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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by P.K. Balachandran on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by P.K. Balachandran on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Consequences of building a dam over the Siang river on the Sino-Indian border]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/consequences-of-building-a-dam-over-the-siang-river-on-the-sino-indian-border-fd5c257335be?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 07:34:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-29T07:34:31.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*DoQEgrZ1ip6jdn7K7G-lvA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd5c257335be" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Consequences of building a dam over the Siang river on the Sino-Indian border]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/consequences-of-building-a-dam-over-the-siang-river-on-the-sino-indian-border-0729a276d1aa?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0729a276d1aa</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 05:27:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-29T05:27:20.239Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*jeBaVldvjtH-rFXGsfCaFw.avif" /><figcaption>Siang river</figcaption></figure><p><em>Its strategic purpose is to meet the threat from China’s much larger hydropower project upstream on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, but the Upper Siang project will have adverse consequences in India and Bangladesh</em></p><p>By P.K.Balachandran</p><p>Colombo, July 29 — Large dams have always been controversial in India. In many cases and, especially with respect to the Sardar Sarovar and Tehri Dams, agitations were also launched. The Sardar Sarovar dam in Gujarat has been one of India’s most controversial, and its environmental impact and net costs and benefits are widely debated. The World Bank was initially funding, but withdrew in 1994 at the request of the Government of India when the state governments were unable to comply with the loan’s environmental and other requirements.</p><p>The latest controversy is over the proposed Upper Siang Multipurpose Project in Arunachal Pradesh in the North East of India. It is no longer being discussed only as a hydropower project, butis framed as a geostrategic safeguard against China. It has local, regional and geopolitical ramifications.</p><p>The roughly 11,200-megawatt project in a place bordering China, is expected to generate electricity, moderate floods and store water on the Siang — the principal Indian channel of the Brahmaputra river. But its strategic purpose is to meet the threat from China’s much larger hydropower project upstream on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet.Indian officials argue that a massive reservoir on the Siang could protect the country against either the diversion of water during the dry season or a sudden release during periods of high flow.That concern should not be dismissed entirely. China’s upstream plans are of legitimate consequence to India, Bangladesh and every community dependent on the Brahmaputra basin. Beijing’s assurances that its project will not harm downstream countries cannot simply be taken at face value. But neither should New Delhi’s.</p><p>The question is not whether India has reason to worry about what China is building upstream. As a matter of precaution, it should. The question is whether constructing another Himalayan mega-dam, in one of the most ecologically fragile and seismically active regions in the world, is an intelligent answer to that risk.</p><p>So far, the Upper Siang project remains at the preparatory and survey stage. Construction has not begun. Yet the political language surrounding it increasingly suggests that the conclusion has already been reached and that environmental studies, village consultations and pre-feasibility surveys are merely obstacles to be cleared afterward. That is where the problem begins.</p><p>A project of this scale cannot be justified simply because it has been given the label of national security. The larger the strategic claim, the greater the need for scrutiny. Instead, geostrategy risks becoming a device through which every objection — from displacement to seismic danger — is treated as secondary to an emergency, media reports say.</p><p>India’s own strategic reasoning also contains an uncomfortable weakness. The proposed reservoir is expected to store as much as 14 billion cubic metres of water and remain partly empty so that it can absorb an unexpected upstream surge. But the usefulness of that defence depends on reservoir levels, the timing and volume of any release, the condition of the dam and the ability of operators to anticipate an event originating beyond India’s border.</p><p>It would also take around a decade to construct the project after work formally begins. During that period, temporary structures and unfinished works could themselves remain exposed to an upstream flood, landslide-generated surge or sudden release.</p><p>A defence mechanism that becomes particularly vulnerable while it is being built cannot be treated as a simple strategic solution.</p><p>The project’s ecological cost is no less troubling. The Siang basin covers more than 15,000 square kilometres, over 82 per cent of which is covered by forest. It forms part of the wider Dihang–Dibang and Siang landscape, recognised for its dense forests, rare species and exceptional biological diversity. A storage project of this size would not affect only the location where concrete is poured. Reservoir formation and altered flow would inundate forests, separate habitats, disrupt fish migration, aquatic food chains and the seasonal rhythms upon which farming communities depend.</p><p>The geological risk is harder to dismiss and cannot be overstated. Arunachal Pradesh lies within India’s highest traditional seismic-risk classification. The eastern Himalayas are not an old and settled geological formation. They remain tectonically active, heavily fractured and vulnerable to earthquakes, landslides and slope failure. The magnitude-8.6 Assam–Tibet earthquake of 1950 triggered extensive landslides, ground fractures and river blockages across the region.</p><p>This does not mean that Upper Siang will inevitably cause an earthquake. It means that placing one of India’s largest dams in such terrain demands far more than a routine environmental clearance.</p><p>The geological hazard would be further accentuated by climate change and it should not be viewed as a peripheral threat. Glacial retreat, extreme rainfall and glacial lake outburst floods are increasing the danger of sudden surges carrying water, rock and sediment.</p><p>The collapse of the Teesta III dam during the 2023 glacial lake outburst flood in Sikkim should have ended the belief that Himalayan hydropower structures can be assessed using historical averages alone. That disaster demonstrated how quickly an extreme event can overwhelm infrastructure regarded as a source of clean energy and regional development.</p><p>The communities of the Siang Valley understand that they will be the first to live with these risks and have chosen to not remain silent. Adi villagers, farmers, students and traditional leaders have repeatedly protested against the project, warning that ancestral land, agriculture and cultural identity could disappear beneath the reservoir.</p><p>Reuters reported that at least 16 Adi villages could be lost to the reservoir, directly affecting around 10,000 people, while community representatives argue that the wider number affected could exceed 100,000.</p><p>Residents from more than 27 villages have opposed survey activities. In May 2025, central armed personnel were deployed near proposed survey locations, as authorities attempted to move forward with pre-feasibility work. Student organisations and local groups protested what they regarded as an effort to conduct surveys under coercive conditions rather than through meaningful consultation.</p><p>The Adi Bane Kebang, the apex traditional body of the Adi community, later rejected the project and demanded the withdrawal of the forces deployed for the survey. For the Adi, the Siang is not simply a volume of water waiting to be converted into electricity. It is Ane Siang — the sacred river around which land, agriculture, customary practice and cultural memory have developed.</p><p>The Arunachal Pradesh government has pointed to survey permissions granted in parts of the project area. But permission to conduct preliminary studies is not the same as consent for the dam itself.</p><p>The project’s final footprint, displacement burden and cumulative risks remain unsettled, making any suggestion of broad public endorsement premature.</p><p>Compensation offers no answer to what would be permanently lost. Financial payments may cover property on paper, but they cannot restore ancestral land, river-based livelihoods or the social and cultural life built around the Siang. Once submerged, these losses cannot be recovered.</p><p>New Delhi should not allow frustration with Beijing to stampede it into a project whose ecological, geological and human costs have not been honestly settled, the agitators say.</p><p>At minimum, work on the Upper Siang project should be paused until an independent cumulative assessment is completed for the entire basin. That assessment must include reservoir-triggered seismicity, glacial lake outburst floods, sediment loading, dam-break scenarios, downstream effects and the combined impact of other planned hydropower projects.</p><p>Most importantly, the people of the Siang Valley must not be treated as another risk to be managed. Their consent must precede the project, not be assembled village by village after the state has already decided to proceed.</p><p>One Himalayan mega-dam does not become a sound answer merely because an even larger one is being constructed across the border in China. If approached without the necessary caution, Upper Siang could become not a shield against disaster, but the setting for another one — much like the destruction of the Teesta III dam in Sikkim. The Indian Environment Ministry’s expert committee recommended the reconstruction of the Teesta-3 dam in Sikkim. This decision came after a catastrophic glacier lake outburst flood in 2024 caused damage and loss of life.</p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0729a276d1aa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How India Lost the Cool of Its Summer Nights]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/how-india-lost-the-cool-of-its-summer-nights-000629c9791b?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 03:16:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-22T03:16:36.578Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Laxmi</p><p>This essay began as an assignment. Earlier this summer, an editor asked me to write a first-person feature on India’s 2026 heatwave — the kind of piece where a reporter’s decades in a country are supposed to earn the reader’s trust. The first thing I reached for was a Hindi word I had learned at Jawaharlal Nehru University in the summer of 1996: loo. The second was the memory of the object that had made the loo bearable — the desert cooler in the hostel window, a water-and-straw box that cooled by evaporation, ran on a tenth of the electricity of a modern AC, and cost around forty-five dollars.</p><p>Then I went looking for how the current Indian press was describing the same summer. The surprise was small and specific: the word loo had thinned. May and June coverage now runs on wet-bulb, feels-like, humid heat, apparent temperature — an English index vocabulary. The word that had been the working name for the northern Indian summer for generations was still there, but no longer central.</p><p>The second surprise was about the cooler, and it came from the framing of the 2026 coverage, not the volume of it. AC was no longer being written about as a middle-class aspiration or a status object. It was being described as a necessity — with low-income households, in several of the pieces I read, pooling money to share a single unit between families. That framing is what sent me back to check what had happened to cooler consumption. The India I had lived in was cost-conscious out of habit and short of grid electricity out of necessity, and by both instincts the desert cooler — a forty-five-dollar box, a tenth of the power draw, no refrigerant, no compressor — should have been the obvious default, especially at the lower end of the income ladder. If even lower-income families were now choosing to share an AC rather than buy their own cooler, prosperity alone did not seem enough to explain it. Something in the air itself, I began to suspect, had changed underneath the choice.</p><p>The third thread pulled me the rest of the way in. Tracing where the loo comes from — geographically — sent me back to the Thar Desert of Rajasthan, India’s Sahara. And I recalled an unexpected pattern from the reporting I have been doing more recently on India’s solar buildout: the Thar had begun to green. Solar-powered irrigation pumps, deployed at record scale, had begun pulling groundwater to the surface, and oases were appearing in the desert I remembered only as sand. That was not a link any single 2026 climate report I read had drawn out loud.</p><p>I want to be honest about which chair I am writing from. For years, as a reporter, I have followed the climate beat across South Asia — but the physics of it is not my discipline.</p><p>Three small things — a word that was thinning, a household object that used to be the greener choice and had stopped being so, and a desert that was quietly stopping being a desert — did not seem to be three separate stories.</p><p>This essay is the shape of that suspicion, followed all the way down.</p><p>The word was loo.</p><p>In the summer of 1996, in Room 332 of Ganga Hostel at Jawaharlal Nehru University, I learned it before I learned the honorific verbs. The older students taught it as a life lesson: from noon to about four in the afternoon, in May and June, a wind comes off the western deserts. It is dry. It carries dust. Its temperature is somewhere between forty-five and fifty degrees. You do not go outside. You do not open the window. If you must go out, you cover your face with a wet cloth. You drink water with salt and lemon in it. You come home before dusk, because at dusk the wind stops, and the ground begins to give back the day’s heat, and the night — properly rationed — is livable.</p><p>That was the loo. It was a working piece of Indian summer. It had a name, an entry in dictionaries, a fixed time slot, a set of counter-measures. There were no phones in 1996, the information came from the newspaper pinned to the hostel canteen wall each morning, and from seniors who had already survived last summer.</p><p>If you open the Indian papers in the summer of 2026, the word is still there, but it is thinning. Behind the new index vocabulary sits a physical change the Council on Energy, Environment and Water has quantified: the Indo-Gangetic Plain, which used to sit at 30–40% summer humidity between 1982 and 2011, now sits at 40–50%, with Delhi alone adding roughly nine points of relative humidity. It is why Down to Earth now names humid heat India’s most dangerous climate threat.</p><p>The word loo rests on a physical assumption. Loo means a hot, dry, dust-laden wind from the west. It requires the very dryness that is retreating. It requires the very westerly wind system that, as a Harvard study documented in 2018, has been declining across northwest India by more than 5% per decade — part of the same broader stilling trend that is bleeding value out of the country’s wind farms.</p><p>Take the word apart, and it does not describe today’s summer. So the papers use it less.</p><p>And even the desert that the loo comes from is no longer quite a desert. The Thar has, in the last two decades, gained 38% in vegetation and 64% in rainfall. India’s largest exporter of dry heat is quietly closing its factory.</p><p>But the loo was never a standalone wind. It was one moving part of a larger arrangement — an arrangement Indians had lived on top of for three thousand years without ever needing to name it as a system. Take that system apart, and you can see what is actually being lost.</p><p>The Indian night was never a myth. It was a machine. And the machine is coming apart.</p><p>The “Indian night” this essay concerns itself with is a specific object, not a year-round one: the pre-monsoon summer night on the northern plains, from April into late June — the eight to ten weeks each year when the day gets to forty-five degrees and the population historically survived by rationing the heat against the cool of the night. It is not the Delhi winter night; Delhi winters are cold, and layered cotton and quilts do most of the work. It is not the monsoon night; the monsoon night is its own separate ordeal, whose vocabulary is humidity and ceiling fan, not loo and radiative cooling. It is the pre-monsoon summer night specifically — the season and the ecology that made Kalidasa’s evening breeze a livable fact rather than a poetic aspiration.