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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Peter Mungiguerra on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Virtue Ethics and the American Prison Project]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@petermungiguerra/virtue-ethics-and-the-american-prison-project-b6a882a0bce2?source=rss-c93086a5c6a0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[criminal-justice-reform]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[criminal-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moral-philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Mungiguerra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Dec 2018 20:02:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-06T20:02:38.533Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Virtue Ethics and the American Prison Project</p><p>Peter K. Mungiguerra</p><p>Director: Dr. David Corey</p><p><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p><p>In the 21stcentury, criminal justice reform has been given a high level of interest and support across the ideological spectrum. In the face of stagnant recidivism rates and ballooning federal and state prison systems, law makers on the left and right realize that there needs to be substantial changes. Just in the past 10 years, due to reforms in sentencing, pretrial diversion, and reentry programs, the prison population has plateaued, and even gone down in some states, and we are seeing fewer formerly incarcerated citizens commit crimes once they are released. This reform effort has been primarily focused on the situations and circumstances that might lead to criminality, things like: poverty, mental illness and racial discrimination. Our main focus is on the external factors that encourage criminality, with little to no attention for the individual who committed the crime. I believe that in cooperation with this interest in addressing environmental causes of criminality, there needs to be a renewed focus on virtue ethics and a realization that character formation will have a greater effect on the behavior of reentering citizens than will just addressing things that might encourage criminal behavior.</p><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>Criminal justice reform is a subject of growing interest in contemporary politics. What was once a niche interest of marginalized communities has become a necessity for mainstream political platforms. Advocates on the left see reform as a way to elevate communities of color and the poor who have been improperly incarcerated in the past, while faith leaders on the right see reform as an act of Christian compassion. This bipartisan support has yielded positive results in the form of pretrial diversion, shrinking prison populations, and a smoother reentry for the formerly incarcerated.</p><p>One measure of success in policy discussions is recidivism, or the rate at which the formerly incarcerated commit another crime. Recidivism is supposed to be representative of whether or not someone has been rehabilitated or not. Rehabilitation, in addition to public safety, is one of the goals of the penal system. We can tell whether or not we are addressing the causes of criminality by looking at the rate of recidivism. Over the past few years, our reforms have primarily addressed situations and circumstances that lead to criminality. During this time period, we saw a substantial decrease in the rate of recidivism.</p><p>Though this reduction in recidivism is laudable, I worry that our sole focus on situations and circumstances is problematic. If criminality is solely determined by outside forces, then individuals cease to be responsible for their actions. Human conduct becomes heavily deterministic, and citizens take less responsibility for their poor choices. If we only address the environment of the criminal, then we forget the actual culprit of the crime: the criminal. Our reformed system needs to account for environmental causes of criminality, while also rehabilitating the individual who is in need of moral formation.</p><p>I will first review the data on recidivism over the last 20 years and show how recent reforms have made substantial improvements in the rate at which people recommit crimes. Second, I will question the reliance on quantitative measures of success in our justice system and insist that we move towards a system which values moral rehabilitation for all prisoners. Third, I will respond to critics who might argue that character formation is a fruitless effort and that situations and circumstances are a greater determinant of human behavior.</p><p><strong>CHAPTER ONE</strong></p><p>Surveying the Rate of Recidivism and Contemporary Responses</p><p>Recidivism is a complex issue that few people know of or understand. In order to get a proper grip on the issue, it is important to define the terms of what kind of recidivism we are referring to so that we can properly interpret the data. When looking at the data, we need to consider the limitations of finding patterns across different studies, because we can have different methods of obtaining data and possibly more accurate information than before. Once we have done this, we can begin to look at the changes in recidivism over time and how certain programs or public policy changes might have changed this measure. In this chapter, I will first define recidivism and explain the process by which we obtain and interpret the data. Second, I will show that between the years of 1994 and 2005, there was little change in the rate of recidivism. Third, I will review the innovations in the criminal justice system within the 21stcentury and how those responses have contributed to a significant drop in the rates of recidivism.</p><p><em>Defining Recidivism, Reviewing the Methodology and Assessing Limitations in the Literature</em></p><p>Recidivism is defined as the propensity for the formerly incarcerated to reoffend. There are three kinds of recidivism: arrest for a new crime, a parole or probation violation leading to imprisonment, and conviction for a new crime that led to imprisonment. The Bureau of Justice Statistics collects data on these types of recidivism, and these data sets allow observance of change over time. In this section, I define the three kinds of recidivism, explain how to obtain data, and assess the limitations of reviewing the data over time.</p><p>Recidivism is a multifaceted issue that does not simply boil down to a convicted criminal committing a crime. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) has come up with hundreds of different strategies to measure recidivism; however, for the purposes of this paper, I will be focus on only a few. The first of the three is the percentage of criminals who are arrested within five years of release from prison. These people may have been released on probation or for the end of their sentence. Though they have been arrested, this does not necessarily lead to a conviction. Oftentimes this arrest can be for a minor misdemeanor offense that would not lead to jail time, or there could be an error of recording the subsequent conviction due to mishandling of documentation at the local level.</p><p>The second form of recidivism is a parole or probation violation leading to a return to prison or a first time admission to prison. When people are released from prison, they are often placed on parole. Parole has many conditions that must be met on a weekly basis in order to prevent being sent back to prison. Probation is when the judge chooses to forgo prison and instead puts a criminal on community supervision, which is subject to conditions that must be met in order to prevent prison time. The final form of recidivism is an arrest that turns into a conviction. Understanding these forms of recidivism is important in order to make sense of the data.</p><p>In a report called “Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005; Patterns from 2005–2010,” the BJS collects the overall recidivism data from 30 participating states deemed suitable for the study. To obtain all of the data, “the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) entered into a data sharing agreement with the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division and the International Justice and Public Safety Network (Nlets) to provide BJS access to criminal history records (i.e., rap sheets) through the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index (III)” (BJS, 2014, p. 16). These data were then processed, and accommodations were made for anomalies. Anomalies might include people dying or incomplete records. The former people were removed from the data, and the latter were neutralized in the data so not to skew the final results. The rap sheets that are mentioned include a citizen’s entire recorded criminal history, which provides excellent data, since we have access to national databases that have largely been digitized over the years. Compared to the 1990s, we now have access to more complete and accurate data.