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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Preston Barclay on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Preston Barclay on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Preston Barclay on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jumpstart Our Crypto Startups: How the JOBS Act Can Save ICOs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hackernoon/jumpstart-our-crypto-startups-how-the-jobs-act-can-save-icos-36b77758a70a?source=rss-69b3225fff90------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[jobs-act]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[securities-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crowdfunding]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preston Barclay]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Apr 2018 02:54:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-14T04:00:27.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Disclaimer: While I hope you enjoy this article, please do not misconstrue any of the information provided below as legal advice; it is merely a personal expression of my interest in the intersection of the law with blockchain technology. Please consult a lawyer and/or financial representative before investing.</em></p><p>Entrepreneurs face a classic chicken or the egg problem. While businesses need capital to function, soliciting investments prior to significant product <a href="https://hackernoon.com/tagged/development">development</a> may lead to relinquishing vital decision-making authority too soon. Founders must identify the optimal amount of funding to cover expenses yet retain controlling equity to build their business aligned with their vision. Along with continuing to foster growth, balancing these competing interests while seeking an investment remains a nearly impossible task for the nascent start-up.</p><p>The crypto <a href="https://medium.com/@cdixon/why-decentralization-matters-5e3f79f7638e">decentralization revolution</a>, in addition to challenging incumbent centralized business models, has dramatically recalibrated the fundraising incentives for entrepreneurs. Instead of housing product development, strategy, decision-making, and — most importantly for investors — profits under one corporate umbrella, new <a href="https://hackernoon.com/tagged/blockchain">blockchain</a>-based projects seek to democratize returns by providing economic incentives to those that facilitate the network rather than those who own it. As a result, distributed networks of workers and adopters earn financial rewards in the network’s “token” based on their participation rather than centralized for-profit structures and passive shareholders.</p><p>For example, in light of recent <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/28/597587830/criticism-prompts-facebook-to-change-privacy-controls">privacy</a> concerns against Facebook, consumers may seek greater control over their data with Internet companies. As such, a decentralized, user-owned social media platform may appeal as a favorable alternative. Instead of Facebook’s users providing their information for free and Facebook’s equity holders absorbing enormous advertising revenues (potentially from questionable <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/technology/facebook-google-russia.html">state actors</a>), a decentralized social network would compensate those who help facilitate the network (via computing power) and those who offer their data and profile information to potential marketers. The network’s tokens may have a use case on the platform (e.g., the ability to advertise or access certain features) and develop a secondary market for those who crave them.</p><p>The passive investor in such a platform must rely on the strength of the network to generate a consumptive or marketable use case for his or her tokens. Entrepreneurs creating decentralized networks no longer need to focus on retaining shares while raising capital since such fundraising models eliminate traditional concepts of equity. Likewise, if a founder maintains a sizable portion of the developed protocol’s tokens (antithetical to the democratized blockchain value proposition), it may stymy user adoption by diminishing the economic incentives for new entrants if the platform remains too centralized. Thus, developers can solicit funding to build platforms, attract new users, and grow networks without surrendering value in a tokenized economy.</p><p>Like traditional companies, blockchain-based entrepreneurs can seek funding at any stage of the network’s development, but will often attract an investment as soon as possible through a pre-sale of the platform’s tokens called an “Initial Coin Offering,” or ICO. An ICO often occurs after a developer team publishes a white paper, which describes the underlying technology that will support the network (i.e., the nuts and bolts of the blockchain technology), the team developing the protocol, and the platform’s value proposition (i.e., its use case; when the network is fully established, how it will improve on incumbents — with our Facebook example, perhaps the ability to control and profit from one’s own data). After ICOs <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/">raised</a> only $39 million combined between 2014 and 2015, investors injected $256 million into the market in 2016 before pouring in nearly $5.4 billion to blockchain start-ups in 2017. In just over three months in 2018, investors have already eclipsed 2017’s crypto financings with over <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/6-3-billion-2018-ico-funding-already-outpaced-2017/?utm_source=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;utm_campaign=b2f92540c7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_997ed6f472-b2f92540c7-157139501">$6.3 billion</a> funneled into ICOs. Social media platform <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/telegram-doubles-amount-raised-in-ico-to-1-7-billion/">Telegram</a> alone received an influx of $1.7 billion through two separate $850 million raises in January and March.</p><p>If the amount of money invested with so little data or information startles you, it should. Given 2017’s <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/2017-year-crypto-became-new-asset-class/">exponential growth</a> embracing crypto-evangelist visions of blockchain technology as a paradigm shifting <a href="https://blog.unchained-capital.com/blockchain-spectrum-806847e1c575">interdisciplinary marvel</a>, investors would rue missing the next potential king-making opportunity. But with backers dropping millions into projects on the basis of a single dozen-or-so-page document, the ecosystem remains ripe for <a href="http://fortune.com/2018/02/25/cryptocurrency-ico-collapse/?utm_source=fortune.com&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=data-sheet&amp;utm_content=2018022613pm">fast failures</a> and <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/dont-believe-the-hype-the-five-largest-ico-exit-scams-expert-take">scams</a>. To protect its citizens, regulators across the globe have played catch-up identifying how to classify this <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610331/when-the-cryptocurrency-bubble-pops-these-tokens-are-built-to-survive/?utm_source=newsletters&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=2018_03_15&amp;utm_campaign=chain_letter&amp;utm_source=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;utm_campaign">new asset class</a> while still fostering the technology’s development. In addition to monitoring money laundering concerns, the defining test in many jurisdictions for issuers and stakeholders remains whether these ICOs amount to sales of “securities” requiring significant compliance with investor protection laws across the world.</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Blockchain-Based Start-ups Seeking U.S. Investors Must Comply with U.S. Law Regardless of the Project’s Home Jurisdiction</strong></p><p>Despite its <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/token-regulate-tokens-messari-raise-ico-2018/">extra-governmental ethos</a>, the distributed, global scope of crypto-assets inevitably encroaches upon the legal authority of several nation-states simultaneously. Although many in the community, including the <a href="https://gemini.com/blog/a-proposal-for-a-self-regulatory-organization-for-the-u-s-virtual-currency-industry/">Winklevoss</a> twins and administrative bodies like the U.S. Commodity and Futures Trading Commission (“<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cryptocurrency-usa-cftc/cftc-commissioner-urges-crypto-companies-to-self-regulate-idUSKCN1FY274">CFTC</a>”), advocate for the creation of a private, <a href="https://medium.com/tbis-weekly-bits/introducing-messari-an-open-source-edgar-database-for-cryptoassets-46fec1b402f6">self-regulating</a> enforcement body, states are unlikely to surrender their police powers so long as bad actor behavior remains prevalent against its citizens and private enforcement mechanisms (e.g., freezing coins procured through malicious conduct) prove technologically difficult or ineffective. Thus, developers of new protocols must remain vigilant of and compliant with a variety of regulatory schemes to avoid triggering liability and causes of actions from governments and <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/legal-risk-icos-private-lawsuits-securities-laws/">private citizens</a>.</p><p>Even if a developer team establishes an organization that complies with local crypto-favorable laws, certain activities impacting other jurisdictions may implicate that nation’s enforcement regime. Regardless of whether a project originates in a state like <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-innovation-switzerland-crypto-valley-new-york/">Switzerland</a> that <a href="https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2018/02/20180216-mm-ico-wegleitung/">welcomes</a> the retailing of certain “payment” and “utility” tokens, the purchase of such an asset may be deemed a sale of a security under U.S. law subject to the reach of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state compliance schemes if offered and sold to U.S. investors. Likewise, an issuer remains subject to U.S. jurisdiction if living in the U.S. and/or using U.S.-based facilities (i.e., the Internet), even if he or she incorporates abroad.</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/993855/international-icos-may-not-be-safe-from-the-sec">John Reed Stark</a>, former chief of the SEC’s Office of Internet Enforcement division, “U.S. federal securities laws boldly apply to everyone in the world, with exceptions being available to the extent the person or organization in question does not actually transact in the U.S. or with U.S. persons or companies.”</p><p>Unless developers wish to avoid the U.S. market, a prospective offering must (i) be structured so as not to constitute an offer or sale of a “security” under U.S. laws; (ii) comply with U.S. securities laws by filing a registration statement with the SEC and following other disclosure requirements (an expensive process required when conducting an Initial Public Offering, or IPO, of traditional equity); or (iii) fall within federal and state securities law exemptions relieving the registration statement requirement (but nevertheless demanding strict adherence to investor qualifications, transfer restrictions, and/or fundraising limits).</p><p>For crypto-entrepreneurs seeking capital to build their platforms, constructing offerings that fall outside the scope of securities laws remains ideal to maximize the pool of potential investors and size of raises; however, considering the broad reach of securities laws, developers should contemplate pursuing a securities exemption to avoid triggering arduous and expensive disclosures required in a full registration.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Most ICOs are Likely Securities under U.S. Law, Requiring Compliance with U.S. Federal and State Securities Laws</strong></p><p>Industry literature from Coin Center’s Director of Research <a href="https://coincenter.org/entry/framework-for-securities-regulation-of-cryptocurrencies">Peter Van Valkenburgh</a>, <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjFpfX4iMrZAhURGKwKHQQ_DrUQFggpMAA&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.coinbase.com%2Flegal%2Fsecurities-law-framework.pdf&amp;usg=AOvVaw2VYFcjqoPrx9Y052JDbwS8">Debevoise &amp; Plimpton LLP</a>, Cooley LLP and Protocol Labs’ <a href="https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-Whitepaper.pdf">“SAFT” Project</a>, the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjb6IzYisrZAhWXxIMKHU-oCN0QFggpMAA&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fcardozo.yu.edu%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FCardozo%2520Blockchain%2520Project%2520-%2520Not%2520So%2520Fa">Cardozo Blockchain Project</a>, and Perkins Coie’s <a href="https://medium.com/@conorohanlon/a-hybrid-approach-to-token-sales-c001481ef775">Conor O’Hanlon</a> have all engaged with the application of U.S. securities laws to blockchain-based fundraising. Although formulated long before the advent of internet technology, the 1946 Supreme Court decision in <em>SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. </em>(“Howey”) provides a malleable framework for identifying whether an unorthodox sale falls under the Securities Act of 1933’s (herein the “Securities Act”) definition of an “investment contract” requiring compliance with U.S. federal securities laws. <em>Howey </em>supplies an “economic reality” four-factor test for an investment contract, considering whether a contract, transaction, or scheme involves: (1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with an expectation of profits (4) solely from the efforts of others.</p><p>While the aforementioned research provides an excellent distillation and debate of the <em>Howey </em>factors to guide developers, investors, and participants, the gist of the discussion suggests that the investment of funds into a still-centrally housed project <em>before</em> its tokens possess marketable utility represents a sale of securities. In other words, before a team of developers reaches a distributed global scope (i.e., expanded beyond the original core development team, weakening the “common enterprise” factor) and the asset transforms into a “commodity” whose price primarily depends on market demand rather than the continued work of the developers (the “expectation of profits” and “solely from the efforts of others” factors), the offering likely satisfies the <em>Howey </em>test and subjects itself to U.S. securities regulation. Thus, if a project <em>intends</em> to develop a commoditized platform or even <em>launches</em> a tokenized network, it may not avoid securities regulation until it achieves its proffered purpose and satisfies regulators as a commodity.</p><p>The U.S. and more ICO-friendly jurisdictions like Switzerland effectively differ most drastically on this issue of an offering’s <em>timing</em>. While utility token ICOs may proceed at their development’s infancy under Swiss law, tokens must transition from securities to established commodities <em>before </em>a developer team may conduct an ICO to <em>potentially</em> avoid the SEC’s reach. Even so, the SEC nevertheless may deem that a particular utility token offering falls under its jurisdiction.</p><p>In fact, the SEC has started to act. Last July, the SEC issued an <a href="http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf">investigative report</a> against “The DAO,” a crypto-venture fund that sold tokens as ownership shares in its investment vehicle’s profits. Although the SEC refused to pursue charges against The DAO’s promoters for issuing an unregistered security, the report nevertheless declared that such “virtual” offerings triggered SEC scrutiny. By December, the SEC issued its first <a href="https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf">cease-and-desist order</a> of an ICO against “Munchee,” a tokenized restaurant review platform. The SEC stressed that despite Munchee’s claim that its tokens <em>would</em> possess utility, its promoters not only sold virtual coins <em>before</em> they acquired their alleged use case, but they also advertised the tokens as an investment opportunity in its white paper and subsequent marketing materials. Munchee immediately refunded its $15 million raise to investors.</p><p>Further enforcement also appears imminent. On February 6 before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, SEC chairman Jay Clayton <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-every-ico-ive-seen-security/">affirmed</a> the enforcement bureau’s perspective on ICO compliance with U.S. federal securities laws, “To the extent that digital assets like ICOs are securities — and I believe every ICO I’ve seen is a security — we have jurisdiction and our federal securities laws apply.” Despite Clayton’s recent <a href="https://coincenter.org/entry/sec-s-clayton-use-of-a-token-can-evolve-toward-or-away-from-being-a-security?utm_source=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;utm_campaign=7a5d991428-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_997ed6f472-7a5d991428-15713950">informal comments</a> acknowledging the potential of a security-non-security continuum, his congressional testimony suggests that the SEC may approach the <em>Howey </em>factors expansively or depart from the <em>Howey </em>framework entirely when evaluating whether an ICO falls under its jurisdiction.</p><p>Likewise, The Wall Street Journal <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-launches-cryptocurrency-probe-1519856266">reported</a> that the SEC has issued at least eighty <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/sec-ico-probe-underway-stories-conflict-extent-sweep/">subpoenas</a> to token issuers, advisors, and investors over the past several months to uncover the <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/sec-going-saft/">mechanics</a> of offerings and their compliance with securities laws. Although the identities of those receiving such subpoenas largely remain unknown, the SEC confirmed it has initiated an <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/overstock-confirms-250-million-tzero-ico-sec-review/">investigation</a> into Overstock.com’s $250 million proposed raise for its new tZero platform, as well as “<a href="https://www.bna.com/sec-working-dozens-n57982089945/?utm_source=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;utm_campaign=d14f5e8836-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_997ed6f472-d14f5e8836-157139501">dozens</a>” of other ICOs. Due to such a hazy regulatory climate, distributed video platform Stream <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/spooked-sec-video-streaming-ico-halts-token-release/">halted</a> its token “<a href="https://www.coindesk.com/long-icos-hello-airdrops-free-token-giveaway-craze/">airdrop</a>” until receiving greater clarity on its legality with securities law, while U.S.-based token exchange Coinbase announced that it will pursue accreditation as a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cryptocurrency-firm-coinbase-in-talks-to-become-sec-regulated-brokerage-1523043315">licensed brokerage firm</a>. Even <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/strong-words-little-action-icos-draw-fire-us-congress-hearing/">Congress</a> appears poised to intervene.</p><p>The ICO <a href="https://hackernoon.com/the-ico-is-dead-long-live-the-ico-2-0-7bb269987513">Wild West</a> as we know it may be <a href="https://prestonbyrne.com/2018/03/07/ico-dead/amp/">dead</a>.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>The JOBS Act Provides Potential Effective Securities Law Exemptions for Crypto-Entrepreneurs to Solicit Both Accredited and Unaccredited Investors</strong></p><p>Given U.S. regulatory uncertainty, it remains prudent for start-ups to embrace compliance with securities laws and design offerings that satisfy an available exemption to avoid onerous registration and reporting requirements of going “public.” Depending upon their objectives, including (i) the proposed size of the offering; (ii) investor profile (i.e., “unaccredited” and/or “accredited” investors — i.e., individuals with either $1 million in non-residential net worth or three years of annual income exceeding $200,000, or $300,000 for a couple); (iii) number of investors (if considered “equity,” possessing more than 500 unaccredited or 2000 total investors triggers reporting requirements for a company with over $10 million in assets); (iv) liquidity (i.e., “restricted” versus “unrestricted” securities available for re-sale); and (v) financial reporting appetite and accompanying litigation risk, developers may find complying with certain exemption requirements more attractive than others.