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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Philippe Everaert-De Block on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Philippe Everaert-De Block on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Philippe Everaert-De Block on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Politics Inherently Problematic?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/is-politics-inherently-problematic-54a6b1ca3f55?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[critical-thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:21:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-16T16:21:56.144Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bg6HGNAxfqflFIdgEToJKQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I frequently encounter a specific basket of arguments concerning politics and how politics relates to “problems”. A small selection from the basket:</p><p>- Politics causes problems.</p><p>- Politics produces problems.</p><p>- Politics sustains problems.</p><p>- Politics is inherently problematic.</p><p>Those are four examples of different relations between two phenomena. Or rather, three of those are. The latter constitutes an ontological overlap. It’s also quite a strong, sweeping claim to make. This claim is often expanded upon by stating that politics is inherently problematic in a way that cannot not be so, that politics can ONLY produce problems and is in fact wholly incapable of offering solutions, and that a world without politics would be preferable.</p><p>I object to the claim that politics is inherently problematic, and to the archipelago of subdivisional claims.</p><h3>1. Politics and power</h3><p>It makes sense to start by asking ourselves: what is politics? Let me suggest a working definition:</p><p>“<em>Politics is the practice of organizing the polis.</em>”</p><p>I understand a polis to be a community of people living under a common framework of laws and institutions. Some definitions of politics incorporate the notion “power”. I understand this inclination, but I believe power is an attribute of the environment rather than a defining feature of politics, kind of like how you can’t swim up and down a swimming pool without getting wet. Wetness is not a feature of swimming, but of the water that makes up the environment in which the activity is practiced.</p><p>Following my proposed definition, politics simply comes directly with the existence of a polis like a toy with the purchase of a McDonald’s Happy Meal. At least I hope that’s still the case. Anyway, that means that even a lack of power structures — deliberate or not — doesn’t exclude politics. I live in a household of three: my wife, our cat, and yours truly. I consider us a polis within a polis, with our own preferences, conventions, rules if you can even call them that, requirements, restrictions, and so on. We haven’t underwritten a constitution, and we have not or not yet experienced any instance of illicit or illegal wrongdoing that would justify getting the outer polis involved. Does this mean our tiny polis deliberately lacks a power structure? Or inadvertently lacks one? I don’t believe the lack of any distinct, stipulated power structure makes our household not a polis, nor does it make this polis non-political.</p><p>Let us now attempt to define power. I suggest the following working definition:</p><p>“<em>Power is the capacity to shape what others do or what options they have.</em>”</p><p>A small note on power, more specifically on the claim that power corrupts. Yes, power corrupts. And swimmers drown. It’s an intrinsic risk of the activity. But the notion that power can corrupt doesn’t mean that everyone who touches upon it becomes corrupt or corrupted by default. I see the claim as nothing but an attempt at witticism that only works if the interlocutor doesn’t think twice.</p><p>That concludes the section on what politics is. Now let’s ask ourselves: how do we practice politics — how do we organize the polis — in a way that adds positive value relative either to leaving the polis unorganized or to any alternative way to organize the polis? This is where political frameworks enter the game. But those are a little irrelevant to the scope of this argument. The point is that political frameworks, as I understand it, happen downstream of the phenomena that constitute politics and power respectively. Following my swimming analogy, systems or frameworks of practice would correspond with, for example, front crawl, breaststroke, backstroke, butterfly, and so on.</p><h3>2. The accused</h3><p>To reiterate: we were interrogating the persistent notion that politics is inherently problematic. But where does this notion enter our game precisely? People, in my experience, tend to be more than a little vague about this and this isn’t helped by a tendency by some individual politicians to obscure things by claiming that the electorate doesn’t have an obligation to explain themselves and that the voter is always right like those phenomena are directly causally related. Or as if they have an incentive to leave the claim out in the open uninterrogated. Yes, voters don’t need to be able to explain why they voted the way they did but that’s nothing but a truism. I still want to be able to ask why our claim under scrutiny exists and what it explains.</p><p>However warranted any specific complaints about politics or politicians are, it’s easy for a citizen to overlook both the bigger and the smaller picture. Let’s inspect, for example, this timeless classic: “THEY’RE IN IT TO LINE THEIR POCKETS!”</p><p>Where I live, members of the national parliament are paid by the state for their parliamentary work. I don’t wanna get bogged down by the numbers but believe me when I say that that pay is substantial. Anyone who’s confronted with the exact amounts (that are tiered) experiences a brain freeze for a fraction of a second. Because they inevitably compare it to their own financial situation. That’s entirely warranted but MPs are in a relatively exceptional situation themselves: being elected. It upends your life. You get elected for — hopefully — one full legislative term. If you had a job at the factory, that would amount to suddenly up and leaving and it’s not like they’re gonna close down the assembly line for five years and switch it back on when or if you don’t get reelected. The whole system is in place exactly because it’s of vital importance that people are represented by their peers, instead of by a selection of people who were already powerful and influential outside of politics. As I see it, the pay is supposed to cover two things: remuneration for the work and compensation for the dent to an MP’s financial security that may come with getting elected to parliament and running a campaign.</p><p>One could object by pointing out that politicians tend to already be “rich folk”. But I would then argue that this objection suffers from a sampling bias, and from assumptions. When people are asked to name politicians, the only available pool is known politicians. And the salient ones tend to be the ones who have been doing politics for quite a while, which is exactly the reason they became salient in the first place. I do not know every newly elected MP whose constituency is on the other side of the country I live in. If politicians are seen as part of a despised elite by default, repeatedly calling them despicable doesn’t really add much value. And what exactly would the alternative be? That they don’t get paid? That used to be the case in several European countries, such as in Germany (from the Empire’s founding in 1871 until 1906), in France during the Restoration and July Monarchy, and in the United Kingdom until 1911. It’s a system that inherently selects for a segment of the public that is maximally available to run for and to hold elected office because they already have the time and the financial capital to sustain themselves through a period without direct income. In other words: exactly the parliamentary populace accused of being a wealthy and self-serving elite in the first place.</p><p>I also want to defend politicians on another ground. I claim that fallibility is a crucial and systemic attribute of what it means to be a good politician. There is nothing wrong with experts in government. Their expertise can inform their decisions, but their political authority comes from their mandate to represent people. My objection is to expertise being offered as a substitute for that mandate, as though knowing more about a subject settles whose priorities should govern decisions about it.</p><p>If there is one phenomenon arising after the financial crisis of 2007–2008 that I have despised and still do, it is the notion that an expert in a hypothetical field A would make the better decision maker in a corresponding policy field A. Yes, there was a time when technocracy was actually purported to be a proper way to organise a polis. It baffles me to this day and it pains me to see that every now and then someone somewhere suffers a mild stroke and suggests it again as a meaningful solution in a democracy.</p><p>The whole point of a representative democracy is people are supposed to be represented by peers. Ideally, anyone could run for office. With the possible exception of infants because their policy proposals are consistently rubbish. In democracies, there already is a built-in corrective system, at least in theory: elections. There is simply no need to defer to someone’s supposed esoteric expertise as a basis for trust. In fact, that deferential movement could in itself already usher in an electorate’s democratic fatigue that is an ideal breeding ground for a self-proclaimed intellectual vanguard to make a claim to power. This risk can be offset by reintroducing fallibility in representatives as a feature to be cherished, not a bug to be stamped out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uE_GLw9bEmPEj5FBNi2JaQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>3. Problems and solutions</h3><p>So far, I haven’t been able to identify where exactly politics becomes inherently problematic by inspecting the levels of its ontology, the polis, power, politicians in general and politicians individually. I left political systems, or frameworks, out for a reason: comparing them would require examining the preferences and circumstances against which one might be judged superior to another. That is a different inquiry from asking whether politics itself is inherently problematic. Political systems simply offer different solutions to potentially the exact same problems. They derive meaning from the experiences and the priorities of their proponents but the building blocks are roughly similar. An example of this is the question of whether, at any specific moment, it is a good idea to increase interest rates or to lower them.</p><p>That leaves us with the notion of “a problem”. What makes something a problem in such a way that distinguishes it from something else that isn’t a problem? I would argue that a problem is something that keeps us from reaching a desired state in a way that causes friction that wouldn’t be there if the problem was absent. If I want to eat sushi and my wife wants to eat pizza, that’s a hurdle. Something becomes a problem when the desired state one attempts to reach has, at least to a degree, existential value either in itself or as a necessary condition to reach a desired state. If the reason I want to eat sushi is because there are only two options and I’m allergic to pizza, it is my wife’s insistence that I partake in eating pizza that constitutes the problem, not her preference for pizza over sushi.</p><p>This touches on the mistaken idea that “a problem” and “the solution” exist solely in opposition to each other.</p><p>Firstly, I cannot conceive of any situation where an existing problem only has one solution. It may have only one currently available solution but even in life-and-death situations, dying is strictly speaking also a solution to the current problem. I personally would advise against it. But what if the choice is made for you? The Battle of Stalingrad is regarded as a victory for the USSR against Nazi Germany but it was paid for in massive volumes of Russian blood by the very person who gave the city by the Volga its name and who crucially didn’t spill a drop of his own blood over it. The problem for the soldier was that they might not live to see the next day. The problem for Joseph Stalin was initially that he couldn’t afford to lose such a strategically important location. But as the battle progressed, it also became a matter of prestige: the swastika flag could not and would not be raised over the city bearing the Great Leader’s name.</p><p>We don’t even have to leave Russia for an example of the inverse situation. Field marshal Mikhail Kutuzov’s decision in 1812 to abandon Moscow and leave the city to Napoleon’s forces was made to buy the Russian army time to recuperate from the immense losses suffered at the Battle of Borodino one week prior to Napoleon’s taking of Moscow, unopposed. This denied the French army a — and probably the — decisive victory and allowed the Russian troops to fight on until Napoleon abandoned Moscow without securing peace. During the subsequent retreat, hunger, exhaustion, Russian attacks and increasingly severe cold devastated his forces.</p><p>These are both examples of hard-fought victories in which a diametrically opposed decision over an important city ended up being the preferred solution to the problem.</p><p>There is a potentially huge difference between available solutions and one or more preferred solutions to a problem. The existence of a problem by itself doesn’t indicate which potential solutions are available or how many. The real question is what cost a decision maker is willing to pay to be able to reach the preferred state post-problem. But the nature or the steepness of the cost of the decision to choose one solution over another also has the potential to change the game. If someone kidnaps me and demands a hefty ransom for my release, I would question either their sanity or their research skills. I doubt I’d be in any way in demand on the open market and part of the reason for that is that I’m seriously annoying to keep around because I talk a lot and what comes out is stuff like this very article. But keeping a kidnappee “in stock” for a while is exactly part of the design of a kidnapping.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SrzZEEXCklNvKwNkgj_hEA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>4. Finding the leak</h3><p>So how does this relate to politics?</p><p>Combining several games simultaneously can drastically reduce the field of available solutions to any problem, and the field of preferred solutions to specific problems with it. Where I live, in a Northwestern European liberal democracy, those games include but aren’t limited to:</p><p>⁃ Keeping the welfare system from collapsing</p><p>⁃ Keeping the radical right and the radical left from power, often resulting in big coalitions that have trouble stipulating a single vision</p><p>⁃ Dealing with a perpetually looming energy crisis</p><p>⁃ Dealing with the fallout of a legislative evolution wherein substantive political choices have become entrenched in European treaties and rules, restricting the ability of successive national governments to pursue different policies even in domains that formally remain within their competence.</p><p>How do you explain to the electorate that their feeling that their choice at the ballot box doesn’t really seem to make any difference is backed up by reality? Let’s keep that question rhetorical within the scope of this essay. I’m not saying that we should take pity on our elected representatives. I’m saying that daring to call out problems is fantastic… as a first step. The fact that elected officials are paid to represent us and to look for solutions to problems doesn’t also mean that we, the electorate, shouldn’t educate ourselves to reach a greater understanding of what our polis’s problems are and where they leak into the system, IF they even DO leak into the system.</p><p>It seems to me that a combination of conditions that is arguably uniquely detrimental to the state of democracy in recent political history is currently being compounded by confusion over what constitutes a political asset relative to a political liability. Moreover, I deem a healthy distrust of power and the powerful a positive feature of a democracy. A call for a reintroduction of the meaning of political is NOT simultaneously an endorsement of any and every action those in power commit themselves to. Hence my semantic split between the notions of politics and power.</p><p>A claim that states that politics causes problems is redundant. Swimming causes problems because it can cause problems, and so can any action or inaction. A claim that states that politics causes only problems is either wrong or intellectually dishonest. On 9 November 1989, the East German politician Günter Schabowski called a press conference in the wake of his faction’s removal of Erich Honecker, then leader of the ultraorthodox Socialist Unity Party of Germany (the SED), in favor of Egon Krenz. The idea was to announce revised travel restrictions in an effort to relieve the pressure of mass emigration and domestic protests while keeping the process under the regime’s control. Because of an accumulation of slight miscommunications and misunderstandings, Schabowski inadvertently seemed to order the immediate opening of checkpoints between East and West Germany, including in Berlin. The journalists present, who were initially dumbfounded by the announcement, asked for confirmation, which Schabowski promptly gave. They subsequently rushed to report on his statements and the rest is history. Is this episode a problem stemming from the practice of organizing a polis? It was for the SED. But Schabowski’s mistaken announcement also proved instrumental in unifying Europe and in pushing democracy eastward. What would make the claim that politics causes only problems intellectually dishonest is what I call “denominational fraud” (see my essay “Denominational Fraud”). If the denominator one utilises in this claim only counts instances when politics has caused problems, then the claim is technically correct, but not meaningfully so. What makes it dishonest is that one selects the data in such a way that one cannot be wrong. And that’s disqualifying for an argument.</p><p>Then there is the claim under scrutiny: “politics is inherently problematic”. That would mean — according to my definition — that the practice of organizing a polis is inherently a problem. That is a claim one can arguably make. But I would then ask if it is even possible to leave a polis unorganized (not disorganized). A preference doesn’t have to be codified to apply within any polis, however tiny. Some could accuse me of “playing semantics” by keeping the definition of politics out of reach. And I would understand that but that would also be missing the point. Definitions are important. They offer calibration for communication. If everyone is free to interpret one mile as they see fit, winning a race would amount to imagining the biggest number, or the smallest. My goal here is to find the leak. If a swimmer doesn’t survive a swimming session, I think we can all agree that closing the ocean or banning the activity altogether may constitute overreach. So where does the drowning leak into the swimming? So also, with politics. The fact that I haven’t been able to identify or locate a leak doesn’t mean that there isn’t one. Just that I can’t find it.</p><p>I assume many will not appreciate when I say this but I will anyway: the answer to the current crisis of trust in politics, or between the electorate and their representatives, is not less politics, it is more politics. More thought about politics. Fight the fatigue!</p><p>Now if you’ll excuse me, I’m gonna go read this essay to my annoyed captors to further annoy them in order to either drive down my price or get myself killed. Both are solutions. I prefer the cheap one.</p><h3>Sources</h3><p>Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers. <a href="https://www.dekamer.be/pdf_sections/depute/statuut%20van%20het%20lid.pdf">Overzicht van de belangrijkste elementen van het statuut van de leden van de Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers.</a> Updated February 2026.</p><p>Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste. <a href="https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/413332/WD-1-254-08-pdf.pdf">Das Diätenrecht des Reichstages (1871–1918) und der Weimarer Nationalversammlung.</a> WD 1–3000–254/08, 27 November 2008.</p><p>De Rugy, François. <a href="https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rapports/r3997.asp">Rapport nos. 3997 et 3998 sur la transparence de la vie publique et la prévention des conflits d’intérêts.</a> Assemblée nationale, 23 November 2011. Historical discussion of parliamentary remuneration.</p><p>Kelly, Richard. <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05075/">Members’ Pay and Allowances — A Brief History.</a> House of Commons Library, 21 May 2009.</p><p>United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-soviet-union-and-the-eastern-front">“The Soviet Union and the Eastern Front.”</a> Holocaust Encyclopedia.</p><p>Fondation Napoléon. <a href="https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/timelines/napoleons-russian-campaign-from-the-niemen-to-moscow/">“Napoleon’s Russian Campaign: From the Niemen to Moscow”</a> and <a href="https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/timelines/napoleons-russian-campaign-the-retreat/">“Napoleon’s Russian Campaign: The Retreat.”</a></p><p>Jacobs, Quinten. <em>Het betonnen beleid.</em> Ertsberg, 2025. Chapter 2, especially sections 2.2–2.3.</p><p>Chronik der Mauer. <a href="https://www.chronik-der-mauer.de/en/chronicle/_year1989/_month11/?moc=1&amp;month=11&amp;opennid=179499&amp;year=1989">Chronicle entries for 9 November 1989</a>; and <a href="https://www.chronik-der-mauer.de/material/180619/internationale-pressekonferenz-von-guenter-schabowski-in-begleitung-der-sed-zk-mitglieder-helga-labs-gerhard-beil-und-manfred-banaschak-9-november-1989-ton-abschrift">“Internationale Pressekonferenz von Günter Schabowski,” 9 November 1989 (transcript).</a></p><p>Everaert-De Block, Philippe. <em>“Denominational Fraud.”</em> Essay.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=54a6b1ca3f55" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My Preference for More Less Explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/my-preference-for-more-less-explained-df47138f078b?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[libertarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uncertainty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 09:17:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-02T09:17:07.743Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HHpWdiOiHhMtVWhiKAZiiQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Descartes, Taleb and Wittgenstein at the tortoise races. Only Taleb has skin in the game.</figcaption></figure><p>I understand minarchy as a political model wherein a minimal state exists that doesn’t overextend itself. I prefer minarchy because I consider it the model best equipped to face uncertainty. I consider uncertainty a key attribute of events, and of reality. Conversely, I regard certainty as an attribute of perception of events, not of events.</p><p>The openness to interpretation of the words “minimal” and “overextend” is intentional. Different interpretations may yield larger or smaller states. I strongly prefer a state that is greatly or even maximally reduced but this is my own preference. And because I am constitutionally incapable of accepting any external preference without being offered a proper justification for it, at least, I believe it only just to grant others that same degree of intolerance.</p><p>There is an argument that has been levelled at minarchy that I am quite fond of because it is of good quality, and a real challenge to respond to. It is a bundle of simple questions: how does minarchy know when to stop? Why not continue into anarchy? And what makes anarchy not preferred in a way that minarchy is preferred?</p><p>I do not share the certainty arguably held by some other proponents of minarchy that anarchy would pose a problem. Not because I am convinced that it wouldn’t pose a problem but because I don’t know. I believe people interact with each other regardless of whether the state expands, maintains a status quo, or retreats.</p><p>For example, I do not believe that people in general refrain from committing crimes out of fear of retaliation by the state, nor do I believe that a state in retreat would in itself cause someone to commit crimes. Similarly, I doubt that someone who is in the process of inventing an entirely new mode of transportation will suddenly stop its development because they just realised that there are no appropriate government-mandated regulations yet.</p><p>Anarchy’s most important hypothetical weakness may lie in an inability to produce constructive predictability in a manner that is sustainable over time. We cannot know this, but the cost of being wrong may or may not be far too great to find out. A degree of predictability that posits that tomorrow will probably not be dissimilar from today, backed up by the knowledge that it cannot be an exact copy either, is arguably a catalyst for stability. We cannot guarantee certainty, but we can strive to achieve a degree of constructive predictability over time. An opening to allow for a minimal state to exist can work to preserve and protect this dynamic.