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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Picus Security Inc. on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Picus Security Inc. on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Picus Security Inc. on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Zerologon Vulnerability — How to Test it… Safely!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/picus-security/the-zerologon-vulnerability-how-to-test-it-safely-f61b38e82e97?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zerologon]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2020 03:49:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-02T03:49:57.779Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Zerologon Vulnerability — How to Test it… Safely!</h3><p>by Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Hgdt7KG3Y88f-AnE" /></figure><p>On the 11th of August 2020, Microsoft released a security update[1], CVE-2020–1472 | Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, for a critical vulnerability within the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC)[2]in Windows Server operating systems, namely Windows Server 2008 R2, 2012, 2012 R2, 2016, and 2019. Since the exploit payload includes a string of zeros, the vulnerability is also known as “Zerologon”.</p><p>An attacker who successfully exploits the vulnerability could elevate their privileges to domain administrator and compromise the domain controller. Accordingly, this vulnerability has a “10.0 CRITICAL” CVSS 3.0 base score[3]. Note that only 3% of vulnerabilities last year had this score. Many vendors and organizations released announcements and directives about the vulnerability, including the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)[4]and CERT-EU[5].</p><blockquote>We recently ran an event on #ProactiveSOCs with experts from Gartner, IBM, and many more! If you’d like to learn more, check out this <a href="https://events.picussecurity.com/soc-reload-2020/session1">link</a>!</blockquote><h4><strong>How to test CVE-2020–1472 on Windows?</strong></h4><p>On the 11th of September 2020, Secura released a testing tool[6]for the vulnerability. This tool is a Python script that attempts to perform the Netlogon authentication. It does not perform any Netlogon operation, including changing the Domain Administrator password, so it is safe to test the vulnerability. The testing script utilizes the Impacket library, but enterprise environments may prevent installing Python or Impacket for security concerns.</p><p>Accordingly, we built a packed version of the testing script using auto-py-to-exe that gathers all Python dependencies. We created a directory packed with all dependencies to run the testing script without installing Python.</p><p>We also wrote a PowerShell script to automatically extract and execute the zerologon_tester.exe file for the primary Domain Controller. This script uses:</p><ul><li>theDomain.GetCurrentDomain method of PowerShell to get the domain object for the current user</li><li>theDomain.PdcRoleOwner.Name property to get the name of the primary domain controller (PDC) for this domain.</li><li>the Domain.PdcRoleOwner.IPAddress property to get the IP address of the PDC for this domain.</li></ul><p>Thanks to the above codes, we don’t need to give DC a name or IP address for this script.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e0iAwkhprYRnBqyg9MZFRQ.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Test Instructions</strong></h4><ul><li>Copy both zerologon_tester.zip and zerologon_tester.ps1 files from <a href="https://github.com/picussecurity/picuslabs/tree/master/CVE-2020-1472%20Zerologon">Picus Labs’ GitHub page</a> [7] into a computer in the domain controlled by the target Domain Controller.</li><li>Run the zerologon_tester.ps1 script on the PowerShell console:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2SObIJQoAFfIT6zHmNCAHA.png" /></figure><p>Or run the script on the command shell:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EJ36Y-0WwoRZatHKEcdsiw.png" /></figure><p>As a note, some antivirus engines may detect all exe files generated by Pyinstaller as a Trojan (10/59 detection rate by lesser-known antivirus products, as of today).</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>If you want to test your network for this vulnerability on a Windows system without installing Python and its dependencies, you can use the above tool, which is based on Secura’s Python script.</p><p>Picus users have already tested the effectiveness of their security controls against the CVE-2020–1472 “Zerologon” Vulnerability with the following threat in the Picus Threat Library:</p><p>474540 Exploitation of Zerologon Vulnerability using Netlogon RPC</p><h4><strong>References</strong></h4><p>[1] “[No title].” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472">https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472</a>. [Accessed: 21-Sep-2020]</p><p>[2] openspecs-office, “[MS-NRPC]: Netlogon Remote Protocol.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nrpc/ff8f970f-3e37-40f7-bd4b-af7336e4792f">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nrpc/ff8f970f-3e37-40f7-bd4b-af7336e4792f</a>. [Accessed: 21-Sep-2020]</p><p>[3] “NVD — CVE-2020–1472.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472</a>. [Accessed: 21-Sep-2020]</p><p>[4] “Emergency Directive 20–04.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/20-04/">https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/20-04/</a>. [Accessed: 21-Sep-2020]</p><p>[5] “[No title].” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://media.cert.europa.eu/static/SecurityAdvisories/2020/CERT-EU-SA2020-046.pdf">https://media.cert.europa.eu/static/SecurityAdvisories/2020/CERT-EU-SA2020-046.pdf</a>. [Accessed: 21-Sep-2020]</p><p>[6] SecuraBV, “SecuraBV/CVE-2020–1472.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472">https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472</a>. [Accessed: 21-Sep-2020]</p><p>[7] picussecurity, “picussecurity/picuslabs.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://github.com/picussecurity/picuslabs">https://github.com/picussecurity/picuslabs</a>. [Accessed: 21-Sep-2020]</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-safely-test-the-zerologon-vulnerability-on-windows"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f61b38e82e97" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/picus-security/the-zerologon-vulnerability-how-to-test-it-safely-f61b38e82e97">The Zerologon Vulnerability — How to Test it… Safely!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/picus-security">Picus Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to Simulate and Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Tachnique: A Real Command used by…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/picus-security/how-to-simulate-and-detect-mitre-att-ck-t1053-scheduled-task-job-tachnique-a-real-command-used-by-87e7c122ef1e?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2020 21:44:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-24T10:17:20.074Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How to Simulate and Detect MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Technique</h3><p>by Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XGY5WNuYK0b_PvAWYHyPgA.png" /></figure><p>A scheduled task is a command, program or script to be executed at:</p><ul><li>a particular time in the future (e.g. 11/08/2022 1:00 a.m.</li><li>at regular intervals (e.g. every Monday at 1:00 a.m.)</li><li>when a defined event occurs (e.g. a user logs on the system).</li></ul><p>Legitimate users like system administrators use scheduled tasks to create and run operational tasks automatically. Adversaries also use task scheduling utilities of operating systems to execute malicious payloads on a defined schedule or at system startup to achieve persistence. <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">Our research</a> has found that Scheduled Task was the seventh most prevalent MITRE ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</p><h3>Red and Blue Team Exercises</h3><h4>Red Teaming — How to simulate?</h4><p>In this exercise, we explain a real scheduled task command in a malicious VBA macro in a Word document that was used by the APT32 Threat Group.</p><p>This payload was included in the following Word document:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1uNyDC5fQ21Zlaa3uaFsKA.png" /></figure><p>Briefly, the below command in the VBA code embedded in the Word document creates a scheduled task named SystemSoundsServices (mimicking System Sounds Service of Windows) to run Regsvr32.exe every 30 minutes. Regsvr32.exe is used to bypass application whitelisting script protection for executing a Component Object Model (COM) scriptlet that is dynamically downloaded from the given URL.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P8S-tFLQMj5tpi12S5hPMw.png" /></figure><p>In conclusion, the given code incorporates following MITRE ATT&amp;CK techniques:</p><ul><li>T1053.005 Scheduled Task</li><li>T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service</li><li>T1218.010 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32</li><li>T1559.01 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model</li></ul><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about MITRE ATT&amp;CK, check out our LinkedIn group with all the latest! <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/">https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/</a></blockquote><h4>Blue Teaming — How to detect?</h4><p>The following Sigma rule can be used to detect creating a scheduled task that runs regsvr32.exe via schtasks.exe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ps316U96PxVtFGC9MMP6VQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sK9Dd-o7_kbBiG5fEeyQRQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-1053-scheduled-task"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87e7c122ef1e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/picus-security/how-to-simulate-and-detect-mitre-att-ck-t1053-scheduled-task-job-tachnique-a-real-command-used-by-87e7c122ef1e">How to Simulate and Detect MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Tachnique: A Real Command used by…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/picus-security">Picus Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Bypass WAFs for OS Command Injection]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/picus-security/how-to-bypass-wafs-for-os-command-injection-2c5dd4e6a52b?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c5dd4e6a52b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2020 09:42:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-01T09:42:15.621Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bOzdKx2Sxe6Bg1fM" /></figure><blockquote>Picus is dedicated to collaborating with its technology alliance partners and the cybersecurity community to build better cyber defenses against the adversary attempts. Accordingly, we have a responsible disclosure policy to publish vulnerabilities and bypass/evasion methods of security controls. We first notified the vendor, and after a grace period of 30 days, the new attack signature update was published.</blockquote><h4><strong>Summary</strong></h4><p>We have discovered that the “rev” and “printf” commands incorporated with the Bash shell’s command substitution feature bypass certain attack signature checks of F5 Advanced WAF/ASM/NGINX App Protect products. We use this combination of commands in a command execution payload that creates a reverse shell to the target web server.</p><h4><strong>Affected product versions</strong></h4><ul><li>BIG-IQ 7.X.X, 6.X.X, 5.X.X</li><li>BIG-IP, BIG-IP AFM, BIG-IP ASM 16.X.X, 15.X.X, 14.X.X, 13.X.X, 12.X.X, 11.6.X</li><li>Network Function Virtualization, F5 VNF Manager</li><li>NGINX Products, NGINX App Protect</li><li>Traffix SDC 5.X.X</li><li>F5 App Protect, F5 DDoS Hybrid Defender, F5 SSL Orchestrator 15.X.X, 14.X.X</li></ul><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about MITRE and #BuildingProactiveSOC, check out this <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/events/socproblems-buildingproactivesoccapabilities-daily/">virtual event</a> with guest speakers from IBM Security, SANS, Carbon Black and Gartner!!</blockquote><h4><strong>Technical Details</strong></h4><p>Senior red ream analyst and team lead <strong>Evren Yalcin</strong> of <strong>Picus Labs</strong> has discovered that certain attack signature checks for command execution can be bypassed by a command that combines and commands in a command substitution payload to create a reverse shell.</p><p>We created a listener on the attacker system to listen for incoming connections from the reverse shell running on the victim system:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KV8j6b3o3hatpd5tp3N0ew.png" /></figure><p>The following command is our base payload that creates a reverse shell by using the netcat utility, where 127.0.0.1 is the IP of the attacker system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m1wnV15D_FzZkYMdm4IWqQ.png" /></figure><p>As expected, this command is easily blocked by the WAF. Then we tried to use the rev command to bypass WAF. rev command in Linux reverses the order of characters of a given file or string as shown in the following example:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f2nBrGDhxpuAUSNNWE997g.png" /></figure><p>So, we tried to run the following command:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8LVPirWoZs-z5xnH8CtAZQ.png" /></figure><p>However, it gives an error as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jwtD8ZDHm1ZxrgHgt8A_Sw.png" /></figure><p>Then, we used command substitution to run the command successfully. Command substitution is a bash feature that allows a command to be executed and its output to replace the command itself.