</p><p>What that summer night rested on, physically, was four things.</p><p>One: radiative cooling — the ground shedding, on clear dry nights, whatever heat it had absorbed during the day, straight up into space.</p><p>Two: extreme low humidity — no water vapor in the air to block that outgoing radiation, and no water vapor on the skin to keep sweat from evaporating.</p><p>Three: a strong westerly wind system — the loo by day, the cooler evening drift after sunset, moving heat around and, more importantly, moving it out.</p><p>Four: a diurnal swing of fifteen to twenty degrees between day maximum and night minimum. Forty-five in the afternoon; thirty, sometimes twenty-six, before dawn.</p><p>What it wore on top of that machine, culturally, was three thousand years of scheduling. Around the fifth century, Kalidasa wrote a cycle called Ṛtusaṃhāra, “The Gathering of Seasons”; its Grīṣma — summer — chapter reads almost as a radiative-cooling observation log. By day, deer, elephant, and lion crouched immobile in shade, and human affairs stopped. By dusk and moonrise, deer descended to water, lovers climbed to rooftops, courts opened their evening feasts, and the moonlight is described, in the poem’s own imagery, as “cool as sandalwood paste.” Read as a physical document, the chapter divides summer not into months but into times of day: noon as death, midnight as life. Mughal architecture — the chhajja, the courtyard, the jharokha — was engineered around the four-part machine’s cool downstream. The Urdu ghazal made shab, the night, its home tense; almost no ghazal of consequence unfolds at noon. The Bombay chawl, the Rajasthani haveli, the Lucknow kothi were all buildings that assumed the machine would run.</p><p>Historians have written and rewritten that cultural scheduling. It is often mistaken for the machine itself.</p><p>It is not. It is the upholstery.</p><p>And the machine’s reach was deeper than the upholstery. Jasmine and gardenia — the night-scented plants of Indian gardens and courtyards — release their fragrance only after dark, in scheduling shared with the moths that pollinate them: the moths fly at night because the day is too hot. Even the smell of an Indian night is downstream of the four-part machine.</p><p>The scheduling was what people did after the physics gave them a livable night. The physics is what actually held the roof up. And the physics — this is the thing no one in India has yet named as a single fact — is coming apart in three of its four parts.</p><p>In the same summer I learned the word loo, I also learned Ganga Dhaba.</p><p>Ganga Dhaba sits on a rocky patch of ground close to the JNU main gate, wedged between the Ganga, Jhelum, and Sutlej hostels, a short walk from the terminus of DTC bus route 615 — the route that has connected New Delhi Railway Station to the campus since the 1982 Asian Games, and that generations of students learn before they learn the campus map. Physically, it is almost nothing: a blue tarp stretched over a masonry counter, a tin roof at the back, two or three concrete blocks in the dirt to sit on, a tamarind canopy overhead, stray dogs asleep in the sand. When I first arrived at JNU, I walked past it for weeks and read it as any nondescript roadside tea stall — the kind that squats in the dirt corners of every Indian university. It took a classmate saying the words Ganga Dhaba aloud, and my asking twice, for me to understand that this collapsing tarp was the place. It opens at four in the afternoon and stays open until three or four in the morning, all year round — students call it JNU’s Hyde Park, and they mean it. Chai. Nimbu pani. Samosa. Bun omelette. Cigarettes. Biscuits. Instant noodles at midnight, if the tea-boy likes you. It does more social work than most classrooms on that campus.<br>A late-night open-air tea stall on the JNU campus in Delhi, with a blue tarp roof, a masonry counter, and students seated on concrete blocks under a tamarind canopy.<br>Ganga Dhaba, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. Photograph, undated.</p><p>The physics of Ganga Dhaba in June 1996 was straightforward. The afternoon temperature had been forty-six. By ten at night it was down to thirty-three. By one it was twenty-nine. By three it was twenty-six. The stone bench you sat on had been baking all day, and now, hour by hour, it was giving that heat back — not to you, not sideways, but upward, into a black cloudless dry sky. If you put your palm on the bench at midnight it was warm. If you put your palm on it at four in the morning it was cool. That transfer, from bench to sky, was radiative cooling. It did not need electricity. It did not need policy. It needed a dry atmosphere and a clear sky, and it had both, and it ran for free.</p><p>You could see it in the bodies. At Ganga Dhaba, at 2 A.M. in June 1996 — Deve Gowda’s United Front had just been sworn in on June 1, India’s third prime minister in the space of two weeks, after the May election had ended Congress’s decades-long grip and Vajpayee’s 13-day BJP ministry had collapsed for want of a majority — students argued about caste and Ambedkar and the Mandal aftermath, wearing a thin cotton kurta. Nobody sweated. Nobody moved close to a fan, because there were no fans. The dry air lifted the sweat off the skin faster than the skin could produce it, and the outgoing radiation lifted the heat off the bench faster than the day could refill it.</p><p>That was the machine running.</p><p>I want to be exact about what was happening, because the argument in this essay depends on it. Ganga Dhaba was not a memory of comfort. It was a lightly-clothed, unfurnished, open-air, midnight, forty-six-degrees-in-the-afternoon place — and it was comfortable. It was comfortable because the four parts of the machine were all in working order. Take out any one of them, and Ganga Dhaba is not a philosophy seminar. It is a heatstroke ward.</p><p>Take out humidity control — put humidity at 60% instead of 20% — and the sweat stays on the skin, and the students go quiet. Take out radiative cooling — put a low, humid cloud deck over the sky — and the bench does not give up its heat, and the students spread to the lawns — because the un-air-conditioned hostel rooms, of which JNU now has roughly eighteen, hold worse than the bench. Take out the westerly airflow — put the air still — and the small parcel of cooler air near the ground never gets refreshed. Take out the diurnal swing — put the night minimum at thirty-two instead of twenty-six — and the tea is not enough.</p><p>Ganga Dhaba worked because all four parts were still there.</p><p>Thirty years later, three of the four parts are being subtracted, one by one.</p><p>Part 1: Radiative cooling. The clear dry sky over northern India is now less clear, less dry, and often not a sky the ground can radiate into. Aerosol loading — from stubble burning, diesel, brick kilns, dust — traps outgoing infrared. Aerosols cool the day, but they also close the lid on the night.</p><p>Part 2: The humidity blanket. This is the largest and best-documented change. The average relative humidity of the Indo-Gangetic Plain has climbed roughly ten percentage points over four decades. The Arabian Sea, which delivers most of that moisture inland, is warming faster than almost any other tropical ocean. Green Revolution irrigation, running for sixty years across Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh, has locally humidified the pre-monsoon air. None of these forcings were deliberate. All of them stack. The plain is now, in the language of physics, blanketed.</p><p>Part 3: The westerly wind. The loo itself. Northwest India has lost more than 5% of its annual wind speed per decade for at least the last thirty years. The stilling is driven, at least in part, by the same ocean warming that is loading the atmosphere with moisture. A slower westerly means a less dry, less refreshing daytime wind — and, at night, less lateral ventilation of the heat that the ground is failing to radiate.</p><p>Part 3½: The source. The loo is defined by where it comes from — the Thar Desert of Rajasthan, India’s Sahara — and the Thar is not the Thar it was in 1996. A 2025 study led by Vimal Mishra and colleagues, published in Cell Reports Sustainability, documents that the Thar’s annual vegetation has increased 38% between 2001 and 2023, driven by a 64% rise in monsoon precipitation and by an explosion of groundwater pumping. India has been rolling out solar-powered irrigation pumps at record scale — Rajasthan among the largest sites of deployment — and those pumps have been quietly moving water from deep aquifers to the surface, where it evaporates, humidifies the pre-monsoon air, and does so at the exact upwind location that used to launch the loo eastward. The Mishra paper describes the Thar as one of the few, and possibly the only, deserts globally with concurrent gains in population, precipitation, and vegetation. Which is another way of saying: India’s largest exporter of dry heat has partially closed its factory. The word loo did not just lose its downstream customers. It lost its upstream supplier.</p><p>Part 4: The diurnal swing. Across India, minimum temperatures are rising faster than maximum temperatures. The India Meteorological Department’s 2025 annual report puts the country’s average maximum only 0.10°C above the 1991–2020 baseline; the average minimum sits 0.49°C above — nights warming roughly five times as fast as days. A 2025 report from the Council on Energy, Environment and Water finds 35 of India’s 36 states and Union Territories now showing rising night temperatures, and — at the district level, when the decade ending 2021–22 is compared against a 1982–2011 baseline — the warm-nights gap opening up faster than the warm-days gap. Mongabay India, in a June 2026 dispatch, calls it the warm-night crisis. That is not a hotter day. That is a night that no longer falls. The specific numbers for Bombay arrive in the next section.</p><p>Radiative cooling: compromised. Humidity: risen. Westerly: weakening. Diurnal swing: eroding. And underneath, the source itself is quietly greening.</p><p>Of the four parts, none is still fully intact. The first three are visibly gone. The fourth is going. The deeper subtraction — the desert itself — sits underneath the model rather than inside it, and it may turn out to be the one that pulls the rest down.</p><p>One more force sits on top of the four, inside cities specifically: the urban heat island. Concrete and asphalt absorb solar radiation by day and release it at night, keeping Indian city centers 2 to 10°C hotter than the surrounding countryside; a 2025 Nature Cities study of 141 Indian cities found them warming roughly twice as fast as the country as a whole, at 0.53°C per decade against a national average of 0.26. Most Indian reporting on warm nights stops here. But the heat island is the amplifier, not the source. What arrives at the city gates has already been rewritten by the four-part machine. The city then doubles it. Bombay is one such city — the city that, on the CEEW 2025 warm-nights ranking, leads the country: fifteen additional very warm nights each summer over the 1982–2011 baseline.</p><p>Compared to Delhi, Bombay’s absolute temperatures were always lower — a July afternoon in Cuffe Parade rarely broke thirty-four — but the humidity ran fifteen to twenty percentage points higher, and that difference did more work than the thermometer suggested.</p><p>In 2015 I moved to Bombay as bureau chief. I had visited many times before — always as a guest, always on someone else’s schedule — but 2015 was the year I began sleeping in one of Bombay’s living rooms and paying its bills. It was also, incidentally, the first apartment I had lived in in India that came with air-conditioning. Setting the AC required two dials, not one: the temperature, and, no less critical, a separate humidity mode. Without the second, thirty degrees still felt like thirty-five.</p><p>The building was Sagar Sangeet, a thirty-one-story sea-facing tower at the southern tip of Colaba, on the Cuffe Parade seafront, looking straight out across the Arabian Sea over Back Bay. An elderly businessman and his wife rented me a flat there. It had two bedrooms — one with AC, one without. I usually chose the one without. On a July evening in 2015, with the outside temperature at thirty-two and the humidity at eighty-five, the sea breeze coming in the west-facing window did the work the AC would otherwise have to. The landlord family’s own flat, on the harbor side of the peninsula, did not catch that breeze — that is why they call it Sagar Sangeet, the husband told me once over tea, sea-song.</p><p>Even so — even with a flat that cooled itself for free most nights — I often walked north along the corniche to Marine Drive to sit in the evening air: sunset, dinner nearby, then the parapet for an hour or two with the sea breeze on my face.</p><p>Bombay summer nights push a particular set of people out to Marine Drive. The humidity refuses to lift after sunset. Indoor air, in most flats of the city, is warmer than the seafront. Between ten at night and two in the morning, the two-mile parapet became a human wall — courting couples, night students, delivery boys, older men out for a walk after dinner, tourists, small groups of women who had come specifically because Marine Drive, at that hour, was one of the few places in central Bombay where a woman could safely sit for an hour without being disturbed. The physical basis of that public was a seven-degree diurnal swing that dropped the seaside temperature from an afternoon high in the low thirties to about twenty-six by midnight, combined with an onshore drift from the open sea.</p><p>By the mid-2020s, the physical basis of that midnight commons has changed. In September 2025, midnight readings at Nariman Point — the southern end of the Marine Drive corniche, where the promenade begins its northward sweep — sit around twenty-nine degrees at eighty percent humidity. Nine months later, on the same coast that used to launch the sea breeze, the Colaba observatory a short walk from Sagar Sangeet logged a minimum of 30.2°C on the night of June 12, 2026 — Mumbai’s warmest June night in fifty-seven years, with four consecutive nights above thirty degrees. The India Meteorological Department attributed the heat to a stalled monsoon surge over South Konkan and weak westerly winds. The last three words are the government, in a routine weather bulletin, confirming that the third part of the machine is now in the record. The sea breeze that used to make Marine Drive a public living room is now, on the wrong nights, a warm damp wall.</p><p>What has not disappeared is the need for the outdoors. What has changed is who reaches for it. In mid-June 2026, video circulating widely across Indian social media showed hundreds of residents from informal settlements near Versova Beach, on the city’s northwestern coast, sleeping on the sand — families carrying their own bedding to the coast each evening, driven from their homes by an unbroken humid-heat episode compounded by power outages that killed the ceiling fans. The debate that followed framed it as a story about housing and inequality. It was also, quietly, a story about the machine. The parapet at Marine Drive was, and remains, a cross-class commons — that was the point of it — and the evening breeze that filled it was a physical relief the machine used to provide for free, to everyone who could get to it. When the machine falters, the loss is not evenly distributed. The people whose homes were the least equipped to hold the summer at bay are the ones the city now sends to sleep on the sand.</p><p>In April 2026, an Instagram reel declared that Mumbai had officially entered boiling mode, over an AI-generated video of the city — sun-bleached, shimmering, hallucinated. In the middle of every frame, a cluster of giant, fantastical wind-wheels turn on scaffolds: spoked discs, half industrial fan and half cooling tower, unattached to any grid, unmoored from any building. They read, in the composite way AI images read, as both cause and remedy — cooling engines that might be pulling heat out of the city, or turbines that might be pumping hot air in. The dream logic of an overheating city imagining its own machinery. What the loo used to do for free — move heat off the plain — is here rendered as prosthetic apparatus no one has actually built.</p><p>The exaggeration is the point. What used to be the ghazal’s shab — the night as home tense — is now a rendered clip forwarded on a phone for the shock of it.</p><p>The word that increasingly displaces loo and shab in the headline-tier register is boiling — and when even the wet-bulb numbers fail to hold the summer, an AI hallucination gets shared as dark humor.</p><p>Screenshot from a viral Instagram reel: Mumbai’s Marine Drive at sunset with giant AI-generated fans composited along the corniche’s lamp-posts and seawall.<br>Frame from the Instagram reel referenced above, Mumbai, April 2026. The giant fans stitched along the sunset Marine Drive corniche do not exist.</p><p>I learned this on my own body first.