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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kelvin Qihindas on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Great Labour Market Reset: How AI, Geopolitics, and the End of the Aid Era Are Reshaping…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/the-great-labour-market-reset-how-ai-geopolitics-and-the-end-of-the-aid-era-are-reshaping-8226e2d22a7d?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 23:01:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-13T23:01:25.359Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Great Labour Market Reset: How AI, Geopolitics, and the End of the Aid Era Are Reshaping Africa’s Future of Work.</h3><h4><em>How artificial intelligence, shrinking foreign aid, geopolitical realignment, remote work, demographic change, and new economic realities are quietly rewriting the future of work.</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7lECn55A4a-FRvkA7SCgPg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>Authors:</em></strong><em> Kelvin Kihindas, Regina Mutua and Esther Moraa.</em></p><p><strong><em>Citation:</em></strong><em> [Kihindas, K., Mutua, R., &amp; Moraa, E. (2026, July 14). The great labour market reset: How AI, geopolitics, and the end of the aid era are reshaping Africa’s future of work. Medium. </em><a href="https://medium.com/@%5Bhandle%5D/%5Barticle-url%5D"><em>https://medium.com/@[handle]/[article-url]</em></a><em>]</em></p><p>In June 2026, a former senior USAID executive wrote something raw on LinkedIn. Nearly two decades leading policy, multimillion-dollar portfolios managed, US congress advised, some of the world’s most complex humanitarian crises coordinated from the inside. And after all of that, she had spent almost a year unemployed, watching rejection emails arrive for roles that matched her experience almost word for word, each one closing with the same hollow line: <em>“We’ve decided to go in another direction.”</em></p><p>She is far from alone. By late 2025, sector trackers were estimating that roughly 60,000 development professionals worldwide, program officers, health workers, teachers, trainers, had lost their jobs as USAID programmes were suspended or terminated outright, with the agency cancelling more than 80% of its active contracts within weeks of the order that triggered its dismantling.[1] The agency had employed over 10,000 staff directly across more than a hundred countries before that.[1] In South Africa alone, the withdrawal of several hundred million dollars in U.S. health funding left roughly 8,000 health workers without jobs and HIV clinics scrambling to stay open.[2] In Ethiopia, around 5,000 workers tied to HIV and malaria programmes lost their positions.[1] By the spring of 2025, more than 80 international NGOs had closed at least one office somewhere in the world.[2]</p><p>In Washington and Nairobi, in Addis Ababa, Abuja, and Johannesburg, thousands of highly skilled professionals are quietly asking themselves the same question: <em>what happened to the labour market we thought we understood?</em></p><p>The easy answer is artificial intelligence. The truer answer is more complicated than that and more interesting.</p><p>AI is transforming work, yes. But it is doing so alongside a cluster of equally powerful forces: geopolitical realignment, shrinking development assistance, demographic change, shifting immigration policy, corporate restructuring, the normalization of remote work, the climate transition, and a quiet but fundamental change in how employers define value in the first place. Taken individually, each of these is a significant trend in its own right. Taken together, they amount to something larger, arguably the most consequential restructuring of the global labour market since the Industrial Revolution.</p><p>The World Economic Forum’s <em>Future of Jobs Report 2025</em>, drawing on surveys of more than 1,000 employers representing over 14 million workers across 55 economies, names technological change, geoeconomic fragmentation, demographic shifts, the climate transition, and economic uncertainty as the five forces most likely to reshape employment through 2030.[3] The Forum projects that roughly 170 million jobs will be created globally this decade while about 92 million are displaced, a net gain of 78 million, but one that masks enormous churn underneath it.[3] Employers surveyed expect close to 39% of the core skills workers rely on today to change meaningfully by 2030.[3] Analytical thinking, resilience, adaptability, AI and big-data literacy, and lifelong learning now top the list of capabilities employers want most, not because these qualities are fashionable, but because uncertainty itself has become the defining condition of modern work.</p><p>And here is the part that should give Africa pause, and perhaps also hope: these transformations do not land evenly. For advanced economies, they largely represent a transition; disruptive, but cushioned by deep institutions and existing wealth. For much of the Global South, they represent something closer to a structural disruption, arriving in places with thinner safety nets and far less room to absorb a shock.</p><p>Africa walks into this new era carrying both extraordinary promise and real vulnerability in the same breath. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the continent’s population will rise from roughly 1.5 billion today to close to 2.5 billion by 2050, pushing its share of humanity from about 10% in 1960 to nearly 28% by mid-century, meaning more than one in four people on Earth will be African.[4] Its working-age population alone is projected to nearly double, from 883 million in 2024 to about 1.6 billion by 2050, eventually accounting for roughly a quarter of the entire global workforce.[4] That is either the most valuable economic asset on the planet or a crisis waiting to compound, and which one it becomes depends almost entirely on what happens in the labour market over the next decade, not on demographics alone.</p><p>That same promise already shows up in the numbers behind Africa’s much-discussed “entrepreneurial culture,” which deserves to be more than a slogan: African tech startups raised an estimated $4.1 billion in 2025, a 25% increase on the year before, while the continent’s mobile money ecosystem now counts more than 500 million active accounts processing upward of $830 billion a year in transactions, proof that the underlying appetite for building and adopting new economic infrastructure is real, even if capital still concentrates heavily in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, and Egypt.[5]</p><p>No country illustrates that paradox more clearly than Kenya, but it is far from the only one worth watching, and treating this as a Kenyan story alone would miss most of what is actually happening.</p><h3>A reset hiding in plain sight</h3><p>Every generation likes to believe its disruptions are unprecedented, and most of the time it’s an exaggeration. This time the claim earns a harder look, not because any one force at play is entirely new, but because of how many of them are arriving at once, on the same workforce, in the same ten-year window.</p><p>Artificial intelligence is quietly swallowing the entry-level tasks that used to be how a junior employee learned a trade. Geopolitical rivalry between major powers is redrawing supply chains and investment flows in ways that decide, almost invisibly, which economies get factories and which get bypassed. Foreign aid, long the quiet financier of a whole professional class of NGO workers, researchers, and development consultants, is contracting as donor-country budgets tighten. The climate transition is creating entirely new categories of work while erasing others, faster than any curriculum committee can keep pace. Remote work has severed the old link between <em>where you live</em> and <em>who will pay you</em>. Migration policy is tightening in some of the world’s traditional destinations even as a quieter kind of migration, digital migration, expands underneath it. Labour platforms have built a shadow gig economy that barely shows up in official statistics. And employers, especially in technology, are starting to care less about the certificate on your wall and more about the work you can actually produce.</p><p>Eight currents. One river. And the river is changing course.</p><p>Eight structural forces feed into one convergent transformation, which in turn reshapes five downstream systems. The reset is not any single arrow; it is what happens when all eight arrive in the same decade.</p><p><strong>Defining the Great Labour Market Reset:</strong> <em>the simultaneous convergence of artificial intelligence, geopolitical realignment, aid contraction, demographic change, remote work, migration shifts, the rise of digital labour platforms, and changing employer expectations into a single structural transformation of how work is organized, financed, and distributed — distinct from an ordinary economic cycle because its component forces are compounding each other rather than arriving in sequence.</em></p><h3>Why this reset is different</h3><p>Every major shift in how humans work has produced the same two-part argument: this time is catastrophic, and don’t worry, it always works out. Mechanization displaced agricultural labour over a century, but eventually created entire new industries. Electrification rendered some trades obsolete while inventing others. The personal computer eliminated typing pools and travel agencies while creating software engineering as a profession most of today’s parents had never heard of when they were young. Globalization moved manufacturing across oceans, hollowing out entire regions in wealthy countries while lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty in others. Even COVID-19, in its narrow way, forced a decade’s worth of remote-work adoption into eighteen months.