</p><p>The syntax of command substitution is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0wjs6VPX_YD6yMNpM_yVTA.png" /></figure><p>The command inside the parentheses executes, and the standard output of the command is returned as the value of the expression.</p><p>At first, we used the echo command in the command substitution payload as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fmmt9Y76NBAc0wIv072wHg.png" /></figure><p>This payload is detected by the WAF as an echo execution attempt. Then, we tried to obfuscate the echo command using different methods, such as the following payload:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bvulOAHxjf086uV0qJFTew.png" /></figure><p>However, the WAF successfully blocked the payload with the same “echo” execution attempt signature. Then, we looked for alternatives to the echo command in Linux. Consequently, we tried the printf command:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LsAzG7p8hyuM9zWJaLDuEQ.png" /></figure><p>It works like a charm without being blocked by the WAF signatures! A get request version of the payload looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Oh5-9qg8Kchm2EABvtCm8Q.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Testing Web Application Firewalls</strong></h4><p>Picus Threat Library includes thousands of web application attack payloads and hundreds of WAF bypass payloads that tests effectiveness of Web Application Firewalls. The above payload is included in the Picus Threat Library as:</p><ul><li>517874 Remote Code Execution using “rev” Command Variant-7</li></ul><p>Moreover, Picus Threat Library includes the following threats that tests this bypass method:</p><ul><li>712592 Remote Code Execution using “rev” Command Variant-1</li><li>534607 Remote Code Execution using “rev” Command Variant-2</li><li>427419 Remote Code Execution using “rev” Command Variant-3</li><li>305724 Remote Code Execution using “rev” Command Variant-4</li><li>312553 Remote Code Execution using “rev” Command Variant-5</li><li>313570 Remote Code Execution using “rev” Command Variant-6</li></ul><p>If you want to know whether your current enterprise security controls can block these types of attacks, please fill out <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/request-demo?hsCtaTracking=99e4fc3b-e8f0-4ec0-afe1-c80a47e5680d%7C42b5a1b8-ed3a-4784-bd1e-fa33774f0763">the demo request form </a>.</p><h4><strong>Mitigations</strong></h4><p>The F5 SIRT team promptly responded to each mail within one day throughout the entire process and quickly released mitigations.</p><p>Fixed Attack Signature Updates:</p><ul><li>ASM-SignatureFile_20200805_144624.im</li><li>ASM-AttackSignatures_20200805_144624.im</li></ul><p>Fixed Signatures:</p><ul><li>200003974 “rev” execution attempt (Parameter)</li><li>200003975 “rev” execution attempt (Header)</li><li>200003984 “printf” execution attempt (Parameter)</li><li>200003985 “printf” execution attempt (Header)</li></ul><p>F5 published the following advisory and acknowledged our researcher, Evren Yalcin:</p><ul><li><a href="https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K22788490">https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K22788490</a></li></ul><h4><strong>Disclosure Timeline:</strong></h4><ul><li>20/07/2020 Summary of the bypass method sent to the F5 Security Incident Response Team (F5 SIRT)</li><li>21/07/2020 Details are requested by F5 SIRT</li><li>21/07/2020 Report sent to F5 SIRT</li><li>22/07/2020 F5 SIRT opened a service request</li><li>23/07/2020 F5 SIRT confirmed the payload and requested details</li><li>05/08/2020 Details sent to F5 SIRT</li><li>06/08/2020 F5 release fixed ASM attack signature update files</li><li>18/08/2020 F5 publish the attack signature improvement article</li><li>17/09/2020 Picus Security publicly disclosed the bypass method after a 30 days grace period.</li></ul><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/f5-advanced-waf-asm-nginx-app-protect-signature-bypass"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c5dd4e6a52b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/picus-security/how-to-bypass-wafs-for-os-command-injection-2c5dd4e6a52b">How to Bypass WAFs for OS Command Injection</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/picus-security">Picus Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Most Used Persistence Technique by Adversaries: MITRE ATT&CK T1053 Scheduled Task/Job]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/picus-security/the-most-used-persistence-technique-by-adversaries-mitre-att-ck-t1053-scheduled-task-job-a65fb7d9482e?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a65fb7d9482e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:49:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-02T05:41:11.464Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><blockquote>In 2019, Picus Labs analyzed 48813 malware to determine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by adversaries in these malicious files. Picus Labs categorized each observed TTP by utilizing the <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">MITRE ATT&amp;CK</a>® framework. As a result of the present research, 445018 TTPs observed in the last year were mapped to ATT&amp;CK to identify the top 10 most common techniques used by attackers. <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">Our research</a> has found that Scheduled Task was the seventh most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</blockquote><p>A scheduled task is a command, program or script to be executed at a particular time in the future (e.g. 11/08/2022 1:00 a.m.), at regular intervals (e.g. every Monday at 1:00 a.m.), or when a defined event occurs (e.g. a user logs on the system). Legitimate users like system administrators use scheduled tasks to create and run operational tasks automatically. Adversaries also use task scheduling utilities of operating systems to execute malicious payloads on a defined schedule or at system startup to achieve persistence. <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">Our research</a> has found that Scheduled Task was the seventh most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</p><p>In this article, we review:</p><ul><li>the fundamentals of the Scheduled Task technique</li><li>updates on the technique in the new version of the ATT&amp;CK framework</li><li>sub-techniques of the Scheduled Task/Job technique</li><li>its use cases by threat actors and malware</li><li>red and blue team exercises for this technique</li></ul><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about MITRE and #BuildingProactiveSOC, check out this <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/events/socproblems-buildingproactivesoccapabilities-daily/">virtual event</a> with guest speakers from IBM Security, SANS, Carbon Black and Gartner!!</blockquote><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p>Operating systems provide utilities to automate execution of programs or scripts on a defined schedule:</p><ul><li>schtasks.exe (Microsoft Windows)</li><li>at.exe (Microsoft Windows)</li><li>at (Linux)</li><li>cron (Unix-like operating systems)</li><li>launchd (macOS)</li></ul><h3>Updates in the New Version of the MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework</h3><p>The July 2020 (v7) ATT&amp;CK release is the first non-beta release of Enterprise ATT&amp;CK represented with sub-techniques [1]. MITRE ATT&amp;CK Sub-techniques are a way to describe a specific implementation of a technique in more detail.</p><p>In the new sub-technique version of the MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework, name of the T1053 Scheduled Task technique is changed as T1053 Scheduled Task/Job and new subtechniques are added:</p><ul><li>At (Windows) was a pre-defined behaviour within T1053 Scheduled Task. Now it is a sub-technique under the T1053 Scheduled Task/Job technique as T1053.002 At (Windows).</li><li>Remaining behaviour in the previous T1053 Scheduled Task became a new sub-technique as T1053.005 Scheduled Task.</li><li>The T1168 Local Job Scheduling technique in the previous version is merged into T1053 Scheduled Task/Job:</li><li>At (Linux) was a pre-defined behaviour within T1168 Local Job Scheduling. Now it is a sub-technique under the T1053 Scheduled Task/Job technique as T1053.001 At (Linux).</li><li>Cron was a pre-defined behaviour within T1168 Local Job Scheduling. Now it is a sub-technique under the T1053 Scheduled Task/Job technique as T1053.003 Cron.</li><li>T1160 Launch Daemon was a technique in the previous version. Now it is a sub-technique under theT1053 Scheduled Task/Job technique asT1053.04 Launchd.</li></ul><h3>Scheduled Task/Job Sub-techniques</h3><ol><li><strong>T1053.001 At (Linux)</strong></li></ol><p>at is a command-line utility that allows users to schedule commands in various operating systems, such as Unix-like operating systems (e.g. Linux distributions, macOS and BSD), and Microsoft Windows. This sub-technique covers the at command within Linux, but it may be extended to other Unix-like operating systems.</p><p>at utility in Linux allows users to schedule commands to be executed only once at a particular time. An adversary may use at command to schedule one-time execution of malicious code in the future.</p><p><strong>2. T1053.002 At (Windows)</strong></p><p>Modern Microsoft Windows operating systems provide a graphical user interface (GUI) for Task Scheduler. Moreover, Microsoft Windows offers two native command line utilities for task scheduling: at.exe and schtasks.exe.</p><p>There are two requirements to use the at command in Windows:</p><ul><li>The Task Scheduler service must be running.</li><li>The user must be logged on as a Local Administrator.</li></ul><p>Adversaries use at.exe to schedule tasks to create a recurring task to execute at regular intervals. For example, it can be used to run a reverse shell to keep reverse shell sessions running.</p><p>At.exe can be used to run a command on not only the local system but also remote systems. As a real-world example, the TG-0416 Threat Group uses at.exe for at command to execute a malicious batch file on a remote system during lateral movement. lateral movement [2]. BRONZE BUTLER APT group uses the the at command to execute a malicious batch file on a remote system during lateral movement.</p><p><strong>3. T1053.003 Cron</strong></p><p>Cron is a utility in Unix-like operating systems to configure scheduled tasks. It can be used to schedule a command, script or program to execute periodically. As mentioned above, atis also a task scheduling utility in Unix-like OSs. However, they have different use cases. While Cron is a utility in Unix-like operating systems to configure scheduled tasks. It can be used to schedule a command, script or program to execute periodically. As mentioned above, atcron is suitable for repetitive tasks, at is suitable for one time tasks.</p><p>Adversaries use cron to execute their malicious payloads at regular intervals for persistence. As a recent example, attackers use cron to run the downloaded malicious payload every minute in the Ngrok Mining Botnet campaign [3].</p><p><strong>4. T1053.004 Launchd</strong></p><p>Launchd is the OS service management daemon for macOS that boots the system, and loads and maintains services. It is similar to systemd on Linux distributions and Service ControlManager on Microsoft Windows.</p><p>When a macOS system starts up, launchd is the first process launched after the kernel. Thus, adversaries may use the launchd daemon to schedule their malicious executables to run at system startup. As an example, Olyx macOS backdoor uses launchd to ensure the backdoor executable automatically launches when the user logs in [4].</p><p><strong>5. T1053.005 Scheduled Task</strong></p><p>This sub-technique refers to Windows Task Scheduler [5]. Windows Task Scheduler is a utility that enables users to schedule execution of commands, scripts or programs according to time-based or event-based triggers. A time-based trigger starts at a certain time or starts at specified time intervals, such as daily, weekly or monthly. An event-based trigger starts at a specific system event, such as when the system starts up or when a user logs on. Task Scheduler also supports multiple triggers, allowing the task to be launched in different ways.</p><p>Adversaries may use various methods to access the task scheduler:</p><ul><li>Running schtasks on the command line (the most common method) — E.g. Quakbot banking trojan used schtasks.exe on the command line to create a scheduled task that executes a JavaScript downloader [6].</li><li>Using a .NET wrapper</li><li>Using the Windows netapi32 library — E.g. Disttrack wiper malware uses the netapi32 library to create a scheduled task to run the payload on the remote system [7].</li><li>Opening Task Scheduler GUI within the Control Panel</li></ul><h3>References</h3><p>[1] “Updates — July 2020.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-july-2020/">https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-july-2020/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[2] H. Carvey, “Indicators of lateral movement using at.exe on Windows 7 systems.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.secureworks.com/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems">https://www.secureworks.com/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems</a>. [Accessed: 13-Aug-2020]</p><p>[3] “Website.