</p><p>The summer of 1996 at JNU began with the loo — the western wind, forty-five degrees, dust and salt-lemon water. It was severe. It was livable. When the pre-monsoon inferno finally broke, I felt something close to relief; the newspapers said the rains were coming; I thought the worst was behind me.</p><p>Reality took the next two months to educate me. Each downpour ended not in cool release but in a slower and more brutal heat. The soaked ground steamed. Clothes did not dry. The body kept trying to sweat and could not, and I ran a low fever I could not shake. The campus clinic ruled out dengue — the default suspicion for any post-monsoon fever in Delhi. A week later the fever left on its own.</p><p>The pre-monsoon loo, for all its afternoon brutality, had been a heat the body could work against. The post-monsoon steam was a heat the body could not answer. Between them, I preferred the loo.</p><p>Someone will stop me here. Everyone knows dry heat is worse. Forty-eight degrees in Jaisalmer is dangerous — I once rode a camel across those dunes in the summer, and the danger came with a script: dawn start, head cover, salt-lemon water at every halt, no movement between noon and four. The loo killed people. Wet, at thirty-five, sounds like a summer beach.</p><p>The physics disagree.</p><p>Dry heat kills through direct thermal load. Humid heat kills through the failure of the body’s own cooling system. A human at 45°C dry-bulb and 15% humidity can survive several hours by sweating — provided salt and water are replaced. A human at 35°C dry-bulb and 100% humidity cannot survive extended exposure, because the wet-bulb temperature — the effective temperature that the body’s thermoregulation actually sees — is at the point where sweat evaporation stops. Which is why India’s 2026 heat headlines are 35°C with a feels-like near 50°C, not the other way around.</p><p>The loo was legible. It came in the afternoon, it stopped at sunset, it announced itself with dust, it had counter-measures — wet cloth, salted lemon water, midday closure — that Indian society had encoded for generations. Wet-bulb heat is illegible. It does not stop at sunset. It has no dust. It has no vernacular name. It has no grandmothered counter-measures.</p><p>The old machine had a killer built in. But the killer was scheduled. The new one is not.</p><p>The retreat of the loo is not the retreat of danger. It is the replacement of a scheduled danger by an unscheduled, unnamed, unclocked one — a danger without a word, and therefore without a warning.</p><p>The most honest way to see the machine’s collapse is to see who is currently paying the bill.</p><p>In the summer of 1996, cooling at Ganga Hostel came in two tiers. Every room had a ceiling fan. A small number of students — mostly from families that could afford it — had a desert cooler installed in the window. The cooler was engineered around the four-part machine: incoming air at 45°C and 15 percent humidity, straw pads soaked in water, evaporation adding moisture the dry outside air did not yet have. Nobody in the hostel had an electric air conditioner. A 1999 Christian Science Monitor dispatch from Delhi, filed during a summer that killed hundreds and forced the capital to ban air-conditioner use between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. to save the grid, called the cooler “the poor man’s air conditioner” — a good electric AC then cost around 50,000 rupees, roughly a year’s salary for many Indians, while a working cooler ran between forty-five and a hundred dollars and drew about a tenth of the current. The same piece closed with a sentence whose weight I would only recognize decades later: “The problem is, desert coolers only work in dry heat. Indians must still find an answer for the humidity that will soon arrive with the annual monsoon rains.”</p><p>Twenty-seven years later that qualifier is no longer seasonal — it is the base condition. India’s evaporative-cooler market is still growing: one 2026 industry forecast puts it at 85.5 million dollars in 2026, on track to reach 217 million by 2035 at nearly eleven percent annual growth. Manufacturers now openly advertise “humidity control” features engineered to sell into Mumbai and Chennai — and the same forecast that treats those features as a growth driver also lists, under restraints, “challenges of air coolers in humid and coastal environments.” The cooler is being sold as a solution to the very condition that breaks it. When pre-monsoon relative humidity sits at 40 to 50 percent instead of 15, the evaporative delta shrinks, the wet pads add moisture the air does not need, and the standing water tank becomes a mosquito reservoir. The middle-class Indian summer has quietly shifted to the window AC — the object that in 1996 was absent from most hostels and most middle-class rooms. Around it has grown a rental economy: shops in working-class Delhi neighborhoods rent out reconditioned window air conditioners for two to six weeks each summer to families that cannot afford to own one. Industry estimates put actual household AC penetration in India between eight and ten percent. The other ninety percent still meet the summer with ceiling fans, with coolers that work worse than they used to, or with an AC borrowed for the worst weeks.</p><p>In the brick kilns of Uttar Pradesh, workers responded to the pre-monsoon heat by shifting to night shifts — a rational, hundred-year-old adaptation to a machine that used to give twenty-six degrees at 3 A.M. A Mongabay report in June 2026 documents that the shift no longer works. Night temperatures at kiln sites sit at thirty-two to thirty-four. Humidity sits at seventy percent. The kilns themselves radiate. Workers finish their shift at dawn and cannot sleep during the day because the day is worse. Blood pressure rises. Sleep deprivation compounds heat strain. Emergency rooms in Kanpur and Varanasi see a specific pattern of collapse — not classical heatstroke, but chronic exhaustion presenting as cardiovascular events on the third or fourth day of a heatwave. Death certificates rarely say heat.</p><p>In Delhi, a thermal-imaging survey posted by an independent creator on YouTube and picked up across social media in the summer of 2026 measured, on a working afternoon, 50°C in Shahdara — the working-class northeast of the city, dense masonry, no tree canopy, one exposed courtyard per fifty households — and 30°C in Lutyens’ Delhi, the leafy colonial-era enclave of ministries and diplomatic bungalows, twenty minutes away by car. A twenty-degree gap inside a single metropolitan area. The gap is not new; heat islands have been mapped in Delhi since the 1990s. The compounding is new. When the daytime gap is compounded by the night not falling, Shahdara does not get its four hours of relief. Lutyens does. This is the machine’s collapse redistributing itself along old inequalities.<br>Split thermal-imaging screenshot from independent YouTube survey: Akbar Road in Lutyens’ Delhi reads 30°C, Shahdara in northeast Delhi reads 50°C, a 20°C gap inside one city.<br>Thermal-imaging survey inside Delhi, summer 2026: 50°C in Shahdara — the dense masonry working-class northeast — versus 30°C on Akbar Road in Lutyens’ Delhi, the leafy colonial-era enclave of ministries and bungalows, twenty minutes away by car. A twenty-degree gap inside a single metropolitan area — the machine’s collapse mapping onto the older geographies of who has access to shade, canopy, and space. Full survey: Mohak Mangal on YouTube.</p><p>Earlier reporting in the British and American press showed heat now shutting schools and pushing women out of the labor force. That is another way of saying the machine subsidized public life. When it stops, public life retreats indoors — for those who have an indoors.</p><p>Ganga Dhaba, JNU, in the summer of 2026, still opens. The un-air-conditioned hostel rooms are still worse. The students still argue. But the bench no longer cools by four in the morning.</p><p>The same machine is coming apart under other plains too.</p><p>Pakistan shares the Indo-Gangetic Plain with India and is losing its own loo on identical physics. Karachi’s 2015 humid-heat event killed more than 1,200 people — almost entirely a humidity event, not a dry-heat one. Around the Persian Gulf, from Dubai to Doha to coastal Iraq, summer wet-bulb readings now cross thresholds at which sweat evaporation begins to fail; universal air-conditioning masks the physics so completely that visitors rarely notice it.</p><p>Each region has its own four parts, its own upholstery, and its own quiet accounting of what has been withdrawn.</p><p>The point is not that India is a preview of somewhere else. The point is that the Indian night is not a proprietary Indian object. It is a name for one particular assembly of physics that once ran, for free, under one particular set of skies. That assembly is failing in India first because the Indo-Gangetic Plain is where three of its four parts converge most tightly. But no plain that ever counted on a fifteen-degree diurnal swing is safe.</p><p>The next decade’s climate literacy will not be about hotter days. Hotter days have been the headline for twenty years. It will be about the specific parts of specific machines that stopped running — and about the vocabulary each region loses when its parts leave.</p><p>The loo is the first word to go. It will not be the last.</p><p>In May 2026, the India Meteorological Department’s Director General, Mrutyunjay Mohapatra, sat for a long interview with Mongabay India. Read next to this essay, the interview is an official inventory of the parts.</p><p>On the machine’s day-and-night failure:</p><p>Our data from 1970 to 2020 suggests a rise in the maximum (daytime), minimum (nighttime) and mean temperatures. As a result, the frequency, duration and intensity of heatwaves are increasing.</p><p>On the humidity blanket arriving as physics:</p><p>For every 1° Celsius rise in temperature (of planet Earth), there is around a 7% increase in relative humidity. As a result, even if the temperature on a particular day remains similar to what it was in the past, discomfort levels are higher in a changing climate. The ‘feels-like’ temperature increases due to humidity.</p><p>On who the collapse hits hardest:</p><p>The impact is particularly serious for people without access to cooling facilities.</p><p>Three answers, in sequence: the essay’s four-part machine and its distributional geography, in bureaucratic prose, on the record. India’s top meteorologist is not disagreeing with the frame. He is confirming it.</p><p>This is a piece of reporting, not a paper. It rests on two on-the-ground years — Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1996, Bombay in 2015 and 2016 — and on close reading, since, of the Indian press, the Indian meteorological literature, and the physical-science research that has caught up with what many of us had begun to notice on the ground. The rest is public: interviews and dispatches from Mongabay India, Times of India, Down to Earth, India Today, The Wire, and United News of India; the India Meteorological Department’s own annual summaries; academic work by Vimal Mishra and others on the greening of the Thar; a 1999 Christian Science Monitor piece on the desert cooler whose closing sentence turned out to be a prophecy; an independent thermal-imaging survey of Delhi posted on YouTube. All linked in place above.</p><p>The four-part machine — radiative cooling, low humidity, westerly airflow, diurnal swing — is the author’s own way of holding several forcings in one frame. It is not a term of art in the climate literature; a climate scientist would probably describe the same physics with different vocabulary. The Kalidasa passage in §2 is an essayist reading of the Grīṣma chapter’s imagery, not a translation claim.</p><p>The author has spent decades reporting from and thinking about South Asia — one region across many years. This essay is the shape that method takes when the subject is a summer night that used to work and has stopped working.</p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=000629c9791b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Economic and strategic implications of India’s new port at Galathea Bay in the Andaman Islands]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/economic-and-strategic-implications-of-indias-new-port-at-galathea-bay-in-the-andaman-islands-054e79bc0db0?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/054e79bc0db0</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 05:46:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-16T05:46:47.603Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PSh9ZFxeNfAptpg3bbtXFw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Colombo July 16 (<a href="https://indopacificaffairs.lk/economic-and-strategic-implications-of-indias-new-port-at-galathea-bay-in-the-andaman-islands/">www.indopacificaffairs.lk</a>) — The International Container Transshipment Port (ICTP) which India is building at Galathea Bay in the Great Nicobar Island in the Bay of Bengal,l will be a deep-water mega port intended to function as a major transhipment hub for containerised cargo along the East-West international shipping corridor, <a href="https://grokipedia.com/page/international_container_transshipment_port_galathea_bay">www.grokipedia.com </a>reports.</p><p>With a natural draft exceeding 20 meters and proximity (approximately 40 nautical miles) to established hubs like Singapore, Port Klang, and Colombo, the Galathea Bay port aims to capture transhipment volumes currently handled abroad. Roughly 75% of India’s cargo is processed abroad. The Galathea Bay port will help conserve foreign exchange and enhance national maritime autonomy.</p><p>Estimated at INR 44,000 crore (U$ 5 billion) overall, the project encompasses four phases scaling to an ultimate annual capacity of 16 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), with Phase 1 targeting over 4 million TEUs by 2028.</p><p>It will be built with a public-private partnership. There will be complementary infrastructure like an airport, township, and power plant under a holistic island development framework aligned with India’s Maritime Vision 2030.</p><p>Notified as a major port in 2025 and led by domestic operators excluding foreign terminal entities to prioritise Indian control, the Galathea Bay port secured environmental clearance from the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change in November 2022.</p><p><strong>Geographical and Geopolitical Positioning</strong></p><p>Geopolitically, the site’s proximity to the Malacca Strait — roughly 40 nautical miles away — positions it near a vital chokepoint through which 25–30% of global trade and over 80% of China’s energy imports pass annually.</p><p>This location enhances India’s strategic maritime footprint in the Indo-Pacific, allowing the port to intercept and redirect cargo flows currently dominated by foreign hubs like Singapore and Colombo, thereby reducing India’s dependence on adversarial or neutral third-party infrastructure.</p><p>The development supports India’s efforts to secure its eastern maritime frontier amidst regional tensions, including Chinese naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, by enabling faster turnaround for export-import traffic and bolstering naval logistics in a contested domain.</p><p><strong>Linked to Tri-Services Command in the Andamans</strong></p><p>The port’s establishment aligns with India’s broader geopolitical objectives, including strengthening the existing Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command framework to project power and deter anti-access/area-denial threats from adversaries.</p><p>By capturing regional transhipment volumes estimated at over 100 million tonnes annually, the Galathea Bay port aims to elevate India’s role as a counterbalance to dominant Asian ports, fostering economic sovereignty while addressing vulnerabilities in supply chain resilience exposed by events such as the Iran-US conflict.</p><p>India spends US$1 billion on handling fees at ports like Singapore, Colombo, and Port Klang. By establishing a domestic facility capable of handling up to 16.2 million TEUs annually upon completion, the port aims to capture a larger share of regional transhipment traffic, thereby retaining economic value within India and enhancing cost efficiencies for Indian shippers.</p><p>Galathea Bay’s geographical advantages underpin this rationale: it features a naturally deep draft of 18–20 meters and a sheltered harbour that minimises dredging requirements compared to alternative sites, allowing the accommodation of mega-container vessels without extensive artificial interventions.</p><p>Beyond economics, the project addresses national security imperatives by strengthening India’s maritime domain awareness and infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a critical archipelago for monitoring Indo-Pacific sea lanes amid rising geopolitical tensions.<br>FDIs</p><p>Indian government assessments highlight potential gains in Foreign Direct Investment, job creation (estimated at thousands during construction and operations), and bolstered regional influence, aligning with broader objectives to transform the islands into a logistics and defence node. These factors collectively justify the investment of approximately US$ 5 billion phased over development to commissioning by 2028 for the initial stage.