</p><p>The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, signed into law by President Obama in April 2012, provides entrepreneurs greater access to capital from both “accredited” and “unaccredited” investors by relaxing previous securities exemption requirements and fostering new legal funding avenues. By combining the Securities Act Section 4(a)(2) private placement exemption, the JOBS Act 506(c) moderation of advertising restrictions, and Section 4(a)(7) and SEC Rule 144 governing re-sales, crypto start-ups can craft private sales to accredited investors to bootstrap their networks. Likewise, the genesis of crowdfunding provides blockchain-based founders the opportunity to capitalize on unaccredited investor excitement and launch a democratized platform by directly targeting diverse users. Finally, the JOBS Act’s revisions to Regulation A and creation of Regulation “A+” offer developers the opportunity to raise up to $50 million in a public round from a pool of accredited <em>and</em> unaccredited investors. Depending on the entrepreneur’s priorities, all three exemptions offer compelling opportunities to elicit funding.</p><p><strong><em>a.</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>The JOBS Act’s Relaxation of Prohibitions on General Solicitation Combined with Securities Act Re-Sale Safe Harbor Rules Provide a Viable Private Offering Opportunity for Blockchain-based Start-ups</em></strong></p><p>Prior to the enactment of the JOBS Act, most start-ups struggled to attract securities exempt private funding given a restricted investor pool (i.e., only wealthy or “sophisticated” individuals) and prohibitions on public advertising. Entrepreneurs relied upon the Securities Act Section 4(2) “private placement” exemption, now <a href="https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rule506b">Section 4(a)(2)</a>, which, as constructed, offers little guidance for issuers and investors by simply authorizing transactions “not involving a public offering.” Common law precedents and SEC no-action letters have defined the contours of the exemption by limiting it to purchasers who can “<a href="http://www.fwlaw.com/news/123-private-placements-september-selected-exemption-disclosure-issues">fend for themselves</a>” either as a “sophisticated investor” or through access to the kind of information available in a traditional investment prospectus for a registered offering. Section 4(a)(2), by not providing a disclosure requirement for issuers, supports the concept of <em>caveat emptor</em> — buyer beware — for such eligible investors. Given the fuzziness of the term “sophisticated investors,” the SEC established Regulation D <a href="https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rule506b">Rule 506(b)</a> in 1982 to provide a Section 4(a)(2) safe harbor for offerings attracting 35 or fewer <a href="https://www.cooleygo.com/can-you-raise-money-from-unaccredited-investors/">unaccredited investors</a> who nevertheless possess financial sophistication and awareness of the investment risk.</p><p>Further limiting the breadth of potential backers, the Securities Act forbids the “general solicitation and advertising” of such Section 4(a)(2) or Rule 506(b) sales. Likewise, investors receive “restricted” securities ineligible for re-sale absent (i) a <a href="https://www.fool.com/investing/brokerage/2015/07/03/how-rule-144a-created-a-shadow-financial-market.aspx">Rule 144A</a> sale to “qualified institutional buyers” (i.e., institutions holding more than $100 million in non-affiliates); (ii) another limited exemption (such as Section 4(a)(7) or Rule 144, discussed below); or (iii) a full share registration.</p><p>For the blockchain-based start-up, Section 4(a)(2) and Rule 506(b) provide limited utility. Designed to protect unaccredited investors from salacious marketing, the pre-JOBS Act Section 4(a)(2) exemption rejected advertising in print, broadcast, or similar media — highly problematic for entrepreneurs developing platforms embedded and reliant upon the Internet. Recognizing the challenge facing founders seeking to efficiently raise capital in the digital age, the JOBS Act authorized the SEC to create a new private exemption allowing the general advertising and solicitation of capital raises. Now, issuers may rely upon <a href="https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rule506c">Rule 506(c)</a> to publicly market their offerings, provided that all purchasers are accredited investors and the founders take “reasonable steps to verify” each person’s accredited status. The new private placement exemption offers entrepreneurs the freedom to reach beyond their pre-existing relationships for funding, which not only increases investor competition, but may also connect developers with better strategic partners. For the crypto-founder, Rule 506(c) enables him or her the opportunity to release a white paper, advertise an interest in raising funds to build a platform, and attract investors from the United States.</p><p>While Rule 506(c) liberates start-ups to raise an unlimited sum, relying on the Regulation D private placement exemption nevertheless possesses certain downsides for a blockchain-based project, particularly considering the ethos of the crypto movement. Unless combined with another securities exemption, a 506(c) financing remains limited to accredited investors. Instead of empowering users and fostering a democratized distribution, wealthy investors retain the spoils of a successful platform; potential unaccredited users cannot buy in to a project early absent an alternative financing or distribution scheme.</p><p>Regulation D issuances also remain subject to limited censorship and disclosure requirements. For example, Regulation D offerings must exclude or disclose certain “<a href="https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/bad-actor-small-entity-compliance-guide.htm">bad actor</a>” issuers and other “covered” persons, and must <a href="https://hackernoon.com/the-ico-is-dead-long-live-the-ico-2-0-7bb269987513">comply</a> with anti-money laundering (AML) and know-your-customer (KYC) regulations under the Bank Secrecy and USA Patriot Acts. Founders also cannot completely avoid disclosing information to the SEC like they can under Section 4(a)(2); Regulation D sales require filing an electronic “<a href="https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/formd">Form D</a>” with the federal enforcement bureau within 15 days after the first sale relying upon the exemption. Fortunately, Form D disclosures remain minimal and pale in comparison to Regulation Crowdfunding reporting, Regulation A information sharing, or the disclosure requirements of a full registration. Still, disclosing information to a centralized agency may deter certain potential token issuers.</p><p>Further, Regulation D sales represent “covered” securities, which, while preempting state securities laws on their initial sale, nevertheless must comply with such state “blue sky” laws and the SEC’s enforcement scheme on re-sales. Under federal law, restricted secondary sales may not occur absent a <a href="http://thestartuplawblog.com/the-text-of-new-section-4a7/">Section 4(a)(7)</a> private exemption, <a href="https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsrule144htm.html">Rule 144</a> public exempt re-sale, or a <a href="http://www.fwlaw.com/news/123-private-placements-september-selected-exemption-disclosure-issues">Regulation S</a> international trade. Signed into law by President Obama in December 2015, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act promulgated the new Securities Act safe harbor, <a href="https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/the-fast-act-new-sections">Section 4(a)(7)</a>, codifying the previous lawyer-made “Section 4(a)(1½)” exemption for private re-sales to fellow accredited investors made at least 90 days after the initial purchase, provided that the transaction remains compliant with other information requirements. Unlike an initial issuance under 506(c), however, such secondary sales cannot result from general solicitation or advertising. After a minimum of one year, a non-company-affiliated investor may also utilize the Rule 144 public re-sale exemption to sell to accredited and unaccredited investors alike in the U.S. Thus, three months after an ICO, a private market may develop for a network’s tokens before welcoming a full exchange (subject to certain individual volume limits) nine months later.</p><p>While such lock-up periods may foster the development of more technologically sound platforms by encouraging longer-term investment decisions, it extends the minimum time required for utility tokens to develop their commoditized use case and attract a network of users. Given the SEC’s expansive jurisdictional reach on ICOs, however, it remains unlikely that a project can escape the definition of a security within such a time frame. Absent a legal opinion from counsel, purchasers of tokens via Regulation D should assume that any subsequent sale must comply with securities re-sale rules.</p><p>Ultimately, Rule 506(c) offers entrepreneurs an attractive option to fund the development of their platforms with American investors. Compared to other security exemptions, 506(c) benefits from offering a potential limitless issuance, fewer disclosure requirements, and reasonable re-sale opportunities. 506(c)’s greatest downfall, however, remains its limitation to accredited investors, the antithesis of the crypto movement. To reach a potential network’s ultimate end users, founders could seek to capitalize on another champion of the JOBS Act: Regulation Crowdfunding.</p><p><strong><em>b.</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>Regulation Crowdfunding Offers Crypto-Entrepreneurs the Opportunity to Bootstrap Networks By Directly Appealing to the Average Consumer</em></strong></p><p>While Rule 506(c) loosens restrictions on marketing and discovering investment opportunities for accredited investors, the JOBS Act’s greatest achievement in fostering entrepreneurship remains the enactment of “Regulation Crowdfunding,” a securities law exemption allowing <em>any </em>investor the ability to support a nascent project and share in its successes. Prior to the JOBS Act’s modification of Securities Act Section 4(a)(6) with “Regulation CF,” unaccredited investors unable to qualify for the Section 4(a)(2) Rule 506(b) safe harbor solely relied upon the public markets to appreciate their capital. Designed to protect unaccredited investors otherwise lacking financial sophistication from risky investments and sensational advertising, the pre-JOBS Act securities regime prevented unaccredited investors from accessing potentially the most lucrative investment opportunities. Now, Regulation CF provides such unaccredited investors the chance to invest a limited sum in compelling early-stage projects.</p><p>Spawned from successful digital non-profit fundraising platforms like Indiegogo, entrepreneurs recognized the opportunity to leverage crowdsourcing to finance for-profit endeavors. Unlike non-profit donations, however, altruistic financiers participating in for-profit crowdsourcing often receive rewards for supplying capital. For example, sites like Kickstarter provide tools for new businesses to court investors by offering their supporters the finished product of a successful financing. Much like how many backers of crypto-based networks expect to receive commoditized tokens for supporting an ICO, for-profit crowdsourcing in this manner avoids the definition of a security by more closely resembling the purchase of a good or service rather than an investment with an expectation of profits. Upon receiving the completed good or service, the relationship often ends (unless, of course, the original backer formally invests in the accelerating business). For most crowdsourced token issuances, however, it remains unlikely that its digital coins will have reached a commoditized equilibrium with a genuine consumptive utility at such an early stage in its development. Thus, crowdfunded token sales more aptly fit under the final category of crowdsourced fundraising efforts: crowdfunding for equity.</p><p>Unlike philanthropic crowdfunding or donations to for-profit entities with limited compensation, many financiers crave equity to benefit from the long-term success of the company. President Obama’s signing of the JOBS Act ushered in the creation of equity crowdsourcing platforms, beginning with Fundable and made more popular since by AngelList, which allow any investor to contribute to a start-up pursuing a Regulation CF offering and obtain a share of the business.</p><p>Under <a href="https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/regcrowdfunding">Regulation Crowdfunding</a>, businesses may currently raise up to $1.07 million over a 12-month period from accredited and unaccredited investors provided that any such investors limit their annual investments over <em>all </em>Regulation CF issuances to (i) $2,200 or 5% of the lesser of net worth and net income (if under $107,000); or (ii) 10% of the lesser of net worth and net income (if over $107,000), up to a maximum of $107,000 over the course of a year. Likewise, the sale must be conducted through an SEC approved intermediary (i.e., either a broker-dealer or crowdsourcing platform registered with the SEC and FINRA). Further, bad actors, public companies, and foreign entities cannot pursue a Regulation CF private placement. The company must also disclose certain financial and shareholder information to potential investors via a “<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiCuMHrnrjaAhXvt1kKHYDGCGgQFjAAegQIABAq&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sec.gov%2Ffiles%2Fformc.pdf&amp;usg=AOvVaw3rub5Qb7bn3sCGrRyeYeJy">Form C</a>,” and may have to provide annual reports on a “Form C-AR.” Like Rule 506(c), Regulation Crowdfunding shares qualify as “covered” securities and remain susceptible to re-sale restrictions. Unlike 506(c), however, issuers utilizing Regulation CF cannot advertise the offering other than a general notice that directs individuals to the funding platform.</p><p>Regulation Crowdfunding issuances ultimately mirror 4(a)(2) private placements, but welcome unaccredited investors. Compared to Rule 506(c), however, Regulation CF maintains several disadvantages. First, Regulation CF departs from Rule 506(c)’s acceptance of general solicitation and advertising. Likewise, crowdfunded offerings may only accept slightly more than $1 million compared to an unbounded potential raise through Section 4(a)(2), Rule 506(b), or Rule 506(c), despite increased costs for a <a href="https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/crowdfunding/regulation-crowdfunding-rules">lengthier disclosure process</a> via Form C (compared to the electronic short Form D) and supplemental annual reports. Crowdsourcing must also be completed through a regulated broker-dealer or portal. Material misstatements to unaccredited investors may also result in strict liability for the issuer. Finally, if more than 500 unaccredited investors provide capital and the company eventually possesses more than $10 million in assets, it must begin providing costly public disclosures. Despite such drawbacks, however, crowdfunding remains attractive for blockchain-based entrepreneurs given the appeal of reaching a distributed audience, which not only more closely embodies the crypto ethos, but may also more effectively foster a successful network.</p><p>Creatively crafted raises, however, may enable developers to pursue both a Regulation CF offering to kick start a network with a large base of unaccredited investors before utilizing a Regulation D issuance to provide additional funding and accelerate the platform’s growth. Under the concept of “integration,” two offerings conducted in close proximity may effectively be considered a single offering under U.S. securities laws, which may threaten the issuer’s reliance on either securities exemption if the combined issuance violates the SEC’s requirements. For instance, a Rule 506(b) reliant offering with 20 unaccredited investors may be in jeopardy if the business utilizes and advertises a Rule 506(c) sale shortly thereafter.</p><p>Securities regulators may treat multiple purported exemptions as a <a href="http://www.fwlaw.com/news/123-private-placements-september-selected-exemption-disclosure-issues">single issuance</a> by considering several factors including (i) the offerings remain part of a single plan of financing; (ii) the issuances involve the same class of securities; (iii) the offerings are made at or about the same time; (iv) the business receives the same kind of consideration for their sale; (v) the capital raise is made for the same general purpose; and (vi) the offerees remain among the same class or character. Like the <em>Howey </em>test for securities, however, analysis of these factors remains fact-intensive. Fortunately, Rule 502(a) provides an integration safe harbor for issuances conducted at least six months apart. If a blockchain developer wants to carefully avoid liability, he or she should initiate a Regulation CF crowdsourced round and wait six months to solicit accredited investors via a Section 4(a)(2), Rule 506(b), or Rule 506(c) private placement.</p><p>Considering that an entrepreneur may be seeking to target two different classes of offerees — <em>unaccredited </em>investors with a Regulation CF issuance and <em>accredited </em>backers via another private placement exemption — waiting six months may not be necessary. Further, in the context of Regulation CF issuances, the SEC has <a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf#page=19">determined</a> that such offerings avoid integration with concurrent Regulation D sales, so long as “each offering complies with the requirements of the applicable exemption that is being relied upon for the particular offering.” In other words, a developer may generally advertise and solicit a Rule 506(c) financing at the same time as pursuing a Regulation CF exempt raise if he or she ensures that any such Regulation CF investor did not access the raise via general solicitation and advertising. Thus, an entrepreneur can pursue a simultaneous bifurcated offering utilizing Regulation D and Regulation CF to attract capital from both accredited and unaccredited investors.</p><p><strong><em>c.</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>Raising Regulation A’s “Mini Registration” Maximum Raise from $5 Million to $50 Million Presents Developers the Chance to Launch Active Networks with Both Accredited and Unaccredited Investors</em></strong></p><p>Another, traditionally less popular, pre-JOBS Act means of funding includes the small business-geared Regulation A “mini IPO” for U.S. and Canadian companies promulgated under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act. Prior to the passing of the JOBS Act, a Regulation A offering permitted a public raise of up to $5 million; <a href="https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html">now</a>, entrepreneurs can use the funding mechanism to obtain $50 million over a 12-month period from accredited and unaccredited investors alike via the modified “<a href="http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/regulation-a-for-smaller-companies-and-icos-a-better-way-to-go-public-2018-02-12/">Regulation A+</a>” abbreviated public offering.</p><p>Unlike the Section 4(a)(2), Regulation D, and Regulation CF private placement exemptions, a Regulation A+ offering involves a <em>public </em>sale of an issuer’s securities to investors. As such, start-ups relying on Regulation A+ must disclose substantial financial information to the SEC for qualification before supplying them to potential backers. Depending on the type of Regulation A+ issuance pursued (“Tier 1” allows a maximum raise of $20 million while a “Tier 2” issuance may reach $50 million), entrepreneurs may have to provide audited financials with management discussion and analysis (“MD&amp;A”) of such figures (Tier 2), file annual, semi-annual, and current event reports after the offering (Tier 2), or register the issuance with offeree states according to relevant “blue sky” laws (Tier 1). If the company elects to list on a national exchange, it must adhere to any additional requirements proffered by the listing agency to access its platform for greater liquidity. Businesses must also begin traditional public information reporting required by the SEC (i.e., 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks) upon reaching certain business thresholds, including exceeding 2,000 shareholders or 500 unaccredited investors, but may reduce certain obligations by qualifying as an “<a href="https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC">emerging growth company</a>,” another JOBS Act design aiding accelerating businesses. Like private placements, the JOBS Act also rejects bad actor issuers from utilizing Regulation A+ for capital formation.</p><p>Despite such increased disclosure requirements, Regulation A+, particularly Tier 2 offerings, provide certain benefits over pursuing other financing schemes. While Tier 1 issuances must comply with state “blue sky” laws, federal law preempts state securities regulations for Tier 2 offerings like Regulation D and Regulation CF. Unlike the private exemptions, however, Regulation A+ represents a <em>public </em>sale, allowing purchasers of such “unrestricted” securities the ability to re-sell their shares immediately. Especially if a company lists its shares on a national exchange, stockholders obtain far greater liquidity for their purchased securities than in private placements, which require waiting a minimum of three months for private re-sales and at least a full year for a public market in the United States. Regulation A+ also benefits from allowing an issuer to “test the waters” and publicly advertise an offering, which even a traditional IPO disallows. Regulation A+ effectively offers two middle ground approaches to raising capital that select the best features of both private and public placements (accredited and unaccredited investors, immediate re-sale opportunities, and substantial yet not overly burdensome disclosures). If entrepreneurs remain concerned with increased disclosure costs present with a Tier 2 offering, they may sacrifice federal preemption and replace a maximum $50 million raise with a $20 million capped issuance.