</p><p>Some of my colleagues on the political right refer to a notion of natural rights to help explain why it is warranted to expect a minimal state to protect some rights but not others. I have always been suspicious of appeals to “natural rights” because I cannot shake the feeling that via this appeal, some asset owners seem to want to safeguard exactly those assets that just so happen to constitute the source of their wealth. One does not have to ab initio appeal to a right when one already has the freedom to claim its subject. A collective does not have a greater claim over the subject of a right’s claim simply by being a collective. But neither does an appeal to the observation that an arrangement has already been in place since before yesterday hold any inherent greater power or command any greater respect merely by being inherited. I dislike being told what to think or how to act by way of peer pressure, whether its source be past or present.</p><p>However, pointing at a mechanism and calling it a ghost may very well be accurate, but that doesn’t settle any claims either. So what to do? In case of conflict, sit down in a room with any opposing parties and negotiate. If it doesn’t yield an immediate result, do it again. If a dispute remains, that’s a reason to lay your claim before a court of justice. I do not see a reason to argue against the existence of courts, a justice system, and a Rule of Law. I find the latter crucial, as one of its functions is to safeguard against a potential devolution of democracy into crude majority rule. By the way, the principle of law “<em>res iudicata</em>” also exists for a reason. Either an arrangement is undisputed, or any remaining dispute can be brought before a court. <em>Res iudicata</em> prevents parties from relitigating a dispute once the judgment has become final and binding. Exceptions require legally recognised grounds, which a court must assess before a case can be reopened.</p><p>Going back to the bundle of questions that constitutes the argument against minarchy, I also want to interrogate specifically the question that asks how minarchy knows when to stop. Firstly, it doesn’t. People might. Secondly, I distinctly recall my initial reaction to reading the question. I wondered which direction is being suggested by its proponents who deem it so self-evident that it warrants an ellipsis. Because I can just as easily reverse the question: what stops a state from overreaching? So similarly: someone at some point, hopefully. One cannot defend a system for working to the best of its ability and demand that an alternative guarantee utopia.</p><p>I feel I need to mention that I have already proposed a mechanism for deciding what constitutes a minimal state for a society that doesn’t immediately ossify it into an absolute and that also counts against uncertainty instead of against certainty. This mechanism is the Minimal Justified Codex (the MJC for short). It posits that a proposed rule, restriction or requirement must be able to defend itself against a preferred counterfactual of an empty codex. This counterfactual, empty codex will remain virtual, and will not be replaced as a counterfactual by one that has been even minimally filled out as a result of the use of the MJC.</p><p>By way of conclusion, an attentive reader may have noticed that I mention “minarchy” and not “minarchism”, and that I haven’t called minarchy a “system”. This is also intentional. I have referred to it at the start of this essay as “a model” because I believe robust uncertainty-forward models prefer fewer rules to more rules since they don’t entertain the illusion that you can guarantee, require or restrict your way into absolute certainty. Absolute certainty is unattainable. Moreover, perceiving a future would itself enter into the conditions shaping what follows. What we can achieve is a sufficiently high level of predictability that allows for residual uncertainty to do work. By “uncertainty doing work” I mean that since the future is equally unknowable to exactly everyone, this levels out the playing field in a way that allows for (informed) guesses about the future to produce a positive or a negative yield. Concretely: in an honest tortoise race, it is exactly the uncertainty about your preferred tortoise that will make your bet a winning bet or a losing one.</p><p>Tomorrow may be different. In fact, it probably will.</p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><p>Everaert-De Block, Philippe. <em>“Defining Freedom and Liberty.”</em> Essay.</p><p>Everaert-De Block, Philippe. <em>An Epistemic Argument for Minarchy: Or, the Minimal Justified Codex.</em> Essay.</p><p>Nozick, Robert. <em>Anarchy, State, and Utopia.</em> Basic Books, 1974.</p><p>Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. <em>Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder.</em> Random House, 2012.</p><p>Wittgenstein, Ludwig. <em>On Certainty.</em> Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Basil Blackwell, 1969.</p><p>Vitkauskas, Dovydas, and Grigoriy Dikov. <em>Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial under the European Convention on Human Rights.</em> Council of Europe, 2012, pp. 32–33, “Finality of court decisions — res judicata.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df47138f078b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Write and Publish?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/why-write-and-publish-c80b2eecdc2f?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c80b2eecdc2f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[success]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 08:09:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-02T08:09:00.282Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I love to see how the mere observation of the fact that publishing on this platform doesn’t guarantee success or even that eyeballs point in the direction of any work by us, writers, generates content in and of itself already, even if a lot of it is in the form of bullet-listed self-help clickbait promising salvation by mentioning the promise and not the salvation.</p><p>I cannot however help but dismiss such promises out of hand. Not out of a sense of antagonism, but because I feel like salvation counts on a strange and alien notion that we are “owed success”, and that not experiencing any draws meaning from this. We are not owed success. And a lack of success is neither a pitstop in transit to the terminus “success”, nor is it a deficiency for not ever having reached any.</p><p>I write because I feel that not having written down my thoughts may rob me of clarity, or of understanding. I publish because someone else may feel the same way about my work, or not. I am not certain of this, nor do I feel I need to be. Not writing and not publishing will always prove you right. Writing and publishing may prove you wrong.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/456/1*BjwmCQnT28TtJgmYkHHYew.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ancient Accadian writing, Messopotamia</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c80b2eecdc2f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Phantom Accounting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/phantom-accounting-021040628538?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/021040628538</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-bias]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[critical-thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accounting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uncertainty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 06:53:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-01T06:53:25.908Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I write this piece because I have noticed that I have used this term fairly frequently in previous work without properly defining it. This is because, until now, I had not been able to come up with a definition that I deemed satisfactory. It is possible that I have previously proposed a definition of this phenomenon, but if this is the case, I cannot recall it. I will also propose a delineation concerning its scope, and provide some examples.</p><p>This is my proposed definition:</p><p><em>Phantom Accounting is when an assessment attributes positive or negative value relative to a baseline that has not been justified or cannot coherently exist. This includes treating something as gained, lost, or missing without establishing why it should have been expected or included, or combining mutually exclusive positions as though they could be held simultaneously.</em></p><p>I believe it constitutes a bundle of flaws in evaluation: it concerns how we arrive at an assessment of something’s worth, adequacy, success, or failure.</p><p>It has two distinct dimensions:</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>The epistemic dimension:</strong> What justifies the baseline? Do we have a warrant to assume that something should have been available, included, or expected?</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>The ontological dimension:</strong> Can that baseline coherently exist? Or does it require mutually exclusive conditions to hold simultaneously?</p><p>Its applications can therefore extend into ethics, politics, economics, relationships, and everyday judgments. Someone can assess a policy, another person, or their own life against a baseline that quietly combines non-existent or incompatible expectations.</p><p>This boundary matters. An imagined, abstract, or unattainable notion isn’t automatically a phantom. The problem arises when its imagined advantages are treated as actually available, owned, or owed, and the resulting difference is counted against reality without warrant.</p><p>I will now attempt to provide some examples that I hope will clarify and demonstrate the phenomenon.</p><ul><li><strong>Choice of dessert:</strong></li></ul><p>If a restaurant offers a choice between cheese and ice cream for dessert, pointing out the lack of cheese after you’ve chosen ice cream is not a valid criticism. At best, it’s a wholly redundant observation. The phantom consists in treating the advantages of an excluded alternative as though they remain available alongside those of the option chosen, without accounting for what recovering them would require giving up.</p><ul><li><strong>The value of real estate and its opportunity costs:</strong></li></ul><p>When one owns property, one can choose to sell it, rent it out, or do neither. The reason this choice exists and none of the three counts as the ideal, perfect choice in a way that is portable over time is because the future is unknowable. One must always count against uncertainty. Even the choice to not choose is a positive choice, not a lack thereof, not when counting against uncertainty. Every one of those three options has certain effects and some of the consequences of those effects are strictly mutually exclusive.</p><p>If one wants to sell by a deadline, mere knowledge of the existence of this deadline by an interested party can push the price down, potentially against the value a seller had imagined. But that latter iteration of the value may or may not account for opportunity costs.</p><p>This works in both directions: a buyer who finds the price of land per square metre in an affluent location A too expensive and therefore buys land at a cheaper price per square metre in a location B that is not (yet?) affluent is entirely free to lament that they don’t own land in location A, but any interlocutor has a full warrant to be annoyed by this.</p><p>Similarly, a real estate owner who sells a property is totally free to bemoan a distinct lack of rent landing in their bank account once per month, but this doesn’t erase the fact that the full amount has already appeared in their bank account all at once. That’s what a sale specifically means.</p><p>Likewise, a property owner who rents their asset out is completely free to wistfully pine for the peace of mind an absence of nagging tenants through a sale would have brought. You know, that’s part of what rent is for: to make exactly this more existentially bearable.</p><p>One has the absolute freedom to deplore the fact that 2+2=4; it will never be 5.</p><ul><li><strong>Counting in dead currencies:</strong></li></ul><p>This sometimes occurs especially in Europe when people consciously recall the day-to-day use of pre-euro currency. Take for example the price of a large loaf of bread. A large white loaf of 800 grams costs around 3.14 euros, based on the listed prices at five Belgian bakeries, including one in my town.<a href="#_edn1">[1]</a> One may remember that the price for a large loaf of bread during the 1990s was generally between 50 and 60 Belgian francs.<a href="#_edn2">[2]</a> So far so good.</p><p>The problem starts when the value of the knowledge of what this product used to cost back then splits into two mutually exclusive values: the very fact that the price for a loaf of bread is frozen in time is exactly because the currency in which it was counted was discontinued. The discrepancy can tell us that this product has more than doubled in price.<a href="#_edn3">[3]</a></p><p>Knowing what bread once cost does not, by itself, establish that an alternative retaining that price is available. The price belonged to a configuration of conditions that cannot simply be omitted from the comparison. Even an unchanged price would require conditions that sustain it. To preserve the historical price while silently discarding those conditions is to treat a selectively reconstructed alternative as though its availability had already been established.</p><p>But as a remnant-relic frozen in time that is unattainable by definition, the discrepancy cannot also count as an argument for anything beyond inflation when one is already pointing out the inflation.</p><ul><li><strong>The omniscience illusion:</strong></li></ul><p>What counts as “knowledge of everything”? The phrase “knowledge of everything” can be elliptical — “knowledge of everything [that I know]” — or it can be used mistakenly, either by misidentifying knowledge or by confusing everything that you know with everything there is to know or everything that can be known, perhaps adjusting for the notion that some things may never be known or cannot be known. If a person claims that they possess all the knowledge on a certain subject I like to ask them to list all the things that they’ve forgotten.</p><p>In conclusion: the most important value of knowledge of what constitutes Phantom Accounting, to me, is as a type of razor: it allows me to distinguish between and more easily separate arguments that make sense and are worth my time and mental bandwidth from arguments that… aren’t. It has helped me become aware of why the choice to (not) expend my finite energy is a good one in certain situations.</p><p><strong>Notes</strong></p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[1]</a> Listed prices for 800 g white loaves: <a href="https://www.steurs-dockx.be/brood">Steurs-Dockx</a> (€3.00); <a href="https://bakkersonline.be/be-nl/peeraergooreind/category/82714/brood">Peeraer, Gooreind</a> (€3.10); <a href="https://www.bakkerij-joeri.be/wp-content/uploads/Prijslijst-2025-05.pdf">Bakkerij Joeri, price list valid from 26 May 2025, p. 2</a> (€3.10); <a href="https://bestellen.bakkerij-swerten.be/nl/">Bakkerij Swerten</a> (€3.20); <a href="https://bakkersonline.be/be-nl/fijnbakkerijlieven-oostkamp/category/6004/brood">Fijnbakkerij Lieven, Oostkamp</a> (€3.30). Arithmetic mean: €3.14. Online listings consulted 30 October 2026.</p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[2]</a> Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs, <a href="https://etaamb.openjustice.be/fr/arrete-ministeriel-du-28-octobre-1999_n1999011388.html">ministerial decree of 28 October 1999 determining maximum prices for certain breads</a>, Article 2; published 20 November 1999 (reproduced by OpenJustice). Maximum price for specified 800 g loaves: 56 BEF, plus up to 3 BEF for slicing and wrapping. This provides a late-1990s reference point for the remembered price range.</p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[3]</a> European Central Bank, <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/exchange/be/html/index.en.html">“Belgium”</a>. Fixed conversion rate: €1 = 40.3399 BEF. At this rate, €3.14 corresponds to approximately 126.67 BEF, more than twice 50–60 BEF.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=021040628538" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Mijn instellingsmoeheid gerechtvaardigd]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/mijn-instellingsmoeheid-gerechtvaardigd-8ca6434f02e8?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ca6434f02e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[samenleving]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalisme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[filosofie]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[overheid]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politiek]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 14:45:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-30T14:45:52.240Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Een klachtenbrief aan de staat</h3><p>Ik schrijf dit essay om enkele van mijn eigen ervaringen met instellingen als burger van een Noordwest-Europese liberale democratie te doordenken en te begrijpen. Als burger ben ik aan sommige van die instellingen verantwoording verschuldigd, en wordt van mij verwacht dat ik die plicht betrouwbaar nakom. Ik heb hiermee op geen enkele manier of op enig moment ingestemd, maar ik acht het redelijk deze stilzwijgende overeenkomst als een vorm van sociaal contract te beschouwen. Zoals ik eerder schreef, beschouw ik mijn verplichtingen tegenover deze instellingen als ‘passiva’. Ik zie weinig reden — maar nooit géén — om dit contract te verbreken, omdat daar op de constitutionele balans ‘activa’ tegenover staan: rechten en bescherming. Ik ben het niet eens met alles wat de staat tot mijn activa en passiva rekent. Om de zoveel jaar krijg ik de kans om via mijn stem van me te laten horen. Dat gebeurt doorgaans grotendeels op een gelijk speelveld, met uitzonderingen. Ik, Philippe Everaert-De Block, heb persoonlijk specifieke bezwaren tegen de werking van de instellingen en overheden waaraan ik verantwoording verschuldigd ben. Ik acht het onwaarschijnlijk dat die meningsverschillen alleen door te stemmen opgelost raken, en dat is een van de redenen waarom ik schrijf. Ik vertrouw erop dat het democratische proces en de rechtsstaat waaraan ik gehouden ben, op zijn minst op de een of andere manier rekening zullen houden met de opmerkingen die ik te goeder trouw maak. Daarom vind ik het doorgaans onverstandig om impulsief te handelen en pleit ik voor geduld. Om dezelfde reden verkies ik evolutie boven revolutie en waardeer ik traditie als rem op de drang naar overhaaste verandering; en ik waardeer traditie uitsluitend om die specifieke reden, niet om enige inherente waarde daarbuiten. Ik verkies een evolutie die ‘vandaag werk verzet, niet morgen’, geen evolutie die verstijft in inertie en haar lethargie van een vals gevoel van causaliteit voorziet. Ik heb een hekel aan het idee van ‘regels’ die verboden opleggen of vrijheden inperken. Niet omdat ik zo’n avontuurlijke ziel ben, eerder zoals mijn kat het niet fijn vindt wanneer er ergens in huis een deur dicht is.</p><p>Maar…</p><h3><strong>Ik ervaar mijn passiva als stelselmatig afdwingbaar en mijn rechten als slechts naargelang de omstandigheden uitoefenbaar. Hun institutionele status heft die discrepantie op zichzelf niet op. Dit kan juist gebeuren doordat iedereen de toegewezen taak naar behoren uitvoert. De zorgvuldige uitvoering van elke afzonderlijke plicht kan de burger uitputten, terwijl iedere individuele instelling tevreden vaststelt dat ze haar deel heeft gedaan.</strong></h3><p>Een ‘balans’ heet niet voor niets zo. De hele constructie werkt omdat ze in evenwicht is, zowel vanuit het perspectief van de activa als vanuit dat van de passiva. Als een van beide onvolledig of scheefgetrokken blijkt, is er onderweg wellicht iets misgelopen.</p><h3>Een fenomenale opeenvolging van gebeurtenissen</h3><p>Een van de vele fantastische dingen aan het leven in een westerse liberale democratie is dat van burgers doorgaans niet verwacht wordt dat ze inspanningen leveren om bijvoorbeeld een Grote Leider, dood of levend, eerbied te betuigen. Weinig verplicht gehuil. Dit is, en dat is cruciaal, geen voorbeeld van een situatie die uit evenwicht is, maar van een situatie waarin het evenwicht anders gekalibreerd is. Dat gezegd zijnde kan die kalibratie ook volledig verkeerd zitten. Een grotendeels agrarische staat die elk jaar precies op het moment dat de oogst binnengehaald moet worden een week verplicht gehuil voorschrijft bij het mausoleum van de Super Duper Dode Leider, heeft zich mogelijk miskeken op de kalibratie. Het is redelijk om gevolgen te verwachten. Daarentegen gelden twee uur per dag in de file staan van en naar het werk, of na een zware werkdag stoom moeten afblazen met een serie op een streamingplatform, niet als eerbetoon op de manier waarop verplicht gehuil dat wel doet. Elke keuze brengt opportuniteitskosten met zich mee. Dat sommige keuzes soms meer van die kosten met zich meebrengen dan andere, kan betreurenswaardig en onwenselijk zijn, maar maakt ze nog geen voorbeelden van verkeerde kalibratie. Dan zouden alleen optimaal wenselijke configuraties als evenwicht gelden, en als burger simpelweg verwachten dat je activa aangereikt krijgt zonder daar ook verantwoordelijkheden tegenover te stellen, schaalt bijzonder slecht. Om de kalibratie vanuit mijn perspectief als burger vast te leggen, en als blijk van goede trouw tegenover de instellingen die ik hier zal bekritiseren, stel ik het volgende:</p><p>· Ik geloof niet dat succes mij verschuldigd is. Ik aanvaard dat iets ondernemen risico’s inhoudt.</p><p>· Ik aanvaard de financiële verantwoordelijkheden die mij toekomen. Daarmee staat niet vast dat ik schuld heb aan elke handeling die daartoe heeft geleid.</p><p>· Ik vraag niet om ‘terugbetalingen’, financieel noch moreel, en ik beweer evenmin dat ik het recht heb die te eisen.</p><p>Ik zal de lezer nu een opeenvolging van handelingen voorleggen die betrekking hebben op zowel activa als passiva, zoals ik die zelf heb beleefd. En ik denk dat ik hierin niet alleen sta, althans op basis van mijn eigen ervaring. Dat betekent niet dat ik automatisch gelijk heb wanneer ik mijn ervaring ook buiten mijn eigen situatie relevant noem. Dat kan ik niet weten. Maar daarom schrijf ik dit stuk.</p><p>Ik zal betogen dat zelfs binnen een over het algemeen goed gekalibreerd systeem een opeenvolging van fouten bij de uitvoering van het ‘sociaal contract’ dat dit systeem biedt, kan leiden en ook daadwerkelijk leidt tot een zeer reële, aanzienlijke erosie van het vertrouwen in instellingen, ondanks het feit dat de fouten op zichzelf en lokaal klein zijn. Ik stel dat dit komt doordat ze zich vermenigvuldigen tot over-leverage, en dat een burger alle recht heeft om elke volgende snee in zijn dood door duizend sneden als ingrijpender te ervaren dan die aanvankelijk lijkt.</p><p>Dit is die opeenvolging:</p><p>· Van mij wordt verwacht dat ik de wet naleef, en dat doe ik.</p><p>· Ik leef de wet ook na waar de kans op handhaving klein of wellicht afwezig is.</p><p>· Ik aanvaard mijn verplichtingen omdat ik begrijp dat mijn wettelijke verantwoordelijkheden deel uitmaken van een regeling die ook mijn rechten erkent en beschermt, en dat ik niet de enige burger ben.</p><p>· Die rechten genieten formele bescherming, waaronder grondwettelijke bescherming waar die van toepassing is.</p><p>· Toch lopen er dingen mis. Sommige fouten zijn de mijne; andere handelingen waarvan ik de gevolgen ondervind, zijn niet door mijzelf gesteld.</p><p>· Ik aanvaard de financiële verantwoordelijkheden die mij toekomen. Daarmee erken ik niet dat ik schuld heb aan elke handeling die daartoe heeft geleid.</p><p>· Ik ervaar de institutionele handhaving van mijn verplichtingen als aanzienlijk doeltreffender dan de institutionele bescherming van mijn rechten, waaronder bescherming tegen dubieuze vervolging. Niet eenmalig, maar met een zekere regelmaat.</p><p>· Het concrete resultaat is een erosie van mijn vertrouwen in de instellingen.</p><p>Er is nog een reden waarom ik denk dat mijn geval hier bijzonder geschikt kan zijn als voorbeeld. Zoals ik in de inleiding al liet doorschemeren, laat mijn aard het doorgaans niet toe om regels achteloos en onbewogen na te leven. Dat is enigszins een understatement. Ik beweer niet dat dit me bijzonder of uniek maakt, maar ik suggereer wel dat mensen die dit specifieke gevoel delen vaak een bovengemiddelde inspanning moeten leveren om dergelijke kaders te aanvaarden. Ik moet hard werken om mezelf ervan te overtuigen dat die aanvaarding iets goeds doet, en dat een groter goed waar ik al dan niet zelf deel van uitmaak, niet noodzakelijk iets is waartegen ik me op principiële gronden moet verzetten. Ik kan niet genoeg benadrukken hoeveel energie dit kost. Daarom heb ik — voor mezelf — de boekhoudkundige metafoor van de balans bedacht. Maar ik geloof ook dat juist die dynamiek me extra geschikt kan maken om uit te leggen wat die fouten in de kalibratie van het evenwicht kunnen zijn, wat ze kunnen betekenen, waarom ze reële gevolgen kunnen hebben en waarom ze niet zomaar van tafel geveegd mogen worden.