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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Prateek Tiwari on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Prateek Tiwari on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@prateek_0490?source=rss-dd4cbb5a8d44------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Prateek Tiwari on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prateek_0490?source=rss-dd4cbb5a8d44------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[How “Recon” helped Samsung protect their production repositories of SamsungTv, eCommerce / eStores]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/how-recon-helped-samsung-protect-their-production-repositories-of-samsungtv-ecommerce-estores-4c51d6ec4fdd?source=rss-dd4cbb5a8d44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4c51d6ec4fdd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Prateek Tiwari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Oct 2019 14:01:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-10T19:15:03.054Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p><strong><em>Recon never ends!</em></strong> You have to be creative and figure out a way in which you can extend your research and sharpen your skills. I believe that finding vulnerabilities in the bug bounty program is probably easy but the main trick lies in the reconnaissance phase.</p><p>After giving a lot of thought, a couple of things hit my mind, and I immediately decided to put a rough sketch altogether:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y6d3Y1HJ0j54qzCXRQLsNQ.png" /></figure><p>These are the list of commonly used services. Almost, 99% of the companies use these, so I decided to give a try and find if anyone has leaked the credentials of these services anywhere, my research was not restricted and focused on any specific program be it Samsung or any other. I stick to research ethics while working on research and finding credentials w.r.t the basic services which all tech/non-tech folks work on — across all organization (small, medium or a multinational one).</p><h3>Bumper Hit 🎁</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*_GqlZhdAwKeaIhEsb-i_YA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Amongst the above, <a href="https://papaly.com/"><strong><em>Papaly</em></strong></a> seemed an interesting research topic basis my observation.</p><p><strong>What’s Papaly?</strong></p><p><a href="https://papaly.com/"><em>Papaly</em></a> is a tool for saving and organizing links (“bookmarks”). Bookmarks are organized into collections called boards. You can have any number of boards. Each bookmark belongs to a category within the board. A Papaly board can either be public or private.</p><blockquote>Did someone mention public board?</blockquote><blockquote>I can already smell what was about to come.</blockquote><p><strong>site:papaly.com bitbucket</strong></p><p>Resulted in quite a few public boards where people had bookmarked bitbucket instances with credentials 😲. After overviewing each board, I got stumbled upon the one which belonged to Samsung’s Engineer. And what was next?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pnJ4hUWZzHbQVwtQR7mwQw.png" /></figure><blockquote>Credentials of BitBucket were exposed on a public board and was not enabled with 2FA, which gave access to their production BitBucket instance. Needless to say, this would have gone worse if it could have gone into wrong hands.</blockquote><h3><strong>Key Takeaways for Companies</strong></h3><ul><li>Security is your responsibility — enable 2FA at org level for your repositories.</li><li>Avoid using the same passwords across accounts, use password managers instead.</li><li>Shortcuts are fancy but risky — Don’t Store passwords locally or on the Internet.</li><li>Takeaways are endless but self-awareness is the virtue!</li></ul><h3><strong>How this methodology helped further</strong></h3><p>Using other passive sources, I encountered credentials of various services pertaining to different organizations out of which I was able to approach those who had a Bug Bounty Program.</p><blockquote>What’s important?</blockquote><p>Sharing results isn’t but sharing approach is, isn’t it?</p><blockquote>IMO, Yes, it is!</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/440/1*N9W6DfGA6wxgKTiywV9aUA.png" /><figcaption>keywords can be anything, like “bitbucket pass”, “trello password”, “asana passwd”, “jira pwd”, “company secrets”, “company sendKeys”, etc…</figcaption></figure><p>site:coggle.it &quot;companyname&quot; →Using this, I’ve found internal flowcharts which on a few occasions had credentials.</p><p>site:scribd.com &quot;companyname&quot; →This had a PDF file of a company, wherein their engineer prepped up something for an internal workshop, which contained links to their internal dashboards (which was not internal 😊).</p><p>It’s all about being creative. <strong><em>Recon goes on and on!