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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Preface Ventures on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Congrats to IntusCare (Preface II) On Their Growth Partnership!]]></title>
            <link>https://prefaceventures.medium.com/congrats-to-intuscare-preface-ii-on-their-growth-partnership-15f07314327d?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 19:36:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-15T19:36:12.740Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*Ct00UJRAeqjB1nMax9tXDA.png" /></figure><p>It’s an old adage in venture capital that the highest returns often come when others think you may be wrong. In the case of IntusCare, it was about recognizing an inevitability that others hadn’t yet seen in a sleepy, somewhat initially constrained TAM in healthcare IT. We are thrilled that this hard-working team, amidst the SaaSpocalypse, has had a material success milestone. It’s not every day that a 26-year-old, URM college dropout transacts his company for meaningful 9-figures in enterprise value. This is the kind of success we want to see more of in the world!</p><p>From a blended MOIC perspective, the 5.5X thus far is a good outcome. But the <strong>232% IRR</strong> tells the real story of velocity and conviction, with Preface doubling down at crucible moments. We are only selling 60% of our follow-on position here, and with the strategic healthcare PE firm they’ve partnered with, IntusCare is poised to grow the business sustainably and meaningfully for years to come. We expect even greater returns on the horizon (expected to be QSBS eligible for applicable US investors). Thus far, they’ve achieved one of the EV / highest revenue multiples in the history of their sector.</p><p><strong>Betting on a First-Time Founder</strong></p><p>The IntusCare investment was a statistical outlier for us. As many of you know, ninety percent of the time we invest in founders who have prior exit experience. Preface founders generally have a credible, capital efficient path to an even bigger success the next time around. Robbie demonstrated those underpinnings without the same pedigree. VCs are compensated to take risk and evolve — and his maturity and capital efficient growth trajectory stood ahead of other opportunities at the time.</p><p>Robbie (and his team) are authentic to the core. Growing up in a single-family household, he watched his mother run a PACE facility. That childhood immersion meant he understood the operational nuances, the patients, and the pain points of the business intrinsically before he ever wrote a line of code or raised a dollar. Once they saw the inefficiencies, Robbie, Alex, and his college football teammate Evan dropped out of Brown University together to build IntusCare. On the journey, he attracted some of the heaviest hitters in HCIT as advisors / board members (including but not limited to Dr. David Feinberg, ex-CEO of Cerner, and Gil Addo, CEO of RubiconMD) who I know are similarly thrilled with this early outcome.</p><p><strong>Will This Work (Today)?</strong></p><p>A common question I ask myself now is, what is different about today where this team can succeed where others in the past have failed? The answer lies in a broader pattern we are seeing in the market: the proliferation of value based care models (a superior healthcare reimbursement model, in our opinion) and the emergence of multi-product, next-generation algorithmic workflows once trust is established with legacy buyers.</p><p>Similar to Abi at DX (<a href="https://prefaceventures.medium.com/dx-to-be-acquired-by-atlassian-for-1b-3b4fd38102db">which exited two quarters ago to Atlassian</a>), Robbie Felton and his team didn’t just build a point solution; they built a platform. By earning the trust of enterprise buyers in the complex PACE (Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly) ecosystem, they created a moat that allowed them to expand their product suite horizontally, eventually landing 7-figure deals. When the market finally caught up to the need for data-driven, value-based care infrastructure, IntusCare had become the obvious choice.</p><p><strong>An “Always On” Partnership</strong></p><p>Luke Cooper, then venture partner at Preface, introduced us to Robbie, and it was immediately clear that this was a special alignment.</p><p>Luke’s and Preface’s involvement didn’t stop at the term sheet. There is a narrative in venture that investors just write checks. We spoke to Robbie every 2 months for the past 5 years. Whether Robbie needed a review of a board deck in advance, curious about when to finance or acquire businesses, or even product development (my personal favorite way to help), we were <em>always</em> there. It’s easy to go above and beyond when you notice the impact / CEO’s growth trajectory. Whether it was 2 AM or during a holiday, Robbie’s mind was always iterating on how to improve outcomes for the most vulnerable patients. That relentless focus is hard to quantify on a spreadsheet, but it’s a variable that separates good outcomes from great ones.</p><p>We expect that Robbie and the team, who genuinely are wonderful people, will start another company eventually. He’ll be a coveted exited / second-time founder, namely because of his hard work, but also the small role Preface played along the way. We’d be thrilled to start another journey with them when ready. It’s what we do this for.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=15f07314327d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DX To Be Acquired by Atlassian for $1B]]></title>
            <link>https://prefaceventures.medium.com/dx-to-be-acquired-by-atlassian-for-1b-3b4fd38102db?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3b4fd38102db</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2025 15:15:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-18T15:15:43.499Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KrZH4fPD874BOFdZdsACgA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’m excited to share that <a href="https://getdx.com/"><strong>DX</strong></a><strong>, the global leader in enterprise developer productivity, has signed an agreement to be acquired for $1B in cash</strong> — upon close, this will be our second “unicorn” exit at Preface!</p><p>DX will be Atlassian’s largest acquisition to date. These outcomes are tremendously gratifying for all involved, but the learnings around major wins like this matters more.</p><h3>Quintessential Preface Story</h3><p>Preface was <strong>the only primary institutional investor</strong> in DX from inception. The company raised just $2.8M in preferred equity, was profitable from its first quarter, and yet built a category-defining product rapidly to 8-figure ARR scale. Capital efficient enterprise infra is in our DNA and we invested meaningfully — when it mattered — which is why DX didn’t have just a great multiple, but was a fund+ returning investment.</p><p>Abi, DX’s founder, is so special. He’s a first generation immigrant <strong>entrepreneur with a highly relevant prior exit</strong>, who was determined to swing bigger with his life’s work. Greyson, his co-founder, was a perfect match on GTM, leveraging his experience at GitPrime. We sourced DX through our proprietary Klarman model at inception. Abi had previously built PullPanda (acquired by GitHub/MSFT), pioneering developer analytics. With DX, he wanted to go further: R&amp;D isn’t just about commit / pull frequency within code repositories — it’s about understanding meaning in the connections between IT stack usage, qualitative measures, industry benchmarking, and the movements of dollars and people.</p><p>We believed if solved, this “nut” would unlock one the most valuable datasets in software development: the ability to tell a CIO/CTO (or CEO) whether their $100M+ R&amp;D budget — or their shiny new AI co-pilot — was actually delivering ROI.</p><h3>Partnership: Generative &amp; Challenging</h3><p>I loved our regular catch ups. Abi and I talked about family and cared for one another fundamentally, but got to business pretty fast. We didn’t always see eye to eye, particularly around product roadmap. Some of you know that I’ve been a boxer since I was 15 and our conversations felt like proper sparring — not easy, but always sharpening. This push-and-pull made DX stronger. It also reminded me that helping on what truly matters, not just when it’s convenient is key.