</p><p>In their report, the BJS shows the percentage change in the three different measures of recidivism over a 5-year period, starting on the date of release from prison. The 5-year period allows the regression line to eventually taper off and reach a point where no more people from the original released population are being incarcerated, arrested or violating parole. This provides a complete snapshot of the released prisoners.</p><p>The BJS has two data sets to compare: the first observes prisoners released in 1994, and the second observes prisoners released in 2005. It is important to consider some limitations of comparing these respective data sets that are over a decade apart. Both of these data sets are comprised of different states, the first study containing 15 and the later 30 (BJS, 2014). BJS chose only to use 12 states that showed up in both studies. From here, they had to make accommodations for the difference in demographics within the two different studies. For example, there was an increase in the percentage of women, and women statistically have a lower rate of recidivism than men. There were also changes in the percentage of different races and age groups, all of which have different rates of recidivism. In order to accommodate these changes in demographics, they decided to observe each group individually to observe the behaviors specific to their group.</p><p>In 2005, there were better records of the deaths of released prisoners. Before 2005, “less than 10% of deaths were captured in the fingerprint verified death information that criminal justice agencies submitted to the FBI’s III system” (BJS, 2014, p. 3). This underreporting of deaths led criminal justice observers to believe that these undocumented people had not committed another crime, when in fact they were deceased. Now that we have better documentation, this can seem to drive up the recidivism percentage.</p><p>Finally, the 2005 reporting, compared to 1994, saw an uptick in reporting for minor misdemeanor offenses. Before 2005, these offenses often went unrecorded because they were deemed to be nonviolent in nature. Though these “public order” offenses are for nonviolent crimes, they inflate the numbers and make recidivism appear to be higher than it is. Given this change in reporting, most experts agree that the best way to read the recidivism data over the years is to look solely at the percentage of violent offenses committed, while separating out the misdemeanor offenses.</p><p>In addition to this comparison of recidivism between prisoners released 1994 and 2005, Pew Research Center has conducted an analysis of groups released in 2005, 2010 and 2012. These data for the 2010 and 2012 groups are held to the same standard as the data for 2005, so it is not necessary to rehash the methodology that has already been explained. The Pew study is careful to remind readers that this was not an effort to find a causal relationship between new policies created in this time period and the drop in recidivism, but to show that there has been a statistically significant drop in the rate of recidivism between these three different groups.</p><p>Recidivism is a multifaceted issue that requires due diligence to understand properly. The data can often be complex, and there will always be variations in methodology when researchers are working across the decades. It is imperative to look critically and carefully at the data sets, otherwise one can be led to a conclusion that is not supported once qualifications are made. This affords a more complete understanding of how certain groups offend once they are released from prison, and give lawmakers the tools to address these different groups. Knowing what we know about how to properly interpret the data, let us dive into the actual numbers.</p><p><em>Changes in Recidivism from 1994–2010</em></p><p>Between the years of 1994 and 2005, there was little to no change in recidivism within a three-year period. The observations made on the cohorts from 1994 through 2005 make use of the characteristics of race, sex, and age at release to look at how specific groups have or have not changed. The Bureau of Justice Statistics observes the change in violent crime among these groups by comparing prisoners released from 1994 to 2005. In this section, I report the percent of prisoners arrested for violent crimes by demographic characteristic, while taking note of statistically significant changes in specific subgroups if available.</p><p>I will be referencing data from prisoners released from 1994 to 2005. For cases of no statistically significant change, I will refer only to the 2005 data (in reference to the 1994 data). This will save time and prevent unnecessary information. In cases of statistically significant changes in demographic groups, I will include the data sets form 1994 and 2005.</p><p>Starting with all released prisoners in the year 2005, 21.8% committed a violent crime within a three-year period. When observing males, 22.7% of them committed a violent crime. Women were observed to have a significant change in their rate of violent crime, increasing from 10.2% to 13.1%. When looking at race, we see a noticeable change from 16.4% to 19.3% for all whites released from prison. For African Americans and Hispanics, violent crimes were committed at a rate of 25.3% and 18.5%, respectively.</p><p>Moving on to specific age groups, there were no observed changes over time in the rates at which released prisoners committed violent crimes. There were five different age groups (including violent crime rates): 24 or younger (28.6%), 25–29 (24.8%), 30–34 (20.1%), 35–39 (19.5%), and 40 or older (14.3%). There is a noticeable decline in violence as the exiting prison population grows older.</p><p>With the best data that we can find, we can conclude that there has been no significant change in the rate of violent crime of all released prisoners, and among most demographic groups. On the one hand, this might seem like good news. Recidivism has not grown worse over time; however, politicians during this time period promised that if we were more tough on prisoners, then upon their release they would commit crimes at lower rates. This theory has not been proven by the data, and would appear to be false. Starting around the release of the final analyzed cohort, we start to see a groundswell of political support for a smart on crime approach to criminal justice.</p><p><em>Contemporary Responses to Stagnant Rates of Recidivism</em></p><p>In response to the backlash against mandatory minimums, mass incarceration and tough on crime policies up to the late 1990s, the federal government and the state governments have rolled out legislation that seeks to reform how we improve the incarcerated. After years of trial and error, legislators came to the conclusion that burdensome sentencing and harsh penal codes did not stop people from reoffending, and often times made the problem of recidivism worse. We now have access to a wealth of information on how to provide the best combination of programs for individual prisoners to improve their reentry outcomes. First, I will review the process used for assessing individual need for the incarcerated. Second, I will look at the three main kinds of approaches used to prevent recidivism: addressing mental health crises, educational and vocational training, and family/victim mediation. Third, I provide accompanying data that shows a statistically significant drop in the recidivism rates when comparing prisoners released in 2005, 2010 and 2012.</p><p>When a person is arrested and convicted of a crime, there is going to be a prescribed punishment intended to punish the individual and correct their future actions. Typically, the decision of punishment falls to the discretion of the judge. The judge will often make this decision based on his knowledge of the facts of the case and of the person, while also working within the parameters of what is called a criminal code sentencing chart. This chart is set by the legislatures of a state or federal government and determines the minimum and maximum amount of years that someone can be sent to prison for the given crime. In the past, there may have been little to no consideration of an exit plan for these criminals. Their treatment was waiting it out in prison and hoping that doing hard time would make them better people</p><p>In recent years, judges and prosecutors have added a new tool to their arsenal. States have begun using risk assessments during the prosecutorial phase so that prisoners can be directed to the proper treatment. These days we have easy-to-use and efficient computer programs that can take all of the information about an offender, including their sex, race, criminal history, drug use, mental health, and family status, and create a tailored combination of programs that would be most conducive for their reentry into society. This method seeks to defeat the one-size-fits all system that does not provide convicted criminals with programs that meet their individual needs. The current method provides the best outcomes and utilization of state and federal resources.