</em></strong></p><h3><strong>Disclosure Timeline [Samsung]:</strong></h3><p>16th June, 2019 — Reported to Samsung</p><p>17th June, 2019 — Report Triaged</p><p>19th June, 2019 — Issue fixed</p><p>20th June, 2019 — Rewarded by Samsung</p><p>I appreciate you all for taking out time and to give it a read.</p><p>Happy hacking!</p><ul><li><a href="https://twitter.com/prateek_0490">https://twitter.com/prateek_0490</a></li><li><a href="https://hackerone.com/prateek_0490">https://hackerone.com/prateek_0490</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c51d6ec4fdd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/how-recon-helped-samsung-protect-their-production-repositories-of-samsungtv-ecommerce-estores-4c51d6ec4fdd">How “Recon” helped Samsung protect their production repositories of SamsungTv, eCommerce / eStores</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Learn from others mistakes, or wait for a BREACH to happen!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prateek_0490/learn-from-others-mistakes-or-wait-for-a-breach-to-happen-640582d4f5ed?source=rss-dd4cbb5a8d44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/640582d4f5ed</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Prateek Tiwari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Oct 2018 09:07:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-06T10:00:43.711Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/1*G5ZBFToGqOkdEiB_MciwsA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image from <a href="http://spacecoastdaily.com/">Space Coast Daily</a></figcaption></figure><p>Breach is becoming very common nowadays, why? Ignorance? Not learning from other(s) mistakes? Or you just don’t care about your customer’s data?</p><p>Whatever might be a reason but it’s a well known fact that “<strong>We take security seriously</strong>” only comes after getting breached! Do you know that a simple basic efforts can help you prevent from attackers to a certain extent?</p><p><strong>Security is a continuous process</strong>, security breaches will keep on happening over and over again. But you can make a life difficult for Hackers if you have some basic checks in place, if you yourself are not gonna put any efforts in order to protect your users/customers than good luck getting breached.</p><p>Lot of folks reached out to me recently and asked what should we do in order to ensure we don’t get breached? I said, sorry there is no way to protect a breach but yes you can definitely make it difficult for attackers, how? Have these basic things within your organisation:</p><ul><li><strong>Continuous Asset Management </strong>— <a href="https://danielmiessler.com/blog/continuous-asset-management-security/">If You’re Not Doing Continuous Asset Management You’re Not Doing Security</a>.</li><li>At least have a <strong>Vulnerability Disclosure Policy</strong>, not having a vulnerability disclosure policy amounts to cybersecurity negligence. Don’t have one? Don’t wait, set it up today! Always remember, the more you get hacked by whitehats, the less hackable you become. Build a strong relationship with researcher community.</li><li>With software deployment becoming continuous, <strong>so should security testing</strong>. I’ve seen many companies do not have a single person in Security. They do have QA Engineers who don’t understand Security. What’s the use of it? Most of the companies get breached because they don’t have an understanding of an <strong>IDOR</strong>, really?</li><li>Most companies do not even have firewall(s) in place. TBH, <strong>Firewalls don’t ensure 100% security</strong> but definitely makes life harder for attackers out there. WAF have been considered a critical line of defence against attacks from outside of an organisation. But just don’t be fully dependent, it’s not a set-and-forget affair and <strong>WAFs Are NEVER Perfect</strong>.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Have some basic checks like:</em></strong></p><ul><li>Enforce 2FA to atleast places where you have sensitive data, that would make harder for malicious actors to access any of your sensitive data</li><li>Monitor what you’re exposing over the Internet</li><li>Avoid using admin | admin as your passwords. Have a proper authentication layer on all your internal assets, private unguessable URLs are not equivalent to password based authentication</li><li>Use SSL Certs | Update Security Software</li><li>Increase Password Security | Staff Training and Awareness</li><li>Encryption and data backup</li><li>Ensure vendors and partners maintain high data protection standards</li><li>Avoid leaking any SECRETS or sensitive info in repository management services</li></ul><p>In today’s technology based world we can’t expect everything to go normal. Things go wrong sometimes but doing a <strong>continuous effort to get yourself more secure</strong> is a better approach rather than sitting tight and waiting to get breached.