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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Phoebe on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Phoebe on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@phoeberosecotter?source=rss-7ce98f9c0ffa------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Phoebe on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@phoeberosecotter?source=rss-7ce98f9c0ffa------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Girl Power: a female-led convoy to Ukraine]]></title>
            <link>https://phoeberosecotter.medium.com/girl-power-a-female-led-convoy-to-ukraine-08631c0b19fc?source=rss-7ce98f9c0ffa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humanitarian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[women]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Phoebe]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Feb 2025 22:18:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-17T22:18:39.432Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This past weekend, I travelled across Europe as part of a convoy delivering humanitarian and medical aid to those on the frontlines of, and most heavily impacted by, the Ukraine Russia war. I volunteered, along with 11 of my Workday colleagues, to partner with Ukrainian Action and form their first all-female team; the work that Ukrainian Action does is so vital, not only because of the need for much-needed supplies, but also because of the way in which the organisation spreads awareness and hope.</p><p>The supplies that the Workday team delivered will support veterans and medical professionals, with some of the vehicles we used being converted into ambulances and medical evacuation transport. When we met with our Ukrainian counterparts to make the vehicle swap over, they greeted us with Ukrainian flags, lollipops and hugs. As they brought us for a celebratory lunch — borscht and chicken Kyiv, obviously — we spoke about our backgrounds and our families, the places we had in common, and the languages we spoke (however poorly, on the Workday side!)</p><p>The biggest lesson and reminder has been, for me, that war can feel so far removed from the nuance of our day-to-day life. You may feel that you have an awareness — or, at the very least, a rudimentary knowledge — of what is happening elsewhere in the world, be it in Ukraine, Palestine, or Sudan, but it doesn’t feel real to you because you’re also trying to navigate a break-up, or fertility treatment, or a sick family member, while all the time thinking about work, and a food shop, and booking a holiday. No subject was left untouched this weekend, as we looked to fill the long hours of driving: deaths, divorces, children, break-ups, therapy, estrangement — to be thrown into such an intense experience, as we drove through cities which had been razed to the ground in previous wars was an irony lost on none of us.</p><p>The kindness and empathy of the women I completed this trip with is unparalleled. They are funny, and clever, and kind, and thoughtful — and I feel privileged to know them as colleagues, but even more so to call them friends. As we arrived at our final destination to meet the Ukrainian Action team, to whom we would hand over control of our vehicles and delivery of the aid we’d transported from London, I was struck with the realization that they, of course, felt the same way about their team. It is nothing but sheer luck and circumstance that dictates that I am not the person in a war zone, or fearing for the life of my loved ones. Sometimes that’s too easy to forget.</p><p>You can support Ukrainian Action in their work by clicking on my JustGiving link below, or directly at ukrainianaction.com. Similarly, if you are interested in volunteering, more information can be found on their website.</p><p>https://www.justgiving.com/page/phoebe-cotter-1736957168811?utm_medium=FR&amp;utm_source=CL</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=08631c0b19fc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[I sit in silence, and I think of Gaza]]></title>
            <link>https://phoeberosecotter.medium.com/i-sit-in-silence-and-i-think-of-gaza-4c4636434648?source=rss-7ce98f9c0ffa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gaza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[genocide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zionism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Phoebe]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2024 11:04:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-10T11:04:29.982Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Back in October, I saw an image on social media which has haunted me ever since. It was in the immediate aftermath of October 7th and I, like many others, had no concept of the degree of violence and pain and horror that I would go on to witness over the coming seven months.</p><p>The image was of a group of men trying to rescue a little girl from the rubble of a collapsed building in Gaza. Her home had been bombed by the Israeli-Zionist army while she was still inside. I use the word ‘rescue’ but she was clearly dead. Her body was swaying in the air, with just her head trapped by the floor above having collapsed on her. Her little trainers, with her frilly socks and her skinny jeans.</p><p>And she had wet herself. In fear. In absolute fucking terror.</p><p>I think about her all the time. And every time I think about her, I feel like I’m about to cry. I’m crying right now.</p><p>I don’t know her name, I don’t know how old she was — surely no more than 6 or 7 — but I know that she is one of more than 13,000 children who have been murdered by the Israeli-Zionist army in their relentless, rabid, unconscionable eradication of the Palestinian people.</p><p>We’ve seen videos of young brothers dying with their arms wrapped around one another; men dragging the bodies of their wives out of range of gunfire, great rivers of blood running behind them; fathers holding their child’s remains in fucking shopping bags; audio clips of children screaming for help, trapped in a car with their massacred family members.</p><p>And then we’ve seen images of the Israeli army rifling through the underwear drawers of Palestinian women. Smashing their kitchen herbs. Stealing their perfume. Does it make you feel sick? Does it make your stomach turn to know that the degradation of Palestinians in the eyes of Zionists has been so effective that they’re perceived as less than human? I literally cannot conceive of it. I feel like I’m going insane. I want to talk about it all the time: ‘Have you seen what’s happening in Gaza?’ ‘What can we do?’ ‘Do you think there’ll ever be an end to this?’</p><p>This is supposed to be a contentious topic. We’re supposed to be afraid to talk about it because we aren’t educated enough, or because there are complexities that we couldn’t possibly fathom. Don’t forget, if you don’t conflate Judaism with Zionism, that means you’re anti-semitic. And yet, I have Jewish friends who are appalled and distraught by what is happening. ‘Not in our name’, they say, only to be told by virulent Zionists that they are ‘self-hating Jews’.</p><p>They poured white phosphorus down on children. Jesus Christ, they mutilated them, and life went on as normal for us. I went to the supermarket to pick up Greek yogurt. I got my nails done. There were 48 attacks on healthcare facilities in Palestine. I thought about buying a new dress for a wedding in the summer. They destroyed every hospital in northern Gaza. They raised Israeli flags in Jerusalem to celebrate the Nakba. I complained about train strikes.</p><p>There’s no solution at the end of this piece except to say that if there were a ceasefire yesterday, every child murdered in Palestine today would be alive. I hope we keep fighting, and I hope the tide turns — the protestors, the students, the influencers who have begun sponsoring Palestinian families to get them to safety, all of it incremental progress in the right direction. But the horrors and atrocities that the Palestinian people have witnessed, the blood and the suffering and the terror, combined with the knowledge that so many of us turned away for as long as we did… even if they survive, how will they ever be ok?</p><p>We have to keep speaking about this. We have to continue to be horrified. We have to revolt against what we are being asked to accept as normal. Our humanity depends upon it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c4636434648" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Gordian Knot of Working Motherhood]]></title>
            <link>https://phoeberosecotter.medium.com/the-gordian-knot-of-working-motherhood-abe3608a827c?source=rss-7ce98f9c0ffa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[wage-gap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[motherhood]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[working-moms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[women]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Phoebe]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Sep 2023 12:43:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-25T12:43:16.669Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Life satisfaction can be understood to refer to the degree to which an individual evaluates and reports the overall quality of their life. Terms such as ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘wellbeing’ have become ubiquitous and tend to cover a multitude of sins; in employing them, businesses tend to aim to hide a multitude of sins as these terms are often considered unquantifiable. In this paper, I intend to explore the tangible determinants of wellbeing and life satisfaction, and how they relate to mothers in the United Kingdom and, further, how the life satisfaction of mothers in the U.K. is supported by governmental policy. While there has been extensive research on the relationship and intersection between unemployment and happiness, there has been significantly less exploration of the consequences of labour market non-participation — this categorisation differs from unemployment, as it indicates a tertiary reason for an individual to be unable to participate in the labour market despite their desire to — and part-time labour participation on happiness. However, for the purposes of this paper, I will refer frequently to Eva Berger (2013), whose paper ‘Happy Working Mothers? Investigating the Effect of Maternal Employment on Life Satisfaction’ served as inspiration for this dissertation. Berger, using a sample of approximately 32,000 German mothers, looked to better understand the varying levels of life satisfaction for mothers in full-time employment, part-time employment, and those considered to be economically inactive. Berger further segmented economically inactive mothers into those who had opted out of the labour force for family reasons, those who had opted out of the labour force for work-related reasons, and those who were out of the labour force and had no intention to work. In using a host of other variables, including number of children, presence of parental partner, and education levels, and fixed effects such as living location, Berger builds a full picture of her paper’s participants. In conclusion of her paper, Berger notes that parenthood — and motherhood in particular — acts as a huge catalyst for both part-time participation in the labour market, and economic inactivity. I believe it is important to understand the ramifications of this study in the U.K. so that we can look to measure the life satisfaction ratings of mothers in and out of the workplace; this becomes particularly relevant when considering the combination impact of higher cost of living in the U.K., and the fact that childcare costs are among the most expensive in the world, second only to New Zealand, according to a 2019 report by the OECD.Further, in a longer-term capacity, I believe it will be relevant to replicate this study following the COVID-19 global pandemic, where women and mothers were disproportionately impacted by both furlough and redundancies. As we know that income affects happiness (Easterlin, 1974), I am interested in trying to better understand the indirect effect of economic inactivity and part-time employment on life satisfaction through its impact on household income; as will be noted in more detail later in this paper, mothers in part-time employment or categorised as economically inactive typically present with lower levels of life satisfaction than mothers in full-time employment.