</p><p>What distinguishes the Great Labour Market Reset from each of those precedents is not any single force, but the <em>compression and convergence</em> of several of them at once. The Industrial Revolution unfolded over roughly a century. Electrification and mass manufacturing took multiple decades to fully diffuse. The internet’s labour-market effects are still being felt thirty years after its commercialization. This reset is compressing comparable structural change into roughly a single decade, while simultaneously layering a contracting aid economy, a tightening migration regime, and a geopolitical realignment directly on top of the technological shift, forces that, in previous transitions, mostly arrived one at a time. Africa’s workforce is being asked to absorb in ten years what previous generations absorbed across forty.</p><h3>When the donors went quiet</h3><p>The USAID executive’s LinkedIn post wasn’t really an isolated story about one career. It was an early tremor of something much bigger, and the numbers behind it are larger than most people outside the development sector have grasped.</p><p>The United States supplied roughly a quarter of all aid flowing into Africa, and in 2024 alone channelled some $12.7 billion into Sub-Saharan Africa, about a third of all U.S. foreign assistance that year.[2] Analysts at the Institute for Security Studies modelled a 20% reduction in aid to the continent and projected close to 19 million additional Africans falling into extreme poverty by 2030 as a direct result.[6] In Kenya specifically, industry estimates put the funding shortfall facing the startup and small-enterprise ecosystem at around $100 million, with some projections suggesting the sector could contract by as much as 15% over three years as USAID-backed grant and accelerator funding disappears.[7] Other major donors, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom among them, have made significant cuts of their own in the same window, even if none as abrupt as Washington’s.[6]</p><p>It’s an unglamorous disruption. It doesn’t trend the way an AI breakthrough does. But for a generation of bright, credentialed young Africans who assumed the development sector would always have a seat for them, the slow contraction of donor-funded work may turn out to be the most immediate change of all arriving at the precise moment that AI and geopolitics are reshaping everything else around it.</p><p>There is, hidden inside the discomfort, the outline of something new: a <strong>Post-Aid Economy</strong>.</p><p><strong>Defining the Post-Aid Economy:</strong> <em>a model of African development financed predominantly by private investment, technology partnerships, domestic revenue mobilization, diaspora remittances, and regional trade rather than by traditional grant aid, not the absence of aid, but its demotion from primary financing mechanism to a supplementary one.</em></p><p>Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, director-general of the World Trade Organization, has put the underlying argument bluntly: Africa needs to stop seeing aid as a permanent feature and start prioritizing investment and domestic resource mobilization instead.[8] It won’t be a comfortable transition. But the countries that start building toward it now, rather than waiting for the old aid flows to return, will be the ones still standing when the dust settles.</p><h3>What AI actually changes, and what it doesn’t</h3><p>It’s tempting to make artificial intelligence the villain of this whole story. It isn’t, quite. Its effects are sharper and more specific than the panic suggests, and they vary enormously depending on which kind of AI you’re actually talking about.</p><p>“AI” in 2026 is not one technology, it’s at least five distinct ones with different labour-market footprints. Large language models handle drafting, summarizing, translation, and first-pass research. Coding copilots and increasingly autonomous coding agents are compressing software development timelines and changing what an entry-level developer is expected to already know. AI agents, systems that can complete multi-step tasks with limited supervision are starting to take over entire workflows rather than single tasks, from customer service resolution to basic financial reconciliation. Robotics and physical automation continue to reshape manufacturing and logistics, more slowly than software but just as permanently. Voice AI and synthetic media are reshaping customer service, content production, and a meaningful slice of the BPO industry that several African economies, including Kenya, have built real employment around.</p><p>What these technologies genuinely compress is the apprenticeship of cognitive work, the drafting, the summarizing, the first-pass code, the routine analysis that used to be how a twenty-three-year-old proved herself before anyone trusted her with judgment calls. Strip that training ground away, and you don’t just lose some jobs, you lose part of how people used to become seniors. McKinsey’s research on generative AI has estimated that the technology could affect activities currently consuming somewhere in the range of 60–70% of employees’ working hours, not by eliminating those employees outright, but by automating large chunks of what currently fills their days, freeing time for work AI cannot yet do, assuming employers and workers are positioned to capture that shift rather than simply being displaced by it.[9]</p><p>What AI still struggles to replicate is harder to put in a headline but matters enormously for Africa’s hand in this game: contextual judgment, the ability to navigate ambiguity and competing interests, creative synthesis across unrelated domains, and systems thinking. These are, not coincidentally, exactly the muscles that African professionals have often had to build out of necessity, working in environments where formal systems are thin and improvisation is a daily requirement.</p><p>Underneath the daily disruption sits a longer, more consequential question: who <em>builds</em> the intelligence, and who merely rents it? Call it <strong>AI Dependency versus AI Sovereignty</strong>.</p><p><strong>Defining AI Sovereignty:</strong> <em>a country or region’s capacity to train, deploy, and govern artificial intelligence systems tuned to its own languages, data, and economic needs as distinct from AI Dependency, where a country only ever consumes tools built elsewhere, on data that does not reflect its own population, and therefore has no say in how the technology evolves to serve (or ignore) it.</em></p><p>A continent that only ever consumes tools built elsewhere, trained overwhelmingly on English-language, Global-North data that barely reflects African languages, markets, or realities, stays structurally dependent on decisions made in boardrooms it has never entered. A continent that invests in its own AI talent, its own data infrastructure, and its own locally-tuned applications has a real chance to shape how this technology serves it, rather than simply absorbing whatever it produces. That race, not the automation headlines, is the one that will matter in ten years, and it deserves its own chapter later in this piece.</p><h3>Geopolitics, disguised as a hiring decision</h3><p>It no longer makes sense to treat foreign policy and labour markets as separate worlds, one for diplomats and one for HR departments. Increasingly, the decisions made in trade negotiations and mineral-rights agreements are labour-market decisions wearing a disguise and most of that conversation, told from a Western vantage point, leaves out the actor reshaping African trade and infrastructure most aggressively of all.</p><p>China has spent two decades building roads, ports, railways, and power plants across the continent through its Belt and Road Initiative and its newer “Digital Silk Road,” financing telecommunications networks, data centres, and fibre infrastructure from Lagos to Lusaka. Huawei alone is estimated to have built a substantial share of Africa’s 4G network infrastructure, and Chinese state and private financing has become one of the largest external sources of infrastructure capital on the continent, at times exceeding combined Western multilateral lending in individual countries. That investment has created real, if uneven, employment: construction jobs, telecom-sector roles, and increasingly, local technical positions as China shifts from “build it and leave” toward longer-term operating and training partnerships. China’s appetite for African critical minerals, cobalt and copper from the Democratic Republic of Congo, lithium from Zimbabwe, and rare earths and graphite from several other markets, also makes its hiring and investment patterns systematically different from, and at times in direct competition with, those of the United States and the European Union, who are racing to secure their own access to the same minerals for the energy transition and for AI hardware supply chains.</p><p>This is not a one-sided relationship, nor an uncomplicated one, debt sustainability, labour conditions on Chinese-financed projects, and the degree of genuine skills transfer to local workers remain live and legitimate concerns across multiple African capitals. But any serious account of how geopolitics is reshaping African labour markets has to include Beijing alongside Washington and Brussels, because increasingly, it is competition between all three, not any single relationship, that decides which economies get factories, which get fibre-optic cable, and which get neither.</p><p>Layered on top of that triangle is the broader contest over “friend-shoring,” where companies relocate supply chains toward politically aligned partners. Morocco has become one of the more interesting beneficiaries of this shift, building a genuine automotive manufacturing base, Renault and Stellantis both operate large plants there, partly because of its proximity to Europe and its trade agreements, positioning it as a friend-shoring destination for European manufacturers looking to diversify away from Asian supply chains. None of this feels close to home when you’re choosing a degree at eighteen. But it filters down, slowly and almost invisibly, into which industries are hiring by the time you graduate.