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.intezer.com/container-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud//where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems">https://www.intezer.com/container-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud//where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems</a>. [Accessed: 13-Aug-2020]</p><p>[4] Microsoft Corporation, “Backdoor:MacOS_X/Olyx.A.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:MacOS_X/Olyx.A">https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:MacOS_X/Olyx.A</a>. [Accessed: 13-Aug-2020]</p><p>[5] “Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/</a>. [Accessed: 13-Aug-2020]</p><p>[6] Anonymous, “Qakbot levels up with new obfuscation techniques.” [Online]. Available: <a href="http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/05/qakbot-levels-up-with-new-obfuscation.html">http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/05/qakbot-levels-up-with-new-obfuscation.html</a>. [Accessed: 13-Aug-2020]</p><p>[7] R. Falcone, “Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper,” 30-Nov-2016. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/">https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/</a>. [Accessed: 14-Aug-2020]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/0*9hVDdCVt7YOP4mSQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-1053-scheduled-task"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a65fb7d9482e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/picus-security/the-most-used-persistence-technique-by-adversaries-mitre-att-ck-t1053-scheduled-task-job-a65fb7d9482e">The Most Used Persistence Technique by Adversaries: MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1053 Scheduled Task/Job</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/picus-security">Picus Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MITRE ATT&CK T1064 Scripting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/picus-security/mitre-att-ck-t1064-scripting-8a031b596342?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8a031b596342</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2020 00:08:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-23T09:44:11.237Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Hackers’ Favourite Scripting Languages Part 2: Offensive and Defensive Analysis of a VBA Script used by a Real Malware (Emotet)</h3><p>Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*KIdyrnaNYTJ4YrQs" /></figure><blockquote>In 2019, Picus Labs analyzed 48813 malware to determine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by adversaries in these malicious files. Picus Labs categorized each observed TTP by utilizing the <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">MITRE ATT&amp;CK</a>® framework. As a result of the present research, 445018 TTPs observed in the last year were mapped to ATT&amp;CK to identify the top 10 most common techniques used by attackers. has found that Scripting was the sixth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</blockquote><h3>Red and Blue Team Exercises</h3><h4>Red Teaming — How to simulate?</h4><p>In this exercise, we explain a real VBA code that was used by Emotet malware. We analyzed this payload in our following blog posts:</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/emotet-technical-analysis-part-1-reveal-the-evil-code">Emotet Technical Analysis — Part 1 Reveal the Evil Code</a></li><li><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/emotet-technical-analysis-part-2-powershell-unveiled">Emotet Technical Analysis — Part 2 PowerShell Unveiled</a></li></ul><p>This payload was included in the following Word document:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6UftG95FWbCyV4Y6sVkLqQ.png" /></figure><p>Researchers identified Emotet for the first time in 2014 as a banking malware stealing sensitive and private information. Now, adversaries are using Emotet as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) for delivering malware, including other banking Trojans. Emotet incorporated various obfuscation and evasion techniques to avoid detection in its payload.</p><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about MITRE ATT&amp;CK, check out our LinkedIn group with all the latest! <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/">https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/</a></blockquote><p>Briefly, the VBA code embedded in the Word document executes an encoded PowerShell command using WMI, then the PowerShell code downloads a second payload of Emotet. Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows-based operating systems [23].</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JnwWvKgJxEzBcvX4eDxLrA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QllNIRO2UNE1zyWuP01JIA.png" /></figure><p>Let’s split and analyze the command:</p><ul><li>Do While GetObject(winmgmtS:win32_Process).Create(): In the Do While loop, the Create method of the WMI&#39;s Win32_Process class is used to create a new process. The first variable of this method is the CommandLine code to execute, which is a PowerShell command in this code.</li><li>Powershell -w hidden: There is not a parameter named -w according to the official PowerShell documentation [24]. In fact, the -w parameter is completed by PowerShell as the -WindowStyle parameter because of the parameter substring completion feature of PowerShell. Adversaries commonly use the -WindowStyle parameter with Hidden value in malicious PowerShell commands to avoid detection.</li><li>-en: Similar to -w, there is not a parameter named -en, according to the official PowerShell documentation [24]. The -en parameter is completed as -EncodedCommand parameter by PowerShell. -EncodedCommand accepts a base-64-encoded string version of a command. Therefore, we must use base64 decoding to reveal the PowerShell command.</li></ul><p>We’ll get the following code after base64 decoding, removing garbage variables, backtick (`), and plus (+) characters, and putting values of variables and beautifying the code. You can read the details of these de-obfuscation process in our blog post [25].</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oSwNgsPcUFMsgLMtVDq0vw.png" /></figure><p>Briefly, this code tries to download a file from the URLS included in the $list array in the given order via the Net.WebClient.DownloadFile method and saves the downloaded file to the $env:userprofile directory as 937.exe.</p><p>In conclusion, the VBA code given in this exercise incorporates following MITRE ATT&amp;CK techniques:</p><ul><li>T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic</li><li>T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation</li><li>T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell</li><li>T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window</li><li>T102 Obfuscated Files or Information</li></ul><h4>Blue Teaming — How to detect?</h4><p>The following Sigma rule can be used to detect WMI DLLs loaded via VBA Macros in Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook files:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m_G6DuePz8CGFhwI2391Sw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yWxkNMxuTRy-DmNG7AFQ7A.png" /></figure><h3>References</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*xu-TVDlu4FS9nI3P" /></figure><p>[23] stevewhims, “Windows Management Instrumentation.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[24] SteveL-MSFT, “about_PowerShell_exe — PowerShell.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_powershell_exe">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_powershell_exe</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[25] S. Özarslan, “Emotet Technical Analysis — Part 2 PowerShell Unveiled.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/emotet-technical-analysis-part-2-powershell-unveiled">https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/emotet-technical-analysis-part-2-powershell-unveiled</a>. [Accessed: 12-Aug-2020]</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-t1064-scripting"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8a031b596342" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/picus-security/mitre-att-ck-t1064-scripting-8a031b596342">MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1064 Scripting</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/picus-security">Picus Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hackers’ Favourite Scripting Languages Part 1: MITRE ATT&CK T1064 Scripting Technique]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/picus-security/hackers-favourite-scripting-languages-part-1-mitre-att-ck-t1064-scripting-technique-e46e037794f7?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e46e037794f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2020 15:32:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-21T15:32:43.949Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*FJWuyMB9g8YzlEXP" /></figure><blockquote>In 2019, Picus Labs analyzed 48813 malware to determine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by adversaries in these malicious files. Picus Labs categorized each observed TTP by utilizing the <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">MITRE ATT&amp;CK</a>® framework. As a result of the present research, 445018 TTPs observed in the last year were mapped to ATT&amp;CK to identify the top 10 most common techniques used by attackers. has found that Scripting was the sixth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</blockquote><p>A script is a set of codes written in a scripting language such as AppleScript, PowerShell, Python, Unix Shells (bash, sh and others), VBScript, and JavaScript/JScript. Legitimate users like system administrators and programmers use scripting to accelerate operational tasks by automating them in scripts. Adversaries also use scripts to automate multiple actions. <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">Our research</a> has found that Scripting was the sixth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>A script is an ordered set of commands written in a scripting language. A scripting language is an interpreted programming language that executes scripts without compiling. Not only legitimate users but also adversaries use Scripting to automate long tasks and execute codes that include multiple actions. Some scripting languages like PowerShell and VBScript in Windows systems and Unix shells in Unix based systems and AppleScript in macOS can interact directly with the operating system at an API, so they can be used by adversaries to bypass weak process monitoring mechanisms.</p><p>In this article, we review:</p><ul><li>the fundamentals of the Scripting technique</li><li>updates on the technique in the new version of the ATT&amp;CK framework</li><li>sub-techniques derived from the Scripting technique</li><li>its use cases by threat actors and malware</li><li>red and blue team exercises for this technique</li></ul><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about MITRE ATT&amp;CK, check out our LinkedIn group with all the latest! <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/">https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/</a></blockquote><h3>Changes in the New Version of the MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework</h3><p>The July 2020 (v7) ATT&amp;CK release is the first non-beta release of Enterprise ATT&amp;CK represented with sub-techniques [1]. MITRE ATT&amp;CK Sub-techniques are a way to describe a specific implementation of a technique in more detail.</p><p>In the new sub-technique version of the MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework, the T1064 Scripting technique is deprecated. However, it was not completely removed in the new version. The Scripting technique is split into separate T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1059.006 Python, and T1059.007 JavaScript/Jscript sub-techniques of T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter.</p><h3>Command and Scripting Interpreter Sub-techniques</h3><p>The first three sub-techniques of the Command and Scripting Interpreter technique, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.002 AppleScript, and T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, were explained in our <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-t1059-command-line-interface">Command-Line Interface blog</a> post. Command Line Interface was the sixth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique according to our 10 Critical ATT&amp;CK Technique research. Although these three techniques are also scripting languages, they were not included in the Scripting technique of the previous ATT&amp;CK version, since they were stand-alone techniques.</p><p>In this blog post, we describe four other sub-techniques that are derived from the Scripting technique.</p><h4><strong>1. T1059.004 Unix Shell</strong></h4><p>Unix shell is the primary command-line interpreter that provides a command-line interface (CLI) for Unix based operating systems (OS) such as macOS, Linux, and BSD. The Bourne Shell (sh), Bourne-Again Shell (bash), Z Shell (zsh), Korn Shell (ksh), and Secure Shell (SSH) are the most commonly used Unix shells.</p><p>In addition to an interactive CLI, The Unix shell also provides a scripting language to control the execution of the OS using shell scripts. Basically, a shell script is a set of commands that are in the execution order. The Unix shell can control any part of the system and support typical programming concepts such as conditional tests, loops, file operations, variables, and functions.