</p><p>This paper will endeavour to build upon Berger’s analysis of life satisfaction of mothers in Germany and look to gaps in the U. K’s governmental policies to understand the link between social infrastructure and wellbeing. While U.K. governmental institutions have been gathering data pertaining to wellbeing and life satisfaction since 2011, the data available lacks the granularity that Berger has relied upon, giving a preliminary indication that the U.K. government is not yet prepared to implement meaningful policy change based on the data that they are gathering. Berger’s study identified that in Germany, the percentage of mothers either opting out of the paid labour market or employed part-time is relatively high, because of institutional conditions — particularly ‘the insufficient availability of appropriate childcare and the traditional half-day school system.’ Interestingly, these are aspects that also impact mothers in the U.K., where the cost of childcare is second globally only to that in New Zealand (OECD, 2019). Globally, there are only four countries where more than 30% of a couple’s average salaries are required to pay for childcare: New Zealand (37.3%), the U.K. (35.7%), the U.S. (33.2%), and Australia (31.1%). Berger’s study finds that mothers falling into the camps of economic inactivity and part-time employment typically experienced institutional constraints which inhibited them from being able to engage in full-time employment despite their wish to do so. Extrapolating on this, Berger hypothesised that it would be entirely plausible that some mothers would prefer the option of engaging in additional hours of work provided they could reconcile it with any familial obligations — and, specifically, that these women experience decreased happiness as a result.</p><p>The study of economics of wellbeing is steadily growing, and the subject matter’s traction has vital application in many different public spheres, with governments internationally decreeing that they intend to prioritise wellbeing and life satisfaction. In the U.K, the government has set up the Cross Government Wellbeing Policy Steering Group and the ONS Measuring National Wellbeing (MNW) programme, among others. On an international scale, the OECD’s ‘Your Better Life’ index, and the WHO’s ‘Health 2020’ monitoring framework, which consists of an expert group on wellbeing give an indication of the emphasis being placed upon this metric. Within the universe of happiness and life satisfaction, several studies and economists have determined the strong relationship between unemployment and self-reported wellbeing, with individuals invariably reporting negative effects. (Clark 2003; Clark and Oswald 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). Interestingly, studies suggest that it is not only the financial impact of unemployment that has a negative impact on an individual’s life satisfaction; even in cases where an unemployed individual’s income has been compensated, lower rates of life satisfaction are reported. This underlines not only the influence of employment on wellbeing, but also the need for continued research and prioritization in this area.</p><p>Further to this, research also indicates that the impact unemployment has on an individual’s life satisfaction or happiness lasts for far longer than other life events. Acknowledging this is important, as studies on the economics of wellbeing have universally noted that there are varying factors that have both short-term and long-term impacts on an individual’s happiness. For example, while many people consider ‘money’ and ‘happiness’ to be irrevocably linked, the Easterlin Paradox demonstrates that an increase in money does not serve to make society any happier (1974). There is a robustness to human beings, meaning that we are able to adjust to many of the changes an individual encounters over the course of a lifetime: while life events such as divorce (Gardner and Oswald, 2006) and bereavement (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008) (Clark 2006) are undoubtedly traumatic, studies have still shown that an individual’s happiness and life satisfaction will return to pre-traumatic event levels within a number of years. In fact, this is not simply restricted to traumatic events, as the initial spike in happiness that many feel post-marriage last for no more than two years (Easterlin and Zimmerman, 2006). That said, studies also suggest that people invariably seek to rationalise the ‘cost’ of their decisions; if these costs are irreversible, e.g., parenthood, individuals conclude that the high price they have paid on this decision must also mean that they are happy with said choices (Powdthavee, 2010). The interesting outlier here is that, according to studies conducted, unemployment appears to be one of the sole life events that an individual may never acclimatise or adjust to (Frijters, Johnston, Shields, 2011) (Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009) These findings suggest that employment plays a greater role in an individual’s wellbeing than financial security alone and, in fact, may play a significant part in our subjective wellbeing.</p><p>Berger (2013), whose study has acted as the basis for my own, has examined the relationship between part-time employment and non-participation in the labour market specifically as it pertains to the self-reported life satisfaction of mothers in Germany. This is of note as parenthood is often perceived as the ‘two roads diverged’ moment in the lives of many women, as they experience a significant decrease in career progression opportunities once they become parents. As noted later in this paper, the gender pay gap in the U.K. is but the beginning; on closer examination of governmental reports, the pay gap between mothers and individuals without children is even more significant than that between men and women. In using Berger’s contributions as a foundation-level indication, I would like to understand the differences between family-related non-participation and non-participation for other reasons, like labour market reasons. I think this is important because there is little indication that the U.K. Government are taking steps to prioritize life satisfaction and wellbeing of its inhabitants, much less that of mothers.</p><p>Berger notes that mothers in full-time employment are happier than those in either part-time employment, or those who are economically inactive for family reasons. These findings have been echoed by Booth and van Ours (2008) in the U.K. This is important, because findings suggest that mothers invariably move into part-time employment for reasons relating to childcare and domestic responsibilities; in geographies where appropriate infrastructure has been put into place by government, mothers — and parents in general — have the freedom to make choices relating to employment and childcare independent of financial constraints and obligations. In contrasting the U.K.’s policies — or lack thereof — around parental wellbeing with other, more egalitarian countries, such as Denmark or Sweden, I would like to address the ways in which the U.K. might look to improve their prioritisation of parental wellbeing. Throughout this paper, I will refer repeatedly to the categorisations of employment set out by Berger in her paper: full-time employment, part-time employment, and out of labour force for family reasons (OLFF).</p><p>While numerous studies have sought to examine the direct impact of employment status on life satisfaction, this also entails keeping household income at a constant. As Berger notes, any financial earnings of mothers are considered part of the cumulative household income, meaning that this contribution is reflected in employment status. This study is important because it demonstrates that mothers who are unable to accept full-time employment as a result of their responsibilities within the home will likely be forced to navigate both the psychological impact of giving up work, as well as the more tangible impact of absence of earnings. Data from the ONS demonstrates that approximately 25% of women with dependent children — aged 15 and younger — are likely to be unemployed but this figure does not specify whether these women have previously been in full-time or part-time employment. As will be noted later in this paper, many women move from full-time employment to part-time positions once they have had children, as part-time employment will typically offer more flexibility and ability for women to balance their paid workload with the caregiving expectations placed on them. Indeed, when focusing specifically on the comparison between working rates of fathers and mothers over the course of the past 3 years (2019–2021), women are approximately 8 times more likely to classify as economically inactive — specifically focused on taking care of the home and family — than men, with an average of 15% of women and 1.9% of men, according to statistics for the first quarter of this year, 2022. In addition to this, only 38.2% of working mothers are in full-time employment, in contrast to 82.8% of working fathers. The concept of ‘identity outside the home’ may seem relatively intangible but, considering the blurring of the lines between external and internal labour (or domestic and paid labour) which took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is still relevant to note. The ONS notes that women in the U.K. perform, on average, 60% more domestic and unpaid labour than men — approximately 26 hours per week. This is in addition to any work taking place outside of the home and is a figure that leapt considerably (Sevilla and Smith, 2020) during the COVID-19 lockdown period.</p><p>Considering the points listed above, this paper will endeavour to explore in more detail the factors impacting on the life satisfaction and wellbeing of mothers. In the Literature Review section of this paper, I aim to draw upon and synthesize research relating to COVID-19, the role of gender norms, and additional factors, as well as the contrast between the U.K. and other countries, with the aim of better understanding the current landscape of existing study. The following sections will discuss frameworks relating to life satisfaction and financial security, as well as looking to examine the U.K.’s current policies relating to parenthood, with specific comparison to recommendations from UNICEF’s Early Childhood Development programme. In addition, this section will employ data pertaining to employment and life satisfaction for parents and non-parents from the U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS) to replicate Berger’s datapoints. These will be discussed in relation to the literature review and, finally, the implications for these findings will be set, including recommendations for the future on which this research can be built upon.