</p><h3>Africa’s AI opportunity</h3><p>If the AI dependency question deserves more than a passing mention, it deserves its own chapter because what’s actually happening on the ground is more interesting than either the doom narratives or the hype cycles suggest.</p><p>Several governments are no longer treating AI policy as an afterthought borrowed from elsewhere. Rwanda has built one of the continent’s more coherent national AI strategies, explicitly positioning itself as a testbed for AI applications in agriculture, health diagnostics, and public-service delivery, while courting data-centre and cloud investment as part of its broader “Smart Rwanda” digital economy push. Egypt and Morocco have both moved early on data-centre and semiconductor-adjacent investment, betting that compute infrastructure, not just software talent, will determine who actually benefits from the AI economy rather than merely using it. South Africa has gone further than most on AI governance, drafting national AI policy frameworks aimed at balancing innovation with the kind of data-protection and algorithmic-accountability standards that Europe has spent years building.</p><p>The more interesting opportunity, though, sits below the level of national strategy: language. The overwhelming majority of large language models are trained predominantly on English, French, Mandarin, and a handful of other high-resource languages, which means Swahili, Hausa, Yoruba, Amharic, and dozens of other African languages spoken by hundreds of millions of people remain poorly served by mainstream AI tools. A small but growing cluster of African AI startups and research groups — building Swahili and Yoruba natural-language-processing models, voice assistants for under-served languages, and agricultural advisory chatbots tuned to local crops and conditions, represent exactly the kind of “AI Sovereignty” infrastructure this moment calls for. Research funding from initiatives like the African Union’s AI strategy framework, Google’s and Microsoft’s African AI research labs, and a slowly growing pool of local venture capital are starting to back this work, even if the scale still lags far behind what the opportunity actually warrants.</p><p>This is the difference between AI Dependency and AI Sovereignty made concrete: one path has African economies forever renting intelligence trained on someone else’s data, for someone else’s market. The other has them building, even modestly, applications that work for the customer who speaks Sheng in Nairobi or Pidgin in Lagos, markets the dominant AI labs have little commercial incentive to prioritize, and African builders have every incentive to own.</p><h3>The new geography of talent</h3><p>If there is one chapter of this story that should make African professionals genuinely optimistic rather than merely anxious, it is this one.</p><p>The normalization of remote work has done something almost sneaky: it has unhooked the question of <em>where you live</em> from the question of <em>who will hire you</em>. A researcher in Nairobi, a designer in Lagos, a data analyst in Kigali can now compete for roles at companies in London or Toronto without ever boarding a plane, something that was, fifteen years ago, close to unthinkable.</p><p>Nigeria offers the clearest large-scale proof of concept. Fintech companies like Flutterwave and Paystack didn’t just build payment rails for African businesses, they became case studies in how African-founded technology companies can attract serious global capital and talent while remaining headquartered on the continent, and their growth pulled an entire generation of Nigerian software engineers into globally competitive remote and contract work. Lagos’s tech ecosystem, alongside Nairobi’s and Cairo’s, now sends a meaningful and growing share of its software talent into remote roles for companies that have never opened an African office at all.</p><p>Consider Wanjiru, a fictional but entirely representative composite of thousands of real Kenyan professionals: a data analyst in Nairobi who spent her twenties bouncing between donor-funded monitoring-and-evaluation contracts that dried up one by one as the aid contraction described earlier took hold. Two years ago she taught herself SQL and Python through free online courses, built a portfolio of real analysis projects, and now works as a contractor for a logistics company headquartered in Rotterdam, paid in dollars, living in Nairobi, mentoring two younger analysts on the side. She has never met her employer in person. She has also never had to leave home to build the kind of career that, a decade ago, would have required relocating to London or Amsterdam.</p><p>Around that shift, an entire ecosystem has quietly assembled itself: digital nomadism, virtual migration, AI-enabled outsourcing, and a fast-growing layer of platforms connecting African freelancers directly to clients on other continents. For decades, the dominant frame for African talent leaving home was <em>brain drain</em>, a one-way loss. Development economists later softened that into <em>brain circulation</em>, talent leaves, learns, eventually returns.</p><p>Remote work makes something better than either possible: a <strong>Brain Cloud</strong>.</p><p><strong>Defining Brain Cloud:</strong> <em>a model of talent retention and global participation in which skilled professionals remain physically based in their home country while working remotely for employers anywhere in the world, capturing the income and skill-development benefits historically associated with emigration, without the departure, brain drain, or loss of local spending, mentorship, and tax base that emigration entails.</em></p><p>It earns at global rates while spending, mentoring, and reinvesting locally, the benefits of migration without the departure. Wanjiru is the Brain Cloud model with a name and a face, and she is far from alone.</p><p>The opportunity is real, but so is the risk of squandering it, and the obstacles deserve to be named plainly rather than waved away. Capturing this opportunity properly requires electricity that doesn’t go out mid-deadline and internet that doesn’t drop mid-call, both still genuine constraints across large parts of the continent, even in relatively well-connected economies. It requires payment systems that don’t punish cross-border earnings with friction, delay, and fees that can eat into a meaningful share of a freelancer’s income. It requires tax regimes that haven’t yet figured out how to treat foreign-sourced digital income, leaving many remote workers operating in genuine grey areas. It requires English or French proficiency that matches the market a worker is competing in, and increasingly, direct competition from equally skilled, equally connected talent pools in South and Southeast Asia, where digital-services exports are already a far larger share of the economy. And it requires basic cybersecurity and data-protection competence, since freelancers handling client data across borders carry real exposure with very little institutional support if something goes wrong. Kenya’s existing bets, Konza Technopolis, the broader Silicon Savannah story, Ajira Digital’s push to formally connect young people to online work, give it a head start. A head start is not the same thing as a finish line, and none of these obstacles are going to resolve themselves.</p><h3>The layoffs don’t mean what they look like.</h3><p>One of the stranger features of this moment, viewed from the outside, is the apparent contradiction sitting at the heart of the tech industry: the same companies, Meta, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and others, announcing thousands of layoffs in one breath and record AI investment in the next.</p><p>The contradiction dissolves once you separate <em>headcount</em> from <em>capability</em>. These companies aren’t simply doing less work with fewer hands; they are reorganizing what kind of work gets done by hands at all. Roles built around routine execution, first-pass content review, basic coding, high-volume customer support, are exactly the roles AI tooling now performs more cheaply and consistently. Roles built around designing, training, and governing that same AI, along with the smaller pool of work still requiring distinctly human judgment, are the roles these companies are racing, sometimes desperately, to fill.</p><p>This isn’t a blip that reverses once markets calm down. It’s a recomposition of what a “job in technology” even means, and it lands hard on outsourcing hubs, including parts of Kenya’s BPO sector and South Africa’s much larger call-centre industry, both of which built their value proposition substantially on cheap, high-volume routine work. South Africa’s business-services sector has spent years marketing itself to UK and European clients on cost and English-language fluency; that proposition gets harder to defend as voice AI and automated customer-resolution tools improve. The answer isn’t to abandon either sector. It’s to push them upward, toward AI-augmented service delivery and quality oversight that pairs human judgment with machine speed, rather than competing against the machine on cost alone.</p><h3>The quiet rise of digital migration</h3><p>Migration policy in some of the world’s traditional destination countries is tightening even as a quieter alternative expands beneath it. Public debate over skilled-worker visa programmes, including the long-running back-and-forth over the American H-1B system, reflects something broader: physical migration for skilled work is becoming more politically contested in several major economies, even as global demand for skilled digital labour keeps climbing.