZS00NjYxLTllOGEtZThlYmMyNjFmY2Mw-QXV0aG9ycw=="><strong>Jean-Claude Piris</strong></a></blockquote><h3>It may be necessary for us to get to the brink, look over the edge and only then realise what a stupid idea it is. Both of these articles give me much more hope that, when the time came, the UK would be able to step back from the brink.</h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1fcc62e2f1c1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Freedom of Movement in the UK — Mismanaged, Misrepresented and Ms May]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/freedom-of-movement-in-the-uk-mismanaged-misrepresented-and-ms-may-e2faa475c018?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e2faa475c018</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2016 12:50:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-30T12:50:48.207Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Mg1VPCiU2T5MZkId." /></figure><h3>What has Theresa May got against EU migrants? Why is she always looking to rubbish their contribution?</h3><p>Theresa May has made stopping EU FoM a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pestonitv/posts/1675210406137031)">red-line</a> in the upcoming negotiations with the EU even , it would appear, at the the cost of loosing our membership of the Single Market.</p><p>There is plainly a large proportion of the electorate against immigration in general and against the Free Movement of workers into the UK in particular. However as Tony_nog explains in his excellent blog <a href="https://musealoudblog.wordpress.com/2016/09/25/korean-brexit/%20via%20@tony_nog">When is a Majority not a Majority? Brexit and Korean Restaurants </a>there is no way that anyone can suggest that there is a majority in favour of stopping FoM at the expense of loosing our trading position with the EU — and it has been made very clear to all that the UK cannot have both.</p><p>So why has Theresa May taken this somewhat extreme position?</p><p>If one looks at her behavior over the past few years, it does begin to show a pattern.</p><h3>2013</h3><p>In April of this year Theresa May, when Home Secretary, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10014508/Britain-and-Germany-demand-EU-cracks-down-on-benefits-tourism.html">claimed</a> that these EU migrants are <strong>“benefit tourists”</strong>. When pressed by the EU for evidence of this claim it came to light that in fact there was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10361971/Britain-admits-it-has-no-figures-on-EU-welfare-tourist-numbers.html">no evidence</a> to back these claims as the British government keeps no figures on how many European Union nationals claim welfare payments in the UK.</p><h3>2014</h3><p>It is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/27/theresa-may-accused-trying-to-alter-immigration-report-before-brexit-vote?CMP=share_btn_tw">now being reported</a> that Theresa May tried very hard to suppress any positive findings in a report on EU migration. Theresa May faces accusations from within government that she tried to <strong>remove evidence</strong>about the positive impact of immigration on the British economy from a critical report that was published before the EU referendum.</p><h3>2015</h3><p>Again whilst Home Secretary, at the Autumn <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/06/reality-check-is-theresa-may-right-about-immigration">Tory party conference</a>, Theresa May claimed that <strong>immigration is pushing thousands out of work</strong>, undercutting wages and bringing no economic benefit to the UK.</p><p>These are just not the facts, as any number of studies show. These claims are debunked in the blog <a href="http://wp.me/p7LzAR-3q">Freedom of Movement isn’t the problem</a></p><h3>2016</h3><p>A new book, <em>All Out War: The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain’s Political Class</em>, by <em>Sunday Times</em> political editor Tim Shipman, claims May <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/25/brexit-books-david-cameron-theresa-may-party-split?CMP=share_btn_tw">refused to support Cameron</a>’s hardline approach to negotiations with EU leaders and rejected his plans to ask for an “emergency brake” on immigration — a stance Cameron described as “lily-livered”.</p><p>Cameron’s director of communications, Sir Craig Oliver, says in his exposé of Downing Street that the former prime minister’s advisers used the nickname “Submarine May” because she never came to the surface to support his efforts. In his book, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/26/david-camerons-spin-doctor-writing-book-eu-referendum"><em>Unleashing Demons: The Inside Story of the EU Referendum</em></a>, published in the <em>Mail on Sunday</em>, Cameron’s chief spin doctor says the prime minister pleaded with May to “come off the fence” about Brexit.</p><h3>How fanciful would it be to suggest that the June plebiscite is being hijacked to satisfy a personal vendetta?</h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e2faa475c018" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[FoM isn’t the problem. The problems are UK Government’s failure to implement properly]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/fom-isnt-the-problem-the-problems-are-uk-government-s-failure-to-implement-properly-a0ef44bcbb70?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a0ef44bcbb70</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2016 12:48:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-30T12:48:38.466Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Myth Buster — Debunking the horror stories surrounding the EU Freedom of Movement directive.</em></p><p><em>Currently Theresa May has made stopping FoM a red-line issue even at the expense of the UK’s membership of the Single Market.</em></p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>One of the four freedoms enjoyed by EU citizens is the free movement of workers. This includes the rights of movement and residence for workers, the rights of entry and residence for family members, and the right to work in another Member State and be treated on an equal footing with nationals of that Member State. Restrictions apply in some countries for citizens of Member States that have recently acceded to the EU.</p><p>There appears to be 4 major arguments in favour of stopping EU migrants exercising this freedom to come and work in the UK. It is my intention to debunk each of these arguments as plainly false.</p><h3>Claim 1 — “Inability for the UK to control migration into the UK”</h3><p><em>The rules and safeguards for the Freedom of Movement can be found </em><a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.3.html"><em>here</em></a></p><p><em>A summary of these rules are:</em></p><p>Freedom for a citizen of another EU member state to move to the UK applies to</p><ul><li>Economically active EU-citizens (i.e. working) + their families if EU-citizens</li><li>Non-economically active EU-citizens for up to 3-months</li><li>Non-economically active (not working) EU-citizens longer than 3-months provided they can show they have sufficient finance and they take out a comprehensive sickness insurance policy</li></ul><p>FoM does not apply to</p><ul><li>Non-economically active EU-citizens without funds</li><li>Non-economically active EU-citizens without sickness insurance</li><li>EU-citizens who have no realistic chance of working</li><li>Family members of an EU citizen who is not an EU Citizen may reside in the UK but does not have an automatic right to work</li></ul><p>Benefits</p><ul><li>EU-citizens working in the UK acquire rights to benefits after working for a period</li><li>EU-citizens not working do not have rights to Benefits</li></ul><p>The UK has the right to restrict FoM through:</p><ul><li>Suspension of the FoM for up to 7 years from when a new member country joins by</li><li>Preventing/prohibiting movement or</li><li>UK can insist upon work permits for each migrant</li><li>Benefit/Welfare “tourism” is illegal</li></ul><p>No-one prosecuted to-date as UK not tracking the issue</p><p>UK has chosen not to enforce these restrictions</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*TItgZRJd84ST6QSC." /></figure><p>There is a view that our politicians have either misunderstood these provisions or deliberately ignored them — read this blog from 2013 by Professor Brad Blitz for his <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/10/25/british-politicians-are-clearly-misreading-eu-provisions-regarding-freedom-of-movement/">view</a>.