</p><h3>1. Literature Review</h3><p>Life satisfaction and employment are inextricably linked though in a complex and dynamic way. This relationship becomes more complex when we consider tertiary factors such as gender norms or identity outside of the home, which invariably further impact attitudes towards employment. Since Berger’s 2013 study, the OECD average rates of maternal employment have jumped significantly from 61.5% to 71% (2019), perhaps because of the increased cost of living. While Germany now falls in the middle of other industrialised countries from a maternal employment perspective — only very marginally lower than the U.K.- researchers in Germany, as well as Australia, Austria, and the Netherlands report that more than half of all employed mothers do not work full-time: in 2005, 55% of mothers with children under 16 were employed, while the OECD average was 61.5%. In this section, I will reference the impact of COVID-19 on women and mothers, which exacerbated existing gender norms. I will also discuss the cost of childcare, and differences between the U.K. and other geographies. In the context of the link between employment and life satisfaction, I will also reference Richard Easterlin’s framework. Finally, to tie these points together, I will reference a 2019 report by UNICEF’s Early Childhood Development programme, noting the ways in which governmental support can lead to positive life satisfaction ratings for parents.</p><h3>2.1 The Impact of COVID-19</h3><p>COVID-19 served as an opportunity to highlight many of the discrepancies between working parents, with Sönmez (2021) noting that working hours, socioeconomic status, and partner’s key worker status are important indicators of daily time spent on housework. Regardless of external workplace obligations, women spend on average twice as much time as their male counterparts on domestic labour and housework as their male counterparts. In Sönmez’s study, whether women were co-habiting with an essential worker or non-essential worker, they still spent a greater quantity of time on domestic divisions than men co-habiting with essential workers. Hipp and Bunnineg (2021) drive this point home further, stating that women, ‘in particular mothers’, reported lower happiness and satisfaction rates than their male counterparts during COVID-19, with mothers carrying out significantly more unpaid work than fathers. The arguments and reasonings for this vary, with suggestions being made that women tend to saturate the sectors most impacted by COVID-19 (Joyce and Xu, 2020) indicating that disproportionate employment in these spaces also led to higher rates of unemployment for women, but Andrew et al. (2020) state that mothers were one and a half times more likely than fathers to have lost their job or been furloughed over the course of the lockdown periods. For mothers who were unable to work for pay due to either redundancy or furlough, they tended to complete twice as much domestic labour and childcare as fathers; in instances where fathers were made redundant or furloughed, time spent on domestic labour and childcare was split equally between parents. Though there is more detailed exploration of the occupational segregation later in this paper, it is worth noting at this point that a report by Close the Gap, a Scottish policy organisation focused on female labour equality, found that women were more likely to work in sectors affected by social distancing requirements, with women comprising 77% of employed individuals working in high exposure jobs in the U.K., meaning that women’s employment rates were disproportionately impacted by furlough in these industries. Despite requiring individuals to spend more time at home and work remotely wherever possible, COVID-19 served to exacerbate the gender pay gap (Lacey and Bricker, 2021), (Milford Morse and Anderson, 2020), (Odiase, Koehler, and Forden, 2021) and also increase the mental health strain on mothers, with 60% of women with children in the household experiencing stress due to family pressures, in comparison with 34% of men with children in the household.</p><h3>2.2 The Role of Gender-Norms</h3><p>While the counterpoint could be made that COVID-19 and numerous global lockdowns may have created a bubble effect of unemployment, parenthood stressors, and life satisfaction, there is plenty of evidence to indicate that the global pandemic simply exacerbated gendered parenthood and relationship norms that were already in place. Kühhirt (2012) tells us that parenthood results in a long-term increase in domestic- and childcare expectations for women, even if women were confirmed to be the breadwinner in their relationships prior to childbirth. While Cox (2000) indicates that there is a proportional increase in paid domestic labour in households where women are in full-time, career-structured jobs, there are also significant financial barriers that must be overcome for this outsourcing to be a reality. Additionally, while such studies intimate that money can be the panacea to such inequality in the home, it does little to address the emotional wellbeing of women in these situations. While the reasons for women opting to devote their time to full-time parenthood may also be tied to underlying factors such as cost of childcare, previous studies have indicated that working women are happier than non-working women — this can be linked to financial freedom, as well as identity outside the home. This, then, begs the question: are non-participatory mothers opting out of the workforce out of genuine preference to become full-time parents? Or, as some studies suggest, do external — often financial — decisions impact the choices of these women. As Bertrand (2013) notes, while both having a family and having a career act as enhancers to an individual’s overall life satisfaction, women do not seem to benefit from twice the happiness when juggling both parenthood and work outside of the home. In addition to this, Breeschoten and Evertsson (2018) assert that part-time work can be interpreted as a positive risk mitigator in the context of work-life conflict because ‘it enables the employee to continue to be active in the labour market’ while also providing the individual with additional time for responsibilities outside of the workplace, a hypothesis further supported by Booth and van Ours (2009). I would argue this is an overly simplistic interpretation. Women are also nearly three times more likely to be in part-time employment than men; a 2022 study found that, in the U.K. 38% of employed women held part-time positions in comparison to 13% of employed men (Irvine et al., 2022) This is without factoring in parenthood, which increases the divide between mothers and fathers in part-time work even more noticeably. Studies led by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Andrew et al., 2021) confirm that women are more likely to incur reduced hours of work or give up work entirely after having children than their male counterparts, even if the women earned more than their partner pre-childbirth. Employment for women drops by approximately 15% after having children, with women choosing to accept no paid-for work; worse, for those who choose to remain in paid employment, their hours drop from approximately 40 hours per week to less than 20 hours per week. What is the cumulative result here? Ultimately, it results in less money for women. Dias et al. (2016) confirm that the gender wage gap widens exponentially year on year after childbirth, particularly for women in low-hours or part-time jobs, as they encounter little to no wage progression. Perhaps it is little surprise, then, that childhood poverty in working households had increased by 800,000 in the previous 9 years according to data gathered by the TUC (2019).</p><p>The fact that heterosexual women tend to take on the burden of domestic and emotional labour is often cited as ‘gender stereotyping’, though we know that this is rooted in truth. As women have fought for, and won, the right to work post-marriage and post-children, the presumption that household chores and childcare is also ‘women’s work’ has persisted, leading to the ‘double-shift’ phenomenon — where the task list of women outside the workplace remains unchanged despite additional financial freedom. The perceived pressure on women to ‘have it all’ is societal in nature and, while women are — as an entire demographic — happier than they were in, say, the 1960s, happiness rates in women are in an overall absolute decline. The reasons for this are difficult to quantify objectively; ultimately, while the societal handcuffs on women have been extensive, society has not sought to readjust the equilibrium of expectations for men and women, particularly as women have continued to add responsibilities to their roster. Women’s happiness has been steadily trending downwards in direct comparison to men’s since the mid-1980’s; it is not beyond the realms of possibility that women are exhausted and jaded by the expectation that the onus of domestic labour and childcare should fall to them, particularly as welfare systems designed to support parents, e.g., Sure Start Centres, are steadily eroded by the government. As Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) note, while there have been societal improvements over recent decades which have ultimately increased opportunities available to women, there are indications that ‘men may have been the beneficiaries of the women’s movement’.</p><h3>2.3 The Question of Childcare</h3><h3>2.3.1 The United Kingdom</h3><p>In the context of this study, it is also worth acknowledging and specifying some of these external factors; childcare in the U.K.is considered among some of the most expensive in the world. In a developed country where poverty is also steadily on the rise for working-class and middle-class families, the cost of childcare can be the deciding factor which pushes families ‘into the red’ financially. Similarly, families may experience loss of benefits or tax implications because of pregnancy or childcare benefits, meaning that it is cheaper to stay at home rather than outsource childcare to an external provider. Further, as this paper references both full-time and part-time employment, it is worth noting that, in 2019, the TUC found that employees in the U.K. work longer hours than any counterparts in the European Union, with the average working week lasting 42 hours and 18 minutes; in comparison, employees in Denmark work approximately four hours less per week, despite productivity being 23.5% higher. Within the limitations of this paper, it is difficult to extensively dive on the longer-term psychological impact of mothers giving up their careers for purely financial reasons; it is easy for an outsider to objectively think of these decisions in a purely financial capacity, but what of the women who leave jobs for which they have trained at length? Indeed, Lévesque et al. (2020) confirm that, while early childhood can be a tumultuous time for both parents, women struggled more than men with loss of individuality and lack of parental equality; further, this reported data also extended to birthmothers in same-sex relationships, indicating that the mental burden of navigating parenting and childcare is not restricted to our gender-stereotyped interpretation of heteronormative relationships. Glass et al. (2016) confirms that there is a ‘considerable variation in the parenthood gap in happiness’ globally, with concepts like childcare subsidies, paid time off, and cost of living impacting the variances in life satisfaction between parents and non-parents. As previously referenced, women are confirmed to perform more domestic and childcare duties than men, even when women are also employed full-time outside of the home (Pettit and Hook, 2009).