</p><p>En ik heb het gevoel dat ik reden heb om te geloven dat ik hierin niet alleen sta.</p><p>Dat ik de regels naleef, valt dus niet uitsluitend te verklaren door angst voor handhaving. Het is mijn aanvaarding van de regeling, van het ‘sociaal contract’ tussen mijzelf en de instellingen, die die naleving mee in stand houdt.</p><h3>Verantwoordelijkheid en schuld</h3><p>Vrij recent had ik de twijfelachtige eer betrokken te zijn bij een reeks ondoordachte investeringsbeslissingen. Of liever: ik heb mezelf erbij betrokken. In één geval schond een operationeel leidinggevende willens en wetens een contract dat van levensbelang was voor de onderneming, meerdere keren in zeer korte tijd en zonder iemand hogerop daarvan op de hoogte te brengen. Dit leidde rechtstreeks en onmiddellijk tot een aanzienlijk verlies van de investeringen van de aandeelhouders. In een ander geval verwarde een andere operationeel leidinggevende de waarde van een grote hoeveelheid activa met datzelfde, volkomen virtuele bedrag in contanten, in de overtuiging dat hij zijn taart tegelijk kon opeten en bewaren. Vervolgens gebruikte hij die ernstige overschatting van de werkelijke activa als basis voor beloften aan leveranciers die de onderneming uiteraard niet kon nakomen, opnieuw in zeer korte tijd. Hierdoor ging de onderneming failliet. In beide gevallen was ik een van de investeerders.</p><p>Ik deel deze voorbeelden uit mijn eigen ervaring omdat ze illustreren hoe verantwoordelijkheid en schuld vaak met elkaar verward worden. Dat leidt geregeld tot een soort ‘zichzelf versterkende morele schuldval’ voor wie er behoefte aan heeft dat er een schuldige is. Ik geloof niet dat een van beide betrokkenen uit kwade wil handelde. Dat is voor het uiteindelijke resultaat ook volkomen irrelevant. In beide gevallen schonden ze procedures die precies dit hadden moeten voorkomen. Een van de belangrijkste schendingen was hun afzonderlijke maar identieke bewering dat zijzelf ook degene waren die de financiële verantwoordelijkheid droeg, hoewel de officiële documentatie — die, mag ik eraan toevoegen, volledig openbaar beschikbaar is — duidelijk aantoonde dat dit niet het geval was. Leveranciers vertrouwden erop dat ze bevoegd waren om de beslissingen te nemen die ze namen. Ik noem dit ‘het spel van hoe het hoort’. Vervolgens kwam ik als een van de investeerders in situaties terecht waarin advocaten maar niet leken te begrijpen dat ik het er niet mee eens was dat er ook schuld bij de investeerders lag, terwijl ik er tegelijk niet voor koos te strijden tegen het feit dat de investeerders in grote mate financieel verantwoordelijk waren voor de fouten van de hele onderneming.</p><p>Hier begon ik die vonnissen te begrijpen waarin iemand geacht wordt één euro morele schadevergoeding aan de tegenpartij te betalen. Voordien had ik daar niets van begrepen. Maar die ene euro is het vonnis niet; hij vertegenwoordigt morele verantwoordelijkheid. Ik zag alleen die ene euro.</p><p>Om volledig open te zijn: ik moet toegeven dat ik nog steeds vooral die ene euro zie. Ik begrijp niet of die euro in de ogen van de staat — hier de rechterlijke macht — verantwoordelijkheid, schuld of beide vertegenwoordigt. Laat staan hoe die zich tot elkaar horen te verhouden. Ik ben ook geen rechtsgeleerde. Ik neem aan dat er misschien een antwoord bestaat, maar dat alleen maakt mijn vraag nog geen gesloten kwestie. Ik wil daar ook aan toevoegen dat ik niet verwacht dat een lezer mijn relaas van deze gebeurtenissen zomaar als waar aanneemt. Er mag twijfel zijn, en men mag het oneens zijn. Ik ben me daarvan bewust en ik vind dat een goede zaak. Ik beweer niet toegang te hebben tot de absolute waarheid terwijl anderen die niet hebben.</p><h3>De handhavingsasymmetrie</h3><p>Veel van mijn ervaringen doorheen mijn leven, waaronder de hierboven genoemde, hebben me doen geloven dat minstens sommige instellingen waaraan ik geacht word betrouwbaar verantwoording af te leggen, aanzienlijk doeltreffender lijken in het ter verantwoording roepen van een burger dan in het werkzaam maken van mijn bescherming, waaronder bescherming tegen dubieuze vervolging.</p><p>Dit is een asymmetrie, geen logische tegenspraak. Stelselmatig afdwingbare passiva en slechts naargelang de omstandigheden uitoefenbare rechten kunnen binnen dezelfde institutionele regeling naast elkaar bestaan. Maar precies die regeling bekritiseer ik wegens de zelfgenoegzaamheid die aan de kant van de instellingen is ontstaan. Van ons wordt niet verwacht dat we eerbied betuigen aan die liberaal-democratische instellingen louter omdat ze er zijn. Wij, burgers, leven de regels doorgaans niet na uit angst voor vergelding door het systeem, maar omdat we verwachten dat er in het grotere geheel een gevoel van evenwicht bestaat. Ik hoef geen strikt quid pro quo te bepleiten om te kunnen vermoeden dat een schuldenaar misschien niet van plan is zijn deel van de afspraak na te komen. Dat is erosie van vertrouwen. Een kredietsysteem werkt doordat we tegelijkertijd en voortdurend elkaars schuldenaar EN schuldeiser zijn. Dat geldt voor burgers en voor instellingen. Ik zal niet naar de aardige mevrouw van de plaatselijke kaaswinkel stappen om haar neer te schieten en al haar kaas op te eisen, juist omdat ik alle reden heb om erop te vertrouwen dat haar niet neerschieten de kans op toegang tot toekomstige kaas aanzienlijk vergroot. En toekomstige kaas is wat de wereld doet draaien. (Voor de niet-witte lezers: <em>I know.</em>)</p><p>Laten we enkele voorbeelden van dit proces bekijken aan de hand van fenomenen die wellicht breder bekend zijn. Neem onreglementair oversteken. Overal waar het voetgangers verboden is om op een bepaalde manier de weg over te steken, kan iemand de regel begrijpen en toch oversteken. Op elke straathoek of op elk voldoende lang stuk straat een agent posteren om elke overtreding vast te stellen, kan meer kosten dan de overheid de moeite waard vindt. Ik stel dat dezelfde rechtsorde die een handeling verbiedt, redenen kan hebben om het voorkomen ervan te gedogen. De verwachting van de voetganger kan berusten op een juist begrip van de handhavingsprioriteiten. Geen van beide partijen hoeft de regel verkeerd te begrijpen. In een straat waar het bord aan het begin bestuurders aanspoort hun snelheid te verlagen om geen kind aan te rijden, hoeven op dat moment niet zichtbaar overal spelende kinderen te zijn om een bestuurder te laten begrijpen dat er ’s nachts plankgas doorheen rijden niet zonder risico is. Evenzo is het oversteken van een al tientallen jaren verlaten woestijnweg in een district dat onreglementair oversteken met gigantische boetes bestraft, daarom niet intrinsiek een vreselijk idee. Een agent in burger die op dat exacte moment toevallig voorbijkomt, kan daar net zo over denken.</p><p>Ik gebruik deze voorbeelden om te laten zien dat handhaving van de omstandigheden afhangt. Dat toont op zichzelf nog geen ongelijke institutionele respons aan. Verwachten dat een burger zich zelfs bij het oversteken van die lang vergeten woestijnweg aan de regels houdt, om redenen die neerkomen op institutioneel eerbetoon als een soort quid pro quo, schaadt het vertrouwen dat van die burger in de instelling waaraan hij verantwoording verschuldigd is, wordt verwacht. Om dat te zien hoef je wellicht geen rechtstreeks quid pro quo aan te voeren. Het staat iemand volledig vrij zich na het oversteken van die verlaten woestijnweg door wroeging te laten verteren en zichzelf bij de autoriteiten aan te geven, maar die autoriteiten zijn net zo vrij om die burger met een terechtwijzing te laten gaan, goed wetende dat dit niets garandeert.</p><p>Een handhavingsasymmetrie vormt geen probleem wanneer ze symmetrisch is. Daarmee bedoel ik dat het zinvol is onze nachtelijke bestuurder met een waarschuwing te laten gaan als nergens uit blijkt dat die zich eerder zo gedragen heeft, en er evenmin aanwijzingen zijn dat die dat na precies deze waarschuwing opnieuw zal doen. Het is redelijk te verwachten dat een bestuurder die duidelijk en aantoonbaar de gewoonte heeft anderen en zichzelf in gevaar te brengen, niet dezelfde mildheid zal genieten.</p><p>Mijn heel specifieke klacht richt zich hier tegen een staat die toekomstige uitkomsten probeert te garanderen door ervan uit te gaan dat de huidige handhaving het middel moet zijn om dat waar te maken. Dit zet de deur open voor een lawine van mogelijk misbruik door een staat die soms lijkt te vergeten dat de volle kracht van institutionele activa achter hem staat, met inbegrip van een geweldsmonopolie.</p><p>Ik zal nog een voorbeeld geven dat toont hoe subtiel deze elementen zich tot één fenomeen kunnen opstapelen, door reële belangen aan de gevolgen te verbinden. Ik zal proberen aan te tonen dat een overheid die specifiek en uitdrukkelijk de handhaving opvoert om toekomstige uitkomsten te garanderen, en dat doet door een asymmetrisch gewicht toe te kennen aan de verantwoordingsplicht van burgers tegenover instellingen, zichzelf en haar burgers herhaaldelijk in de voet kan schieten zonder het zelfs te beseffen.</p><p>Ik woon in een van die landen waar de vraag naar opvang voor kleine kinderen het aanbod ruimschoots overtreft. Ik heb de indruk dat dit tot op zekere hoogte een wereldwijd fenomeen is. Dat zou logisch zijn: een ouder kiest er immers voor zijn kind achter te laten bij een vreemde die daar geld voor vraagt. Ernstige schade aan een kind zal hoogstwaarschijnlijk niet afgehandeld zijn met de oprechte belofte van de opvang om de kosten van die dag van de maandfactuur af te trekken.</p><p>Zoals ik het begrijp, zitten we momenteel in een situatie waarin meer kinderopvanglocaties sluiten dan er nieuwe bijkomen, doordat veel uitbaters ongeveer tegelijkertijd met pensioen gaan. Een bestaande wanverhouding tussen vraag en aanbod wordt dus groter. Zowel de overheid als het electoraat vindt het van het grootste belang dat geen enkel kind leed wordt aangedaan, wat volgens mij wel voor zich spreekt. Maar dat vertaalt zich in een opeenstapeling van vereisten en beperkingen die in de praktijk zeer eigenaardige effecten hebben. Kinderopvang heeft ruimte nodig, relatief veel personeel in verhouding tot haar schaal, en kennis van zaken om kinderopvang te kunnen zijn. Vastgoed verwerven is een serieuze investering. Een pand huren is te duur om er niet onmiddellijk opbrengsten uit te halen. Maar ook de opleiding tot kinderbegeleider vergt al tijd en investeringen. En gekwalificeerd zijn om voor kinderen te zorgen, geeft iemand op zichzelf nog niet de toelating om een kinderopvang te openen. Een toekomstige organisator moet ook een afzonderlijk starterstraject doorlopen voordat die een vergunning kan aanvragen, zonder garantie op groen licht aan het einde van het proces. Dat beïnvloedt investeringsbeslissingen. Je kunt investeren in vastgoed dat de nodige ruimte voor de onderneming zou kunnen bieden, maar dat doe je dan ondanks de vergunningsprocedure. Daarmee valt een redelijke beslissing om in afwachting van een vergunning te huren wellicht al weg. En dan gaan we er al van uit dat je überhaupt over het kapitaal beschikt om vastgoed te kopen. Zolang dat proces nog loopt, zonder garantie op de uitkomst, kun je niet geacht worden met je handen in je schoot te blijven zitten. Leven kost geld. De kans bestaat dus dat je uiteindelijk een vergunning krijgt die je toelaat iets uit te oefenen wat op dat moment neerkomt op een nieuw risico, dat je moet afwegen tegen de zekerheid die je huidige financiële situatie al biedt. En zelfs met dat alles is de oorspronkelijke reden voor de opleiding, de toetsing en de vereisten nog steeds op geen enkele manier gegarandeerd: dat geen enkel kind iets zal overkomen. Ik bedoel, heb je kinderen al eens bezig gezien?</p><p>In deze situatie leveren een overvloed aan goede bedoelingen en een uitstekende reden om de vergunning voor een kinderopvang betekenis te geven, uiteindelijk niets bepaalds op. En we zijn nog niet eens begonnen over de gevolgen als er WEL iets misgaat, ongeacht of iemand iets verkeerd heeft gedaan. Nogmaals… Heb je kinderen al eens bezig gezien?</p><p>Een overheid kan aanbod niet op een toekomstbestendige manier in het leven reguleren. Dit onvermogen om te garanderen dat er nooit iets misgaat, is in wezen asymptotisch: alles in kussens veranderen doet scherpe voorwerpen op zichzelf niet verdwijnen. Het valt me op dat elk opvallend geval van mogelijke schade een extra reden oplevert om nog een beperking of vereiste in te voeren, waardoor de redenen zich opstapelen om NIET voor het beroep van kinderbegeleider te kiezen. Het resultaat is dat elke poging van een overheid om de hele situatie te ondersteunen, via fiscale prikkels of rechtstreekse subsidies, het bestaande probleem uiteindelijk verergert. Want wat zijn de indirecte gevolgen? Noodgedwongen thuisblijven van het werk om voor je kind te zorgen. Ook DAT drijft de prijzen op, terwijl de klant zich de dienstverlening bovendien minder goed kan veroorloven. Het is een neerwaartse spiraal.</p><p>De eerste reden waarom ik dit voorbeeld van kinderopvang relevant vind, is dat een activum van onschatbare waarde — een kind — hier botst op de onmogelijkheid om te kalibreren voor de enorme risico’s die het zelf voortbrengt. Mogelijk heel letterlijk, met een knal en vervolgens gehuil. Je kunt onzekerheid niet met garanties wegwerken zonder ook enorme kosten te veroorzaken, en niet alleen financiële. De tweede reden waarom ik dit voorbeeld relevant vind, is dat zowel de risico’s als de kosten — waarvan vele simpelweg ontstaan door nutteloze overheidsinterventies die ze proberen te laten verdwijnen — terechtkomen bij precies die burger aan wie de overheid beweert bescherming te bieden. Dat is niet het geval.</p><p>Dat maakt dit tot een geval van asymmetrische handhavingsasymmetrie.</p><h3>De werkelijke kosten van gevolgen</h3><p>Om het nog eens te herhalen: volgens mij omvat elk voorbeeld dat we tot nu toe besproken hebben redelijkerwijs een regeling tussen de staat en de burger, zelfs in situaties waarin men redelijkerwijs niet verwacht dat de staat fysiek aanwezig is, zoals op de woestijnweg. Andere voorbeelden omvatten een regeling tussen de staat en de burger waarbij men voor of tegen de aanwezigheid van de staat kan pleiten, zoals bij de kinderopvang.</p><p>Ik wil een voorbeeld toevoegen dat me gisteren letterlijk in de schoot viel. De overheid is me nog belastingteruggaven verschuldigd. Ik aanvaard dat dit het geval is, en ik aanvaard dat ik geacht word die teruggaven als een soort kredietlijn voor de overheid aan te houden, die van ander krediet kan worden afgetrokken of eraan kan worden toegevoegd, of ik nu schuldeiser of schuldenaar van de staat ben. De officiële brief die ik gisteren van de financiële administratie kreeg, deelde me het volgende mee: omdat ik de overheid nog een totaalbedrag van X/100 euro verschuldigd ben, heeft ze besloten X euro af te trekken van het bedrag dat ze mij nog verschuldigd is, ongeveer 2X euro. Ik ben op de hoogte van die X/100 euro, en de overheid had vóór gisteren al erkend dat dit kleine bedrag haar niet rechtmatig toekomt, maar aan mij toebehoort. Ondanks dit alles heeft ze eenzijdig besloten mij de 2X euro waarop ik recht heb niet terug te betalen. Of ze de aftrek van X euro als openstaand krediet beschouwt of als een bedrag voor wat zij als een overtreding ziet, legt ze niet uit. De kosten om de overheid ALWEER te bewijzen wat ze al erkend heeft, vallen dus bij de burger, die geld moet uitgeven om te achterhalen of het bedrag dat hem rechtmatig toekomt daadwerkelijk terugbetaald zal worden. Mogelijk maak ik mezelf armer, alleen maar om te horen te krijgen dat ik armer ben.</p><p>Dit lijkt me een uitstekend moment om toe te voegen dat belastingteruggaven waarmee de staat knoeit en die je mogelijk pas na jaren terugkrijgt, niet als leningen aan de staat worden gezien. Het is dus niet zo dat de kosten die de burger draagt hier door enig rendement gecompenseerd worden. Ik wil ook benadrukken dat belastingteruggaven en kosten om met overheidsincompetentie om te gaan, geen betaling vormen voor diensten die die instellingen leveren: daar dienen de belastingen voor, boven op eventuele vergoedingen voor diezelfde dienstverlening.</p><p>Ik ben in mijn eigen ervaring geregeld het argument tegengekomen dat een recht een recht is en dat je gewoon actie moet ondernemen om de werkelijkheid te laten overeenstemmen met een vorm van morele boekhouding waarin rechten mettertijd en misschien met enige inspanning vanzelf toegekend en gerespecteerd worden. En tegen die mensen zeg ik: proficiat. Proficiat dat je een leven hebt opgebouwd waarin je jezelf de tijd en de gemoedsrust kunt verschaffen dat alles wel goedkomt. Velen van ons hebben momenteel niet de marge om dat toe te laten. Velen van ons leven van loon tot loon, en ik ben het alvast kotsbeu om te doen alsof dat niet zo is.</p><p>Om terug te komen op de eerdere voorbeelden van de mislukte investeringen: ik ben eraan gewend geraakt om achteraf gelijk te krijgen. Dat draait de tijd niet op magische wijze terug. Niets doet dat.</p><p>De kosten van de asymmetrische handhavingsasymmetrie vallen bij de burger, niet bij de overheid.</p><h3>Democratische kalibratie van institutionele activa</h3><p>Een ander aspect van dit onderwerp is dat de staat consequent lijkt te vergeten dat hij de staat is, en niet zomaar een burger. Doen alsof je niet over de middelen beschikt om vermeend onrecht dat je wordt aangedaan te bestrijden, doet die middelen niet verdwijnen. De staat heeft activa ter beschikking om te bestrijden wat hij als een onrechtmatige behandeling beschouwt, waarover burgers simpelweg niet beschikken.</p><p>Neem bijvoorbeeld het gezegde ‘de waarheid zal u bevrijden’ en het beeld van de geblinddoekte Vrouwe Justitia. Als een instelling al sinds mensenheugenis een duim op de weegschaal heeft, vergeet ze gemakkelijk dat die duim er überhaupt op ligt. Die ‘waarheid’ doet verschillende dingen voor verschillende mensen als de kalibratie waarmee feiten gemeten worden, scheefgetrokken is.</p><p>Je zaak moeten bewijzen is één ding. Over de middelen beschikken om te blijven betwisten wat als bewijs geldt, wat het betekent en wat eruit moet volgen, is iets anders. Ik wil onderzoeken hoe die manoeuvreerruimte er aan de andere kant van de schaal uitziet.</p><p>Op woensdag 21 oktober 2026 noemde de Amerikaanse speciale gezant Steve Witkoff de president van de Russische Federatie, Vladimir Poetin, een ‘humanitair mens’. Dat leidde tot wat redelijkerwijs felle kritiek vanuit de vrije pers genoemd kan worden. Ik zal me hier niet in een ethische discussie mengen; dat valt buiten het bestek van dit stuk. Wat ik kan vaststellen, is dat Witkoff, Jared Kushner — net als Steve Witkoff ook speciaal gezant voor het Midden-Oosten — en Vladimir Poetin tijdens hun ontmoeting op 5 september 2026 een mogelijke verkoop van de internationale activa van Lukoil bespraken. De baas van Witkoff en Kushner, de Amerikaanse president Donald Trump, is degene met de afstandsbediening waarmee sancties en embargo’s aan- en uitgezet worden en waarmee het volume wordt geregeld. Onder de potentiële kopers bevinden zich investeerders uit het Midden-Oosten met zakelijke banden met hun families. Een van die investeerders had ook banden met World Liberty Financial, het cryptobedrijf dat Witkoff samen met de familie Trump oprichtte. Kushner is de schoonzoon van Donald Trump. Voor die transactie was goedkeuring uit Washington en Moskou nodig. Steve Witkoffs eigen The Witkoff Group, een vastgoedinvesterings- en ontwikkelingsbedrijf, doet zaken met miljardair Len Blavatnik, wiens fortuin deels is opgebouwd met investeringen in Rusland, een land dat erom bekendstaat in zowat elke pot van betekenis een vinger te willen hebben. Volgens zijn woordvoerder heeft Blavatnik na de grootschalige invasie van Oekraïne in 2022 al zijn Russische activa van de hand gedaan. Het lijkt me redelijk om ook op te merken dat dit een heel goede zaak is om hardop te zeggen. Nu beweer ik niet te weten of Witkoff en Kushner schimmige deals sluiten. Dat is hier eigenlijk enigszins naast de kwestie. Relevant is de bewering dat deze mannen niet omgekocht kunnen worden, alsof het beeld van hen die een vergadering verlaten met een grote zak met een dollarteken erop ooit geloofwaardig was. Dat is beledigend. Eventuele invloed komt niet voort uit wat is, maar uit wat zou kunnen zijn of niet zou kunnen zijn. Het mogelijke feit dat ze geen contant geld aannemen — in het verleden, het heden of de toekomst — gaat er volledig aan voorbij dat niet elk activum zich rechtstreeks in contanten laat vertalen. Een hint dat er vanaf januari 2029 misschien nieuwe projecten besproken kunnen worden, of juist niet, is respectievelijk ook een activum of een passivum. Geen enkel idee van neutraliteit van de feiten hoeft hier noodzakelijk geschonden te worden opdat een belofte van macht van eigenaar verandert.</p><p>Evenzo lijkt het Witte Huis onder Trump er op het moment van schrijven, eind oktober 2026, op gebrand om meer dan een paar duimen op de weegschaal van de Oekraïense oorlogsinspanning te leggen, door de Oekraïense president Volodymyr Zelensky herhaaldelijk als onrechtmatig en als agressor af te schilderen. Er zijn suggesties geweest dat het delen van inlichtingen zou worden stopgezet en dat de internettoegang van de Oekraïense troepen in het veld zou worden afgesloten. Ik kan dit niet bevestigen, dus ik laat het hierbij. Beweringen van functionarissen van het Witte Huis en van Donald Trump zelf die Vladimir Poetin als de ware vredestichter neerzetten, kunnen lachwekkend zijn en tegelijk aanzienlijke waarde hebben. Op dinsdag 3 november 2026 staan de Amerikaanse tussentijdse verkiezingen gepland. Die zijn doorgaans lastig voor wie aan de macht is. De peilingen zijn… niet goed. Peilingen zijn geen voorspellingen, maar ze kunnen wel ‘de stemming beïnvloeden’, wat mensen op zichzelf al een reden kan geven om op de ene of de andere manier te stemmen. Vanuit het perspectief van president Trump kun je tegelijk hopen dat de peilingen in het voordeel van je tegenstanders vertekend zijn en je indekken tegen de mogelijkheid dat diezelfde peilingen de publieke stemming juist heel goed gevat hebben. Eén manier om dat te doen, is zwaar druk zetten op een van de twee oorzaken van de hoge energieprijzen. Niet op degene die hij zelf heeft gecreëerd en waarin hij nu samen met de rest van ons vastzit, namelijk Iran. Wel op degene waarbij ze niet al te rechtstreeks betrokken zijn: de Russisch-Oekraïense oorlog. Als je toch al verwacht een verkiezing te verliezen, en een akkoord geeft je ofwel plots invloed op het verlagen van de energieprijzen waaronder ook het electoraat gebukt gaat, ofwel kost het je nog wat meer stemmen, dan lijkt de berekening duidelijk. Hier en daar enkele tientallen, honderden of duizenden Oekraïense levens tijdens bombardementen die het Witte Huis doet alsof het niet ziet, zijn, zoals we allemaal kunnen vaststellen, een prijs die Donald Trump zeer bereid is te betalen.</p><p>Mijn punt is dit: asymmetrische handhavingsasymmetrie maakt het mogelijk schaamteloos onjuiste feiten te gebruiken waarvan de staat zichzelf niet eens hoeft wijs te maken dat ze stiekem toch waar zijn. De pers en de burgers kunnen tot sint-juttemis benadrukken dat die feiten onjuist zijn en hoe onjuist precies; die vaststelling levert helemaal niets op, omdat de staat activa heeft die wij niet hebben. Waarheid en neutraliteit stellen weinig voor wanneer de staat ze kan kalibreren op het persoonlijke of institutionele gewin dat hij nastreeft. Wij, burgers, hebben geen toegang tot zulke activa. Nee, wij krijgen in plaats daarvan een factuur gepresenteerd omdat we erop wijzen dat feiten op verschillende manieren geïnterpreteerd kunnen worden.</p><p>Weten dat iets volgens de wet verkeerd is en toch besluiten het te doen, zijn volkomen verenigbaar. Ook als dat consequent gebeurt. Tenminste, als je over de activa of de middelen beschikt om de kosten van de tegenreactie te dragen.</p><h3>Mijn instellingsmoeheid gerechtvaardigd</h3><p>Een burger kan aan elke verplichting blijven voldoen en er tegelijk steeds minder van overtuigd raken dat de instellingen het verdienen dat hij op hen vertrouwt. Voortdurende naleving bewijst dus geen voortdurend vertrouwen. Ik heb het gevoel dat ik als burger geen realistische mogelijkheid heb om de strijd met een staat aan te gaan, zelfs na de duizendste snee. Ik ben moe. Uitgeput zelfs. In plaats daarvan voel ik mijn economische deelname verschrompelen op manieren die ik nog maar enkele jaren geleden niet voor mogelijk hield. Ik ben gestopt met investeren, ik ben gestopt met het bedenken van zakelijke ideeën, ik ben gestopt met meer medewerking te verlenen dan verplicht is. Iemand kan simpelweg ophouden activiteiten te ondernemen die op zijn minst gedeeltelijk afhankelijk zijn van toegankelijke institutionele bescherming.</p><p>Mijn vroegere drang om te innoveren leeft voort in mijn schrijven. Ik wijs de staat waarvan ik burger ben af als betrouwbare aanbieder van institutionele bescherming, omdat ik mijn vertrouwen in zijn bereidheid daartoe verloren heb. Ik heb besloten om niet meer uit te geven. Wie in het Europa van vandaag graag wil innoveren, is degene die het eerst met de ogen knippert. Jij bent degene die je nek riskeert. Je kunt je ideeën maar beter voor jezelf houden als je eerst moet investeren om ze tot uitdrukking te brengen. Ik haat het dat ik tot die conclusie ben gekomen.</p><p>Als nagel aan de doodskist stel ik vast dat de staat zich grotendeels onbewust lijkt van zijn eigen gewicht op de weegschaal. Niet elke individuele vertegenwoordiger van de staat, uiteraard. Sommigen beseffen dat Europa zich via de Europese Unie met regels en beperkingen uit de vrije markt van ideeën werkt, het graf in waar innovatie komt te sterven. Maar het volstaat niet, vind ik.