</p><p><strong>Phase 1</strong></p><p>Phase 1 targets 4 million TEUs annually by 2028 via 2.3 km of berths, breakwaters, dredging, and 125 hectares of reclamation, scaling to 16 million TEUs by 2058.</p><p>The Galathea Bay port will be based on the “landlord” model, designating the Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port in Kolkata (in partnership with Andaman and Nicobar Islands Integrated Development Corporation) as the nodal agency to build core assets. A private concessionaire will manage the design, financing, operations, and maintenance of the port for 30–50 years via a public-private partnership.</p><p>The Galathea Bay port is listed as a major port under the Major Port Authorities Act, which grants it statutory status for enhanced funding and operational autonomy. On September 4, 2024, the port was officially notified as India’s 13th major port. A special purpose vehicle was formed involving Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Deendayal Port, Paradip Port, and V.O. Chidambaranar Port for construction.</p><p>The Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the port, prepared by Kamarajar Port Limited (Ennore), was finalised and readied for submission to the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways for approval in October 2025, with tenders for Phase I development, operation, and maintenance anticipated shortly thereafter.</p><p>In December 2025, the government mandated the exclusion of foreign port operators from bidding, restricting participation to Indian entities to align with national security and self-reliance objectives under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-reliant India) initiative.</p><p>Port Design and Capacity</p><p>The design incorporates a navigational channel 400 meters wide and a turning circle of 800 meters in diameter to facilitate safe vessel manoeuvring, alongside provisions for rail-mounted quay cranes (RMQCs) on berths and rubber-tyred gantry cranes (RTGs) in the container yard for efficient handling.</p><p>Maximum crane heights are limited to 135 meters, with an upper constraint of 150 meters due to nearby airport operations. Phase 1 development includes approximately 2.3 kilometres of container quay length, alongside two dedicated liquid cargo berths for bunkering, ship repair, and support for Free Trade Warehousing Zones. This initial phase targets a handling capacity of 4 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) annually by 2028, forming the core infrastructure under a landlord model with government-backed breakwaters, dredging, reclamation, and utilities.</p><p>Subsequent phases will expand berths, storage, and equipment to accommodate growing transhipment demands from regional trade corridors.</p><p>Associated Developments</p><p>The development of the International Container Transhipment Port at Galathea Bay is integrated with broader infrastructure initiatives under the Holistic Development of Great Nicobar Island plan, approved by the Indian government in 2021. Key associated projects include the construction of a greenfield international airport at Campbell Bay, approximately 15 km from Galathea Bay, designed to handle up to 6.5 million passengers annually by its completion target of 2025, enhancing connectivity for cargo and personnel supporting port operations.</p><p>This airport features a 3,000-meter runway and integrated cargo facilities, aimed at positioning the island as a regional logistics hub. Additional infrastructure encompasses a 450 MW gas-based power plant and renewable energy facilities to meet the energy demands of the port and township, with provisions for desalination plants to ensure water supply amid the island’s limited freshwater resources. Road networks, including a 42-km coastal highway linking the port to the airport and proposed township, are planned to facilitate logistics.</p><p>A 14,000-hectare township is also under development to house up to 50,000 residents, including port workers, with integrated housing, schools, and healthcare facilities. These developments are coordinated by the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Integrated Development Corporation (ANIIDCO), drawing from central government allocations and potential private investments. The project aims to synergise port throughput with aerial and terrestrial connectivity.</p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=054e79bc0db0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[US must incentivise Sri Lanka to accept its Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/us-must-incentivise-sri-lanka-to-accept-its-economic-framework-for-prosperity-ipef-8ce9f217694c?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ce9f217694c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 16:36:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-15T16:36:13.345Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/438/1*m8baMf_Y3OTQ5oTuXKP7aw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The IPEF will be a boon to Sri Lanka, but both Sri Lanka and the US must negotiate a consensus on it so that the concerns of both are accommodated.</p><p>Colombo, July 15 (www.indopacificaffairs.lk) — America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) has the potential to boost Sri Lanka’s regional economic development, but the framework offers very few tangible economic incentives in its current form, say Michael Iveson and Keerthi Martyn in their feature published in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, August 2024.</p><p>The IPEF will be a boon to Sri Lanka, but both Sri Lanka and the US must negotiate a consensus on it so that the concerns of both are accommodated.</p><p>The incentives the US offers under IPEF coexist with Sri Lanka’s geopolitical challenges in participating in the IPEF. It has to maintain its nonaligned principles and develop a robust foreign policy to withstand tensions in the Indian Ocean.</p><p>The IPEF holds significant promise for Sri Lanka and other littoral states in the Indian Ocean region, but the US must address key challenges to incentivise prospective partners to fully engage with the economic components of the framework.</p><p><strong>Goals of IPEF</strong></p><p>The IPEF is a US initiative designed to foster economic cooperation and growth among its signatory countries in the Indo-Pacific. Centred on the principles of “resiliency, sustainability, inclusivity, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness,” the framework stands on four pillars: (1) trade, (2) supply chains, (3) clean economy, and (4) fair economy.</p><p>The IPEF currently includes 14 partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region, collectively accounting for more than 40% of GDP and 28% of global trade. The US and its partners emphasise the importance of the IPEF for generating tangible economic activity, promoting sustainable development and investment, by ensuring worker-centred benefits and regional inclusivity.</p><p><strong>The US Strategy</strong></p><p>The United States has emphasised the IPEF’s role in shaping the economic rules of engagement and promoting connectivity among US partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific, aiming to secure a strategic foothold in the region, harness economic opportunities, and counter China’s regional influence.</p><p>Unlike traditional Free Trade Agreements (FTA) that prioritise concessional market access, the IPEF concentrates on non-tariff barriers and emerging issues such as supply-chain resilience and clean energy.</p><p>Previous FTAs were “20th-century tools” overly focused on market access and tariffs, neglecting critical sectors and global supply-chain vulnerabilities. The IPEF’s trade pillar aims to facilitate trade through enhanced transparency measures, regulatory practices, and access to goods at competitive prices. The emphasis on technology underscores the US commitment to digital economic transformation within the Indo-Pacific. By focusing on high-standard provisions for competition, environment, labour, and regulations, the US aims to ensure fair practices in the Indo-Pacific, facilitating trade between the US and its partner countries.</p><p>The supply chains pillar seeks to mitigate future economic shocks and build resilience in the global economy. This pillar identifies crucial sectors and goods, emphasising the need for investment, supply chain diversification, and increased transparency.</p><p>Implementing these provisions will strengthen access to essential imports for the US and its partner countries by addressing chokepoints in regional supply chains.</p><p>The third pillar emphasises the need for a clean economy. The framework promotes energy security, greenhouse gas reduction, international commitments to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and the green transition. The IPEF places significant emphasis on policies, standards, and infrastructure investments to support partners in their pursuit of net-zero targets, a crucial component of sustainable economic development.</p><p>The fair economy pillar aims to bolster collective support and enhance anti-corruption measures, tax administration, capacity building, and transparency among all stakeholders. This pillar underscores the need for capacity-building efforts to help countries develop better institutions and compliance.</p><p>The Indo-Pacific Strategy recognises that Southeast Asia has been recognised as “central to the regional architecture,” while the Indian Ocean and its littoral states, aside from India, receive scant mention despite these states facing growing vulnerabilities and emerging opportunities. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy lacks deeper engagement with the Indian Ocean’s littoral states.</p><p>The IPEF mainly consists of upper- and upper-middle-income countries in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. While supporting India’s role as a regional power remains a top priority for US policy, a broader top-down approach hinders deeper US engagement and integration within the Indian Ocean’s regional architecture.</p><p>Inclusion of Brunei and Fiji in the IPEF is an important step in linking smaller littoral states with the US, but extending the framework to other Indian Ocean states such as Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and the Seychelles has yet to be seriously considered.</p><p><strong>The Economics of the IPEF for Sri Lanka</strong></p><p>The IPEF presents an opportunity for Sri Lanka to engage economically with the US and its regional partners.</p><p>Products failing to meet US standards are denied entry into the market, with Robert Grundke and Christoph Moser demonstrating that import refusals disproportionately harm developing countries..</p><p>For exporters from developing countries like Sri Lanka, establishing clear product standards and transparency reduces the risk of costly import refusals and provides greater assurance of selling Sri Lankan goods in the US market.<br>Implementing regulatory, environmental, and labour reforms is a costly process. So companies go for other investments to reduce production costs and enhance the goods’ competitiveness in alternative markets.</p><p>Sri Lanka’s strong access to US markets, particularly in the apparel sector, underscores the lack of incentive to implement costly reforms through the IPEF. Of the USD 5.5-billion worth of apparel and clothing accessories exported by Sri Lanka in 2022, USD 2.3 billion (42 per cent) went to the United States. Despite facing relatively high tariffs — 14% on knitted and 11% on non-knitted apparel — Sri Lankan products perform well in the US market. Existing trade patterns and preferences suggest that Sri Lanka does not necessarily need tariff liberalisation to compete in the US market, as demand for Sri Lankan apparel remains high. Consequently, participation in the IPEF offers no tangible benefits to trade.</p><p>The main challenge, however, lies in the lack of diversified exports to the US and the potential competition from emerging markets like Vietnam and Indonesia, which are rapidly expanding their apparel sectors.</p><p>Previous regional agreements, such as the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), focused on reducing trade costs, creating strong mutual incentives to negotiate deals that improved market access in preferred sectors for all parties.</p><p>With larger labour forces and better access to technology and manufacturing capital, Indonesia and Vietnam have unsurprisingly experienced faster average growth in their apparel exports to the US compared to Sri Lanka. Howard and Bram Nicholas compare Sri Lanka and Vietnam, highlighting the success of Vietnam’s export-oriented manufacturing industries, driven largely by technological transformation and diversification. This success has left Sri Lanka’s apparel sector internationally uncompetitive, lagging behind other regional exporters.</p><p>Given that Indonesia and Vietnam export a similar range of manufactured apparel goods to the US, their participation in the IPEF raises significant concerns. By aligning their product standards with the US, improving transparency, and promoting good regulatory practices, Indonesian and Vietnamese apparel exports gain a competitive edge through non-price factors.</p><p>If Indonesia and Vietnam can offer lower-cost apparel goods that meet US product standards, there is limited incentive for the US to continue importing from Sri Lanka when it can satisfy demand with more attractive exporters.</p><p><strong>Supply Chains</strong></p><p>Recent economic shocks underscore the risks posed by globalised supply chains. In response, US industrial policy has sought to rebuild the American manufacturing sector by promoting domestic industries and “friend-shoring” production.</p><p>In an increasingly globalised world, undiversified supply chains pose significant risks to long-term economic productivity, as exogenous shocks — and policy-induced economic shocks by rivals — can severely disrupt production and create a fragile global economy.</p><p>The IPEF’s focus on diversifying supply chains and building resilience reflects US concerns about China’s influence over imports and production, which could be manipulated to gain an economic advantage.</p><p>Although the United States is aware of Asian countries engaging with both US- and China-led initiatives such as the RCEP, China’s omission from the IPEF and the agreement’s non-tariff emphasis indicate US intentions to promote global sourcing from trusted economic partners in the region. Economic literature underscores the importance of diversifying global supply chains to mitigate the effects of exogenous economic shocks.</p><p>Supply shocks hit Sri Lanka particularly hard, affecting imports of pharmaceuticals, fuel, and fertiliser, leading to foreign exchange reserve depletion and disrupting essential domestic industries. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis was fundamentally a supply-chain crisis, exacerbated by a historical failure to diversify away from price-volatile imports and build domestic capacity.</p><p>The disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine worsened the situation. Without sufficient alternative suppliers of essential goods, Sri Lanka and its domestic firms were forced to maintain their supplies under severe economic constraints, leading to failures in the domestic industry and insufficient foreign exchange reserves to meet debt obligations.</p><p>By supporting the United States’ transition away from China, Sri Lanka’s participation in the IPEF would primarily serve as an “insurance” policy to preserve US economic stability and demand, rather than capitalising on tangible economic benefit.</p><p>Ganeshan Wignaraja describes South Asia as a relatively minor player in global supply chains, with India accounting for less than 2% of global supply-chain trade and the rest of South Asia, including Sri Lanka, only 0.13 %. Southeast Asian economies have historically benefited from supply chain spillover from China due to slower growth and rising wages. Sri Lanka must seek to benefit from similar transitions as the United States aims to diversify its supply chains.</p><p>By leveraging India’s engagement with the IPEF, Sri Lanka can promote intermediate goods trade, integrate into global supply chains, and attract FDI.</p><p>Participating in the IPEF and collaborating with the US on supply-chain resilience would signal to firms and prospective investors that Sri Lanka adheres to high standards of supply-chain trade and aligns with the world’s largest destination market.</p><p>Combining these non-price factors with low wages, a highly educated labour force, and a strategically advantageous geographic location, Sri Lanka could offer significant benefits to firms aiming to diversify their supply chains and outsource intermediate production stages.</p><p>As South Asia’s most open economy, Sri Lanka&#39;s low tariffs and limited barriers to trade could provide compelling incentives for firms to incorporate Sri Lanka into their supply chains.