</p><p>This creates an unusual opening that favours the Brain Cloud model described earlier. As visa pathways grow harder to navigate, the relative appeal of remote, borderless work rises with them. No visa is required to build software for a company headquartered abroad from a desk in Westlands or Yaba. What’s required is reliable infrastructure, a strong portfolio, and access to the networks where that work circulates.</p><p>The smarter policy instinct for this decade may be less about managing the loss of skilled emigrants the old brain-drain anxiety and more about building the rails that let skilled people stay exactly where they are and still reach the global market: better payment infrastructure, credible digital-reputation systems, and platforms that travel faster than passports ever could.</p><h3>A generation trained for an economy that’s already gone</h3><p>This is the chapter that hurts most to write, because it sits closest to the lived experience of the graduate entering this labour market right now.</p><p>The complaint that universities teach yesterday’s economy is not new, it’s been a fixture of commentary on African higher education for years. What’s changed is the speed at which the gap widens. A curriculum reviewed once every five or six years cannot possibly track skill demands that shift every twelve to eighteen months. Graduate underemployment, already structural across much of the continent, compounds further as AI absorbs precisely the entry-level tasks that used to let an underprepared graduate prove herself on the job anyway.</p><p>The institutions adapting fastest aren’t necessarily tearing up four-year curricula, that process is too slow to matter on this timeline. They’re building parallel pathways instead: microcredentials that can be issued and revised in months rather than years, AI literacy woven across every discipline rather than fenced inside computer science departments, and deeper industry partnerships that close the gap between classroom and workplace through exposure, not just redesign.</p><p>The deeper shift is conceptual. The old promise of a university degree, a credential earned once, valid for a career, is eroding in real time. What’s replacing it looks more like a <strong>Skills Economy</strong>.</p><p><strong>Defining the Skills Economy:</strong> <em>a labour market logic in which employers evaluate and reward demonstrable, current capability, verified through portfolios, work samples, and track record, over formal credentials earned at a fixed point in time, shifting the basis of professional trust from where someone studied to what they can be shown to have done.</em></p><p>A degree still matters. It is no longer enough on its own, and treating it as sufficient is, increasingly, a quiet act of self-sabotage.</p><h3>Not everyone is falling at the same speed</h3><p>It would be dishonest to describe this reset as though it touches every African worker equally, because it doesn’t, and pretending otherwise flatters exactly the people least at risk.</p><p>Urban professionals with university degrees and reliable internet access are positioned to ride the Brain Cloud wave; workers in rural areas with patchy connectivity and inconsistent power are largely locked out of it, regardless of talent. Women across much of the continent remain disproportionately concentrated in the informal sector and in the care, education, and health-adjacent roles hit hardest by aid contraction, the same USAID-funded programmes disproportionately staffed by women in gender, maternal-health, and education roles. The formal-informal divide matters enormously too: someone with a registered job, a payslip, and access to a bank account has a fundamentally different relationship to digital payment platforms, credit, and remote-work opportunities than someone working informally, who makes up the majority of African employment in most economies. And the gap between graduates and non-graduates, while still real, is narrowing in an unexpected direction, a self-taught developer with a strong GitHub portfolio increasingly competes credibly against a computer-science graduate with none, which is good news for some and genuinely threatening to the value proposition universities have sold for a century.</p><p>None of this is an argument against the optimistic framing in the rest of this piece. It’s a reminder that “Africa’s opportunity” is not evenly distributed within Africa any more than it’s evenly distributed between Africa and the rest of the world, and a policy that ignores that will widen inequality even while headline numbers improve.</p><h3>Kenya, and the wider continent watching alongside it</h3><p>Kenya is worth dwelling on because it sits, more visibly than most of its peers, at the exact intersection of every current described above, but it is one data point on a much larger continental map, and the rest of that map deserves equal attention.</p><p>Kenya has real digital assets to its name: Konza Technopolis as a flagship for the digital economy, Ajira Digital as a state-backed bridge into online work, and the global reputation of M-Pesa, proof that African-built financial innovation can scale far beyond its borders. It also carries, in sharper relief than most countries around it, every tension this article describes: stubbornly high youth unemployment, a vast informal sector, a graduate pipeline outrunning job creation, and an aid-dependent professional class now navigating a contraction nobody quite trained it for.</p><p>Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy and most populous country, tells a different version of the same story, a fintech and remote-software-export boom built by companies like Flutterwave and Paystack, sitting alongside one of the continent’s largest and most precarious gig and informal economies. Rwanda has leaned hardest into top-down digital-economy and AI strategy, betting that disciplined state planning can substitute for the scale Nigeria gets almost by accident. South Africa carries the most mature financial and AI-governance institutions on the continent, paired with deep, persistent structural unemployment and a call-centre industry under direct pressure from voice AI. Egypt and Morocco are positioning around manufacturing, friend-shoring, and data-centre infrastructure rather than software talent alone. Ghana has built a smaller but credible reputation in fintech and business outsourcing. Botswana and Mauritius, smaller and wealthier than most peers, offer early glimpses of what a well-managed transition into knowledge and financial services can look like at a more modest scale. Ethiopia, despite the scale of the aid contraction it has absorbed, retains one of the continent’s largest manufacturing and light-industrial ambitions.</p><p>None of these national stories is unique on its own. But taken together, they make clear that the Great Labour Market Reset is not a Kenyan phenomenon being narrated to the rest of the continent, it is a continental phenomenon for which Kenya happens to be one of the most visible, well-documented case studies.</p><h3>What the optimists get right</h3><p>A fair-minded account of this moment has to take seriously the strongest version of the more optimistic counterargument, because dismissing it would be intellectually lazy.</p><p>Some economists argue that AI will ultimately create more jobs than it destroys, much as earlier technological revolutions, mechanization, electrification, the personal computer, eventually expanded total employment well beyond what they initially displaced, even though each transition produced real pain for the workers caught in the disruption itself. The WEF’s own projection of a net 78 million new jobs by 2030 is, in fact, consistent with this more hopeful reading: disruption and net job growth are not mutually exclusive, and it would be misleading to imply otherwise.</p><p>Others contend that the anxiety over aid contraction overlooks the growing role of African domestic philanthropy, sovereign wealth, diaspora remittances, which already substantially exceed total aid flows to the continent in most years, and private capital, all of which are expanding even as traditional donor budgets shrink. On this view, the Post-Aid Economy isn’t a defensive adaptation to crisis; it’s simply where African development finance was always heading, and the aid cuts have only accelerated a transition that domestic and private capital were going to drive anyway.</p><p>Both arguments deserve to be taken seriously, and both are probably partially right. The disagreement worth having isn’t whether new jobs and new financing models will eventually emerge, they will. It’s whether they emerge <em>fast enough</em>, and <em>for the people currently being displaced</em>, rather than for a different generation a decade from now. Historical technological transitions took decades to fully play out their employment effects; the workers displaced in year one rarely benefited from the jobs created in year fifteen. That timing gap, not the long-run employment math, is the part of this reset that should worry policymakers most.</p><h3>Three roads to 2035</h3><p>It’s worth sketching, briefly, where these currents could lead, not as prophecy, but to make clear what’s actually being decided right now.</p><p>In the hopeful version, governments, universities, and employers recognize the convergence early enough to move with it. Digital infrastructure keeps expanding. Payment systems are reformed so cross-border digital income flows freely instead of leaking away in fees. Curricula absorb AI literacy and microcredentials at speed. A meaningful share of the continent’s young population captures the Brain Cloud opportunity, earning globally, building locally, and the demographic dividend so often discussed as a looming risk finally becomes the asset it was always supposed to be.