</p><h4>UK chose not to control the 2004 inflow of migrants</h4><p>Certainly it is true that one of the sharpest rises in net migration came in <a href="http://www.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_18_09.pdf">2004</a>, when the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined. However it is also fact that the UK was one of only 3 of the original EU members to choose not to apply transitional restrictions on these eight countries and as such the UK invited this surge. They could have avoided it if they wished. Restrictions can apply for up to 7 years after a new member joins the EU and there are provisions to restrict movement if there should be any localised “surges”.</p><h4>UK does not know or track how many migrants are in the country</h4><p>It is important to realise that the UK does not know how many EU migrants are in the country, as migrants are not checked or tracked. The numbers provided by Government are estimates only. The total migrant population is measured through the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Annual Population Survey (APS), which aggregates and supplements LFS data to improve statistical accuracy. The annual movement of migrants is measured primarily through the International Passenger Survey (IPS), which surveys passengers at UK ports, with additional data on migration to and from Northern Ireland and Home Office data on asylum seekers.</p><p>The UK could have managed the inflow of EU migrants and chose not to.</p><h3>Claim 2 — “Need to restrict and /or eliminate so called “Benefit Fraud” and “Welfare Tourism””</h3><p>An ongoing claim of the anti-EU lobby has been that EU migrants are coming to the UK merely to access public services and the host state’s benefits system. Indeed the UK Prime Minister Theresa May, when Home Secretary, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10014508/Britain-and-Germany-demand-EU-cracks-down-on-benefits-tourism.html">claimed</a> that these citizens are “benefit tourists.” However, whilst this has not stopped Ms May making this claim, the British government keeps no figures on how many <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/">European Union</a> nationals claim welfare payments in the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/">UK</a> and so there is <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10361971/Britain-admits-it-has-no-figures-on-EU-welfare-tourist-numbers.html">no evidence</a> to back these claims.</p><p>Actually, <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-does-benefits-tourism-exist-22279">when checked</a> then rather than being a “unacceptable burden” our EU migrants are contributing significantly to the economy, far more than their UK-native counterparts.</p><p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-does-benefits-tourism-exist-22279">FactCheck</a> study on these claims showed that EU migrants rather than being a drain on the UK bank balance actually contribute significantly, far more than their UK-native counterparts.</p><p>According to the European Commission, between 2004 and 2009 free movement from newer member countries increased the GDP of the old EU member countries by <a href="http://www.google.be/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;frm=1&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;cad=rja&amp;ved=0CC0QFjAA&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fsocial%2FBlobServlet%3FdocId%3D7294%26langId%3Den&amp;ei=YGqfUuCdCa-e7AaokYCQDw&amp;usg=AFQjCNEJxJM31JhXmfA82MrGLUvwwz5GNQ&amp;bvm=bv.57155469,d.ZGU">almost one percent</a>.</p><p>A <a href="http://www.cream-migration.org/files/FiscalEJ.pdf">further study</a> showed that where UK-natives (during 2001–2011) claimed more than they paid in Tax the reverse was the case for EU Migrants who contributed significantly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*BUprReGP26k1JECG." /></figure><p>So there is no Benefit Tourism that the UK can point to however, even if there were migrants abusing the system as claimed then the FoM directive is clear. The directive enables Member States to adopt the necessary measures to refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred in the event of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience. Article 35 of the directive expressly grants Member States the power, in the event of abuse or fraud, to withdraw any right conferred by the directive. The Migrant could be removed from the UK as well as prosecuted for Fraud.</p><p>The problem would seem to be more one of lack of control by the UK Government rather than “Benefit Tourism” by migrants.</p><h3>Claim 3 — “Migrants reduce wages and take jobs of the UK-natives”</h3><p>Another false claim I’m afraid.</p><p><a href="http://w.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_03_08.pdf">This paper</a> from the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM) at UCL found that immigration depressed wages slightly for the very low paid between 1997 and 2005. But the overall effect over the whole wage distribution was slightly positive.</p><p><a href="http://ftp.iza.org/dp3756.pdf">Another report</a> looked specifically at the period when the UK experienced a surge of EU migration 2004–2006 and found “Despite anecdotal evidence, we found little hard evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant unemployment in the UK between 2004 and 2006.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*OIxzCuB8nEQPifUw." /></figure><p>Research commissioned by the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257235/analysis-of-the-impacts.pdf">Migration Advisory Committee</a> found that “inflows of working-age EU migrants did not have a statistically significant association with native employment” between 1995 and 2010.</p><p>Finally a study <a href="http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit05.pdf">Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK</a> concluded:</p><ul><li>There is also little effect of EU immigration on inequality through reducing the pay and jobs of less skilled UK workers. Changes in wages and joblessness for less educated UKborn workers show little correlation with changes in EU immigration.</li><li>EU immigrants pay more in taxes than they take out in welfare and the use of public services. They therefore help reduce the budget deficit. Immigrants do not have a negative effect on local services such as crime, education, health, or social housing</li></ul><h3>Claim 4 — “Unfair pressures on the NHS and public services caused by this uncontrolled mass migration”</h3><p>This would, on the face of it, provide the most pressing argument in the case against FoM. Surely uncontrolled migration into an area could and has swamped local services and increased pressure on Public Services such as increased NHS waiting times.</p><p>Well, the first thing to consider is that the UK has singularly failed to apply the controls available to manage the movement of migrants, opting not to impose transitional restrictions in 2004 and failing to even track where EU migrants are. The truth is the Government do not know if this is an issue or not.</p><p>However, once again, facts disprove these allegations and a <a href="http://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/working-paper-series/working-paper-005">study of nationwide immigration data</a> shows that immigration actually reduced waiting times for outpatient referrals. On average, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of migrants living in a local authority would reduce waiting times by 9 days.</p><p>A Channel4 <a href="http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-eu-immigration/23016">FactCheck</a> on the topic concludes:</p><p>“The Office for Budget Responsibility accepts the basic point that immigrants tend to improve the country’s finances. A major cut in immigration would mean tax hikes or more spending cuts, the watchdog has said.</p><p>This is because migrants tend to be younger and healthier, so they are more likely to be in work and paying taxes and less likely to be retired or to need healthcare.</p><p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522811/HMRC-Ad_Hoc_Stats_Release-EEA_Nationals_net_contribution_2013-2014.pdf">HMRC</a> recently said that recently arrived EEA nationals paid £3.1bn in income tax and national insurance in 2013/2014. They took out £0.56bn in HMRC benefits.