</p><p>Drawbacks to pursuing a Regulation A+ issuance include caps on issuances and the costs and risks associated with pursuing a public market. Compared to a simultaneous Regulation CF and Regulation D financing, Regulation A+ cannot raise an unlimited sum while building an accredited and unaccredited coalition. Regulation A+ may only raise $20 million or $50 million depending on the issuer’s appetite for disclosure. If an entrepreneur remains wary of beginning an extensive reporting process, a $20 million Regulation A+ issuance may be attractive, but nevertheless places a ceiling on a raise that otherwise does not exist with a Rule 506(c) private placement.</p><p>Immediate re-sale opportunities may also harm a nascent network by attracting investors seeking a quick return rather than long-term, strategic believers in the platform. Successful distributed tokenized platforms require both time to develop technologically proficient protocols and evangelists to foster network effects rather than speculators distorting the mission of the technology too soon. Finally, public reporting also <a href="https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/the-secs-shutdown-of-the-munchee-ico.html">increases litigation risk</a> against an issuer for materially misleading statements or omissions under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which, according to 1995 Supreme Court case <em>Gustafson v. Alloyd</em>, do not apply to private sales.</p><p>Practically, certain blockchain-based start-ups may also not be able to properly coordinate relevant disclosures required to complete a Regulation A+ offering. Although most projects begin centralized with a limited pool of developers, if a project transitions into a distributed network, consensus coordination to complete financial disclosures may be impossible. If power returns to individual users rather than a centralized corporation, traditional financial reporting may not be applicable. Although this issue also remains relevant for private placements, coordinating on consistent and detailed reporting requirements for Regulation A+ offerings may be too difficult for certain structures.</p><p>Governmental or credible self-regulation may be prudent to establish new reporting standards unique to the industry and decentralized organizations. Nevertheless, creative incentive structures within a network itself may allow for certain token holders on a protocol to head such reporting required by the U.S. securities system. For networks that can successfully coordinate disclosure efforts, Regulation A+ provides an enticing capital raising scheme for entrepreneurs seeking to publicly advertise and attract a significant raise from accredited and unaccredited investors.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: Compliance with U.S. Securities Laws Will Allow Blockchain-Based Start-ups to Innovate with Legitimacy</strong></p><p>Blockchain technology’s evangelized disruption not only represents a potential paradigm shift in how entrepreneurs may consider raising capital and forming companies, but also in data privacy and ownership. With the pervasiveness of hacks and other nefarious uses of individual data, people may crave market solutions less reliant on centralized corporate structures. Although in its infancy, blockchain technology offers the potential to provide greater security and allow a network’s users to share in its collective successes.</p><p>As more minds gravitate to the field, regulators should pursue a measured approach to protect investors yet foster innovation and capital formation. Switzerland (and potentially others like <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/malta-determined-to-become-the-blockchain-island-regulations-adoption-binance-headquarters">Malta</a>) offer entrepreneurs favorable regulations to those creating and enabling distributed utility-based systems while the United States’ federal and state securities regime requires careful compliance to avoid triggering governmental and private liability if engaging the U.S. market.</p><p>While credible self-regulation or federal legislation preempting state law specifically for crypto platforms remain attractive, the 2012 JOBS Act provides frameworks to effectively raise money and grow distributed networks. Regulation D Rule 506(c), for example, provides entrepreneurs the opportunity to raise an unlimited sum from accredited investors in a private placement and appeal to those beyond their networks through general solicitation and advertising. Likewise, Regulation Crowdfunding provides a novel mechanism for unaccredited investors to access potentially lucrative venture opportunities. Blockchain-based founders may also seek to reach both accredited and unaccredited investors by completing dual Regulation D and Regulation CF private placements. Finally, entrepreneurs could capitalize on dramatic changes to Regulation A and conduct a public Regulation A+ offering to attract any investor, raise up to $50 million, and provide investors immediate access to liquidity. Depending on the priorities of issuers among (i) the idealized size of their token issuance; (ii) the type and (iii) number of investors they may wish to recruit; (iv) the urge to provide investors liquidity; and (v) their willingness to comply with costly and lengthy disclosure requirements, certain issuances may be more appealing to crypto-platform developers.</p><p>Fortunately, exciting developments within the industry may ease the process for developers to deal with a litany of complex regulations not only in the U.S., but also across the world. <a href="https://medium.com/harborhq/introducing-the-private-ico-pico-3e8b782924c1">Harbor</a>’s R-Token seeks to provide a blockchain solution for crypto-start-ups by providing additional lines of code to complete securities, AML, KYC, and tax checks on the initial and re-sale of securitized tokens directly on the protocol. Other platforms like <a href="https://coinlist.co/">CoinList</a>, <a href="https://www.startengine.com/">StartEngine</a>, <a href="https://www.prometheum.info/?utm_source=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;utm_campaign=a5fc9fc965-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_997ed6f472-a5fc9fc965-157139501">Prometheum</a>, <a href="https://www.tzero.com/?utm_source=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;utm_campaign=a5fc9fc965-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_997ed6f472-a5fc9fc965-157139501">tZero</a>, and <a href="https://www.tradetemplum.com/?utm_source=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;utm_campaign=a5fc9fc965-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_997ed6f472-a5fc9fc965-157139501">Templum</a> also dramatically streamline registration, assist start-ups seeking to complete securities compliant offerings, and provide “alternative trading systems” for secondary sales.</p><p>As with any nascent technology, exciting advancements also breed exceptional risk. While the industry waits for tailored legislation to provide clarity for issuers and investors, by complying with U.S. securities laws, entrepreneurs not only may limit their personal liability, but may also foster credibility for themselves and the industry. To create truly revolutionary distributed global systems, entrepreneurs must continue to decrypt blockchain technology to the masses through compliance with the law.</p><p><em>Thank you for reading! If you made this far, I would love to hear from you. I encourage any and all feedback either in the comments, via Twitter (@presbarclay), or email (</em><a href="/service/mailto:presbarclay@gmail.com"><em>presbarclay@gmail.com</em></a><em>).</em></p><p><em>In addition to the incredible writers and thought leaders whose work I have cited and linked to above, I owe a special thank you to Daniel Budofsky for his thought-provoking comments and insights during the drafting process. I must also thank Howard Marks, Sara Hanks, and Scott Purcell, whose ICO Webinar with </em><a href="/service/mailto:https://www.coindesk.com/webinars/"><em>CoinDesk</em></a><em> inspired many details discussed herein. Any crypto-enthusiast should also follow the work of Coin Center’s Peter Van Valkenburgh, whose policy research papers not only remain must-reads for lawyers, but also anyone interested in the regulatory health of the industry. Finally, stay tuned to the latest developments in the blockchain ecosystem with </em><a href="/service/mailto:https://www.coindesk.com/"><em>CoinDesk</em></a><em>, </em><a href="/service/mailto:https://tokeneconomy.co/"><em>Token Economy</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.thedailybit.news/"><em>The Daily Bit</em></a><em> my favorite news and analysis sites for all things crypto. Please reach out to continue this discussion.</em></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fdde502%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fhackernoon%2F&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3c851dac986ab6dbb2d1aaa91205a8eb/href">https://medium.com/media/3c851dac986ab6dbb2d1aaa91205a8eb/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=36b77758a70a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/jumpstart-our-crypto-startups-how-the-jobs-act-can-save-icos-36b77758a70a">Jumpstart Our Crypto Startups: How the JOBS Act Can Save ICOs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon">HackerNoon.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Steph Curry’s Missed Shot at Millions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prestonbarclay/steph-currys-missed-shot-at-millions-393ab779689f?source=rss-69b3225fff90------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/393ab779689f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stephen-curry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preston Barclay]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Jun 2017 07:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-18T00:56:27.046Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This article first appeared on the author’s sports business, legal, and analytics website, </em><a href="http://www.unsung-zeroes.com/"><em>Unsung-Zeroes.com</em></a><em>, on June 18, 2017.</em></p><p>Steph Curry is aware of the elephant in the room.</p><p>“One thing my pops always told me is you never count another man’s money,” the Golden State Warriors point guard <a href="http://blogs.mercurynews.com/kawakami/2017/01/14/tk-show-steph-curry/?doing_wp_cron=1484592990.7336189746856689453125">told</a> The Mercury News’ Tim Kawakami on January 14. “It’s what you’ve got and how you take care of it. And if I’m complaining about $44 million over four years, then I’ve got other issues in my life.”</p><p>Curry’s statement <em>feels</em> authentic. Despite growing up in an NBA family, Curry’s success was never guaranteed as a <a href="https://n.rivals.com/content/prospects/2006/stephen-curry-13518">lightly-recruited</a> slight guard out of high school. Even after averaging 28.6 points per game as a junior at Davidson College en route to an unexpected run to the Elite Eight, the Minnesota Timberwolves infamously whiffed twice in the 2009 NBA Draft, electing for guards Ricky Rubio and Jonny Flynn in his stead. Curry proved valuable on the court for Golden State when healthy early in his career, but significant ankle injuries limited him to just 26 games in his third season. The Warriors’ decision to offer Curry $44 million — $16 million less than the four-year max available for a player of Curry’s experience — suddenly <a href="http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1391383-stephen-curry-contract-extension-is-risky-business-for-golden-state-warriors">appeared to some</a> as a potential overpay. After earning “just” over $12.7 million over his rookie contract, seizing $44 million provided Curry with life-changing money in case his ankles proved to be his <a href="http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/14750602/how-golden-state-warriors-stephen-curry-got-best-worst-ankles-sports">Achilles’ heel</a>.</p><p>Of course, the rest as they say is history. Since signing his deal, Curry has blossomed into a superstar, earning two MVP awards, four All-NBA selections, and four All-Star appearances, while playing 394 of 410 possible regular season games. During the Warriors’ <a href="http://www.cbssports.com/nba/news/comparing-the-warriors-three-year-run-to-other-great-nba-dynasties/">record-setting</a> three-year run culminating in their second championship, Curry has been the fulcrum to the team’s on- and off-court growth, revolutionizing the sport by proving positionless pace-and-space basketball can win titles, while providing Golden State the financial flexibility to assemble a burgeoning dynasty. Without Curry’s <a href="http://www.basketball-reference.com/contracts/players.html">82nd ranked</a> <a href="http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/c/curryst01.html">$12,112,359 2016–17 salary</a> as a consequence of the league’s unprecedented <a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/10/23/analyzing-and-improving-the-nbas-cba/">salary cap boom</a>, the Warriors never would have been able to add Kevin Durant last July after previously extending <a href="http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/t/thompkl01.html">Klay Thompson</a> and <a href="http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/g/greendr01.html">Draymond Green</a> to near-max contracts.</p><p>While most two-time reigning MVPs and NBA champions may not have been so humble to share the spotlight with another transcendent superstar, let alone serve as his team’s <a href="http://www.basketballinsiders.com/golden-state-warriors-team-salary/golden-state-warriors-salary-archive-201617/"><em>fourth</em></a> highest paid player, in reality, Curry never had the opportunity to demand a greater salary. The NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement <a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q61">restricts</a> players and teams from negotiating raises absent sufficient salary cap space. Thus, Curry and the Warriors could only negotiate a raise to last season’s figure up to the max, but at the expense of signing Durant. With <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/02/19/the-nba-all-stars-2017-players-that-earn-the-most-money-from-endorsements/#78f663f678f6">$35 million</a> in off-court endorsements and the likelihood of a five-year, $207 million max <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/stephen-curry-free-agent-contract-golden-state-warriors-2017-1">extension</a> looming after the season, the prospect of adding Durant justifiably exceeded Curry’s <em>need </em>for more money.</p><p>But what if in an alternate universe, Kevin Durant never came to the Warriors? What if, instead of approving an unprecedented massive cap spike, the Players Association acquiesced to <a href="http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/12461874/players-union-rejects-salary-cap-smoothing-historic-cap-increase-nba-set">salary cap smoothing</a>? In such a world, Golden State would have lacked the cap space to sign another impact player or reward their superstar. A California labor law, however, may have provided Curry with a rare opportunity to circumvent the CBA, opt out of the final year of his contract, and earn a substantial raise.</p><p>On January 4, sports law professor Nathaniel Grow wrote an <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/how-mike-trout-could-legally-become-a-free-agent/">article</a> on FanGraphs analyzing the impact of <a href="http://law.onecle.com/california/labor/2855.html">Section 2855</a> of the California Labor Code on baseball players’ potential free agency through the lens of Los Angeles Angels superstar outfielder Mike Trout. The “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/industry-lawsuit-dc-idUSN2329585820070824">De Havilland Law</a>” essentially provides individuals a right to void any contract for personal services in California exceeding seven years in length. Originally crafted as a public policy measure to protect actors from onerous agreements, the scope of “personal services” remains sufficiently broad to encapsulate professional athletes. In fact, California’s Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment <a href="http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0451-0500/ab_465_cfa_20070327_130510_asm_comm.html">considered passing a bill</a> in 2007 exempting MLB, NFL, and NBA franchises from Section 2855’s reach after the Los Angeles Angels feared their eight-year offer to free agent outfielder Alfonso Soriano would be void upon signing. Unfortunately for the leagues, the measure failed to pass, presenting players with a potential cause of action against their franchises for contracts exceeding seven years in California.</p><p>While the obvious application of Section 2855 covers contracts that explicitly exceed seven years in duration, Grow’s analysis of California court decisions suggests that the law also applies to both (i) agreements featuring a series of one-year renewable options tacking seven years or more (e.g., team options), and (ii) contract renegotiations and/or extensions. In 2001, a federal district court held in favor of boxer Oscar De La Hoya in <em>De La Hoya v. Top Rank, Inc.</em>, stating that a series of boxing contracts did not resemble separate agreements, but rather constituted a “continued, uninterrupted contractual relationship.” Top Rank appealed, but the parties settled out of court. Given the court’s favorable view toward employees, Grow discusses how <a href="http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/279512/employee+rights+labour+relations/Personal+Service+With+a+Smile+A+History+of+Californias+SevenYear+Rule">many California business require</a> their employees to spend one day “unemployed” every seven years to avoid triggering Section 2855.</p><p>Applied to the NBA, a player could theoretically elect to opt-out of his agreement with a California franchise after spending more than seven consecutive years with the organization. Since the NBA limits contracts to no more than five years, a player would likely have to rely on the tacking of options and subsequent extensions while still under contract. The typical player who could take advantage of Section 2855 would be one whose team exercises its third and fourth year team options on the player’s original rookie scale contract and subsequently agrees to extend the player before he reaches free agency. Other players may trigger Section 2855 if they re-sign with the same California franchise before hitting free agency, but such an opportunity remains less prevalent given the league’s restrictions on renegotiations and extensions. Teams also benefit from allowing their free agents’ contracts to expire (provided they maintain their “<a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q34">Bird Rights</a>”) so they may first utilize cap space to import outside free agents before re-signing their players and exceed the salary cap.</p><p>As such, a player in an analogous position to Curry at the end of the 2015–16 season represents the theoretical ideal plaintiff to test the California Labor Code loophole. As a first-round draft pick, Curry received a two-year contract with two subsequent one-year team options that were duly exercised. Before the expiration of his rookie scale deal, Curry and Golden State agreed to the now infamous four-year, $44 million extension. After the 2015–16 season, Curry completed his seventh season with the Warriors, satisfying the requisite period under contract to exercise his opt-out, despite having another year on his deal he otherwise would have to perform under, which he did.</p><p>By opting out, Curry would have been able to earn a $26,540,100 salary in 2016–17, instead of the $12,112,359 figure he inevitably received, with the opportunity to negotiate up to an additional four years with 7.5% annual raises, per the terms of the CBA. Curry, likely privy to the NBA and NBPA’s labor negotiations last year, probably would have negotiated for a two-year deal with an opt-out after the first year to take advantage of the <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/nba-new-contract-extensions-rule-2016-12">new CBA’s rules</a> for a max deal starting at 35% of the cap — the proposed five-year, $207 million extension — instead of 30% under the old rules. By triggering the opt out, Curry would technically become a free agent even if he intended to immediately re-sign, which would likely re-start the seven-year clock to take advantage of Section 2855 again.