</p><h3>2.3.2 International Comparisons</h3><p>It is pertinent to reference the countries who are outperforming the U.K. in their progressive and hyperopic approach to parenting policies, most notably the majority of Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). Nordic countries frequently rank in the top 5 happiest countries in the world, according to the World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al., 2022). These countries, while worthy of emulation from a childcare policy perspective, are also interesting because they have not been able to fully eradicate domestic labour or family care disparities; women still perform a greater proportion of these tasks in comparison to men, suggesting that there is an attitudinal shift that also needs to take place to reach true equal division of labour. A study by the Nordic Council of Ministers (2019) has identified that occupational segregation remains an issue requiring additional focus from all Nordic countries; ultimately, this refers to the disproportional representation of female employees in sectors such as healthcare, childcare, and elder-care — work that has ‘traditionally been carried out by women as unpaid labour in the home’. Unsurprisingly, the same holds true for occupational segregation in the U.K. Data gathered by the ONS Economic and Labour Market Review indicates that women employed in the U.K. can be found across 10 sectors, with the largest concentration-based administration and secretarial services (20%), personal services (15%), and customer services (11%) (ONS, 2009). Grimshaw et al. (2007) note that the sectors most populated by women — care, cleaning, and retail — are ‘systematically undervalued in the labour market’. Pettit and Hook (2009) raise another valid point here; while it is important to make sure that women and mothers are included in the labour market, it is also vital to examine <em>how</em> they are being included in the labour market, e.g. while publicly provided childcare may allow for mothers to participate in the workforce, it may not facilitate gender equality ‘in terms of hours worked, occupation, or wages.’ While this paper centres on the infrastructure required to improve life satisfaction for working mothers, indicating that mothers employed in these ‘systemically undervalued’ spaces are still happier than those who are economically inactive, it is also worth noting the societal perceptions of the value of these industries.</p><p>While the financial choices may win out for these parents, meaning that the only options available are either a decrease in working hours or a departure from paid work altogether, there is sufficient space to ask what the emotional cost for these women is. What sacrifice is being made by these women, by virtue of sacrificing their identity outside of the home? Some studies have indicated the positive correlation between equitable — or <em>more</em> equitable — division of domestic labour and increased fertility intentions for female partners in heterosexual relationships, by virtue of ‘decreased work-family conflict’ (Okun and Raz-Yurovich, 2019) This corresponds with the findings of studies such as Bird (1999), which indicate that spouses who spend more time on household work report lower levels of happiness and satisfaction than those who find themselves absolved from the responsibility of domestic tasks. Patra and Suar (2009) also support this finding in their paper, which indicates that the variables with the greatest impact on familial happiness are high levels of multi-tasking attitude and marital adjustment. Against the backdrop of these discussions, it is important to also note the changes in what society believes to be ‘parenthood norms’; while these gendered ideas, as noted by Preisber and Neuberger (2019), indicate vast differences in what individuals perceive to be a ‘good father’, versus a ‘good mother’ expectations often vary; almost all of us can be said to be familiar with the trope of fathers ‘babysitting’ when they take care of their own children. For every pay decrease and missed promotion that mothers in full-time employment experience, fathers in the U.K. experience, on average, a 21% pay increase once they become parents — women typically experience a 15% wage decrease (Cory and Stirling, 2016). Where does this leave mothers? According to Chapman and Gubi (2022) it leaves them financially worse off, navigating the contradictory expectations of being either a ‘supermum’ or a ‘career woman’.</p><p>In contrast to Berger’s findings, the U.K. poor childcare situation is related less to a dearth of availability. Childcare in the U.K. is among the most expensive in the world and, when coupled with the untenable waiting lists associated with day-care and nurseries, it seems that parents are starting on the back foot when attempting to re-enter the workforce post-children. Interestingly, while Berger speculates that Germany’s childcare issues stem from the fact that private for-profit childcare providers are a rarity, the U.K. offers very few non-profit providers and regulation for these providers are almost non-existent. Again, there is space to contrast this stance with the position of other countries; Sweden offers means-tested state subsidies to parents with children in childcare, ensuring that parents do not spend more than 3% of their gross salary on this additional outgoing expense. This indicates that, perhaps, the most pressing issues are the elements that remain static regardless of geography; of these, the inflexibility of full-time work and lack of affordability of childcare are, perhaps, the most relevant in the context of this paper as they have direct impact on the constraints that parents experience and, as such, may also impact the decisions that parents make regarding employment opportunities. A prime example of this is, of course, mothers choosing part-time employment over full-time employment in order to fit around these operating hours of childcare services. While the employment of a nanny or an au pair can be thought of as a capture-all solution, the reality is that this is an unlikely scenario for many families to entertain; the financial implications of hiring a private nanny are far greater than day-care centres or nurseries and, while employing an au pair is often cited as a more financially achievable option, the fact remains that employment of an au pair also requires a family to have enough additional room for an additional adult to reside under the same roof. This is simply not a reality for many households in the U.K. Financial implications and loopholes aside, the fact remains that children in these scenarios also do not benefit from the same exposure to other children, which may delay the development of their social skills, in addition to impacting the immune system strengthening of these children.</p><h3>2.4 Easterlin’s Framework</h3><p>Easterlin’s (1974) framework is perhaps the most frequently cited when it comes to analyses of money and happiness. His economic study famously identified the disparity between the self-reported happiness rates of lower socio-economic status individuals and higher earners, with higher earners reporting as significantly happier than those on the poorer end of the scale. Extensions of this study enabled Easterlin to determine that the comparative component of this scenario is vital; fundamentally, an increase in the income of all does not lead to an increase in the happiness of all. If we were to extrapolate on this theory in the context of working and non-working mothers, it might be fair to hypothesize that those who fall into the category of ‘higher earners’ are more likely to be able to afford childcare, while those who have left the labour-force or decreased their working hours because they are unable to afford the option of childcare will still the same outgoings as they had pre-children — bills, mortgage repayments, and living expenses will not have disappeared, but there will be less household money to pay for them. There are several legitimate counterclaims to Easterlin’s study; notably, that comparisons with neighbouring countries is key, and that higher incomes allow for the utilisation of safety nets that do positively impact life satisfaction, as noted above. However, the U.K. has experienced an overall uptick in life satisfaction despite the fiscal crisis of the past decade; as such, it is perhaps easier to delegitimise the importance of parental life satisfaction as a sub-section of these numbers. If the broad strokes indicate that society is happier, why should we preoccupy ourselves with making sure governmental policies become more favourable to parents?</p><h3>2.5 UNICEF’s recommendations</h3><p>In 2019, UNICEF’s Early Childhood Development programme published a paper in which they set out the key policies required to ensure wellbeing for parents and children alike. While the responsibility of these improvements is often left with employers UNICEF notes that positive governmental policy change in these areas contribute significantly to social and economic growth in countries. In examining these suggestions, which are framed objectively rather than pointed at any particular geography, I refer back to existing policies in the U.K. and identify the gaps that currently exist in order to improve upon existing frameworks for mothers. As Fritjers et al. (2020) note, there is an abundance of low-hanging fruit relating to wellbeing policies specifically in the realms of mental health and social relations.</p><h3>2.5.1 Paid Parental Leave to Care for Young Children</h3><p>As previously noted, this is an area in which the U.K. does not perform well; mothers in the U.K. are entitled to six weeks maternity leave at 90% of their average weekly earnings before tax, after which point, they receive £156.66 per week, or 90% of their average weekly earnings — whichever of the two is lower in value. Statutory Maternity Leave lasts for 39 weeks in total. Statutory Paternity Leave consists of a maximum of two weeks paid in the U.K. In a contrasting example, parents in Sweden are entitled to a cumulative 480 days of statutory parental leave per child, at 80% of full pay. The benefits of increasing maternity and parental leave as a whole improve bonding between parent and child, as well as noted health benefits for all parties (Teitler, 2001) (Martin et al., 2007)</p><h3>2.5.2 Support Breastfeeding</h3><p>The U.K. ranks as one of the poorest internationally with regards to breastfeeding rates. Interestingly, as a key indication of the ways in which the U.K. government is not appropriately engaged with wellbeing of mothers, there has been no significant study conducted on breastfeeding rates in the U.K. since 2010, when the NHS’s Infant Feeding Survey was discontinued. However, the findings of this survey were stark; while 69% of mothers exclusively breastfed at birth, these statistics dropped to 49% no more than a week later. Further to this, despite recommendations from both the WHO and U.K. health organisations that breastfeeding should continue until an infant is at least six month’s old, breastfeeding rates for mothers in the U.K. drop to just 1%. Victora et al. (2016) suggests that an increase in breastfeeding rates would have a positive impact on both mothers and children, with a decrease in infant mortality rates and an uptick in breast cancer detection for mothers.