</p><h3><strong>Lessons We’re Carrying Forward</strong></h3><ol><li><strong>Think independently.</strong> DX was not initially a “hot deal.” When wanting to syndicate with some most famed infra and AI investors they didn’t just say no to me (based on a legacy view of the market / previously failed attempts of theirs), they even tried to convince me <em>not</em> to invest. Abi who is based in beautiful Salt Lake City didn’t have the classic Silicon Valley seed round, but he did have some of the best technical angels in the world (founders of GitHub, MongoDB, etc.) and most importantly, a long-term view of why now is different. The VC consensus said “this won’t work, we’ve tried it before.” Fortune 500 Customers said, “please build this ASAP.” We listened to the customers.</li><li><strong>Help in uncommon ways.</strong> From product development to customer connectivity, we leaned in where it counted. Through our debates, DX created two products (legacy Git Analytics + software tooling ROI) which tripled ACVs and grew customer love significantly. We pushed on hiring and financing which weren’t always executed on, but it informed and changed the trajectory of the company. Helping also incorporates leaving management alone to execute (which isn’t talked about nearly enough) which DX did almost flawlessly.</li><li><strong>Digital experience drives enterprise outcomes.</strong> Across industries, R&amp;D and engineering are now the #1 or #2 cost centers. Companies that optimize engineering productivity deliver better customer experiences — offline and online. Initial ACVs at DX were modest at lower 5-figures, but customer success from the pharma industry to retail, to financial services, and also high tech drove that to 6 and sometimes 7-figures. It was highly encouraging early on.</li><li><strong>Incentive alignment makes supporting easy.</strong> Venture works when you fund what others dismiss as improbable, but founders and customers know to be inevitable. As seed investors we gratefully had the opportunity to invest very early in the journey (3X over in total), with capability of funding the company further if needed. Abi had the opportunity to continue growing DX profitably, but felt for himself, his employees, and DX stakeholders that Atlassian would be the best home for the business. Respecting and supporting that decision was important and easy since we were foundational investors.</li></ol><h3>What this means for Preface</h3><p>For LPs: DX is our <strong>second unicorn exit</strong> (after Truebill), and reinforces the consistency in our results and investment approach. Our strategy of backing <strong>repeat and technically elite founders at inception</strong> in need-to-have business infrastructure works. Other portfolio companies (including but not limited to <a href="https://www.endorlabs.com/">Endor</a>, <a href="https://www.compscience.com/">CompScience</a>, <a href="https://intuscare.com/">IntusCare</a>, and <a href="https://candorhealth.com/">CandorHealth</a>) show similar traits and early signals. To date, our hit rate is 1 out of 10 for fund returning investments which rivals some of the best VC firms in history.</p><p>For founders: DX is a reminder of why Preface exists — to fund teams that others overlook, to lean in when it matters most, and to build repeatable, fund-returning outcomes from improbable beginnings.</p><p>We love this work, and we’ll do it again. A hearty congrats to Abi, Greyson, and the whole DX team as well as Murali from ICONIQ who supported scaling in this very important year.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b4fd38102db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Enterprise Seed VC Funding Napkin (At Year 4/5 of Deployment)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/preface-ventures/enterprise-seed-vc-funding-napkin-at-year-4-5-of-deployment-791e76353001?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/791e76353001</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Dec 2024 16:49:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-23T16:49:02.382Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What are good “results” for a seed-stage Enterprise VC fund, today (i.e. when it’s early)?</p><p>We created the <a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures/a-gps-view-on-vc-fund-performance-when-it-s-early-21e63600789b?source=user_profile_page---------2-------------d590d2ccfe7a---------------">Seed Stage Enterprise VC Funding Napkin</a> about one year ago. Our thinking has evolved over time, just as markets do…</p><p>The S&amp;P is now hovering at all-time highs. Exit and IPO markets have seemingly tightened further, buoying private equity firms and secondary liquidity providers around very select private and public targets (this is expected to change in the coming months with the new administration). It is early days, but LLMs and Gen AI technologies are appearing to catalyze one of the biggest technical shifts in recent venture history. All in all — tech continues to deliver tremendous value in our economy despite the market seemingly bifurcating into the haves and have-nots (are you AI or not?!). In times of fast change, it is increasingly important to have measured, consistent judgement which is why we’re updating, and will continue to update, the VC Funding Napkin. You’ll notice a few additional metrics below.</p><p>For new readers — this framework provides a window into early fund performance before a fund ultimately settles into its final quartile (and ultimately decile!), typically happening in years 6–10 of a fund’s lifecycle. In 2026 we’ll begin benchmarking Preface III.</p><p>Per usual, <strong>Fund II (2020 vintage) is highlighted in orange</strong>. We’re incredibly proud of our results considering the “happy” vintage of 2020, where we began investing. We’ve maintained a high bar on deploying to capital-efficient, need-to-have, technical assets at compelling valuations:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6iJizccFQECZuRlZdZ5PZw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Seed Graduation Rates:</strong> This metric is fairly straightforward. High-performing VC funds have high follow-on rates to Series As. Taking it a step further — a leading FoF disclosed to me that if a seed VC fund has 50% of the portfolio graduate to Series B, the likelihood of a fund achieving above a 3.0X DPI is over 80%.</p><p><em>GP Comments: Excellent is now 65% where previously was 70%+. We’ve revised this figure slightly downward even with further time to have graduated for several reasons: 1) the duration between seed and Series A is now 2 years+ 2) large inception rounds / slower burn rates are much more common within enterprise 3) Series A graduations in aggregate have been less frequent in the past year+ (</em><a href="https://carta.com/data/vc-fund-performance-q1-2024/"><em>see Carta’s recent quarterly report</em></a><em>).</em></p><p><strong>Pro-rata Accessibility: </strong>Seed investors should desire the opportunity, whether contractual or not, to re-invest in their winners. Not all GPs are given the opportunity to protect their initial ownership stake from dilution or grow it. Having the opportunity to invest in follow-on rounds expands the investment universe for the GP — who should have better information on the asset than others — this is a good thing. The follow-on check is more likely to have a modest multiple vs. the entry ticket, though it might still be accretive to the fund’s overall performance. If the GP wishes to have a more meaningful reserve strategy in their new fund(s), this is additionally important. GPs should aim to have pro-rata offered to them the majority of the time, if not always.</p><p><em>GP Comments: Excellent is now 85% where previously was 75%+. Given the relatively less buoyant follow-on market, pro-rata accessibility should increase for Enterprise Seed VCs. Lack of access indicates a problematic dynamic.</em></p><p><strong>Entry: Reserve Ratio in Top 3 Companies: </strong>This ratio is a metric for executing pro-rata in fund winners (top 3 positions). For example, investing $1.0M (entry) in a seed round and $2.0M (reserve) in the follow-on is a healthy ratio for a high performing Preface III company. Going beyond that can encroach on single asset concentration limits stipulated within an LPA (commonly 10% but I’ve seen up to 20%). A leading FoF highlighted an even higher ratio (1:3) in their best performing underlying businesses.