</p><p>Of course, this kind of macroeconomic analysis cannot capture the experiences of people living in areas that have seen very high levels of EU immigration, so we can’t rule out incidents of pressure on local services.”</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>I think it is pretty clear that there has been a concerted effort to show the FoM in a bad light and our current Conservative Government and Theresa May in particular must shoulder some of the blame for this.</p><p>The FoM has increased GDP (by an estimated 1%), has increased tax revenues (by a net £2b over benefits claimed), provided the largest source of labour for an otherwise impoverished NHS and also provided the freedom for 1.4m UK citizens to work or retire all over Europe.</p><p>The problems are in the main perceived rather than real and are exacerbated by the sheer incompetence of successive governments and the Home Office (again including the 6 years that Theresa May has been in charge). A failure to implement the available controls, manage or indeed even track the migration of labour into the UK. A shameful state of affairs that has contributed in no small part to the current Brexit debacle.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a0ef44bcbb70" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[UK don’t trigger Article 50 without ability to stop the process]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/uk-dont-trigger-article-50-without-ability-to-stop-the-process-b22e884b253d?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b22e884b253d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Sep 2016 23:50:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-18T23:50:56.299Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Either don’t trigger A50 at all or at least build in a mechanism to stop the withdrawal if the exit deal not in the UK’s best interests.</strong></p><p>If the UK enters negotiations with the EU without the ability to stop the process the EU negotiators will hold all the negotiating power.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*FJpxiffZjsiFflLuGX2BfQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>At present the wording of Article 50 is silent on the possibility for the UK to withdraw it’s notification to leave the EU once given. It has commonly been accepted that this means the UK cannot withdraw notification once given.</p><p>The author believes that it would be irresponsible of the UK to enter into exit negotiations with the EU without the ability to stop the process should it become clear that leaving is not in the UK’s best interests.</p><p>This paper examines how the UK can gain agreement from<strong> </strong>the EU for the UK to have a ratification process at the end of negotiations.</p><p>The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution have recently release a report on — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50 </a>12th. Sept 2016. As the most authoritative and independent review available, the author refers to this report throughout this paper.</p><p>It is generally accepted that if the UK had a method of stopping the EU exit process (triggered by notification under Article 50) it would strengthen the UK’s negotiating position however, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution recommend that the UK assume that Article 50, once triggered, cannot be withdrawn without the agreement of the EU.</p><p>However the HoL report does also go to explain that the UK will particularly strengthen the legal position if they enact primary legislation to define how they will operate the Article 50 process and the UK will have a strong case to argue that any mechanisms enshrined with an Act of Parliament form our “constitutional requirements”.</p><p>This paper suggests the UK does indeed enact primary legislation to define the Article 50 process and include 2 checkpoints:</p><p><strong>Checkpoint 1</strong></p><p>If there is no sensible deal possible then the process may end here and an expensive negotiations exercise is avoided.</p><p>It is there is the possibility of a sensible deal then Article 50 will be triggered and the negotiations will take place.</p><p><strong>Checkpoint 2</strong></p><p>At the end of the negotiations their will be a democratic decision taken whether to ratify the Exit deal or not. This might take the form of a Parliamentary vote, a further (2nd) referendum or in a General Election with the candidates in each constituency either supporting or opposing the deal on offer.</p><p>The UK may decide to continue with the exit terms negotiated and leave the EU.</p><p>Should the democratic decision of the UK be that the deal on offer is not in the UK’s best interests then the UK would be able to withdraw it’s notification and stop the withdrawal process.</p><p><strong>Rationale for a Checkpoint 2</strong></p><p>There is a very real possibility that, without change, the UK is heading for a very Hard Brexit whether we want it or not.</p><p>If we “just do it” and trigger Article 50 notification of the UK’s intent to leave the EU as the John Redwoods et al encourage us then we effectively trigger a Hard Brexit. As soon as the UK notify the EU of our intent to leave the EU under Article 50 (2) we effectively hand over all negotiating power to the EU. They could, in theory, just let the 2-year clock run down and the UK would cease to be a member of the EU and no longer a party to the EU treaties.</p><p>It is hard to imagine a better way to ensure that Brexit is Hard than to trigger Article 50 without the ability to reverse the UK’s notification.</p><p>By providing for a democratic ratification process for the UK at the end of the negotiation process the UK will have the ability to stop and indeed step away from the withdrawal process should it be necessary.</p><p>The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution have recently examined this matter and concluded that:</p><blockquote><em>It is unclear whether a notification under Article 50, once made, could be unilaterally withdrawn by the UK without the consent of other EU member states. In the light of the uncertainty that exists on this point, and given that the uncertainty would only ever be resolved after Article 50 had already been triggered, we consider that it would be prudent for Parliament to work on the assumption that the triggering of Article 50 is an action that the UK cannot unilaterally reverse.</em></blockquote><blockquote>House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 5 para 13</blockquote><p>It would seem an eminently sensible approach for the UK to assume that notification under Article 50 (2) cannot be withdrawn without agreement from the EU.</p><p>Notwithstanding this caution, it is worth considering how much better our negotiating position would be if we could get the EU to agree that the UK could withdraw notification. It is a prize worth fighting for and it will avoid the nightmare scenario of the UK defaulting into a Hard Brexit as the negotiating period runs out.</p><p><strong>Act of Parliament, Resolution or Motion?</strong></p><p>The key dependency upon this approach working is that the Government accept that they need to involve Parliament. They are currently arguing that they can trigger Article 50 notification, undertake negotiations and withdraw from the EU using powers reserved under the Royal Prerogative.</p><p>This stance is being challenged in the Courts and the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, after taking evidence, have concluded that to continue with this position would be foolhardy:</p><blockquote><em>It would be constitutionally inappropriate, not to mention setting a disturbing precedent, for the Executive to act on an advisory referendum without explicit parliamentary approval — particularly one with such significant long-term consequences. The Government should not trigger Article 50 without consulting Parliament.</em></blockquote><blockquote>House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 8 para 24</blockquote><p>The select Committee then review the appropriateness of an Act of Parliament, a Resolution or a Parliamentary motion in defining the Article 50 process.</p><blockquote><em>An Act of Parliament would ensure that any constitutional uncertainties are avoided, and make certain that Parliament has the opportunity properly to debate the issues at hand and define in law the “constitutional requirements” that must be met before<br>Article 50 is triggered. Resolutions would allow Parliament swiftly to demonstrate its position on the triggering of Article 50, while — in the case of a motion simply setting out that position — keeping that issue separate from wider debates about Parliament’s proper role in the negotiation process.