</p><h3>De reikwijdte van de staat</h3><p>De natie waarvan ik burger ben, is er een die trots is op de bescherming die ze haar burgers biedt en die zichzelf daarom een welvaartsstaat noemt. Dat klopt ook gewoon. De sociaaldemocratie heeft een diepgaande invloed gehad op de manier waarop de staat hier bescherming biedt, en hoewel ik bezwaren heb tegen elke mate van socialisme, wil ik niet ondankbaar klinken voor de infrastructuur die tot stand is gebracht. De algemene kwaliteit van de sociale voorzieningen is gemiddeld goed, en wijzen op uitzonderingen die er altijd zullen zijn, lijkt me precies vijf minuten lang een leuke hobby en dient misschien als een leuke manier om mensen te ontmoeten tijdens een klaagmarathon.</p><p>Nee, de aftakelende infrastructuur die hier onder de loep ligt, is abstract, democratisch en geenszins anekdotisch. De natie waarover ik het al die tijd heb gehad, is België.</p><p>De Belgische overheidsuitgaven behoren met ongeveer 54% van het bbp tot de hoogste ter wereld. We zijn er op een vreemde manier aan gewend. Alarmbellen worden rustgevend zodra je eraan gewend raakt. Sociale zekerheid, ambtenarenlonen en subsidies zijn de grootste boosdoeners. De totale fiscale druk bedraagt ongeveer 45% van het bbp. Opnieuw een van de hoogste ter wereld. Wil je een onderneming starten? Veel succes, want het abonnement op het ondernemersbestaan is erg duur en ik heb mijn vragen bij de kwaliteit van het product. Uit eigen ervaring heb ik geleerd dat je, om het hoofd boven water te houden, moet kunnen garanderen dat werkelijk alles volgens de rooskleurigste plannen verloopt. Eén tegenslag en je ligt eruit. Het abonnement op het ondernemersbestaan is veel te duur en ik heb mijn vragen bij de kwaliteit van het product. Werken in loondienst heeft zijn eigen rekensom: voor een alleenstaande werknemer zonder kinderen met een gemiddeld loon nemen belastingen en sociale bijdragen ongeveer 52,5% van de totale loonkosten voor de werkgever in beslag. Minder dan de helft bereikt de werknemer als nettoloon. Als je een onderneming hebt, ben je wettelijk verplicht de boekhouding bij te houden, ongeacht of je je accountant ertoe krijgt dat werk te doen. Ik krijg de mijne al meer dan twee jaar niet te pakken en heb in de praktijk diens medewerking nodig om van accountant te veranderen. Het een tijdje alleen doen is niet eens een optie. Mijn bescherming is wat me bescherming ontzegt.</p><p>Maar wees eerlijk, wat levert het nu werkelijk op om in buitenlandse hulp te snijden? Een vluchteling een slaapplaats te weigeren? De grenzen helemaal te sluiten? Neem ontwikkelingshulp: het schrappen van alle Belgische officiële ontwikkelingshulp, waarin al bepaalde binnenlandse kosten voor de opvang van vluchtelingen zijn opgenomen, zou op basis van de cijfers voor 2024 ongeveer 20 euro per maand per inwoner hebben opgeleverd, vóór rekening te houden met indirecte effecten. Voeg hier en daar wat indirecte effecten en verschuivingen in opportuniteitskosten toe, en dat bedrag kan al dan niet een duik nemen op een manier die we niet kunnen voorspellen. Dat is geen reden om niet in die kosten te snijden, dus ga gerust je gang. Maar iemand anders een aandeel in de herverdeling via de welvaartsstaat ontzeggen, doet dat bedrag niet op magische wijze verschijnen op de plek waar jij vindt dat het het meeste kan betekenen. Een goedkopere versie van dezelfde asymmetrie blijft dezelfde asymmetrie. Bovendien heeft de inflatie het verschil net tenietgedaan en zijn de kosten van je woningrenovatie nu aanzienlijk gestegen. Eet je graag peren? Geweldig! Je kunt naar Limburg rijden om ze zelf te gaan plukken, wat fantastisch is, want brandstof en je tijd zijn zo goed als gratis! Oeps.</p><h3>Een even goed moment als elk ander voor meer minder</h3><p>Ik doe dit gewoonlijk niet, maar ik ga hier een uitzondering maken en daadwerkelijk voor een alternatief pleiten. Ik wil de aanname ter discussie stellen dat onvoldoende toegankelijke bescherming een bijkomende beschermingsbelofte rechtvaardigt. Het werkt duidelijk niet.</p><p>Sinds wanneer is middelen tegen een probleem aangooien verstandig beleid? Volgens mij is dat nooit verstandig beleid geweest. Ik heb een ander idee. Ga de andere kant op, in plaats van laag na laag bescherming toe te voegen in de hoop dat die een toekomstbestendige garantie wordt. Schaf beschermingen af. Haal de angel eruit om de zwelling te stoppen. Laat de samenleving de infectie oplopen om haar afweer te versterken. Dat betekent op zichzelf niet dat mensen achtergelaten zullen worden. Het kan juist zichtbaar maken wie werkelijk hulp nodig had. De staat heeft niets te zoeken in je portemonnee, in je slaapkamer, in de manier waarop je ervoor kiest te leven. Maak het speelveld gelijk. Haal overal de stootkussens weg. Dat betekent ook komaf maken met de belangen van bevoorrechte groepen en met voorkeursbehandelingen voor wie zich die kan veroorloven. We zijn hier allemaal volwassenen; een geschaafde knie overleven we wel.</p><p>Pas de Minimal Justified Codex toe bij het maken van beleid. Vraag je af of een regel of een beperking werkelijk nodig is. Als dat misschien niet zo is, schrap hem dan, of voeg hem niet toe aan de codex. Als je vindt dat een regel een lijst uitzonderingen nodig heeft om zinvol te zijn, was het waarschijnlijk om te beginnen al geen goede regel. Weg ermee. Dat we een regel geërfd hebben, is geen goede reden om hem te behouden. Weg ermee. De bescherming die een regel belooft, kan op zichzelf de verplichtingen die in zijn naam worden opgelegd niet rechtvaardigen. Voor die rechtvaardiging telt of die bescherming in de praktijk voor burgers beschikbaar is. Zo niet… Weg ermee. Hetzelfde geldt voor beperkingen. Vraag het aan mijn kat. Wat kan het kwaad om een deur open te laten? Ofwel gebruik je de kamer niet en is het jouw probleem niet, ofwel gebruik je de kamer omdat de deur openstond.</p><p>Die occasionele dode muis in mijn bed neem ik er als rente bij.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y7xpIq-YS9cci2_k-yQpxg.png" /></figure><h3>Bronnen</h3><p>Bronnen gecontroleerd op 26 oktober 2026. Persoonlijke ervaringen zijn het getuigenis van de auteur; de onderstaande openbare bronnen ondersteunen de feitelijke verwijzingen en bieden institutionele context.</p><p><strong>1. Vergunningen en kwalificaties in de kinderopvang</strong></p><p>Opgroeien — Veelgestelde vragen over starten met kinderopvang</p><p>Maakt onderscheid tussen personeelskwalificaties, het starterstraject voor de organisator en de daaropvolgende vergunningsaanvraag. Het afronden van het starterstraject levert niet automatisch een vergunning op.</p><p><strong>2. Aanbod en sluitingen in de kinderopvang</strong></p><p>Opgroeien — Kinderopvang baby’s en peuters, cijfers 2025</p><p>Meldt 370 sluitingen en 220 openingen van gezinsopvanglocaties, met pensionering en gezondheid als belangrijkste redenen voor sluiting. Het totale aantal vergunde plaatsen in Vlaanderen en Brussel daalde met 356; de capaciteit in de groepsopvang nam toe.</p><p><strong>3. Vertraagde belastingteruggaven</strong></p><p>Federale Ombudsman — Recommandation Intérêts moratoires, RO 13/04</p><p>Beveelt automatische betaling aan van moratoriuminteresten bij laattijdige terugbetalingen die daarvoor in aanmerking komen, en in afwachting daarvan informatie voor belastingplichtigen over hoe ze die interesten kunnen aanvragen. Dit documenteert het onderscheid tussen een recht en de uitbetaling ervan; het individuele voorval rond de belastingteruggave is het relaas van de auteur.</p><p><strong>4. Witkoffs omschrijving van Poetin</strong></p><p>The Washington Post — Trump’s special envoy calls Vladimir Putin a ‘humanitarian’, 21 oktober 2026</p><p>Bericht over de uitspraak tijdens de ontmoeting in Sint-Petersburg na de vrijlating van Stephen Hubbard, naast Trumps kritiek op Zelensky en de versoepeling van de sancties tegen Rusland.</p><p><strong>5. Onderhandelingen over Lukoil en zakelijke banden</strong></p><p>Reuters — US-Russia talks on Ukraine involve multi-billion dollar oil deal, NYT reports, 3 oktober 2026 (herpubliceerd door The Star)</p><p>Ukrainska Pravda — US and Russia are negotiating multibillion-dollar deal on Lukoil assets, says NYT, 3 oktober 2026</p><p>Beide berichten over het onderzoek van The New York Times, waaronder de ontmoeting van 5 september en de zakelijke banden van potentiële kopers. Ukrainska Pravda vermeldt ook de band met World Liberty Financial. Dit zijn verslagen over onderhandelingen, geen bewijs van persoonlijke betalingen aan een van beide gezanten.</p><p><strong>6. Witkoff Group en Len Blavatnik</strong></p><p>Erin Banco en Gram Slattery, Reuters — Trump officials’ meeting with Russian in Miami spurs questions about Ukraine proposal, 22 november 2025; gecorrigeerd op 1 december 2025</p><p>Bevestigt de zakelijke relatie en schrijft de verklaring over het afstoten van Russische activa toe aan de woordvoerder van Blavatnik. Die verklaring gaat over Blavatnik, niet over de Witkoff Group.</p><p><strong>7. Vermogen als vermeende bescherming tegen beïnvloeding</strong></p><p>Nicholas Kralev — Are Trump’s Rich Envoys More Resistant to Foreign Influence?, Diplomacy Notebook, 18 februari 2026</p><p>Citeert een bericht van The New York Times dat de verdediging van Witkoff en Kushner op basis van hun rijkdom toeschrijft aan aanhangers van de regering. Het schrijft die verdediging niet toe aan uitspraken van de twee mannen zelf.</p><p><strong>8. Peilingen voor de tussentijdse verkiezingen en energieprijzen</strong></p><p>Jason Lange, Reuters — Trump approval falls to record low of 31% as midterms near, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds, 19 oktober 2026 (herpubliceerd door Investing.com)</p><p>Bericht over lage goedkeuringscijfers, een Democratische voorsprong in de algemene partijvoorkeur voor het Congres en bezorgdheid over benzineprijzen in de aanloop naar 3 november. De interpretatie van Trumps onderhandelingsprikkels in het essay is de analyse van de auteur.</p><p><strong>9. Belgische overheidsuitgaven</strong></p><p>Eurostat — Euro area government deficit at 3.0% and EU at 3.1% of GDP, 21 oktober 2026</p><p>De tabel voor België vermeldt overheidsuitgaven van 54,4% van het bbp in 2025 en 54,1% in 2024. Deze uitgavencijfers staan los van de onderstaande verhouding tussen belastingen en bbp.</p><p><strong>10. Belgische fiscale druk</strong></p><p>Eurostat — EU and euro area tax-to-GDP ratio up in 2024, 31 oktober 2025</p><p>Vermeldt voor België belastingen en netto sociale bijdragen ter waarde van 45,1% van het bbp in 2024, de op twee na hoogste verhouding in de EU.</p><p><strong>11. Belasting op arbeid</strong></p><p>OESO — Taxing Wages 2026: Belgium</p><p>Vermeldt voor 2025 een belastingwig van 52,5% voor een alleenstaande werknemer zonder kinderen met een gemiddeld loon. De noemer is de totale loonkost voor de werkgever, inclusief werkgeversbijdragen voor de sociale zekerheid.</p><p><strong>12. Boekhoudkundige verplichtingen en overdracht van dossiers</strong></p><p>VLAIO — Voer een heldere boekhouding</p><p>ITAA — Changement d’expert-comptable sous le RGPD : entre obligation de restitution, confidentialité et continuité, 21 september 2026</p><p>VLAIO benoemt het voeren van een boekhouding als een wettelijke verplichting. ITAA licht de verplichtingen toe rond de teruggave en overdracht van klantendossiers. De beschreven moeilijkheid om medewerking te verkrijgen is de ervaring van de auteur.</p><p><strong>13. Ontwikkelingshulp en de berekening per inwoner</strong></p><p>Belgische FOD Buitenlandse Zaken, DGD — Onze organisatie, bijgewerkt op 4 februari 2026</p><p>Statbel — On 01 January 2025, Belgium had 11,825,551 inhabitants, 11 juni 2025</p><p>OESO — Development Co-operation Profiles: Belgium</p><p>DGD vermeldt 2,74 miljard euro aan officiële ontwikkelingshulp voor 2024. Gedeeld door 11.825.551 inwoners en twaalf maanden levert dit 19,31 euro per persoon per maand op, in het essay afgerond tot ongeveer 20 euro. De OESO bevestigt dat officiële ontwikkelingshulp ook binnenlandse uitgaven voor de opvang van vluchtelingen omvat. Dit is een bruto rekenkundige vergelijking, zonder rekening te houden met indirecte effecten.</p><p><strong>14. Buitenlandse werknemers in de tuinbouw</strong></p><p>VILT — Meer dagen seizoenarbeid om arbeidstekort en coronaverspreiding tegen te gaan, 2 februari 2022</p><p>Bericht over de afhankelijkheid van de sector van buitenlandse seizoenarbeiders, onder meer in de appel- en perenteelt, en over de personeelsgevolgen van verstoorde grensoverschrijdende verplaatsingen.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ca6434f02e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[GEIGER’S SHIP]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/geigers-ship-ef3d4f01fafb?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef3d4f01fafb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nepotism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[meritocracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[society]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 18:33:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-29T18:33:45.944Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>An Argument for Nepotism and Against IQ as a Meaningfully Comparative Phenomenon</h3><p>A lot of virtual ink has been spilled on discussing the phenomenon of “nepo babies”, or nepotism in general. I believe it doesn’t so much constitute an argument as it does a loose sort of observation that, according to the people making the observation, indicates that many individuals who hold socially salient occupations (such as actors, politicians, CEOs, and so on) are related to people who at least previously also held similar occupations, be it in the public eye or not. This often leads to accusations of nepotism. And, well… Duh.</p><p>But what exactly makes nepotism an accusation? Nicolas Cage has made a bunch of movies that I greatly appreciate. His range is fantastic. One need only watch 2009’s Bad Lieutenant — Port of Call: New Orleans back to back with 2002’s Adaptation. Go on, I’ll wait.</p><p>No, I won’t. Cage’s legal surname was Coppola until 2025, when he legally changed it to Cage. Oh yes, THAT Coppola. Now, what here then counts as an instance of nepotism? That he’s an accomplished actor? That he’s a Coppola? That he’s a Coppola who’s hiding the fact that he’s a Coppola? Is he hiding this? Now that we know that he is a Coppola, should we kinda just forget that we saw movies that inspired us? Imagine, if you will, that he really sucked as an actor at a young age — which is demonstrably not the case — what would follow from this? That the ability to become a good actor is inherently genetic? Then why would nepotism be a bad thing in itself? For anyone making the argument that money can buy fame: yes, that is true. But money can buy an actor exposure without buying the viewer’s appreciation of their performance. That distinction, I believe, matters: money alone does not a good actor make. Throwing resources at a problem never makes the problem disappear. It just provides the opportunity for the problem to maybe dress a little better… In theory.</p><p>I believe it is reasonable to assume that within the context of Western liberal democracies generally, meritocracy tends to be regarded as an equaliser. I will refer to the Collins English Dictionary’s definition of meritocracy:</p><blockquote><em>“</em>…rule by persons chosen not because of birth or wealth, but for their superior talents or intellect.<em>”</em></blockquote><p>I support the notion of meritocracy, but I think the definition I refer to already hints at the problem: what exactly constitutes the denominator? What is the referent? Talent and intellect don’t exist in a vacuum. One of the most moronic possible contemporary phenomena is the entirely virtual dick-measuring contest that is comparing intelligence quotients. And by dicks I mean people who act the part. Comparing the length of one’s… thinking is two things: kinda gay and concrete evidence against the intellect of the person engaging in the endeavour. An IQ score measures performance within a predefined framework. Showing that the score predicts success in occupations that reward similar abilities doesn’t make it a good general measure of intellect. What about adapting and improvising when the conditions themselves keep changing — including what counts as a successful response? Put someone with a high IQ in an unfamiliar environment near the equator and tell me what, precisely, that score establishes about their ability to keep themselves going there. Measuring a thing, even something abstract and referential like intellect, is not in any way inherently futile, but that doesn’t make its relevance and its uses any less narrow than they actually are. Correlation between high IQ scores and job performance may very well exist. But so does measuring the water depth in a swimming pool. Five centimetres of water may accurately explain why there’s a pile of dead bodies right in front of the measurer, but that doesn’t mean that the ten centimetres of water depth a little further on is entirely safe to jump into from the pool springboard. As is often the case with systems that — seemingly or not — thrive despite their fragility, certainty-forward models tend to create the ideal conditions to converge on a measuring process and tool that may work perfectly fine, excellently even, in situations they were intentionally designed for and in few others. To keep things aquatic, it reminds me of deploying a Geiger counter on the open ocean: it will confirm that there is nothing to worry about by way of maritime radiation on a ship that is also simultaneously sinking.</p><p>The same goes for talent. How I’ve always hated the very notion. What does it mean? An attribute that you’re born with? Like what? My amazing ability to walk into walls that aren’t really in my path? Must it be positive? And what does that mean? The ability to gain immense knowledge from cutting open animals as a small child? Is that positive? Or is that a symptom of something else? People seem to be making the argument often that everyone has talents. Says who? And what if I can’t find a talent within myself? I may be the best pottery maker that will ever exist. I also hate touching clay. Does this constitute a sin? Can I ever conclude that the search for talent is futile? Can it ever be meaningfully over without presenting a result?</p><p>When I say I support meritocracy, what I mostly mean is that I ardently defend equality of opportunity. That means that I greatly appreciate a society that has as an attribute that it strives to give every single one of its citizens a fair and equal chance to compete for social, economic, and educational positions, regardless of background. I am a white, cis man from a country with an above-average GDP per capita. Of course I assumed those two phenomena of meritocracy and equality of opportunity overlapped. What made me change my mind and realise my initial ignorance were the writings and the lectures of the Belgian scholar, artist, and disability rights advocate <a href="https://josefiencornette.com/">Josse Cornette</a>, specifically their book <a href="https://epo.be/shop/het-huis-dat-pijn-heet/"><em>Een huis dat pijn heet</em> (<em>A House Called Pain</em>)</a>. It is through their work that I came to see that true equality of opportunity is a cause worth continuing to fight for despite being a goal that may very well never be attained. That should be a reason to continue. Not a reason to abstain from doing battle in its name.</p><p>What does strike me as odd is that when discussing meritocracy, I never really hear about the one thing that constitutes a “weak link” in its proposed model: its tendency towards an inability to judge sustained performance. A potential future employer has ways of gauging how a candidate would perform, like conducting a test at the moment within the relevant working conditions, or looking at someone’s previous job experience, or looking at the candidate’s diplomas. A candidate’s test results, previous job experience, and diplomas may all look fantastic. But sustained performance involves more than performing well when everything goes according to plan. How often is that all a job asks of anyone? Now, this doesn’t have to be a problem. But I live in a country where making an error of judgement as an employer may have absurdly costly consequences, because it’s insanely expensive to fire people. I understand the rationale behind it from the point of view of a welfare state, but it has a couple of vile side effects that don’t require anyone to have malicious intent. This system incentivises employers to look for signs of certainty that are in no way guarantees, like for example an over-reliance on diplomas and degrees. It also prevents the candidate from growing into their role in a way that isn’t riddled with all sorts of potentially unrealistic expectations. Employing someone means paying a small fortune in social contributions to the state. Getting the hire wrong can add another substantial bill: compensation to the employee, with social contributions to the state on top. It bends the market into a perpetual state of imminent convulsion that benefits no one. Another victim of this is the ability to innovate: when mistakes are costly, you tend to not spend on new ideas, because those are uncertain by definition.</p><p>Something else I find strange is the impression I often get from critics of the phenomenon of nepotism that there is some sort of strictly finite supply of goods and services. The most conspicuous industry where nepotism exists is arguably the film industry. Of course studios can’t make endless movies per year. But there are a lot of film studios competing for the viewer’s attention, and streaming has made theatrical distribution more optional than it already was. Some have called the supply of cinematic content saturated, arguably resulting in a potential dip in quality. Under these current conditions, why would the success of one actor in the industry strain the hypothetical success of a colleague who is distinctly less connected when entering the market? Moreover, any consumer is always entirely free to boycott any product for the best or the stupidest of reasons. I have recently cancelled my Spotify subscription because I believe that their model for what constitutes success — and generates revenue — is as asinine as it is self-perpetuating. I may be wrong. Likewise, one can simply not see a Nicolas Cage movie. The bar for not doing things tends to be very low and the option is always available. I’m not doing a whole bunch of things right now! Bliss. Or righteous anger. You do you.</p><p>I could include a list of so-called nepo babies who have tried but failed to achieve success in Hollywood. I won’t. Because that would be disrespectful and it would ossify failure into an absolute, and that goes against every fibre of my being. Also, what would it prove exactly? If it proves anything, it’s that being connected doesn’t guarantee success, just like everything else doesn’t guarantee success. Nor does the universe owe anyone success, or any lack of success.</p><p>I posit that there is a notion of nepotism that exists within the taxonomy of meritocracy. This nepotism has a specific USP that keeps it alive: when one is born within a family some of whose members are active in a specific industry, chances are that mere exposure generates a baseline that can constitute reliable soil for “relevant talent” to grow out of. It provides a potential future employer who may or may not be a member of the family themselves with a semblance of sustained performance, or at least with some indication that there isn’t a high switching cost when it comes to performing within these very specific conditions. To use a very blunt example: a studio representative does not owe a person who goes into a full-on panic at the sight of a camera a second try-out.</p><p>That said, that’s it. There is no additional USP. This is also the only place where I believe nepotism is even allowed to exist. Ironically, nepotism is especially detrimental as a measurement of professional capacity where positions of power are scarce and decision-making is concentrated in very few hands — sometimes just one person’s. Hereditary succession supplies certainty about who comes next, not about their ability to meet whatever comes next. Like, I dunno, monarchies. I’m European. We’ve seen our fair share. Some of us still do. I live in a country that has a royal twiddling their thumbs at the supposedly symbolic position of “head of state”. At least I hope it is purely symbolic. That’s not necessarily a problem. But neither is granting that position to my cat. These functions have been so hollowed out — and I applaud that — and subtracted from that they’ve now come to serve as a buffer for when everything else has gone wrong: a kingdom reduced to contingency. I honestly believe my cat would do great.</p><p>Sources</p><p>1. Collins English Dictionary. “Meritocracy.”<br> <a href="https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/meritocracy">https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/meritocracy</a></p><p>2. Cornette, Josse. Een huis dat pijn heet. EPO, 2023.<br> <a href="https://epo.be/shop/het-huis-dat-pijn-heet/">https://epo.be/shop/het-huis-dat-pijn-heet/</a></p><p>3. Weisholtz, Drew. “Nicolas Cage reveals he legally changed his name in 2025.” TODAY / NBC, 28 May 2026.<br> <a href="https://www.nbclosangeles.com/entertainment/entertainment-news/nicolas-cage-reveals-he-legally-changed-his-name/3896368/">https://www.nbclosangeles.com/entertainment/entertainment-news/nicolas-cage-reveals-he-legally-changed-his-name/3896368/</a></p><p>4. Demeke, Saron, et al. “Is general mental ability still the best predictor of job performance? Integrating contemporary meta-analytic evidence.” Journal of Business and Psychology, 2026.