</p><p><em>GP Comments: Excellent is now 1:2.5 when it previously was 1:2. Seed valuations have risen though Series As have declined / are now somewhat stable in the past year+. This should benefit GPs as they’ll invest further capital in a presumably more de-risked seed-extended or Series A asset.</em></p><p><strong>Weighted Blended Entry Cost (post-Series A): </strong>Too often LPs look at entry price / ownership and not the dollar-weighted blended entry cost between entry and follow-on, which is critical if the fund has a reserve strategy (many do). We all hope for asset outperformance — but having low blended cost will generate attractive blended return in “average” exit environments as well. GPs may sometimes write a small entry check and “logo buy” at a high price once an asset gets a strong follow-on offer. This metric should illuminate the downsides of that behavior. Many FoFs have done Monte Carlo analyses on their funds’ reserve strategy — a notable one mentioned that if their underlying VC funds just wrote the same check size evenly across positions with no reserve strategy — they’d outperform the normative fund performance 70% of the time. That might be impractical, but bigger checks, earlier for seed managers tend to be a good rule (particularly in boom times like 2021).</p><p><em>GP Comments: Excellent is now $25.0M — $35.0M where it was previously $20.0M — $30.0M. We’ve revised this figure upward slightly given the dynamic mentioned in the prior comment (with likely a better entry revenue multiple). In totality, this should benefit GPs in the wonderfully large and liquid category of enterprise infra / vertical AI. Looking at M&amp;A outcomes alone — which accounts for the large majority of liquidation events in our asset class — exit values have been increasing (2015–2020 at $220.0M; 2020–2024 at $329.0M).</em></p><p><strong>Cumulative Burn Multiple: </strong>This is calculated by summing all $ burned to date vs. current ARR across the portfolio. Many folks reference burn multiple i.e. dollars burned in 12 months vs. net new ARR which is a helpful efficiency metric. However, it’s possible that a company with a healthy current burn multiple may have burned a ton of cash prior to the current year, correlating to low management ownership (which we don’t want — <a href="https://hbr.org/2016/03/founder-led-companies-outperform-the-rest-heres-why">founder led companies tend to outperform</a>). Technology companies should fundamentally be capital efficient and startups cost less than ever to launch. In 2023, a Series A investor would look at $2.5M burned to get to $1.0M in ARR as a highly refreshing and attractive foundation for a company’s future growth.</p><p><em>GP Comments: Excellent is now 2.3X where it was previously 2.5X. On the burn side, launching a startup has never been cheaper. Compute and training costs continue to decline over time and our now AI-powered workforces should be able to do increasingly more with less resources (hasten the “</em><a href="https://fortune.com/2024/02/04/sam-altman-one-person-unicorn-silicon-valley-founder-myth/"><em>one-person unicorn</em></a><em>”). Lastly, in the long-term, a company should burn less and show evidence of operational leverage i.e. cash flow potential.</em></p><p><strong>% Ownership in Winning Positions (top 10%) vs. Average Ownership (post-Series A): </strong>We calculate this metric by taking the average percentage ownership of a portfolio’s best post-Series A companies (top 10% of them) and dividing it by the average percentage ownership of the overall portfolio. For example, if the average ownership of a set of post-Series A companies is 4%, but the ownership of the top 10% of the portfolio is 5%, the ratio is ~1.3X.</p><p><em>GP Comments: No change. Managers with information advantages and reserves should continue to be able to concentrate their capital in their winners.</em></p><p><strong>Tail Ratio: </strong>Modeled after the “power law” — <a href="https://sicthoughts.substack.com/p/the-tail-ratio?r=2vq5ii&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web">Sumeet Gajri’s ‘Tail Ratio’</a> metric offers LPs a tool for assessing what’s required to return a fund of any size. The higher the ratio, the less likely the GP will return the fund on any given investment based on their fund model. Another way to view this metric — can one position be “outlier enough” to return the fund?</p><p><em>GP Comments: No change. A concentrated portfolio of 20–25 positions is generally better, for seed managers :-)</em></p><p><strong>Aggregate GRR (Gross Retention Revenue) / NRR (Net Retention Revenue): </strong>Though new to the napkin, these are old SaaS metric(s) which correlate to high-performing companies (both in public and private markets). Leaky buckets are never good and it is widely known that it is 8X more expensive to acquire a new customer vs. retain an existing one. NRR is an increasingly important metric and a reflection of product innovation — interestingly, startups with Generative AI-powered SaaS (key theme at Preface) see 7% <a href="https://docsend.com/view/pi629vaxy57u9qvb">higher NRR</a> than their more “lower-tech” peers.</p><p><strong>CAC Payback: </strong>Also new to the napkin, but increasingly important as gross margins in AI-powered SaaS products fluctuate.<strong> </strong>In aggregate across a relatively mature SaaS portfolio — contribution margin payback on marketing should ideally be less than one year. Quicker turns on the working capital of marketing enable a company to grow larger off the same sized balance sheet.</p><p><strong>TVPI / DPI: </strong>Hopefully most of us know what these metrics mean. While directionally helpful and worth including, I see too many folks overweighing them early on. For example, I’ve seen fund TVPI tempered with the advent of convertible notes (quite common today) that don’t change holding valuations. DX, a high-growth company with fund-returning potential in Preface II, is a strong example as they’re still held at 1.0X MOIC. DPI is also hard to see given the holding period of private investments is 5.0+ years on average. Some FoFs look at TVPI / DPI while excluding the top and bottom quartile of investments to see “repeatability”; however again, this is less useful to assess by year 4 of fund life which is what we’re attempting to accomplish.</p><p><em>GP Comments: These figures are updated with Cambridge Associates’ recent benchmarks across TVPI and DPI. One would expect funds that have “excellent” characteristics particularly after years 6–10 will have requisite TVPI and DPI.</em></p><p><strong>% of Portfolio Led by Tier 1 VCs at Series A:</strong> Many seed stage VCs reference how they co-invest with established firms like Sequoia, Benchmark, Accel, or a16z. <em>When</em> that happens is critical. According to AngelList, having a Tier 1 fund (multi-stage) invest in a company at seed correlates to a <a href="https://www.angellist.com/blog/top-vc-seed-performance">neutral</a> or even negative Series A, defined as a 3X+ mark-up at normative dilution led by a reputable firm. That correlation changes quite a bit when the Tier 1 multi-stage firm <em>follows</em> the seed investor in a Series A. A notable FoF mentioned if one of the aforementioned groups leads the seed manager’s Series A company, the likelihood of a “homerun” i.e. 10X return increases by 4X.</p><p><em>GP Comments: No change. Series As with established, successful funds continue to be correlated with higher exit outcomes.</em></p><p><strong>Early Recycling: </strong>Highest performing seed funds tend to recycle and deploy ~106% into companies. At year 4 one would hope some more dollars have been reallocated to existing winners or in new companies i.e. “more shots on goal”.</p><p><em>GP Comments: Excellent is now 6%+ when used to be 5%+. A 4–5 year old fund vs. 3–4 years should have slightly higher recycling rates. More shots on goal is usually the right answer for good pickers.</em></p><p>In some ways, creating and measuring our results is a VC’s version of “building in public”. We hope to continue sharing our learnings as well as evolve our thinking for the better with your feedback. Thank you for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=791e76353001" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures/enterprise-seed-vc-funding-napkin-at-year-4-5-of-deployment-791e76353001">Enterprise Seed VC Funding Napkin (At Year 4/5 of Deployment)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures">Preface Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The “Developing” VC Manager]]></title>