</p><p>In the muddling-through version, progress happens, but in disconnected pieces. Some infrastructure gets built. Some curricula get reformed. Some young professionals find remote work. But policy, education, and hiring practices keep treating AI, aid contraction, migration, and remote work as separate problems for separate ministries, with no shared map connecting them. Progress is real. It’s just slower than the disruption it’s racing against.</p><p>In the harder version, the contraction of aid-funded jobs, the disruption of entry-level work by AI, and tightening migration pathways all arrive faster than infrastructure and reform can respond. A large, increasingly educated youth population finds itself locked out of both the old formal economy and the new digital one at the same time, a combination with consequences well beyond economics, in a continent where, as researchers studying USAID’s withdrawal from fragile states have warned, weakened public services can hand recruitment advantages to armed groups in places already struggling with instability.</p><p>The gap between these three futures isn’t mainly about money. It’s about whether the pattern gets recognized in time.</p><h3>What everyone in this story needs to do next</h3><p>The recommendations that follow are not a wish list. They’re sequenced by urgency, because not everything can or should happen at once.</p><p><strong>In the next one to two years</strong>, the priority is triage and visibility. Governments should stand up real-time labour-market dashboards that track digital and remote employment, currently almost invisible in official statistics, rather than waiting for annual surveys that arrive long after the disruption they’re measuring. Universities should fast-track AI-literacy modules into existing courses rather than waiting for full curriculum reviews. Employers in exposed sectors like BPO and call centres should begin retraining frontline staff toward AI-oversight and quality-assurance roles before, not after, automation makes the retraining moot. Development partners and African governments alike need a coordinated response to the immediate humanitarian and employment fallout of the aid contraction, since the human cost of delay is measured in clinics closing and salaries stopping, not in five-year projections.</p><p><strong>Over three to five years</strong>, the focus shifts to building durable infrastructure. Governments should reform payment and tax systems so that cross-border digital earnings move easily and are taxed sensibly rather than penalized by default. Universities should institutionalize microcredentialing and industry-embedded learning as a permanent parallel track alongside degree programmes, not a pilot project. Employers should shift decisively toward skills-based hiring, evaluated through portfolios and demonstrated work rather than credentials alone. Development partners should redesign financing models around capacity that survives the partnership itself, rather than service delivery that ends when the grant does.</p><p><strong>Over five to ten years</strong>, the work is structural. Governments should pursue genuine AI sovereignty, backing local-language AI research, data infrastructure, and compute capacity rather than permanent dependence on tools built elsewhere. Universities should redesign degree programmes themselves around adaptability as a core competency, not an elective. Employers should build remote-first organizational structures capable of drawing on talent anywhere on the continent as a matter of course, not an experiment. And governments and regional bodies like the African Union should treat the Post-Aid Economy not as a contingency plan but as the actual long-term financing model for African development, built on domestic revenue, regional trade, and private investment, with traditional aid as a supplement rather than a foundation.</p><p><strong>For young professionals</strong>, the practical guidance doesn’t sort as neatly into timeframes, because it has to start now. Build AI literacy as a core professional skill rather than a defensive afterthought. Think in terms of a portfolio career, because the single linear path this generation was promised no longer reliably exists. Build a visible, verifiable body of work, because that increasingly does the trust-building a degree used to do alone. Treat remote-work fluency, and basic cross-border payment and data-protection literacy, as essential infrastructure, not a bonus skill. Make continuous learning a permanent habit rather than a phase that ends at graduation. And consider entrepreneurship not as the fallback when employment fails, but as a legitimate first choice inside an economy that now runs across <strong>four overlapping labour markets</strong>, the Traditional world of government, NGOs, and corporates; the Digital world of remote work, freelancing, AI, and the creator economy; the Green world of climate finance and renewable energy; and the Knowledge world of research, consulting, and data, rather than the single narrow path most of us were raised to expect.</p><h3>What this is really about</h3><p>Picture the USAID executive again, scrolling job boards a year after a career that once looked unshakeable. Picture, alongside her, Wanjiru, or any of the thousands of real young African professionals she represents, building a freelance career out of nothing because the donor-funded path she expected never materialized. Two women, two continents, two completely different starting points, asking some version of the same question.</p><p>It’s reasonable for this to feel like a loss, because in some ways it is, the predictable career ladders both of them were promised simply don’t exist in the same form anymore. But it’s worth sitting, too, with what this moment makes possible that wasn’t possible before: working for a company on another continent without ever leaving home; building a body of work that speaks louder than any transcript or title; stepping into green industries, knowledge industries, and digital industries that didn’t exist at this scale a decade ago; and the still-open possibility that Africa’s demographic weight becomes a genuine asset in a world that is, for the first time in a long while, actually short of skilled young people.</p><p>The Great Labour Market Reset is not a single storm to survive and move past. It is a structural reorganization of work itself, and reorganizations like this always produce winners and losers, not at random, but according to who reads the pattern early enough to move with it.</p><p>Neither of them did anything wrong. They are standing, from different vantage points, at the edge of the defining economic transition of this era.</p><p>Africa is no longer preparing for the future of work. It is already living through it. The only remaining question is whether its institutions will catch up before its workers are forced to do so alone.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><ol><li>Estimates on USAID contract cancellations, staffing levels, and global development-worker job losses: Global Policy Journal, “Cuts to USAID — the Fallout Continues (Part 2),” June 2025; Devex, “Impacted by the USAID job cuts in 2025?,” December 2025.</li><li>South Africa health-worker layoffs, NGO office closures, and 2024 USAID Sub-Saharan Africa funding figures: Africa Practice, “USAID Cuts: Six Months On,” July 2025; The Conversation, “International aid groups are dealing with the pain of slashed USAID funding,” April 2026.</li><li>Employer survey scope, projected job creation/displacement, and core-skills-change estimate: World Economic Forum, <em>Future of Jobs Report 2025</em>, January 2025.</li><li>African population and working-age population projections to 2050: UN Economic Commission for Africa, “As Africa’s Population Crosses 1.5 Billion, The Demographic Window Is Opening.”</li><li>African tech startup funding and mobile money account/transaction figures: Tech In Africa funding round-ups and FurtherAfrica, “Africa’s Digital Payment Boom,” 2025–2026, citing GSMA data.</li><li>Modelled poverty impact of a 20% reduction in aid to Africa, and comparative donor-cut figures for Germany, France, and the UK: Institute for Security Studies, African Futures, “The toll of USAID cuts on Africa,” February 2025.</li><li>Kenya startup funding shortfall and projected sector contraction: Michigan Journal of Economics, “The Devastating Impacts of the USAID pullout on Africa,” May 2025, citing Ajim Capital (2025) and Anderson et al. (2025).</li><li>Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on aid versus investment and domestic resource mobilization: as reported in Nonprofit Quarterly, “Impact of International Aid Cuts on African Communities,” April 2025.</li><li>Estimated share of work activities affected by generative AI: McKinsey &amp; Company, published research on generative AI and the future of work.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8226e2d22a7d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Deception in East Africa: Sectoral Vulnerabilities, Behavioral Traps, AI Double-Edged…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/digital-deception-in-east-africa-sectoral-vulnerabilities-behavioral-traps-ai-double-edged-93bc83f3911f?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93bc83f3911f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 17:31:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-27T17:31:02.689Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Digital Deception in East Africa: Sectoral Vulnerabilities, Behavioral Traps, AI Double-Edged Sword, and Ethical Pathways to Resilience — Lessons from Papal Wisdom.</strong></p><p>East Africa’s digital boommarked by over 459 million mobile money accounts, vibrant innovation hubs like Nairobi’s Silicon Savannah, and rapid social media penetration coexists with proliferating misinformation, disinformation, and scam ecosystems. With a projected 400–600% rise in AI-driven campaigns by late 2026 amid elections in Tanzania, Ethiopia, and beyond, the stakes are existential for governance, economy, and society.