</p><p>One of the approaches that caught on early in the 2000s was addressing issues of mental health. In states across the country, prisons were acting as a revolving door for those who had major mental health issues. People with a mental retardation or a severe drug addiction could be treated as criminals when all they needed was proper mental health services and drug treatment programs. Many states have instituted what are called mental health courts that specialize in creating programs for people with drug addiction and mental deficiencies. They can recommend a range of options like closely monitored community supervision, substance abuse treatment, or cognitive behavior programs. All of these programs seek to isolate the single or multiple causes that led to an individual’s incarceration, and properly address them. This method of mental health assessment can vastly alter what would be the typical experience for a prisoner. The judge may choose to put them under community supervision, or parole, and leave them under the guidance of a family member or sponsor. They will be mandated to attend programs and receive treatment, all while foregoing real prison time. People in prison can have access to mental health services as well, and these programs can also be a condition of parole upon their release. These interventions can help to address the sole reason for criminality in some cases and give people the help they desperately need.</p><p>Prison reformers have also found that vocational and educational programs are an effective method of preventing recidivism. Upon reentry to society, the formerly incarcerated are faced with multiple obstacles that prevent their becoming employed, including: requirements to put their criminal record on job applications, gaps in an employment record while incarcerated, or lack of education for jobs that they may want. These barriers to entry create difficult situations for prisoners, who might decide that it wouldn’t be a bad idea to commit a crime again to make some quick money. State governments have met this challenge by introducing job training, higher education attainment, and community partnerships with businesses. In Texas, the state has brought job training programs into prisons so that people can get certification in vocations like welding or HVAC repair. The state covers the fees and will even help to provide assistance in finding a job upon reentry into society. Texas also offers the attainment of an associates or a bachelor’s degree while in prison. These higher education programs have been proven successful; people who attain these degrees have a much lower rate of recidivism and they have much better luck in the job market upon reentry.</p><p>Counties have been closely partnering with willing businesses to create guaranteed job placement for criminals. The county will approach the business and ask them if they are willing to participate and accept a convict. Upon acceptance, the business will tell the county what jobs they have and what training will be needed for the prisoner to participate. The county will then pair a participating prisoner with one of these employers; upon pairing, the jail will give them the proper training to be ready for the job upon release. This partnership has not only ensured that people will have a job when they leave prison, but also saved the state money from providing people with job training that they might not be able to use.</p><p>Finally, states have been working on programs and procedures that seek to create victim mediation and counseling with the families of the incarcerated. Victim mediation is a relatively new practice being used in lieu of a trial. A defendant can meet with the victim of their crime, and the two can create a program to make the victim feel like there is justice. This also allows the defendant to meet the person who they have wronged and understand that their action had a direct consequence upon someone else. This can assist in their moral thinking in the future. Reformers have also seen the importance for the incarcerated to be in close contact with their family. Prison can be a place where an individual is not only separated from society, but from their family too. Upon reentry, there can be huge relationship issues that prevent the criminal from having a successful future. States have been strongly encouraging group family counseling that connects the criminal with their families. This creates a dialogue of love and forgiveness. Mending this divide is not only important for the criminal, but for the criminal’s children as well. A person’s chance of being incarcerated in the future increases significantly if they have ever had a parent in prison, and providing this mediation can possibly prevent them from committing crimes in the future.</p><p>We have reason to believe that these programs are helping to lower the rate of recidivism. A recent study released by the Pew Charitable Trusts shows that the 3-year prison recidivism rate has dropped by close to a quarter in the 7-year period between 2005 and 2012, moving from 48% of prisoners released in 2005 to 37% of prisoners released in 2012 (Gelb and Velazquez). The study does not attempt to create causal relationships between these programs and the magnitude of the change between the different groups, but they do remark that “evidence-based re-entry policies and programs that have been enacted in recent years have been shown to improve outcomes for people released from prison” (Gelb and Velazquez). This suggests that the changes we’ve made to incarceration in the past decade or so have had noticeable effects on people’s lives and their readjustment into society.</p><p>Criminal justice reform has been integral in helping to drive down recidivism rates, and we are only beginning to understand the full effect. These programs have helped to direct people with mental health problems to the doctor instead of the prosecutor. People who may have never obtained a job can now look forward to valuable employment that provides them with self worth. Finally, people can make peace with the people who they have hurt, whether they are victims of crimes or the hurting families of the incarcerated.</p><p>With the help of these programs, we have seen dramatic improvements in the rates of recidivism in the United States. By utilizing programs that really work, we have been able to make meaningful progress towards statistically significant drops in recidivism. A new analysis from The Pew Charitable Trust shows close to a quarter drop in recidivism when comparing prisoners released in 2005 and 2012. The data shows us that the 3-year recidivism rate for prisoners released in 2005 was 48%, compared to a rate of 37% when observing prisoners released in 2012. Pew cites the “evidence based re-entry policies and programs that have been enacted in recent years” as one of the main reasons for this sudden drop in recidivism.</p><p>This approach to reducing recidivism has been deemed widely successful, and to this day policy makers and community activists are offering new and ingenious programs that seek to address these leading indicators for criminality. Despite these developments, it appears that there is something missing in the midst of all this clamor that we have solved the problem of repeat criminality. While in the past we might have considered recidivism to be one problem among many to address, it now appears to be one of the only conversations being had around criminality. Lowering the rate of recidivism has become an end in and of itself, and not merely an instrumental end towards a greater good. We no longer value rehabilitation as the good in and of itself, if we ever did at all. Our outlook on recidivism has become consequentialist in nature.