            <link>https://prefaceventures.medium.com/the-developing-vc-manager-6a9e5f87dd0d?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6a9e5f87dd0d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Sep 2024 17:20:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-10T12:45:01.173Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hundreds of years ago, major colonial powers described themselves as “developed” or “civilized” while speaking of the rest of the world — many who they exploited — as underdeveloped, uncivilized, or even barbaric. Looking back, it’s obvious that the worldview was wrong in many ways. If the powers at be had a better lens, they may have been better able to understand the current state of the outside world and more appropriately benefit from partnership.</p><p>I see some similarities in how some VC firms are designated by LPs. Sector focus notwithstanding, it’s baffling that one would categorize a $12M Fund I in Berlin, a $40M Fund III in NYC, and a $125M Fund II spin-out in LA all as “emerging managers.” This broad classification overlooks significant differences. Some may argue that the aforementioned new spin-out from a multi-billion AUM firm may be considered established and attract established LP capital, despite a GP track record mismatch to stated strategy / fund size. That $40M Fund III — may still be considered emerging just based on it being smaller, despite success in the same strategy over the prior two funds. While I don’t exactly equate LPs with old-school colonialists — that wouldn’t exactly be fair — it is clear that the thinking on what classifies an emerging manager needs to be evolved.</p><p>We see established firms increasingly attract the lion’s share of LP capital. As of May this year, GC and a16z alone captured 44% of US LP capital raised in 2024. Based on data it’s hard to believe continued consolidation will yield optimal allocation to startups. Some forward-thinking LPs know this and therefore pursue a “barbell approach” built up of a bench of emerging and established managers, but they are overlooking a key group. We propose a new category — <strong>developing managers</strong>. These are firms who have demonstrated the right to exist as well as early evidence of persistent returns which should get better as they reach their “end state” (more on that below).</p><p>Asking the right questions in any situation is crucial. In diligence before being assumptive on how big a new GP’s partnership or fund might grow, LPs should consider first asking the GP what <em>they </em>think an ideal fund looks like for the stated strategy. What is the right size, concentration, and liquidity strategy for the assets they plan to hold or the team they’ll have? Are they there now — or do they need to grow into it?</p><p>I have empathy for LPs in this diligence process, as VC firms may deviate or course correct from the initial plans. Markets do change. How often has a manager initially promised to stay consistent with a small, focused, early-stage partnership only to quickly evolve into a multi-stage firm due to readily available LP capital (perhaps resulting from some early quick wins in a peak vintage)? To underwrite appropriately, one should consider a multi-fund commitment and therefore should first inquire and measure change carefully, over time, to see if change is rightfully directional. Without this view, one might miss when an emerging manager graduates to strongly developing or even established, or perhaps when an established group ages out / decays into developing or emerging status (it happens…).</p><p>Let’s make it more real with an example. Consider a large VC ($500M Fund IV) with a $250M Fund III. Fund I and Fund II were 3.5X and 2.0X DPI respectively, with Fund III still too early to judge. These jumps over such a short window imply strategic change. This partnership, with some new GP hires, may begin investing in new categories like AI, crypto, or biotech. Or perhaps they’ll open an international office with a local deployment strategy to keep up with new peers. Despite reasonable success over the past 5 years, should we consider this manager established?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/693/1*5bOLhoAyjh04qDQALxlRAw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Manny Millan for Sports Illustrated</figcaption></figure><p>Some special folks can be multi-sport athletes. Think of Jim Thorpe or Bo Jackson. But personally, I’d rather make a bet on Michael Jordan playing basketball with the Chicago Bulls. That is the kind of development we should be looking for. Here are a few helpful guidelines and questions to assess VC managers in their sport:</p><p><strong>Which fund is the GP deploying from (1, 2, 4, etc.)?</strong></p><ol><li>Has investment strategy across those funds been consistent, relatively (does the last one, or hopefully two prior, look like a sibling or rather distant cousins)?</li><li>If it doesn’t look similar, has management “done it” before (and recently — in the last 2–4 years before spinning out)?</li><li>If none of the above — is there quantifiable evidence the GP is moving toward the alleged “end state” i.e. increasingly hitting stage / ownership targets, seeing better win-rates, consistent founder NPS, etc.?</li></ol><p><strong>What changes in fund make-up or team would decay performance?</strong></p><ol><li>What would be too big or too small, or too fast?</li></ol><p><strong>Do stakeholders in the ecosystem refer on-brand investment opportunities?</strong></p><ol><li>Can respected peer GPs or LPs even describe an ideal startup for this manager? How about reputable founders?</li></ol><p><strong>What is the GP’s LP makeup (accredited vs. institutional)?</strong></p><p><strong>What is the historic LP make-up and re-up rate?</strong></p><p>Consistency wins the race. In my eyes, Preface is a developing manager en route to becoming established. Embracing perpetual studenthood, we’ve progressed from walking to jogging and are now beginning to run.</p><p>In the first 10 years of my career at former VC firms, I primarily led institutional seed rounds and selectively followed on in A rounds with a 6% company hit rate from early stage to IPO. My personal strategy here was with a prepared mind, backing exited / successful founders wishing to go for a second or third bigger swing within the same industry (largely in enterprise). In 2015 with our pilot vehicle and first institutional fund in 2020, we narrowed our focus with statistical prowess to back startups — with the same team profile — in addition to 40+ other predictive variables to attack the enterprise infrastructure and applied AI market (one of the largest, high growth, and liquid spaces within tech). This evolution aligns with our intellectual curiosities, network, and top-decile performance expectations.</p><p>Assuming consistent construction and entry point, a larger fund correlates to more ownership. It is in line with pricing power, which is one of the most interesting and exciting components of what we do. Preface works to earn meaningful ownership (which correlates to high fund performance) in our companies while ensuring our founders still own a lot at exit. It may be the most important developmental feature in our firm toward becoming established, as our pre and post-investment work remains the same.</p><p>In our pilot Fund I, we followed a lead investor 100% of the time. In institutional Fund II, we priced rounds 28% of the time. In our current, larger Fund III, we have priced and / or led investments 90% of the time with a 90%+ win rate. We hope to consistently build and maintain double-digit ownership in our enduring companies while relying less on dilutive downstream partners. That’s home.</p><p>There are a lot of VC firms out there. But I hope LPs appreciate these nuances since there is so much to each story. I also hope GPs are honest about who they are and what they wish to become and in doing so, prospective LPs will secure slots in their soon-to-be oversubscribed funds.</p><p>Best,</p><p>Farooq Abbasi</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6a9e5f87dd0d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Congratulations to Knock on Its Series A and Welcome Craft Ventures!]]></title>