</p><p>This comprehensive analysis dissects impacts across key sectors, integrates behavioral science and AI dynamics, offers criticism and global comparisons, outlines future scenarios to 2030, and weighs <strong>pros and cons</strong> of interventions. It concludes with ethical guidance inspired by papal teachings on truth, human dignity, and responsible technology.</p><h3>Sectoral Impacts: Deep Vulnerabilities</h3><p><strong>Governance</strong>: Disinformation erodes electoral trust through deepfakes and ethnic polarization. Internet shutdowns and selective “fake news” laws often suppress dissent more than falsehoods.</p><p><strong>Banking &amp; Insurance</strong>: 49% fraud surge in Kenya (2023), with social engineering dominating. Fraudulent claims and eroded trust raise costs and hinder inclusion.</p><p><strong>Mobile Money</strong>: 58–72% of fraud is social engineering (SIM-swaps, phishing, agent collusion). M-Pesa’s success makes it a prime target, risking reversal of financial inclusion gains.</p><p><strong>Health</strong>: Infodemics during COVID-19 and mpox amplified vaccine hesitancy and panic, endangering lives.</p><p><strong>Agriculture</strong>: Fake input scams and climate disinformation disrupt smallholder farmers, threatening food security in a climate-vulnerable region.</p><p><strong>Academia</strong>: AI-generated papers, citation fraud, and funding scams undermine research integrity, especially in context-specific studies on health and agriculture.</p><p><strong>Social Media</strong>: WhatsApp groups and algorithmic amplification spread emotional content rapidly, exploiting communal trust networks.</p><h3>Behavioral Science: Why It Spreads</h3><p><strong>Confirmation bias,</strong> emotional contagion, and social proof thrive amid economic precarity, ethnic histories, and low digital literacy. Rural users and non-dominant languages face acute risks.</p><p><strong>Criticism</strong>: Many interventions import Western individualistic models that overlook East Africa’s collectivist cultures and oral traditions.</p><h3>AI Dynamics: Enabler vs. Defender</h3><p><strong>Enabler</strong>: Low-cost deepfakes, synthetic media, and micro-targeting scale harm dramatically. <strong>Defender</strong>: NLP for detection, deepfake forensics, and behavioral AI for fraud prevention offer scalable tools. <strong>Criticism</strong>: Foreign AI models suffer from cultural bias and poor local-language performance a form of “AI colonialism.”</p><h3>Pros and Cons of Key Approaches</h3><p><strong>1. Technological Solutions (AI Detection + Biometrics)</strong> <strong>Pros</strong>: Scalable, real-time fraud reduction in mobile money/banking; empowers fact-checkers; supports predictive analytics in health and agriculture. <strong>Cons</strong>: High false positives suppress speech; expensive for smaller nations; risks over-centralization and surveillance; dependent on foreign tech, deepening inequality.</p><p><strong>2. Regulatory Frameworks (Laws + EAC Harmonization)</strong> <strong>Pros</strong>: Enables cross-border collaboration; deters blatant scams; builds public trust when transparent. <strong>Cons</strong>: Frequently weaponized against journalists/opposition (e.g., Uganda, Ethiopia); uneven enforcement; may stifle innovation and free expression.</p><p><strong>3. Digital Literacy &amp; Behavioral Interventions (Pre-bunking, Media Education)</strong> <strong>Pros</strong>: Empowers citizens long-term; cost-effective at community level; addresses root cognitive vulnerabilities. <strong>Cons</strong>: Slow to scale in rural areas; underfunded; limited impact without simultaneous platform accountability.</p><p><strong>4. Public-Private Partnerships</strong> <strong>Pros</strong>: Leverages tech giants’ tools with local expertise; accelerates innovation in Silicon Savannah. <strong>Cons</strong>: Lack of transparency; platforms prioritize profits over safety; potential for data exploitation.</p><p><strong>Global Comparison</strong>: Europe’s GDPR/Digital Services Act emphasize rights and transparency but struggle with enforcement speed. India shares linguistic complexity but has stronger domestic capacity. East Africa’s mobile-first context makes its scam threats more economically acute than in the West.</p><h3>Papal Ethical Guidance: Wisdom for the Digital Age</h3><p>Pope Francis and Pope Leo XIV offer profound moral framing relevant to East Africa’s challenges. Pope Francis condemned disinformation as “probably the greatest damage that the media can do,” tracing it to manipulative “snake tactics” and warning that even slight distortions can have dire consequences. He urged media education, countering lies, and prioritizing human relationships over toxicity.</p><p>Pope Leo XIV emphasizes that technology must serve the human person — not replace or diminish dignity. He warns against AI simulating emotions, algorithms creating echo chambers that fuel polarization, and the need for digital literacy alongside humanistic education. He calls for “networks that save” — relationships of truth, communion, and care for the vulnerable rather than division.</p><p><strong>Applying Papal Advice</strong>:</p><ul><li>Treat information as a common good, not a weapon.</li><li>Prioritize ethical discernment and critical thinking.</li><li>Ensure AI serves human flourishing, especially protecting the poor and rural communities.</li><li>Build inclusive digital spaces that foster dialogue instead of outrage.</li></ul><p>This ethical lens critiques purely technical or security-heavy responses, insisting on human dignity at the center.</p><h3>Future Outlook to 2030: Scenarios</h3><p><strong>Pessimistic</strong>: AI-fueled authoritarian drift, widened urban-rural divides, economic losses reversing inclusion gains, and eroded institutional trust leading to instability.</p><p><strong>Optimistic</strong>: East Africa pioneers context-aware AI, EAC-wide resilience standards, localized behavioral programs, and ethical governance — becoming a global leader in inclusive digital innovation.</p><h3>Recommendations for Holistic Resilience</h3><ol><li>Establish independent, multi-stakeholder oversight with civil society voices.</li><li>Invest in African-led AI development and multilingual datasets.</li><li>Scale community-rooted digital literacy combining behavioral science and papal-inspired ethical education.</li><li>Mandate platform transparency and localized moderation.</li><li>Harmonize EAC policies balancing security, rights, and innovation.</li><li>Integrate ethical frameworks (truth, dignity, common good) into national strategies.</li></ol><p>East Africa’s youthful, entrepreneurial spirit positions it to transform threats into strengths. By addressing root causes — inequality, governance gaps, and ethical voids — while embracing technological and moral wisdom, the region can forge a resilient digital future that empowers rather than exploits. As papal teachings remind us, the ultimate goal is not control or profit, but human communion and truth in service of the common good. The choices made today will define the region’s trajectory for decades.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93bc83f3911f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Rise and Fall of KOKO Networks: What Kenya’s Climate-Tech Collapse Teaches Startups…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/the-rise-and-fall-of-koko-networks-what-kenyas-climate-tech-collapse-teaches-startups-fa0ee8a093bd?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa0ee8a093bd</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 10:12:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-09T10:12:24.503Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Rise and Fall of KOKO Networks: What Kenya’s Climate-Tech Collapse Teaches Startups, Policymakers, and Investors.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*lrb1cVk50GjEykxN.png" /><figcaption>Image credited</figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong>By Kelvin Kihindas</strong></blockquote><p>In January 2026, KOKO Networks, once celebrated as one of Kenya’s most promising climate-tech startups, abruptly shut down operations. Within days, fuel dispensers went dark across Nairobi and other urban centres. Over a million households lost access to affordable clean cooking fuel. Hundreds of employees and thousands of informal agents were left without livelihoods.</p><p>This was not a story of weak demand. Kenyans had embraced KOKO’s bioethanol as a cleaner alternative to charcoal and kerosene. The technology worked. The distribution worked. What failed was the financial and policy architecture underpinning the model. The collapse of KOKO offers sobering lessons about how Africa is currently trying to finance its climate transition and who bears the risk when those experiments unravel.</p><p>Importantly, KOKO’s story is not an isolated failure. Over the past five years, dozens of venture-backed startups in Kenya across fintech, logistics, e-commerce, mobility, agri-tech, and climate-tech have quietly shut down, pivoted into obscurity, or exited the market altogether. While Kenya remains East Africa’s most vibrant startup hub, ecosystem trackers and media reporting suggest that well over a hundred startups launched between 2018 and 2022 are no longer operational today. What distinguishes KOKO is not that it failed, but that it failed after becoming everyday infrastructure for ordinary households. When most startups collapse, investors lose money. When infrastructure-like startups collapse, citizens lose access to essential services.</p><h3>A Bold Solution to a Real Problem</h3><p>Clean cooking remains one of Africa’s most stubborn development challenges. Millions of households rely on charcoal and kerosene, exposing families especially women and children to indoor air pollution while accelerating deforestation. KOKO’s model directly addressed this problem by offering a modern, convenient cooking fuel through a network of smart dispensers embedded in neighbourhoods.