</p><p>Since Unix shells are powerful and flexible tools that execute commands and control the system, adversaries use Unix shells to execute various commands and malicious payloads. Moreover, they control remote systems with SSH during the lateral movement and command and control phases. Some use cases of Unix shells in malware:</p><ul><li><strong>to execute multiple commands on victims:</strong></li><li>macOS Bundlore adware [2], Derusbi malware [3], Linux/Exaramel backdoor [4]</li><li><strong>to create a reverse shell:</strong></li><li>CallMe OSX Trojan [5], Chaos backdoor [6], Cointicker macOS cryptocurrency ticker [7]</li><li><strong>to start/stop OS services and installed applications:</strong></li><li>LoudMiner cross-platform cryptocurrency miner [8], WindTail OSX backdoor [9]</li><li><strong>download additional payloads:</strong></li><li>Shlayer macOS malware [9], [10], Skidmap cryptocurrency miner [11]</li></ul><h4><strong>2. T1059.005 Visual Basic</strong></h4><ul><li><strong>Visual Basic for Applications (VBA): </strong>VBA is an implementation of the Visual Basic language that provides process automation, Windows API access, and other low-level functionality through DLLs. Including Office for macOS, it is included in most Microsoft Office applications. As a common malicious usage scenario, adversaries embed their malicious codes in VBA macros in Microsoft Office files, then sends these malicious files as email attachments to victims (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T166.001 Spearphishing Attachment)</li><li><strong>VBScript (Microsoft Visual Basic Scripting Edition):</strong>VBScript is a derivative of Visual Basic that enables the user to control many aspects of the system by using COM. Although VBScript initially targeted web developers by providing web client scripting in Internet Explorer and web server scripting in IIS, it gained support from Windows system administrators and adversaries because of its extensive functionality. For example, in a malware campaign revealed in March 2020, an obfuscated VBScript package was used to drop various malware such as Zloader, Ursnif, Qakbot, and Dridex [16]. The initial access vector is an email that contains a zipped VBScript file (.vbs) that appeared to be an invoice.</li></ul><h4><strong>3. T1059.006 Python</strong></h4><p>Python is a popular high-level interpreted programming language. Since Python interpreters are available for the most of the operating systems and it has a comprehensive standard library that can perform many functions, adversaries use Python to execute commands, download payloads and perform various malicious behaviors. Threat actors create not only malware but also vulnerability exploit tools with Python.</p><p>Python can be executed in multiple ways:</p><ul><li>interactively from the command-line interface (CLI)</li><li>via Python scripts (.py)</li><li>via binary executables created by compilation of Python code</li></ul><p>One of the most recent Python-based malware is the PoetRAT remote access trojan (RAT) [17]. Briefly, it uses a Word document that contains a VBA script to drop a ZIP file. Then, the VBA macro unzips the zip file and executes the PoetRAT, which is a Python script. The zip file also contains a Python interpreter because Windows has no default Python interpreter.</p><h4><strong>4. T1059.006 JavaScript/JScript</strong></h4><p>JavaScript (JS) is a high-level ad multi-paradigm programming language that supports event-driven, functional, and imperative programming styles. JavaScript conforms to the ECMAScript specification, which is a standard for the interoperability of Web pages across different browsers. In fact, ECMAScript is the official name of the JavaScript language [18]. Jscript is Microsoft&#39;s implementation of the ECMAScript language specification [19]. It is an interpreted scripting language as most of the scripting languages.</p><p>In most cases, adversaries use JScript to develop droppers/downloaders to install/download the actual malware [20], [21]. They use heavy obfuscation methods on .js files that can evade static AV signatures [20], [21]. In some cases, adversaries use VBA and JScript together in their malware like TrickBot [22].</p><h3>References</h3><p>[1] “Updates — July 2020.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-july-2020/">https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-july-2020/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[2] O. Sushko, “macOS Bundlore: Mac Virus Bypassing macOS Security Features,” 17-Apr-2019. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://mackeeper.com/blog/post/610-macos-bundlore-adware-analysis">https://mackeeper.com/blog/post/610-macos-bundlore-adware-analysis</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[3] “Website.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2016/2016.02.29.Turbo_Campaign_Derusbi/TA_Fidelis_Turbo_1602_0.pdf">https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2016/2016.02.29.Turbo_Campaign_Derusbi/TA_Fidelis_Turbo_1602_0.pdf</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[4] “New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya,” 11-Oct-2018. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[5] R. Falcone and J. Miller-Osborn, “Scarlet Mimic: Years-Long Espionage Campaign Targets Minority Activists,” 24-Jan-2016. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/">https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[6] S. Feldmann, “Chaos: a Stolen Backdoor Rising Again,” 14-Feb-2018. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2018/02/14/chaos-a-stolen-backdoor-rising/">https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2018/02/14/chaos-a-stolen-backdoor-rising/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[7] T. Reed, “Mac cryptocurrency ticker app installs backdoors,” 29-Oct-2018. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/10/mac-cryptocurrency-ticker-app-installs-backdoors/">https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/10/mac-cryptocurrency-ticker-app-installs-backdoors/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[8] “LoudMiner: Cross‑platform mining in cracked VST software,” 20-Jun-2019. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/06/20/loudminer-mining-cracked-vst-software/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/06/20/loudminer-mining-cracked-vst-software/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[9] “Middle East Cyber-Espionage.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3B.html">https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3B.html</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[10] “TAU Threat Intelligence Notification: New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered,” 12-Feb-2019. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/">https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[11] T. Micro, “Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload,” 16-Sep-2019. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/">https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[12] mcleanbyron, “The Component Object Model.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/the-component-object-model">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/the-component-object-model</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[13] “The Windows Native API — TechNet Articles — United States (English) — TechNet Wiki.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/11831.the-windows-native-api.aspx">https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/11831.the-windows-native-api.aspx</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[14] “Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[15] “Native API.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[16] blubracket, “Obfuscated VBScript Drops Zloader, Ursnif, Qakbot, Dridex — Security Boulevard,” 24-Jun-2020. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/2020/06/obfuscated-vbscript-drops-zloader-ursnif-qakbot-dridex/">https://securityboulevard.com/2020/06/obfuscated-vbscript-drops-zloader-ursnif-qakbot-dridex/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Aug-2020]</p><p>[17] W. Mercer, “PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors.” [Online]. Available: <a href="http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html">http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html</a>. [Accessed: 12-Aug-2020]</p><p>[18] “JavaScript Versions.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.w3schools.com/js/js_versions.asp">https://www.w3schools.com/js/js_versions.asp</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/yGGjpu/R7yc">. [Accessed: 12-Aug-20</a>2 <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/yGGjpu/R7yc">0]</a></p><p>[19] “JScript (ECMAScript3).” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/hbxc2t98(v=vs.85)">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/hbxc2t98(v=vs.85)</a>. [Accessed: 12-Aug-2020]</p><p>[20] “Undetected JScript Dropper Installs Sage Ransomware,” 20-Apr-2017. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.vmray.com/cyber-security-blog/undetected-jscript-dropper-executes-sage-ransomware/">https://www.vmray.com/cyber-security-blog/undetected-jscript-dropper-executes-sage-ransomware/</a>. [Accessed: 12-Aug-2020]</p><p>[21] “[No title].” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://file.gdatasoftware.com/web/en/documents/whitepaper/G_DATA_Analysis_Script.Trojan-Downloader.Fodevepdf.A.pdf">https://file.gdatasoftware.com/web/en/documents/whitepaper/G_DATA_Analysis_Script.Trojan-Downloader.Fodevepdf.A.pdf</a>. [Accessed: 12-Aug-2020]</p><p>[22] “Deobfuscating Ostap: TrickBot’s 34,000 Line JavaScript Downloader,” 03-Sep-2019. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/deobfuscating-ostap-trickbots-javascript-downloader/">https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/deobfuscating-ostap-trickbots-javascript-downloader/</a>. [Accessed: 12-Aug-2020]</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-t1064-scripting"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e46e037794f7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/picus-security/hackers-favourite-scripting-languages-part-1-mitre-att-ck-t1064-scripting-technique-e46e037794f7">Hackers’ Favourite Scripting Languages Part 1: MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1064 Scripting Technique</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/picus-security">Picus Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MITRE ATT&CK T1059 Command Line Interface]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/picus-security/mitre-att-ck-t1059-command-line-interface-a9c164fc451c?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9c164fc451c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2020 21:40:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-15T22:58:16.570Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>OS Features help Malware Developers: MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1059 Command Line Interface Technique</h3><p>by Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*t8adUSry8ww-apEJ" /></figure><blockquote>In 2019, Picus Labs analyzed 48813 malware to determine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by adversaries in these malicious files. Picus Labs categorized each observed TTP by utilizing the <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">MITRE ATT&amp;CK</a>® framework. As a result of the present research, 445018 TTPs observed in the last year were mapped to ATT&amp;CK to identify the top 10 most common techniques used by attackers. has found that Command Line Interface was the fifth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</blockquote><p>A Command-Line Interface ( CLI) offers a way of interacting with local or remote computer systems. <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">Our research</a> has found that Command-Line Interface was the <strong>fifth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique</strong> used by adversaries in their malware. As an execution technique, adversaries use one or more CLI to run their code, interact with local and remote systems, and execute other software during an attack campaign.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Operating systems ( OS) provide one or more built-in Command Line Interfaces ( CLIs) to users. Not only legitimate users but adversaries also frequently use built-in OS CLIs to run their commands since it is easy to detect a third-party program that executes commands.</p><p>As an Execution technique, CLI is critical to run adversary-controlled code on a local or remote system. Execution techniques are typically combined with techniques from all other tactics to accomplish specific aims, such as lateral movement and data exfiltration.</p><p>In this article, we review:</p><ul><li>the fundamentals of the Command-Line Interface technique</li><li>updates on the technique in the new version of the ATT&amp;CK framework</li><li>sub-techniques of the new version of the Command-Line Interface technique</li><li>its use cases by threat actors and malware</li><li>Red team exercises for this technique</li></ul><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about MITRE ATT&amp;CK, check out our LinkedIn group with all the latest! <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/">https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8955879/</a></blockquote><h3>Changes in the New Version of the MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework</h3><p>The July 2020 (v7) ATT&amp;CK release is the first non-beta release of Enterprise ATT&amp;CK represented with sub-techniques [1]. MITRE ATT&amp;CK Sub-techniques are a way to describe a specific implementation of a technique in more detail.