            <link>https://prefaceventures.medium.com/congratulations-to-knock-on-its-series-a-and-welcome-craft-ventures-cfd184bc25ea?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfd184bc25ea</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 2024 21:55:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-15T21:55:02.262Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*f2Ixz2MISSaIJcpr" /></figure><p>How often we all receive unhelpful, batch-style comms / notifications via digital channels…sometimes they hit us generically pre or post-purchase, or perhaps during or after collaboration with a colleague or partner. Sometimes the information we get via notification is just wrong. It may arrive via an unfamiliar channel, bringing question to its legitimacy and our digital security. We interact with digital every single day — but it interacts with us like we’re dumb sheep in a herd.</p><p>Marketing has long-led this function but they, and the developers that maintain and execute these delivery systems in response, have been left short-handed. Every organization invests so much to attempt to get this right and it’s been an absolute pleasure to see Knock deliver via API with developers in mind. <a href="https://knock.app/">Knock</a> is<em> the</em> product-first customer engagement platform, providing API primitives and frontend components that customers can leverage to build useful communication experiences. Customers can stand up notification feeds quickly, log and use product events toward smart-routing user messaging cross-channel, and all with the enterprise-grade performance and observability developers require. Some of the best engineering teams in the world including but not limited to Webflow, Vercel, and Amplitude rely on Knock for this critical function.</p><p>We met Sam via Preface Unpartner Abram Dawson back in 2021. Abram knew Sam from college and always kept in touch. He mentioned on one of our calls that Sam is one of the most talented people he knew (enough said; feedback like that makes it certainly worth having a conversation and we’re so happy we did. Thank you Abram!). Sam’s founder story immediately resonated and was consistent with the rest of Preface founders. Sam and Chris were both early technical builders at Frame.io who went through the classic buy vs. build case and opted to create proprietary, event-driven customer communication infrastructure which was sorely needed. In addition to strong founder + market fit, their technical approach aligns with one of core investment tenets — enabling real-time computing toward usable, cross-stakeholder data and applications.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*u33StCpSgj6ypHcE" /></figure><p>Post investment we caught up with the Knock team frequently. Fortune 500 customer introductions from our network to Sam / Chris always landed well. We were excited and honored to speak with several early engineering and product candidates to get them over the line toward joining this incredible team. It’s always easy to help a team that has exceptional product velocity (check their <a href="https://docs.knock.app/">developer documentation</a>), a high bar on people (both customer and HR — Sam once told me to send him my best, no matter where they’re at in their career journeys), and mature communication skills / investor relations reporting which have always been incredibly detailed, transparent, fun and gratitude filled.</p><p>We were fortunate to be one of their first commitments and have re-invested twice over. Sam and Chris — we’re so happy for this (preemptive) milestone. I’m excited to see you guys deliver on your exciting product roadmap, continue to win nearly every competitive bake-off, and holistically make digital communications more intelligent and value generative for the enterprise and user alike.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfd184bc25ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A GP’s View on VC Fund Performance (When It’s “Early”)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/preface-ventures/a-gps-view-on-vc-fund-performance-when-it-s-early-21e63600789b?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21e63600789b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[enterprise-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[openlp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Nov 2023 17:04:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-21T17:04:42.577Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have and always will have empathy for asset allocators. It’s a privileged job, but by no means is it easy.</p><p>LPs primarily entrust third party managers to make intelligent, risk-adjusted decisions on assets they don’t have access to, or at the least are not situated to underwrite or manage to the same degree. This is quite difficult for an LP who allocates across assets. Consider finding the optimal balance in an ever-changing environment across multiple asset classes i.e. private credit, buyout, real estate, commodities, etc. Even for allocators deploying to a single asset class like venture capital — it can be hard. In the near-term, rising interest rates have caused folks to rightfully sharpen their pencils to invest in managers that can sufficiently exceed the risk-free premium.</p><p>I’ve always enjoyed reviewing <a href="https://medium.com/point-nine-news/what-does-it-take-to-raise-capital-in-saas-in-2023-56d8f617714">Christoph Janz’s SaaS Funding Napkin</a>. It’s on a napkin because it is a sketch — a mix of art and science. What is good enough to raise a round for a SaaS company in a given year? How about for the<em> fund</em> that invests in that SaaS company? Cambridge Associates’ benchmarks are a common and okay place to start, but even they say it’s less useful to compare in the early days as funds settle into their ultimate quartiles between <a href="https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/en-eu/insight/a-framework-for-benchmarking/">5.8 years and 6.8 years</a>.</p><p>Additionally, according to two well-known VC FoFs I’m close to, ~50% of their profits accrue <em>after year 7</em>. Many managers — myself included — raise new funds in the last year of the deployment period which is typically in years 3–4 of fund life. Sometimes the timeline is shorter for higher velocity investors. What should an LP optimally focus on in the underwriting decision, then?</p><p>The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior / past performance in a similar situation. Assuming the strategy is comparable, we must look at past funds to determine what repeatable performance can look like. Too often I see LPs focus on activities within the current fund being raised. The newly marketed fund may have early momentum, perhaps even a mark-up or two, but <em>so little</em> has been “paid-in” to make conclusions off of in the first year or so.</p><p>Enter the <strong><em>Seed Stage Enterprise VC Funding Napkin</em></strong> (at year 4 of deployment of the prior fund) which I’ve sketched below. It too, is also a mix of art and science — based on Cambridge metrics, Carta data, proprietary FoF data, and general guidance which is subject to interpretation akin to the SaaS Funding Napkin. See below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eHRqKxwE_WLTDPCoZpaS4w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Seed Graduation Rates:</strong> This metric is fairly straightforward. High-performing VC funds have high follow-on rates to Series A’s. Taking it a step further — a leading FoF referenced to me that if a seed VC fund has 50% of the portfolio graduate to Series B, the likelihood of a fund achieving above a 3.0X DPI is over 80%.</p><p><strong>Pro-rata Accessibility: </strong>Seed investors should desire the opportunity, whether contractual or not, to re-invest in their winners. Not all GPs are given the opportunity to protect their initial ownership stake from dilution or grow it. Having the opportunity to invest in follow-on rounds expands the investment universe for the GP — who should have better information on the asset than others — is a good thing. The follow-on check is more likely to have a modest multiple vs. the entry ticket, though it might still be accretive to the fund’s overall performance. If the GP wishes to have a more meaningful reserve strategy in their new fund(s), this is additionally important. GPs should aim to have pro-rata offered to them the majority of the time, if not always.