</p><p><strong>Clean Economy</strong></p><p>Sri Lanka faces significant challenges in meeting its ambitious climate targets amidst fiscal constraints exacerbated by the recent economic crisis. One of Sri Lanka’s flagship Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) is to generate 70% of its domestic electricity supply from renewable energy sources by 2030, reaching 100% by 2050.</p><p>Although Sri Lanka has historically relied on hydroelectric infrastructure to supply electricity to the national grid, the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption dropped from 77% to 49% between 1990 and 2020. During the same period, net energy imports as a percentage of total energy consumption rose from 25% to 50%, indicating a structural shift toward imported fossil fuels.</p><p>Underinvestment in hydroelectric infrastructure has exacerbated this imbalance, leading to inefficiency and maintenance issues. Even in times of economic stability, investment in domestic energy infrastructure has been limited.</p><p>This lack of domestic investment is driven by policy missteps and financial constraints. Indebtedness and limited capacity to establish or upgrade energy infrastructure have increased reliance on imported fossil fuels to meet national demand. This dependence necessitated maintaining a sustainable stock of foreign exchange reserves to support the domestic energy supply, cultivating a highly vulnerable energy sector influenced by external economic factors.</p><p>When COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine caused falling global incomes and soaring fuel prices, Sri Lanka was forced to exhaust its foreign exchange reserves, making fuel imports unaffordable. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis underscored the urgent need for energy sector diversification.</p><p>However, domestic financial constraints limit Sri Lanka’s ability to mobilise resources for these investments. The IPEF presents an opportunity to support developing countries’ green transitions both directly — by financing renewable energy infrastructure projects — and indirectly — by enabling concessional, accessible, and sustainable finance.</p><p>The United States must play a key role in enhancing cooperation and providing a blueprint for infrastructure investments that overcome challenges associated with bureaucracy, instability, and lack of transparency.</p><p>By investing directly in renewable energy infrastructure through the IPEF, the United States could support economic development, energy security, and climate change mitigation in partner countries, while also fulfilling its own climate commitments. The IPEF can provide a robust framework to attract investment into this critical sector.</p><p>Sri Lanka’s energy sector boasts significant potential, with the World Bank estimating a 56-GW capacity for offshore wind and recent discussions signalling the integration of Sri Lanka&#39;s and India’s energy sectors, which could facilitate renewable energy exports.</p><p>Sri Lanka’s renewable energy sector has potential far beyond its own domestic green transition. India’s strong relationship with the United States and its participation in the IPEF could leverage further US support in this regard. By providing financial and technical assistance, the IPEF can bridge the capacity gap for Sri Lanka to fulfil its NDCs and facilitate a crucial green transition in the energy sector.</p><p>Given the bureaucratic hurdles and administrative challenges that Sri Lanka’s public enterprises face amid the constraints imposed by the economic crisis, private sector initiatives must also play a central role in the green transition.</p><p><strong>Fair Economy</strong></p><p>The relationship between strong institutions and economic development is well-documented in the economic literature, with the prevailing view that institutions are the primary determinant of economic performance. Many economists argue that corruption is one of the most significant barriers to economic development and that institutional reforms are crucial for successful anti-corruption campaigns.</p><p>Diverse economic literature underscores the complexities of this relationship, but Stefan Dercon effectively summarises the need for a “unique development bargain” to incentivise public officials to act in the national interest while also serving their individual interests.</p><p>The IPEF places institutional development at the core of economic capacity building in the Indo-Pacific. The US aims to increase transparency in the region to counter illicit engagements with China through its BRI projects. A study by AidData found that 35% of BRI projects have been challenged by corruption, excessive debt, or labour exploitation, enabled by weak institutions and a lack of transparency in policy development. This could be perceived as a strategy to counter China’s economic influence in the region by increasing bureaucratic hurdles that Chinese FDI projects have typically overcome.</p><p>By emphasising transparency and anti-corruption, the IPEF signals to its regional partners that continuing economic engagement with the US requires addressing structural issues that enable corruption.</p><p>Capacity-building efforts and technical assistance through the IPEF could help mitigate corruption vulnerabilities, develop robust legal frameworks, and promote further economic engagement.</p><p>The IMF Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA) identified governance weaknesses in public financial management (PFM), tax policy, and revenue administration in Sri Lanka, highlighting the need for institutional reforms. Participation in the IPEF’s fair economy pillar presents an opportunity for Sri Lanka to partner with the United States and implement these necessary economic reforms.</p><p>The IMF agreement’s conditionalities require the Sri Lankan government to raise tax revenue to 14 % of GDP by 2026, an ambitious target given the current economic climate. Frequent changes in tax design, lacking political and technical scrutiny, have exacerbated existing compliance and administrative issues within the system.</p><p>Between 1990 and 2022, Sri Lanka’s tax revenue as a proportion of GDP declined from 19% to 7.3%; national income increased but was not matched by a rise in tax collection. In 2022, 69.5% of tax revenue was generated through indirect taxes, such as value-added tax, which disproportionately affect low-income households. As of January 2024, the government raised value-added tax from 15% to 18%, facing backlash due to its inherently regressive nature.</p><p>The IPEF holds promise for supporting structural reforms and capacity-building initiatives through financial and technical assistance. The fair economy pillar provides a robust framework for implementation and accountability, potentially benefiting both political leadership and Sri Lanka’s broader economy.</p><p>However, a significant challenge lies in enforcing standards within the anti-corruption pillar. Currently, the IPEF lacks a clear enforcement mechanism that operates across international borders and fails to articulate the direct benefits of participation.</p><p>The IPEF has not established Dercon’s “development bargain” for its partner countries, whereby there are incentives to eradicate corruption, making it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of this component of the framework. This also highlights the potential drawbacks of a decentralised approach. It fails to explain why prospective partners would voluntarily opt into the pillar unless key stakeholders stand to gain more from the economic benefits of the IPEF than from maintaining corruption.</p><p>If prospective members can opt out of the fair economy pillar, it creates a selection bias that hinders the framework’s effectiveness and inclusivity.</p><p>Upon examining the potential economic benefits of Sri Lanka’s participation in the IPEF, it becomes evident why discourse has remained minimal. While the IPEF’s conceptual framework signifies a strong commitment to regional economic involvement, its incentive structures fail to attract prospective economic partners.</p><p>The lack of concessional market access and clarity on immediate economic benefits explains why Sri Lanka’s outward-looking economic recovery has not included prospective membership in the IPEF.</p><p>Although substantial long-term economic gains such as international supply chain integration, decarbonization, and enhanced product standards are crucial for sustained economic development, Sri Lanka’s ongoing IMF program and current focus on revenue-generating economic opportunities have shifted attention away from these longer-term prospects.</p><p>The responsibility of communicating the economic benefits of the IPEF falls on US policy makers. Critical issues such as supply chain resilience, clean energy transition, and anti-corruption efforts remain inadequately addressed in the Indo-Pacific region, presenting an opportunity for Washington to contribute significantly to the region’s economic transformation.</p><p>However, engagement with the United States requires more attractive incentive structures to complement its ambitions and clearer communication of the IPEF’s role as an economic framework rather than a regional trade agreement.</p><p>Misconceptions surrounding the function of the IPEF could complicate bilateral relationships and leave countries disappointed by US engagement in the region. This economic analysis of Sri Lanka’s potential membership in the IPEF demonstrates that while economic opportunities exist, their realisation depends on more effective engagement from the United States to influence an economic recalibration in Sri Lanka.</p><p><strong>Geopolitical Aspects</strong></p><p>Deeper economic engagement alone does not capture the full complexity of the IPEF’s expansion to potential states like Sri Lanka. Policy makers must also recognise the intricate connections between these decisions and the Indo-Pacific geopolitical landscape, particularly the dynamics among the United States, China, and India, and Sri Lanka’s relationships with each.</p><p>As the global economy increasingly pivots toward the Indo-Pacific region, Sri Lanka finds itself on a geopolitical battleground, acutely aware of the regional tensions between the United States and China, as well as Washington’s growing partnership with New Delhi. <br>This presents a formidable challenge for Sri Lankan foreign policy, which requires a contemporary and outward-looking approach to manage its relationships with the region’s major powers.</p><p>Sri Lanka and the Inevitable Tension between the United States and China Tensions between the United States and China loom large over the Indo-Pacific region, significantly shaping Sri Lanka’s foreign policy decisions. As a small littoral state, Sri Lanka faces challenges in navigating economic, security, and political concerns amid the competing interests of these two economic powerhouses.</p><p>Issues such as tariff impositions, diplomatic fluctuations, and US wariness over China’s escalating tensions with Taiwan contribute to regional imbalances and influence the foreign policies of smaller states.</p><p>The geopolitics between the United States and China have spilt over into their bilateral relationships with Sri Lanka. The United States remains Sri Lanka’s top export partner, while China is its number two import partner. This dependency on both superpowers significantly influences Sri Lanka’s international trade dynamics, as it constantly oscillates between the two.</p><p>Furthermore, Chinese investments in infrastructure and development projects in Sri Lanka, such as the Hambantota and Port City initiatives, highlight the growing Sino-Lanka relationship. Although their efficacy has been challenged, China has filled a void left by the United States and its perceived lack of economic initiatives and infrastructure investments.</p><p>However, the US was quick to criticise China’s slow response to the Sri Lankan debt crisis and provided immediate assistance in its debt restructuring efforts. This tit-for-tat engagement between the United States and China in Sri Lanka underscores the inherent burden on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, which it must navigate carefully when considering agreements such as the IPEF.</p><p><strong>China’s Moves to Thwart US</strong></p><p>Beijing has acknowledged the US attempt to supplant China’s role as a regional economic power through the IPEF. Soon after the framework was announced, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Wang Wenbin expressed concerns that Beijing, along with other countries in the region, was worried about the potential drastic effects of the framework and the economic “decoupling from China.”</p><p>However, the US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen countered this by stating that a full decoupling of the two economies would “simply not be practical” and that “a full separation of our economies, or an approach in which countries, including those in the Indo-Pacific, are forced to take sides, would have significant negative global repercussions.”</p><p>These concerns highlight both powers’ awareness of the consequences of overextending economic engagement in the region and implicitly recognise that the IPEF cannot exclude potential partners due to their deep economic ties with China.</p><p>The awareness of this rhetoric and the risk of overextending policy is not necessarily a challenge for US policymakers and was likely a critical consideration when formulating the regional strategy. By allowing partners to engage with both the IPEF and China-led regional agreements, such as the RCEP, the United States can indirectly influence engagements with China by upholding its own standards.</p><p>If Washington can enforce certain standards and regulations on crucial industries in partner countries, these mechanisms will positively spill over into the economic relationships between their partner countries and China.</p><p>By employing nonmarket mechanisms to influence industries and domestic policies across the region, the IPEF can coexist with China’s endeavours in the Indo-Pacific. This approach enables Washington to expand US influence in the region by indirectly shaping its partners’ engagements with China. Such economic influence, while not exclusionary, may concern Chinese policymakers when assessing their economic partners’ engagements with the United States through the “softer” economic mechanisms of the IPEF.</p><p>Rather than seeking to rival China’s economic engagement with regional partners, the IPEF aims to shape the context in which it occurs. From the US perspective, Colombo’s interest in joining the China-led RCEP reflects Sri Lanka’s desire to integrate with regional partners, not to supplant US influence in the country.<br>Consequently, Washington should not view this with disdain. Instead, the IPEF’s expansions in trade and infrastructure offer the United States an opportunity to strengthen economic ties.</p><p>For Sri Lanka, this dual engagement presents a strategic opportunity to benefit from its relationship with the United States while maintaining its ties with China.</p><p>The key for Colombo is to emphasise to Washington the conditions of Sri Lanka’s participation in the IPEF and to articulate to Beijing that joining the framework does not constitute an abandonment of its significant economic and developmental relations with China.</p><p>Caught in this soft battle for economic influence, Sri Lanka must tread carefully with both bilateral partners. Engaging with the IPEF without straining its economic relationship with China will require a nuanced and balanced approach, ensuring that Sri Lanka maximises benefits from both US and Chinese engagements.</p><p><strong>India Factor</strong></p><p>Sri Lanka’s potential engagement with the IPEF requires acknowledging India’s pivotal role in Sri Lankan foreign policy. Despite periods of turbulence, Indo-Lanka relations have featured prominently in Sri Lankan foreign policy, a notion that will persist as both countries’ roles in the region expand.</p><p>In its trade relationship, India accounts for 27% of Sri Lanka’s total annual imports, making it Sri Lanka’s top import partner and its third-largest export partner, holding the distinction as the only country in the top three for both. Additionally, India is one of the largest contributors of FDI to Sri Lanka, with total investments exceeding USD 2.2 billion.</p><p>Like the United States, India’s increasingly complex relationship with China has greatly shaped its emergence as a regional power and influenced its bilateral relationships with Sri Lanka. Direct security concerns, such as the India–China border issues, China’s increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and infrastructure financing projects through the BRI, have made India increasingly wary of China’s growing hegemonic influence in the region’s economic and security architecture.</p><p>These apprehensions have directly affected Sri Lanka, where India and China continually compete in port and infrastructure investments and engage in cyclical diplomatic and security tensions, especially when Chinese vessels dock at Hambantota Port.