</p><p>Interestingly, Krol and Grossman (2018) also suggest that breastfeeding positively impacts mood and alleviates stress, indicating that policy reform in this area would contribute to life satisfaction in mothers, in addition to supporting mothers to return to work post-childbirth.</p><h3>2.5.3 Affordable, Accessible, and Quality Childcare</h3><p>As Powdthavee (2010) notes, the paradoxical nature of the relationship between money and happiness means that the ‘status’ of money is one of the reasons that it has an impact on the happiness of an individual. In other words, an individual’s happiness is not solely related to their own income, but also how their income relates to those around them. Based on what this paper has noted so far, this is important for mothers in particular as many will have to look no further than their partner in order to be confronted with wage comparisons; if they succeed in returning to work post-children, they will be confronted with the career progression of others while many of them stagnate and find promotion opportunities closed off to them. In addition, as we refer to UNICEF’s findings, we know that access to quality and affordable childcare is integral to parental and child wellbeing. While the U.K. government aids parents with children in childcare, this is woefully inadequate when examined in closer detail; the government will pay a maximum of £2,000 per child per year towards childcare costs, increasing to £4,000 per child per year if the child in question is disabled. This in and of itself demonstrates a complete apathy on the part of the government to put meaningful policies in place to support parents. The average weekly cost of childcare in the U.K. is £210, increasing to £260 in cities such as London and Manchester, leaving families to find an additional minimum of £8,000 per annum or, alternatively, leave their own occupations in order to provide full-time childcare instead. In contrast, demonstrating the kind of infrastructure that can be put in place by governments, local authorities in Denmark are legally required to pay approximately 75% of childcare costs, with only the remaining 25% to be paid by parents. Again, in Finland, the government provides entirely free universal childcare from eight months until children are ready to commence formal education aged seven.</p><p>A central part of Berger’s thesis homes in on Germany’s lack of formal childcare. While childcare is more prevalent in the U.K., it is also significantly more expensive; an OECD study focused on the financial disincentive to enter employment with childcare costs found that if a parent of two children takes up full-time employment in the U.K., they stand to lose up to 57% of their earnings to either higher taxes or lower benefits. This statistic, though staggering, also pertains only to individuals earning an average wage. If we are to, instead, look to parents earning a minimum wage in the same scenario, they may lose up to 91% of their earnings to higher taxes or lower benefits. These numbers are stark and horrifying, particularly for lower-income families, who may end up unable to break out of poverty cycles created by such severe financial expectations. Rather than prioritise the ways in which lower-income families can be better supported by governmental policy and infrastructure, the U.K. government has instead applied ritual and significant cuts to the funding of enterprises such as Sure Start Centres, leading to a reduction of both availability of such centres and a decrease in the number of services that existing centres can provide. At the risk of over-emphasising the importance of these children’s centres, a 2019 report by the IFS indicates that the attrition rate of these centres can be directly associated with greater hospitalisation rates of children from lower socio-economic groups; the gaps in health, education, and child services that the U.K. government is failing to bridge are, quite literally, causing harm to children and leaving parents without a fair start</p><h3>3. Discussion and Data</h3><h3>3.1 Understanding Variance in Employment</h3><p>In accordance with Berger’s study, I have endeavoured to define varied categories of employment: ‘out of labour force’, ‘part-time employment’, ‘employed full-time’, and ‘unemployed’. In contrast to Berger’s study, I have not been able to discern the difference between ‘short’ and ‘long’ part-time employment, as statistics from the ONS do not offer this degree of granularity. That said, as previously noted, the ONS does allow for observational difference between ‘economic inactivity’ — referenced here as ‘out of labour force’ — and ‘economic inactivity — looking after family and/or home’. Unemployment is held to the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition: individuals without a job, seeking work, and available to begin work. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘economically inactive’ refers to individuals without a job who have not sought work in the last four weeks and/or are not available to start work in the next two weeks. Typically, the main economically inactive groups are students, people looking after family and home, long-term sick and disabled, temporarily sick and disabled, retired people and discouraged workers. ONS statistics have enabled us to specifically focus on individuals for whom ‘economically inactive’ specifically refers to ‘looking after the family and/or the home’. It has been important to do this in order to differentiate between women who have opted out of the paid labour market for reasons relating to caregiving and domestic labour as opposed to reasons relating to labour market constraints. As many previous studies note, and as has been indicated in this paper, this differentiation is important as job market constraints have been proven to have a negative impact on happiness and life satisfaction. Those who are economically inactive due to domestic responsibilities form the first subgroup: ‘out of labour force for family reasons’ (OLFF). For individuals who fall into the bracket of economic inactivity, but are not defined as working within the home, lack of participation in the labour force is assumed to be due to lack of opportunity in the job market; Berger notes that these individuals are considered to be ‘discouraged workers’, which the ILO defines as ‘individuals who wish to work, but are not actively seeking work because they believe no suitable job is available for them’. They form the second subgroup: ‘out of labour force for labour market reasons’ (OLFL). In employing the use of data from the ONS, it has not been possible to identify individuals who do not intend to work, outside the category of ‘unemployed’, For this reason, the subgroup ‘out of labour force and no intention to work’ (OLFN) has not been referenced in this paper.</p><p>For the purposes of this paper, I have looked at the differing rates of employment and how they contrast with one another. Particularly of interest are mothers who are out of the labour force for family reasons; in this instance, we are to understand that the mothers falling into this category intend to or, rather, hope to return to employment — either full-time or part-time — but are not able to do so at present due to their familial obligations. As a result, we can infer that labour market volatility cannot be interpreted as the cause of their economic inactivity. That said, it is not possible to establish the additional reasons for women in the OLFF withdrawing from employment, whether this is due to additional preferences or constraints relating to parenthood. For example, this paper has noted that childcare in the U.K. is the second most expensive in the world; if the cost of childcare and cost of living were to fall in line with average wages — or wages were to increase in line with cost of living — we would not expect to find a negative impact on life satisfaction. However, as other studies have noted, many women would prefer to return to paid employment if they were presented with a scenario in which they could accommodate both motherhood and labour outside of the home. As a result of this, it should be expected that mothers who are not in paid employment would report lower levels of life satisfaction, indicating that lack of financial independence has a negative impact on life satisfaction. In this scenario, women without children who are unable to work may likely be unable to do so for health related reasons such as disability or illness; while it would also be interesting to understand the ways in which the U.K. government is seeking to support life satisfaction levels and wellbeing of individuals in this category, particularly for mothers with disabilities or health issues, this paper looks to focus on the issue of motherhood and life satisfaction specifically.</p><p>Additionally, while Berger notes that it would be beneficial to further segment mothers in part-time employment by their intention and ability to take on full-time employment to get a sense of the faction of mothers who have a stated preference for part-time employment, this is not something that the ONS currently provides. Again, this indicates that there is a significant bridge to be gapped by U.K. governmental institutions; while granular data gathering is required on a myriad of different demographics to better understand the variance in life satisfaction levels, there seems to be little sub-demographic investigation into the mitigating factors impacting the wellbeing and life satisfaction of specific groups.</p><p>In addition to utilising household income to derive the impact of OLFF on life satisfaction, Berger also endeavoured to use disposable income to give an understanding of what financial flexibility the household has — essentially, this can be interpreted as the household income less net labour earnings. This method, however, is not without flaws; most notably, it is difficult to assert the impact of women’s’ earnings in the context of household income, because some social and welfare benefits may replace some of the woman’s earnings. That said, the U.K. offers differing criteria from Berger’s study, where it is noted that eligibility for parental leave benefits was not extended to high income earners until 2007 in Germany, while statutory maternity leave is available to all mothers regardless of salary bracket. However, as previously noted, statutory maternity pay (SMP) in the U.K. leaves much to be desired from the perspective of working parents; between weeks six and thirty-three of a statutory maternity leave, mothers receive either £156.66 per week, or 90% of their weekly salary — whichever is <em>lower. </em>I restate this point in its entirety because it bears repeating; this figure is such a paltry amount that it is difficult to conceive of a how a two-parent family, previously dependent upon two incomes, would be able to navigate such financial restrictions. In this instance, SMP may push families deeper into the red, as individuals may be forced to acclimate to a significantly lower income than they are used to, while also navigating the additional expenditure associated with having a new-born.