</p><p>For many urban families, KOKO became everyday infrastructure. It reduced smoke in kitchens, lowered cooking costs for some households, and offered dignity through a modern, pay-as-you-go energy service. This is why the shutdown felt less like a startup failure and more like the collapse of a public utility.</p><p>KOKO demonstrated that there is strong demand for clean cooking when price, convenience, and accessibility align. That achievement should not be dismissed. The failure lies not in innovation, but in how that innovation was financed and protected against systemic risk.</p><h3>The Carbon Finance Bet</h3><p>At the heart of KOKO’s model was a bold financial bet: subsidise household fuel prices using revenue from carbon credits. Each household that switched from charcoal to bioethanol reduced emissions. Those reductions could be monetised in global carbon markets, generating revenue to keep fuel prices low for low-income consumers.</p><p>In theory, this was elegant. In practice, it introduced a fragile dependency. Accessing high-value carbon markets requires regulatory approval from national authorities. Without formal authorisation, credits cannot be sold into compliance markets where prices are meaningful. When that approval did not materialise, KOKO’s core subsidy mechanism collapsed.</p><p>This reveals a deeper problem with many climate-tech business models: they price essential services on volatile, policy-dependent revenue streams. Carbon markets are not consumer markets. They are regulatory instruments shaped by geopolitics, sovereignty, and evolving international rules. When startups rely on them to fund household energy, they transfer sovereign and regulatory risk directly to the poorest users.</p><h3>A Shared Failure, Not a Single Villain</h3><p>Public debate around KOKO’s collapse has been emotional, and understandably so. People lost access to a basic service. Jobs disappeared overnight. But framing this as the fault of a single actor misses the structural nature of the failure.</p><p>KOKO’s founders and management built an ambitious model but over-weighted carbon finance without robust fallback pricing strategies. Investors and board members backed rapid scale without sufficiently hedging regulatory and sovereign risk. Government authorities exercised their sovereign right to regulate carbon markets, but the absence of predictable, time-bound approval pathways created investor uncertainty and social fallout. The global carbon market itself remains immature, complex, and politically contested.</p><p>This was not sabotage. It was a misalignment between innovation speed and policy reality. The startup ecosystem moved faster than the regulatory frameworks designed to govern climate finance.</p><h3>When Startups Become Infrastructure</h3><p>One of the most important lessons from KOKO is how quickly private ventures can become de facto public utilities. When a startup provides daily energy access to over a million households, its collapse becomes a public welfare issue. Markets alone are ill-equipped to manage that level of social dependency.</p><p>KOKO’s failure fits into a wider pattern of startup mortality in Kenya, but with far higher social stakes. Over the past five years, dozens of venture-backed startups have failed quietly, leaving behind disappointed investors and laid-off staff. KOKO’s collapse, by contrast, left entire communities without access to a basic energy service overnight. This distinction matters. It suggests that once a private venture crosses into the realm of essential services, it should be subject to a different level of public oversight, risk management, and continuity planning.</p><p>This raises a hard question: should essential services such as clean cooking be left entirely to venture-backed models dependent on uncertain global finance? Or should governments and development partners treat clean cooking as basic infrastructure worthy of stable public support, guarantees, and policy protection?</p><p>If Africa’s clean energy transition relies solely on fragile private financing, then every regulatory shock risks pushing households back to charcoal and kerosene, undoing years of progress.</p><h3>Risk Management Failures in Climate-Tech</h3><p>KOKO’s collapse exposes a deeper failure of risk management in Africa’s climate-tech ecosystem. The business model concentrated multiple forms of risk regulatory risk, sovereign risk, revenue concentration risk, and social risk into a single fragile mechanism: carbon finance.</p><p>When regulatory approval stalled, the company had no diversified revenue hedge. When carbon credit revenues failed to materialise, there was no public subsidy backstop. When operations ceased, there were no consumer protection mechanisms to cushion households from abrupt service loss.</p><p>For infrastructure-like services, risk management cannot stop at investor downside protection. It must include regulatory shock planning, policy delay contingencies, service continuity mechanisms, and social harm mitigation. Climate-tech startups delivering essential services should be stress-tested not only for financial viability, but for what happens when policy timelines slip, markets fail, or political priorities shift.</p><h3>Media, Emotion, and the Search for Simple Narratives</h3><p>Media coverage of KOKO’s shutdown has largely captured the core facts: regulatory uncertainty collided with a fragile financial model. Social media discourse, however, has often simplified the story into blaming governments versus founders, corruption versus incompetence.</p><p>But this is not a morality play. It is a system failure. When innovation ecosystems mature faster than policy institutions, collapses like KOKO’s become inevitable. The emotional response reflects how deeply KOKO embedded itself into everyday life and how unprotected communities are when private experiments fail.</p><h3>What Comes Next for Clean Cooking in Kenya?</h3><p>The demand for clean cooking has not disappeared. If anything, the backlash underscores how necessary affordable, modern cooking fuels are to urban households. The danger is regression: families reverting to charcoal and kerosene because alternatives become unaffordable or unavailable.</p><p>This moment calls for a reset in how clean cooking is financed. Blended finance models combining public subsidies, development finance, and private capital can reduce over-reliance on volatile carbon markets. Clear, predictable regulatory pathways for climate finance can lower risk for innovators. Risk-sharing mechanisms and service continuity planning can ensure that when business models fail, households do not bear the full cost.</p><p>Clean cooking should be treated as infrastructure, not an experiment.</p><h3>Lessons for Startups, Policymakers, and Development Partners</h3><p>For startups, KOKO’s collapse is a warning against anchoring core pricing on regulatory instruments beyond their control. Policy strategy is not a peripheral function; it is central to survival in climate-tech.</p><p>For governments, the episode highlights the need for transparent, predictable regulatory frameworks that protect public interest while enabling innovation. Regulatory uncertainty may seem abstract, but its consequences are acutely felt by households when essential services disappear.</p><p>For development partners and investors, the lesson is that de-risking should extend beyond capital protection to service protection. Social gains should not be wiped out by market volatility or policy delays.</p><h3>A Cautionary Tale for Africa’s Climate Transition</h3><p>KOKO Networks was not a failure of innovation. It was a failure of alignment between business models, public policy, and climate finance mechanisms. The collapse exposes the danger of building public goods on private fragility.</p><p>If Africa is serious about a just and durable climate transition, essential services like clean cooking cannot be left to the mercy of uncertain carbon markets and regulatory delays. They require stable financing, policy coherence, and shared responsibility across the public and private sectors.</p><p>Otherwise, we will continue to celebrate bold climate innovations only to watch them collapse in the hands of the people who need them most.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa0ee8a093bd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Screen Saturated Weekends to Forest Fueled Renewal in Nairobi’s Chaos.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/from-screen-saturated-weekends-to-forest-fueled-renewal-in-nairobis-chaos-d3f4d1e00159?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d3f4d1e00159</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Jan 2026 09:53:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-25T09:53:43.617Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pOIS9xuIJAnToMPpA8t5VA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Recent Photo 24.01.2026</figcaption></figure><p>Living in the beautiful but relentless chaos of Nairobi in 2025, honking matatus, crowded streets, endless buzzing notifications, I’ve been forced to confront an uncomfortable truth: my lifestyle was quietly draining me.</p><p>My weekends had become almost entirely screen-based. I estimate that <strong>about 70% of my free time disappeared into my phone, endless</strong> social media scrolling, Netflix binges, checking messages that could wait. At first, it felt harmless. Normal, even. But slowly, the effects began to show.</p><p>I wasn’t just tired. I was <strong>distracted, impatient, and disconnected</strong> from my family, from friends, and from myself. Conversations became half-listened. Moments were missed. Presence was replaced by perpetual distraction. When I finally paused to reflect on how my habits were affecting not just me, but the people around me, it became clear: something had to change.