</p><p>*</p><p>In this chapter, I gave a clear definition of recidivism and how our policy makers go about measuring such a thing. I provided evidence that recidivism did not change from 1994–2010, showing that our tough on crime approach to criminal justice did little to lower criminality among the incarcerated. I then showed that the modern criminal justice reform effort made a significant dent in the rate of recidivism when comparing prisoners released in 2005 and 2012. Moving forward, we need to consider the implications of these reforms. A primary focus on situations and circumstances could lead us to a deterministic outlook.</p><p><strong>CHAPTER TWO</strong></p><p>Addressing the Gap in Criminal Responsibility</p><p>To say that this aforementioned reduction in recidivism is a bad thing would be completely misguided. It is a public policy success to alleviate these situations and circumstances that might lead someone to commit or recommit crimes. We have made a commitment to helping people succeed upon reentry into society by addressing circumstances outside their control that would lead them to commit criminal acts. That being said, policy makers do themselves, the public, and the incarcerated a disservice when criminal responsibility only comes from the outside. In the course of our efforts to address these issues, we have oriented recidivism and its consequences as an end, when human flourishing should be the end. In looking to lowering recidivism, we also ignore the rehabilitation of those who may never see the outside of a prison wall for the rest of their lives. In this chapter, I will first argue that our overreliance on quantifiable measures of recidivism has distracted us from other qualitative assessments. Second, I will argue that when we only consider circumstances and situations to be the cause of criminality, we fundamentally ignore the notion that character, virtues and/or vices may contribute towards an individual’s criminality. Third, I will argue that our currently exclusive focus on “reentering citizens” (prisoners who will one day reenter society) ignores the rehabilitative and moral formation of those who will spend the rest of their lives in jail.</p><p><em>The Limits of Quantification</em></p><p>In the 21stcentury, we have a tendency to seek the quantifiable, especially when crafting public policy. Criminal justice reform is no exception. In the reform effort of the last decade, policy makers have found it helpful to measure the success of a prisoner’s reentry in terms of recidivism, in addition to a couple of other measurements like gainful employment or homelessness. We have also been able to measure success in terms of dollars saved in the long-run. We can compare the success of multiple programs and find out which of them costs us the least amount of money, which can inadvertently quantify a prisoner or reentering citizen in terms of money.</p><p>As we have observed these programs over time, we have been able to measure their success with a level of predictive power. Knowing this predictive power can tell us how effective a given program or treatment should be when it comes to possible future criminal acts. People in the non-profit and public sector argue with an increasing degree of certainty that their given program will provide the formerly or currently incarcerated with the right environment in which they can thrive. Due to the recent successes we have seen when it comes to this method, many are left to think that this single approach is the single answer to addressing recidivism. Our public project has left many with the impression that criminal activity is entirely deterministic, and that by continuing this project we will continue to see marginal results.</p><p>Though these measures have been invaluable in our data driven approach to recidivism, there is something missing in the way that we talk about the success, or the flourishing of the individual. This distinct focus on situations and circumstances could lead someone to believe that human agency is entirely deterministic, and almost machine-like in nature. When we are discussing human action or behavior, it can be attractive to use the great gift of the Enlightenment that we call the “social sciences.” In an effort to introduce reason and science to all aspects of life, we in the 21stcentury have attempted to quantify and analyze human behavior in order to predict actions and prescribe treatment accordingly. In our efforts to influence human behavior, we have largely abandoned the classical approach of individual moral fortitude in favor of the creation of positive environments in which people won’t commit crimes. The latter approach has been deemed suitable by the policy crafting community. While I do believe we need to properly use the information that we can create predictions from, we also need to remember that we can only capture so much of human behavior by using the social sciences, and that the predictive power of social scientific research can be overstated.</p><p>In<em>After Virtue,</em>Alasdair MacIntyre takes issue with the tendency of social scientists to overstate their ability to predict human behavior with a high level of certainty. He argues that “the aim of social science is to explain specifically social phenomena by supplying law-like generalizations which do not differ in their logical form from those applicable to natural phenomena in general” (MacIntyre 88). MacIntyre takes issue with this project because he believes that social scientists aspirations far exceed their abilities. With natural science research, we see that there are far more claims that can be made with or without the inclusion of concrete qualifications. Social science research comes out messier, and often does not account for numerous counter examples that threaten the accuracy of the conclusions.</p><p>MacIntyre does still see a role for social sciences in the predictive planning of human behavior. For those actions which we can predict with a higher degree of certainty, like the ordering of our social actions or the statistical regularities in human behavior (MacIntyre 102), these can be incredibly helpful in our social planning and implementation of projects. When we use social science to the degree which is efficacious, while not overestimating its predictive power, we can be confident in its ability to assist us properly.</p><p>We can see how this criticism of social science would be relevant to studies in out criminal justice system. On the one hand, crimes are fairly easy to measure, so too are some of the conditions that lead to crime. But if we are interested not only in the causes of crime but also in the conditions of human flourishing, then quantitative measures lose much of their power. Human flourishing seems to demand a more qualitative, and indeed philosophical approach.</p><p>Let me make a closely related point. Not only are most studies of criminality quantitative, they also tend to focus on rather mechanical, external causes of crimes: poverty, mental health, drugs, and the like. This may be because such causes are the easiest to measure, but it may also reflect a shortsightedness on the part of the researchers of crime. I will argue in this chapter that we need to pay more attention to things like character, virtue and vice-dimensions of human action which the agent can be educated to control. I am going to propose here that we take a much more serious look at the possibilities of the moral development of criminals, both inside and outside the prison system.</p><p><em>Virtues, Vices and Situations: The Missing Connection</em></p><p>When we observe the cumulative criminal justice reform effort, I believe that we are left with a default situationist perspective on criminal behavior. Situationism is the theory that human behavior is the product of environmental or situational factors typically outside the control of the human agent. This perspective has been advanced by psychologists who find that character or moral development is less of an important factor in the decision making process than is external stimuli. Academics in the thrall of this theory might find that the current CJ reform effort is perfectly sufficient in addressing criminality, especially since the overwhelming majority of programs and initiatives are tailored towards addressing these outside stimuli.</p><p>In the beginning of the last paragraph I used the phrase “default situationist perspective.” I am careful with my wording here because I don’t believe that the public has willfully or intentionally adopted this position. We find ourselves where we are because of a lack of options or alternative approaches to the issue of criminality; however, there is currently nothing stopping this default perspective from becoming hegemonic in studies of crime.