</em></blockquote><blockquote>House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 15 para 44</blockquote><p>It is clear that an Act of Parliament is the most appropriate vehicle in order to define our “constitutional requirements” in law. As this phrase is key to gaining the EU acceptance of a ratification step for the UK it is essential that the UK do indeed enact primary legislation through an Act of Parliament for this Article 50 process.</p><p><strong>Advantages to HMG in introducing legislation for Article 50 process</strong></p><p>The Government are facing legal challenge, censure from the House of Lords, and Parliamentary revolt when they do eventually have to enact or repeal some law. It would seem like a sensible path for Government to adopt an approach that avoids these obstacles. The most appropriate route would appear to be the introduction of an Act of Parliament to manage and control the negotiation process.</p><p>However , as it stands, the Government might feel that trying to take primary legislation through Parliament with their slender majority and the groundswell of Remain public opinion might actually be an impossible task. However there is a way to structure the legislation that would bring the moderate Leavers and Remainers in both Parliament and the country along with them.</p><p>The fact that the UK would have the option to walk away from the negotiations will improve the possibility of negotiating a reasonable agreement.</p><p>The Select Committee report does confirm that the UK could use the Act of Parliament to improve it’s legal standing when triggering Article 50 and the author believes we could also use the Act to control a Ratification process at the end of negotiations and this too would then become part of the UK’s <em>“constitutional requirements”</em></p><blockquote><em>Given the nature of the UK’s constitution, resting as it does on Acts of Parliament, convention and common law, the contents of any legislation would become part of the UK’s “constitutional requirements” for the purposes of Article 50. This means that Parliament could choose to set out requirements that would allow it to take control of the process by which Article 50 was to be triggered. For example, an Act could state that Parliament authorised the UK Government to trigger Article 50 if — and only if — the Government had first presented for parliamentary approval its proposal for the UK’s new relationship with the EU on the basis of which it intended to negotiate. We note in addition that if Parliament required the Government to meet certain prerequisites before Article 50 could be triggered, it would strengthen the Government’s position against those in the EU who argue that no negotiations, even informal, should take place before Article 50 has been invoked.</em></blockquote><blockquote>House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 10 para 32</blockquote><p>The Select Committee recommend the first checkpoint i.e. the ability to call a halt before notification under Article 50.</p><p>The author recommends including a second checkpoint where the UK can ratify the deal(s) following negotiations.</p><p>This two checkpoint approach would strengthen the UK’s position to negotiate before we trigger Article 50 and it follows that we can also strengthen our position during and after negotiations as well.</p><p>It is important to note that even if acceptable terms are agreed, Article 50 requires that the other 27 EU members would need to ratify the agreement. If they cannot ratify the agreement then, unless we have the ability to stop the process, the UK would just cease to be a member without any agreement.</p><p>If we want to have a soft landing then the UK must be able to withdraw it’s notification under Article 50 (2) if either the UK or the EU cannot ratify the deal(s) on offer.</p><h3>Why would the EU agree to the UK being able to withdraw notification of it’s intent to leave the EU?</h3><p>The challenge that has come from many quarters is why the EU would agree to such a mechanism as it obviously weakens their own position?</p><p>Well, despite statements made during the Referendum campaign, the EU is deeply democratic and utterly predicable. It is my contention that if the mechanism is correctly structured, the EU would not be able to refuse.</p><p>For the UK’s ratification step to gain EU acceptance the approach will need to demonstrate that it is:</p><ul><li><strong>Compliant with Article 50</strong></li><li><strong>“in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</strong></li><li><strong>Fair to EU citizens</strong></li><li><strong>Non-discriminatory between nationalities</strong></li><li><strong>Democratic</strong></li></ul><p>If the UK present a plan/approach that meets these criteria the EU will support it, in fact it would be utterly incredible for them to do anything else.</p><p>Similarly the European Court of Justice could intervene and interpret Article 50 as not permitting a notification, once duly given, to be withdrawn. But to reach that decision — which is not to be found in any overt provision — in the teeth of a democratically enacted law by a national Parliament which has a wholly democratic final decision — would itself be damaging to the reputation of the EU.</p><p>So, does the plan as outlined meet this criteria? Let’s take them one at a time:</p><p><strong>1. Compliant with </strong><a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html"><strong>Article 50</strong></a></p><p>We will need to frame our approach to conform with Article 50.</p><p>Article 50 Section 4 provides for a ratification process for the Union members and it would be very difficult indeed for the EU to argue that the UK should not provide for a similar, wholly democratic ratification step themselves.</p><p><strong>2. “in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</strong></p><p>This is the key point in Article 50. As the UK does not have a single written constitution, Parliament is the supreme decision-making body — and since this situation has not previously arisen, it is for Parliament to decide on those constitutional arrangements.</p><blockquote><em>Given the nature of the UK’s constitution, resting as it does on Acts of Parliament, convention and common law, the contents of any legislation would become part of the UK’s “constitutional requirements” for the purposes of Article 50. This means that Parliament could choose to set out requirements that would allow it to take control of the process by which Article 50 was to be triggered.</em></blockquote><blockquote>House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a>12/9/16 page 10 para 32</blockquote><p>If the UK approach is encompassed by an Act of Parliament it can set out whatever steps felt necessary and again the EU would find it very difficult to challenge. These will become our “constitutional requirements”.</p><p><strong>3. Fair to EU citizens</strong></p><p>This includes being fair to UK UK citizens. Article 50 provides for the other member states to ratify, by qualified majority, the deal being offered to the UK. If our UK Withdrawal from the EU Bill provides a ratification process for the UK citizens it will be seen as fair.</p><p><strong>4. Non-discriminatory</strong></p><p>If the ratification process is to involve a popular vote then it would be expected that all EU citizens directly impacted would have a vote. This would extend the electorate beyond the UK, Eire, Malta and Cyprus to include all EU citizens resident in the UK plus all UK citizens living outside the UK. With this enfranchisement such a popular vote would not be challenged by the EU.</p><p><strong>5. Democratic</strong></p><p>UK could satisfy the requirement to be democratic by having a vote as part of the ratification process. This might take the form of a Parliamentary vote, a further referendum (with the electorate as outlined above) or in a General Election with the candidates in each constituency either supporting or opposing the deal on offer. Any of these options would be seen as wholly democratic and not subject to challenge.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>In the scenario outlined above the ratification decision will have been sanctioned and controlled by UK law, as recommended by the HoL Select Committee on the Constitution and the EU would, with their inherent democratic and fair-minded structure have to accept the process including the two defined checkpoints thus providing the UK with the ability to stop the process if the UK so wish.