</p><p>Now, even if Curry was aware of the De Havilland Law last summer, there are several reasons why he nevertheless would have refrained from opting out of the final year of his extension. First, opting out would have dramatically lowered Golden State’s chances to sign Durant. By becoming a free agent, Curry’s cap hold would have risen from his salary of $12,112,359 to $21,604,493 (i.e., <a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q38">190%</a> of Curry’s 2015–16 $11,370,786 salary, the required calculation for a player who earned more than the league average salary the previous season), which would have counted toward the team’s salary cap to retain his Bird Rights. Carving out the requisite cap space to afford Durant would have necessitated moving Andre Igoudala ($11,131,368 2016–17 salary) without taking on more than a league minimum salary. Such a move probably would have been possible; rebuilding teams like the Nets had plenty of cap space with little use for it, and maybe could have squeezed a draft pick out of the Warriors for the trouble or at least turned Igoudala into one by flipping him elsewhere. Nevertheless, losing Igoudala would have dealt a significant blow to Golden State’s depth and defensive versatility. By opting out, Curry would have made assembling last year’s championship roster impossible.</p><p>The most likely reason Curry never would have been tempted to opt-out: Curry himself. Even if he was dissatisfied with his salary, as one of the faces of the league, Curry’s reputation would suffer greater harm by challenging the league for an additional $10 million. Unlike when he signed his $44 million deal, Curry’s off the court endorsements this past year dwarfed his NBA salary.</p><p>While Curry no longer remains a valid plaintiff, another player from one of California’s four NBA teams — the Warriors, Los Angeles Lakers, Los Angeles Clippers, and Sacramento Kings — could weigh the merits of a challenge. After next year, for example, Curry’s Golden State teammate Klay Thompson will have accrued seven years with the franchise. Like Curry, he would have one year remaining on his deal, for a sum of $18,988,725. Should league revenues continue to grow, Thompson would stand to make millions more by becoming a free agent.</p><p>No matter who first tests the California Labor Code loophole, the NBA would surely mount a significant legal challenge. The league has a vested interest in maintaining competitive balance and eliminating inequity among its franchises. (For this reason, professional sports leagues should also consider state tax-neutral salary cap regimes.) Although the league and players failed to consider Section 2855 in the latest iteration of the <a href="http://nbpa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf">CBA</a>, the NBA would likely maintain that its collectively-bargained provisions should take precedence over California’s protections. As Grow intimates, however, lack of precedent presents a compelling controversy; while Section 2855 has never faced a challenge from a unionized employee, the Supreme Court in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4369916011864768282&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr"><em>Livadas v. Bradshaw</em></a><em> </em>in 1994 held that federal labor law provided an employee basic protections, preempting the state labor commissioner’s deference to the provisions of an applicable CBA. Unlike the MLB, which experienced a joint Section 2855 challenge by Don Drysdale and Sandy Koufax in 1966, the NBA cannot easily settle a contract dispute given the league’s strict salary constructs; any supplemental compensation provided for via settlement would likely clash with a CBA contract provision. Prospective plaintiffs may ultimately find that the costs outweigh the benefits of pursuing litigation absent extraordinary circumstances.</p><p>As the NBA transitions to a new league year, the Warriors appear on the precipice of a modern dynasty. By staying the course, Steph Curry’s patience — and a little luck — provided the perfect storm to add Kevin Durant last July and exact revenge on the Cleveland Cavaliers this June. With two championships and perhaps more on the way, now Curry only needs to worry about counting his $207 million, and how to take care of it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=393ab779689f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Yankees-Betances Clash Highlights Arbitration’s Flaws in Efficiently Compensating Players]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prestonbarclay/yankees-betances-clash-highlights-arbitrations-flaws-in-efficiently-compensating-players-2fd25344f82?source=rss-69b3225fff90------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2fd25344f82</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arbitration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[yankees]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preston Barclay]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Mar 2017 07:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-18T00:57:28.318Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This article first appeared on the author’s sports business, legal, and analytics website, </em><a href="http://www.unsung-zeroes.com/"><em>Unsung-Zeroes.com</em></a><em>, on March 19, 2017.</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: I previously served as an intern with Dellin Betances’s agency, Excel Sports Management, discussed in the article.</em></p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Arbitration may theoretically be a form of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), but sometimes it becomes the very sword that parties seek to shield themselves from when electing to avoid a more contentious formal litigation.</p><p>After an <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2017/02/dellin-betances-loses-arbitration-hearing.html">arbitration panel ruled in favor</a> of the New York Yankees against their reliever Dellin Betances on February 18 regarding the pitcher’s salary for the 2017 season, Yankees’ President Randy Levine unleashed against the three-time All-Star for filing a sum that “<a href="https://twitter.com/BryanHoch/status/832992280164368384">had no bearings in reality</a>.” Betances, who sought a $5 million salary commensurate with “closers” in their first foray into arbitration, will instead earn $3 million next year, New York’s submitted value for an elite “set-up man” lacking a gaudy save total. Given Betances’s limited save opportunities behind Aroldis Chapman and Andrew Miller in New York during the young pitcher’s career, Levine <a href="https://twitter.com/BryanHoch/status/832992063838879744">characterized</a> the figure argued by the pitcher’s agents at Excel Sports Management as a “half-baked attempt” to “use a player to change a well-established market.” <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2017/02/dellin-betances-arbitration-case-and-the-value-of-closing.html">Advanced statistics</a>, however, suggest that Betances was one of the most effective relief pitchers in the game since his full season debut in 2014 and deserved a greater sum.</p><p>Naturally, the MLBPA’s Rick Shapiro and Betances’s agent Jim Murray <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2017/02/yankees-president-dellin-betances-arbitration-filing-had-no-bearings-in-reality.html">took exception</a> to Levine’s public comments in the wake of the arbitration, calling them an “absolute disgrace” and “reprehensible,” respectively. More importantly, Betances, a Bronx native, <a href="https://twitter.com/BryanHoch/status/833009721930027008">suggested</a> that Levine’s comments may make leaving the team “a little easier when the time comes” as a free agent following the 2019 season.</p><p>The public spat between the Yankees and Betances not only epitomizes the issue of relying on arbitration to peacefully resolve a conflict in a relationship intended to survive the dispute, but the details at the heart of the Betances case also suggest that the current arbitration system is ill-equipped to handle modern determinations of player value. Advanced baseball statistics since the dawn of the “Moneyball” era in the 21st century continue to outpace the courts in isolating the value of certain player outputs. Despite a better understanding of how certain statistical attributes contribute to team success, baseball’s arbitration system continues to rely on traditional numbers to determine salary figures. The doctrine of <em>stare decisis</em> — respecting and honoring legal precedent — serves as a vital tool ensuring stability and predictability in our legal and business system, but it can fall victim to both changing societal attitudes and scientific understanding. In baseball’s current system, adherence to precedent in trusting traditional statistics without placing significant weight on new age metrics does not efficiently allocate arbitration awards. The MLB and MLBPA should consider modifying its arbitration process to better incorporate modern statistics into determining player salaries.</p><p><strong>History of MLB Salary Arbitration</strong></p><p>In 2017, even the casual fan is well-aware of the role of arbitration in ameliorating sports disputes. The NFL’s utilization of the ADR method gained infamy in the wake of the “<a href="http://www.si.com/nfl/video/2016/04/25/deflategate-tom-brady-suspension-appeal-michael-mccann">Deflategate</a>” scandal given Commissioner Roger Goodell’s role as the “<a href="http://fordhamsportslawforum.com/nfl/why-the-nfl-should-re-consider-goodells-role-as-judge-jury-and-executioner/">judge, jury, and executioner</a>” in issuing and upholding a four-game punishment to New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady. Of course, Brady and the NFLPA challenged the scope of Goodell’s collectively bargained power in court, but ultimately lost on appeal in the Second Circuit.</p><p>For decades though, arbitration has served as the bargained for dispute resolution approach between leagues and players for addressing a variety of conflicts. While most high-profile sports arbitration cases involve performance enhancing drug use and player discipline, Major League Baseball also <a href="http://sabr.org/research/arbitrator-seitz-sets-players-free">utilizes binding arbitration</a> to adjudicate the salaries of a select class of players.</p><p>This was not always the case, however. For the first century of professional baseball, players and teams operated without a major labor agreement providing for basic player protections. Prior to the <a href="http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2008/11/24/668999/marvin-miller-and-the-how">formation of the MLB Players’ Association</a> (“MLBPA”) in 1953, players maintained little bargaining power to combat the league’s <a href="http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2008/12/3/678134/the-history-of-baseball-s">antitrust exemption</a>. While the <a href="https://www.baseballprospectus.com/compensation/cots/league-info/cba-history/">first Collective Bargaining Agreement</a> (“CBA”) between the owners and players in 1968 introduced new benefits, including minimum salaries, team-covered expenses, travel requirements, and, importantly, an independent arbitrator to decide labor disputes, it failed to eliminate the controversial “reserve” clause in player contracts. The <a href="http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2008/11/24/668999/marvin-miller-and-the-how">“reserve” clause</a>, which enabled teams to employ a player indefinitely with annual renewals, profoundly limited player freedom; while the team could trade the player to any other franchise, the player remained obligated to play for their contracted team to continue earning a living playing professional baseball.</p><p>In 1972, outfielder Curt Flood <a href="http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2008/11/26/670702/marvin-miller-and-the-how">challenged</a> the league’s antitrust exemption after the St. Louis Cardinals, his club for twelve years, traded him to the Philadelphia Phillies. Although the Supreme Court ultimately deferred to the league’s exemption in <a href="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/407/258.html"><em>Flood v. Kuhn</em></a>, the owners <a href="http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2008/11/24/668999/marvin-miller-and-the-how">anchored</a> their argument in the reserve clause as a collectively bargained benefit in the CBA, providing players the impetus to attack the clause in subsequent negotiations. In 1975, the players earned a <a href="http://sabr.org/research/arbitrator-seitz-sets-players-free">crucial legal victory</a> when arbitrator Peter Seitz determined that the reserve clause only allowed a team to renew a player’s contract once, rather than in perpetuity. Between the <em>Flood </em>case and Seitz’s arbitration ruling, the MLBPA garnered ammunition to continue chipping away at employment restrictions. After a lockout from spring training by the owners in 1976, the MLB and MLBPA <a href="http://sabr.org/research/arbitrator-seitz-sets-players-free">agreed</a> to grant veterans access to free agency.</p><p>While the players and owners continue to bicker over various labor provisions, the structure of the 1976 CBA remains largely intact. Today, players with more than six years of Major League experience maintain access to an <a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/12/23/new-mlb-cba-limits-team-building-creativity-as-owners-seize-greater-share-of-league-revenues/">uninhibited open market</a>. Players with less than six years, however, cannot freely negotiate with other teams unless their parent club releases them from their contract. During a player’s first three seasons, except certain “<a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/super-two/">Super Two</a>” players between two and three years’ experience, teams unilaterally control compensation under the same reserve clause concept, awarding either league minimum or close to league minimum figures. “Super Two” players and Major Leaguers with three to six years’ experience, however, are <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=2&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiKgP-fs7jSAhXCjFQKHfz-DMsQFggiMAE&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.law.tulane.edu%2FuploadedFiles%2FSports_Law%2FArbitration%2520Guide.pdf&amp;usg=AFQjCNHt1r8YSIhniN11KHPE5xIgc6I9Vg&amp;sig2=g">subject to salary arbitration</a>.</p><p>Unlike conventional arbitration, which invites arbitrators to independently determine an appropriate award within a range of submitted values, the <a href="http://www.sportingnews.com/mlb/news/mlb-salary-arbitration-process-breakdown-spring-training-2016/4jkawqkczi8i17cb4rhqjxseh">MLB’s Collective Bargaining Agreement</a> requires teams and players to submit “final offers” to a panel of three mutually agreed upon <a href="http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=15864">American Arbitration Association approved</a> arbitrators who must choose between the two figures. Article VI, Section E, Part 10 (a) &amp; (b) of the <a href="http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/4923509.pdf">2012–16 CBA</a> provides the types of evidence that may be introduced by either party:</p><blockquote><em>(a) The criteria will be the quality of the Player’s contribution to his Club during the past season (including but not limited to his overall performance, special qualities of leadership and public appeal), the length and consistency of his career contribution, the record of the Player’s past compensation, comparative baseball salaries, the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part of the Player, and the recent performance record of the Club including but not limited to its League standing and attendance as an indication of public acceptance (subject to the exclusion stated in subparagraph (b)(i) below). Any evidence may be submitted which is relevant to the above criteria, and the arbitration panel shall assign such weight to the evidence as shall appear appropriate under the circumstances. The arbitration panel shall, except for a Player with five or more years of Major League service, give particular attention, for comparative salary purposes, to the contracts of Players with Major League service not exceeding one annual service group above the Player’s annual service group. This shall not limit the ability of a Player or his representative, because of special accomplishment, to argue the equal relevance of salaries of Players without regard to service, and the arbitration panel shall give whatever weight to such argument as is deemed appropriate.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>(b) Evidence of the following shall not be admissible: (i) The financial position of the Player and the Club; (ii) Press comments, testimonials or similar material bearing on the performance of either the Player or the Club, except that recognized annual Player awards for playing excellence shall not be excluded; (iii) Offers made by either Player or Club prior to arbitration; (iv) The cost to the parties of their representatives, attorneys, etc.; (v) Salaries in other sports or occupations.</em></blockquote><p>Although long-winded, the process essentially involves comparing the player’s present case with previously adjudicated disputes, considering the player’s position, Major League service time, and statistical output. Given the zero-sum nature of baseball’s approach, the system actually succeeds in <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/02/23/whos-winning-the-mlb-salary-arbitration-game-heres-data-from-1974-to-2015/2/#57c93f05391c">encouraging settlement</a> between most players and teams subject to arbitration. Often, teams and players <a href="http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/arbtracker2017">settle at or close to the mid-point</a> between the submitted figures. Resolving a case like Dellin Betances’s, however, remained close to impossible given wildly divergent views on the value of the player and the role of precedent.</p><p><strong>Yankees v. Betances: Exhibition in Miscalculated Player Value</strong></p><p>Although Levine and the Yankees versus Shapiro, Excel, and Betances made for a compelling story-line, the case itself presented an opportunity for a seismic shift in arbitration player valuation. To a certain extent, Levine’s criticism of Excel “us[ing] a player to change a well-established market” has some validity (ignoring that arbitration is <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2017/02/dellin-betances-arbitration-case-and-the-value-of-closing.html">not actually</a> a “market,” but rather a restriction on a free market). The statistics at the heart of arbitration disputes have <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/dellin-betances">remained static</a> for four decades, with “saves” the primary driver of compensation for relief pitchers (conveniently, the statistic’s <a href="http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Save">origin</a> aligns with the advent of salary arbitration in 1969).</p><p>Since a team’s best relief pitcher has traditionally served as its “closer,” saves have served as a proxy of a reliever’s value. Large save totals, however, are dependent on <a href="http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=8060">opportunity</a>; to record a significant number of saves, a pitcher not only relies on his teammates to consistently provide leads, but he also needs his <a href="http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-flawed-importance-of-the-closer/">manager</a> to elect for him to end the game. Fostering a compensation system reliant on saves penalizes players who have quality teammates who may usurp save opportunities. In New York, Betances suffered from sharing a bullpen with Aroldis Chapman and Andrew Miller, who, with Betances, <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/leaders.aspx?pos=all&amp;stats=rel&amp;lg=all&amp;qual=y&amp;type=8&amp;season=2016&amp;month=0&amp;season1=2014&amp;ind=0&amp;team=0&amp;rost=0&amp;age=0&amp;filter=&amp;players=0">paced the league</a> in Fangraphs’ <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/library/misc/war/">Wins Above Replacement</a> (“WAR”) all-encompassing context-neutral value metric over the past three seasons. Betances only received regular save opportunities after the Yankees traded Chapman and Miller to the Cubs and Indians, respectively, at last summer’s trade deadline.</p><p>Further, teams no longer prioritize closers in the free agent or trade market. During the 2014–15 offseason, the Yankees signed Miller to a four-year, $36 million deal, despite recording <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=6785&amp;position=P">only one save</a> in his career. Miller’s $36 million guarantee <a href="http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2015-mlb-free-agent-tracker">ranked second</a> among all free agent relievers that offseason, eclipsing the years, average salary, and total guarantee given to established closers Koji Uehara, Francisco Rodriguez, Sergio Romo, Jason Grilli, and Huston Street. After earning 36 saves with New York in 2015, Miller, like Betances, deferred to Chapman for save opportunities in 2016 yet nevertheless brought the Yankees a <a href="http://www.si.com/mlb/2016/07/31/yankees-indians-andrew-miller-trade-clint-frazier">significant trade package</a>. This offseason, fellow non-closer Brett Cecil (<a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=2660&amp;position=P">11 career saves, none in 2016</a>), received a four-year, $30.5 million contract from the St. Louis Cardinals. Cecil’s $7.75 million 2017 salary places him <a href="http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/rankings/relief-pitcher/">eleventh</a> among all relief pitchers. Teams <a href="http://nypost.com/2016/02/11/death-to-the-save-new-thinking-guides-mlb-bullpen-revolution/">continue to invest</a> significant resources into relievers with limited closing experience.