</p><p>In the new sub-technique version of the MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework, the name of the Command-Line Interface technique is changed as Command and Scripting Interpreter, and seven sub-techniques are added under this technique:</p><ul><li>T1086 PowerShell and T1155 AppleScript were existing techniques in the previous version and became sub-techniques in the new version, T1059.001 PowerShell and T1059.002 AppleScript respectively.</li><li>T1059.003 Windows Command Shell was included in the T1059 Command-Line Interface technique in the previous version and became a sub-technique in the new version.</li><li>The T1064 Scripting technique in the previous version deprecated and split into separate T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1059.006 Python, and T1059.007 JavaScript/Jscript sub-techniques of T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter.</li></ul><h3>Command and Scripting Interpreter Sub-techniques</h3><p>In this blog post, the first three sub-techniques will be explained. Since Scripting was the sixth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique according to our 10 Critical ATT&amp;CK Technique research, we will describe the remaining four sub-techniques in our Scripting blog post.</p><h4><strong>T1059.001 PowerShell</strong></h4><p>PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line shell and scripting language installed by default on Windows operating systems. Since PowerShell has extensive access to Windows internals, system administrators frequently use it to manage and configure the operating system, and automate complex tasks. Not only system administrators but also adversaries have realized the potential in incorporating this powerful tool into their arsenal.</p><p>Before being a sub-technique of the Command and Scripting Interpreter technique, PowerShell was a stand-alone technique. It appeared as the second most frequently used MITRE ATT&amp;CK technique in our <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">Ten Critical ATT&amp;CK techniques search</a>. Click <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-t1086-powershell">here</a> to read our detailed blog post on the PowerShell technique.</p><h4><strong>T1059.002 AppleScript</strong></h4><p>AppleScript is a macOS scripting language that allows users to directly control scriptable macOS applications, as well as parts of macOS itself [2]. Scripts - sets of written instructions - can be created to automate repetitive tasks, integrate features from multiple scriptable applications, and build complex workflows. A scriptable application is an application that can be controlled by a script. For AppleScript, scriptable applications are responsive to inter-application messages, called Apple events. An Apple event can be sent from a script, an application, and macOS.</p><p>Macro malware developers use AppleScript to run their malicious code on Mac systems. For example, the macro code in a macro malware verifies whether WScript.Shell — the Windows Script Shell — is present [3]. If WScript is not detected, the code executes the MacScript function of the VBA. This function executes an AppleScript script that creates a reverse shell via Python. As another use case of the AppleScript sub-technique, OSX/Dok trojan utilizes AppleScript to create a Login Item [4]. macOS malware uses Login Items for persistence since they can execute applications when the users log on. Moreover, AppleScript is also utilized by the WebTools component of the Bundlore adware to inject malicious JavaScript code into the browser [5].</p><h4><strong>T1059.003 Windows Command Shell</strong></h4><p>Adversaries frequently utilize the Windows command shell (also known as cmd.exe), command line, or simply cmd) for execution. Actually, it is an application built into the Windows OS that accepts commands and executes them. Although not as powerful as PowerShell, you can control almost any aspect of a system with the Windows Command Shell. PowerShell has been developed to enhance the abilities of the Command Shell.</p><p>The Windows cmd.exe shell can be used to build scripts, and store them in batch files (e.g., . bat or . cmd files) to run multiple commands and automate long and repetitive tasks like user account management or nightly backups.</p><p>Adversaries commonly use cmd.exe with the /c parameter such as cmd.exe /c &lt;command&gt;. The /c parameter is used to run the command and then terminate the shell after command completion [6]. Interactive shells may also be created (such as a reverse shell) to run commands and get outputs interactively.</p><p>Malware families abuse cmd.exe for different purposes. For example, the WastedLocker ransomware that has recently caused a worldwide outage of services of wearable device maker Garmin [7] uses cmd.exe for:</p><ul><li>Execute malicious payloads</li><li>Creating delays for Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1497) via Time Based Evasion (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1497.003) [8]</li><li>Deleting service executables for Indicator Removal on Host (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1070) via File Deletion (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T11070.004) [9]</li><li>Modify file attributes with the attrib command <a href="https://paperpile.com/c/ZkdVcP/42Ut">[10]</a></li></ul><h3>Red and Blue Team Exercises</h3><h4>Red Teaming — How to simulate?</h4><p>Briefly, the following cmd.exe one-liner gets system information using an obfuscated command.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*opqZmpGlPmChZg6JGIfmSQ.png" /></figure><p>Let’s split and analyze the command:</p><p>cmd.exe /c: As mentioned above, the /c parameter is used to run the command and then terminate the shell after command completion (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1059.003 Windows Command Shell) [6].</p><p>Inserted character for obfuscation (T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information):</p><ul><li>Comma: The comma (,) character can serve as delimiters and can be used instead of the whitespace character in cmd.exe commands. This feature is used by attacks to obfuscate commands.</li><li>Carets: The caret (^) is the escape character of cmd.exe and one of the most commonly used characters for obfuscation of cmd.exe commands to evade rigid detection signatures.</li><li>Double quotes: In this command, double quotes (&quot;) are used to wrap characters, which is equivalent to connecting these characters with others.</li></ul><p>After removing the above obfuscation characters, we have the following de-obfuscated command:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-N1VlgCWNqX9VRDT6iyu6A.png" /></figure><ul><li>powershell.exe: cmd.exe will run a PowerShell command. (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1059.001 PowerShell)</li><li>Get-WmiObject: The PowerShell command uses Get-WmiObject cmdlet that gets information about the available WMI classes (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation).</li><li>Win32_ComputerSystem: This WMI class discovers system information (MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1082 System Information Discovery).</li></ul><p>In conclusion, this command incorporates five different ATT&amp;CK techniques.</p><h4>Blue Teaming — How to detect?</h4><p>Following Sigma rule can be used to detect gathering system information using Get-WmiObject cmdlet of PowerShell:</p><p>title: SystemInformationDiscoveryviaPowerShellCmdlet<br>status: experimental<br>description: DetectstheattempttogathersysteminformationusingGet-WmiObjectcmdletofPowerShell.Thistechniqueiscommonlyutilizedfordiscovery.<br>author: PicusSecurity<br>references:<br>- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/<br>- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086/<br>- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/<br>- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/<br>- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/<br>logsource:<br> product: windows<br> service: security<br> definition1: &#39;Requirements: Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Detailed Tracking\Audit Process Creation&#39;<br> definition2: &#39;Requirements: Group Policy : Computer Configuration\ Administrative Templates\ System\ Audit Process Creation\ Include Command Line&#39;<br>detection:<br> selection:<br> EventID: 4688<br> NewProcessName: &#39;*\powershell.exe&#39;<br> ProcessCommandLine: &#39;*wmi* *Win32_ComputerSystem*&#39;<br> condition: selection<br>falsepositives:<br> - Legitimate administrative activities<br>level: medium<br>tags:<br> - attack.execution<br> - attack.discovery<br> - attack.t1047<br> - attack.t1086<br> - attack.t1082<br> - attack.ta0002<br> - attack.ta0007</p><h3>References</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*2Thj7BLH-PTUfvCZ" /></figure><p>[1] “Updates — July 2020.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-july-2020/">https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-july-2020/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[2] “Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide,” 25-Jan-2016. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html">https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html</a>. [Accessed: 09-Aug-2020]</p><p>[3] Y. Grbic, “Macro Malware Targets Macs,” 14-Feb-2017. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/">https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/</a>. [Accessed: 09-Aug-2020]</p><p>[4] “Mac Malware of 2017.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#Dok">https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#Dok</a>. [Accessed: 09-Aug-2020]</p><p>[5] O. Sushko, “macOS Bundlore: Mac Virus Bypassing macOS Security Features,” 17-Apr-2019. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://mackeeper.com/blog/post/610-macos-bundlore-adware-analysis">https://mackeeper.com/blog/post/610-macos-bundlore-adware-analysis</a>. [Accessed: 09-Aug-2020]</p><p>[6] “CMD.exe.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://ss64.com/nt/cmd.html">https://ss64.com/nt/cmd.html</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[7] S. Gatlan, “Garmin outage caused by confirmed WastedLocker ransomware attack,” <em>BleepingComputer</em>, 24-Jul-2020. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/garmin-outage-caused-by-confirmed-wastedlocker-ransomware-attack/">https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/garmin-outage-caused-by-confirmed-wastedlocker-ransomware-attack/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[8] “Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[9] “Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[10] coreyp-at-msft, “attrib.” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib</a>. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2020]</p><p>[11] Neo23x, “Neo23x0/sigma,” <em>GitHub</em>. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma">https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma</a>. [Accessed: 12-Jul-2020]</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-t1059-command-line-interface"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9c164fc451c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/picus-security/mitre-att-ck-t1059-command-line-interface-a9c164fc451c">MITRE ATT&amp;CK T1059 Command Line Interface</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/picus-security">Picus Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From pentesting to red teaming: Security testing solutions compared]]></title>