</p><p>As Sir David Edward told the House of Lords in May 2015** “It is absolutely clear that <strong>you cannot be forced to go through with it if you do not want to</strong>: for example, if there is a change of Government.” and the UK would remain in the EU.</p><p>*****************************************************************</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*Uy8V4GfPn3ZmU2OO94ATsw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>References</em></p><p><em>*Richard Tunnicliffe discusses this in his blog site in an article Negotiation Brexit — </em><a href="http://howshouldyouvote.co.uk/"><em>Shades of Article 50</em></a><em> @howshouldwevote.</em></p><p><em>** The EU Committee of the House of Lords considered this question in its report on “</em><a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf"><em>the process of withdrawing from the European Union</em></a><em>” published on 4th May.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b22e884b253d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Avoiding a Hard Brexit]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/avoiding-a-hard-brexit-5e9f7d2369cb?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5e9f7d2369cb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Sep 2016 22:47:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-14T22:47:32.638Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*bDupHZh284gR4tAgWoxR5g.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Incorporating a ratification step to the Article 50 process.</h4><p>Based upon the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16</p><p>The House of Lords Select Committee for the Constitution have recently reviewed the implications of invoking Article 50.</p><p>On 12th September 2016 they issued a report on their findings and recommendations <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a>.</p><p>This paper examines these findings and suggests a way forward for the Government that could bring the moderate Leave and Remain camps together. If adopted, this approach could also remove the possibility of a protracted legal battle, censure, by-election embarrassment and Parliamentary defeats.</p><p>There is a very real possibility that, without change, the UK is heading for a very Hard Brexit whether we want it or not. If we “just do it” and trigger Article 50 notification of the UK’s intent to leave the EU as the John Redwoods et al encourage us then we effectively trigger a Hard Brexit. As soon as the UK notify the EU of our intent to leave the EU under Article 50 (2) we effectively hand over all negotiating power to the EU. They could, in theory, just let the 2-year clock run down and the UK would cease to be a member of the EU and no longer a party to the EU treaties.</p><p>It is hard to imagine a better way to ensure that Brexit is Hard than to trigger Article 50 without the ability to reverse the UK’s notification.</p><p>This document looks at how the UK can build in a reversal mechanism to Article 50 notification and also how the UK can get the EU to agree to this approach. Providing a <strong>“Soft Landing” </strong>option.</p><p>The key dependency upon this approach working is that the Government accept that they need to involve Parliament. They are currently arguing that they can trigger Article 50 notification, undertake negotiations and withdraw from the EU using powers reserved under the Royal Prerogative.</p><p>This stance is being challenged in the Courts and the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, after taking evidence, have concluded that to continue with this position would be foolhardy:</p><blockquote>It would be constitutionally inappropriate, not to mention setting a disturbing precedent, for the Executive to act on an advisory referendum without explicit parliamentary approval — particularly one with such significant long-term consequences. The Government should not trigger Article 50 without consulting Parliament. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 8 para 24</blockquote><p>And the select Committee go on to say that an Act of Parliament is the best way to confirm our legal status and to control the process:</p><blockquote>We consider it constitutionally appropriate that the assent of both Houses be sought for the triggering of Article 50.</blockquote><blockquote>An Act of Parliament would ensure that any constitutional uncertainties are avoided, and make certain that Parliament has the opportunity properly to debate the issues at hand and define in law the “constitutional requirements” that must be met before Article 50 is triggered. Resolutions would allow Parliament swiftly to demonstrate its position on the triggering of Article 50, while — in the case of a motion simply setting out that position — keeping that issue separate from wider debates about Parliament’s proper role in the negotiation process.</blockquote><blockquote>We consider that either mechanism would be a constitutionally appropriate means for the Government to secure parliamentary approval for the triggering of Article 50. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 15 paras 43.44,45</blockquote><p>The Government are facing legal challenge, censure from the House of Lords, and Parliamentary revolt when they do eventually have to enact or repeal some law. It would seem like a sensible path for Government to adopt an approach that avoids these obstacles. The most appropriate route would appear to be the introduction of an Act of Parliament to manage and control the negotiation process.</p><p>However , as it stands, the Government might feel that trying to take primary legislation through Parliament with their slender majority and the groundswell of Remain public opinion might actually be an impossible task. However there is a way to structure the legislation that would bring the moderate Leavers and Remainers in both Parliament and the country along with them.</p><p>The proposition of this paper is that the Government should indeed enact an Act of Parliament and they should include two checkpoints , one at the beginning of negotiations and one at the end.</p><p>If it looks like there is no sensible deal to be had then the UK would stop the process at the first checkpoint, before Article 50 is triggered.</p><p>If a reasonable, workable, deal looks possible then the UK would trigger Article 50 and pursue a deal(s) with the EU through a defined negotiating process.</p><p>At the end of this process, in parallel with the EU ratifying the deal, the UK will also have a second checkpoint, in the form of our own democratic ratification process (see below) that will confirm the UK is leaving the EU.</p><p>However, and this is the main point of writing this paper, if the democratic view at this second checkpoint is that the deal is not worth pursuing then the UK reserves a right to withdraw it’s Article 50 notification.</p><p>This approach should satisfy majorities in both the Leave and Remain camps as it provides for Leaving the EU if a sensible deal can be found whilst also providing a mechanism for the UK to stop the withdrawal process if it becomes clear that Leaving is not in the UK’s best interests.</p><p>The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution have recently examined this matter and concluded that:</p><blockquote>It is unclear whether a notification under Article 50, once made, could be unilaterally withdrawn by the UK without the consent of other EU member states. In the light of the uncertainty that exists on this point, and given that the uncertainty would only ever be resolved after Article 50 had already been triggered, we consider that it would be prudent for Parliament to work on the assumption that the triggering of Article 50 is an action that the UK cannot unilaterally reverse. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 5 para 13</blockquote><p>This would seem an eminently sensible approach for the UK to assume that Article 50 cannot be withdrawn without agreement from the EU.</p><p>Notwithstanding this caution, it is worth considering how much better our negotiating position would be if we could get the EU to agree that the UK could withdraw notification. It is a prize worth fighting for and it will avoid the nightmare scenario of the UK defaulting into a Hard Brexit as the negotiating period runs out.