</p><p><strong>Entry : Reserve Ratio in Top 3 Companies: </strong>This ratio is a metric for executing that pro-rata in fund winners (top 3 positions). Investing $1.0M (entry) in a seed round and $2.0M (reserve) in the follow-on is a healthy ratio for Preface III, for example. Going beyond that can encroach on single asset concentration limits stipulated within an LPA (commonly 10% but I’ve seen up to 20%). A leading FoF highlighted an even higher ratio (1:3) in their best performing underlying businesses.</p><p><strong>Weighted Blended Entry Cost (post-Series A): </strong>The average VC backed exit is ~$120.0M today. Too often LPs look at entry price / ownership and not the dollar-weighted blended entry cost between entry and follow-on, which is critical if the fund has a reserve strategy (many do). We all hope for asset outperformance — but having low blended cost will generate attractive blended return in “average” exit environments as well. GPs may sometimes put a small entry check in and “logo buy” at a high price once an asset gets a strong follow-on offer. This metric should illuminate the downsides of that behavior. Many FoF’s have done Monte Carlo analyses on their funds’ reserve strategy — a notable one mentioned that if their underlying VC funds just wrote the same check size evenly across positions with no reserve strategy — they’d outperform the normative fund performance 70% of the time. That might be impractical but bigger earlier for seed tends to be a good rule (particularly in boom times like 2021).</p><p><strong>Cumulative Burn Multiple: </strong>This is calculated by summing all $ burned to date vs. current ARR across the portfolio. Many folks reference burn multiple i.e. dollars burned in 12 months vs. net new ARR which is a helpful efficiency metric. However it’s possible that a company with a healthy current burn multiple may have burned a ton of cash prior to the current year, correlating to low management ownership (which we don’t want — <a href="https://hbr.org/2016/03/founder-led-companies-outperform-the-rest-heres-why">founder led companies tend to outperform</a>). Technology companies should fundamentally be capital efficient and startups cost less than ever to launch. In 2023, a Series A investor would look at $2.5M burned to get to $1.0M in ARR as a highly refreshing and attractive foundation for a company’s future growth.</p><p><strong>% Ownership in Winning Positions (top 10%) vs. Average Ownership (post-Series A): </strong>We calculate this metric by taking the average percentage ownership of a portfolio’s best post-Series A companies (top 10% of them) and dividing it by the average percentage ownership of the overall portfolio. For example, if the average ownership of a set of post-Series A companies is 4%, but the ownership of the top 10% of the portfolio is 5%, the ratio is ~1.3X.</p><p><strong>Tail Ratio: </strong>Modeled after the “power law” — <a href="https://sicthoughts.substack.com/p/the-tail-ratio?r=2vq5ii&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web">Sumeet Gajri’s ‘Tail Ratio’</a> metric offers LPs a tool for assessing what’s required to return a fund of any size. The higher the ratio, the less likely the GP will return the fund on any given investment based on their fund model. Another way to view this metric — can one position be “outlier enough” to return the fund?</p><p><strong>TVPI / DPI: </strong>Hopefully most of us know what these metrics mean. While directionally helpful and worth including, I see too many folks overweighting them early on. For example, I’ve seen fund TVPI tempered with the advent of convertible notes (quite common today) that don’t change holding valuations. DX, a high-growth company with fund returning potential in Preface II, is a strong example which is still held at 1.0X MOIC. DPI is also hard to see given the holding period of private investments is 5.0+ years on average. Some FoF’s look at TVPI / DPI while excluding the top and bottom quartile of investments to see “repeatability”; however again, this is less useful to assess by year 4 of fund life which is what we’re attempting to accomplish.</p><p><strong>% of Portfolio Led by Tier 1 VCs at Series A:</strong> Many seed stage VCs reference how they co-invest with established firms like Sequoia, Benchmark, Accel, or a16z. <em>When</em> that happens is critical. According to AngelList, having a Tier 1 fund (multi-stage) invest in a company at seed correlates to a <a href="https://www.angellist.com/blog/top-vc-seed-performance">neutral</a> or even negative Series A, defined as a 3X+ mark-up at normative dilution led by a reputable firm. That correlation changes quite a bit when the Tier 1 multi-stage firm <em>follows</em> the seed investor in a Series A. A notable FoF mentioned if one of the aforementioned groups lead the seed manager’s Series A company, the likelihood of a “homerun” i.e 10X return increases by 4X.</p><p><strong>Early Recycling: </strong>Highest performing seed funds tend to recycle and deploy ~105% into companies. At year 4 one would hope some dollars have been re-allocated to existing winners or in new companies i.e. “more shots on goal”.</p><p>I continue to believe that there is an imperfect marketplace for LP capital. Who is allocating, how much, what’s the process, and where it goes is largely suboptimal. I’ve seen this happen first-hand but mostly second-hand in the 16 years investing in venture, as LP capital has herded to too few groups. My hope is that leveraging objective metrics such as the above will be helpful to both LPs and GPs. LPs will hopefully not misallocate to managers with an aversion to measurement or worse, to managers that are more art than science (when you need both).</p><p>Thank you to Yuri Sagalov, Winter Mead, the Preface team, and other close, experienced allocators for their feedback and late night debates on this lively topic. Further feedback is very welcome.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21e63600789b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures/a-gps-view-on-vc-fund-performance-when-it-s-early-21e63600789b">A GP’s View on VC Fund Performance (When It’s “Early”)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures">Preface Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Preface Gratitude]]></title>
            <link>https://prefaceventures.medium.com/preface-gratitude-cf112418811c?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cf112418811c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2021 18:53:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-19T18:53:06.027Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*cD2OntFEgD0qIyyWkzLj2g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Starting anything is impossible without the support of friends, believers, advisors, supporters, and family. There are many people without whom Preface Ventures would not exist — and I hesitate to name them for fear of forgetting someone. But I will try:</p><ul><li>My dear family and closest friends, who believed in Preface from day one. Specifically my mother, father, and brother. To my inner circle Manu Raghavan, Sean Eckard, Vik Sharma, Jamil Khan, Brian Maya, Matt Slotnick, Sangeen Zeb, Mood Rowghani, Shakhil Khan, Sid Kapoor, Jonathan Yaffe, Yousif Dujaili, Rick Zullo, Yuri Sagalov, Max Mersch, Evan Schoenbach, Amir Malayery, Pietro Invernizzi, Tanya Grischenko and Oliver Heimes — I know I can be a pain, but our fellowship got me through.</li><li>My former bosses Mike Chalfen, Steve Schlenker, and Sandy Kory for backing me day one. You guys have been successful in your own right and always pay it forward — which is quite rare in our field — but you went above and beyond for Preface. Thank you. When others who could have helped made me feel alone, your support made me feel at home. I will do the same for others.</li><li>To my LPs who doubled down after a highly successful POC Fund I.</li><li>To Toni Alejandria for giving me time and support on all things Preface. You’re magical.