</p><p>The market reflects a changing consensus in how teams consider utilizing their best relief pitchers. After acquiring Miller, Cleveland Indians manager Terry Francona prioritized using his new reliever in <a href="https://theringer.com/the-indians-are-reshaping-how-we-think-about-relievers-912a2b4bbaef#.qx2pgvccz">higher leverage situations</a> as early as the fifth inning during the 2016 postseason. Expecting teams to radically depart from standard roles <a href="http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=29490">remains less likely</a> over the course of a long season and Miller’s experience in several roles with both the Yankees and Indians may prove to be an exception. Nevertheless, managers have been <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/baseball-managers-are-getting-smarter-about-handling-their-bullpens/">increasingly more efficient</a> in placing their better pitchers in more important situations. Change in baseball remains notoriously slow, but bullpen use and the market for relievers’ services continues to trend away from the save.</p><p>As an elite “set-up” man, Betances represented the ideal plaintiff to challenge arbitration’s archaic reliance on saves to dictate relief pitcher compensation. New York, who signed Miller to a lucrative deal with only a single save to his name, appeared particularly ripe for a challenge; Betances and his agents at Excel could frame the Yankees’ saves-based argument as hypocritical. In siding with New York, however, the arbitration panel maintained antiquated precedent despite <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2017/02/dellin-betances-arbitration-case-and-the-value-of-closing.html">other metrics</a> indicating that Betances deserved his petitioned for salary. In addition to leading the league in WAR over the previous three seasons, Betances <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2017/02/dellin-betances-arbitration-case-and-the-value-of-closing.html">outpaced</a> every other relief pitcher in the context-based <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/library/misc/wpa/">Win Probability Added</a> (“WPA”) statistic since his debut. Ironically, Betances’s Yankees teammate Chapman <a href="https://twitter.com/dougdirt24/status/832996619457019905">earned</a> a $5 million arbitration settlement after his third season in 2014, despite pitching fewer innings (Chapman’s 198 2/3 to Betances’s 254 2/3), recording fewer strikeouts (324 to 404), earning a higher earned run average (“ERA”) (2.40 to 2.16), recording a higher walks and hits per innings pitched average (“WHIP”) (1.02 to 1.00), and a higher <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/library/pitching/fip/">fielding independent pitching</a> (“FIP”) average (2.27 to 2.06) compared to Betances over their first three years in the Majors. Chapman only materially edged Betances in saves (77 to 22). Without saves driving arbitration awards for relief pitchers, Betances would have earned a far superior sum.</p><p><strong>Considering Alternatives to the Current System</strong></p><p>Betances’s loss highlights the current arbitration system’s inefficiency in appropriately rewarding players in tune with modern valuation methods. While the save has largely been dismissed as an effective evaluative tool, it nevertheless remains highly dispositive in the arbitration setting. In order to properly align performance and compensation, Major League Baseball and the MLBPA should consider modifying its dispute resolution approach for players ineligible for free agency.</p><p>Among possible options, the MLB and MLBPA could consider adopting a new approach, such as traditional litigation or mediation, or modify the current arbitration method. In a disagreement over a player’s salary, however, litigation makes little sense. A jury trial not only increases costs for both parties, but the threat of litigation may force players to settle for smaller figures. Teams maintain deeper pockets to stomach legal costs and thus retain greater leverage over players if the league transferred to a formal litigation approach. Salary disputes also fail to present a novel legal question that traditionally benefit from civil litigation; disagreements instead remain premised in the importance of certain facts and statistics, which can be argued in an arbitration in front of experienced judges. Mediation also offers limited value since it fails to provide parties finality. While mediation encourages settlement, the current system already incentivizes compromise.</p><p>The MLB and MLBPA can modify the arbitration system by either departing from the “final offer” approach and introduce judicial discretion in awarding salaries through “conventional arbitration,” reset the statistical calculus that serves as the foundation for determining awards, or a combination of the two. Conventional arbitration invites greater judicial authority to depart from relying on traditional statistics and give greater deference to modern metrics. Instead of choosing a winner influenced by a wealth of precedent, arbitrators would not be as wedded to their previous decisions. While arbitrators may not be as willing to award a player like Betances an outright victory, they may nevertheless choose a sum closer to his petitioned value than the team’s conservative figure in a conventional arbitration. Over time, new cases may elevate salaries faster and more efficiently than the current zero-sum approach.</p><p>Despite its advantages, however, conventional arbitration may reduce settlements and increase costs. Arbitrator discretion may “chill” negotiation and limit compromise if the parties trust that the panel will produce a result at least close to the mid-point. Final offer arbitration, on the other hand, <a href="http://www.dir.ca.gov/chswc/BasebalArbFfinal.htm">promotes settlements</a> as both parties hope to avoid uncertainty. According to law professor and former baseball arbitrator <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Money-Pitch-Baseball-Agency-Arbitration/dp/156639774X">Roger Abrams</a>, in an arbitration “[w]inning means being more reasonable, which is the key that unlocks the door to settlement.” During the <a href="http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/arbtracker2017">2016–17 offseason</a>, 189 players were eligible for arbitration with only 29 avoiding settlement before submitting arbitration values. Of those 29, 15 proceeded to arbitration with teams winning eight cases and players prevailing in seven hearings. In the <a href="http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/arbtracker2016">2015–16 offseason</a>, 34 of 183 eligible players filed arbitration figures with only four hearings.</p><p>Although successful at producing settlements, the players nevertheless remain constrained by inefficient precedent that prevents aligning a player’s worth with his salary. Since the mid-point of submitted arbitration salaries drives agreements, settlements remain tied to the same statistical flaws evidenced in the Betances case. Arbitration can also <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/kevin-keirmaier-and-the-continuing-problem-of-arbitration/">depress the value</a> of long-term extensions for players whose skill-sets traditionally fare poorly in arbitration. While players ultimately agree to such pacts, it is often difficult to resist life-changing money when the arbitration process will not adequately reward them. Teams are also electing to avoid tendering contracts to players who project to earn significant arbitration salaries that the free agent market no longer rewards. Arbitration is not only inefficient in allocating salaries commensurate with player value, but also no longer benefits any class of player. Teams will only tender contracts to players who will provide them surplus value.</p><p>The MLBPA thus should fight to re-calibrate the statistical calculus to emphasize modern metrics and ensure that its members are more fairly compensated. A purely formulaic approach reliant on new age statistics may provide greater efficiency in awarding salaries consistent with player values, but it may also resemble an overly rigid approach that fails to incorporate nuance and a player’s intangible value. Players may also oppose being dehumanized and reduced to their statistics. Instead, the MLBPA should seek to amend the CBA to include a comprehensive list of metrics that should be considered by arbitrators in place of traditional statistics. The system should still enable players and teams the opportunity to advance sophisticated arguments and evidence, but any new CBA negotiation must expressly provide arbitrators the authority to base their decisions in statistics such as WAR or WPA and diminish the role of prior precedent reliant on traditional statistics like saves. While changes to arbitration may increase team payroll, owners should agree to such concessions to avoid future contentious labor disputes and to foster good will with their players, which may provide an intangible value in future contract negotiations. At the very least, adopting changes to arbitration will enable teams to avoid a public relations nightmare experienced by Levine and the Yankees.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Despite a game revered for its steep tradition as the “national pastime,” salary arbitration should embrace the statistical revolution. Since the dawn of “Moneyball,” teams and agencies alike have contributed to an arms race of statistical analysis to not only gain a competitive advantage over their respective competitors, but also against each other in contract negotiations. The Yankees’ signing of non-closing relief pitcher Andrew Miller to a lucrative contract demonstrates that teams increasingly value new-age metrics over traditional statistics in the free agent market. To adequately compensate athletes who provide the greatest impact to their teams, the MLB and MLBPA must reconsider their compensation approach for players subject to salary arbitration.</p><p>“Final offer arbitration” remains the best method to encourage compromise, but it must be reconfigured to jettison old-school statistics from controlling salary awards. The MLB and MLBPA would mutually benefit from encouraging a system that mirrors the market reality based in advanced metrics. Arbitration remains naturally adversarial, but by tweaking the system, teams and players may be able to enhance their relationships, rather than tarnish them. For the Yankees and their hometown star Dellin Betances, however, the wounds from their public war of words may be beyond repair.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2fd25344f82" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[New MLB CBA Limits Team Building Flexibility as Owners Seize Greater Share of League Revenues]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prestonbarclay/new-mlb-cba-limits-team-building-flexibility-as-owners-seize-greater-share-of-league-revenues-ec374861ecdc?source=rss-69b3225fff90------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec374861ecdc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preston Barclay]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2016 08:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-18T00:59:39.389Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This article first appeared on the author’s sports business, legal, and analytics website, </em><a href="http://www.unsung-zeroes.com/"><em>Unsung-Zeroes.com</em></a><em>, on December 23, 2016.</em></p><p><em>Click </em><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1AoWs3bR6FrREKvI14EIsX9EKjkjdUrxXMbT3RS8QM9o/pubhtml"><em>here</em></a><em> for more information regarding league payrolls, revenues, franchise valuations, amateur signing figures, and more discussed in this article.</em></p><p><strong><em>Introduction</em></strong></p><p>“Labor peace” is a fragile concept. While the MLB’s owners and players have agreed to and subsequently ratified a <a href="http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/18272683/mlb-owners-ratify-labor-deal-29-1-tampa-bay-rays-voting-against">new five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement effective through 2021</a>, the league’s latest iteration of the CBA more closely resembles a temporary cease fire with a major showdown likely waiting at its expiration. With major concessions from the MLBPA, including significant restrictions on access to compensation for both domestic and international amateurs and more severe penalties for teams surpassing only a moderately increasing luxury tax threshold, owners are set to unilaterally capitalize on expected continued league-wide revenue growth, <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2016/12/05/mlb-sees-record-revenues-approaching-10-billion-for-2016/#3cb7adb31845">exceeding $10 billion in 2016</a>, throughout the term of the agreement.</p><p>The players should be applauded for ultimately avoiding a work stoppage and implementing several <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2016/11/30/breaking-down-mlbs-new-2017-21-collective-bargaining-agreement/2/#332dc0393d1f">socially proactive measures</a>. The new agreement’s progressive changes include bans on certain hazing activities, limits on the prevalence of smokeless tobacco, team-funded sports psychiatrists and translators, improved nutrition programs, four additional in-season off days to ease the grind of the season, a stronger domestic violence policy, and greater long-term benefits for retirees (e.g., pensions, healthcare, etc.). Despite these advances, however, the deal lacks few substantive financial victories for the MLBPA while losing ground on several crucial negotiating points.</p><p><strong><em>MLBPA Modest Victory: Change to the Free Agent Qualifying Offer System</em></strong></p><p>The strongest benefit for players in the new agreement involves changes to the <a href="https://unsungzeroes.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/">free agent qualifying offer and draft pick compensation rules</a> by drastically <a href="https://unsungzeroes.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/">limiting the opportunity cost</a> to sign another team’s free agent. Instead of sacrificing a first round selection (or a second round choice if the team owned a top ten pick), the new CBA provides for a more <a href="https://apnews.com/41de5400e505440cba0478fbac8a6ee4/MLB-players,-owners-reach-tentative-labor-deal">complicated determination</a> of the draft pick cost based upon the signing team’s financial standing when signing a player who rejected a qualifying offer from his previous employer. If a small market club who receives revenue-sharing signs such a player, it must sacrifice its third highest selection. At the other end of the spectrum, a team that exceeds the luxury tax threshold must surrender its second and fifth highest draft choices and $1,000,000 in international amateur signing bonus money. Any team that neither receives nor pays the luxury tax must relinquish its second highest selection and $500,000 in international money. Since teams can no longer spend freely on draft picks, the <a href="https://unsungzeroes.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/">opportunity cost to sign a free agent who turned down a qualifying offer is dramatically reduced</a>, increasing the market for such a player’s services. Further, players may now only be offered a qualifying offer once during their careers and have ten days, as opposed to seven, to consider accepting an offer extended to them from their previous employer.</p><p>Under the new CBA, teams losing free agents figure to receive lesser compensatory draft selections, which should also benefit players. Previously, teams received a draft pick following the first round for losing players extended qualifying offers. Now, only teams that lose players who sign contracts valued in excess of $50 million will continue to receive picks after the first round; if under $50 million, the team will either receive a draft selection after the “Competitive Balance B Round,” occurring after the second round, or after the fourth round if the team exceeded the luxury tax. Since fewer teams will surrender higher picks or receive high end compensatory selections, the incentive to retain a pending free agent is reduced. Instead, a team may elect to trade the player during the season to earn a better return if they are out of playoff contention. Players ultimately benefit by likely earning better opportunities to contend for championships, while also eliminating the possibility of receiving a potentially market-altering qualifying offer after the season. Like under the previous CBA, players who are traded mid-season cannot receive qualifying offers from their new franchises.</p><p><strong><em>Other Modest MLBPA Win: Decreasing Minimum Disabled List Time from 15 to 10 Days</em></strong></p><p>During negotiations between the players and owners, several roster structuring proposals presented opportunities for more players to earn valuable Major League service time and access to greater compensation.</p><p>A hallmark in the league for the <a href="http://sports.yahoo.com/news/the-inside-details-from-baseballs-fascinating-new-cba-082559072.html">past 50 years</a>, the players and owners successfully negotiated a change to the minimum time a player must spend on the disabled list from 15 to 10 days. After introducing the seven-day concussion disabled list in the previous CBA, the league recognized the benefit of a more flexible disabled list structure to protect players and enable greater roster flexibility. By decreasing the length of the normal disabled list stint, players with minor ailments may now be more receptive to being placed on the disabled list, allowing teams to more readily call up minor leaguers and protect their normal active roster players from further injury. If a team has an off day and does not anticipate needing a fifth starter during a ten day span, it may also decide to place a pitcher on the disabled list to gain an extra position player or reliever. Since players on the disabled list continue to earn Major League salaries, more players may have access to the prorated major league minimum salary, providing an additional benefit for fringe players who would otherwise earn a lesser salary in the minors.</p><p>Despite service time gains through changes to the disabled list, the players missed another opportunity to provide more players access to the league’s coffers. The league and players reportedly <a href="http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/report-mlb-is-likely-to-increase-roster-size-from-25-to-26-players-in-2017/">considered adding a 26th player</a> to the active roster throughout the season, but ultimately decided to retain the traditional 25-man structure. Even if the sides agreed to create an additional roster spot, such a solution may not have presented additional service time for the players given changes to the September 40-man roster system. In conjunction with adding an additional full-time position throughout the season, MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred stated that any change would simultaneously involve a reduction in September rosters when teams may expand their rosters up to 40 players. Transitioning to a 28-man roster in the final month of the year would provide the same net amount of service days throughout the course of the year as the current 25 and 40-man system retained in the agreement. Thus, while the league considered increasing roster sizes throughout the year, theoretically increasing the number of service days available (and access to Major League minimum salaries), it would do so to limit the 40-man system. By keeping the current system, the league retained the same net number of service days represented on the active roster throughout the year while failing to curtail the <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/expanded-rosters-exacerbate-baseballs-biggest-issue/">flawed September call-up system</a>.</p><p><strong><em>International and Domestic Amateurs Continue to Suffer Signing Bonus Suppression</em></strong></p><p>Despite certain gains, the MLBPA failed to protect the next generation of professional players by capping signing bonuses for both domestically drafted players and international amateur free agents. Rather than embrace a free market to pay prospects, as is available for veteran free agents, the MLB has dramatically curtailed teams from offering market-value signing bonuses in the last two CBAs, with the latest changes particularly restricting.