</p><p>The Select Committee report does confirm that the UK could use the Act of Parliament to improve it’s legal standing when triggering Article 50 and I believe we could also use the Act to control a Ratification process at the end of negotiations and this too would then become part of the UK’s <em>“constitutional requirements”</em></p><blockquote>Given the nature of the UK’s constitution, resting as it does on Acts of Parliament, convention and common law, the contents of any legislation would become part of the UK’s “constitutional requirements” for the purposes of Article 50. This means that Parliament could choose to set out requirements that would allow it to take control of the process by which Article 50 was to be triggered. For example, an Act could state that Parliament authorised the UK Government to trigger Article 50 if — and only if — the Government had first presented for parliamentary approval its proposal for the UK’s new relationship with the EU on the basis of which it intended to negotiate. We note in addition that if Parliament required the Government to meet certain prerequisites before Article 50 could be triggered, it would strengthen the Government’s position against those in the EU who argue that no negotiations, even informal, should take place before Article 50 has been invoked. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 10 para 32</blockquote><p>This two checkpoint approach would strengthen the UK’s position to negotiate before we trigger Article 50 and it follows that we can also strengthen our position during and after negotiations as well.</p><p>Even if acceptable terms are agreed, Article 50 requires that the other 27 EU members would need to ratify the agreement and if they cannot ratify the agreement then the UK would just cease to be a member without any agreement.</p><p>If we want to have a soft landing then the UK must be able to withdraw it’s notification under Article 50 (2) if either the UK or the EU cannot ratify the deal(s) on offer.</p><h3>Why would the EU agree to Article 50 notification being reversible?</h3><p>The challenge that has come from many quarters is why the EU would agree to such a mechanism as it obviously weakens their own position?</p><p>Well, despite statements made during the Referendum campaign, the EU is deeply democratic and utterly predicable. It is my contention that if the mechanism is correctly structured, the EU would not be able to refuse.</p><p>For the UK’s ratification step to gain EU acceptance the approach will need to demonstrate that it is:</p><p>· Compliant with Article 50</p><p>· “in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</p><p>· Fair to EU citizens</p><p>· Non-discriminatory between nationalities</p><p>· Democratic</p><p>If the UK present a plan/approach that meets these criteria the EU will support it, in fact it would be utterly incredible for them to do anything else.</p><p>Similarly the European Court of Justice could intervene and interpret Article 50 as not permitting a notification, once duly given, to be withdrawn. But to reach that decision — which is not to be found in any overt provision — in the teeth of a democratically enacted law by a national Parliament which has a wholly democratic final decision — would itself be damaging to the reputation of the EU.</p><p>So, does the plan as outlined meet this criteria? Let’s take them one at a time:</p><h3>Compliant with <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html">Article 50</a></h3><p>We will need to frame our approach to conform with Article 50.</p><p>Article 50 Section 4 provides for a ratification process for the Union members and it would be very difficult indeed for the EU to argue that the UK should not provide for a similar, wholly democratic ratification step themselves.</p><h3>“in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</h3><p>This is the key point in Article 50. As the UK does not have a single written constitution, Parliament is the supreme decision-making body — and since this situation has not previously arisen, it is for Parliament to decide on those constitutional arrangements.</p><blockquote>Given the nature of the UK’s constitution, resting as it does on Acts of Parliament, convention and common law, the contents of any legislation would become part of the UK’s “constitutional requirements” for the purposes of Article 50. This means that Parliament could choose to set out requirements that would allow it to take control of the process by which Article 50 was to be triggered. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 10 para 32</blockquote><p>If the UK approach is encompassed by an Act of Parliament it can set out whatever steps felt necessary and again the EU would find it very difficult to challenge. These will become our “constitutional requirements”.</p><h3>Fair to EU citizens</h3><p>This includes being fair to UK UK citizens. Article 50 provides for the other member states to ratify, by qualified majority, the deal being offered to the UK. If our UK Withdrawal from the EU Bill provides a ratification process for the UK citizens it will be seen as fair.</p><h3>Non-discriminatory</h3><p>If the ratification process is to involve a popular vote then it would be expected that all EU citizens directly impacted would have a vote. This would extend the electorate beyond the UK, Eire, Malta and Cyprus to include all EU citizens resident in the UK plus all UK citizens living outside the UK. With this enfranchisement such a popular vote would not be challenged by the EU.</p><h3>Democratic</h3><p>UK could satisfy the requirement to be democratic by having a vote as part of the ratification process. This might take the form of a Parliamentary vote, a further referendum (with the electorate as outlined above) or in a General Election with the candidates in each constituency either supporting or opposing the deal on offer. Any of these options would be seen as wholly democratic and not subject to challenge.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>It is in the UK’s interests to do as much preparatory work on exiting the EU prior to entering formal negotiations. At this point the select Committee strongly recommend that Parliament is consulted before Article 50 is triggered.</p><blockquote>The Government should not trigger Article 50 without consulting Parliament. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report — <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf">The Invoking of Article 50</a> 12/9/16 page 8 para 24</blockquote><p>If there is no sensible deal possible then the process may end here and an expensive negotiations exercise is avoided.</p><p>It is there is the possibility of a sensible deal then Article 50 will be triggered and the negotiations will take place. At the end of the negotiations their will be a democratic decision taken whether to ratify the Exit deal or not. The UK may decide to continue with the exit terms negotiated and leave the EU. The fact that the UK have the option to walk away from the negotiations will improve the possibility of negotiating a reasonable agreement.</p><p>Should the democratic decision of the UK be that the deal on offer is not acceptable then we would be able to withdraw our notification.</p><p>As the ratification decision is sanctioned and controlled by UK law, as recommended by the HoL Select Committee on the Constitution, the EU would, by their inherent democratic and fair-minded structure have to accept the process as right and proper.</p><p>As Sir David Edward told the House of Lords in May 2015** “It is absolutely clear that you cannot be forced to go through with it if you do not want to: for example, if there is a change of Government.” and the UK would remain in the EU.</p><p><em>References</em></p><p><em>*Richard Tunnicliffe discusses this in his blog site in an article Negotiation Brexit — </em><a href="http://howshouldyouvote.co.uk/"><em>Shades of Article 50</em></a><em> @howshouldwevote.</em></p><p><em>** The EU Committee of the House of Lords considered this question in its report on “</em><a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf"><em>the process of withdrawing from the European Union</em></a><em>” published on 4th May.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5e9f7d2369cb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Soft Brexit that everyone can get behind]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/a-soft-brexit-that-everyone-can-get-behind-4a1c90240597?