</p><p>I would like to propose two correctives to our default situationist perspective. The first is that we extend our concern for the criminal’s future. Not only for whether the criminal will return to jail, but also for his human flourishing. The second is that if we are concerned with human flourishing, we need to break out of the situationist and look more towards a holistic approach centered on moral formation. We need to fill out our understanding by considering a non-situationist perspective. I’ll begin to do this below by looking to Aristotle for guidance.</p><p>There is a huge gap in our understanding of the causes of crime. Scholars have tended to disregard the notions of virtue and vice. It is beyond the scope of contemporary inquiry to employ virtue ethics because it cannot operate within a framework that places all blame outside of the agent. We need to reclaim an understanding of human behavior that recognizes character development.</p><p>We can also take issue with the end goal of recidivism. Though this a valuable public policy goal, it is problematic as an end in and of itself. Recidivism, simply put, is the rate at which people commit crime upon reentry into society. If the end goal is to lower this criminal measure, then we are instrumentalizing human beings towards an end which is purely political. This end goal is value free, and it does not consider the person to be an intrinsically valuable entity. This is not to say that people cannot be valued in this process, but as far as lower recidivism goes, it does not matter. The only concern is getting people to commit crimes at a lower rate, and anything that gets us to that point will be sufficient in this end.</p><p>We are not concerned with the flourishing of the individual who has reentered society, but only with whether or not they fulfill the bare minimum task of not being a criminal again. There is no question of whether this person is happy or flourishing, only if they have accomplished their instrumental task. For many policy makers, this would be sufficient to claim success; however, I believe that we can do more to help these people and improve their lives. I believe that an understanding of human flourishing, virtue, and teleological ends can give us a proper answer to these two problems I have stated.</p><p>In the <em>Nicomachean Ethics, </em>Aristotle provides us with an account of voluntary and involuntary human action that is quite illuminating with respect to this discussion. Involuntary actions would be “actions done under constraint or due to ignorance” of the particulars (1109b 35–36). A voluntary one would be actions done freely by the agent. Aristotle says that “there are some instances in which such actions elicit forgiveness rather than praise, for example, when a man acts improperly under a strain greater than human nature can bear and which no one could endure” (1110a 24–26). This means that there are factors beyond human control that might compel someone to commit an immoral or criminal act, like a mental health problem or other compromised state, that would be worthy of our consideration and forgiveness.</p><p>There can definitely be a conversation about what varying situations Aristotle thought could have a bearing on human actions, but I don’t think that we can make a claim with certainty. Knowing that Aristotle was an empiricist, he might have been sensitive to the concrete empirical theories that we have come to understand in the social sciences. He did not have access to many of the tools that we have today, and he might have had more to say on the subject if he could have been provided with more information. Nevertheless, he would agree that there are <em>some </em>situations which put an undue strain on a man’s ability to exercise virtue. We would show these kinds of people more deference than those who are fully free beings and choose to commit a criminal act.</p><p>Aristotle also helps us to understand how certain situations can lead people to commit criminal acts, but not necessarily because the situation has forced their hand or that they are evil in nature. Aristotle shows us that an act can still be involuntary if there is “ignorance of the particulars which constitute the circumstances and the issues involved in the action” (1110b 30–34). Often times we might have an understanding of what the right thing to do is, but we fundamentally misunderstand the situation that we are in which requires that right action. There can be mistakes made, even when people might have the best intentions or constitutions.</p><p>While Aristotle has been illuminating in his ancient recognition of situations or circumstances that might lead someone to commit immoral or criminal acts, we would be missing the point of his ethics were we not to consider that which should orient our character: virtue. Aristotle properly illustrates that virtue should be the guiding principle in a man’s character by starting with his function argument. He believes that “the goodness and the performance of man would seem to reside in whatever is his proper function” (1097b 22–24). Just as the excellence or good of an axe is that it properly chops wood, so is a man excellent if he performs <em>his </em>proper function.</p><p>Aristotle then says that what makes man distinct from animals or plants is “an active life of the rational element” (1098a 3–4). This is a function that only man can perform, so he believes it to be our proper function. He then goes on to say that this “activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle” (1098a 6) must be geared towards the excellence of this function and not just the existence of it. Aristotle believes that the function of a simple man is to exercise his rational element, while an excellent man would exercise his rational element well.</p><p>Aristotle finally concludes that “the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete” (1098a 15–19). He later defines virtue as a characteristic that makes someone a good man and that helps that man perform his function well. He more clearly defines the moral virtues as the ability to conduct our actions and emotions “at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner — that is the median and the best course (1106b 20–25). He believes that to be virtuous in the moral sense is to orient our emotions and actions towards a naturally oriented median. He believes that this median or mean falls between the extremes of human action in certain situations, and he finds this to be the right place to be.</p><p>For Aristotle, the man that can properly exercise these virtues in the right place, right time and in the right situation possesses practical wisdom or <em>phronesis</em>. This practical wisdom allows us to utilize our understanding of the good and exercise it in the correct manner given the situation in which we find ourselves. This rich conception of human conduct is fundamentally missing in our criminal justice reform conversation. There is no discussion about the exercising or inculcation of virtues whatsoever. We lack the tools and institutions to properly address the fact that people don’t commit crimes solely because of situations or circumstances that they find themselves in. We need to recognize that virtue and vice are of great importance in human action, and that our reentering citizens are going to require the proper practical wisdom in order to exercise these virtues.</p><p>This conception of rehabilitation requires us to question the entire teleology of a prison. Our single goal of addressing circumstances and situations will no longer suffice, and we have to reorient the entire criminal justice system towards the inculcation of virtue. While addressing precursors to criminality needs to be a component part of this process, we have to recognize that a rightly oriented constitution will do more in the long run to promote human flourishing.</p><p>Our new goal will be the creation of a virtuous man who knows how, when, in what manner, and to what to degree to act rightly. When we make this our teleology, we can say with greater certainty that we are getting to the root of human behavior and addressing it properly. Individuals will reenter their communities, not only with the tools to succeed, but with the proper constitution to know how to use those tools.</p><p><em>The Perpetually Incarcerated and Our Duty to Educate</em></p><p>With this revelation, we face a new problem. When we change this teleology, and our sole concern is no longer recidivism or public safety, then how do we account for those who will face incarceration for the rest of their lives? In most American state and federal prisons systems, educational and reentry services are denied to those who will never see the benefits of those programs. In the calculus of the state, prisoners for life have been deemed unworthy of educational stimulation, or in our case moral formation, because these individuals will never have the opportunity to exercise an altered constitution in the real world. In the eyes of the state, these people would be seen as a waste of money and time. In this section, I will argue that given our new prison teleology that we have a duty to provide moral education to these individuals. The degree to which you are criminal, which in this case is determined by years and severity of crime, should not preclude you from the opportunity to better yourself.