</p><h3>Have any questions or need any help? Feel free to reach out on <a href="https://twitter.com/prateek_0490">Twitter</a>!</h3><p><em>Twitter — </em><a href="https://twitter.com/prateek_0490"><em>@prateek_0490</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=640582d4f5ed" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bug Bounty — Tips / Tricks / JS (JavaScript Files)]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/bug-bounty-tips-tricks-js-javascript-files-bdde412ea49d?source=rss-dd4cbb5a8d44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bdde412ea49d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Prateek Tiwari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2018 19:36:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-29T18:55:18.495Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It all started in month of August when I reached out to <a href="https://twitter.com/gerben_javado">Gerben Javado</a> regarding a question, yes it was a basic question but a quick chat with him that day gave me some confidence to hunt for Bugs when he pointed towards his blog post The <a href="https://gerbenjavado.com/the-race-to-the-top-of-a-bug-bounty-program">race to the top of a bug bounty program</a>, and asked me to look for Bugs in that particular program.</p><p>The game began, I never knew that I was about to turn the tables and be at the top of that program pretty soon. Within a span of 6 Months I learned a hell lot of techniques / tricks and how to read JS (that was most important for me).</p><p>Sharing is Caring :) Straight to the Point now.</p><p><strong>Recon?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/636/1*5DSfSv_DkfyIEdvUQU2YAA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Recon Recon Recon</figcaption></figure><p>Everyone knows about Recon and how to do it, the most important is what more you can add in your recon techniques to find some more bugs:</p><p>Number 1 — Do you search for endpoints on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.? No, don’t ask me how, here it is &gt; If you know of an endpoint which returns 403 since it’s an admin endpoint but have you ever imagined knowing the correct directories and parameters sometimes can turn 403 into 200 (because of misconfigurations) and then into a SQLi? ;)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/970/1*2ejJKQb0tVZBxKllSSC-ZA.png" /><figcaption>Endpoint Discovered on a Social Media Platform</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*Z0zznwoW2_OQ2cjdvAQikQ.png" /><figcaption>Result of that ^^ particular endpoint</figcaption></figure><p>Number 2 — CSP Headers? Anyone? It had one subdomain, I scanned for the IP ranges and found an interesting one which gave me full admin access [that report is already public ;)]. Whoaaa!</p><p>Number 3 — Google, please give me all the results which has “<a href="http://www.domain.com/%7Bdirectory%7D/%7Bdirectory">www.domain.com/{directory}/{directory</a>}&quot; &gt; No, I’m not using site:domain.com inurl:, I’m just using DOUBLE QUOTES and as mentioned “<a href="http://www.domain.com/%7Bdirectory%7D/%7Bdirectory">www.domain.com/{directory}/{directory</a>}&quot;, this can be most of the times PITA but if you want more bugs then let’s do it. You can just modify your search based on the endpoints which you notice is being used on constant basis by the company. If you’re lucky then you can find something which can help you get ::</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/1*nmACRPhq-AfpzNkUSdOGug.png" /><figcaption>She was a nice lady who had that companies endpoint in her blog which when clicked was redirecting to her own business site. She might be having some extra privileges within her profile which allowed her to do this.</figcaption></figure><p>Number 4 — Don’t look for Number 4, be creative ;)</p><p><strong>Oh My JS FILES ;) I’m Loving you more and more!</strong></p><p>There are great tools out there to look for the endpoints in JS files like JS Parser (from <a href="https://twitter.com/NahamSec">Ben</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/bbuerhaus">Brett</a>), Linkfinder (from <a href="https://twitter.com/gerben_javado">Gerben Javado</a>), those are great tools but nothing can be as great as manual searches, yes those are again PITA but if you want more bugs you have to ;)</p><p>Few Examples from Manual Search:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/731/1*cXAFMv2roqc-iKTyQnmDoQ.png" /><figcaption>I Love You JS :)</figcaption></figure><p>Yes, you read that ^^ right.