<br> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-026-10146-8">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-026-10146-8</a></p><p>5. Belgian Federal Public Service Employment. “Congé moyennant le paiement d’une indemnité de rupture.”<br> <a href="https://emploi.belgique.be/fr/themes/contrats-de-travail/fin-du-contrat-de-travail/fin-du-contrat-duree-indeterminee-0">https://emploi.belgique.be/fr/themes/contrats-de-travail/fin-du-contrat-de-travail/fin-du-contrat-duree-indeterminee-0</a></p><p>6. Belgian National Social Security Office. Administrative instructions: “Bedragen betaald bij de beëindiging van de dienstbetrekking.”<br> <a href="https://www.socialsecurity.be/employer/instructions/dmfa/nl/latest/instructions/salary/particularcases/end_of_contract.html">https://www.socialsecurity.be/employer/instructions/dmfa/nl/latest/instructions/salary/particularcases/end_of_contract.html</a></p><p>7. The Belgian Monarchy. “La Fonction Royale.”<br> <a href="https://www.monarchie.be/fr/monarchie/la-fonction-royale">https://www.monarchie.be/fr/monarchie/la-fonction-royale</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef3d4f01fafb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A WARRANT FOR EXHAUSTION]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/a-warrant-for-my-exhaustion-43b80ebe68a4?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43b80ebe68a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[society]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 19:14:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-28T19:34:52.149Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>My Letter of Complaint to the State</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L7qZLKNcU2dchfY0q6esVg.png" /></figure><p>I write this essay to help myself think through and make sense of some of my own experiences dealing with institutions as a citizen of a Northwestern European liberal democracy. As a citizen, I am and I am expected to be reliably accountable to some of these institutions. I have not in any way or at any point agreed to this but I think it is reasonable to designate this mute agreement as a form of social contract. As I have written before, I deem my responsibilities relative to these institutions “liabilities”. I see not much reason — but never none — to breach this contract because in the constitutional ledger these are backed by “assets”: rights and protections. I have disagreements with what the state deems my assets and my liabilities. Every couple of years, I have the chance to make myself heard through voting. This tends to be largely a level playing field, with exceptions. I, Philippe Everaert-De Block, personally have specific disagreements with the way the institutions and governments that I am accountable to operate. I believe these disagreements are unlikely to be resolved through voting alone, which is one of the reasons why I write. I trust that the democratic process and the Rule of Law to which I am beholden will at least consider the remarks I make in good faith in some form or other. This is why I deem it generally unwise to act on impulse and why I argue for patience. I prefer evolution to revolution for the same reason and I appreciate tradition as a brake on any urge for hasty change; and I appreciate tradition only for that specific reason, not inherently for any reason beyond that. I prefer evolution that “gets work done today, not tomorrow”, not evolution that ossifies in inertia and that imbues its lethargy with a false sense of causality. I dislike the notion of “rules” that constitute prohibitions or diminish freedoms. Not because I am a particularly adventurous soul, more like how my cat doesn’t like it when any doors are closed around the house.</p><p>But…</p><h3>I experience my liabilities as reliably enforceable and my rights as contingently usable. Their institutional status does not, by itself, resolve that discrepancy. This can happen precisely because everyone is doing their assigned job properly. The diligent performance of each separate duty can exhaust the citizen while leaving every individual institution satisfied that it has done its part.</h3><p>A “balance sheet” is called this for a reason. The whole structure works because it is balanced both from the perspective of assets and from the perspective of liabilities. If either of those comes up incomplete or bent, something went arguably wrong along the way.</p><p><strong>A phenomenal sequence</strong></p><p>One of the many fantastic things about living in a Western liberal democracy is that citizens aren’t generally expected to do work to display deference to, for example, a Great Leader, dead or alive. Not a lot of mandatory crying. This is crucially not an example of what constitutes a situation that’s out of balance, but a situation wherein balance is calibrated differently. That said, balance calibration can also be completely off. A state that is to a large degree agrarian and that prescribes mandatory crying for a week at the Super Duper Dead Leader’s mausoleum every year at the exact time when crops are supposed to be harvested may have gotten its calibration wrong. It is reasonable to expect consequences. Conversely, sitting in traffic for two hours per day to and from one’s place of occupation, or having to blow off steam from a hard day’s work by watching a series on a streaming platform do not count as deference in the way mandatory crying does. Every choice has opportunity costs. The fact that some choices sometimes carry more of those relative to others may be unfortunate and undesirable, but that doesn’t make those instances of wrong calibration. That would make only optimally preferable configurations examples of balance and just expecting to be handed assets without backing that up by also assuming responsibilities from the perspective of a citizen scales terribly. To establish calibration from my perspective as a citizen, and as a show of good faith to the institutions I will here criticise, I claim the following:</p><p>• I do not believe I am owed success. I accept that undertaking something involves risk.</p><p>• I accept financial responsibilities that fall to me. This does not establish culpability for every act that produced them.</p><p>• I am not asking for “refunds”, be they financial or moral, nor do I argue that I have a right to demand those.</p><p>I will now provide the reader with a sequence of actions as they relate to both assets and liabilities as I have lived them. And I think that I am not alone in this, at least not according to my own experience. That doesn’t mean I am automatically right to call my experience also externally relevant. This I cannot know. But that’s why I write this piece.</p><p>I will argue that even in a generally well-calibrated system, a sequence of errors in the implementation of the provided “social contract” within that system can and does lead to a very real, substantial erosion of trust in institutions despite the errors themselves being individually and locally small. I posit that this is the case because they multiply into over-leverage, and that a citizen is well within their rights to experience any subsequent cut in their death by a thousand cuts as more substantial than it may initially seem.</p><p>Here is that sequence:</p><p>• I am expected to follow the law, and I do.</p><p>• I also follow the law where the likelihood of enforcement is low or arguably absent.</p><p>• I accept my obligations because I understand that my legal responsibilities exist within an arrangement that also recognises and protects my rights, and that I am not the only citizen.</p><p>• These rights have formal protection, including constitutional protection where applicable.</p><p>• Things nevertheless go wrong. Some mistakes are mine; other acts exposing me to consequences are not committed by my own hand.</p><p>• I accept the financial responsibilities that fall to me. I do not thereby accept culpability for every act producing them.</p><p>• I experience institutional enforcement of my obligations as substantially more effective than institutional protection of my rights, including protection against dubious prosecution. Not once, but with a degree of consistency.</p><p>• The concrete result is erosion of my trust in the institutions.</p><p>There is another reason why I believe that my case may be especially well-suited to serve as an example here. As I have alluded to in the intro, my personal nature tends to not allow for casual, dispassionate adherence to rules. This is something of an understatement. I do not claim that this makes me special or unique, but I do suggest that people who share this particular sentiment often have to make an above-average effort to accept such frameworks. I have to work hard to convince myself that this acceptance does good, and that a greater good that may or may not include me in it isn’t necessarily something to object to from first principles. I cannot stress enough how much energy this takes. This is why I came up — for myself — with the accounting metaphor of the balance sheet. But I also believe that it may be this very dynamic that makes me additionally well-suited to explain what these balancing calibration errors may be, what they may represent, why they may have real consequences, and why they shouldn’t be rejected out of hand.</p><p>And I feel I have reason to believe that I am not alone in this.</p><p>My compliance is therefore not explained solely through fear of enforcement. It is my acceptance of the arrangement, of the “social contract” between myself and the institutions, that helps sustain it.</p><p><strong>Responsibility and culpability</strong></p><p>I have fairly recently had the distinct misfortune of being involved in a string of ill-advised investment decisions. Or rather: I involved myself in them. In one instance, an operational executive knowingly and willingly breached a contract of enormous existential importance several times over in a very short period of time and without informing any higher-ups of this. This directly and immediately resulted in a substantial loss of the shareholders’ investments. In another instance, a different operational executive conflated the value of a large amount of assets with that same entirely virtual amount in cash, believing he could both eat and keep his cake. He proceeded to treat this severe overestimation of real assets as a basis to make promises to suppliers the company of course wasn’t able to keep, again in a very short span of time. This bankrupted the company. I was one of the investors in both of these instances.</p><p>I choose to share these examples from personal experience because they represent instances of the frequent conflation of responsibility with culpability. This frequently has the consequence of creating a sort of “moral culpability flywheel trap” for anyone who needs there to be some. I believe that neither of the two aforementioned agents acted out of ill will. That also is completely irrelevant to the eventual result. In both cases, the agents breached protocols meant to keep this exact thing from happening. Chief among those breaches was their respective but identical claim that they themselves were also the person bearing financial responsibility, despite the official documentation that is, might I add, entirely publicly available, distinctly showing that this was not in fact the case. Suppliers trusted them to be authorised to make the decisions that they made. I call this “the game of shoulds”. I have subsequently found myself, as one of the investors, in situations where lawyers couldn’t seem to grasp that I didn’t agree that any culpability also attached to any investors while simultaneously not choosing to do battle over the fact that the investors were to a large degree financially responsible for the faults of the whole company.</p><p>This is where I started understanding those sentences where someone is expected to pay one euro in moral damages to the opposing party. Before that, it hadn’t made any sense to me. But that one euro isn’t the sentence; it represents moral responsibility. All I saw was the one euro.</p><p>For the sake of full disclosure, I must admit that I still mostly see the one euro. I do not understand if in the eyes of the state — here, its judicial branch — that euro represents responsibility, culpability, or both. Let alone how they are supposed to relate to each other. I am also not a legal scholar. I presume that while an answer to this may exist, that alone doesn’t make my question not an open one. I also want to add that I do not expect a reader to just take my account of these events as true. There may be doubt, and there may be disagreement. I am aware of this and I deem this to be a good thing. I do not claim to have access to the absolute truth while some others don’t.</p><p><strong>The Enforcement Asymmetry</strong></p><p>Many of my experiences throughout life, including the ones mentioned above, have led me to believe that at least some of the institutions that I am expected to be reliably accountable to appear substantially more effective at holding a citizen accountable than at making my protections effective, and those include protection against dubious prosecution.</p><p>This is an asymmetry, not a logical contradiction. Reliably enforceable liabilities and contingently usable rights can coexist within the same institutional arrangement. But it is exactly this arrangement that I call out for having become complacent from the side of the institutions. We are not expected to defer to these liberal democratic institutions just because they are there. We, citizens, do not generally comply out of fear of retribution by the system but because we expect there to be a sense of balance in the grand scheme of things. I do not have to argue for a strict quid pro quo to be able to suspect a debtor might not intend to hold up their end of the bargain. This is erosion of trust. A credit system works because we are simultaneously and consistently both each other’s debtors AND each other’s creditors. That goes for citizens and for institutions. I will not walk up to the nice lady of the local cheese store to shoot her and claim all her cheese exactly because I have every reason to trust that not shooting her greatly increases the chances of access to future cheese. And future cheese is what makes the world go around. (For any non-Caucasian readers: I know.)</p><p>Let’s look at some examples of this process as it relates to phenomena that are arguably more widely known. Take jaywalking. Anywhere crossing the road as a pedestrian in a particular way is prohibited, someone may understand the rule and cross anyway. Stationing an officer on every street corner or long enough stretch of street to catch every violation may cost more than the authority considers worthwhile. I argue that the same legal order that prohibits an act can have reasons to tolerate its occurrence. The pedestrian’s expectation can rest on an accurate understanding of enforcement priorities. Neither party needs to misunderstand the rule. There need not be a currently visible abundance of playing children in a street where the sign at the entrance to the street urges a driver to lower their speed to avoid hitting a child for this driver to understand that speeding through that same street at night at full throttle is not without risk. Similarly, crossing a desert road that’s been abandoned for decades within a county that prohibits jaywalking under threat of gigantic fines isn’t therefore intrinsically a terrible idea. A plain-clothes officer who just happens by at that exact moment may also see it this way.</p><p>I take these examples to demonstrate enforcement’s contingency. That does not by itself demonstrate unequal institutional responsiveness. Expecting a citizen to comply even when crossing that long-forgotten desert road for reasons that amount to institutional deference as a sort of quid pro quo is detrimental to the trust that the citizen accountable to the institution is expected to place in it. One arguably doesn’t need to invoke any notion of a direct quid pro quo to see this. One is entirely free to feel eaten up by remorse after crossing that abandoned desert road and turn oneself in to the authorities, but those authorities are similarly entirely free to let that citizen off with a reprimand knowing full well that it guarantees nothing.</p><p>An enforcement asymmetry is not a problem when it is a symmetrical one. By this I mean that it makes sense to let our night driver off the hook with a warning if there is no record of them having behaved thusly in the past, nor is there any indication that they will do so in the future after receiving this exact warning. It is reasonable to expect that a driver with a clear and proven habit of endangering others and themselves will not receive the same leniency.</p><p>My very specific complaint here is aimed at a state that seeks to guarantee future outcomes by assuming that current enforcement should serve as the agent that will make this a reality. This opens up the gate to an avalanche of potential abuse by a state that sometimes seems to forget that it has the full force of institutional assets behind it, including a monopoly on violence.</p><p>I will give another example of this that shows how subtle these elements can compound into one phenomenon by adding real stakes to consequences. I will attempt to show that a government that doubles down on enforcement specifically and explicitly to guarantee future outcomes and that does this by placing an asymmetrical amount of weight on citizens’ accountability to institutions can shoot itself and its citizens repeatedly in the foot without even realising it’s doing this.</p><p>I live in one of those countries where the demand when it comes to daycare for small children greatly exceeds the supply. I am under the impression that this is to a degree something of a global phenomenon. That would make sense: this constitutes a parent making a choice to leave their child with a stranger who asks for money for this in return. Any substantial damage to a child very probably won’t be settled by the sincere promise by the daycare that it will subtract that day’s expenses from that month’s invoice.</p><p>As I understand it, we are currently experiencing a situation where more daycares are closing than there are new ones being created because many owners are going into retirement at roughly the same time. So an existing imbalance between supply and demand is compounding. Both the government and the electorate find it of paramount importance that no children suffer, which I think probably goes without saying. But this translates into an accumulation of requirements and restrictions that have very peculiar effects in reality. A daycare needs space, a substantial labour force relative to scale, and know-how in order to be a daycare. Acquiring property is a serious investment. Renting property is too cost-heavy to not immediately generate a yield. But training to become a daycare worker already takes time and investment. And being qualified to care for children does not itself authorise someone to open a daycare. A prospective organiser must also complete a separate starter assessment before applying for a licence, with no guarantee that the light will be green at the end of the process. That has an effect on investment decisions. One can invest in property that could provide the necessary space for the business but one would do that despite the licensing process. That already arguably cancels out any reasonable decision to rent while awaiting a licence. And that is already assuming that one has the available capital to buy property in the first place. While that process is still underway, with no guarantee as to the result, one cannot be expected to just sit on their hands. Life costs money. So chances are that eventually, one is granted a licence that allows for the practice of what amounts to — at that moment — a new risk that one needs to offset against the security one’s current financial situation already provides. And even with all that, the initial reason for the education, the vetting and the requirements is still in no way guaranteed: that no harm will come to a child. I mean, have you seen children?</p><p>In this situation, a copious amount of good intentions and a great reason to make the licence to run a daycare facility meaningful amount to exactly nothing in particular. And we haven’t even started discussing consequences in case something DOES go wrong, regardless of any wrongdoing. Again… Have you seen children?</p><p>A government cannot regulate supply into existence in a way that is future-proof. This inability to guarantee that nothing will ever go wrong is in essence asymptotic: making everything cushions doesn’t in itself make sharp objects cease to exist. I cannot help but notice that any salient instance of potential harm provides an extra reason to instate another restriction or requirement, thereby stacking reasons for anyone considering the option of becoming a daycare worker to NOT do it. The result is that any efforts by a government wanting to prop up the whole situation, either via tax incentives or via direct subsidies, end up making the existing problem worse. Because what are the indirect results? Taking off work to take care of your child out of necessity. That ALSO just drives prices up in addition to making a client less able to pay for the service in the first place. It’s a doom loop.</p><p>The first reason I believe this daycare example is relevant here is because an asset beyond value — a child — here runs up against the impossibility of calibrating for its own immense risk generation. Possibly quite literally and with a bang followed by crying. You cannot guarantee your way out of uncertainty without also generating huge costs, and not just financial ones. The second reason I believe this example to be relevant is because both the risks and the costs (many of which are simply generated by useless government intervention trying to make those disappear) fall into the lap of the very citizen a government claims to be providing protection for. This isn’t the case.</p><p>That’s what makes this an instance of asymmetrical enforcement asymmetry.</p><p><strong>Real costs of consequences</strong></p><p>To reiterate: I believe that every example we have discussed up until now reasonably includes an arrangement between the state and the citizen, even in situations where one may reasonably not expect the state to be physically present (the desert road). Other examples include an arrangement between the state and the citizen where one may argue for the presence of the state or against it, such as in the case of the daycare facilities.</p><p>I want to add an example that quite literally fell into my lap yesterday. The government still owes me tax refunds. I accept that this is the case, and I accept that I am expected to keep those tax refunds as a sort of credit line for the government that can be subtracted from or added to other credit, be it as a creditor to the state or as a debtor to it. Yesterday’s official letter from the state’s finance department informed me of the following: because I still owe the government a total amount of X/100 euros, the government has decided to subtract X euros from the amount it still owes me, which is about 2X euros. I am aware of that amount of X/100 euros, and the government had already agreed before yesterday that this tiny amount of X/100 euros is not rightfully its, but instead belongs to me. Despite all this, the government has unilaterally decided to not pay me back the 2X euros that I am rightfully owed. Whether it regards the subtraction of X euros as open credit or as what it deems to be a cost for wrongdoing, it doesn’t explain. So the cost of YET AGAIN proving to the government exactly what it has already agreed to falls to the citizen, who must spend money to find out whether the amount they are rightfully owed will actually be repaid. I will possibly make myself poorer just to be told that I’m poorer.</p><p>This feels like a great time to add that tax refunds being fumbled by the state and that may take years to regain aren’t seen as loans to the state so it’s not like the costs that befall the citizen are offset by any yield here. I also want to stress that tax refunds and costs incurred in dealing with government incompetence do not constitute payment for services that those institutions provide: that’s what the taxes are for, on top of any potential fee for the same service.</p><p>Now, I have in my experience frequently encountered the argument that makes the claim that a right is a right and one should just take action to make reality represent a form of moral accounting wherein rights are automatically granted and respected with time and maybe some effort. And to those people I say congratulations. Congratulations on having built for yourself a life wherein it is possible to provide yourself with the time and the certainty of mind that all will be well. Many of us do not currently have the margins to allow for those. Many of us live from paycheque to paycheque and I for one am sick and tired of pretending this is not actually the case.</p><p>To bring this back to the previous examples of the failed investments: I have gotten used to being proven right post factum. That alone doesn’t magically reset time. Nothing does.