</p><h3>3.2 Gaps in Existing Data Gathering</h3><p>This paper has utilised studies conducted by the ONS collected from 2017–2021 to construct the empirical analyses in this paper. The ONS is the executive office of the U.K. Statistics Authority, and is the largest independent producer of official statistics in the U.K. I have focused on data relating to mothers and parents with at least one child under the age of 16, and have endeavoured to provide a contrast between mothers, fathers, and individuals without children to contrast employment levels. While it may seem facile to tie employment so explicitly with wellbeing in this instance — particularly considering Easterlin’s Paradox above — and, further, to tie these employment variances to governmental policy (or lack thereof) I believe it these data points give clear indication of the ways in which women and mothers are disenfranchised in the workplace, and the gap that the U.K. government should look to address if seeking to make good on their supposed commitment to wellbeing. The four key pillars for parental wellbeing, as suggested by UNICEF, can all be tied to employment either directly or indirectly. If we know that unemployment is tied to low levels of life satisfaction, and we know that mothers in full-time employment are happier than those in part-time employment, or those out of the labour force due to familial obligations, and we <em>also</em> know that access to quality childcare becomes impossible for many families due to exorbitant costs, then this presents several avenues wherein improvements can be made to current systems of post-natal support and childcare in order to improve life satisfaction of mothers.</p><p>Most importantly, the data below provides a breakdown of the different working rates of individuals with and without dependents, differentiating between full-time, part-time, and non-participatory activity in the labour-force. Vitally, while on surface level there appears to be — at first glance — little difference between the reported employment rates of women both with and without children, the true meat of this study appears when it is broken down into comparison between men and women with children of dependent age. Once again, the superficial figures may align with stereotyped expectations of labour outside the home, with an average of 92.1% of fathers and 76.5% of mothers with dependent children under the age of 15 working outside of the home. However, when figures of full-time work (averaged at 36.5 hours per week) are compared between working parents, these statistics drop to 83.4% and 38.4% respectively. As previously stated, we know that women are more likely than men to give up full-time careers in favour of part-time employment, as this option tends to offer greater flexibility around caregiving and childcare responsibilities. If less than half of mothers can commit to full-time employment in comparison to fathers, this invariably leaves women trapped in a vicious cycle from which they are unable to break free.</p><p>The current policies in place for mothers in the U.K. are woefully inadequate. If the government is to take meaningful steps to improve upon the wellbeing of this demographic, there are several areas which must be addressed. While the ONS’s current metric for gathering statistics relating to wellbeing and life satisfaction is sufficient, far greater study is required on the associated effects that various policies and circumstances may have on the chosen metric of wellbeing; that is to say, it is important to specifically examine the life satisfaction of mothers — and, more broadly, parents in general — and tie these results definitively to governmental policies that impact the day to day lives of this demographic. Doing so is vital, not only to ensure prioritisation of policies but also to measure the proposed and resulting impact of such policies on life satisfaction.</p><h3>3.3 Interpreting Berger’s Data</h3><p>As previously noted, Berger succeeds in further compartmentalising part-time employment into ‘short’ and ‘long’ based on amount of hours worked per week; while it has not been possible for me to complete the same segmentation, it is interesting that Berger find mothers employed on a long part-time basis — at a maximum of thirty-two hours per week — to be equally as happy as mothers in full-time employment, while mothers in short part-time employment — at an approximate maximum of twenty to twenty-five hours per week — report as less happy than mothers who are in full-time employment. The focus, and key area of interest for this study, is the subgroup ‘out of labour force for family reasons’ (OLFF) Referring again to Berger’s study, she finds that mothers categorised as economically inactive due to familial obligations are significantly less happy than mothers in full-time employment. If one is to extrapolate, it becomes clear that these mothers are falling through the cracks of the current governmental system; in providing a framework for women to bypass this economic inactivity, not only would the economy benefit by virtue or more individuals working, but so too might morale and wellbeing improve for this demographic as mothers avoid the stagnation of this category. As a result, it is fair to assert that there are personality traits which could have ripple effects on both decisions around employment and life satisfaction; that said, governments do not propose policy changes based on individual personality types and the improvements which have been suggested in this paper are rooted specifically in objective macrotrends. As Berger found however, there are, external shock factors which, if they were to take place during the observation period, could be perceived to affect both the reported life satisfaction of an individual, as well as impact their employment status; while I have referred to some of these more generic life events earlier in this paper — namely divorce, death, and marriage — in this instance I am referring to becoming pregnant or the birth of another child. While these shock factors bear noting for the purpose of Berger’s analysis, this paper again centres more specifically on the current barriers to happiness experienced by mothers.</p><p>Health is another shock factor that may distort potential results, with the obvious extrapolation that being sick or unwell is likely to make an individual unhappy. While previously cited studies also suggest that people likely acclimate to longer-term or ongoing illnesses, and that life satisfaction levels will return to pre-illness or pre-diagnosis levels. However, it is fair to say that such health problems may also result in an individual withdrawing from the labour market entirely, or they may be forced to move to part-time employment. That said, these potential health issues only serve to reinforce the importance of better support systems and networks for parents. Vitally, in the context of mothers being supported to return to work and explore opportunities outside of domestic labour and childcare, it is worth remembering that employment opportunities begin to decrease in proportion to extended periods of economic inactivity; it is harder for women to return to the workplace full-time once they have taken a ‘career break’ or moved to more flexible hours to raise their children. This awareness may well also have an additional impact on the happiness of mothers, as they are aware that they must operate within the confines of an arbitrary, unquantifiable deadline which they have little control over. Finally, in this regard, COVID-19 has acted as a huge catalyst for women leaving the labour force; as cited, studies have indicated that women were disproportionately impacted by furlough schemes, and pandemic-related redundancies. This is in conjunction with the fact that women are more likely to work in industries impacted by COVID-19 and social distancing measures; little surprise, then, that the figures for mothers categorised as economically inactive due to disability or illness jumped by 6% between 2019 and 2021. While it is fair to state that COVID-19 was an outlier, the global pandemic highlighted the lack of governmental infrastructure in place to support parents; the UNICEF guidelines referred to in this paper tend to overly emphasise the support systems and networks required of parents of new-borns, while neglecting the ongoing support that is also required of parents for older children. While support is most certainly required of new parents in this regard, the difficulties faced by mothers require ongoing, measured support — the most pertinent example here becomes, again, the issue of childcare for which the U.K. Government provide little support.</p><p>While there is a plethora of anecdotal literature and research-driven analysis stating that mothers are more likely than fathers to opt for part-time employment opportunities, I have employed caution in assigning personal interpretation to this category; contrary to the category of economic inactivity, which provides the differentiation of familial responsibilities and labour market reasons, there is no elaboration within the category of part-time employment. By virtue of this, it could be fair to state that mothers may report with lower levels of happiness and life satisfaction in part-time jobs, but it is not possible to establish whether their reasons for remaining in these employment situations are due to domestic constraints or because of lack of alternative employment opportunities. Booth and van Ours (2008) echo these findings in the U.K., asserting that mothers in full-time employment report the highest levels of life satisfaction when compared to mothers in part-time employment or who are not employed at all. Additionally, some of the most cited work in this space to date has been conducted specifically focusing on males. While this is valuable insight and speaks to the broader link between economic inactivity and life satisfaction, it is fair to state that fathers are significantly less likely to be economically inactive due to reasons relating to familial obligations. This is echoed by the disparity between the varied employment categories of fathers and mothers in the U.K. in data gathered by the ONS, where fathers are twice as likely as mothers to be in full-time employment.</p><h3>3.4 Other Factors</h3><p>This study has attempted to control for several variables in focusing on women based in the U.K. However, for future study, it would be of interest to discuss the role that gender plays for stay-at-home parents, as well as the contrast between families living in urban and rural areas. In addition, the concept of a ‘second shift’ is typically confined to heterosexual couples, so to further explore the impact that working has on the happiness rates of parents in same-sex relationships. Ultimately, in addition to these factors, it seems that generational factors play a not-insignificant role in equitable households; millennial relationships are more frequently eschewing the binary nature of gender stereotypes, as previously referenced by Okun and Raz-Yurovich (2019), indicating that individuals are not destined to emulate the patterns of their own parents. Similarly, while much of the writing in this space centres on the female-experience, the issues discussed in this paper — parenthood, career, financial stresses, and wellbeing — impact men as well. In fact, while millennial relationships may have become more egalitarian in their division of parental labour, studies indicate that the workplace perception of men leads to many struggling to take even the most paltry paternity leave. While this paper has sought to examine the financial disadvantages of parenthood for women, it would be fair to state that many fathers are also dissatisfied with the status quo and would welcome the opportunity to disrupt it. Data from the HMRC indicates that only a third of eligible fathers actually take some form of parental leave; as a result of the lack of framework put in place for fathers by the U.K. Government, not only are fathers suffering but, so too, are children. Studies suggest that children with engaged, present fathers benefit from improved mental health and better cognition skills than their peers without (Allport et al., 2018) The laziness of the existing parenthood/childcare system in the U.K. as a whole invokes lazy gender stereotyping, and infers that men care little for spending time with and raising their own children, while women are happy to leave the paid labour force and cede their identity outside of the home. Adjacent to this, and perhaps even more pressingly, it is categorically fair to state that any difficulties encountered by mothers in heteronormative relationships are experienced tenfold by single parents.