            <link>https://picus.medium.com/from-pentesting-to-red-teaming-security-testing-solutions-compared-20b2d53dfb1c?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20b2d53dfb1c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2020 02:09:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-17T02:09:21.268Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Armagan Zaloglu</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pD6J0-mXeEsbFR-U" /></figure><p>In our recent blog, <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/what-is-security-testing-and-why-is-it-important">What is security testing and why is it important?</a>, we talked about how security testing is one of the single most important jobs an effective security department can do.</p><p>Without it, security leaders have no way to make informed and pragmatic decisions about the areas of investment they need to prioritize — and no basis on which to make the argument for a bigger security budget.</p><p>However, while it’s uncommon nowadays to find a business without some form of security testing program in place, different organizations tend to be at very different levels of maturity when it comes to testing. This is often reflected in the tools, techniques and processes they use for the purpose. That’s not to say that some security testing solutions are right and some are wrong — they all have their own strengths and weaknesses, and the most sophisticated security teams know how to use them in conjunction to achieve the desired outcome.</p><p>Here are the four key security testing solutions and how they compare.</p><blockquote>Find out more about improving your security testing in our <a href="https://hubs.ly/H0ttFwS0">whitepaper</a>, Breach and Attack Simulation: A Novel Cybersecurity Validation Approach.</blockquote><h3>Security testing solution 1: Vulnerability management</h3><p>The role of a vulnerability management solution is to scan your environment for network and application vulnerabilities that haven’t been patched yet, and to help you manage the process of getting them fixed.</p><p>It’s one of the oldest and best-known security testing solutions, and — on the surface — has a compelling use case: many successful cyber attacks exploit vulnerabilities that have been known about to the security community for weeks or months, but haven’t been patched by their victims. If only they had been faster to identify and address those vulnerabilities.</p><p>In reality, of course, vulnerability management isn’t the silver bullet it may sound like. The challenges of working with this 25-year-old technology are twofold:</p><ul><li>Even with real-time visibility of new vulnerabilities (and, with some modern solutions, predictive prioritization), most security teams oversee such complex IT environments that patching remains an onerous, time-consuming task. If the solution lacks context on other control capabilities, false positives can also muddy the waters.</li><li>More importantly, vulnerability management focuses on vulnerabilities — not the actions of threat actors themselves. So, while they help draw attention to possible points of compromise, they can’t advise on whether there’s a real risk that one of those points of compromise will be targeted. This stops security teams from taking a pragmatic view of each vulnerability, and prioritizing patches based on the value to the business.</li></ul><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about cyber breaches, check out our <a href="https://hubs.ly/H0ttFq90">research</a> on the most commonly used attack techniques.</blockquote><h3>Security testing solution 2: Pentesting</h3><p>Penetration testing, or pentesting, is another common and well-known security testing solution. In a penetration test, an organization hires a trusted third party to attempt to breach their IT environment using the same tools and techniques as a real threat actor.</p><p>For obvious reasons, a pentest offers far more insight than a vulnerability scan when it comes to the question of whether a system would really stand up in the event of a cyber attack. The value of a pentest is also easily communicated to and understood by business stakeholders, and many compliance regimes such as PCI DSS specifically state they should be carried out on a regular basis.</p><p>So what are the downsides?</p><p>Well, from a security perspective, perhaps the biggest issue with pentesting is that it only reflects your defenses at a specific moment in time. Most pentests are conducted within a limited timeframe on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis — enough time for the threat landscape to be almost unrecognizable from one test to the next.</p><p>Moreover, pentesters normally look for security gaps within a pre-agreed scope. If you coordinate a pentest to look for security gaps within the parts of your IT infrastructure used to process card payments, it won’t tell you much about your overall security control capabilities.</p><p>Finally, while pentesters do normally report back on their findings, it’s not their job to give specific mitigation instructions. Establishing and coordinating the followup actions after a pentest are up to you.</p><h3>Security testing solution 3: Red teaming</h3><p>A red team exercise is essentially a much more sophisticated and comprehensive version of a pentest, taken a number of steps further in terms of replicating real-world threat behavior.</p><p>Over the course of the exercise, a multidisciplinary team of ethical hackers will attempt to circumvent your defenses and achieve a specific outcome by any means necessary. Their job isn’t to test for weaknesses in a specific system or bypass a specific defense measure, but to think and act like a real threat actor. A skilled red team will offer a wider and deeper view of your threat readiness than almost any other security testing solution.</p><p>Another key part of a red team’s mandate is to work alongside the organization’s internal security team — or “blue team” — and pass on specific mitigation instructions. This helps ensure the same security gaps won’t be exploited by threats in the wild.</p><p>However, bear in mind that red team exercises do have a significant downside. Running an exercise like this is time and resource-intensive to plan, coordinate and deliver, so it’s not a technique you can rely on for anywhere near real-time visibility into how well your environment would deal with new threats.</p><h3>Security testing solution 4: Breach and attack simulation (BAS)</h3><p>Finally, <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/whitepaper/a-novel-cyber-security-validation-approach">breach and attack simulation (BAS)</a> is a relative newcomer to the security testing world.</p><p>BAS is a software solution that follows the same threat-centric mindset as a red team exercise, where real and documented threat behavior is used as a starting point to identify and prioritize security gaps. However, the key difference is that BAS automatically simulates this behavior to provide 24–7 insight into your readiness to defend against new and emerging threats.</p><p>As the BAS market is new and less mature than some of the other security testing solutions described above, there tend to be a few small differences in the way different vendors define BAS. We believe it should deliver on five key requirements:</p><ul><li>It should keep up with the threat landscape and use the latest threat intelligence as it becomes available.</li><li>It should provide continuous security validation 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.</li><li>It should be able to assess existing control capabilities, ensuring security teams aren’t flooded with false positives.</li><li>It should provide mitigation instructions for each threat sample, linked back to existing detection and prevention technologies in use (such as detection rules for your SIEM system).</li><li>Like red and blue team testing, it should facilitate effective communication and collaboration between stakeholders.</li></ul><p>As BAS becomes more common, it should help solve some of the problems we discussed above around vulnerability management, pentesting and red team testing.</p><p>That’s not to say it’s a replacement for them, of course. Effective security testing has always been about using the right tools and techniques in the right context. BAS won’t, for example, offer the same depth of insight (or, say, social engineering capabilities) as a world-class red team.</p><p>However, when it comes to balancing speed and coverage against real threat behavior, it makes for an extremely effective foundation to your overall security validation strategy.</p><p>Find out more in our <a href="https://hubs.ly/H0ttFwS0">whitepaper</a>, Breach and Attack Simulation: A Novel Cybersecurity Validation Approach.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/security-testing-solutions-compared"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20b2d53dfb1c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MITRE ATT&CK T1036 Masquerading]]></title>
            <link>https://picus.medium.com/mitre-att-ck-t1036-masquerading-3b5e16cef590?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3b5e16cef590</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2020 01:50:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-17T01:50:53.877Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Süleyman Özarslan, PhD</p><blockquote>In 2019, Picus Labs analyzed 48813 malware to determine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by adversaries in these malicious files. Picus Labs categorized each observed TTP by utilizing the <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">MITRE ATT&amp;CK</a>® framework. As a result of the present research, 445018 TTPs observed in the last year were mapped to ATT&amp;CK to identify the top 10 most common techniques used by attackers. <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">Our research</a> has found that Masquerading was the fourth most prevalent ATT&amp;CK technique used by adversaries in their malware.</blockquote><p>As a defense evasion technique, adversaries change features of their malicious artifacts with legitimate and trusted ones. Code signatures, names and location of malware files, names of tasks and services are some examples of these features. After masquerading, malicious artifacts of adversaries such as malware files appear legitimate to users and security controls.</p><p>In this article, we review:</p><ul><li>the fundamentals of the Masquerading technique</li><li>features manipulated by adversaries for Masquerading</li><li>its use cases by threat actors and malware</li><li>Red team exercises for this technique</li></ul><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Adversaries masquerade their malicious artifacts, such as malware files and processes, as legitimate software and processes to evade detection by users and security controls.</p><h3>Masquerading Sub-techniques</h3><h4>1.T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature</h4><p>Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables to verify the author of the program and guarantee that the code has not been tampered with. In the invalid code signature sub-technique, adversaries copy metadata and code signature information of valid and signed programs and use this information in their malware.</p><p>Since a code signature is valid for a specific program, it is not valid for any other programs. Therefore, unlike the Code Signing sub-technique of the T1553 Subvert Trust Controls ATT&amp;CK technique [1], this code signature cloning activity for masquerading will not result in a valid signature. So, although these malware files appear more legitimate to users, security analysts and security controls, they cannot pass digital signature validation.</p><p>MetaTwin is an open-source tool that copies metadata and AuthentiCode signature from one file and injects it into another [2]. MetaTwin extracts the resources of a legitimate binary using the Resource Hacker tool [3]. It also extracts the digital signature information of the legitimate binary with the SigThief tool [4]. Then, MetaTwin writes the extracted metadata and digital signature information to a target binary</p><h4>2. T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override</h4><p>Right-to-left override ( RTLO or RLO) character is a non-printing Unicode character ( U+202E) that is used to display the text that follows it in right-to-left order. This special character is used to deal with languages that are written from right-to-left and causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, the file name receiptU+202Etxt.exe will appear on the screen as receiptexe.txt. Users may think that the file is a text file, but it is actually an executable file. As another example, the filename with receiptmcod.txt may be actually receipt\u202Etxt.docm , which is a macro-enabled document file with a U+202e placed just before mcod.txt. Note that this operation only changes the visual appearance of the file name, does not change the actual file name - it still has the extension docm.</p><p>This feature (!) is used by adversaries to trick users into opening malware files by showing the file extension as a benign extension instead of executable. This Masquerading sub-technique is commonly used with the Malicious File sub-technique of the T1204 User Execution ATT&amp;CK technique [5] and Spearphishing Attachment sub-technique of the T1566 Phishing ATT&amp;CK technique [6].</p><p>Etumbot backdoor malware leverages the Unicode Right-to-Left Override ( RLO) technique combined with convincing icons for various types of PDFs or Microsoft Office documents to trick the user into clicking and executing the malware file delivered via spearphishing [7].</p><p>As a recent example, an APT group used the RLO technique to disguise an SCR (Windows screensaver) malware as a document file [8]. Adversaries also used a classic Right-to-Left Override attack to trick Telegram users by changing displayed file extension [9]. For example, a JS malware file is renamed as follows: my_photo_U+202Egnp.js Where U+202E is the RLO character to make Telegram display the remaining string gnp.js in reverse, sj.png. Then, the adversary sends the message, and the recipient sees an incoming PNG image file instead of a JS JavaScript file.</p><p>RLO/RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well. For example, Sirefef malware uses the RLO technique to trick users into believing that the entries it creates in the registry of the infected machine are legitimate Google update entries [10].</p><h4>3. T1036.003 Rename System Utilities</h4><p>Adversaries frequently utilize Windows system utilities in their operations to bypass defensive security controls. Rundll32.exe, cmd.exe, and certutil.exe are some of these utilities. Because of the increased use of legitimate system utilities by adversaries, security tools may monitor them to detect their suspicious use. To avoid name-based detection, adversaries may rename system utilities. For example, threat actors of Operation Soft Cell changed the name of the cmd.exe as cdm.exe [11]. Korplug malware, which is leveraging the COVID-19 pandemic to spread, is using a renamed certutil.exe - msoia.exe to decode the CAB file [12].