</p><p>In the <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/rule-changes-in-the-international-market/">previous agreement</a>, the MLB instituted a tax regime penalizing teams for eclipsing predetermined bonus “pools” that varied inversely with team records (i.e., the worst team the previous season would receive the largest pool the following year). If a team exceeded its pool by 0–5%, the league required the team to pay a 75% tax on the overage; if 5–10% in excess, a 75% tax on the overage plus a ban on signing any international amateur free agent for more than $500,000 in the subsequent year. If a team rose above its pool by 10–15%, it had to pay a 100% tax with the same maximum signing bonus ceiling and if over the bonus pool by more than 15%, a 100% tax and a ban on signing a player for more than $250,000 the following year. For premier prospects like Yoan Moncada, the highlight of this winter’s Chris Sale trade, the <a href="http://m.mlb.com/news/article/110016130/red-sox-agree-to-terms-with-cuban-infield-prospect-yoan-moncada/">Red Sox spent $63 million</a> in 2015 to employ his services, with half of the sum devoted to the tax, while accepting the year ban on signing players for over $250,000. In previous regimes, Moncada likely would have received more than the $31.5 million signing bonus he garnered from the Red Sox since the team was willing to shell out an additional $31.5 million in taxes plus the opportunity cost of signing other significant prospects the following year.</p><p>Under the new CBA, a deal like Moncada’s is no longer possible. Although every team will start with $4.75 million next year (with up to an additional $1 million available for small market teams awarded “competitive balance” draft picks), exceeding <a href="http://www.baseballamerica.com/international/2016-17-international-slot-values-and-bonus-pools/#H0oFhZ3xxBM5cfMF.97">last year’s median</a> of close to $2.5 million, teams are subject to a “<a href="https://twitter.com/JeffPassan/status/804499749504172032">death penalty</a>” for circumventing the rules and exceeding their bonus pools. Teams <a href="https://twitter.com/JeffPassan/status/804393251784495106">may trade</a> their full allotment, but may only receive up to 75% more than their original sum. Thus, a team may only acquire close to $10 million to spend on international amateur free agents next season. Further, the new bonus limits <a href="http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/why-the-new-cba-will-keep-japanese-phenom-shohei-otani-from-coming-to-mlb/">now apply</a> against international players 25 years and under, up from 23 in the previous CBA, which may inhibit fans from seeing 22-year-old Japanese sensation Shohei Otani for several more years. While players remained <a href="http://sports.yahoo.com/news/the-inside-details-from-baseballs-fascinating-new-cba-082559072.html">adamant about avoiding an international draft</a> throughout negotiations, they may have inadvertently created a worse system for Latin American <a href="https://nacla.org/article/baseballs-exploitation-latin-talent">prospects and communities</a>, particularly elite prospects.</p><p>The MLBPA also failed to alleviate spending caps on the domestic amateur draft. Like with international free agency, the <a href="http://www.hardballtimes.com/major-league-spending-trends-the-draft-bonus-pool/">previous agreement</a> instituted a tax system on draft spending, a departure from the previous unrestricted system that permitted a free market for negotiating signing bonuses with amateur players selected in the draft. In the 2012 CBA, each draft pick through the first ten rounds received a particular slot value with teams allocated the sum of their selections to spend on their selections in the first ten rounds. Anticipating a loophole, any player signed for more than $100,000 after the first ten rounds would have the portion of his bonus exceeding $100,000 count against the team’s pool. The penalty system also paralleled the international regime: (1) for spending 0–5% over its bonus pool, a team would pay a 75% tax on the overage; (2) for spending 5–10% over, a 75% tax plus the loss of a first round pick in the following year’s draft; (3) if 10–15% over, a 100% tax plus the loss of a first and second round pick in the subsequent draft; and (4) if greater than 15% over their spending limit, a 100% tax and the loss of two consecutive first round picks.</p><p>Given the <a href="https://unsungzeroes.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/">surplus value of premium draft selections</a>, the system proved to be a success in limiting the cash spend on amateur players. Under the 2012 agreement, teams were willing to spend the tax, but unwilling to cross the 5% threshold and surrender draft picks. Although the MLB anticipated that similar tax systems on domestic and international amateur talent acquisitions would adequately suppress the same sort of behavior, the international free agent system incentivized teams to blow past their spending limits to maximize their talent pull in one year before signing penalties kicked in the following year. Essentially, teams were willing to forego signing the international equivalent of a first round pick in one year if they were able to acquire multiple first round talents the previous year, an unavailable tactic in the traditional draft setting. Further, teams also sought less legitimate means to skirt international signing restrictions during their penalized year; the Red Sox, for example, <a href="http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/red-sox-penalized-over-2015-international-signings-what-it-means-and-what-to-know/">paid several international players</a> represented by the same agent a similar bonus capped at their maximum signing limit, while instructing the agent to redistribute the money to pay certain players more than they were allowed.</p><p>While the league felt the need to reform the international system, the domestic draft only received modest changes in the latest iteration of the CBA, none of which particularly benefits the players. In the new agreement, the slot values of top picks have been reduced and spread more uniformly throughout the draft. Although teams at the top of the draft have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/sports/baseball/creative-spending-benefits-the-astros.html?_r=0">utilized their position</a> to spend less on top selections to overspend on talented players later in the draft who slipped due to signing demands, deflating the slot value of the top picks <a href="https://unsungzeroes.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/">further widens the gap</a> in the value top picks provide their franchises compared to the cost to sign them. Ultimately, the amateur talent acquisition process in the new CBA continues to artificially suppress compensation that would otherwise be available to players in a free market.</p><p><strong><em>Stricter Luxury Tax, Boost in League Revenue Likely to Lead to Wealth Disparity Between Players and Owners</em></strong></p><p>With more money withheld from amateurs, Major League veterans theoretically stand to profit from the remaining resources; however, a more punitive luxury tax, combined with <a href="http://www.espn.com/blog/sweetspot/post/_/id/76926/winning-is-harder-when-everyone-is-smarter">shrewder front office decision-making</a>, will allow owners to capture the fruits of league-wide revenue gains.</p><p>Major League Baseball’s greatest difference from other major professional sports leagues remains its prohibition against a salary cap. Often presented as the <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/469877/why-should-applaud-baseballs-allpowerful-players-union">world’s strongest players’ union</a>, the MLBPA deserves credit for empowering its players with full access to the league’s teams as potential buyers for their services. Unlike other leagues that provide either hard salary caps (e.g., NFL and NHL) or soft caps supplemented with a progressive tax system (e.g., the NBA), the MLB ultimately remained a true free market until the advent of its <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlbs-evolving-luxury-tax/">own luxury tax</a> in 1997. As <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/the-mlbpa-has-a-problem/">Fangraphs’ Nathanial Grow discussed</a>, however, the institution of a luxury tax, designed to help foster competitive balance by limiting the spending habits of the league’s richest franchises through progressive tax regimes, inevitably harms the players’ access to a free market. By agreeing to the luxury tax, the players introduced a weapon for the owners to limit the players’ share of revenue.</p><p>While <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1AoWs3bR6FrREKvI14EIsX9EKjkjdUrxXMbT3RS8QM9o/edit#gid=1261707315">internal calculations</a> based on payroll data from Cot’s Contracts and league revenue data from Forbes suggest that the players have obtained approximately 46.4% to 48.3% of league revenues from 2013 to 2015, changes to the luxury tax framework in the new CBA combined with continued optimism surrounding the growth of the <a href="http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/01/19/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/MLB-owners.aspx">league</a> and its <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2016/03/03/mlb-advanced-media-projected-revenues-to-be-1-1-1-2-billion-in-2016/#32017cea7236">business ventures</a> suggest that this estimate will drop. Since the integration of the league’s progressive tax regime, the <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlbs-evolving-luxury-tax/">luxury tax threshold</a> has increased at a slower rate than the growth of revenue. With more resources at their disposal, more teams have crossed the luxury tax threshold and implicated its punitive penalties. Beginning in the 2002 agreement, the league has charged first time luxury tax offenders a 17.5 to 22.5% penalty on each dollar spent over the threshold, 30% for second time offenders, and 40% for teams that exceed the threshold for three or more consecutive years. In 2012, the league added an additional tier, a 50% tax for four-time offenders.</p><p>In the <a href="http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2016/12/mlb-mlbpa-agree-to-new-collective-bargaining-agreement.html">newest agreement</a>, the penalties for exceeding the tax threshold are far more punitive. For first, second, and third-time offenders, the league now charges tax rates of 20%, 30%, and 50%, respectively. In addition, teams that spend $20–40 million over the limit must pay an additional 12% tax on all overages, while teams that exceed it by $40 million may be taxed up to 90% on sums exceeding the threshold and also have their first draft selection fall ten spots in the subsequent draft (unless the team selects in the top six, in which case their second pick drops ten positions), sacrificing additional <a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/">incremental value</a>.</p><p>Teams now remain heavily incentivized to comply with the new tax regime. Although the league still allows teams to control their payroll spend, the luxury tax now functions as a <em>de facto</em> salary cap, exacerbated by the premium on crossing the $40 million threshold implicating a draft penalty. In the previous agreement, teams demonstrated a willingness to spend significant taxes while noticeably less interested in harming their access to amateur talent. Although teams sacrificed draft picks to sign certain free agents, teams maintained greater flexibility to recover through the international amateur market. For teams to exceed the luxury tax by over $40 million, they must value the free agent as a difference maker. Since teams can no longer overspend in either the domestic or international amateur market, teams will likely remain apprehensive to implicate new penalties.</p><p><strong><em>Searching for New Team Building Techniques</em></strong></p><p>While teams previously maintained the freedom to invest in international free agents, the domestic draft, and veteran free agency, the new CBA provides far stronger restrictions to creative team building and fostering sustainable winning franchises. In the past, rebuilding organizations may have elected to allocate their resources on premium prospects by spending more in the amateur channels, while major market franchises could focus on established veterans. With caps in place, both franchise building models must find new solutions and identify inefficiencies to create a competitive advantage.</p><p>Given the caps on amateur spending, talent evaluation and development remains as vital as ever. Although teams face perilous restrictions on paying actual on-field talent, organizations remain free to spend on scouts, coaches, developers, and front office personnel with successful track records or innovative approaches to identifying talent. Engineering young and cheap talent remains the most efficient model to creating sustainable winning teams.</p><p>Since most teams have yet to trigger luxury tax penalties, they may be able to continue to use the free agent market to supplement their current and future rosters. For teams intent on rebuilding without significant expectations for contending, they may be able to offer aging veterans higher than market one-year offers hoping to utilize the players as valuable trade chips to contenders at the trade deadline for prospects. Further, the trading franchise may elect to continue paying the veteran’s salary to help the contending team avoid the tax while potentially returning a greater prospect haul. The free agent market thus may serve as an indirect channel to build an organization’s farm system and acquire young talent.</p><p><strong><em>Conclusion</em></strong></p><p>The new CBA presents an interesting challenge and opportunity for Major League front offices, but the players may have engineered the greatest challenge for themselves. While we should celebrate five more years of labor peace, a more punitive luxury tax regime ultimately restricts players from realizing the benefits they originally expected by limiting amateur compensation. If the league continues to grow as anticipated, the players may seek to challenge the owners for fundamental changes to the league’s labor structure in 2021.</p><p><em>Click </em><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1AoWs3bR6FrREKvI14EIsX9EKjkjdUrxXMbT3RS8QM9o/pubhtml"><em>here</em></a><em> for more information regarding league payrolls, revenues, franchise valuations, amateur signing figures, and more discussed in this article.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec374861ecdc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Analyzing and Improving the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prestonbarclay/analyzing-and-improving-the-nbas-collective-bargaining-agreement-ab47735e9009?source=rss-69b3225fff90------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab47735e9009</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kevin-durant]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preston Barclay]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Oct 2016 07:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-18T01:01:27.095Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This article first appeared on the author’s sports business, legal, and analytics website, </em><a href="http://www.unsung-zeroes.com/"><em>Unsung-Zeroes.com</em></a><em>, on October 23, 2016.</em></p><p><em>Click </em><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1g0anzQDJ9XqOePzcPYicB3uB6b8LT_dYH4HN16OgVNE/pubhtml"><em>here </em></a><em>to view the salary proposals discussed in this article.</em></p><p><strong><em>Introduction</em></strong></p><p>Kevin Durant’s departure from Oklahoma City to Golden State may not represent the NBA’s most significant paradigm shift in 2016. Amidst reports of ongoing labor discussions between the NBA and the NBPA, Commissioner <a href="http://www.nba.com/article/2016/10/09/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-confident-cba">Adam Silver</a> and NBPA Executive Director <a href="http://www.cbssports.com/nba/news/michele-roberts-union-nba-hope-to-announce-new-cba-by-end-of-season/">Michele Roberts</a> remain optimistic of coming to terms on a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) before either party may opt-out of the current deal December 15.</p><p>With massive media deals exponentially elevating league-wide revenues, players and owners remain incentivized to avoid a work stoppage and continue their prosperous relationship. Unanticipated revenue growth, however, has enabled relatively synonymous players at the end of their contracts the opportunity to seize upon a surging salary cap, while superior players locked into long term deals cannot earn raises. Stars like Steph Curry and John Wall, for example, have witnessed lesser teammates obtain more lucrative contracts without the opportunity to capitalize on the sizable salary cap increase themselves.</p><p>While these players earning millions of dollars hardly deserve the sympathy of the average fan, the influx of funds has created imbalanced classes while enabling players that reach free agency the ability to control the league’s competitive climate. Without the salary cap’s expansion this offseason, Kevin Durant would not have been able to join the Western Conference’s two-year reigning champion. Parity in the NBA is threateningly low with few realistic championship contenders.</p><p>Herein lies the conflict: players seek to retain their true “free agency” — not simply their ability to ultimately decide their cities of employment, but rather the maximization of lucrative options. Given suppressed salary caps in the past, most franchises operated above the soft cap line and were unable to offer free agents market value deals while limited to various exceptions to offer veterans opportunities. Now, cap spa­ce provides more teams with the ability to make competitive offers to free agents.</p><p>Owners, on the other hand, wish to limit outside opportunities ­for their free agents through devices like restricted free agency and higher maximum contracts. By restricting free agency options, owners hope to retain more of their players, decrease volatility in their franchise’s year-to-year competitive outlook, and reduce the risk of the creation of “super teams” and a subsequent reduction in parity.</p><p>Ultimately, the exponential increase in league revenues provides a unique opportunity to develop a creative solution that benefits all parties. By avoiding a work stoppage and finding an adequate resolution, the NBA may be able to seize upon the NFL’s ratings decline and emerge as the preeminent professional sports league in the world.</p><p><strong><em>Defining and Distributing Basketball Related Income (“BRI”)</em></strong></p><p>The greatest challenge to sports labor negotiations remains defining sharable revenue and dividing such revenue between franchises who orchestrate a league’s business affairs and players who represent the source of entertainment. In 2011, the NBA and players suffered losses <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2011/11/16/nba-lockout-costs-league-800-million-and-counting-players-justified-to-fight-in-courts/#59fbe9a12379">estimated over $800 million</a> when they were forced to sacrifice a fifth of the 2011–12 season while negotiating a division of Basketball Related Income (“BRI”). The owners ultimately <a href="http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/page/CBA-111128/how-new-nba-deal-compares-last-one">won the stalemate</a>, increasing their share from 43% of BRI in the 2005 agreement to approximately 50%.</p><p>Fortunately, new executive leadership and booming revenues, namely the league’s <a href="http://deadspin.com/what-the-nbas-insane-new-tv-deal-means-for-the-league-a-1642926274">nine-year, $24 billion media rights deal</a> with ESPN and Turner, appear to have healed the scars from the previous contentious negotiation. The league and players <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2016/10/13/lebron-union-prioritizes-help-for-retired-players-in-talks/92022170/">have reportedly agreed</a> to maintain a 50–50 distribution of revenue, providing optimism that a new agreement is imminent. Given the league’s current health and <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogergroves/2015/12/12/why-the-nba-will-eventually-overtake-the-nfl-in-popularity-and-why-it-matters/#22e3bb9f5309">international upside</a>, an even split represents a smart compromise for both parties; owners are turning profits while players continue to earn the most lucrative contracts in professional sports.</p><p>New revenue streams, however, present challenges to defining BRI in the next CBA. While BRI has been rather <a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q12">all-encompassing</a>, players should seek as expansive a definition as possible to account for new opportunities like <a href="http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/15210151/nba-jerseys-carry-advertisements-beginning-2017-18">jersey advertisements</a> and the advent of future digital mediums that may market NBA content. Commissioner Adam Silver estimates that jersey advertisements may provide an additional $100 million per year into the NBA’s revenue portfolio, which should effectively provide $50 million more a year to the players per the BRI percentage split (i.e., an increase in each team’s salary cap by about $1.67 million).