</p><p>Adjacent areas of interest in this space may include the impact of gender identity, race, and religion on happiness rates in parents. Some studies also indicate the varied impact that rural and urban settings can have on the happiness rates of individuals, with this effect only heightened for parents due to the availability of public transport, leisure facilities, and childcare. There is capacity, also, to conduct a deeper dive on the industries individuals work within and the ripple effect this has on parenthood and happiness; while the rhetoric of women opting for lower-paid industries is permissive, it is somewhat rooted in truth. Budig and England (2001) confirm that mothers are more likely to choose lower-paid or part-time work specifically because these positions are more likely to be flexible around childcare and domestic duties. This is relevant because the financial choices women make around returning to work after having children may be separate to their own preferences. This speaks to the theory that the gender pay gap could more accurately be referred to as a parenthood pay gap, as the divide in the U.K. between men and women reaches its apex of 12% for age groups 40–49 or older, just as the parenthood grind of sports clubs, music lessons, and school runs kick in.</p><p>Whether it is acknowledged or not, we begin absorbing media centred on womanhood, motherhood, and gender almost as soon as we are born. These topics have been extensively studied prior to this paper, even in a popular culture sense. The implications of these gender dynamics in mainstream texts can be stark, even if they are difficult to quantify scientifically; women in children’s literature tend to be either infantilised (marrying princes for love and, incidentally, money and security) or villainised (evil stepmothers, and wicked witches). Invariably there is an association between the ‘goodness’ of characters whose lives are devoted to domesticity and childcare, while an absence of these traits allows the viewer to instantly condemn an individual. These are sweeping generalisations, of course; as previously noted, this paper references the variables in economic position, education, salary, and relationship status (among others) that play a role in, but it is interesting to note nevertheless as it us that binary ideas of motherhood are ever-present in the cultural zeitgeist. The unfortunate truth is that the absorption of these binary ideals places the onus on an individual to navigate a feasible solution to self-fulfilment and parenthood, as opposed to being able to rely upon governmental infrastructure to achieve this balance.</p><p>It is evident that women are disproportionately negatively impacted by parenthood, relating specifically to employment, loss of opportunity, and the burden of domestic duties and childcare, all of which are exacerbated by the lack of appropriate governmental policy. We know that these factors have an influence on life satisfaction, which is why I have looked to identify the ways in which the U.K. Government can address iniquities in existing policies and frameworks to improve upon the happiness rates of this demographic.</p><h3>4. Recommendations</h3><p>As acknowledged throughout this paper, I have encountered restrictions when seeking to emulate Berger’s study directly; unfortunately, the data available to me through the ONS has been less extensive than that of the SOEP, though more detailed study of parenthood and its impact on life satisfaction has been more intensely explored by the ONS from 2017 onward. While the data I have included in this paper relates more directly to the areas that the U.K. government should actively seek to address, it is worth noting that Berger presents model extensions in order test for heterogeneities.</p><p>These heterogeneities are worthy of closer inspection, particularly in relation to variance in income and educational degrees; after all, as previously noted, increased exposure to education is also positively associated with life satisfaction and can also dictate the types of employment industries accessible to an individual. The ONS provide visibility on the breakdown of mothers and fathers based on occupation group; while, again, this is not presented in a way that intersects meaningfully with other data points included in this paper it is certainly interesting and pertinent to know that 17.2% of men with dependent children work in management or senior official roles. This is a significantly higher amount than women with dependent children working in the same roles, which is only 8.8%, and is also higher than men <em>without </em>dependent children; only 11.3% of these individuals work in this occupation group, indicating that fathers are far more likely to find success profession as a result of because of their desire to expand their family than women are.</p><p>While, on surface level, mothers from high-skilled backgrounds seem more likely to work in industries or organisations where they will have a secure job to return to after maternity leave, this is not often the case. Limited studies have been conducted in this regard, but it is important to acknowledge that stigmas relating to parenthood are also pervasive in almost all industries (Greenbaum et al., 2021); many women struggle to navigate conversations around work-life balance, and many organisations are ill-equipped to provide mothers — and fathers — with the flexibility required to return to work after parental leave. Assumptions that mothers with skilled backgrounds may find it easier to find new employment is also not necessarily grounded in truth, as parenthood status places many applicants on the backfoot when seeking new employment. That said, while I was not able to employ specific data from the ONS, the OECD has indicated the variances between high, low, and medium education for mothers and the effect this has on their employment status, with highly educated mothers having an employment rating of 82% across the OECD, and mothers with low education having only a 46% employment rating.</p><p>As Berger also looks to contrast East and West Germany, it is perhaps worth bearing in mind the seismic societal changes that have taken place there over the past 30 years; while these shifts may not be reflected in the minutiae of policy, attitudinal shifts and attitudes towards employment and parenthood are perhaps baked into the psyche in a way which may be difficult to unpack in a straightforward fashion. Similarly it is not yet possible to say, perhaps, the impact that Brexit may yet have on the childcare industry in England; while these two components may seem unrelated, the impact of reduced immigration into the U.K. may well have a ripple effect on the availability of childcare — particularly if we consider that migrant-related studies indicate that immigrant workers experience over-representation in childcare profession, and typically rest on the lower-paid and lower-skilled end of the spectrum of employment. One might argue the same for the far-reaching implications of COVID-19; though the ONS and other studies have succeeded in identifying the immediate and short-term impact of the global pandemic on employment, anxiety, and domestic inequality, there is little visibility on how this may continue to impact the lives of parents — particularly if we are forced to reckon with future lockdowns, and the juggling of home schooling alongside employment outside of the home. In addition, there will likely be significant impact on the families of those with pre-existing conditions, who may also be forced to navigate the complexities of specialised childcare and ongoing social distancing measures.</p><p>In further exploration, while acknowledging that primary research would have allowed for greater visibility on components such as education, age of children, and partner status, it is interesting to me that the ONS does not currently allow for a way for this data to intersect meaningfully with other data points. While Berger has succeeded in employing a myriad of different fixed effects estimations, including the figures for women out of the labour force for family reasons further broken down by age of youngest child, and number of children, this is not something that the ONS appears to track. If it is the case that governments are seeking to prioritise life satisfaction, and the link between positive wellbeing and employment is confirmed, it would be fitting to examine the low-hanging fruit of enabling better support for mothers to re-enter the workplace after having children.</p><h3>4.1 What Now?</h3><p>Nordic countries are frequently held up as standard-setting examples of how government can help to form policy and societal inclusivity to improve the wellbeing of parents. Though Nordic countries acknowledge that there is still work to do, this does not mean that their infrastructures are not worthy of emulation. As referenced earlier in this paper, Fritjers, Clark, Krefeld, and Layard note that policymakers must identify the areas requiring further development to decrease the number of individuals struggling with lower rates of life satisfaction. The following, overly simplistic calculation is offered to suggest how governments might form the criterion for a policy to be accepted.</p><p>Extra happiness / Net cost = 𝜆</p><p>This, ultimately, becomes a form of cost-effectiveness analysis; in measuring the life satisfaction of mothers in one set of units, government can then establish the financial cost in another. As, in this instance, we are referring to frameworks created by governmental budgeting — parental leave, childcare, return to work schemes — it can be assumed that the sum available is pre-determined. It is important to acknowledge that this differs from a typical cost/benefit analysis, wherein both benefits and costs would be measured in the same units in order to give the total scale of public expenditure — for obvious reasons, as governmental budgets are dictated by politicians, and are often contested, cost-effectiveness analysis is likely the most efficient method to employ.</p><p>There are, understandably, queries as to how the success of such policy changes might be measured; how to ensure that mothers are happier because of more considerate, egalitarian frameworks? While a longitudinal study of mothers and their life satisfaction would give an indication, it would be worthwhile to also examine indirect public expenditure as a result of policy change. An existing, negative example of this has already been referenced in this paper; while budget cuts has led to the decimation of Sure Start Centres across the country, the indirect cost of this has been a far higher strain on the NHS, as children report higher hospitalization rates in subsequent years. To this point, when analysing policy changes, it is worth considering that some changes require more weight than others. While the central thesis of this paper indicates that life satisfaction of mothers is disproportionately impacted by variances in employment and, as such, requires greater focus from governmental policy. However, within this ‘hierarchy’ of mothers, those in full-time employment typically report as happier; this may then mean that more weight is given to mothers in part-time employment, or those falling in category OLFF, as these are the individuals most likely to experience positive change by virtue of favourable policy change for mothers.