</p><h4>4. T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service</h4><p>Adversaries use task and service functionalities of operating systems to facilitate initial or recurring execution of their malicious code [13] [14]. As a part of execution and persistence, malware may create tasks and services to be executed at system startup or repeatedly.</p><p>Security controls may quickly detect custom-named tasks and services. Therefore, threat actors masquerade the name of a task/service with the name of a legitimate task/service to make it appear benign and evade detection. Adversaries commonly use identical or similar names of legitimate tasks/services executed by the Windows Task Scheduler, at (Linux and Windows), Windows services, and Linux systemd services.</p><p>They may use the name of a Windows service or a legitimate third-party service. For example, ComRAT has used WSqmCons, a name associated with Windows SQM Consolidator [15]. Fin7 has disguised its scheduled tasks as AdobeFlashSync for persistence [16]. In addition to names, adversaries may masquerade descriptions of their tasks/services. For example, Disttrack wiper malware has created a service named ntssrv, with a display name of &quot;Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service&quot; and a description of &quot;Helps guard against time change attempts targeting known and newly discovered vulnerabilities in network time protocols&quot; [17].</p><h4>5. T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location</h4><p>Adversaries may masquerade names/locations of their artifacts as identical or similar names/locations of legitimate files to evade monitoring and detection. As a recent example, the Tropic Trooper cyberespionage group has used %USERPROFILE%\Documents\Flash\ folder to place its USBferry malware and masquerade its name as flash_en.exe [18]. Threat actors of the Operation In(ter)ception cyberespionage campaign disguised their files and folders by giving them similar names of known software and companies, such as C:\Intel\IntelV.cgi, C:\NVIDIA\NvDaemon.exe, C:\ProgramData\DellTPad\DellTPadRepairexe [19].</p><p>Moreover, adversaries change icons of their malware with icons of benign files. As an example, Pony Trojan used a well-known Adobe Reader icon and the filename security or infos to look trustworthy [20].</p><h4>6. T1036.006 Space after Filename</h4><p>In macOS, adding a space to the end of a filename will modify how the operating system handles the file with other kinds of files. If an executable Mach-O file is called malware.txt, it will open with the text editing program when double-clicked by a user. So, the executable will not run properly. On the other hand, if the file is renamed as &quot; malware.txt &quot; (a space added at the end). macOS detects the executable file type and executes the binary when a user double-clicks it.</p><p>As an example, OSX / Keydnap backdoor malware was distributed in a zip archive, which contained a binary named &quot; screenshot.jpg&quot; [21]. Note that the filename contained a space character at its end. Therefore, it would be executed by Terminal.app, and the Keydnap backdoor malware would be run when a user double-clicked it.</p><blockquote>For a table of use cases by malware and threat actors please see the original <a href="https://hubs.ly/H0tyzf00">article</a>.</blockquote><h3>Red and Blue Team Exercises</h3><h4>1. Rename cmd.exe ( T1036.003 Rename System Utilities)</h4><h4>Red Teaming — How to simulate?</h4><p>In this test, we will copy cmd.exe as cdm.exe like threat actors of Operation Soft Cell [11]:</p><p><strong>C:\WINDOWS\system32&gt;copy C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe C:\WINDOWS\System32\cdm.exe<br> 1 file(s) copied</strong></p><p>Now, we can use cdm or cdm.exe instead of cmd or cmd.exe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/796/0*nyAhc5m4__8zfk6U.png" /></figure><h4>Blue Teaming — How to detect?</h4><p>Following Sigma rule can be used to detect the execution of a renamed binary leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint [25].</p><p>title: Renamed Binary <br>id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142<br>status: experimental<br>description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.<br>author: Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton / @4A616D6573, oscd.community (improvements), Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)<br>date: 2019/06/15<br>modified: 2019/11/11<br>references: <br> - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/<br> - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html<br> - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html<br>tags: <br> - attack.t1036<br> - attack.defense_evasion<br>logsource: <br> category: process_creation<br> product: windows<br>detection: <br> selection: <br> OriginalFileName: <br> - &#39;cmd.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;powershell.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;powershell_ise.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;psexec.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;psexec.c&#39; # old versions of psexec (2016 seen)<br> - &#39;cscript.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;wscript.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;mshta.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;regsvr32.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;wmic.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;certutil.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;rundll32.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;cmstp.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;msiexec.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;7z.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;winrar.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;wevtutil.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;net.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;net1.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;netsh.exe&#39;<br> filter: <br> Image|endswith:<br> - &#39;\cmd.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\powershell.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\powershell_ise.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\psexec.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\psexec64.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\cscript.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\wscript.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\mshta.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\regsvr32.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\wmic.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\certutil.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\rundll32.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\cmstp.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\msiexec.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\7z.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\winrar.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\wevtutil.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\net.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\net1.exe&#39;<br> - &#39;\netsh.exe&#39;<br> condition: selection and not filter<br>falsepositives: <br> - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist<br>level: medium</p><h4>2. Use a task name similar to a Windows service (T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service)</h4><h4>Red Teaming — How to simulate?</h4><p>We will test the masquerading method used by the Rancor threat group&#39;s Plaintee Trojan (Picus Threat ID: 206343).</p><p><strong>C:\WINDOWS\system32&gt;cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /mo 5 /tn “Windows Updata Services” /tr “\”%APPDATA%\Local Service.exe\” \”C:\PICUS_863a9199decf36895d5d7d148ce9fd622e825f393d7ebe7591b4d37ef3f5f677.dll\”,OpenURLB” /F <br>SUCCESS: The scheduled task “Windows Updata Services” has successfully been created.</strong></p><p>As shown in the above figure, the Rancor group used Windows Updata Services as the name of the scheduled task. Note that they wrote updata instead of update.</p><h4>Blue Teaming — How to detect?</h4><p>Following Sigma rule can be used to detect scheduled task creation pointing to the %APPDATA% directory.</p><p>title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Pointing to AppData <br>status: experimental <br>description: Detects the attempt to create a scheduled task pointing the %APPDATA% directory. <br>author: Picus Security <br>References:</p><p>- <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/</a></p><p>- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/ <br>logsource: <br> category: process_creation <br> product: windows <br>detection: <br> selection: <br> Image: &#39;*\schtasks.exe&#39; <br> CommandLine: &#39;* /create *AppData*&#39; <br> filter: <br> User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM <br> condition: selection and not filter <br>fields: <br> - CommandLine <br> - ParentCommandLine <br>tags:</p><p>- attack.t1053 <br>falsepositives: <br> - Legitimate administrative activities <br> - Software installation <br>level: low</p><h4>3. Use a task name similar to a common software service (T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service)</h4><h4>Red Teaming — How to simulate?</h4><p>In this test, we will use Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater as the task name like the Turla threat group (Picus Threat ID: 141210).</p><p>C:\WINDOWS\system32&gt;schtasks /Create /TR “%APPDATA%\Adobe\adobeup.exe” /SC WEEKLY /TN “Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater” <br>SUCCESS: The scheduled task “Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater” has successfully been created.</p><h4>Blue Teaming — How to detect?</h4><p>Following Sigma rule is specific to the above masquerading method used by the Turla group. Moreover, you can use the Sigma rule given in the second exercise to detect this attack.</p><p>title: Suspicious Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater Scheduled Task Creation <br>status: stable <br>description: Detects the attempt to create a scheduled task called &quot;Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater&quot; which runs malicious backdoor (adobeup.exe). This technique is commonly utilized for persistence as Turla APT Group&#39;s usage in its threat campaigns. <br>author: Picus Security <br>references: <br> - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/ <br> - https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010/ <br> - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/ <br> - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/ <br> - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/ <br>logsource: <br> product: windows <br> service: security <br> definition1: &#39;Requirements: Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Detailed Tracking\Audit Process Creation&#39; <br> definition2: &#39;Requirements: Group Policy : Computer Configuration\ Administrative Templates\ System\ Audit Process Creation\ Include Command Line&#39; <br>detection: <br> selection: <br> EventID: 4688 <br> NewProcessName: &#39;*\schtasks.exe&#39; <br> ProcessCommandLine: &#39;schtasks /Create *Adobe\\adobeup.exe\&quot;* \&quot;Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater\&#39; <br> condition: selection <br>falsepositives: <br> - None <br>level: high <br>tags: <br> - attack.persistence <br> - attack.privilege_escalation <br> - attack.execution <br> - attack.ta0002 <br> - attack.ta0003 <br> - attack.ta0004 <br> - attack.t1053 <br> - attack.g0010</p><h3>Appendixes</h3><h4>Appendix A — Aliases of Threat Groups</h4><p>Threat Group: Ke3chang — Aliases: APT15, Mirage, Vixen Panda, GREF, Playful Dragon, RoyalAPT</p><p>Threat Group: Tropic Trooper — Aliases: KeyBoy, Pirate Panda</p><p>Threat Group: Turla — Aliases: Waterbug, WhiteBear, VENOMOUS BEAR, Snake, Krypton</p><h4>Appendix B — Aliases of Malware Families</h4><p>Malware: Disttrack — Alias: Shamoon</p><p>Malware: Korplug — Alias: DestroyRAT, Sogu, Kaba, PlugX</p><h4>References</h4><h4>References</h4><p>[1] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/aRH3">“Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, Sub-technique T1553.002 — Enterprise | MITRE ATT&amp;CK®.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002/</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/aRH3">. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</a></p><p>[2] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/2Fjw">threatexpress, “threatexpress/metatwin,” GitHub. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://github.com/threatexpress/metatwin">https://github.com/threatexpress/metatwin</a>. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</p><p>[3] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/FblU">“Resource Hacker.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="http://angusj.com/resourcehacker/">http://angusj.com/resourcehacker/</a>. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</p><p>[4] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/harQ">secretsquirrel, “secretsquirrel/SigThief,” GitHub. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://github.com/secretsquirrel/SigThief">https://github.com/secretsquirrel/SigThief</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/harQ">. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</a></p><p>[5] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/BIwX">“User Execution: Malicious File, Sub-technique T1204.002 — Enterprise | MITRE ATT&amp;CK®.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/</a>. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</p><p>[6] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/J4h1">“Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment, Sub-technique T1566.001 — Enterprise | MITRE ATT&amp;CK®.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/J4h1">. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</a></p><p>[7] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/ku1W">ASERT, “Illuminating the Etumbot APT Backdoor,” Jun-2014. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2014/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2014-07-Illuminating-Etumbot-APT.pdf">https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2014/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2014-07-Illuminating-Etumbot-APT.pdf</a>. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</p><p>[8] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/3Wsi">“Threat Actor Groups use COVID-19 pandemic theme — Red Alert.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://redalert.nshc.net/2020/04/16/threat-actor-groups-use-covid-19-pandemic-theme/">https://redalert.nshc.net/2020/04/16/threat-actor-groups-use-covid-19-pandemic-theme/</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/3Wsi">. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</a></p><p>[9] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/nTp7">A. Firsh, “Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/">https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/</a>. [Accessed: 09-Jul-2020]</p><p>[10] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/feZy">“Sirefef Malware Found Using Unicode Right-to-Left Override Technique.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://threatpost.com/sirefef-malware-found-using-unicode-right-to-left-override-technique/102033/">https://threatpost.com/sirefef-malware-found-using-unicode-right-to-left-override-technique/102033/</a>. [Accessed: 08-Jul-2020]</p><p>[11] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/83Lg">“Virus Bulletin :: VB2019 paper: Operation Soft Cell — a worldwide campaign against telecommunication providers.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2019/12/vb2019-paper-operation-soft-cell-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunication-providers/">https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2019/12/vb2019-paper-operation-soft-cell-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunication-providers/</a>. [Accessed: 09-Jul-2020]</p><p>[12] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/uJ8I">“COVID-19 Ongoing Cyber Updates.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://blog.cyberint.com/covid-19-ongoing-cyber-updates">https://blog.cyberint.com/covid-19-ongoing-cyber-updates</a>. [Accessed: 12-Jul-2020]</p><p>[13] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/hCVM">“Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, Sub-technique T1053.005 — Enterprise | MITRE ATT&amp;CK®.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Jul-2020]</p><p>[14] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/4FcF">“Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Sub-technique T1543.003 — Enterprise | MITRE ATT&amp;CK®.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/4FcF">. [Accessed: 10-Jul-2020]</a></p><p>[15] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/OVKv">M. Faou, “From Agent.BTZ to ComRAT v4.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf">https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/OVKv">. [Accessed: 10-Jul-2020]</a></p><p>[16] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/S7VE">M. Gorelik, “FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry">https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry</a>. [Accessed: 10-Jul-2020]</p><p>[17] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/gQWc">R. Falcone, “Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper,” Unit42, 30-Nov-2016. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/">https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Jul-2020]</p><p>[18] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/3SfJ">J. Chen, “Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air-gapped Environments.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/Tech-Brief-Tropic-Trooper-s-Back-USBferry-Attack-Targets-Air-gapped-Environments.pdf">https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/Tech-Brief-Tropic-Trooper-s-Back-USBferry-Attack-Targets-Air-gapped-Environments.pdf</a>. [Accessed: 10-Jul-2020]</p><p>[19] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/yuo0">D. Breitenbacher and K. Osis, “Operation In(ter)ception: Aerospace and military companies in the crosshairs of cyberspies | WeLiveSecurity,” WeLiveSecurity, 17-Jun-2020. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/17/operation-interception-aerospace-military-companies-cyberspies/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/17/operation-interception-aerospace-military-companies-cyberspies/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Jul-2020]</p><p>[20] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/JfXN">hasherezade, “No money, but Pony! From a mail to a trojan horse — Malwarebytes Labs,” Malwarebytes Labs, 19-Nov-2015. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2015/11/no-money-but-pony-from-a-mail-to-a-trojan-horse/">https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2015/11/no-money-but-pony-from-a-mail-to-a-trojan-horse/</a>. [Accessed: 10-Jul-2020]</p><p>[21] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/y5yI">“Mac Malware of 2016 | Synack Blog,” Synack. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://www.synack.com/blog/mac-malware-2016/">https://www.synack.com/blog/mac-malware-2016/</a>. [Accessed: 11-Jul-2020]</p><p>[22] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/Nz7t">“Middle East Cyber-Espionage.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3B.html">https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3B.html</a>. [Accessed: 11-Jul-2020]</p><p>[23] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/w7yR">Kaspersky Lab, “THE REGIN PLATFORM NATION-STATE OWNAGE OF GSM NETWORKS,” 24-Nov-2014. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070305/Kaspersky_Lab_whitepaper_Regin_platform_eng.pdf">https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070305/Kaspersky_Lab_whitepaper_Regin_platform_eng.pdf</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/w7yR">. [Accessed: 11-Jul-2020]</a></p><p>[24] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/H4oY">Nart Villeneuve, James T. Bennett, Ned Moran, Thoufique Haq, Mike Scott, and Kenneth Geers, “OPERATION ‘KE3CHANG’: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs.” [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf">https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf</a>. [Accessed: 11-Jul-2020]</p><p>[25] <a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/IMEN">Neo23x, “Neo23x0/sigma,” GitHub. [Online]. Available: </a><a href="https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma">https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma</a><a href="http://paperpile.com/b/cZq4kQ/IMEN">.</a> [Accessed: 12-Jul-2020]</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-t1036-masquerading"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b5e16cef590" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[5 requirements for an effective security testing solution]]></title>
            <link>https://picus.medium.com/5-requirements-for-an-effective-security-testing-solution-dba74b660da7?source=rss-ac72598e09c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dba74b660da7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Picus Security Inc.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2020 01:38:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-17T01:38:19.371Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Armagan Zaloglu</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kKLdWIchXuMbUyUp" /></figure><p>Security testing isn’t just a nice-to-have — it should be the north star of effective security leadership. Your security validation program should be able to tell you, in real time, whether your security controls would stand up against the most advanced current threats, whether your current investments are driving ROI, and where you need to steer the business next.</p><p>That’s a lot of pressure, considering the rate at which new attack techniques and tactics are emerging, which is why the security validation market is evolving fast. A wide and diverse array of security testing methods are in use today, from vulnerability scanning to more sophisticated techniques such as breach and attack simulation (BAS), and practitioners commonly rely on frameworks such as <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques">MITRE ATT&amp;CK</a> to help get the job done.</p><p>But what really makes for an effective security testing solution? To help CISOs orient themselves in this fast-changing market, we’ve put together a list of five must-haves when assembling a modern, threat-centric security validation program.</p><blockquote>Find out more about threat-centric security testing in our <a href="https://hubs.ly/H0ttFwS0">whitepaper</a>, Breach and Attack Simulation: A Novel Cybersecurity Validation Approach.</blockquote><h3>Requirement 1: Ability to utilize imminent advanced threats</h3><p>One of the greatest challenges in security testing is that new cyber threats are emerging all the time, and they use a wide spectrum of sophisticated techniques and tactics to achieve their ends. This includes techniques designed specifically to evade detection.</p><p>As such, while traditional vulnerability scanning solutions will help security teams gain visibility on new security issues as they are discovered (which may or may not be exploited in the next wave of attacks) they lack the all-important context of what threats are really up to “in the wild”. They enable security teams to identify potential “victims” in their business, but that’s not the same as responding to documented trends in adversary behavior.</p><p>Red team exercises can help organizations bring their validation more in line with real-world scenarios. However, red team testing is resource-intensive and time-consuming, so on its own won’t deliver against our second key requirement: 24x7x365 readiness.</p><h3>Requirement 2: 24x7x365 validation</h3><p>In cyber security, the enemy never sleeps. Not only are new threats emerging all the time, but they do so at such a rate that security stakeholders describe it as a “constant battle” to stay ahead, a <a href="https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insights/security/invest-cyber-resilience">2020 Accenture report</a> reveals.</p><p>In this environment, red team exercises — which may take weeks or even months to plan and execute — simply can’t deliver the level of round-the-clock threat readiness security teams need to succeed. While they have a vital role to play when it comes to testing security controls against the most sophisticated techniques, organizations will need to look elsewhere for continuous, 24x7x365 security validation.</p><h3>Requirement 3: Assessing existing control capabilities</h3><p>It may sound obvious, but an effective security testing solution needs to account for the full range of security controls already present in a business’ IT environment, however complex and multifaceted it may be. Without the ability to assess existing control capabilities, security validation tools will struggle to provide meaningful insight on the relevance of individual security gaps, and the priority in which they need to be addressed.</p><blockquote>If you’d like to learn more about cyber breaches, check out our <a href="https://hubs.ly/H0ttFq90">research</a> on the most commonly used attack techniques.</blockquote><h3>Requirement 4: Immediate mitigation</h3><p>In some cases, security validation tools will highlight security gaps that need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. For this reason, we think it’s vital that an effective security testing solution should not only alert security teams to areas of risk, but arm them with the necessary information to remedy those risks within minutes. In some cases, this may involve a detailed to-do list of mitigation suggestions.</p><h3>Requirement 5: Enable team communication and collaboration</h3><p>Finally, an effective security testing solution needs to respond not only to the full range of threats out there, the full range of potential victims in the business and the full range of existing control capabilities, but also the many different functions, departments and individuals who need to be involved in responding to security risk.</p><p>Every security leader knows that driving communication and collaboration between security and business stakeholders is easier said than done. Effective validation should be able to help all stakeholders see and understand the complex relationships between threats, risks, mitigation actions and security ROI, and get the entire team to rally around a shared objective.</p><p>Does your security testing solution meet the five requirements described above, or are there still gaps you need to address? Download our whitepaper to find out more about the different approaches to validation and their pros and cons.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/5-requirements-for-an-effective-security-testing-solution"><em>https://www.picussecurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dba74b660da7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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