</p><p>In the last section, I came to the conclusion that we need to reconsider the teleology of the prison system and that this this system should be oriented towards the inculcation of virtue. While I recognize that lowering recidivism is an important goal, and continues to be a goal in my framework, I think that the rehabilitation of all with an eye to virtue should be the most important. Lower rates of recidivism will follow naturally.</p><p>If recidivism is no longer the end goal and reentry is not a qualifier to take part in educational treatment, then this means that we need to provide moral education to all prisoners. This, of course, includes people who will never see the outside of a prison wall. These people have likely committed some of the most heinous crimes, including, but not limited to, rape, murder, assault, or the selling of drugs. Our society shows the most disdain for these people. To these individuals we comfortably assign the designation of being evil, and rightfully so. Many, including the victims of their crimes, find it difficult to afford these people any kind of benefit, especially one which might attempt to redeem them of their criminal action.</p><p>I believe that we owe it to these people to morally rehabilitate them and get them as close to being virtuous as is possible. While we should recognize that some individuals might be too far gone for moral education, and should rightfully be separated from society and the general prison population, we have no reason to believe that someone who committed a single criminal action is incapable of receiving and retaining moral education. Whether or not someone will have the opportunity to leave at the end of their sentence does not seem totally relevant. It is possible that a lifetime prisoner could be more receptive to moral formation than someone who is only serving a 6-month sentence. We would need to assess on an individual basis whether or not it is possible to reform someone, and not write them off based on irrelevant criteria.</p><p>Clint Smith, an academic/advocate with an interest in criminal justice reform and incarceration, has made a similar point in his article “Complex Sentences: Searching for the Purpose of Education Inside a Massachusetts State Prison.” In his article, Smith writes of his experience working with a group of prisoners serving life sentences for various crimes. Smith met with these prisoners once a week, where they would read literature, share their own written words, and have thought provoking discussions. In his experience, he came to question the consensus around ignoring this distinct population. He found that they were incredibly receptive to this weekly intellectual stimulation, and that it challenged them to ask deeper questions about their identities and their purposes in life. He found that this education was valuable for these prisoners, even though they may never have the opportunity to utilize the benefits of it outside of prison.</p><p>Smith, like myself, questions “the success of prison education [being] defined by whether or not people will experience recidivism” (Smith 96). Smith believes that the prison space can and should be a space where everyone can have access to education, “regardless of how many days spent inside or outside a prison” (Smith 96). There should be not degrees to which someone is eligible for the opportunity to make themselves more virtuous. If the exercising of virtue is the highest state of human flourishing, and this is desirable for everyone to achieve, then it doesn’t make sense that we should create a cutoff for those who commit the most vicious acts. It would appear that these people are in the most immediate need of this moral formation, and that we should work with them to achieve this virtuous constitution.</p><p>I agree with Smith that educational programs, in my case moral education, can be incredibly valuable for all prisoners, especially those who will spend the rest of their lives in jail. It is possible to conceptualize a program that “facilitate[s] community building, identity development, and cognitive liberation, not singularly limited to ideas of instrumentalism or vocational utility” (Smith 97). This extension of moral formation to all prisoners reminds us that the effort is valuable in and of itself, and that a secondary consequence like lowering recidivism is not necessary in order to justify it. Freeing someone from their vicious constitution is an important goal that we should be fighting for, and to ignore it would be unjust.</p><p>Many might question whether these lifetime prisoners will ever have the opportunity to exercise this virtuous demeanor and if this is all an intellectual exercise that yields no results. This is a naïve observation and fails to acknowledge the level of activity that goes on inside of a prison. Prisoners have every opportunity to interact with their peers, the guards and their families and friends if they choose to visit. In all of these interactions, they have the opportunity to exercise virtue. Though their everyday activities are structured and restricted in a sense, there are countless opportunities to interact positively with their fellow prisoners. Prisoners who are reentering society especially need to practice virtue if they are going to properly exercise it on the outside. This exercise will need to happen on the inside. Everyone can work towards their moral development with their community of inmates and get closer to being virtuous individuals.</p><p>This raises the point that in order to create a system that is oriented towards virtue we need everyone to be a part of this process. If we have two different groups coexisting simultaneously, one working towards moral development and one left to its own devices, then this could complicate the project. If we do not have everyone within the unit working towards the same goal, then there could be disruption and corruption of those who are actually trying to be rehabilitated. I believe that we need everyone to be working towards this goal so that we can provide a larger community in which everyone can not only practice virtue but assist their community members in their moral development. This is not possible if we exclude a large swath of the prison population, especially one that could be considered to be more morally depraved than the rest.</p><p>Our new conception of a prison requires that we extend moral formation to all prisoners, whether or not they will reenter society. If we value virtue and human flourishing as the highest good, then it would only make sense that we extend this opportunity to obtain that to as many people as possible. We know that people serving life sentences are capable and willing to receive moral and intellectual formation, and that they could be more willing than those who have the chance to reenter society. It is obvious that these prisoners would have the opportunity to exercise this virtuous constitution and it is necessary that we educate all of them so that we can supplement the moral education with the help of close friends.</p><p>*</p><p>To recap, in this chapter I have argued that we need to be cautious of the deterministic nature of our current rehabilitative approach and that we need to seek more qualitative measures of success, like character or virtue. When addressing criminality, we cannot look solely to the situations and circumstances that might encourage criminality, but we must also look to the constitution of the agent. We need to have a system of corrective justice that works to bring people closer to being moral beings that can properly exercise virtue in the right situation and at the right time. The end must be the inculcation of virtue in tandem with providing a positive environment in which citizens can properly exercise that virtue, and the lowering of recidivism will follow naturally. We have to be ready and willing to extend this program to all inmates, given that reentry is no longer a requirement in order to receive these services.</p><p>While I would argue that character formation is the important missing piece of the puzzle, many academics and psychologists would argue that character traits are not empirically sound and that situations and circumstances can determine human action with a greater predictive power. In my next chapter, I will speak to this situationist critique of virtue ethics and argue that character formation is a viable option in orienting human behavior.