</p><p>Although the NBA’s aggressive revenue grab provides players a tangible economic benefit, certain advertisements may be problematic for players with potentially conflicting endorsement deals. Unlike the NFL, which controls in-game player apparel, NBA players can market and capitalize off of shoe deals that remain immune from revenue sharing. In the 1980s, Michael Jordan and agent David Falk pioneered basketball shoes as an overwhelmingly lucrative industry through the launch of <a href="http://hypebeast.com/2016/2/inside-michael-jordans-deal-with-nike">Air Jordan</a>. Since, star players have partnered with an array of brands for personal shoe deals approaching or <a href="http://www.si.com/nba/2016/05/17/lebron-james-nike-deal-contract-one-billion">eclipsing the value of their playing contracts</a>. The league’s partnership with Nike, which provides for the company’s trademark “swoosh” on jerseys, creates conflict for athletes not sponsored by the brand. Further, athletes that pursue outside endorsement opportunities may have deals with companies that operate in the same industry as others partnering with teams to advertise on jerseys. While new endorsement deals will likely contain carve outs for jersey advertisements, players may nevertheless lose certain opportunities. Jersey advertisements may also cause players to unintentionally breach current relationships. Players must seek protection from the league against any claims and should insist on a greater share of income from jersey advertisements due to sponsorship cannibalization.</p><p><strong><em>Balancing Player Pay: Renegotiations, Extensions, and Increasing Minimums &amp; Exceptions</em></strong></p><p>While most big picture issues relating to the pool of money available to players appears settled, skyrocketing salary cap figures have caused an imbalance of wealth among the players. The CBA’s restrictions against renegotiating long term contracts has presented several awkward situations where a team’s franchise player earns far less than his teammates, simply due to the timing of each player’s free agency (e.g., Washington Wizards star John Wall will earn an average of $16.78 million over the next three seasons while his backcourt teammate Bradley Beal signed a five-year deal averaging $25.43 million per year this offseason).</p><p>The next CBA must allow teams greater freedom to renegotiate raises for players under contract. Currently, teams may only <a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q61">renegotiate</a> with players if the franchise maintains ample cap space and the player originally signed a deal for four or more years. Further, the parties cannot start negotiations until after the third anniversary of the contract’s signing. Providing added flexibility creates benefits for both players and teams: (1) players who deserve a greater share in the expanding cap space can receive wages closer to their market worth; (2) more players may receive opportunities for longer term contracts, providing security against injury risk; (3) teams may be able to retain their talented players, especially if the “hometown” team can offer a greater portion of the salary cap than their competitors (Kevin Durant may never have left Oklahoma City if the franchise was allowed to offer him a lucrative extension several seasons ago); and (4) teams may avoid awkward internal dynamics if players receive salaries more closely aligned with their value to the team and the market for their services. Since teams may eclipse the salary cap to sign certain free agents (e.g., a team’s own player with Bird Rights or unrestricted free agents through “mid-level,” veteran, and other exceptions) teams should be able to exceed the cap to offer extensions to players they would otherwise possess Bird Rights to if the player was a free agent. In such a scenario, the Wizards could offer Wall a max deal that would allow Wall to earn more money closer to his market value while the team would be protected by keeping him under contract for a longer term. Further, <a href="https://theringer.com/washington-wizards-john-wall-bradley-beal-6124b39352a1#.sia0mguys">team chemistry issues</a> may be mitigated.</p><p>The league’s expanding salary cap has also created disparaging imbalances among player classes. While the previous CBA provided certain players with fixed salaries (e.g., rookie salary scale, veteran minimums, other free agent exceptions), other player contracts only remain restricted by certain max percentages of the salary cap. As a result, teams have utilized newfound cap space to sign players to disproportionately exorbitant deals while other players, namely veterans who may not command long term pacts given their limited upside and inevitable downside, miss out on the cap openings and can only be signed with fixed over-the-cap free agency exceptions. Rookies also experience pre-determined fixed contracts. While free agent contracts have escalated, certain veterans and rookies cannot negotiate a compatible increase. Tying exceptions and the rookie scale to a percentage of the salary cap in the next CBA would enable all classes of players to prosper off of any future unanticipated revenue growth.</p><p>While it is easy to sympathize with players unable to access greater wealth because of fixed salaries, a fixed system limits downside risk in the event league revenue plateaus or declines. Just within the past five years, the league experienced stagnant revenue growth in the wake of the lockout — the 2011–12 and 2012–13 salary caps were each $58.044 million, while negligibly increasing to $58.679 million in 2013–14. Although the league continues to experience high growth, the looming threat of the <a href="http://deadspin.com/is-the-live-sports-rights-bubble-finally-bursting-1774516030">burst of the cable bubble</a> may depress future media deals. Several factors, however, suggest that the NBA likely will not experience a decline in revenue any time soon, including: (1) the likelihood of the avoidance of a labor dispute; (2) sports remaining the only true “must watch” live content on television (funneling advertisers to sports); (3) <a href="http://www.stats.com/industry-analysis-articles/london-calling-nba-continues-global-expansion-on-and-off-the-court/">international growth</a>; and (4) a <a href="http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/08/31/future-of-football-nfl-safety-concussions">beckoning NFL decline</a> (due to <a href="http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/04/18/nfl-concussion-lawsuit-settlement-retired-players">concussions</a>, other injuries, and <a href="https://theringer.com/nfl-tv-ratings-crisis-81fd9dbd53a#.liqepnhu8">declining fan interest</a>). Despite league-wide optimism for continued growth, players should nevertheless seek to carve-out minimum “worst case scenario” salary floors while tying the upside to percentages of the salary cap.</p><p><strong><em>Other Roster Structuring Changes: Higher Max Salaries, Qualifying Offer Draft Pick Compensation, Elimination of Restricted Free Agency</em></strong></p><p>While all players deserve greater access to the league’s financial boon, teams and players alike may benefit through a modification of the league’s max salary system and the fostering of a free agent compensation model. In the current climate, teams receive only modest advantages to retain their free agents. For players who have not changed teams via free agency for either two or three years (known as “Early Bird” and “Larry Bird” free agents, respectively), the player’s original team may offer <a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q25">incremental 7.5% salary raises</a> while opposing teams may only provide 4.5% increases. Teams with “Larry Bird” rights on their players can also offer a fifth guaranteed year while all other players can only sign four year pacts in unrestricted free agency.</p><p>With the cap rising at a rate in excess of max raises, however, many <a href="http://www.cleveland.com/cavs/index.ssf/2016/07/lebron_james_the_godfather_of.html">elite players</a> have elected two-year deals with a first-year player opt-out to maximize their returns and maintain flexibility. As a result, a player’s original franchise no longer retains an advantage over their opponents to re-sign their free agents. Greater cap space also provides players with additional outside opportunities.</p><p>For added protection, teams should be able to offer their free agents higher max salaries than other franchises while also receiving draft pick compensation for losing high level free agents. Depending on <a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q16">whether a player qualifies</a> for a max salary of 25%, 30%, or 35% of the cap, the original franchise should be able to offer a “super-max” deal up to an additional 5% of the cap to their own players. Unlike current protections, teams would maintain an advantage immune from year-to-year cap fluctuations. For added flexibility, the NBA should also install a draft pick compensation system similar to those present in the <a href="http://overthecap.com/the-basics-and-methodology-of-projecting-the-nfls-compensatory-draft-picks/">NFL</a> and <a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/draft-pick-compensation/">MLB</a>. In such a model, the downside to losing free agents would be partially mitigated by adding an asset. Unlike the NFL system, however, teams should not automatically collect draft picks for losing free agents; draft pick compensation should be relegated to teams intent on retaining their players. Baseball’s compensation model, on the other hand, requires teams to propose “qualifying offers” to their free agents to receive draft picks, but forces teams signing free agents to relinquish high selections. MLB’s system thus <a href="https://unsungzeroes.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/">may depress the market</a> for certain free agents. The NBPA would likely avoid such a scenario in any agreed upon draft pick compensation model.</p><p>While the NBA Draft remains a <a href="http://www.82games.com/nbadraftpicks.htm">top-heavy avenue</a> for acquiring talent, allocating teams supplemental draft picks between the first and second rounds nevertheless provides value and flexibility to franchises. In practice, an NBA compensation system should follow the NFL’s “net” pick system where a team can only earn selections if they lose more free agents than they sign from competitors. For veterans, qualifying offer values should be set at a high enough level (e.g., $20MM+) to deter teams from offering contracts to relatively innocuous free agents; compensation should only be provided to teams losing stars.</p><p>Likewise, the NBA should terminate <a href="http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q44">restricted free agency</a> and include players completing their rookie deals not signed to long term extensions into the draft pick compensation system. Players currently subject to restricted free agency witness their markets plummet as teams avoid tying up their cap space into players whose deals may be matched by their original franchises. Instead, players should have unfettered access to free agency while teams can acquire a valuable asset for losing a talented young player. Ultimately, a free agent draft pick compensation model may be mutually beneficial for teams and players.</p><p><strong><em>Protecting the Bottom Tier: Retirement Compensation, Supporting the D-League &amp; Two-Way Contracts</em></strong></p><p>When LeBron James and Chris Paul joined the NBPA as the preeminent active player representatives, some <a href="http://www.si.com/nba/2015/02/15/lebron-james-nbpa-chris-paul-adam-silver-lockout-cba">worried</a> that the interests of the league’s elite may override those of the common player. Without substantial check from lower tiered veterans, James and Paul could leverage their influence into higher maximum salary cap percentages, leaving less money available to other players. With escalating salaries providing less of an impetus to effect change to the max salary compensation model, James and Paul instead appear poised to use their platform to advocate for those less represented in the players’ labor negotiations with the owners. As a compromise for refraining from battling for an increased share in BRI, the NBPA and NBA have <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2016/10/13/lebron-union-prioritizes-help-for-retired-players-in-talks/92022170/">reportedly agreed</a> to new league-funded educational and health programs for retired players.</p><p>In addition to advocating for their predecessors, James and Paul should aid the next wave of players by supporting a quality minor league system through two-way contracts, team-specific affiliates for all 30 franchises, and a D-League salary cap. While sacrificing a limited sum of money, injecting more money into the D-League will (1) allow more quality players opportunities state-side (presenting the D-League as a viable alternative to opportunities abroad currently able to offer far superior compensation); (2) allow players to effectively help their parent franchises; (3) provide added team flexibility and injury protection; and (4) proactively <a href="http://www.baseballamerica.com/news/major-league-baseball-scores-win-minor-league-litigation/">avoid wage-related litigation</a> experienced by the MLB. By developing a robust minor league system, the NBA may also seek to expand its draft to three rounds. As the NCAA continues to <a href="https://unsungzeroes.wordpress.com/2016/09/28/obannon-expanding-ncaa-student-athlete-rights-of-publicity-and-foreshadowing-the-downfall-of-amateurism-law-review-note/">combat challenges</a> to its payment scheme (or lack thereof), a substantive D-League may offer basketball players an enticing alternative to earn money while in their athletic primes and unable to earn a return in college.</p><p>Although the league is strongly considering <a href="http://sports.yahoo.com/news/sources-nba-players-association-push-closer-to-new-cba-224612785.html">two-way contracts</a> for the 16th and 17th players on the roster (similar to the NHL’s system where players earn an elevated salary when called up to the parent club and a lower salary in the minors), the league and players should extend two-way contracts up to the 20th player, which represents each team’s roster limit during the offseason. Over time, the NBA should extend the two-way contract system to comprise an entire NBDL roster, which would enable for maximum roster flexibility and opportunities for players.</p><p>Of course, the biggest downside to building out a competitive minor league system remains the cost to support D-League expansion and increased pay. For the 2016–17 season, each D-League franchise will be limited to a <a href="http://upsidemotor.com/2016/07/15/nba-d-league-salary-money/">salary cap of $209,000</a>, with player salaries set at either $19,500 or $26,000 (not including players sent down from their parent franchises). While staggeringly low, the D-League itself cannot support higher pay without a better brand of basketball to entice fans. Foreign teams can attract quality players with salaries often beginning in the <a href="http://sportsagentblog.com/2012/07/30/nba-d-league-vs-european-basketball-why-dont-more-players-go-to-europe/">six figures</a>. Although it may not be tenable to support salaries at that level initially, the NBA should still raise minimum salaries to not only entice players but provide them a living. A salary cap of $1,000,000 and minimum minor league salaries of at least $50,000 may bring more quality players state-side with the appeal of the NBA dream. Determining who will subsidize the development of the D-League remains problematic, but owners and players may be able to agree to “split the baby” to fund player salaries without substantially impacting their bottom lines. If the league wants to develop a competitive minor league system that can train and produce quality players for the NBA, it needs to invest greater resources and subsidize its expansion.</p><p><strong><em>Increasing Competitive Basketball: In-Season Tournaments &amp; Cutting Pre-Season Games</em></strong></p><p>Limited parity presents the league with potential problems in fostering consistent interest throughout the regular season. With <a href="http://www.nba.com/gmsurvey/2016">rival executives unanimously expecting</a> Warriors-Cavaliers Part III, the league needs to seek creative opportunities for added year-long intrigue.</p><p>One such proposal includes adopting an in-season, single-elimination <a href="http://www.cbssports.com/nba/eye-on-basketball/24623552/Notre%20Dame%20RB%20Tarean%20Folston%20tears%20MCL,%20out%20for%20season:%203%20things%20to%20know">knockout tournament</a> akin to the English Premier League’s FA Cup. Creating another competition enables each team an additional opportunity to “win” each year; a mid-tier team that otherwise faces long odds to win the NBA Finals may be able to win such a tournament given the volatility of single contests.</p><p>The league should utilize the opportunity to foster regional rivalries by hosting preliminary rounds within divisions or other geographic dividers. A hypothetical “Red Auerbach Cup” could pit eight northeastern rivals in a single-knockout competition, advancing to face the winner of a supposed “Larry Bird Classic” in the Midwest. Regional tournaments breeding into a national competition could incense already bitter rivalries. Clubs gunning to win the NBA Finals may also strategically utilize the knockout tournament as a chance to develop young players in a competitive environment while resting stars. By playing tournament games at specified dates throughout the season, early elimination may provide teams with additional rest during the season-long grind.</p><p>By adding a potentially exciting play format at the expense of preseason contests, players would not necessarily be subjected to additional games or an earlier season start date. While the regular season would likely start earlier, the NBA may be able to eliminate back-to-backs to provide additional opportunities for rest. Any losses of preseason contests would likely be offset by more lucrative competitive games; sponsors may be attracted to the tournament’s unique format, which could also be used to fund prize money for the winner and incentivize all teams to compete for the tournament title.</p><p><strong><em>Conclusion</em></strong></p><p>Over the past few years, the NBA has experienced exponential growth and remains in position to continue its global ascension. Problems predominantly relating to competitive balance and inequitable player pay, however, present an opportunity to tweak the CBA to find a creative and balanced solution to maximize the interests of both the players and owners.</p><p>In the next CBA, the NBA and NBPA should (1) include an expansive definition for BRI; (2) protect players against endorsement losses resulting from conflicting jersey advertisements; (3) consider more expansive time for contract renegotiations and extensions; (4) align rookie scale and free agent exceptions with certain percentages of the salary cap; (5) allow teams to re-sign players at higher max salaries; (6) provide free agent draft pick compensation; (7) eliminate restricted free agency; (8) create two-way contracts; (9) invest in the D-League and raise minimum NBDL salaries; and (10) develop an in-season knockout competition similar to the English Premier League’s FA Cup.</p><p>With the distribution of BRI largely settled, the NBA and NBPA appear poised to continue its prosperous relationship indefinitely.</p><p><em>Click </em><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1g0anzQDJ9XqOePzcPYicB3uB6b8LT_dYH4HN16OgVNE/pubhtml"><em>here </em></a><em>to view the salary proposals discussed in this article.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab47735e9009" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Valuing MLB Free Agent Qualifying Offers: The Opportunity Cost of Surrendering Draft Picks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@prestonbarclay/valuing-mlb-free-agent-qualifying-offers-the-opportunity-cost-of-surrendering-draft-picks-583c151f5c5b?source=rss-69b3225fff90------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/583c151f5c5b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-agency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Preston Barclay]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jul 2016 07:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-18T01:06:58.969Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This article first appeared on the author’s sports business, legal, and analytics website, </em><a href="http://www.unsung-zeroes.com/"><em>Unsung-Zeroes.com</em></a><em>, on July 22, 2016.</em></p><p><em>Click </em><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17a1PoVN99bv6dn0vt8D0Qg6LBrASfSgttElhu82FtJU/edit?usp=sharing"><em>here </em></a><em>to view the qualifying offer valuation model and play with the assumptions and variables discussed in this article.</em></p><p>In sports, “free agency” is generally a fallacy. While free agent professional athletes ultimately select their future employers, collectively bargained salary cap structures and other related rules — designed to enhance competitive balance — restrict their freedom. Among a variety of complex rules, the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement caps their stars’ earning potential at a maximum percentage of the salary cap, while also enabling a player’s previous employer the ability to offer a higher percentage than any other team. The NFL offers a different obstacle restricting player movement by allowing teams to designate one of their free agents as their “franchise player,” forcing the player to either come to terms on a long term deal or accept a one-year tender with that franchise. Salary caps and other collectively bargained rules prevent free market opportunities.</p><p>Baseball remains the lone major American professional sports league immune from the restrictions of a salary cap. After six years in the MLB, players are free to sign with the highest bidder for their services and teams may spend as much as they want to assemble their MLB rosters.