</p><p>Furthermore, while China responded slowly to Sri Lanka’s IMF debt crisis, India provided more than USD 4 billion in emergency humanitarian and financial assistance. This dynamic between India’s and China’s respective engagements in Sri Lanka will continue to complicate Sri Lanka’s strategic dilemma.</p><p>Balancing these relationships while considering potential IPEF engagement is crucial for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy strategy.</p><p>For India, the IPEF offers an opportunity to strengthen ties with the United States and counter China’s regional economic and strategic dominance. Set to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030, India prioritises domestic growth and outward economic strategies as part of its Neighbourhood First policy. The IPEF promises benefits to India and its regional partners, particularly through supply chain development, which India hopes to lead in South Asia, building resilience on the principles of “trust, transparency, and timeliness” in the wake of COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>New Delhi’s interest in developing clean energy initiatives, as addressed in pillar 3, can also provide tremendous benefits for India and the surrounding economies of the region. The United States and India Strategic Clean Energy Partnership (SCEP) seeks to increase energy investments to drive decarbonization through technological capacity-building in India, with potential extensions to other countries within the region.</p><p>Sri Lanka, which stands to benefit from the extension of this clean energy infrastructure, has begun discussions with India regarding energy-sector integration through an oil pipeline and power grid connections.</p><p>Engaging with the IPEF’s clean energy pillar could catalyse Sri Lanka’s growing connection to India and promote standards for long-term economic improvements.</p><p>India’s participation in the IPEF and its broader regional strategy directly impact Sri Lanka, irrespective of whether Sri Lanka itself joins the framework.</p><p>Although New Delhi has historically maintained a nonalignment policy, India’s growing relationship with the United States and active role in the IPEF indicate a significant shift in its foreign policy approach.</p><p>For Sri Lanka, engaging with the IPEF and partnering with India, a country increasingly wary of China, could strain Colombo’s own bilateral relationship with Beijing. However, the potential economic benefits from partnering with India through the IPEF could be highly advantageous for Sri Lanka’s debt-laden and recovering economy.</p><p>Given these complex dynamics, Sri Lankan policymakers must carefully analyse the evolving geopolitical landscape before establishing a concrete policy for IPEF engagement moving forward.<br> <br>Former Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara articulated that Sri Lanka’s foreign policy challenge is to secure “tangible economic benefits” while avoiding “geopolitical mischief ” in the Indian Ocean.</p><p>Other experts argue that in an era of economics-driven foreign policy, Sri Lanka must partner with countries that offer the greatest economic benefits, rather than adhering strictly to nonalignment, which is more nuanced today than during its NAM formation. Sri Lanka’s prospective engagement with the IPEF would certainly test this historical approach.</p><p>Economic analysis reveals that Sri Lanka stands to gain significant benefits from engaging with the IPEF. The geopolitical question for Colombo, however, is not whether IPEF engagement constitutes an alignment with the United States and India, thereby threatening its relationship with China. Rather, it is whether Sri Lanka can pursue a foreign policy rooted in economic self-interest and forge a multi-aligned approach that maximises tangible economic benefits while maintaining relations with all states.</p><p>In a forum on nonalignment, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Ali Sabry stated: “Across party lines, Sri Lanka is yearning to continue its greatest legacy of an independent and sovereign foreign policy. That is there to stay. But the modalities as to how we progress with that in a pragmatic manner in an ever-increasing polarised world is what we need to learn.”</p><p>If Colombo were to engage with the IPEF, it must recognize that while the “trilemma” between the United States, India, and China persists within the Indo-Pacific and within Sri Lanka itself, it should not hesitate to make decisions that benefit it as a sovereign and independent nation.</p><p>Colombo’s current foreign policy, while grounded in historic principles of non-alignment and mindful of Sri Lanka’s position amid geopolitical tensions, lacks the robustness to turn awareness of its challenges into coherent policy that benefits all sides.</p><p><strong>Lack of Coherent Foreign Policy</strong></p><p>While countries like the United States, Japan, and India have outlined their respective Indo-Pacific strategies, Sri Lanka has yet to develop a comprehensive engagement strategy.</p><p>Experts and scholars have identified areas in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy that can work within the changing nature of nonalignment, yet this has not been articulated as a coherent and concrete strategy for economic engagement. To effectively engage with the IPEF amid geopolitical complexities, Sri Lanka first requires an evaluation of how Colombo can maximise the economic benefits of its bilateral relationships with the United States, India, and China.</p><p>Furthermore, recent discussions on the future of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy emphasise that policy formulation should not be solely through the lens of great-power competition but also should consider how Colombo can build relationships with other states in the Indo-Pacific and globally.</p><p>If Sri Lanka undergoes this remodelling of its foreign policy strategy, it will be better suited to navigate the geopolitical challenges that lie ahead.</p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ce9f217694c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ramifications of Hasina’s return to Bangladesh]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/ramifications-of-hasinas-return-to-bangladesh-1e891ea01830?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e891ea01830</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 02:55:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-14T02:55:11.550Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/549/1*Bd4xDgu66yz8zpPYYfI98A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sheikh Hasina</figcaption></figure><p>By P.K.Balachandran/Daily Mirror</p><p>Colombo, July 14 — Ousted Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, currently living in exile in India and facing a death sentence back home for causing the death of 1400 agitators demanding her ouster, has said that she plans to return to Bangladesh in December. She told Reuters in New Delhi earlier this week that, upon her return, she would expose her “farcial” trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC).</p><p>“They may arrest me on my return, they may even kill me. Still, I have to go. My party leaders and workers are being subjected to tremendous repression. If death comes, I want it to come on my own soil, where my parents are buried and where their blood was shed.”</p><p>Her return could sharpen political divisions in Bangladesh, as she has been a polarising figure for decades. But the return could also enable the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in Dhaka to repair strained relations with India that had supported Hasina’s Awami League government.</p><p>The Interim Government from August 2025 to February 2026, headed by Dr Muhammad Yunus and the successor Tarique Rahman-led BNP government had written to New Delhi multiple times seeking Hasina’s extradition. But New Delhi would stonewall the request.</p><p>However, relations between New Delhi and Dhaka began to warm up after February 2026, when the Yunus government, installed by the agitating students and the radical Jamaat-i-Islami, resigned following fresh elections.</p><p>It is said that New Delhi had a hand in the re-emergence of the BNP as an alternative to Yunus and his backers, the student-led National Citizens Party, and Jamaat-e-Islami. The BNP, like the Awami League, is a secular party that had also interacted with India when it was in power earlier.</p><p>New Delhi had indicated that it was ready to refashion its relations with Bangladesh when it welcomed the return of the BNP to power. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, wrote to Rahman expressing friendship, with the letter being personally handed over by Foreign Minister S.Jaishankar.</p><p>New Delhi also broke from the practice of sending a foreign service official as its envoy in Dhaka by announcing the appointment of Dinesh Trivedi, a seasoned politician from West Bengal and a former cabinet minister in the Modi government. He was also bestowed with the status of a Central Cabinet Minister. The idea was to enable Trivedi to make political moves on behalf of the government in New Delhi.</p><p>Yet, there was no sign of a thaw on the ground in Bangladesh. Issues like the development of the Teesta water basin and the sharing of Ganga waters remained. There was also no sign of New Delhi’s handing over Sheikh Hasina to face the death sentence passed by the International Criminal Court in Dhaka.</p><p>Tarique Rahman, therefore, decided to strengthen ties with China, India’s geopolitical rival in South Asia. Rahman chose China to be his first foreign destination after assuming power, while the norm had been to visit India first. He also entered into an agreement with China to develop the Teesta River basin and the hinterland of the Mongla and Chittagong ports.</p><p>The prospect of a Chinese presence in the Teesta River Basin Project rang alarm bells in New Delhi because the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip of land linking mainland India and its North-Eastern States, was nearby. A Chinese presence in this area and in the Mongla and Chittagong ports could have adverse strategic consequences for India. With these two ports in its hands, China would have access to the Bay of Bengal, considered to be an Indian lake.</p><p>Bangladesh watchers say that Rahman’s marked tilt towards China might have led to New Delhi’s rethinking on Hasina’s extradition. Extraditing her might help mend fences with the Rahman government and prevent him from drifting further towards Beijing.</p><p>However, in Bangladesh, there is speculation that India might be wanting to muddy the political waters in that country by sending Hasina back. It is well known that the Awami League, though banned since 2024, still has about 15 to 20% of the popular vote. After all, the Awami League had fought for the independence of Bangladesh, and Hasina had developed Bangladesh as Prime Minister over several terms. Hasina’s execution or incarceration could activate the party’s supporters and threaten the BNP’s monopoly of power.</p><p>India’s foreign ministry did not respond to Reuters’ request for comment on Hasina’s plan to return. But in April, the ministry had said that it was examining Bangladesh’s request to extradite her and added that it wanted to “engage constructively with the new government and further strengthen bilateral ties”. A desire for a rapprochement was evident.</p><p>Hasina herself is confident that she will emerge from the crisis strengthened and politically relevant.</p><p>“I believe in justice, and I feel that once proceedings start, it will be clear to the people how farcical the court is — and that I want to prove it, “ she told Reuters. She said she was not worried about jail time, noting that she had been arrested several times before.</p><p>“When a government works for a long time, mistakes can happen. No government is above error. But the right to judge the good and bad, the right and wrong of a government belongs to the people. I leave that judgment to the people. The court may have convicted me, and I may not be able to contest elections. But why should they suspend the Awami League? If we have done badly, let the people decide,” Hasina said.</p><p><strong>Political Anxiety in Bangladesh</strong></p><p>In a report on Hasina’s return, “The Daily Times of Bangladesh” said that political leaders in the country have branded her announcement a “political stunt”. Shafiqur Rahman, leader of the opposition in parliament and the Ameer of the Jamaat-e-Islami, said, “Hasina will never return.”</p><p>National Citizens Party Convener Nahid Islam said, “We want her to return so that her death sentence can be implemented. The government must extradite this genocidal killer through proper diplomatic and legal channels to execute the verdict.”</p><p>The BNP government is on high alert, viewing the proposed homecoming as a dangerous “political trap” designed to incite national chaos. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman had earlier warned that the move was a “calculated ruse” intended to re-energise Awami League activists and trigger street protests. BNP policymakers fear that if the Supreme Court rejects any potential appeal against her death sentence, it could lead to severe political instability and “anarchy”.</p><p>Hasina had revealed to Reuters that she had been organising the Awami League through online meetings covering 125 of Bangladesh’s 300 parliamentary constituencies.She had been defying a Bangladesh government diktat against indulging in any political activity even on line.</p><p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p><p>Writing in “The Daily Times of Bangladesh”, political correspondent Sheikh Shahariar Zaman recalled that Bangladesh and India had signed a framework agreement on cooperation during former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in 2011. One of its key provisions emphasised cooperation to achieve a “shared destiny” based on mutual development and regional stability. Zaman said that Rahman should work on this basis for the sake of Bangladesh.</p><p>Given its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific and its economic dependence on multiple partners, Bangladesh cannot afford to be perceived as aligning exclusively with any particular power bloc, he said.</p><p>China remains a major source of infrastructure investment and development financing, while India is an immediate neighbour with deep cultural, economic and security linkages. At the same time, the United States and the European Union are among Bangladesh’s largest export destinations and important political and development partners, he pointed out.</p><p>Strategic autonomy, he argued, does not mean choosing one partner over another; rather, it means engaging all partners based on national priorities while avoiding entanglement in geopolitical rivalries or military alliances.</p><p>“The challenge for Dhaka is to maximise economic opportunities without creating perceptions that could undermine trust among other key stakeholders,” Zaman said.</p><p>There is concern in Bangladesh about the ill effects of the extremely negative propaganda in the Indian political arena and the media about Bangladesh, its foreign relations and alleged illegal immigration from that country. The political atmosphere in India, especially in Assam and West Bengal, should be rendered conducive to meaningful rapprochement. In turn, Bangladesh should be more accommodating of India’s interests and sensitivities to clear the decks for cooperation.</p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e891ea01830" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The global significance of Bastille Day, the French National Day]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/the-global-significance-of-bastille-day-the-french-national-day-e052817dad9a?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e052817dad9a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 02:48:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-14T02:50:29.382Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*oQcAiG36WLe_oWAoaWKmog.jpeg" /></figure><p>By P.K.Balachandran/Daily Mirror</p><p>Colombo, July 14 — It was on July 14, 1789, that the common people of France stormed the Bastille prison in Paris to liberate persons unjustly thrown into its dungeons by an autocratic ruler, Louis XVI. At the Bastille, prisoners were subjected to physical torture, forced labour, and isolation without trial or charges. Many were thrown into it for their opinions, writings, or associations deemed threatening to the crown.</p><p>The prison’s notorious reputation was fuelled by the case of Étienne de Bonnart, a nobleman who spent several years in the Bastille for his alleged involvement in a plot against King Louis XVI. De Bonnart’s imprisonment sparked outrage among the nobility and commoners alike, highlighting the monarch’s tendency to imprison anyone deemed the slightest threat.</p><p>The storming of the Bastille is one of the iconic events of the French Revolution and its first violent manifestation. The fall of the Bastille was a turning point. It showed that people were no longer willing to tolerate absolute rule. The traumatic event had far-reaching consequences for society, politics and the constitutional development in France and very soon, across the world. Fittingly, the day is celebrated as the French National Day.