</p><p><strong>CHAPTER THREE</strong></p><p>A Counter to the Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics</p><p>Introducing Aristotelian virtue and character formation is an essential fix to our criminal justice system, though many in academia would argue that character formation is a futile effort. These detractors, commonly known as situationists, believe that the existence of character traits do not hold up to empirical analysis and that our behavior can be more predictively attributed to outside forces. They believe that Aristotle’s account of human behavior cannot meet the standards of being a descriptive psychology, and that our efforts on altering behavior ought to be spent elsewhere. Some psychologists and philosophers have come forward to argue that these interpretations are incorrect, and that humans can have a constitution, though a complex one, that determines our conduct. They believe that human behavior is far more complex than a cursory data set can suggest, and that we need to look at a number of factors when determining how people make choices. In this chapter, I will first share the situationist perspective through the psychologist John Doris, who will argue that traits lack cross-situational consistency and that Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot withstand empirical criticism. Second, I will challenge the efficacy of cross-situational consistency and introduce the CAPS model as a viable psychological model to support Aristotle. Third, using Robert C. Roberts, I will argue that Aristotle himself has a strong appreciation for environment having an effect on our conduct.</p><p><em>John Doris and the Situationist Critique</em></p><p>The critics of virtue ethics believe that character traits as we have come to understand them are rarely predictive of how humans behave in real life. Doris would say that “character is expected to have regular behavioral manifestations: we believe that the person of good character will behave appropriately, even in situations with substantial pressures to moral failure” (Doris 505). Simply, if we believe someone to possess a character trait, or in our case a virtue, we would expect them to exercise this trait in trait-relevant situations with some high degree of probability. Doris does not believe that this level of certainty is supported by empirical science, and would go as far to say that “differing behavioral outcomes often seem a function of situational variation more than individual disposition” (Doris 506). Doris would assert that situations and circumstances are far more influential on our actions than these unproven traits.</p><p>Doris supports his theory that character traits do not exist by citing the standard of cross-situational consistency. For a trait to have cross-situational consistency, the trait needs to be properly demonstrated across different trait-relevant situations. For example, if I claim to have the trait of being talkative, then I might need to prove that I am talkative in all varying social situations varying in size and familiarity of the groups. If I consistently fail to exhibit talkativeness in all of these groups, then I have failed to be cross-situationally consistent. In reality, “systematic observation typically reveals failures of cross-situational consistency; behavior is very often surprisingly unreliable” (Doris 507). This finding is especially problematic for descriptive psychologies, like Aristotle’s <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em>, that try to make claims about how we can shape and orient people’s actions.</p><p>The Aristotelian ethical framework faces a great challenge from the situationist critique. If it proves to be empirically unproven that people have the ability to possess character traits, then Aristotle would be of no help in our modern project of helping the formerly incarcerated make better decisions. If it proves to be fruitless to inculcate virtue in people, then our only means of shaping decisions would be through environmental factors. Some Aristotelians counter this claim, saying that even though traits are not as robust as we would like them to be, we can still consider his ethics as more of an intellectualist account. This would mean that “virtue consists in a distinctive ‘way of seeing’ — appropriate habits of moral perception, not reliable dispositions to action, are what distinguish the virtuous person” (Doris 509). Virtue would consist in seeing the virtues as a sort of goal to obtain, and not necessarily something that is reasonably attainable.</p><p>Though an intellectualist account maintains the goal of virtuous action, it fails to capture what Aristotle is going for. Aristotelian virtue is valuable not only because it gives us a teleological end to our actions, but because it also gives us the tools to properly orient ourselves towards that end. Aristotle provides a vision on the good life <em>and </em>a means of reaching that good life. To abandon the latter misses a huge part of the equation. Furthermore, the intellectualist framework forgets that virtue does not simply exist in thought. Virtue exists in the committing of virtuous acts. For Aristotle, to have an understanding of morality does not mean that you are a virtuous person. You need to be able to execute these virtues in virtue-relevant situations. To fail to do so would indicate a weak disposition.</p><p>In order for virtue ethics to survive as a viable descriptive psychology, it needs to have a proper defense against “damaging empirical criticism” (Doris 520). Moral formation needs to prove that someone’s well ordered constitution directs the decisions they make, and that situations and circumstances are not the sole determinant of action. In the next section, I will show that the empirical claims made against virtue ethics are misinterpreted and that new psychological research supports the idea that someone’s constitution does determine the decisions they make.</p><p><em>The Collapse of Cross-Situational Consistency and the CAPS Model</em></p><p>For situationists who take issue with the notion of character, the standard of cross-situational consistency is the death blow to virtue ethics. If character is determined by whether or not that character is exhibited in all character-relevant activities, then character would be proven not to exist. Despite these claims, the notion of cross-situational consistency is dubious. Mischel and Shoda believe that measuring the existence of character by averaging the degree to which you perform an act is improper. They argue that “by averaging our variations across situations, this approach treats the variations in the individual’s behavior across situations as unwanted or uninformative variances or as measurement error, and demonstrates that different people are in fact different on the whole with regard to the dimension” (Mischel and Shoda 247). Each individual act is relevant and that deviation from a given trait does not necessarily mean that the subjects are acting randomly.</p><p>Mischel and Shoda found that it makes more sense to see if people act consistently when the same situation is presented to them multiple times. When they observed whether or not someone would repeat a specific behavior multiple times, they found that the correlation would be far higher than if we were looking for cross-situational consistency. For example, in the last section I mentioned the trait of talkativeness. Let’s say that in observation, I am found to be talkative in large and medium sized groups, but that I cease to be nearly as talkative in smaller groups. By the measure of cross-situational consistency, I would appear to lack this trait; however, when looking back on the data, we can see that in the multiple rounds of observation I consistently exhibited my levels of talkativeness in the varying group sizes. Though I cannot claim to be consistent in every situation, I can claim to be consistent when presented with a situation multiple times.</p><p>Mischel and Shoda would attribute this anomaly to the complex nature of human decision making. When someone is deciding what action to take, there are many competing intuitions and dispositions competing to be actualized. In the example of my talkativeness, my inability to exhibit talkativeness in smaller social settings could be explained by my overriding disposition to respectfully listen in more intimate settings. Though it would not seem so clear from the data, I do have concrete traits that determine my actions. The data does not capture how people order the characteristics that they value and how they would like to show them in certain situations.