</p><p>The costs of the asymmetrical enforcement asymmetry fall to the citizen, not the government.</p><p><strong>Democratic asset calibration</strong></p><p>Another aspect of this subject is that the state seems to consistently forget that it is the state and not just any citizen. Pretending you don’t have the means to fight a perceived injustice that befalls you doesn’t make those means disappear. The state has assets at its disposal to combat what it believes to be wrongful treatment that citizens simply don’t have.</p><p>For example, the adage “the truth will set you free”, and the image of Lady Justice as blind. If an institution has had a thumb on the scale since forever, it’s easy for them to forget that they have a thumb on the scale at all. That “truth” does different things for different people if the calibration for measuring facts is bent.</p><p>Having to prove your case is one thing. Having the resources to keep disputing what counts as proof, what it means, and what should follow from it is another. I want to examine what that room to manoeuvre looks like at the other end of the scale.</p><p>On Wednesday, 21 October 2026, the American special envoy Steve Witkoff referred to the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin as a “humanitarian”. This was met with what one can reasonably call severe backlash from the free press. I will not involve myself in any discussion of ethics here; that is outside of scope. What I can observe is that Witkoff, Jared Kushner (also a special envoy to the Middle East just like Steve Witkoff), and Vladimir Putin discussed a proposed sale of Lukoil’s international assets during their meeting on 5 September 2026. Witkoff and Kushner’s boss, US President Donald Trump, is the person holding the remote that turns sanctions and embargoes on and off and that controls the volume. Potential buyers include Middle Eastern investors with business connections to their families. One of those investors was also connected to World Liberty Financial, the cryptocurrency company Witkoff co-founded with the Trump family. Kushner is Donald Trump’s son-in-law. That transaction required approval from Washington and Moscow. Steve Witkoff’s own The Witkoff Group, a real-estate investment and development company, does business with billionaire Len Blavatnik, whose fortune was built in part through investments in Russia, a country famous for wanting to have a finger in practically every pie of substance. According to his spokesperson, Blavatnik fully divested from his Russian assets following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. I think it also reasonable to take note that this is a very good thing to say out loud. Now, I do not claim to know if Witkoff and Kushner are doing shady deals. That is in fact a little beside the point here. What is relevant here is the claim that these men can’t be bought, as if the image of them walking out of a meeting with a large bag with a dollar sign on it was even believable to begin with. That is insulting. Any leverage doesn’t come from what is, but from what could or could not be. The potential fact that they don’t accept cash — past, present or future — completely overlooks the fact that not every asset directly translates to cash. A hint at the possibility of discussing new projects come January 2029, or not, is also an asset, or a liability, respectively. Any notion of neutrality of facts here doesn’t have to be necessarily violated for any promise of power to change hands.</p><p>Likewise, the Trump White House at the time of writing in late October 2026 seems to be bent on putting more than a few thumbs on the scale when it comes to the Ukrainian war effort by repeatedly painting the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as illegitimate and an aggressor. There have been suggestions of intelligence stops and of pulling the plug on the Ukrainian troops’ internet access in the field. I cannot confirm this, so I will leave this here. Any White House officials’ and Donald Trump’s very own claims that tend to regard Vladimir Putin as the real man of peace here can be both laughable and still have substantial value. On Tuesday 3 November 2026, the United States Midterm Elections are scheduled to take place. Those tend to be tough for incumbents. The polls are… not good. Polls aren’t predictions but they do get to “shape sentiment”, which by itself can already give people an incentive to vote one way or another. From the perspective of President Trump, one can both be hopeful that the polls are skewed in his opponents’ favour and still hedge for the possibility that those very polls did in fact catch public sentiment very well. One option for making this a reality is by pushing hard on one of the two sources for the high energy prices. Not on the one he created and is now stuck in along with the rest of us, namely Iran. But on the one they’re not too directly involved in: the Russo-Ukrainian War. If you already expect to lose an election anyway, and making a bargain either lets you suddenly have a hand in pushing down energy prices that the electorate also suffers under or makes you lose some more, then the calculation seems clear. A few dozen or a few hundred or a few thousand Ukrainian lives here and there during bombing raids that the White House pretends not to observe are, we can all see, a price Donald Trump is very willing to pay.</p><p>My point here is this: asymmetric enforcement asymmetry allows for the use of blatantly false facts that the state doesn’t even need to tell itself are secretly true. The press and the citizenry can stress that those facts are wrong and exactly how wrong they are until the cows come home; this observation amounts to exactly nothing because the state has assets that we don’t have. Truth and neutrality amount to nothing much when the state is in a position to calibrate them toward whatever personal or institutional gain it seeks. We, citizens, do not have access to such assets. No, instead we get presented with an invoice for pointing out there can be several different interpretations of facts.</p><p>Knowing that something is wrong in the eyes of the law and then deciding to do it anyway are entirely compatible. Even if this is consistently the case. That is, provided you own the assets or the resources to face any cost of backlash.</p><p><strong>A warrant for exhaustion</strong></p><p>A citizen can continue fulfilling every obligation while becoming less convinced that the institutions merit reliance. Continued compliance therefore does not establish continued trust. I feel I have no realistic option as a citizen to do battle against a state even beyond the 1,000th cut. I am tired. I am exhausted. I feel ill because of it. Instead I feel my economic participation wither in ways I did not deem possible even a few years ago. I have stopped investing, I have stopped coming up with business ideas, I have stopped granting cooperation beyond what is compulsory. A person may simply stop undertaking activities that at least partly depend on accessible institutional protection.</p><p>My prior eagerness to innovate continues through my writing. I reject the state that I am a citizen of as a reliable provider of institutional protection because I have lost my confidence in its willingness to do so. I have chosen to no longer spend. Being eager to innovate in today’s Europe amounts to being the first to blink. It’s your neck on the line. Best keep one’s ideas to oneself if expressing those needs investment first. I hate that I have come to conclude this.</p><p>As a nail in the coffin, I observe that the state seems largely unaware of its own weight on the scales. Not every single individual state actor, of course. Some are aware that Europe by way of the European Union is regulating and restricting its way out of the free market of ideas and into the grave where innovation goes to die. But it is not enough, I feel.</p><p><strong>The reach of the state</strong></p><p>The nation of which I am a citizen is one that prides itself on the protection it offers its citizens by deeming itself a welfare state. That is also simply true. Social democracy has had a profound impact on the way the state here offers protections and while I have my disagreements with any degree of socialism, I do not want to sound ungrateful for the infrastructure that has been provided. The general quality of welfare is good on average and pointing at exceptions that will always be there seems like a fun hobby for exactly five minutes and perhaps serves as a nice way to meet people in a complainathon.</p><p>No, the deteriorating infrastructure under scrutiny here is abstract, democratic, and in no way anecdotal. The nation about which I have been talking this entire time is Belgium.</p><p>Belgium’s public expenditure relative to its GDP is among the largest in the world at around 54%. We are sort of weirdly used to it. Alarm bells become soothing once you get used to them. Social security, salaries for public servants and subsidies are the main culprits. The total fiscal pressure relative to GDP is around 45%. Again, among the largest in the world. Want to start a company? Good luck with that because the subscription to life as an entrepreneur is very expensive and the product kinda sucks. From my own experience I have learned that in order to stay afloat, you need to be able to guarantee that exactly everything goes according to the rosiest of plans. Any setback and you’re a goner. The subscription to life as an entrepreneur is way too expensive and the product kinda sucks. Employment offers its own arithmetic: for a single employee without children earning the average wage, taxes and social contributions absorb about 52.5% of the employer’s total labour cost. Less than half reaches the employee as take-home pay. When you own a company, you’re legally required to maintain its accounts whether or not you can get your accountant to do the work. I haven’t been able to reach mine in over two years and I need their go-ahead in practice to change accountants. Going it alone for a bit isn’t even an option. My protections are what’s denying me protection.</p><p>Now, be honest, what good does it do to cut foreign aid, really? Refusing a refugee a place to sleep? Closing borders altogether? Take development aid: scrapping Belgium’s entire official development assistance expenditure, which already includes some domestic refugee reception costs, would have amounted to roughly 20 euros per month per capita on the 2024 figures, before accounting for indirect effects. Take some indirect effects here and there and some shifts in opportunity costs and that number may or may not take a dive in a way that we cannot predict. That is no reason to not cut those costs, so by all means be my guest. But denying someone else a share in the redistribution via welfare doesn’t magically make that amount appear where you deem it fit to do the most work. A cheaper version of the same asymmetry would still be the same asymmetry. Also, inflation just cancelled out the difference and now the cost of your home renovations went up significantly. You like pears? Awesome! You can drive to Limburg to go pick them yourself, which is great because gas and your time are practically free! Oops.</p><p><strong>As good a time for more less as any other</strong></p><p>I don’t usually do this but I’m gonna make an exception here and I’ll actually argue for an alternative. I want to challenge the assumption that an inadequately accessible protection warrants adding another protective commitment. It clearly doesn’t work.</p><p>When did throwing resources at a problem become intelligent policy? I don’t think it was ever intelligent policy. I have a different idea. Instead of adding layers upon layers of protections in the hope they become a future-proof guarantee, go in the opposite direction. Remove protections. Extract the stinger to stop the swelling. Allow society to catch the infection so as to strengthen immunity. That doesn’t in itself mean people will be left behind. If anything, it may unveil who really needed help. The state has no place in your wallet, in your bedroom, in the way you choose to live your life. Level the playing field. Remove the cushioning across the board. That also means getting rid of special interests and preferential treatment for those with the means to buy it. We’re all adults here; we’ll survive a scraped knee.</p><p>Adopt the Minimal Justified Codex in policymaking. Ask yourself if a rule or a restriction is really needed. If it might not be, scrap it, or don’t add it to the codex. If you feel a rule needs to stipulate a list of exceptions to make sense, it probably wasn’t a good rule to begin with. Gone with it. Inheritance is not a good reason to keep a rule. Gone with it. A rule’s promised protection cannot, by itself, justify the obligations imposed in its name. Its practical availability to the citizens is what matters to that justification. If not… Gone with it. The same goes for restrictions. Ask my cat. What harm does it do to leave a door open? You either don’t use the room and it’s not your problem, or you do use the room because the door was open.</p><p>I’ll accept the occasional dead mouse in my bed as interest.</p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><p>Sources checked on 26 October 2026. Personal experiences are the author’s testimony; the public sources below support the factual references and provide institutional context.</p><p><strong>1. Childcare licensing and qualifications</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.opgroeien.be/veelgestelde-vragen/veelgestelde-vragen-over-starten-met-kinderopvang">Opgroeien — Veelgestelde vragen over starten met kinderopvang</a></p><p>Distinguishes staff qualifications, the organiser’s starter assessment and the subsequent licence application. Completing the assessment does not automatically confer a licence.</p><p><strong>2. Childcare supply and closures</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.opgroeien.be/kennis/cijfers-en-onderzoek/kinderopvang-babys-en-peuters">Opgroeien — Kinderopvang baby’s en peuters, 2025 figures</a></p><p>Reports 370 family-based locations closing and 220 opening, with retirement and health the main reasons for closure. Total licensed places fell by 356 across Flanders and Brussels; group-care capacity increased.</p><p><strong>3. Delayed tax refunds</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.mediateurfederal.be/fr/recommandation-interets-moratoires-0">Federal Ombudsman — Recommandation Intérêts moratoires, RO 13/04</a></p><p>Recommends automatic payment of qualifying late-refund interest and, pending implementation, information for taxpayers about how to claim it. This documents the distinction between entitlement and payment; the individual tax-refund episode is the author’s account.</p><p><strong>4. Witkoff’s description of Putin</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/10/21/trumps-special-envoy-calls-vladimir-putin-humanitarian/">The Washington Post — Trump’s special envoy calls Vladimir Putin a ‘humanitarian’, 21 October 2026</a></p><p>Reports the remark at the St Petersburg meeting following Stephen Hubbard’s release, alongside Trump’s criticism of Zelensky and the easing of Russian sanctions.</p><p><strong>5. Lukoil negotiations and business connections</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2026/10/03/us-russia-talks-on-ukraine-involve-multi-billion-dollar-oil-deal-nyt-reports">Reuters — US-Russia talks on Ukraine involve multi-billion dollar oil deal, NYT reports, 3 October 2026 (republished by The Star)</a></p><p><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/03/8056300/">Ukrainska Pravda — US and Russia are negotiating multibillion-dollar deal on Lukoil assets, says NYT, 3 October 2026</a></p><p>Both report the New York Times investigation, including the 5 September meeting and prospective buyers’ business ties. Ukrainska Pravda also reports the World Liberty Financial connection. These are accounts of negotiations, not evidence of personal payment to either envoy.</p><p><strong>6. Witkoff Group and Len Blavatnik</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-officials-meeting-with-russian-miami-spurs-questions-about-latest-ukraine-2025-11-22/">Erin Banco and Gram Slattery, Reuters — Trump officials’ meeting with Russian in Miami spurs questions about Ukraine proposal, 22 November 2025; corrected 1 December 2025</a></p><p>Confirms the business relationship and attributes the statement about divestment from Russian assets to Blavatnik’s spokesperson. The divestment statement concerns Blavatnik, not the Witkoff Group.</p><p><strong>7. Wealth as supposed protection from influence</strong></p><p><a href="https://nicholaskralev.substack.com/p/are-trumps-rich-envoys-more-resistant">Nicholas Kralev — Are Trump’s Rich Envoys More Resistant to Foreign Influence?, Diplomacy Notebook, 18 February 2026</a></p><p>Quotes a New York Times report attributing the wealth-based defence of Witkoff and Kushner to administration supporters. It does not attribute that defence to statements by the two men themselves.</p><p><strong>8. Midterm polling and energy prices</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/exclusivetrump-approval-falls-to-record-low-31-as-midterms-near-reutersipsos-poll-finds-4958185">Jason Lange, Reuters — Trump approval falls to record low of 31% as midterms near, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds, 19 October 2026 (republished by Investing.com)</a></p><p>Reports low approval, a Democratic advantage in the generic congressional ballot and concern about gasoline prices ahead of 3 November. The essay’s interpretation of Trump’s bargaining incentives is the author’s analysis.</p><p><strong>9. Belgian public expenditure</strong></p><p><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-21102026-ap">Eurostat — Euro area government deficit at 3.0% and EU at 3.1% of GDP, 21 October 2026</a></p><p>The Belgium table records government expenditure at 54.4% of GDP in 2025 and 54.1% in 2024. These expenditure figures are distinct from the tax-to-GDP ratio below.</p><p><strong>10. Belgian fiscal pressure</strong></p><p><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20251031-2">Eurostat — EU and euro area tax-to-GDP ratio up in 2024, 31 October 2025</a></p><p>Reports Belgium’s taxes and net social contributions at 45.1% of GDP in 2024, the third-highest ratio in the EU.</p><p><strong>11. Taxation of employment</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2026/04/taxing-wages-2026-country-notes_491a0e97/belgium_2c42d1fc/f118830f-en.pdf">OECD — Taxing Wages 2026: Belgium</a></p><p>Reports a 52.5% tax wedge in 2025 for a single worker without children earning the average wage. The denominator is total employer labour cost, including employer social contributions.</p><p><strong>12. Accounting obligations and transfer of records</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.vlaio.be/en/node/481">VLAIO — Voer een heldere boekhouding</a></p><p><a href="https://www.blogitaa.be/fr/2026/09/21/changement-dexpert-comptable-sous-le-rgpd-entre-obligation-de-restitution-confidentialite-et-continuite/">ITAA — Changement d’expert-comptable sous le RGPD : entre obligation de restitution, confidentialité et continuité, 21 September 2026</a></p><p>VLAIO identifies bookkeeping as a legal obligation. ITAA explains duties concerning the return and transfer of client records. The difficulty obtaining cooperation described in the essay is the author’s experience.</p><p><strong>13. Development aid and the per-capita calculation</strong></p><p><a href="https://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/beleid/ontwikkelingssamenwerking-en-humanitaire-hulp/wie-zijn-we/onze-organisatie">Belgian FPS Foreign Affairs, DGD — Onze organisatie, updated 4 February 2026</a></p><p><a href="https://statbel.fgov.be/en/news/01-january-2025-belgium-had-11825551-inhabitants">Statbel — On 01 January 2025, Belgium had 11,825,551 inhabitants, 11 June 2025</a></p><p><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co-operation-profiles_04b376d7-en/belgium_61c41549-en.html">OECD — Development Co-operation Profiles: Belgium</a></p><p>DGD reports €2.74 billion in official development assistance for 2024. Dividing by 11,825,551 residents and twelve months gives €19.31 per person per month, rounded in the essay to roughly €20. The OECD confirms that ODA includes domestic refugee reception expenditure. This is a gross arithmetic comparison before indirect effects.</p><p><strong>14. Foreign workers in horticulture</strong></p><p><a href="https://vilt.be/nl/nieuws/uitbreiding-aantal-dagen-seizoenarbeid-om-arbeidstekort-en-coronaverspreiding-tegen-te-gaan">VILT — Meer dagen seizoenarbeid om arbeidstekort en coronaverspreiding tegen te gaan, 2 February 2022</a></p><p>Reports the sector’s reliance on foreign seasonal labour, including in apple and pear cultivation, and the staffing consequences of disrupted cross-border movement.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43b80ebe68a4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Em Dashes and Armbands]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/em-dashes-and-armbands-eefd2f2c1a48?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eefd2f2c1a48</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[critical-thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:47:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-28T18:10:45.204Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Signalling Certainty in the Dabate on AI Writing</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_FWerPPKVajbB6XhiS4znA.png" /></figure><p>This short essay began as a comment on the article “<a href="https://medium.com/the-daily-draft/the-biggest-tell-an-article-was-written-by-ai-196792da1499"><em>The Biggest Tell An Article Was Written By AI</em></a>” by <a href="https://medium.com/u/1dec1a53f526">Matt Lillywhite</a> as it appears on the platform Medium. When I say “appears”, I need to also supply the caveat that what I assume to be most of the article is hidden behind a paywall. That means I am reacting to the very beginning of the article right up until the phrase “more like everyone had invented their own version of what AI sounded…”. This is where the article stops for me. I believe I am in no way obligated to pay to read full articles. But I also want to stress that I do not know what the writer concludes, nor would I want to make any assumptions. I am simply confronted by what I can read, and that is what I react to.</p><p>I have some concerns here that are of an arguably “epistemological” nature. I think we should take a couple of steps back and look at what’s being suggested, what’s being hinted at, the shape of the phenomenon of “being able to spot the use of AI in writing”. It reminds me of Joseph McCarthy’s Red Scare tactics. It also reminds me — and bear with me here — of the phenomenon “knowing that someone is Jewish”. Imagine there are two available data nodes:</p><p>- P1: a town has a synagogue</p><p>- P2: I, an inhabitant of said town, am Jewish and I am observant</p><p>These two facts may very well be connected: access to a synagogue can influence where an observant Jewish person chooses to live. I may or may not have moved to the town because there IS a synagogue, but there is a non-zero chance that I will not move to another town because that would also mean leaving the synagogue, regardless even of the fact that another town also has a synagogue, for it is not the one I go to.</p><p>From an outside perspective looking in, pointing at one unknown inhabitant “who arguably looks the part” and claiming that there is a higher-than-average chance of them being Jewish can thusly be entirely true yet serve as a sort of funnel to shove the claimant’s entire notion of what it means for one to be Jewish onto that one person or the entire Jewish population of the town or even the entire town, regardless of an individual’s religious or ethnic background.</p><p>The reason why I believe the example works well here as an analogy to being able to spot “text written with or written by AI” is because one cannot simply point at one thing and deem the case closed, like pointing at a person with black skin and claiming they have recent African ancestry. Still, many Aboriginal people would arguably object. The writer, Matt Lillywhite, acknowledges this, writing that “It’s never, ‘I think.’ Or, ‘Maybe.’ Rather, the verdict’s already in but the investigation just hasn’t caught up yet.”</p><p>I would go one step further and interrogate what would amount to a successful result of said hypothetical investigation. I, as a writer, have caught myself avoiding both en dashes and em dashes in favour of hyphens every time, even if grammar would prescribe that I use the dashes. I don’t believe I have anything to hide, but I recognise the impulse to exclude any reason for suspicion that a German citizen in the 1930s up until 1945 with one grandparent who may or may not be Jewish might have felt.</p><p>There is also another phenomenon that compromises any claim to purity or any claim that purity is attainable and should be strived for. The technology that constitutes Artificial Intelligence has become gradually integrated into the tools many of us use on a daily basis since some time before the release of what we now see as its most salient examples: LLMs and generative AI. For instance, Google documented machine learning and neural networks in Gmail’s spam filtering in 2015, well before ChatGPT’s release in November 2022. The way many of these tools work on the level of programming and engineering often constitutes a black box for users, with proprietary details kept undisclosed. And why shouldn’t it? The alternative is to open up the box and that may very well be a substantially detrimental move from an investment and business point of view.