</li><li>The countless folks who pushed me to get over a decade of imposter syndrome and ensured my presentation and narrative was true to who I am — specifically, Pat Grady of Sequoia, Winter Mead of Oper8r, Mike Chalfen of Chalfen Ventures, Ed Sim of Boldstart, Sangeen Zeb of FCC, and Brett Berson of First Round Capital.</li><li>For prescient advice on portfolio construction, particularly mid-fundraise (a niche but critical topic) — thank you to Roger Ehrenberg, Cack Wilhelm, Lee Linden, Morgan Beller, James Hardiman, Gaurav Jain, Trevor Oelschig and Amir Mayaleri.</li><li>Particular thank you to Carlos Espinal, Kathleen Utecht, Saad Siddiqui, Nathan Krasnoff, Kate Beardsley, Jess Peltz-Zatulove, Soona Amhaz, Kanyi Maqubela, Chrys Chrysanthou, Chuck Ziegler, Shane Happach, Laura Thompson, Nikita Fahrenholz, Gopi Rangan, Cherian Mathew, Daniel Qu, Nick Chirls, Alfie Lavery, Aleksandr Gampel, Ken Seiff, Ashmeet Sidana, Jessie Guo, Iñigo Juantegui, Sharran Deora, Eric Woo, Henry Grant, and Ertan Can for opening your networks of both founders and LPs.</li><li>Thank you to David Presser of NGE, Raisa Berger of Lorem Labs, and Matt Wheeler / Anne Dixon of the Standish Team for treating Preface as it was a multi-billion dollar fund.</li><li>To the founders who I’ve partnered with that invited Preface to be part of their journey. You guys are my heroes! Through the trials and triumphs, I’m constantly learning from you. I’m inspired by your grit, creativity and sheer determination. Without you, Preface wouldn’t exist. In short, THANK YOU, I truly love you. I’m particularly grateful to Eric Olden, May Wang, Malinka Waliddayade, Andrew Mcleod, Matt Oppenheimer, Varun Badhwar, Gaurav Kumar, Alex Cyriac, Shikhar Shrestha for helping with references and just being there.</li></ul><p>My very best,</p><p>Farooq</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf112418811c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Announcing Preface Fund II]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/preface-ventures/announcing-preface-fund-ii-a7d571f4c6b7?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7d571f4c6b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[enterprise-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diversity-in-tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Apr 2021 14:49:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-28T14:49:02.527Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today, I’m thrilled to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccaszkutak/2021/04/28/preface-raises-23-million-to-fund-enterprise-infrastructure-companies-led-by-engineers/?sh=45c156b2739d">announce the launch of Preface Fund II</a>, a $23M inaugural institutional fund that will help start and grow enduring companies that build enterprise infrastructure technology that no one else can — and that everyone needs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TT9JRLPROzS-BRp7RAekxQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Farooq Abbasi, GP of Preface Ventures</figcaption></figure><p>Over the past year, the pandemic has turned the world upside down, and fundraising was no exception. 90% of Fund II was raised over Zoom, and I’m grateful to the endowments, institutions, and individual investors who placed their faith and funds in Preface to empower founders during this unprecedented time. History shows that it’s during these times of challenge that some of the best companies were incubated, and it’s also times like these when it is hardest for an entrepreneur to make that first leap.</p><p>At Preface, we want to be that first investment that helps a founder get started — literally, the funding before they write their stories. With the launch of Fund II, I am excited to continue backing pioneers in software and security infrastructure, healthcare, and fintech.</p><p>I’m a first-generation Indian immigrant, so the idea of creating something within a new context is woven into my personal history. I understand intuitively what a big leap going from 0–1 can be — and the conviction it takes to leave a steady job, never mind during the economic uncertainty resulting from COVID-19.</p><p>I’m also personally committed to increasing diversity and improving inclusion within the VC space by supporting early-stage founders who come from underrepresented backgrounds. So often, the companies that I back aren’t started by the Stanford or Harvard drop-outs of the world; in my experience, that’s not the signal we need to look for. Instead, Preface founders are often immigrants, people with 10–20 years of industry experience, and a hunger to build something beyond themselves. 56% of Preface’s portfolio companies have been founded by immigrants, and 59% of founders are age 35 and older. 70% are repeat founders who want to go even bigger this time. This isn’t just the right thing to do, though — our proprietary sourcing algorithms show time and again that this is the smart thing to do: Klarman, our proprietary tool, has roughy 45 features that are predictive of future entrepreneurial success and timeliness, indicating not only whether the company will be successful but also when it is the right time to build for themselves.</p><p>What’s more, our founders are typically repeat founders or ex-vice presidents of product or engineering who had a critical enterprise problem internally at their motherships. They couldn’t find a fitting solution, so they built the product themselves internally. Their new companies are based on their learnings.</p><p>With the launch of Fund II, I’m committed to continuing to build a diverse ecosystem, where founders have the experience to back up their vision but don’t have to fit the startup stereotype.</p><p><strong>What’s next?</strong></p><p>Preface’s work is just beginning right now, and I’m going to continue looking for more amazing founders to partner with while continuing to support the teams Preface is already invested in. We’re the capital before your story.</p><p>And if you’re building something, it’s never too early to reach out. Get in touch at <a href="/service/mailto:farooq@prefaceventures.com">farooq@prefaceventures.com</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7d571f4c6b7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures/announcing-preface-fund-ii-a7d571f4c6b7">Announcing Preface Fund II</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures">Preface Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[10 Practices of Sustainable Diversity in VC Partnerships]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/preface-ventures/10-practices-of-sustainable-diversity-in-vc-partnerships-4dca97cb2378?source=rss-d590d2ccfe7a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4dca97cb2378</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[diversity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diversity-in-tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preface Ventures]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2020 18:00:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-11T18:00:23.840Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1008/1*enL2SaT_kpYAQNCoLx9lOA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The last several weeks have been eye-opening into the systemic racism that exists across our society. Unfortunately the recent events are not a new phenomenon — just more visible in a world of social media and smartphones. From <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/8/18217076/congress-racial-diversity-white">Congress</a> to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/04/urban-areas-police-are-consistently-much-whiter-than-people-they-serve/?arc404=true">Police</a> to even our small industry of venture capital, the decision makers who impact livelihoods are <em>far</em> from representative of the total populace.