</p><p>A psychological framework that champions this theory is the cognitive-affective personality system, or the CAPS model. The CAPS model claims that the decision making process in human beings is determined by a complex network of “five different types of relatively stable person variables: the individual’s encodings or construal (of self, other people, situations); expectancies (about outcomes and one’s own efficacy); subjective values; competencies (for the construction and generation of social behavior); and self regulatory strategies and plans in the pursuits of goals” (Mischel and Shoda 252). These person variables go further than simple character traits and incorporate things like how we perceive our environment, what we think the future holds for us, and what we value.</p><p>I believe that the CAPS model fits neatly within the Aristotelian virtue ethic. The CAPS model understanding of human behavior refutes the standard of cross-situational consistency, and returns to Aristotle’s belief that the human constitution largely determines how people act. In addition to acknowledging that traits, or virtues, help to shape human behavior, the CAPS model can give us another way of looking at practical wisdom or <em>phronesis.</em> Aristotle believes that practical wisdom is necessary in order to know when, where and to what degree to exercise the virtues. The CAPS model acknowledges that a large part of human decision making is how we view a situation and what our long-term goals are. This means that someone who possesses a certain characteristic that is valued can properly review the situation and then exercise that characteristic to the degree which they deem it necessary. Mischel’s and Shoda’s more thoughtful approach to the psychological research has shown us that Aristotle ethical framework withstands empirical criticism and that it can be considered a suitable descriptive psychology.</p><p><em>An Aristotelian Conception of Situationism</em></p><p>Aristotle provides us with a strong, and now empirically supported, conception of how people make decisions. He understands that the inculcation of virtues is key to shaping the actions of people. Situationists sensitive to Aristotelian ethics as a descriptive psychology might still argue that Aristotle does not make any exceptions for how a social setting might affect how people act. Though he has a solid understanding of how we might orient people and shape their personal constitutions, they think that he is weak on acknowledging how the world around them might work to inhibit or encourage their decision making process. These critics are incorrect.</p><p>Robert C. Roberts believes that in addition to Aristotle’s virtue ethic, there is a respect for how situations and circumstances might shape the individual. This respect for environment comes from the second part of the <em>Nicomachean </em>Ethics, which is the <em>Politics.</em> Roberts says, “Aristotle holds that virtue requires a social context that supports it. Thus his <em>Nicomachean Ethics </em>and his <em>Politics </em>are complementary volumes of the same topic: how to live a human life well. The first is about the character of the person who is fit to live a good life, and the second is about the society in which a person of good character will function well” (Roberts 21). Aristotle, in his <em>Politics, </em>shows us that environment is a very important part of the success of individuals. A virtuous individual could not succeed as easily if he did not have a situation in which he could properly thrive. This means that in addition to shaping the individual, we have to create a supportive social situation to further facilitate a good life.</p><p>This perspective has huge implications for the modern criminal justice movement. One could argue that we’ve only been reading the <em>Politics </em>and that are sole focus has been to create a political environment in which people can succeed and not recommit criminal acts. We need to realize that, while this is important, we cannot forget the <em>Ethics </em>and that we have to properly orient human individuals if we want them to live a fully flourishing life. Aristotle gives us this full picture, and gives us all the tools we need to create virtuous citizens.</p><p>*</p><p>To recap, in this chapter I have shown that the situationist critique of Aristotelian virtue ethics is unfounded. The notion of cross-situational consistency pushed by situationists does not stand up to careful observation, and further psychological research has shown us that virtues and individual dispositions are supported by the data. We also know that Aristotle does not ignore that situations have an affect on human behavior, and he properly addresses how we might orient our political environment so that citizens can properly exercise virtue.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>In conclusion, I believe that moral education needs to be introduced into the American criminal justice system. We have done an outstanding job of addressing outside causes of criminality through various programs and alternatives to prison, but if we are to move any further in improving the lives and hearts of the formerly incarcerated, then we need to incorporate moral formation into our rehabilitative system. We can surely continue with this strategy of addressing afflictions outside of the control of the individual, but over time we will only achieve diminishing returns on our investment. We will fail to address those who have made a bad decision of their own fully functioning mind, and they will continue to reenter the prison system in perpetuity. It is vital that we meet people where they are and seek to address the underlying reason why they have come to this point in their life. If we ignore those who are responsible for their own actions, then they will presume that their punishment is not through any fault of their own. They will adopt the perspective that society is to blame and that they cannot be helped.</p><p>In order to prevent this fatalist view from manifesting itself into our larger culture, we need to grant agency back to these people. There are bad people in the world, despite our intuitions to the contrary, and until we acknowledge this we will be putting our resources in the wrong places. Providing people with moral formation is the answer to this problem. It allows us to get past the numbers and the data and get back to the purpose of criminal rehabilitation: creating better citizens.</p><p><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></p><p>Aristotle, and Martin Ostwald. <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em>. Prentice Hall, 1999.</p><p>Doris, John M. “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics.” <em>Nous</em>, vol. 32, no. 4, 1998, pp. 504–530., doi:10.1111/0029–4624.00136.</p><p>Gelb, Adam, and Tracy Velazquez. “The Changing State of Recidivism: Fewer People Going Back to Prison.” <em>The Pew Charitable Trusts</em>, 2018, <a href="http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/08/01/the-changing-state-of-recidivism-fewer-people-going-back-to-prison.">www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/08/01/the-changing-state-of-recidivism-fewer-people-going-back-to-prison.</a></p><p>Mischel, Walter, and Yuichi Shoda. “A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure.” <em>Psychological Review</em>, vol. 102, no. 2, 1995, pp. 246–268., doi:10.1037//0033–295x.102.2.246.</p><p>Rhodes, William, et al. “Following Incarceration, Most Released Offenders Never Return to Prison.” <em>Crime &amp; Delinquency</em>, vol. 62, no. 8, 2014, pp. 1003–1025., doi:10.1177/0011128714549655.</p><p>Roberts, Robert C. “Situationism and the New Testament Psychology of the Heart.”</p><p>Smith, Clint. “Complex Sentences: Searching for the Purpose of Education Inside a Massachusetts State Prison.” <em>Harvard Educational Review</em>, vol. 87, no. 1, 2017, pp. 81–98., doi:10.17763/1943–5045–87.1.81.</p><p>United States, Congress, Office of Justice Programs, et al. “Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994.” <em>Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994</em>, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002, pp. 1–16.</p><p>United States, Congress, Office of Justice Programs, et al. “Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010.” <em>Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010</em>, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014, pp. 1–30.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6a882a0bce2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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