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/915/1*dFXNKucd2z8yaq1oCHacHQ.png" /><figcaption>I Love you even more now ;)</figcaption></figure><p>JS will most of the time allow you to find something for sure, recently I was able to find an internal host of a company upon visiting it, it was only to be found that it was not accessible from outside their network. Oh really? No, let’s fire Nmap and see if we can find any Open Ports. Super, later it was discovered it had Open Jenkins Instance running on port 8080 wowwww cool it was time to execute some cmds, aaannnndddddd using Groovy Scripts I was able to execute a cmd on the server. Woohoo!</p><p>There are couple of my reports (about JS) already published on my <a href="https://hackerone.com/prateek_0490">H1 Profile</a> too, <a href="http://hackerone.com/prateek_0490">hackerone.com/prateek_0490</a>.</p><p>I’d like to thank <a href="https://hackerone.com/">HackerOne</a> and <a href="https://bugcrowd.com/">BugCrowd</a> and all other companies who run a BBP and provide us with an opportunity to make this happen.</p><p>Yes, I’ve and I’m doing my bit in making internet a safer place :)</p><p>Questions? Hit me up on <a href="https://twitter.com/prateek_0490">Twitter </a>&gt; <a href="https://twitter.com/prateek_0490">https://twitter.com/prateek_0490</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bdde412ea49d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/bug-bounty-tips-tricks-js-javascript-files-bdde412ea49d">Bug Bounty — Tips / Tricks / JS (JavaScript Files)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I Could Have Compromised Any Account On One Of The Biggest STARTUP Based In California]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prateek_0490/how-i-could-have-compromised-any-account-on-one-of-the-biggest-startup-based-in-california-3ebc8c6844b5?source=rss-dd4cbb5a8d44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ebc8c6844b5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-research]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Prateek Tiwari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Jan 2017 06:54:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-06T08:06:08.876Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Summary:</strong></p><p>This blog is about a severe vulnerability which was being discovered on one of the biggest startup based in California. Since I’m not authorized to reveal the companies name so I’ll just try and keep the name as <strong>Private Company</strong> here!</p><p>I wouldn’t have gone to their website and found this vulnerability if Facebook would have stopped showing me their ads, every now and then Facebook was displaying their ad on my timeline, for the fifth consecutive day when I saw the ad then a thought came into my mind, why not let’s check them out once! And one thing was for sure, they were paying heavily to Facebook to get that ad popped up again and again! So, a BIG Thanks to Facebook from myself and from that Private Company.</p><p>So, I started looking at their web application, signed up and after 10–15 mins of browsing I thought it’s not worth investing much of a time when they don’t run a bug bounty program. I signed out and was about to close the application when my eyes suddenly went at a so-called reset-password link, I was like let’s take a look at this and if that works well then, I’ll just close it and get back to what I was doing. Most of the companies become victim of these type of vulnerabilities because they do not set up a proper mechanism for Password recovery. Password recovery functionalities can result in vulnerabilities in the same application they are intended to protect.</p><p>Using reset password feature I was able to compromise any user’s account easily without any user interaction. This could have also given me full access of another users account which has all the confidential data even stored payment details, private messages, etc. The most severe issue to notice was once the password was being reset then there was a feature inside the app to change the email, so what more do you want! Change the email and that was it, when victim will try to reset the password from his/her email the app will say sorry you’re not there in our database anymore because someone has hacked your account <strong>BECAUSE</strong> we were not able to set up a proper reset password mechanism. [the app actually didn’t said this, it just said sorry wrong username]!</p><p>Let’s take a look at how this was achieved.</p><p><strong>Description of the Vulnerability:</strong></p><p>Whenever a user Forgets his password, he has an option to reset the password by entering his email address on https://www.domain.com/forgotpassword, Application will then send an email with a link to set up a new password which would be like — https://www.domain.com/authentication/resetpas/userID?key=&lt;token&gt;&amp;auth=&lt;token<strong>&gt;</strong></p><p>When I saw the link, my initial reaction was like WOWW, userID in the reset link? I mean I just need to change the userID to Victim ID (any other userID) and would it be done?