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4a1c90240597</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2016 21:12:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-13T21:12:50.822Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*q8ZiBqpFy9jAuKPGW4WPhg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>An alternative to legal challenges and by-election embarrassment. Soft Brexit for all.</h3><p>There has been a lot of talk recently about Hard vs Soft Brexit and what each would mean. My fear is that if we are not careful we will get a very Hard Brexit whether we want it or not.</p><p>I can’t think of a better way to ensure that Brexit is Hard than to trigger Article 50 without the ability to reverse the UK’s notification.</p><p>Many commentators have interpreted the relatively concise wording of <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html"><em>Article 50</em></a> to mean that the process, once triggered is one-way and unstoppable. After 2-years the UK would cease to be a member of the EU and all EU treaties would cease to apply to the UK.</p><p>Even if acceptable terms are agreed, the other 27 EU members would need to ratify the agreement and again if they cannot ratify the agreement then the UK would just cease to be members without any agreement.</p><p>Thus as soon as we trigger the process we effectively hand over all negotiating power to the EU who could just let the 2-year clock run down and the UK would become ever more desperate to get an agreement.</p><p>If we want to have a Soft Brexit then the UK must be able to withdraw it’s notification under Article 50 (2) if we choose.</p><h3>How do we get around this issue?</h3><p>This paper discusses how the UK can construct an approach to the Brexit negotiations that preserves our negotiating position by ensuring that the UK’s notification of intent to Leave issued under Article 50 (2) can be withdrawn if we cannot ratify the deal(s) on offer.</p><p>This mechanism would have the effect of giving the UK the option of winding the clock back to a pre-notification position should the UK decided not to ratify the deal(s) on offer.</p><p>There seems to be a general acceptance that this would be good for the UK and, if nothing else, considerably strengthen our negotiating position.</p><p>As we are a Parliamentary democracy the most straightforward approach would be for the UK to pass an Act of Parliament, let’s call it the BREXIT BILL, that’s sets out a process that will conform to our constitutional requirements. As part of our constitutional requirements the UK can specify two conditions, one that the UK ratifies the agreement(s) and another that the other EU Member States also ratify the agreement(s). If either of these conditions is not met then the UK will reserve the right to withdraw our notification of intent to leave issued under Article 50 (2).</p><p>The chart below steps through the activities that will need to be enshrined within the Brexit Bill:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*taWza_ZmiizOGlXUeASYnQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Why would the EU agree to A50 being reversible?</h3><p>The challenge that has come from many quarters is why the EU would agree to such a mechanism as it obviously weakens their own position?</p><p>Well, despite statements made during the Referendum campaign, the EU is deeply democratic and utterly predicable. It is my contention that if the mechanism is correctly structured, the EU would not be able to refuse.</p><p>For the UK’s approach to triggering Article 50 (2) to gain EU acceptance the approach will need to demonstrate that it is:</p><p>· Compliant with Article 50</p><p>· “in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</p><p>· Fair to EU citizens</p><p>· Non-discriminatory between nationalities</p><p>· Democratic</p><p>If the UK present a plan/approach that meets these criteria the EU will support it, in fact it would be utterly incredible for them to do anything else.</p><p>Similarly the European Court of Justice could intervene and interpret Article 50 as not permitting a notification, once duly given, to be withdrawn. But to reach that decision — which is not to be found in any overt provision — in the teeth of a democratically enacted law by a national Parliament which gives citizens the final decision — would itself be damaging to the reputation of the EU.</p><p>So, does the plan as outlined meet this criteria? Let’s take them one at a time:</p><h3>Compliant with <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html">Article 50</a></h3><p>We will need to frame our approach to conform with Article 50 but as Article 50 is relatively short on detail we can do this with ease.</p><p>Section 1 requires that our notification is in accordance with our own constitutional requirements and I will deal with this below. Section 4 provides for a ratification process for the Union members and so if the UK process also has an equivalent ratification process it is difficult to see how this will raise an objection.</p><h3>“in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</h3><p>This is the key point in Article 50. As the UK does not have a single written constitution, Parliament is the supreme decision-making body — and since this situation has not previously arisen, it is for Parliament to decide on those constitutional arrangements. If the UK approach is encompassed by an Act of Parliament (The Brexit Bill?) it can set out whatever steps felt necessary and again the EU would find it very difficult to challenge. These will become our constitutional requirements.</p><h3>Fair to EU citizens</h3><p>This includes being fair to UK UK citizens. Article 50 provides for the other member states to ratify, by qualified majority, the deal being offered to the UK. If our Brexit Act provides a ratification process for the UK citizens it will be seen as fair.</p><h3>Non-discriminatory</h3><p>If the ratification process is to involve a popular vote then it would be expected that all EU citizens directly impacted would have a vote. This would extend the electorate beyond the UK, Eire, Malta and Cyprus to include all EU citizens resident in the UK plus all UK citizens living outside the UK. With this enfranchisement such a popular vote would not be challenged by the EU.</p><h3>Democratic</h3><p>UK could satisfy the requirement to be democratic by having a vote as part of the ratification process. This might take the form of a Parliamentary vote, a further referendum (with the electorate as outlined above) or in a General Election with the candidates in each constituency either supporting or opposing the deal on offer. Any of these options would be seen as wholly democratic and not subject to challenge.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>At the end of this process the UK may decide to continue with the exit terms negotiated. The fact that the UK have the option to walk away from the negotiations will improve the possibility of negotiating a reasonable agreement.</p><p>Should the democratic decision of the UK be that the deal on offer is not acceptable then we would be able to withdraw our notification. I believe that the UK can construct an approach which provides a reversal process from the notification to leave provided under Article 50 (2).</p><p>The EU would, by their inherent democratic and fair-minded structure have to accept the process as right and proper.</p><p>As Sir David Edward told the House of Lords in May 2016 “It is absolutely clear that you cannot be forced to go through with it if you do not want to: for example, if there is a change of Government.”</p><p>Whatever the outcome of the UK’s ratification process we can be assured that “Brexit meant Brexit” and that we have avoided the hardest Brexit of all.</p><p><em>References</em></p><p><em>*Richard Tunnicliffe discusses this in his blog site in an article Negotiation Brexit — </em><a href="http://howshouldyouvote.co.uk/"><em>Shades of Article 50</em></a><em> @howshouldwevote.</em></p><p><em>** The EU Committee of the House of Lords considered this question in its report on “</em><a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf"><em>the process of withdrawing from the European Union</em></a><em>” published on 4th May.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4a1c90240597" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Soft Brexit — how can we get one?