</p><p><strong>The ground was Ready for Revolt</strong> <br> <br>At the time of the storming, France was in a deep crisis. The monarchy was struggling financially, partly due to its participation in the American War for Independence (1775–1783). The common Frenchman was suffering from high taxes and food shortages.</p><p>To address these issues, King Louis XVI (1774–1792) called a meeting of the “Estates-General” in 1789. The Estates General comprised the three Estates of pre-revolutionary France, namely, the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. But the Estate General broke up when the Third Estate (the Commoners) broke away from royal authority. This is generally considered the start of the French Revolution (1789–1799).</p><p>First created in 1302 as an advisory body to King Philip IV of France (1285–1314), the “Estates-General” was traditionally consulted on fiscal policy. It presented the King with petitions and grievances from the various Estates. Although it had no legislative power of its own, its authority came from its role as the voice of the people.</p><p>But the “Estates-General” was not a sitting body and was only called intermittently at the King’s will. As the French Kings began to centralise power and pursue policies of absolute monarchy, the Estates-General was convened less often. Upon the close of the 1614 meeting, it would not be called again until 1789, 175 years later!</p><p><strong>Tennis Court Oath</strong></p><p>The deputies of the Third Estate (Commoners), realising that in any attempt at reform they would be outvoted by the two privileged Estates (the clergy and the nobility), formed, on June 17, 1798, a “National Assembly.”</p><p>But on June 20, 1789, they found that they were locked out of their usual meeting hall at Versailles. Thinking that the King was forcing them to disband, the Third Estate moved to a nearby indoor tennis court to hold their meeting. There, they took an oath never to give up until a written constitution had been established for France. It came to be known as the “Tennis Court Oath.””</p><p>In the face of the solidarity of the Third Estate, King Louis XVI relented, and on June 27, ordered the clergy and the nobility to join with the Third Estate in the National Assembly, which took the official title of National Constituent Assembly on July 9. However, at the same time, he began gathering troops to force its dissolution.</p><p>These two months of prevarication at a time when the problem of maintaining food supplies had reached its climax infuriated the towns and the provinces. Rumours of an “aristocratic conspiracy” led by the King and the privileged to overthrow the Third Estate led to the Great “Fear of July 1789”. The gathering of troops around Paris was provocative. <br> <br>On July 14, 1789, the Parisian crowd stormed the Bastille, a symbol of royal tyranny. They killed its Governor and liberated the seven prisoners they wanted to set free. Above all, they destroyed the structure as it was a symbol of oppression</p><p>Again, the king had to yield. Visiting Paris, he showed recognition of the sovereignty of the people. But the people had lost faith in him.</p><p><strong>Organised Attack</strong></p><p>The storming of the Bastille is often romanticised as a spontaneous and heroic act. However, historians have debunked this notion, revealing a more complex sequence of events. The reality is that the prison’s fall was the culmination of weeks of planning and organisation by radical revolutionaries.</p><p>The myth of spontaneity likely originated from the fact that the crowd that stormed the Bastille on July 14 was large and seething with anger. But this crowd was not just a disorganized mob — it was made up of people who had been mobilised through weeks of propaganda and agitation. The Parisian population had been primed for rebellion by inflammatory speeches, pamphlets, and graffiti plastering the city walls.</p><p>A key factor that contributed to the fall of the Bastille was the presence of armed groups within the crowd. These groups, composed of revolutionaries and members of the National Guard, were instrumental in breaching the prison gates and overpowering the garrison inside. Their actions were not without strategic planning — they had been preparing for this moment for weeks.</p><p><strong>The Aftermath -the Good and the Bad</strong></p><p>The storming was celebrated across France, with people taking to the streets in joy. The fall of the Bastille led to the abolition of feudal privileges and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which established the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.</p><p>The immediate aftermath saw the establishment of a temporary committee to govern Paris, marking a shift from absolute monarchy to representative democracy. This bold move emboldened the National Assembly, which soon declared itself the sole governing authority in France.</p><p>Camille Desmoulins, a charismatic orator, emerged as a key figure in this movement. He advocated for the rights of the people and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Georges Danton, another influential leader, joined forces with Desmoulins, and together they helped galvanise support among Parisians.</p><p><strong>Politics Turned Violent</strong></p><p>However, the storming also marked the beginning of the revolution’s violent phase. The revolutionaries, now armed and emboldened, began to take more radical actions, including the execution of King Louis XVI in 1793. Key figures emerged during this period, including Maximilien Robespierre and Georges Danton, who would later play significant roles in the “Reign of Terror.”</p><p><strong>Global Impact</strong></p><p>The storming of the Bastille sent shockwaves across Europe, inspiring other revolutionary movements and influencing key figures. In Germany, the fall of the Bastille sparked widespread protests against feudalism, leading to the eventual collapse of the Holy Roman Empire. The French Revolution’s emphasis on liberty, equality, and fraternity also resonated with the Polish people, who were fighting for their own independence from Russia.</p><p>In Britain, radicals like Thomas Paine drew inspiration from the French example, advocating for democratic reforms and an end to monarchic rule. Meanwhile, in Italy, nationalists were emboldened to push for unification against Austrian dominance. These evolutionary fervours eventually led to the establishment of new governments and the redrawing of national borders in Europe.</p><p>In America, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams drew parallels between their own struggle for independence and the French people’s fight against monarchy.</p><p>A key legacy is the establishment of democratic principles, such as universal suffrage, equality before the law, and government accountability. These concepts were first articulated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, adopted by France’s National Assembly in 1789.</p><p><strong>Recognition of Human Rights</strong></p><p>The French Revolution’s emphasis on human rights has inspired similar movements globally. For instance, the American civil rights movement drew heavily from the language and ideals of the French Revolution. Similarly, anti-apartheid activists in South Africa invoked the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity to challenge the racist regime.</p><p>Today, social justice movements continue to draw upon these ideals, advocating greater economic and social equality. The influence of Bastille Day can be seen in various international institutions, such as the United Nations, which has enshrined human rights in its charter.</p><p>(Sources: <a href="http://www.worldhistory.com/">www.worldhistory.com</a>, <a href="http://www.completeera.com/">www.completeera.com</a>, <a href="http://www.britannica.com/">www.britannica.com</a>)</p><p>Cover photo — Watercolour by Jean Houvel</p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e052817dad9a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are India and Pakistan keeping their Track 2 diplomacy under wraps?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/are-india-and-pakistan-keeping-their-track-2-diplomacy-under-wraps-e42772715158?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e42772715158</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 08:07:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-29T08:07:21.717Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ESGb2PjnD3CKzQRSx8tvaQ.png" /><figcaption>RSS second-in-command Dattatreya Hosabale at the Hudson Institute, US -Photo Hudson Institute</figcaption></figure><p>Is the US behind the informal diplomacy for its own reasons or is it a product of the fraught international situation due to the Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz?</p><p>By P.K.Balachandran</p><p>Colombo, June 29 (<a href="http://www.indopacificaffairs.lk/">www.indopacificaffairs.lk</a>) — In the last few days, Indian and Pakistani media have carried unconfirmed reports about India and Pakistan having had at least five Track 2 or Track 1.5 talks in places like London, Muscat, Bangkok and Colombo since the India-Pakistan war in May 2025.</p><p>With both New Delhi and Islamabad observing silence on this matter, there is much speculation about the focus of the “talks” and what motivated or nudged the two ever-feuding neighbours to have a dialogue, at least unofficially.</p><p>Some, like Dr Muqtedar Khan of Delaware University, speculate that the US was behind it, while others, like South Asis expert Michael Kugelman, say that the reason could be the fraught global economic situation arising from the Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.</p><p><strong>The US Stake</strong></p><p>The US interest may be rooted in its wanting Pakistan to be less India-centric and more Middle East-centric to help the US rehabilitate itself in that region after the disastrous Iran war. In fact, Washington has already clubbed Pakistan with the Middle East, removing it from South Asia, thereby nudging it to reorient itself towards the Middle East rather than South Asia.</p><p>On the other hand, the US needs India also, though for purely economic reasons. While India is no longer considered a military bulwark against China, given its reluctance to take on China militarily. What attracts the US to India is its huge market, which could be open to American consumer goods and defence hardware.</p><p>To realise these two objectives, the US could make efforts to bring about a modicum of peace between India and Pakistan. President Donald Trump has made no secret of his desire to be a peacemaker between India and Pakistan. In fact, he claimed to have ended the May 2025 India-Pakistan war by threatening the belligerents with punishing tariffs. He also said that the two had agreed to begin talks. Vice President J.D.Vance stated that the two countries had agreed to talks at a neutral venue.</p><p>But India repeatedly said that there could be no talks until Pakistan stops sending terrorists, the reason for the wars fought so far since 1947. Pakistan, of course, has been stubbornly denying the charge of being a terror sponsor and has accused India of oppressing the people of Muslim-majority Kashmir.</p><p>India mounted pressure on Pakistan by abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. The Indus River flows from India into Pakistan. In a belligerent mood, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “Operation Sindoor” of May 2025 against Pakistan had not “ended” but only “paused.””</p><p>However, behind the triumphalism in Pakistan and belligerence in India, there must have been a feeling among decision makers that modern warfare is extremely expensive and could not be pursued to the bitter end. Ground troops and tanks have been replaced by missiles, drones and sophisticated aircraft. While the Indian air force is short of fighter aircraft, the Pakistanis depend on the Chinese for hardware and satellite intelligence. In fact, neither side can fight for more than a few days under the present circumstances.</p><p><strong>Kite Flying by RSS?</strong></p><p>There is speculation that it is for these reasons that Dattatreya Hosabale, the Number 2 leader of the powerful Indian right-wing organisation, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), called for talks with Pakistan and people to people contacts. He even said that Indians and Pakistanis were one people. Observers say that Hosabale could not have made radical statements over the Indian government-backed Press Trust of India (PTI) news agency without a nudge from the powers-that-be in New Delhi. The RSS, after all, is the ideological wing of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the two work in tandem.</p><p>Before Hosabale’s interview with PTI, he and his RSS colleague, Ram Madhav, had gone to the US and addressed the Hudson Institute in Washington, where they said that the RSS was a moderate organisation friendly to the US. According to Prof. Muqtedar Khan, the Hudson Institute event was organised at the instance of the US government.</p><p>A conspiracy theory floated about the RSS’s initiative is that any softening displayed by India would result in the Pakistan army sabotaging it by mounting a terror attack in India, which, in turn, would give India an excuse to renew the paused Operation Sindoor.</p><p>Experience shows that every time Indian and Pakistani politicians made a friendly move, the Pakistan army would unleash an attack either by regular troops or non-State actors.</p><p><strong>Track 1.5 Meeting in Colombo</strong></p><p>India and Pakistan have had Track-2 or Track 1.5 (the former with only non-officials as participants and the latter with official and non-official participants) at various places five times since May 2025.</p><p>Indian and Pakistani media said that a Track 1.5 dialogue was held in Colombo on the sidelines of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) annual South Asia Dialogue in the Sri Lankan capital. “The Hindustan Times” claimed that the Colombo talks were a Track 2 dialogue, meaning that no serving Indian official was involved. The report added that the Indian side included former national general secretary of the BJP Ram Madhav, former Army Chief Gen. M.M. Naravane and former diplomat Ruchi Ghanashyam. The Pakistani delegation reportedly featured a serving diplomat from a foreign ministry, Director General (South Asia and SAARC) Sajjad Haider Khan, former senator Sherry Rehman, and retired Major General Isfandiyar Ali Khan Pataudi.</p><p>The report also said that US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, S Paul Kapur, joined participants at a special dinner during the conference.</p><p>“The Express Tribune” of Pakistan said that the primary objective was to strengthen mechanisms for communication during crises and explore measures to prevent and manage potential escalations.</p><p><strong>Ram Madhav Debunks Claims</strong></p><p>Be that as it may, Ram Madhav of the RSS and BJP rejected the claim about bilateral talks. He described media reports to the contrary as a “complete spin on a non-story”. Shooting down the idea of talks, a Pakistani official told “Arab News” that Pakistan would not go for anything less than Track 1 official talks with India.</p><p>Senior Indian national security analyst, Nitin A Gokhale, said in a post on X, “Reports on the so-called India-Pakistan Track 2 meetings in Muscat, Bangkok and Colombo were being cleverly projected as new bilateral initiatives when they were, in fact, long-standing multilateral conferences organised by international think tanks”.</p><p>Referring to another conference held in Bangkok, Gokhale said, “It was organised by a Canadian university with a long history of bringing Indian and Pakistani participants onto a common platform”.</p><p><strong>Talks Have Always Followed Conflicts: Kugelman</strong></p><p>In a hopeful article in TIME magazine, South Asia expert Michael Kugelman said that tensions between India and Pakistan have in the past eased after periods of conflict, often accompanied by a revival of commercial and cultural ties.</p><p>In the years immediately following the Partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947 and the first India-Pakistan war a few months later, the two nations ramped up trade and inked new trade facilitation deals. In 1972, a year after a brutal conflict — one in which India helped with the rebirth of the eastern wing of Pakistan as Bangladesh — New Delhi and Islamabad concluded an agreement that resumed limited trade, he recalled.</p><p>In January 2010, barely a year after Pakistan-backed terrorists killed 166 people in Mumbai in November 2008, The “Times of India” and the Jang Group, two of the biggest newspaper groups in India and Pakistan, launched a new peace initiative meant to foster cultural diplomacy.</p><p>After Narendra Modi was elected as Prime Minister of India in 2014, he ushered in a new era of muscular Hindu nationalism and fought against Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks. Yet, despite all of this, in February 2021, India and Pakistan agreed to stop cross-border firing and reaffirmed their commitment to an older cease-fire agreement.