</p><h3>4.2. Next Steps</h3><p>Improving parental leave policies is the first step in improving the life satisfaction of mothers; ensuring appropriate recovery and bonding time for mothers and children requires an increase in SMP, so that mothers can afford to take time off. This marries well with the need to improve breastfeeding support in the U.K. as well; government should again seek to improve upon maternity and parental leave in order to improve upon this metric, as well as providing more detailed and comprehensive education on the importance of breastfeeding for maternal and child health. In addition, providing mothers with the statutory right to breastfeeding breaks at work will also positively impact statistics in this area.</p><p>Finally, provision of universal childcare, or increased government subsidies towards childcare would also allow mothers to return to work, with the additional benefit of breaking many families out of poverty cycles as a result of mitigating this household expenditure.</p><h3>5. Conclusion</h3><p>My paper utilised Berger’s 2013 study ‘Happy Working Mothers?’ as the foundation for my own study, examining the U.K. as opposed to Germany. As noted earlier in this paper, there is a plethora of data available on the relationship between unemployment and life satisfaction, but less so measuring the impact of varied employment contracts and reasons for opting out of the workforce, particularly for women. I believe this question is important for the U.K., particularly as we consider variable costs such as childcare and cost of living, which have increased significantly in the time since Berger’s study was first conducted. While it has not been possible, at this stage, to focus on the far-reaching impact of COVID-19 on mothers in the U.K., it is fair to say that women and mothers have been disproportionately impacted by furlough and redundancies because of the pandemic. In general, it is a challenge for mothers to accommodate both motherhood and full-time employment, due to the expense and inflexibility of childcare; this is not only restricted to pre-school age children, as a typical primary school day is also at odds with a full-time work schedule. This suggests that part-time employment can be more detrimental for mothers in lower-income families; while it is not possible to definitively quantify with certainty the specifics of what these underlying reasons may be, as previously suggested some families do find that being in receipt of statutory maternity pay and Child Tax Credits can negate other governmental payments that lower-income families may rely upon more urgently than families from higher-income backgrounds. Ultimately, this can push these lower-income families into more financial strain. Economic inactivity can prove more detrimental to mothers who perceive fewer and less valuable job opportunities, but these non-objective criteria can be difficult to test for. It is equally important to consider how factors such as self-esteem and emotional self-fulfilment are also impacted by employment; while it is easy to place value specifically on the monetary value of work outside the home, the overall wellbeing and life satisfaction of society will surely improve if we focus on extending and creating egalitarian parenting policies. Studies have shown that economies and businesses thrive when women are given sufficient opportunity to take a seat at the table, and these economic benefits are often the most frequently cited when discussing the improvement of parental employment policies. It is unfortunate that the mental health, identity outside of the home, and subjective happiness of mothers has not yet had enough of a central role in this debate. While strides have been made to discuss the importance of a more egalitarian approach to parenting and working outside of the home, it still seems that it is necessary to tie a financial value to the argument, as opposed to policies pushing forward with a prioritisation for maternal wellbeing and life satisfaction. Women who are forced out of the workplace due to parenthood, or are in part-time employment due to reasons relating to childcare suffer by virtue of a dearth of infrastructure in the U.K. There can also be a failing to consider a mother as a three-dimensional character, with thoughts, feelings, and ambitions outside the role of parent. Certainly, it can often seem that mothers in the workplace are held to a higher standard than others, and that there is an intangible expectation to perform as though one does not have additional obligations and responsibilities outside of the workplace. From a speculative perspective, it is also worth noting that while there have been incremental increases in opportunities available to women, the gender wage gap is very much so alive and well in all industries, in all geographies; is it counter-intuitive that women should be grateful for a seat at the table when the seat is less comfortable than that of their male equivalents?</p><p>I was inspired by Berger’s study to examine the U.K.’s data surrounding the life satisfaction of working and non-working mothers, and have sought to better understand the policies set out to support mothers — and parents in general — in the U.K. I believe the results of this paper give some indication as to the ‘top level’ questions that should be asked in relation to the happiness and life satisfaction of mothers, but I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the facets of study that I was unable to fully explore due to limited data. While the ONS has been gathering data relating to life satisfaction and wellbeing since 2011 there has not yet been meaningful policy change tied to these results of this data-gathering. Data specifically pertaining to parental employment has only been gathered from 2017 onward, and progress seems slow in terms of utilising these data points to effect systematic change within our existing governmental policies. As noted, blueprints of how this can be done are in existence from other European nations; while change may not occur overnight, building on and improving the areas highlighted in this paper offers the U.K.an opportunity to demonstrate that they are committed to taking the life satisfaction and wellbeing of its inhabitants seriously, and allow future generations to benefit.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=abe3608a827c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[There’s no end-of-lockdown party for Sarah Everard]]></title>
            <link>https://phoeberosecotter.medium.com/theres-no-end-of-lockdown-party-for-sarah-everard-aff9b1b02a9f?source=rss-7ce98f9c0ffa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aff9b1b02a9f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[violence-against-women]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Phoebe]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2021 16:33:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-13T17:41:31.909Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I keep reading the news, and my husband says ‘Maybe you should take a break from that, you’re making yourself sad.’ And I think to myself ‘I’m not <em>making </em>myself sad, I <em>am</em> sad.’ I didn’t have to read the news to be sad about Sarah Everard. I’m sad because, in the U.K., a woman is murdered every 3 days. Sarah Everard was the 120th woman killed by a man in 12 months. Like many others, I’m also sad because I feel as though we keep having this conversation.</p><p>When celebrities like Davina McCall say that calling all men dangerous is ‘bad for men’s mental health’, not only does this deliberately shift our focus away from Sarah’s murder, it also presents another get-out-of-jail-free card to the men in our lives. The fact is that patriarchal ideals harm us all, but women shoulder the responsibility to dismantle them. With respect, I don’t care if you feel persecuted when I call men dangerous. What are you doing to prove me wrong? Are you calling out misogyny when your friends call us sluts and whores? What about when they say we’re frigid bitches? Are you looking for overt, enthusiastic consent in your romantic interactions? Are you still making period jokes if we get upset?</p><p>It’s so frustrating when men say ‘<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/10/women-tell-men-how-to-make-them-feel-safe-after-sarah-everard-disappearance">What can we do?</a>’ because you know the answer! Stop actively harming us! Let us walk home, and let us be frivolous and free, and not constantly on the lookout. Not always having to hold at least 5% of our guard up, just in case we wander in to a situation where people don’t have our best interests at heart. Respect us, without having to have the come-to-Jesus moment of ‘becoming a father to daughters’.</p><p>When women and other victims of assault relive their trauma in order to convince you that this violence is entrenched in entitlement and misogyny, it propagates an environment where we are required to tell the worst of what has happened to us so that you can convince yourself ‘<em>I’ve</em> never done that’. If <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/almost-all-young-women-in-the-uk-have-been-sexually-harassed-survey-finds">97% of women in the U.K.</a> have been harassed, who do you think is harassing us?</p><p>And women are grieving. Some women may be grieving for reasons that haven’t even occurred to you. Because, yes, it’s hard to be a woman but it’s harder still to be a black woman, or a non-binary person, or a trans woman. And it can be hard to sit with the knowledge that some victims don’t get the same amount of attention as others. That’s a grief too.</p><p>What a senseless, useless loss of life. Sarah, with 33 years-worth of memories and hopes and experiences, gets reduced to ‘human remains found in a woodland’. All the while, we keep playing with our talismans — sharing our location, texting ‘home safe’, gripping our keys — as though they actually protect us. As though there is any real power in the incantation.</p><p>Poor Sarah. The gaping hole she’s left behind. She’s been reduced to a headline now, instead of maybe someone funny or silly, or someone who hates Chardonnay, or orders two desserts instead of a main, or can quote the ‘big mistake’ scene in Pretty Woman. Her private jokes with her friends, her last phone conversation with her boyfriend on her walk home.</p><p>How sad. How fucking awful. How shit that she’ll never go to the cinema again, or wear a swimming costume, or complain about the price of a takeaway coffee, or run out of dishwasher tablets. Everything she deserved has been taken away from her. There’s no end-of-lockdown party waiting for her, with warm cans of G&amp;T in the park. There’s no post-vaccination hug with people she hasn’t seen for a year, because now she won’t see them again. And we all know exactly why.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aff9b1b02a9f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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