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@peterc0206/soft-brexit-how-can-we-get-one-9c25cc911c9a?source=rss-5db727ef5b87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9c25cc911c9a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[RemaininEU]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Sep 2016 14:04:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-12T14:14:11.580Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*k8IIFVCmNHDP4-S1bk0VKw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hard Brexit or Soft Brexit?</figcaption></figure><h3>Brexit will be very hard unless we improve our negotiating position. Here’s one way to do this.</h3><p>There has been a lot of talk recently about Hard vs Soft Brexit and what each would mean. My fear is that if we are not careful we will get a very Hard Brexit whether we want it or not.</p><p>I can’t think of a better way to ensure that Brexit is Hard than to trigger Article 50 without the ability to reverse the UK’s notification.</p><p>Many commentators have interpreted the relatively concise wording of <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html"><em>Article 50</em></a> to mean that the process, once triggered is one-way and unstoppable. After 2-years the UK would cease to be a member of the EU and all EU treaties would cease to apply to the UK.</p><p>Even if acceptable terms are agreed, the other 27 EU members would need to ratify the agreement and again if they cannot ratify the agreement then the UK would just cease to be members without any agreement.</p><p>Thus as soon as we trigger the process we effectively hand over all negotiating power to the EU who could just let the 2-year clock run down and the UK would become ever more desperate to get an agreement.</p><p>If we want to have a Soft Brexit then the UK must be able to withdraw it’s notification under Article 50 (2) if we choose.</p><h3>How do we get around this issue?</h3><p>This paper discusses how the UK can construct an approach to the Brexit negotiations that preserves our negotiating position by ensuring that the UK’s notification of intent to Leave issued under Article 50 (2) can be withdrawn if we cannot ratify the deal(s) on offer.</p><p>This mechanism would have the effect of giving the UK the option of winding the clock back to a pre-notification position should the UK decided not to ratify the deal(s) on offer.</p><p>There seems to be a general acceptance that this would be good for the UK and, if nothing else, considerably strengthen our negotiating position.</p><p>As we are a Parliamentary democracy the most straightforward approach would be for the UK to pass an Act of Parliament, let’s call it the BREXIT BILL, that’s sets out a process that will conform to our constitutional requirements. As part of our constitutional requirements the UK can specify two conditions, one that the UK ratifies the agreement(s) and another that the other EU Member States also ratify the agreement(s). If either of these conditions is not met then the UK will reserve the right to withdraw our notification of intent to leave issued under Article 50 (2).</p><p>The chart below steps through the activities that will need to be enshrined with the Brexit Bill:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*taWza_ZmiizOGlXUeASYnQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Why would the EU agree to A50 being reversible?</h3><p>The challenge that has come from many quarters is why the EU would agree to such a mechanism as it obviously weakens their own position?</p><p>Well, despite statements made during the Referendum campaign, the EU is deeply democratic and utterly predicable. It is my contention that if the mechanism is correctly structured, the EU would not be able to refuse.</p><p>For the UK’s approach to triggering Article 50 (2) to gain EU acceptance the approach will need to demonstrate that it is:</p><p>· Compliant with Article 50</p><p>· “in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</p><p>· Fair to EU citizens</p><p>· Non-discriminatory between nationalities</p><p>· Democratic</p><p>If the UK present a plan/approach that meets these criteria the EU will support it, in fact it would be utterly incredible for them to do anything else.</p><p>Similarly the European Court of Justice could intervene and interpret Article 50 as not permitting a notification, once duly given, to be withdrawn. But to reach that decision — which is not to be found in any overt provision — in the teeth of a democratically enacted law by a national Parliament which gives citizens the final decision — would itself be damaging to the reputation of the EU.</p><p>So, does the plan as outlined meet this criteria? Let’s take them one at a time:</p><h3>Compliant with <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html">Article 50</a></h3><p>We will need to frame our approach to conform with Article 50 but as Article 50 is relatively short on detail we can do this with ease.</p><p>Section 1 requires that our notification is in accordance with our own constitutional requirements and I will deal with this below. Section 4 provides for a ratification process for the Union members and so if the UK process also has an equivalent ratification process it is difficult to see how this will raise an objection.</p><h3>“in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements”</h3><p>This is the key point in Article 50. As the UK does not have a single written constitution, Parliament is the supreme decision-making body — and since this situation has not previously arisen, it is for Parliament to decide on those constitutional arrangements. If the UK approach is encompassed by an Act of Parliament (The Brexit Bill?) it can set out whatever steps felt necessary and again the EU would find it very difficult to challenge. These will become our constitutional requirements.</p><h3>Fair to EU citizens</h3><p>This includes being fair to UK UK citizens. Article 50 provides for the other member states to ratify, by qualified majority, the deal being offered to the UK. If our Brexit Act provides a ratification process for the UK citizens it will be seen as fair.</p><h3>Non-discriminatory</h3><p>If the ratification process is to involve a popular vote then it would be expected that all EU citizens directly impacted would have a vote. This would extend the electorate beyond the UK, Eire, Malta and Cyprus to include all EU citizens resident in the UK plus all UK citizens living outside the UK. With this enfranchisement such a popular vote would not be challenged by the EU.</p><h3>Democratic</h3><p>UK could satisfy the requirement to be democratic by having a vote as part of the ratification process. This might take the form of a Parliamentary vote, a further referendum (with the electorate as outlined above) or in a General Election with the candidates in each constituency either supporting or opposing the deal on offer. Any of these options would be seen as wholly democratic and not subject to challenge.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>At the end of this process the UK may decide to continue with the exit terms negotiated. The fact that the UK have the option to walk away from the negotiations will improve the possibility of negotiating a reasonable agreement.</p><p>Should the democratic decision of the UK be that the deal on offer is not acceptable then we would be able to withdraw our notification. I believe that the UK can construct an approach which provides a reversal process from the notification to leave provided under Article 50 (2).</p><p>The EU would, by their inherent democratic and fair-minded structure have to accept the process as right and proper.</p><p>As Sir David Edward told the House of Lords in May 2016 “It is absolutely clear that you cannot be forced to go through with it if you do not want to: for example, if there is a change of Government.”</p><p>Whatever the outcome of the UK’s ratification process we can be assured that “Brexit meant Brexit” and that we have avoided the hardest Brexit of all.</p><p><em>References</em></p><p><em>*Richard Tunnicliffe discusses this in his blog site in an article Negotiation Brexit — </em><a href="http://howshouldyouvote.co.uk/"><em>Shades of Article 50</em></a><em> @howshouldwevote.</em></p><p><em>** The EU Committee of the House of Lords considered this question in its report on “</em><a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf"><em>the process of withdrawing from the European Union</em></a><em>” published on 4th May.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9c25cc911c9a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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