</p><p>“Today, each side has compelling reasons to avoid new escalations. Pakistan is embroiled in a limited conflict with the Taliban on its frontier with Afghanistan, and until recently, it was grappling with a war across its border with Iran. India, despite having lowered tensions with China, still faces the risk of border provocations — and other major challenges — from a Pakistan-Beijing military alliance.”</p><p>“More broadly, India and Pakistan are navigating a world of considerable turbulence. The economic fallout of the recent conflict in the Middle East weighs heavily on them. The Gulf states are home to several million Indian and Pakistani expatriates, and the region supplies much of the oil and gas on which both nations depend. With so many fires raging, neither India nor Pakistan can afford to ignite another. This fraught global context and its domestic implications could be the context for recent reports of Track 2 or even Track 1 diplomacy,” Kugelman suggested.</p><p><em>(The views in the article are those of the author only)</em></p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e42772715158" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Renaming of US Indo-Pacific command hints at strain in US-India ties]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/renaming-of-us-indo-pacific-command-hints-at-strain-in-us-india-ties-6416d5c9c1fe?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6416d5c9c1fe</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2026 02:21:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-27T02:21:40.272Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jIkx082r4qUZMlz4FnT8fg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo: Wikimedia/AFP</figcaption></figure><p>By P.K.Balachandran/The Sunday Morning <br> <br>Colombo, June 27 — The renaming of America’s Indo-Pacific Command, dropping the “Indo” part, is generally believed to reflect recent strains in US-India relations. The naval area command will now be known as the US Pacific Command, or USPACOM, as it was eight years ago. <br> <br>Name changes tend to reflect changes in orientation and policy. In view of Trump’s aggressive “America First” policy, the US <br>Department of Defence was renamed “Department of War”. Over the past year and a half, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has renamed several Army bases that originally honoured separatist Confederate leaders of the 19th century. Century. <br> <br>Then came the renaming of the Indo-US Pacific Command, reflecting Trump’s diminishing faith in India’s cooperation in giving effect to his policy on China. <br> <br>According to a Pentagon release, the change in the nomenclature “honours the command’s deep historical roots, fostering a sense of pride and collective spirit among all who serve in the Pacific.” <br> <br>“From its critical role in establishing the post-WWII regional security architecture to its coordination of joint forces during the Korean War, the Vietnam War and countless humanitarian operations, the USPACOM namesake carries decades of military heritage and enduring regional partnerships,” the Pentagon’s release states. <br> <br>“US Pacific Command” was the official name of the formation until May 2018, when, during the first term of President Donald Trump, it was changed to “US Indo-Pacific Command in recognition of the increasing connectivity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the rising military and economic pressure emerging from Beijing. <br> <br>The Command’s top officer in 2018, Adm. Harry Harris, said that the change reflected the “return of great power competition as decades of combat in the Global War on Terror were winding down.” He added that the US was reaching an “inflexion point in history as a geo-political competition between free and oppressive visions is taking place in the Indo-Pacific.” He was referring to the emergence of China in conflict with the US and the West. <br> <br>While announcing the name change this June, the Pentagon clarified that the change will have no impact on the Command’s mission or areas of operational responsibility that were in place under INDOPACOM. <br> <br>But analysts say that the Pentagon’s decision to strip “Indo” from the name of its largest unified military command questions the United States’ continuing commitment to India, said Christopher Clary, an associate professor of political science at the University at Albany. “The renaming is senseless. It is reasonable for sceptics to wonder whether the goal is to appease China, which seems to be the recurrent feature of this administration’s policy in Asia,” Clay said. <br> <br>On the face of it, the name change is largely administrative — as Pentagon officials were quick to point out. Yet the removal of “Indo” from the command’s title arrives at a sensitive time in the US–India relationship, with ties already battered by tariff disputes, a deadly strike in the Strait of Hormuz and friction over Delhi’s energy ties with Russia. <br> <br>According to Derek Grossman, a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California, Trump has signalled that India no longer enjoys the privileged position it once held. “Since last summer, Trump has demonstrated a willingness to risk serious tensions with India in pursuit of other objectives,” Grossman wrote in “Foreign Affairs.” <br> <br>He recalled that Trump had embarrassed India by pulling out of the planned QUAD summit in New Delhi in 2025 while simultaneously pressuring the Narendra Modi government over Russian oil purchases and repeatedly claiming credit for brokering a ceasefire in last May’s brief air war between India and Pakistan. Trump has also moved closer to Pakistan, a country India regards as a State sponsor of terrorism. <br> <br>Reacting to the change in the nomenclature, the Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman, Randhir Jaiswal, said that the PACOM name change was being “carefully considered”. Shruti Pandalai, India chair at Australia’s Lowy Institute think tank, said that the change risked jeopardising more than two decades of trust building undertaken by both the US and India. It has inflamed public antipathy in India towards America. <br> <br>Troy Lee-Brown, a research fellow at the University of Western Australia’s Defence and Security Institute, said that while it was too early to interpret the move as a shift in strategy on the part of Washington, it will be interesting to track the consequences of the change in the name. <br> <br>Writing in <a href="http://www.asiatimes.com/">www.asiatimes.com</a>, Saima Afzal recalled that US-India defence cooperation had expanded dramatically, intelligence sharing deepened and military interoperability increased over the years. The US and India signed a series of foundational defence agreements while bilateral defence trade grew from virtually zero in the early 2000s to more than US$ 20 billion. Through mechanisms such as the QUAD and joint exercises such as Malabar, India became increasingly integrated with American strategic planning. <br> <br><strong>Where India Lagged </strong><br> <br>And underlying all this was a broader assumption, that India would emerge not only as a counterweight to China but also as a stabilising force in South Asia and a major contributor to wider Indo-Pacific security. Afzal says. <br>“The question today is not whether India has become more powerful, which it clearly has. Rather, it is whether the strategic expectations the US sought from India have been realised,” Afzal points out. <br> <br>India’s recent achievements are substantial. Few countries have expanded their international profile as rapidly over the past two decades. Yet regional leadership depends not only on economic growth and military spending but also on the ability to shape regional outcomes and manage security challenges. In this context, Saima Afzal wonders if India has a proven record of shaping outcomes in its own backyard- South Asia. <br> <br>“It is here that India’s record is mixed,” Afzal says, citing the 2019 <br>Balakot crisis, which demonstrated how rapidly tensions between India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, could dangerously escalate despite enhanced international engagement with both countries. More recently, the May 2025 confrontation over the terrorist attack in Pehalgam again required diplomatic intervention by the US to prevent further deterioration and possibly nuclear escalation. <br> <br>“These episodes do not diminish India’s strategic importance. They do, however, highlight the limits of military and diplomatic coercion as instruments for managing the India-Pakistan relationship. The realities of nuclear deterrence have constrained escalation in recent clashes and limited the ability of India to impose unilateral outcomes on Pakistan,” Afza points out. <br> <br><strong>US Needs Allies’ Military Participation </strong><br> <br>The US, under Trump, increasingly seeks partners capable of reducing America’s strategic burdens. As strategic competition with China intensifies, the US has strong incentives to avoid becoming repeatedly drawn into regional crises that divert attention from its broader priorities. <br> <br>There are also signs that Washington is increasingly willing to evaluate India through a more transactional lens than was common during the early years of the Indo-Pacific framework, Afzal says. <br> <br>Trump’s first term embraced the Indo-Pacific concept as a strategic vision in which India was positioned as a future counterweight to China. But India, as a US-based Indian analyst, Ashley Tellis, pointed out, India had been getting a lot from the US, but had not given back commensurately. <br> <br>India has contradictions with China over the border, but is not willing to go to war with China. Indian industries survive on valuable intermediaries from China. The Indian government does not criticise openly. This irks the Trumpian US. <br> <br>Therefore, despite repeatedly describing India as an important strategic partner, Washington has maintained pressure on trade issues, pursued tariff disputes and approached economic negotiations through a framework emphasising reciprocity rather than exceptional treatment, Afzal points out. <br> <br>“This suggests that geopolitical importance alone no longer guarantees preferential consideration in American policymaking. This does not necessarily downgrade India in America’s vision. Rather, it suggests that Washington under Trump may be moving from strategic aspiration toward strategic performance as the principal standard of evaluation,” Afzal says. <br> <br>In this context, Pakistan fills the bill for the US. But the US does not see Pakistan as being part of the Indo-Pacific. In its recent reclassification of countries, Pakistan is clubbed with the Middle Eastern countries, following its useful role in bringing a settlement with Iran in collaboration with the Arab States. <br> <br><em>(The views expressed in this article are the author’s)</em></p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6416d5c9c1fe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pathfinder Foundation , Colombo, holds discussion on Indonesia’s Golden Vision 2045]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@pkbalachandran11/pathfinder-foundation-colombo-holds-discussion-on-indonesias-golden-vision-2045-17867360833d?source=rss-1551a1e324f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/17867360833d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[P.K. Balachandran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 11:41:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-18T11:43:41.269Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*21fiXdDrMjkvhriSq6LI3w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ambassdor Dewi Gustina Tobing</figcaption></figure><p><em>Pathfinder Foundation Ambassadors’ Roundtable Explores Indonesia’s Golden Vision 2045 and Lessons for Sri Lanka’s Development Journey</em></p><p>Colombo, June 18 — The Pathfinder Foundation held its latest Ambassadors’ Roundtable at the Colombo Club, Taj Samudra, featuring Dewi Gustina Tobing, Ambassador and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, who presented on Indonesia’s long-term national development strategy, Indonesia’s Golden Vision 2045.</p><p>Reflecting on the relevance of Indonesia’s experience for Sri Lanka, Ambassador Tobing observed that while the two countries have distinct development trajectories, they share common aspirations in strengthening human capital, improving food security, attracting investment, and building resilience against emerging challenges.</p><p>The Ambassador highlighted that Indonesia, with a population exceeding 280 million and a GDP of approximately US$1.4 trillion, continues to remain the largest economy in Southeast Asia. Despite global uncertainties, the country has maintained resilient economic growth of around 5 percent in recent years, supported by industrial development and infrastructure investment.</p><p>In her address, Ambassador Tobing outlined Indonesia’s vision of becoming a developed, prosperous, and globally influential nation by 2045. She explained that the vision is being pursued under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto, building upon successive administrations’ long-term development agenda.</p><p>The Ambassador outlined four foundational pillars underpinning Indonesia’s Golden Vision 2045: Human Development and Mastery of Science and Technology — Building a healthy, educated, innovative, and technologically capable population. Sustainable Economic Development — Transforming Indonesia into a productive, competitive, and resilient high-income economy while maintaining environmental sustainability.</p><p>Equitable Development — Ensuring that the benefits of growth are shared across regions and communities through improved connectivity, public services, and social cohesion. National Resilience and Governance — Strengthening institutions, governance, legal reform, anti-corruption measures, and national resilience in areas such as food, energy, water, climate, and maritime security.<br> <br>A key component of Indonesia’s strategy is downstream industrialisation, which encourages domestic processing and value addition to natural resources rather than exporting raw materials.</p><p>Ambassador Tobing cited the country’s nickel industry as a notable example, highlighting its transformation into an integrated ecosystem that includes smelting, battery production, and electric vehicle supply chains.</p><p>Indonesia’s abundant reserves of nickel, palm oil, coal, and gold are being leveraged to attract foreign investment, support industrialisation, and create higher-value economic opportunities.</p><p>Looking ahead, Indonesia aims to become the world’s fifth largest economy by 2045, with projected GDP reaching between US$9.1 trillion and US$9.8 trillion and GDP per capita ranging from US$23,000 to US$30,000.</p><p>Ambassador Tobing stressed that the components of Vision 2045 that are currently being implemented are integral building blocks toward achieving these objectives.</p><p><strong>On Sri Lanka</strong></p><p>Reflecting on the relevance of Indonesia’s experience for Sri Lanka, she observed that while the two countries have distinct development trajectories, they share common aspirations in strengthening human capital, improving food security, attracting investment, and building resilience against emerging challenges.</p><p>As Indian Ocean states, both countries also share an interest in enhancing connectivity, expanding trade and investment, and promoting regional stability and prosperity, while creating mutually beneficial opportunities for deeper bilateral cooperation.</p><p>The presentation was followed by an interactive discussion on ASEAN’s role in regional affairs, Indonesia’s independent foreign policy, governance and anti-corruption efforts, social cohesion, RCEP and opportunities for Sri Lanka, Papua’s development, and Indonesia’s democratic and economic transformation.</p><p>In her final remarks, Ambassador Tobing reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to strengthening cooperation with Sri Lanka. “Sri Lanka is a good partner of Indonesia,” she stated. “We would like the progress and opportunities that Indonesia has achieved to be shared through collaboration. Our partnership is very important, and we look forward to strengthening it further in the years ahead.”</p><p>Opening the session, Executive Director, Pathfinder Foundation, Dr. Dayaratna Silva, highlighted the significance of Indonesia’s remarkable development journey and the valuable lessons it offers countries across the Global South. He noted that Indonesia’s rise as a G20 member and its growing influence in regional and global affairs demonstrate the success of its long-term development planning. He further emphasised Indonesia’s leadership role within ASEAN and its contribution to establishing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement.</p><p>END</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=17867360833d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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