</p><p>I posit that even if one were to point to one instance of the use of an em dash within a text, conclude that the text was produced by or by using AI, and be entirely correct in their assessment, nothing would inherently follow from it. Mr. Lillywhite has — I believe accurately — observed that many AI critics’ claims of outwardly apparent certainty about what constitutes AI use in writing may be without warrant. I strongly believe that this can arguably be explained by the notion that the cost of being wrong is practically nothing, while the yield of simply uttering the statement may signal an identity marker: “I stand on this side of this important debate”. Whether or not the claim is properly backed up may then be of less importance. This is problematic.</p><p>I want to also draw attention to another phenomenon that greatly compounds any reasons to be suspicious of AI use in writing: many AI writing tools generate text probabilistically, drawing on patterns learned during training. Wording that occurs frequently in similar contexts in the training data may therefore also be more likely to appear in their output. But recurring words and expressions have always been a feature of human language use as language evolves through being used. Their prevalence may reflect both human habits and AI reproducing or amplifying those habits, with both processes continuing alongside each other. The writer mentions other people treating words like “delve” as evidence of AI use. Again, it may be entirely true that this word indicates AI use in the production process of the text, but what exactly does this mean beyond it?</p><p>I cannot help but think that the “bundle of impressions” that constitutes criticism of AI use in writing is made up of claims that are individually greatly deficient when it comes to demonstrating causality, or even correlation. Just like in the example of the town with the synagogue, an above-average chance that one random inhabitant will be Jewish can correlate with the presence of a synagogue in that town, but from that alone it doesn’t follow that any bearded man with a hat walking around the town will probably be Jewish. Correlation is not some “lower form” of causation that allows for the claimant to reach a conclusion from weaker arguments. It is not a warrant for basing one’s views on what arguably amounts to “vibes”.</p><p>Furthermore, what do the critics propose as a solution exactly? Exclusion? Expulsion? Ostracisation? It seems to me that this isn’t in any way clear. I am completely fine with pointing out that impression A may point to the presence of phenomenon A. But my abundantly lush hair growth may point to the possibility that I am a werewolf. Even if that were the case, and I cannot currently confirm this, a claimant still has to explain how my being a werewolf is problematic, or even wrong. I do not believe that we are owed a counter-proposal by the critics; they can make their vibe-based claims as long as they please. But I also think that just like in a debate about sexual preferences where the argument is mentioned that “homosexuality is wrong and undesirable”, at some point in a world where homosexuality simply exists, it is reasonable to expect the group making that argument to explain what it proposes as a solution. If they don’t, I feel it is warranted to at some point draw the conclusion that an argument about a phenomenon’s “wrongness and undesirability” may be actually about signalling one’s own identitary purity to the world, to people who agree, to people who don’t agree, and maybe even to themselves.</p><p>Delve.</p><h3>Sources</h3><p>Matt Lillywhite, <a href="https://medium.com/the-daily-draft/the-biggest-tell-an-article-was-written-by-ai-196792da1499">“The Biggest Tell An Article Was Written By AI”</a>, The Daily Draft, Medium, 20 August 2026. This response addresses only the opening accessible before the paywall.</p><p>Google, <a href="https://gmail.googleblog.com/2015/07/the-mail-you-want-not-spam-you-dont.html">“The mail you want, not the spam you don’t”</a>, 2015. On machine learning and neural networks in Gmail’s spam filtering.</p><p>Hugging Face, <a href="https://huggingface.co/docs/transformers/v4.44.0/generation_strategies">“Text generation strategies”</a>. On how language models select or sample possible continuations.</p><p>United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-nuremberg-race-laws">“The Nuremberg Race Laws”</a>. Background on classification by ancestry under Nazi rule.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eefd2f2c1a48" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[THE NOPE POINT]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/the-nope-point-1dc32963c4af?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1dc32963c4af</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-commentary]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 16:52:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T16:52:13.573Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>An Epistemological Critique of U.S. President Donald J. Trump</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F2TxGK6askgY_9bJlGm7-A.png" /></figure><p>As the reader may by now be aware, I have extensively written about my disdain for ethics as a notion and as a phenomenon. The reason why I detest it so much is that it has a tendency to become the framework people grab onto in moments of emotional tension because it is the most directly accessible. Either it explains absolutely nothing about the physical world that cannot also be more substantially explained by accessing another framework, or it simply leads to factually wrong conclusions that may or may not feel right despite their inaccuracy.</p><p>The best examples of the latter movement are phenomena that are largely inaccessible to us common folk because they are relatively isolated in time and space. Like for example how the Allied victory over the Axis nations still has the effect of largely painting the Allies as moral victors despite Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and despite practically everyone’s knowledge of that. The fact that “the other guys were worse” doesn’t in any way offset this. Another example is Mother Teresa, whose formal title since 4 September 2016 is <em>Saint Teresa of Calcutta </em>through canonisation by then-Pope Francis. Critics including Christopher Hitchens alleged before her death in 1997 that her institutions privileged the religious value of suffering over adequate treatment. To the extent that withholding treatment kept otherwise treatable patients incapacitated, I regard these places as detention centres. She is still seen to this day by many as a humanitarian. She wasn’t.</p><p>The other phenomenon constitutes instances where “<em>moral wrongness</em>” may be entirely accurate — as far as morality can be in any way accurate — and still be the stupid pick for an explanatory framework because one or more better ones are readily available and accessible. An absolutely incessant generator of such instances is the current President of the United States of America Donald Trump. And then some.</p><p>While he is right in his claim that sometimes, or even fairly often, criticism of whatever he says or does amounts to <em>Trump Derangement Syndrome </em>— a phenomenon I deem to be a sort of overdriven version of immediately grabbing for one’s moral revolvers in their ethical, open holsters in a sudden and momentous surge of Important Emotions Inc. — that doesn’t mean making that claim every time makes it true every time. That is an argument for never fixing a broken clock because it happens to be accurate twice per day. That said, I have of late often found myself positively baffled by the cool, the professionalism and the sheer, undiluted <em>chutzpah</em> that especially women reporters keep throwing in his orange face without so much as moving a facial muscle in the process. That is exactly the type of forensic brutalism I for one greatly and intensely appreciate. Makes me feel protected and provided for as a member of an arguably weaker sex, y’know.</p><p>On 19 October 2026, an attack ad targeting Amy Acton, the Democratic candidate for governor of Ohio, began circulating online. Her Republican opponent, Vivek Ramaswamy, confirmed the following day that his campaign had produced it. The election was scheduled for 3 November. The ad featured Acton’s mother, Donna Arthur, accusing her daughter of lying about her childhood and questioning her fitness for office. According to Acton, they had not seen or spoken to each other since 1978. That year, when Acton was 12, her stepfather, Cledith Arthur, was charged with rape and subsequently indicted. He pleaded not guilty, then left the state with her mother and failed to appear in court. The case never went to trial. Her mother remained married to him until his death in 2004. On 20 October, Acton’s campaign released a response ad featuring her brother, Philip Stearns, corroborating her account of childhood abuse. He said that both siblings had suffered abuse and that Acton had endured the worst of it while protecting him.</p><p>I have written an essay on this episode that is very accurate and totally devoid of any spot of irony called “<em>A Support Letter to Vivek</em>”. I will add the link in the sources. Any reader who ignores this text is worse off for doing so, has proven themselves to be a moral failure, and is a disgrace to both themselves and to their families. The world will have gotten a bit dimmer because of it.</p><p>Anyway. On Friday 23 October 2026, United States President Donald Trump stepped out onto the White House South Lawn on his way to Florida and was met — as is tradition — by a flock of flamingos. I mean a gaggle of geese. Reporters! A school of reporters! One of the bigger fish, Monica Alba of NBC News, asked him a question concerning Ramaswamy’s ad that had by that time become a kind of calibration mark that indicates the bottom’s bottom of the political decency swamp: the so-called Nope Point, translated directly from the French <em>Point de Nôpe.</em></p><p>Alba referred to Acton’s estrangement from her mother and her stepfather’s rape indictment, then asked whether that information changed his support for the advertisement, which he had publicly defended the previous day. He said it did not. When the length of the estrangement was raised, he dismissed its relevance and argued that comparable criticism from his own mother would receive extensive news coverage. Later in the same exchange, a reporter raised Republican opposition to the advertisement, specifically mentioning Ashley Hinson, a Republican congresswoman running for the U.S. Senate in Iowa. Hinson had called for the advertisement to be withdrawn and had appeared alongside Trump at his Iowa rally the previous evening. Trump replied, “But they don’t know the facts.”</p><p>He again defended the use of the mother’s statements. Alba repeatedly asked whether the sexual-abuse allegations affected his assessment. Trump asked which network she represented. After she identified NBC, he criticised the network, instructed her to be quiet and called her a “horrible little reporter”, as per sacred tradition. He continued defending the advertisement.</p><p>Trump then asked Alba why she would not listen to Acton’s mother. Alba began explaining that the mother had remained with the stepfather. Trump interrupted: “<strong>I don’t know anything about a stepfather.</strong>” Alba continued, specifying that he had been charged with raping his stepdaughter in 1978. Trump <strong>complained that she</strong> kept talking; Alba replied that she was answering his question. Trump repeated that he knew nothing about the stepfather, returned to the mother’s statements about Acton and asserted that the stepfather was irrelevant to the advertisement. He maintained that the advertisement was legitimate campaign material.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BpsBaCu7xDr6EVcETD-Czw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photograph by Christopher Morris / VII / Redux</figcaption></figure><p>Do you hear them, in the distance? The Forensic Bells of Epistemics!</p><p>The sheer fun in interpreting this exchange on the White House South Lawn lies once again in the fact that, as stated before, one doesn’t need to appeal to any sense of morality. Additionally, this specific event also indicates that Donald Trump’s reasoning needn’t even be sinister, secretive, or nefarious to just be… let’s say “of an inadequate standard”. President Trump has explicitly professed ignorance about the stepfather while simultaneously asserting that “<strong>this has nothing to do with a stepfather or anything else</strong>”. He claims enough knowledge to rule something irrelevant while disclaiming knowledge of that very thing.</p><p>President Trump also has a sort of signature move in his adversarial communication with the press wherein he consistently seems to suggest that they haven’t taken all of the information into account while never really addressing what the missing information might be and at the same time suggesting that this additional information that he has access to may be absolutely crucial to one’s capacity to assess a situation properly, thereby discrediting the press’s professional capabilities. An example of this movement is his insistence that voter fraud occurs through allowing foreign nationals to vote illegally and through people voting several times by claiming to be deceased people who may or may not still be registered as voters. This can be true, and it can be true that this fraud may be so substantial that it thwarts elections in his opponents’ favour. It can also be true that I am a werewolf while also being completely unaware of this. The fact that something can be true doesn’t make it so. If this were the case, I could claim that Barack Obama won the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. No wait! Jimmy Carter. Yes, Jimmy Carter is the first Zombie President of the United States. The true winner was diversity, really. As long as the zombie isn’t also a woman.</p><p>But crucially, the epistemic failure in Donald Trump’s reasoning here also survives any appeal to unknown unknowns, regardless of whether they exist. If Amy Acton had made the whole sequence of events up, she wouldn’t have become estranged from her mother in the way that she has, which would give Ramaswamy’s attack ad no reason to exist. That makes the alternative exactly what’s available today. President Trump cannot simultaneously claim ignorance of the role of the stepfather and support an interpretation of events that is built on the foundation that Acton lied about the role of the stepfather while expecting to look “smort” in the process. That amounts to phantom accounting.</p><p>In conclusion, I have in writing this essay attempted to demonstrate two things. Firstly, that reflexive appeals to morality or decorum work against the argument of the claimant. I claim that the invariant here cannot and can never be an immediate response. If, while carrying bags of groceries, one is hit by a basketball one didn’t see coming, the best first option is always to re-collect the groceries. Chances are that despite how unfortunate this incident was, one gets to walk away with all the groceries AND a brand-new basketball. I do not understand where this notion that you owe any idiot uttering a non sequitur an immediate response comes from. You can take a couple of seconds to recover. What’s the risk? That someone will dismiss you for your rigour? Avoid the split-second reflex to reach for a notion of morality. Think first. Secondly, that the President of the United States Donald Trump has a clear and consistent tendency to discredit other people’s assessments by invoking their supposed lack of information, while his own admitted lack of information places no apparent constraint on his judgment. I claim that this reflex makes him a worse leader than he could be if he stopped to think instead, that this is indicative of how he thinks, and that this is detrimental to the United States and arguably the world relative to a counterfactual wherein he would not act on this impulse. I did not say that it is a bad thing that he acts on impulse. I claim that it is a bad thing that he acts on <strong>specifically this impulse</strong>.</p><p>Sources</p><p>Christopher Hitchens. <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Missionary_Position.html?id=h5MjrZ7JZOMC">The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice</a>. Verso, 1995, especially pp. 37–41. Allegations concerning treatment and the religious valuation of suffering.</p><p>Vatican. <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2016/documents/papa-francesco_20160904_omelia-canonizzazione-madre-teresa.html">Canonization of Mother Teresa of Calcutta</a>, 4 September 2016.</p><p>PolitiFact. <a href="https://politifact.com/article/2026/oct/21/amy-acton-ohio-mother-ramaswamy-campaign-ad/">Abuse and estrangement: What Ramaswamy’s Ohio governor’s race ad with Amy Acton’s mom didn’t mention</a>, 21 October 2026. Advertisement, family history, court records, and campaign response.</p><p>ABC News. <a href="https://abcnews.com/Politics/trump-doubles-amy-acton-criticism-ramaswamy-ad-controversy/story?id=137516959">Trump doubles down on Amy Acton criticism as Ramaswamy ad controversy swirls</a>, 23 October 2026. Trump’s defence of the advertisement and Republican objections.</p><p>Trump Archive. <a href="https://trump-archive.com/item/23340a38-013b-4b75-914a-433646d8f728">South Lawn press exchange, 23 October 2026</a>, particularly 07:29–13:12. Transcript and recording of the central exchange.</p><p>Robert Farley, FactCheck.org. <a href="https://www.factcheck.org/2016/10/trumps-bogus-voter-fraud-claims/">Trump’s Bogus Voter Fraud Claims</a>, 19 October 2016. Trump’s allegations concerning noncitizens, deceased voters, and multiple voting.</p><p>Philippe Everaert-De Block. <a href="https://pheverdotexe.substack.com/p/a-letter-of-support-to-vivek">A Support Letter to Vivek</a>. Substack, 2026.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1dc32963c4af" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Calibrating State-Sanctioned Deprivation of Liberty Against a Meaningful Counterfactual]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pheverdotexe/calibrating-state-sanctioned-deprivation-of-liberty-against-a-meaningful-counterfactual-512702b5b349?source=rss-d1eb53237cfa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/512702b5b349</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[criminal-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prison]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freedom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philippe Everaert-De Block]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:51:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T00:51:50.235Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I write this essay because I want to interrogate a phenomenon that has intrigued me since my early teens, maybe even earlier. I have a theory on why that has been the case since such an early age but I can’t prove it. Here it is anyway: On 13 August 1996 in Lobbes, Belgium, Marc Dutroux was arrested by the police. A career criminal, he had spent approximately six years and five months in custody between 1986 and 1996, prior to his August arrest. He confessed to the abduction and confinement of several girls — including children under the age of 16 — between 1983 and the date of his arrest. He was ultimately convicted of the abduction and unlawful imprisonment of all of those girls and of the murder of some of them, and was held criminally responsible for the deaths of two girls who died of starvation because he was being held on remand while he had them incarcerated in his basement. This directly led to a crisis in a slew of Belgian institutions, but it also took a heavy toll on the populace. It’s like any notion of innocent explanations got wiped from the books in one fell swoop. Absence could indicate abduction.</p><p>Nothing much changed for me, as I had a tendency to confine myself to my room even as a child. I grew up in an environment that was so acutely aware that things could go wrong at any moment and that life was a fragile thing to an extent that can be reasonably described as pathological. I have only fairly recently started wondering if my confinement really was as self-imposed as I had priorly assumed it to be. Some time after 1996, I think I recall asking myself if I was confining myself to my room — or did so as a proxy for my parents — to avoid being confined to a worse room by someone who was now famously confined to a room. That concludes what I believe to be the provenance of my fascination for the phenomenon “confinement”.</p><p>My sensitivity to the subject of (self-)confinement may also explain my strong sense of puzzlement when I am confronted with what I believe to be a fairly prevalent claim: that imprisonment in Western liberal democracies barely constitutes punishment, if it constitutes any at all. I have encountered this claim many, many times. The fact that it confuses me doesn’t imply that the claim is necessarily wrong. In my experience, the claim as uttered by people other than myself often captures a feeling, but I have also been presented with data to support the claim — data that I deem to be indeed meaningful and believable, yet that do nothing to offset my puzzlement. This bundle of claims is what I want to interrogate by writing this essay.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/716/1*rkUy110T6w_kfLpg1Ev0KQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Vincent van Gogh, <em>Prisoners’ Round (after Gustave Doré)</em>, 1890.</figcaption></figure><p>What I will write here are questions I have that concern this bundle, NOT moral judgements on what prompts people to make these claims or on the people who make these claims themselves. I realise that some of what will follow may read as a moral verdict or as contempt. I can assure the reader that any notion or degree of morality does not belong to the scope of this piece. But I cannot fully exclude the possibility that some morality may end up having clawed its way back into my reasoning, or that an impression thereof may arise.</p><p>Arguably popular renditions of the claim state that state-sanctioned deprivation of liberty through confinement in jail or in prison is “<em>like going on holiday</em>”, that it is “like summer camp”, or — most often — that “<em>it isn’t that bad</em>”. The claim also often points out that inmates are being provided for in a way that may not be the case outside of confinement.</p><p><strong>Calibrating deprivation of liberty exclusively from within liberty</strong></p><p>I have never been incarcerated. I have also never visited a detention facility. I have known people who have been in jail. All of those people prefer life outside of detention. That only means what it means: that those people prefer that. I consider myself incapable of properly judging what it is like to be incarcerated. Yet I am free to imagine it. And anyone who also doesn’t have any experience — direct or indirect — of what incarceration is like is entirely free to claim as loud as they want that they in fact CAN imagine what it is like. That’s where those similes come in handy, the statements that say detention is <em>like </em>another phenomenon that is more widely known, like a holiday, or summer camp with your buddies, or the life of a late-18th-century Bohemian princess my cat basically leads.</p><p>The people who know me well and a lot of the people that simply occasionally tolerate my presence are no doubt well aware of my love for metaphoric language. I have a tendency to speak in riddles or in puzzles and metaphors help with that. I like to think I also greatly appreciate the limits of metaphors. I am also aware of one specific danger of metaphors: if you don’t tread carefully they can suddenly latch onto a conversation in such a way that the subject is no longer the thing being discussed, but the dynamics from within the ontology of the metaphors. Sort of like parasites. An example of this that has occurred in my presence more than once is when a specific topic that includes the notion of conditioning suddenly becomes concerned with either the question of whether a dog really sees all in shades of grey or whether a frog shouldn’t have been alerted by the conspicuous and unanticipated presence of kitchen appliances. Is this bad? No, not necessarily. But it does demonstrate how I can reasonably start asking myself about what sort of holidays or summer camps one tends to go on and visit exactly that serve as one’s calibration mark.