</p><p>I have been very troubled, but at the same time, incredibly touched by the outpouring in the wake of George Floyd’s killing. Folks have shared their stories about how they don’t feel safe in our society, or have been <a href="https://twitter.com/bdeeter/status/1268716753862815744?s=20">threatened</a> because of their skin color alone. It happens all the time. Yet despite these tragedies, other upstanding citizens have stood up for others toward justice at their own <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/02/us/dc-protesters-sheltered-trnd/index.html">risk</a>. What I hope is becoming clear to many of us in hearing these stories, particularly those in the VC industry, is that we are <em>incredibly</em> privileged. As such we have a duty to be stewards of positive change. In being business leaders and capital allocators, we can choose who to fund and what problems are addressed fastest. Given that 1) almost<a href="https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/how-much-does-venture-capital-drive-us-economy"> ½ of public companies</a> today were initially VC backed 2) <a href="https://about.crunchbase.com/blog/startup-exit/">enterprise value creation</a> in technology happens fast 3) equity is more frequently <a href="https://www.nceo.org/articles/employee-ownership-by-the-numbers#3">distributed to employees</a> in the technology vs. other industries, the actions we make today directly facilitates large-scale economic empowerment and therefore addresses income inequality. We can think globally and act locally.</p><p>I co-founded <a href="https://www.diversity.vc/">Diversity.vc</a> (launched in 2016) alongside a few passionate and talented professionals, which exists to increase diversity of thought in the venture industry. The organization, based in London, has grown successfully cross-continentally with a reach of tens of thousands globally. Our objective is to help the venture capital industry represent the rich tapestry of society, which generates better decision making, <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-other-diversity-dividend">higher returns</a> and meritocratic access to entrepreneurship. We’ve executed on several meaningful initiatives such as <a href="http://www.diversity.vc/venturing-into-diversity-inclusion-2019/">accurately measuring the experiential diversity of investment teams</a>. We started by highlighting gender inequality, in which there are encouraging changes since 2017, but there is an even longer road ahead for minorities and people of color.</p><p>When VC’s make their investment decisions, they naturally do so based on imperfect, incomplete information of a young company which is a rich tinder for biased thinking. Given this and the aforementioned privilege we have as well as potential impact, it puts even more of an onus for us to have better structural guardrails to mitigate bad practices. In an effort to encourage sustainable and lasting change, I’ve compiled a list of what I believe to be “table stakes” for encouraging diversity in VC. Many of these practices are common in corporate settings, but the application to venture firms has nuance. Here are some tactics for effecting change at your firm:</p><ol><li><strong>Ask your teammates</strong>. This is the easiest and least often done. Simply inquire if your team feels they are doing enough to provide equitable access for internal recruiting and funding entrepreneurs. Do they answer comfortably? Do they have good examples, or is there an interaction they remember with regret? It is worth performing this exercise periodically (as often as folks have “off-sites”). Be open to your colleagues’ feedback and suggestions — discomfort brings change. Ask your minority and POC colleagues what they are working on in this realm, and support the hell out of them.</li><li><strong>Communicate as a firm</strong>. Reaffirm messages and communicate proactive actions to underrepresented communities — not just individually. In recent days, I’ve seen plenty of individuals tweet and retweet, donate generously, etc. It is meaningful, but their respective firms are often silent. Highlighting that “we’re committed to X” is important but what is being done differently as a firm now is key. Racial bias causes fails concretely in group systemics, not just in 1–1 interactions.</li><li><strong>Benchmark your firm’s diversity metrics</strong>. Measure diversity (gender, ethnic, experiential) of the investment decisioning team i.e. voting and check writing ability. Compare yourself in the same way as TVPI / DPI / IRR in Cambridge Associates reports.</li><li><strong>Be honest about who is a check writer</strong>. The Information’s <a href="https://www.theinformation.com/vc-diversity-index">Diversity Index</a> attempts each year with good intent to enlighten diversity in US VC Partnerships with reasonably specific inclusion criteria. However, multiples of participants who contributed data unfortunately lie by omission most often via inflating “Partner” titles. Elliot Robinson’s <a href="https://twitter.com/TheValuesVC/status/1268268907288080384?s=20">post</a> captured this succinctly. The truth might be bad, but if it isn’t allowed to be visible that’s even more problematic.</li><li><strong>Have a meritocratic policy for promotions</strong>. Examine your track record in promoting folks. To start, rank your highest, most performant investments in the last five years. The investments which your LP’s are proud of too. Look at the historical voting (if you have a voting system) — who voted for the affirmative? Who sourced, sponsored or worked on it? Were they promoted? Where are they now? Is there a correlation between that? Who were naysayers or voted against? Is the carry split or management company ownership reflective of these conclusions? Economic performance isn’t the only factor, but it’s a critical one and there should be correlation here. If not, please think about why.</li><li><strong>Start regular office hours for underrepresented groups</strong>. If you keep them, work to open it to entrepreneurs regularly, and make it accessible to more underrepresented groups. Meet diverse founders where they are — and don’t assume they occupy the same spaces and channels that you do. Work it and keep it going in perpetuity.</li><li><strong>Reexamine your HR policy</strong>. From generating pipeline to onboarding, from benefits packages to periodic implicit bias training — all of these factors are inputs to an inclusive work environment, where different people can thrive and be retained in your organization. An easy first step is to publish your next job posting online. Don’t just use a recruiter accessible to few. And question your hiring criteria. Distribute it to lots of channels toward a more representative applicant base. A minority student or person of color should be able to discover your job. Examine if the <a href="https://www.glassdoor.com/employers/blog/10-ways-remove-gender-bias-job-listings/">language</a> written in the job description is biased or non-inclusive.</li><li><strong>Ask portfolio companies to measure diversity metrics in the board decks</strong>. Doing so by function is ideal, but aggregate figures across the organization is a start. It can highlight adverse turnover via poor culture which can be problematic as we’ve seen in many cases.</li><li><strong>Be willing to give explicit feedback on why you are passing on an investment opportunity</strong>. Consider making several introductions for founders to those who could be interested. Many of our peers will say no to founders based on the surface, so be one of the good folks to do more in light of it.</li><li><strong>Pitch and partner with diverse LP’s</strong> (for those who are fundraising). Given the attractiveness of venture capital as an asset class, inclusiveness matters. Unfortunately there is far too short of a list of common LP’s in top funds. LP’s are important stakeholders in venture and there are <em>scores</em> of emerging and established partners from the non-profit, endowment, UHNW world who might not look like the others. They should be active LP’s. Find them and work with them.</li></ol><p>The <a href="http://www.diversity.vc/toolkit/">Diversity toolkit</a> from Diversity.vc has fuller content which I’d encourage others to listen to. I am holding myself to these standards at a minimum, and would be thrilled to engage with other firms who want to have a dialogue for shared learnings. I believe we can all do better.</p><p>— Farooq Abbasi // General Partner, Preface Ventures</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4dca97cb2378" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures/10-practices-of-sustainable-diversity-in-vc-partnerships-4dca97cb2378">10 Practices of Sustainable Diversity in VC Partnerships</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/preface-ventures">Preface Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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