</p><p>Despite this freedom, the 2011 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement provides for other measures to foster competitive balance. Instead of players primarily bearing this burden like in the NBA, NFL, or NHL (ignoring the sums major market franchises sacrifice in revenue sharing), the MLB has promulgated spending rules with significant financial and organizational penalties for transgressions. For teams that spend over the league’s designated “competitive balance tax” threshold ($189MM in 2016), for example, teams must surrender accelerating sums for each consecutive year spending in excess.<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>The CBA also equips teams with the option to offer their free agents a one year “qualifying offer” tender valued at the average salary of the top 125 players in the league. If accepted by the player, the team retains the player at a relatively high salary ($15.8 million last offseason). If rejected, the player becomes a free agent and the team receives a sandwich pick in the subsequent MLB draft. The eventual signing team, however, must surrender their first round pick if it falls outside the top ten selections (or their second round pick if the team owns a top ten pick).</p><p>While the previous CBA also required surrendering draft picks to sign premier free agents, teams without their first or second round selections could elect to overspend recommended signing bonuses later in the draft to acquire premium prospects that fell due to exceptional demands. Now, however, teams also face significant penalties for exceeding their bonus pools, including the loss of future draft picks if egregious. Organizations face similar restrictions for exceeding international bonus pools and may not be able to sign elite international free agents in the next or multiple signing periods.</p><p>Since the 2011 MLB CBA restricted draft and international free agent spending, teams now have finite opportunities to add young talent to their organizations. Given these severe restrictions, surrendering one of the few avenues to acquire talent is costly; with fewer quality prospects to supplement the Major League roster, franchises must spend greater resources on the free agent market to piece together a quality team. Since homegrown products provide their organizations with cheap labor, each draft pick maintains a certain amount of surplus value. Teams that express a willingness to sign free agents who turned down qualifying offers must also include this figure when considering the overall cost to the organization. This article seeks to quantify that cost.</p><ol><li><strong>Draft Pick Productivity: Average WAR Under Team Control</strong></li></ol><p>In order to properly value draft picks, we must first determine the performance (in terms of Wins Above Replacement) that players at each draft selection provide their franchises while under team control. Given the significant amount of time it would take to catalog the production of decades of draft classes, I elected to defer to outside sources to provide a formula of the average WAR produced by players at each draft choice through the first six years of their Major League career (before they hit free agency) to isolate the typical value provided to the drafting franchise.</p><p>After presented with several alternatives, I proceeded with a formula determined by the Hardball Times’ Matthew Murphy<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn2">[2]</a>, who calculated the average WAR provided by the 1991–2005 draft classes. While his sample remains limited to 15 years, it operates under the assumption (analyzed by Chris Cwik on Sports on Earth<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn3">[3]</a>) that the most recent draft classes provide a better predictive measure into future draft classes than earlier years given the influx of greater resources devoted to identifying amateur talent. Compared to older classes, improved information has made the draft more efficient in funneling the best players to the top of the draft. Future draft classes should only further demonstrate such efficiency since new draft restrictions limit the ability for top prospects to fall in the draft due to signability concerns. While ordering previous draft classes by signing bonuses may prove a more effective measure, such an undertaking would be more difficult to compile and the draft likely serves as a strong proxy for such regardless.<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>An alternative formula developed by Sky Andrecheck<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn5">[5]</a> analyzes a greater sample of draft classes, which ultimately provides lower expected WAR values for top selections. As Murphy discusses, however, Andrecheck’s model, while limited in describing the value by top picks, is actually more accurate in predicting the actual WAR of picks toward the end of the first round. The following graph provides the actual WAR generated by each draft position (blue) with Murphy’s model (green) and Andrecheck’s model (red) superimposed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/467/0*oyLOINspwkYI12lX." /></figure><p>An important caveat to this analysis remains the potentially false assumption that “average” represents the best measure of draft pick value. While it requires further research, the average WAR of each draft position is significantly higher than the median; most draft picks do not reach the Majors, while stars serve as outliers raising the average. The median WAR may therefore serve as a better predictive measure. For the purposes of this study, however, I elected to proceed with Murphy’s approach as the most accurate third party representation of draft pick value.</p><p><strong>2. Present Value of Draft Pick WAR</strong></p><p>While we have a model providing for the expected total future WAR of each draft pick while under team control, utilizing such as our tool for calculating its monetary worth ignores time-value concepts (i.e., a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the future, assuming normal inflation). A team may receive 14 WAR from the first pick, but they do not receive that benefit for several years, which is likely spread over the six-year period a player remains under team control. For the purposes of this analysis, I assumed that players typically require three years in the minor leagues before reaching the Majors to start to realize their worth to the team; however, the assumption may be manipulated on the attached spreadsheet. Further, I assumed a 5% discount rate on future seasons, as advocated by FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver while writing for Baseball Prospectus in 2005<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn6">[6]</a>. This value, too, may be altered to produce different results in the spreadsheet; for example, a rebuilding team may not value present wins as significantly as future wins, while others seeking to compete in 2016 may value them more.</p><p>The present value formula must also consider when a player will produce WAR for the team; it would likely be wrong to conclude that the average rookie and average five-year veteran provide the same performance to a team. In analyzing the value that top prospects provide their franchises (a similar type of analysis as the one conducted here), Kevin Creagh and Steve DiMiceli of Point of Pittsburgh discovered that most players produce about 2/3 of their team control WAR during their final three years before reaching free agency (while proceeding through arbitration).<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn7">[7]</a> For this reason, I allocated 1/9 of the total average WAR to each of the first three years of a player’s career, and 2/9 to each of the player’s latter three years (1/3 total to the first three years, 2/3 total for the last three). These percentages of total WAR may be changed in the spreadsheet if a better study exists.</p><p><strong>3. WAR Valuation</strong></p><p>A now-common measure in evaluating the value in a free agent signing remains a comparison of the cost of the signing with the WAR the player is expected to produce over the term of his contract. Retroactive analyses of the WAR received in contracts (e.g., Matt Swartz<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn8">[8]</a>) as well as forward-looking models based on projection tools (e.g., Dave Cameron<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn9">[9]</a>) have generated a variety of valuations that inflate each season. As part of the 2013 Diamond Dollars competition, I calculated a “$/WAR” value of slightly north of $7 million with a 5.5% growth rate (and closer to $8 million for players tied to draft pick compensation). With a variety of valuation techniques, the $/WAR figure may be changed in the spreadsheet as seen fit, but I assumed Dave Cameron’s $8 million 2016 assumption.</p><p>The $/WAR figure demonstrates the amount of money teams pay for wins on the open market, their only unrestricted access to talent. Theoretically, if the team knew they would receive exactly 2 WAR for one season from a rookie or veteran free agent, all else held equal, they would not discriminate in who they would seek to sign. Thus, we can use the free agent $/WAR figure as a proxy to determine the value a player under team control provides the team. By multiplying the present-value net WAR described above, we can determine the average value a player selected at each pick will provide its team (“Gross Val. WAR” in the spreadsheet).</p><p>While I utilized a flat $/WAR figure for this analysis, future models may include a $/WAR growth factor to account for $/WAR inflation. Assuming a player reaches the Majors in three years, the $/WAR of a hypothetical 2 WAR season in his rookie season may be valued higher in the future. Assuming teams continue to spend more per win each season, the value of a draft pick may actually be greater than the current model suggests.</p><p><strong>4. Cost of a Player While Under Team Control</strong></p><p>Although we have determined the value a team provides his team over his six years under team control, we must also account for the costs to employ the player. There are four basic costs paid to the player that must be added together to provide the net total cost: (a) the signing bonus paid upon signing, (b) pre-arbitration salary (generally paid the first three years in the Majors), (c) arbitration salary (paid in the fourth, fifth, and six seasons after reaching the Majors), and (d) minor league salary prior to reaching the Majors.</p><p><em>Signing Bonus</em></p><p>While teams often pay different bonuses than the recommended “slot” figures, given the aforementioned strict penalties on exceeding draft bonus pools, the slot value assigned to each draft pick serves as an adequate proxy for this figure.</p><p><em>Pre-Arbitration Salaries</em></p><p>For the first three years of a Major League player’s career, he makes close to the league minimum salary of $500,000 (estimated at $500,000, $510,000, and $525,000, respectively, in the spreadsheet). While Matthew Murphy’s valuation dismisses these costs since all players must earn this salary while on a Major League roster anyway,<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn10">[10]</a> I have elected to include it since the minimum figure is not discounted in most (if not all) $/WAR valuations. Although a theoretical replacement level player assumes a league minimum salary, the salary remains a cost of employing the player and receiving the value of his services.</p><p>Given that WAR production has been discounted (and thus discounting the player’s value provided to the team in the model), the costs must also be discounted. Since the discounted WAR valuation is part of the formula for calculating arbitration costs (see below), such costs have already been discounted. The signing bonus, however, does not need to be altered since it is presumably paid immediately upon acquiring the player. Alternatively, the pre-arbitration salaries must be reduced since they are paid four, five, and six years following the player’s signing (assuming the player takes three years to reach the Majors and start receiving such figures).</p><p><em>Arbitration Salaries</em></p><p>After three years, a player normally enters arbitration where he starts to earn salaries closer to what he would earn on the free agent market for the last three years he remains under team control. Matthew Murphy’s analysis revealed that players in their first year of arbitration on average earn 28% of their market value, 37% of their market value in their second year, and 62% of their market value in their final year of arbitration. Creagh and DiMiceli alternatively propose 40%, 60%, 80%, respectively. While I elected to incorporate the latter’s structure into the spreadsheet, those figures may be manipulated.</p><p>To determine the total arbitration cost, we first take the net “Gross Val. WAR” and multiply it by the percentage of WAR accumulated during arbitration (may be manipulated as mentioned above, but default at 2/3) to isolate the value generated to the team during the player’s arbitration years. Since the player earns less than his market value during arbitration, however, we must then multiply the arbitration value by the net percent of market value between the three years. To appropriately align a player’s performance with his salary, the model actually multiplies the percentage of WAR accumulated in a particular season (i.e., 2/9) with the respective year’s salary market rate percentage. Given that the default model attributes equal WAR percentages among the three arbitration years, it has the same result as simply adding the percentages together and multiplying by the average arbitration market rate. Should the team elect to distribute different WAR percentages to each season, it may affect the draft pick values.</p><p><em>Minor League Salaries</em></p><p>Minor league salaries are not irrelevant, but they are miniscule compared to other costs. The spreadsheet agrees with Murphy’s model in ignoring minor league salaries in the cost calculation.</p><p><strong>5. Surplus Value: Worth of a Draft Pick/Qualifying Offer</strong></p><p>To complete the analysis, we simply subtract the net costs found in the above Section 4 from the WAR valuation in Section 3, which provides the net surplus of each draft pick — the average value of a draft pick. Depending on where the team selects in the following June’s draft, a franchise can adequately consider the additional cost in signing a high end free agent. A deal that appears to represent a bargain based on a simple $/WAR calculation may actually represent a below market deal given the value of the surrendered pick. Lesser tier free agents attached to qualifying offers may see their markets dramatically reduced.<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p><strong>6. Additional Important Consideration: Draft as a Zero Sum Game</strong></p><p>While we have focused on the direct cost of surrendering a draft pick, it also enriches other franchises. When a team relinquishes their pick, the team losing the free agent gains a selection between the first and second rounds. Further, each selection between the location of the original pick and the new added selection increases in value equivalent to the difference between its new spot in the order one pick higher and its previous selection. For example, if a team loses the 20th pick for signing a free agent attached to a qualifying offer, every team below them and above the new selection moves up one position in the draft. Another team originally picking 27th would now pick 26th, and would thus obtain approximately $150,000 in additional value because of the higher selection.</p><p>Ultimately, the new draft pick compensation system resembles a zero sum game. Regardless of who owns each selection, the number of selections remains constant; thus, for a team to lose value, at least one team must gain that value. While I have been wrestling with how to value this reciprocal gain — considering whether to simply double the value — it ultimately depends on other, more difficult to quantify, circumstances, specifically the teams set to gain from the pick changing hands and incremental selection modifications. For example, signing a free agent away from a division rival may provide an obvious significant benefit for the signing team, but the rival gains the value of the draft pick — surely a team would prefer a team in the opposite league to obtain the selection instead. While the signing team would merely dismiss this as the cost of business of acquiring a key player from a rival, it nevertheless provides their rival a potentially significant benefit.<a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p><strong>Conclusion: How Much is a Qualifying Offer Worth?</strong></p><p>Given the aforementioned parameters and assumptions, the model provides for the following first round pick values:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/348/0*OrHMSealJTnpwAZD." /></figure><p>The major takeaway? Depending on where a team is projected to pick in the first round, it must consider the opportunity cost of signing a player who turned down a qualifying offer when determining an appropriate offer for the player. For example, a team picking 14th overall should recognize that a $40 million offer effectively costs them $50 million in value.</p><p>Likewise, free agents facing a qualifying offer must scrutinize their position in the free agent market. While top tier free agents will not see their markets suffer, the average free agent should reconsider turning down a qualifying offer if their salary demands plus the the opportunity cost to signing them exceeds their projected $/WAR performance.</p><p>Ultimately, teams and players can both make better informed decisions by understanding the economic significance of qualifying offers.</p><p><em>Click </em><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17a1PoVN99bv6dn0vt8D0Qg6LBrASfSgttElhu82FtJU/edit?usp=sharing"><em>here </em></a><em>to view the qualifying offer valuation model and play with the assumptions and variables discussed in this article.</em></p><p>Endnotes:</p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Teams that exceed the threshold must pay a 17.5% tax on each dollar over the limit. If they eclipse that figure two years in a row, they must pay a 30% tax; three years in a row, 40%; and four years and above, 50%. <em>See </em><a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/luxury-tax/">http://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/luxury-tax/</a>.</p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Formula: y = 14.055x-.481 <em>See </em><a href="http://www.hardballtimes.com/how-much-is-a-draft-pick-worth-in-2014/">http://www.hardballtimes.com/how-much-is-a-draft-pick-worth-in-2014/</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/75214320/major-league-baseball-draft-success-improving-baseball-america#!Ok8l0">http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/75214320/major-league-baseball-draft-success-improving-baseball-america#!Ok8l0</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Analyzing the correlation between draft position and signing bonus remains beyond the scope of this article, but it can be reasonably assumed that there is a strong correlation.</p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Formula: y = 12.03x-.52 <em>See </em><a href="http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/2009/06/draft_picks_and.php">http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/2009/06/draft_picks_and.php</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <em>See </em><a href="http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4368">http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4368</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <em>See </em><a href="http://www.thepointofpittsburgh.com/how-much-an-mlb-prospect-is-worth-updated-trade-surplus-values/">http://www.thepointofpittsburgh.com/how-much-an-mlb-prospect-is-worth-updated-trade-surplus-values/</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <em>See </em><a href="http://www.hardballtimes.com/methodology-and-calculations-of-dollars-per-war/">http://www.hardballtimes.com/methodology-and-calculations-of-dollars-per-war/</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <em>See </em><a href="http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/win-values-explained-part-six/">http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/win-values-explained-part-six/</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="http://www.hardballtimes.com/the-net-value-of-draft-picks/">http://www.hardballtimes.com/the-net-value-of-draft-picks/</a></p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Stephen Drew, Kendrys Morales, and Nelson Cruz, among others, would agree.</p><p><a href="https://unsung-zeroes.com/2016/07/22/mlb-qualifying-offer/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> One such example: in order to sign Orlando Hudson in 2009, the Dodgers relinquished the pick used by the Diamondbacks to select A.J. Pollock.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=583c151f5c5b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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