</p><p>I then ask myself two questions. Firstly, if someone who likens incarceration to holidays doesn’t also simultaneously sort of admit to living a life that is a special kind of devoid of oxygen and excitement. I personally do not see how being deprived of one’s liberty by the state can seem rosy, except in one bundle of exceptions that I will discuss later on. My second question concerns the possibility that the person making one of these claims may attribute semantic and moral value to what it means to live a life of liberty that is, shall we say, not commonly accepted. As an example of the latter phenomenon I want to present the notion that some may or may not experience a citizen’s life outside of confinement itself as a sort of confinement. In my own experience, this idea seems to have some traction among those who are bent on proving that freedom and liberty “under” capitalism in liberal democracies actually amount to being trapped in a prison that we cannot perceive. Yes. I get it. Which side of the glass are you really on? Fun idea to entertain on an evening out with friends who have the capacity to tolerate questions like these that are entirely unfalsifiable. The fact that I do not in any way feel confined in my choices “under capitalism” cannot reasonably count as proof of confinement. Otherwise, I can similarly claim that my interlocutors cannot actually really handle their freedom and their liberties so they resort to claiming these don’t really exist while being completely unaware of this dynamic. It scales into infinity, and it makes no sense. Additionally, the fact that going to work and coming back home takes time and that one might be tired during the weekend because their job was particularly demanding that week doesn’t count as proof of confinement either. If anything, those may count as evidence that the claimant doesn’t want to make an effort in order to achieve something.</p><p>Now, to inspect that exception of note. Some inmates may indeed experience their incarceration as a net positive relative to their lives outside confinement. There is in fact evidence of instances where people have deliberately committed crime with the purpose of being incarcerated. One caveat though: statements of intent tend to of course be entirely self-reported. That doesn’t make them not true, but some caution may be appropriate before recruiting any of these cases into an argument. I have been able to distinguish three groups here. The first group consists of people who are homeless and have self-reported committing crime with the goal of being incarcerated so they don’t have to sleep on the streets for at least one night. A Sheffield Hallam University study for Crisis, published in 2011, surveyed 437 homeless people in 11 English towns and cities. It reported that 28% had committed a crime in the hopes of being taken into custody and that 20% had avoided bail or committed an imprisonable offence specifically to obtain a custodial sentence as a “solution” to their housing problems. The second group consists of people with housing and family connections who are nevertheless facing a serious personal crisis. Lawrence Ripple of Kansas was married, housed and with four stepchildren. He robbed a bank in 2016 and waited for police, saying he preferred prison to returning home after an argument with his wife. At sentencing he described depression following heart surgery; his lawyer characterised the offence as a cry for help. Similarly, James Verone of North Carolina had an apartment, family connections and plans for retirement. In 2011, he also robbed a bank specifically to obtain incarceration and medical treatment he couldn’t afford. His savings were exhausted and physical illness prevented him from working. The third group consists of criminals who have committed murder with the goal of becoming incarcerated, according to their own statements or the court’s findings. In 2024, a man from Nastätten facing homelessness murdered a homeless wheelchair user in Frankfurt. In April 2025, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment and found that he had killed to secure accommodation, food, social contact and a structured routine in prison. On board a busy Japanese bullet train going between Tokyo and Osaka in 2018, Ichiro Kojima killed one passenger and injured two others. Prosecutors identified his desire to spend the rest of his life in prison as the motive. He had been sleeping outdoors and reportedly found independent life too difficult. He admitted murder and attempted murder and received life imprisonment in December 2019. An attentive reader will have made a connection here quite some sentences ago. Homelessness and psychiatric conditions significantly correlate and any impending existential crisis doesn’t exactly do wonders for one’s mental health either.</p><p>All of this is to say: the decision that the commission of a criminal act constitutes a worthwhile trade-off is dependent on many factors, none of which sound — to me — like particularly appealing predicaments. Calibration matters. And so does the condition the person making the calibration finds themselves in. The arguably delusional notion that jail or prison are places where one is being served free cocktails by tiny pink elephants in cute little dresses who are doing a funny dance may provide a reason to want to become incarcerated as well. Just not a very good one.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GQH_vMI1djM0aRrDlbgD9w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Still from the “Pink Elephants on Parade” sequence in Disney’s <em>Dumbo</em>.</figcaption></figure><p>This also compounds with my first question from before: if one argues that incarceration is “<em>not actually that bad</em>”, I believe that I am allowed to reasonably doubt a claimant’s notion of what good and bad mean to them precisely, if there is any clear notion of these to begin with. As I have mentioned, the only other reason I can think of that would allow one to meaningfully make this claim is as an admission of existential and experiential anaemia. But unless one is willing enough to make their desperation concrete by committing a crime in order to become incarcerated oneself, one has the distinct liberty to change the course of one’s life in a way that DOES allow for existential and experiential fulfilment. Unless of course the act of complaining qualifies as fulfilment in one’s personal calibration. In that case, carry on; you’re doing fantastic.</p><p><strong>Calibrating deprivation of liberty against relevant knowledge</strong></p><p>That leaves us with instances where the claim that deprivation of liberty by the state isn’t actually that bad is backed by real, relevant experience that confirms that incarceration can be a positive experience. I will try to tread carefully here to avoid expressing assumptions that I can’t arguably back up by any warrant myself. So I will remain on the surface of the matter at hand. I want to separate two types of instances of positive experience while being incarcerated. The first one is one that I also often encounter as a sort of subclass of our main claim under scrutiny that posits that deprivation of liberty isn’t actually that bad: references to locally pleasant experiences. This often seems to converge on the availability of entertainment in cells, such as a TV or a gaming console. Let’s for the sake of argument assume that inmates have access to Xboxes. What does this mean exactly as part of an argument? That you deem an afternoon of playing video games to be a pleasant way to pass the time? That may very well be true. Does this also immediately imply anything beyond the pleasantness of that afternoon? Or does it mean that you assume that said Xbox is always available for every individual whenever it pleases them? I accept that playing video games several hours per day every day may seem attractive to some without finding it a good use of my own time. There is also an opportunity cost here that cuts both ways: playing Xbox can be enjoyable against the knowledge that you have the liberty to do almost anything you want when you put down the controller. To me personally, the idea that a video game may serve as a tiny oasis of escapism in a barren land of limitations sounds excruciatingly dreadful. I’m certain some of us will recall the distinct pain that befell us as children when taking away the option of playing video games for a stretch of time was a punishment for performing a deed that was frowned upon by our parents. Well, one of the important advantages of granting someone a luxury is twofold in situations where power is inherently out of balance: the agent granting the luxury will be seen as benevolent by granting it but that also intrinsically means that that same agent has the weapon of being able to also take the luxury away.</p><p>Again calibration matters here. The observation that a fisherman catches two fish within a timespan of two minutes doesn’t by itself mean that the boat isn’t sinking.</p><p>Similarly, an observation that an inmate had a positive experience while being incarcerated that directly resulted in them turning their life around, devoting it to something positively constructive, and no longer committing crime doesn’t count as evidence that incarceration failed as punishment, but does count as evidence that it succeeded at rehabilitation. There is a way to test this: ask the former inmate if they want to do the stint in prison all over again despite not having committed any crime and with no prospect of any reward outside of the knowledge that they will be released after the identical amount of time served. I doubt many will answer in the positive. But I do not know this for certain.</p><p><strong>Punishment, rehabilitation, and perspective</strong></p><p>So far, I have considered how people assess confinement against life outside it. But calibration also matters within confinement: how does an inmate understand the relationship between what they did, the sentence they received, and the future available to them? This brings me to the purpose of state-sanctioned deprivation of liberty. Another confusing phenomenon concerning incarceration that seems to me to be at least somewhat prevalent is the idea that punishment and rehabilitation exist in a framework of competition, as if a successful sentence needs one to prevail over the other like they are two substances fighting for the same amount of space to exist in. I do not see how these are mutually exclusive. In fact, I believe that the insistence that they are may be more harmful than the insistence that the sole purpose of incarceration should solely be punishment. Artificially worsening the conditions in which someone lives their life for a finite amount of time that they themselves know is finite in order to make them see the errors of their ways has the distinct advantage of clarity. Do this, expect that. Seems like a good deal. And it can be a good deal, if everyone agrees that 1+1=2. If you’re driving two friends of yours to the grocery store, they ask you to wait around the corner, and they rob that store at gunpoint, fatally shooting the store owner in the process, you may end up as an accomplice to a crime you may not have known was happening while it was happening. If you confront your partner’s rapist and things get a little out of hand, causing them to trip over a loose stone after you shoved them with a death by way of a broken neck as a result, you may agree to the causality of the events while being less happy with the fact that you’re now spending years behind bars because of it. Perspective also matters. I think it is reasonable to assume that when you’re being confronted by an imbalance of power that favours an institution that claims that 1+1=5 over the course of several years of having no other option than to be confronted by the Newspeak that 1+1=5 all the motherflippin’ time, a sense of cynicism might start to settle in. Now imagine that you agree that 1+1=5 because you synced your watch with the institution that holds the advantage in this local power imbalance. You robbed a little old lady, you confessed, you see your error and you accept your punishment as fair. That means you have perspective that you have accepted and have internalised. There is a substantial chance that the sheer exposure to inmates who lack this internalised perspective because they don’t accept that 1+1=5 may result in you becoming the victim of the actions of someone who decided that today is a day for violence because the powers that be keep confronting them with untruths. Without perspective and the synced calibration that provides the ability to internalise said perspective, more incarceration loses its meaning. That means that you, the inmate with internalised perspective, now have to live out both your deprivation of liberty and the remainder of your natural life dealing with the fallout of an accidental encounter with someone who bashed your head in. This is what I call the “Nihilism carrousel”: exposure to lack of perspective may cause you to lose your personal perspective. This I claim to demonstrate that detention facilities do not even have to be what is colloquially called “crime schools” to be an engine for the nihilism that serves as the perfectly fertile soil for it. Crime is just one of the shitty crops this soil provides apt nourishment for.</p><p><strong>Life and liberty at a dead end</strong></p><p>I accept the notion that there exist some people for whom any attempt at rehabilitation is futile. I do not see any problem in this acceptance. Either they are beyond rehabilitation and it would be unwise to release them into society or they are not beyond rehabilitation.</p><p>That leaves us with death row inmates. Let me state my priors first and foremost. I am not opposed to the death penalty in practice. I also see a lot of reasons to not support it in practice either, and in principle. Those views are not contradictory. A properly performed execution of a hypothetical death sentence is entirely imaginable and feasible. I know this because euthanasia is practised in Europe and can be carried out successfully. “That which we call a rose / By any other word would smell as sweet.”<em> </em>(from Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2, by William Shakespeare and spoken in the play by the character Juliet Capulet). The fact that an execution serves as punishment does not itself explain why the procedure should entail any more suffering than euthanasia. Consent may distinguish the two, but even that distinction is not absolute. There have been reported cases of convicts consenting to and even preferring their own death penalty relative to other options, regardless of how realistically available those were in their specific cases. Two examples are Steven Hayes of Connecticut, sentenced to death in 2010, and Robert Gleason Jr. of Virginia, sentenced to death in 2011.</p><p>There is however no clear reason whatsoever why death sentences in the United States of America should be so prone to being incompetently carried out while the technology and the know-how to do it properly are readily available. Lowering the chances of a successful execution of a death penalty through professional ethical rules that prohibit doctors from participating in executions or making reliable supplies of execution drugs harder to obtain through manufacturers’ distribution restrictions and export controls helps no one. Not the convict, not the families of the victims, not the state, not the prison. No one.</p><p>But there is one thing that distinguishes death sentences from incarceration: a death sentence’s result, if executed properly, is irreversible. And this is the core of my objection to the death sentence in principle. History has demonstrated that innocent people have been sentenced to death by states or by the federal government of the United States of America. For the sake of argument here I will assume that the investigations that helped a jury reach this verdict were carried out to the best of the investigators’ abilities and that they tried their darndest to make sure the right person was convicted and not, I don’t know, someone whose skin colour sorta made them “look the part” while the real perpetrator was in fact still enjoying their freedom and liberties regardless of the colour of their own skin. The mere notion that fallibility here can exist and does also implies that there is a non-zero chance that death row inmates may one day walk free. That means death row inmates also need to be able to become recipients of perspective.</p><p>So even in the case of the people often deemed “the worst of the worst”, there is no reason nor justification for making their lives resemble some kind of living hell in a way that could arguably be satisfactory to a person who makes the claim that life behind bars “doesn’t seem all that bad”. Even death behind bars has no use being more unpleasant than it already is.</p><p>In conclusion, I want to point out that in writing this essay, I have in no way ever felt any need, urge, or obligation to be, let alone to appear altruistic, humane, humanitarian, empathic, or benevolent. I have no real reason to care about individual people that I do not personally know and appreciate. That does not mean that I am incapable of kindness. Just that I don’t feel obligated to grant it by default. I have attempted to not let any notion of morality or ethics enter into this essay. I don’t much care for it. I find morality constitutes a distraction, a spook. But I posit that it is exactly this exclusion of morality of mine that provides a real and meaningful basis to not see people as wasted space, but as beacons of potential future opportunity for existential and experiential enrichment of oneself in the first place, and of others and the world as a byproduct.</p><p>Sources</p><p><strong>Factual and textual sources</strong></p><p>1. Benjamin Biard and Vincent Lefebve. “La libération conditionnelle : de la « loi Le Jeune » à l’instauration de la période de sûreté.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, nos. 2480–2481, 2020.<br> Background on Dutroux’s imprisonment, conditional release, subsequent detention, and the case’s impact on Belgian institutions. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.2480.0005">Read source</a></p><p>2. Le Monde. “Marc Dutroux reconnu coupable de meurtres, confusion autour de la thèse du réseau.” 17 June 2004.<br> Contemporary reporting on the verdicts for abduction, confinement, rape, and murder. <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/2004/06/17/marc-dutroux-reconnu-coupable-de-meurtres-confusion-autour-de-la-these-du-reseau_369431_1819218.html">Read source</a></p><p>3. Kesia Reeve. The Hidden Truth about Homelessness: Experiences of Single Homelessness in England. Report summary. Crisis, May 2011; research by Sheffield Hallam University.<br> Source for the survey of 437 people in 11 English towns and cities and the figures of 28% seeking overnight custody and 20% seeking a custodial sentence to address housing problems. <a href="https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/236816/the_hidden_truth_about_homelessness_es.pdf">Read source</a></p><p>4. Katy Bergen. “Man who robbed bank to avoid wife sentenced to home confinement.” The Kansas City Star, reproduced by Police1, 15 June 2017.<br> Reports Lawrence Ripple’s stated preference for prison, family circumstances, depression after heart surgery, and his lawyer’s account of the robbery as a cry for help. <a href="https://www.police1.com/arrests-sentencing/articles/man-who-robbed-bank-to-avoid-wife-sentenced-to-home-confinement-BP33xV4t8ni5XmFK/">Read source</a></p><p>5. Katie Moisse. “James Verone: The Medical Motive for his $1 Bank Robbery.” ABC News, June 2011.<br> Reports Verone’s health problems, loss of employment, exhausted resources, housing arrangements, and plan to obtain treatment in prison before retirement. <a href="https://abcnews.com/Health/Wellness/james-verone-medical-motive-bank-robbery/story?id=13895584">Read source</a></p><p>6. SWR Aktuell. “Rollstuhlfahrer ermordet: Lebenslang für Mann, der ins Gefängnis wollte.” 25 April 2025.<br> Identifies the offender as a man from Nastätten and reports the Frankfurt court’s finding that he killed to obtain imprisonment. <a href="https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/rheinland-pfalz/koblenz/mordfall-prozess-obdachloser-frankfurt-taeter-nastaetten-100.html">Read source</a></p><p>7. Hessenschau. “Getötet, um ins Gefängnis zu kommen: Lebenslang für Mord an Rollstuhlfahrer.” 25 April 2025.<br> Reports the court’s findings concerning accommodation, food, social contact, and a structured routine as motives. <a href="https://www.hessenschau.de/panorama/lebenslang-fuer-mord-an-rollstuhlfahrer-im-frankfurter-bahnhofsviertel-v2,mordprozess-frankfurt-obdachloser-100.html">Read source</a></p><p>8. “Japanese man pleads guilty to deadly knife rampage on shinkansen.” News On Japan, 29 November 2019, reproducing reporting attributed to The Japan Times.<br> Reports Kojima’s guilty plea and prosecutors’ account of his difficulty living independently, sleeping outdoors, and desire to enter prison. <a href="https://newsonjapan.com/article/125933.php">Read source</a></p><p>9. Reuters. “Japanese man sentenced to life in prison for fatal stabbing on bullet train.” 18 December 2019.<br> Confirms the December 2019 life sentence and reports Kojima’s expressed preference for lifelong imprisonment. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/world/japanese-man-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-fatal-stabbing-on-bullet-train-idUSKBN1YM0LG/">Read source</a></p><p>10. Rebecca Barry et al. “Prevalence of Mental Health Disorders Among Individuals Experiencing Homelessness: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” JAMA Psychiatry 81, no. 7 (2024): 691–699.<br> Evidence of the high prevalence of mental health disorders among people experiencing homelessness. It does not establish a diagnosis for any individual discussed in this essay. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2024.0426">Read source</a></p><p>11. J. H. Groenewoud et al. “Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands.” New England Journal of Medicine 342, no. 8 (2000): 551–556.<br> Empirical evidence concerning completed procedures and clinical complications. Supports the qualified claim that euthanasia can be carried out successfully, without implying that it is invariably complication-free. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM200002243420805">Read source</a></p><p>12. William Shakespeare. Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2. Folger Shakespeare Library edition.<br> Source for Juliet’s “That which we call a rose” quotation and the wording “By any other word.” <a href="https://www.folger.edu/explore/shakespeares-works/romeo-and-juliet/read/2-2/">Read source</a></p><p>13. Emily Friedman and Anne-Marie Dorning. “Steven Hayes Smiles When Sentenced to Death for the Deadly Home Invasion.” ABC News, 8 November 2010.<br> Reports the death verdict and his lawyers’ statements that Hayes welcomed it. <a href="https://abcnews.com/US/steven-hayes-sentenced-death-role-connecticut-home-invasion/story?id=12087221&amp;page=2">Read source</a></p><p>14. Supreme Court of Virginia. Gleason v. Commonwealth, Record Nos. 111956 and 111957. Opinion of 7 June 2012.<br> Primary judicial record of Gleason’s requests for death sentences and waiver of his appeals. <a href="https://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1111956.pdf">Read source</a></p><p>15. Death Penalty Information Center. “Botched Executions.” Includes Michael L. Radelet’s catalogue of examples and a summary of Austin Sarat’s historical research.<br> Documents problems in US executions. The historical estimates concern 1890–2010 and should not be read as a current annual failure rate. <a href="https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/botched-executions/">Read source</a></p><p>16. American Medical Association. “Capital Punishment.” Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 9.7.3.<br> Primary source for the professional ethical prohibition on physician participation in executions and its stated scope. <a href="https://code-medical-ethics.ama-assn.org/ethics-opinions/capital-punishment">Read source</a></p><p>17. Pfizer. “Pfizer’s Position on Use of Our Products in Lethal Injections for Capital Punishment.” Global Policy &amp; Public Affairs, June 2021.<br> Primary manufacturer statement explaining distribution restrictions intended to prevent use of its products in executions. <a href="https://cdn.pfizer.com/pfizercom/2021-06/21-lethal-injection-policy-paper-final.pdf">Read source</a></p><p>18. European Parliament and Council. Regulation (EU) 2019/125 of 16 January 2019, particularly Chapter IV and Annex IV.<br> Primary legal source for EU export controls on goods that could be used for capital punishment, including certain pharmaceutical products. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0125">Read source</a></p><p>19. Center on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. “First DNA Death Row Exoneration.”<br> Documents Kirk Bloodsworth’s wrongful death sentence and subsequent DNA exoneration, supporting the argument about fallibility and possible release. <a href="https://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/md/kirk-bloodsworth.html">Read source</a></p><p><strong>Related earlier work</strong></p><p>Philippe Everaert-De Block. <em>An Epistemic Argument for Liberty, Divergence, and Contingency.</em> Develops the argument that divergence can reveal value unavailable in advance, and that restrictions must account for the possibilities they foreclose. This informs the conclusion’s attention to people as sources of potential future enrichment.</p><p>Philippe Everaert-De Block. <em>Why I Exclude Morality.</em> Sets out the grounds for excluding morality from political justification while retaining scrutiny of consequences and requiring restrictions of liberty to justify themselves. This provides the background to the conclusion’s explicitly nonmoral approach.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=512702b5b349" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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