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*01TNaz9Us_MxE-ZyLMYhOg.gif" /></figure><p>As the rules says in our community we should not do any harm on any other users account, so I created another account and obtained an userID, obtaining userID, emails weren’t that difficult because –</p><p><strong>FIRST</strong> — they were not encrypted</p><p><strong>SECOND</strong> — they were passed in the GET request, so if you visit any other users profile, you would easily obtain the userID as well as the email address!</p><p>So, now what? I have another userID, let’s modify the userID of reset-password link and see if we get success! After changing the userID in the URL param and sending the request for the new password, the message was SUCCESS! I was like ohh WTF? Was it so simple that too with this biggest startup Giant, I said to myself, calm down, yeah we will report the issue for sure now, but let’s just check it out first if it did changed the password of another user? NOOOOO!!! I was like whattt then why was it Success, then I tried to login with this new pass of that old account on which we actually tried to reset the password, ohh I see now, it got changed here though we changed the userID in the URL param.</p><p>So, my next reaction was like they were simply generating the userID but not actually using it! I thought before ending a mission let’s try some different route, so close yet so far!</p><p>Okay, so now I was trying to play with the tokens key=&lt;token&gt;, I tried decrypting this a lot with no success, it was 16 chars! My initial reaction was that it might be a base64 string but I was wrong. And another token which was auth=&lt;token&gt; was of 16 char string, but since the first one didn’t work I didn’t try to play with this one because I was an idiot (you’ll discover later, why)!</p><p>So, by now, I was pretty sure that it’s not that easy as it was looking in the initial observation, but I had my thoughts clear, I was just trying to think why the hell is userID in there in URL param for reset password? I thought to poke a bit more now, I again requested a password reset link but this time with a newly created account and this time the auth=&lt;token&gt; caught my attention just because it ended with an equal to sign (base64), now you know why I was idiot in not trying to play with auth=&lt;token&gt; at first place!</p><p>I immediately decrypted the auth key and VOILA, the decrypted value came as <a href="/service/mailto:*****@gmail.com">*****@gmail.com</a>, goodness me! So this email was an email of the person who requested the reset password feature. BUT still we had to decrypt the key=&lt;token&gt; value, but that wasn’t happening so what I did was I tried using the same key&lt;token&gt; and replaced the auth=&lt;token&gt; with an encrypted value of a newly created account and changed the userID as well. Now, it failed no Success! Let’s give another shot, let’s remove the key=&lt;token&gt; value from the post request, again no Success.</p><p>Something was wrong for sure, the hopes were there but success was not too far either, I thought let’s try and observe these key=&lt;token&gt; values, I requested 4–5 password reset, each time the char strings were different but in a same format, then I thought why not create one of our own in similar format, I created very similar 16 char string, so now I have everything, let’s go for the kill and the Final Blow, and that was it, the message was SUCCESS and this time it changed the password of the Victim Account, WHOOOP!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/240/1*D-wmctkJLFZbUkmS0VPxtg.gif" /></figure><p>Adding more insult to injury was after changing the password, an attacker can immediately login into the system and change the email, so the victim would never be able to login back neither he would be able to reset the password, full compromise. Now, attacker can have access to all the data starting from all basic details to the payment/bank details, private chats!</p><p>Special Thanks:</p><p>I would like to thank all my family members, friends, and everyone around me who plays an important role in motivating me each and every day.</p><p>Always TRUST in your abilities.</p><p>Disclosure Timeline:</p><p>January 25th, 2017: Report sent to Private Company</p><p>January 25th, 2017: Company responds within 20 mins, Bug reproduced from their end. They immediately took down the passwordreset feature!</p><p>January 27th, 2017: Bug Fixed, and asked to verify the FIX. I confirmed.</p><p>The most annoying part was even after responsibly working with their team they said the max they would be able to reward is only $$$ (min value).</p><p>Feel free to connect with me here — <a href="https://twitter.com/prateek_0490">Tweet me</a>! , <a href="https://in.linkedin.com/in/prateek-tiwari-867b905a">LinkedIn</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ebc8c6844b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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