</p><h3>The Hidden Cost of Constant Connection</h3><p>There’s growing evidence that excessive phone and social media use is linked to increased anxiety, depression, loneliness, and strained relationships. Endless exposure to carefully curated “perfect lives” fuels comparison, fear of missing out, and quiet dissatisfaction.</p><p>The brain doesn’t help either. Likes, notifications, and infinite scrolling trigger short bursts of dopamine, tiny rewards that keep us hooked, while real life starts to feel slower, duller, and less stimulating by comparison.</p><p>For me, this played out as <strong>emotional flatness</strong>, superficial interactions, and a strange loneliness, even when surrounded by people I love.</p><h3>Choosing to Step Out of the Scroll</h3><p>In 2026, stepping back from my phone wasn’t about rejecting technology entirely. It was about <strong>removing the source of negative patterns</strong> I could finally see clearly.</p><p>Instead of feeling deflated watching others live adventurous lives online, I began asking: <em>What would actually make my own life feel full?</em></p><p>The answer wasn’t another app. It was a presence.</p><p>I started replacing screen time with real, tangible experiences: shared meals without phones on the table, evening walks, longer conversations, and most importantly a new Saturday ritual in Karura Forest.</p><h3>Resetting the Mind, Naturally</h3><p>What surprised me most was how quickly my mood began to change.</p><p>Reducing screen driven dopamine spikes allowed my brain’s reward system to reset. Simple achievements like finishing a walk, completing a journal entry, having a deep conversation started to feel genuinely satisfying again.</p><p>Real-world experiences also triggered healthier hormones:</p><ul><li><strong>Oxytocin</strong>, released through eye contact, conversation, and human connection</li><li><strong>Serotonin</strong>, supporting mood stability</li><li>Sustainable <strong>dopamine</strong>, earned through effort and achievement, not endless scrolling</li></ul><p>Unlike digital hits, these effects lingered.</p><h3>Saturdays in Karura: A Weekly Reset</h3><p>Every Saturday from <strong>7 a.m. to noon</strong>, I disconnect deliberately.</p><p>Karura Forest has become my reset button.</p><p>I arrive early, phone on silent or sometimes left behind completely and let the greenery do its work. I walk or cycle along the color-coded trails, breathing air that instantly lowers my stress levels. The city fades. My mind slows.</p><p>I find a quiet spot to reflect, free from blue-light distractions. Journaling follows pen on paper where thoughts untangle and emotions settle.</p><p>And then there are the conversations. Real ones. With hikers, families, strangers. Brief exchanges or longer chats that feel more nourishing than hundreds of online messages ever did.</p><h3>What Changed and What’s Still Changing</h3><p>Within weeks, the shifts were noticeable:</p><ul><li>Sharper focus</li><li>Reduced anxiety</li><li>Better sleep</li><li>Calmer moods</li><li>Warmer, more present interactions</li></ul><p>Nature is remarkably efficient at lowering stress hormones. Reading and journaling offer immediate emotional relief. In-person conversations release oxytocin almost instantly, softening misunderstandings and strengthening bonds.</p><p>Over time, I believe this routine is <strong>rewiring me for resilience</strong>. Regular nature exposure supports cognitive health and reduces depression risk. Journaling builds self-awareness and emotional regulation. Prioritising real relationships strengthens empathy in ways no comment section ever could.</p><h3>The Friction Is Real</h3><p>This shift hasn’t been friction-free.</p><p>Slower responses sometimes feel like neglect to others. Friends used to instant replies drift slightly. Dedicating Saturdays to Karura means fewer spontaneous plans and occasional family tension. Early detox phases brought irritability classic dopamine withdrawal.</p><p>And in a hyper-connected world, there’s always the fear of missing something urgent or appearing out of touch professionally.</p><p>So I compromise. I stay online during the week but <strong>intentionally </strong>purpose over habit.</p><h3>Choosing Real Over Reel</h3><p>The gains of mental clarity, deeper relationships, and genuine joy far outweigh the costs.</p><p>In Nairobi’s chaos, this simple routine has redefined my life. From a screen-dependent 2025 to a more grounded, hormone balanced 2026, I’m choosing <strong>real over reel</strong>.</p><p>If you’re caught in the scroll, start small.<br> One unplugged conversation.<br> One walk in nature.</p><p>The transformation is worth it.<br> Your future self and the people who love you — will thank you. 🌿</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d3f4d1e00159" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Next for Research and Advisory Firms in Africa After USAID Cuts: A Shifting Landscape]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/what-next-for-research-and-advisory-firms-in-africa-after-usaid-cuts-a-shifting-landscape-fcb842ea7d7d?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fcb842ea7d7d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 21:21:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-26T21:31:14.811Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oHsWMm9lqrRbZXo3uMtNuQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4>A Seismic Shift in Development Funding</h4><p>As of March 26, 2025, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), once a linchpin of foreign assistance in Africa, has undergone a dramatic reduction in scope. Following a 90-day funding freeze initiated in January 2025 under the Trump administration, USAID’s budget — previously hovering around $44 billion globally in 2023, with significant allocations to Africa — has been slashed, and its workforce reduced from 10,000 to a skeletal crew. This shift has profound implications for research and advisory firms across the continent, which depended heavily on USAID contracts for studies in health, governance, agriculture, and climate resilience. With top recipients like Ethiopia ($1.37 billion in 2023), Somalia ($973 million), and the Democratic Republic of Congo ($943 million) now facing aid gaps, these firms must navigate uncharted waters. This article examines their next steps, alongside the emerging roles of other development partners and African governments in filling the void.</p><h4>The Immediate Impact: A Research Ecosystem in Crisis</h4><p>The USAID cuts have hit research and advisory firms hard. In 2023, sub-Saharan Africa received approximately $8 billion in U.S. aid, much of it channeled through these firms for data-driven policy advice and program evaluation. The sudden halt of multi-year contracts has triggered financial distress, particularly for smaller, local outfits lacking the reserves of international giants like Deloitte or Palladium. A Kampala-based researcher noted in early 2025 that her firm, previously tasked with evaluating USAID’s Feed the Future initiative, faces closure without swift intervention. Beyond finances, the cuts disrupt critical knowledge production. Projects on HIV/AIDS prevention in South Africa and famine early-warning systems in the Sahel — once USAID staples — are now stalled, leaving policymakers without vital insights at a time of escalating crises.</p><p>The loss of USAID’s institutional memory compounds the challenge. Decades of datasets, networks, and expertise are evaporating as staff depart and systems shut down. For firms, this means not only a loss of funding but also a diminished ability to leverage historical data for new proposals, weakening their competitiveness in a shrinking market.</p><h4>Adaptation Strategies: Reinvention or Collapse</h4><p>To survive, research and advisory firms are pivoting with urgency. Three strategies dominate their response:</p><ol><li><strong>Diversifying Funding Streams</strong><br> Firms are courting alternative donors like the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth &amp; Development Office (FCDO), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The EU, which provided €17 billion in official development assistance (ODA) to Africa in 2023, is a prime target, though its bureaucratic processes favor established players. China’s aid, tied to the Belt and Road Initiative, offers another avenue, but its focus on infrastructure over research limits its appeal. A Ghanaian firm recently secured an AfDB grant to study urban resilience, signaling a viable path for those adept at navigating new donor landscapes.</li><li><strong>Tapping African Resources</strong><br> With foreign aid faltering, firms are turning inward. The Africa Wealth Report 2024 highlights 135,200 millionaires on the continent and $100 billion in annual remittances — pools of capital ripe for research funding. A Nairobi-based advisory group partnered with a Kenyan philanthropist in February 2025 to fund climate adaptation studies, a model others are replicating. African governments, too, are being pitched as clients, though debt burdens (e.g., Zambia’s $13 billion external debt) constrain their ability to pay. Tax incentives for corporate giving, proposed by analysts in early 2025, could unlock further domestic resources if implemented.</li><li><strong>Private-Sector Pivot</strong><br> The corporate sector beckons as multinationals expand in Africa. Firms are repositioning as consultants for companies like MTN or Unilever, offering market analysis and regulatory guidance. A South African firm transitioned from USAID health research to advising a tech company on digital inclusion in March 2025, preserving jobs but shifting focus from public goods to profit-driven outcomes. This trend risks sidelining socially critical research unless balanced with other funding.</li></ol><h4>Opportunities for Reinvention</h4><p>The USAID retreat offers a chance to reshape Africa’s research landscape. First, it reduces dependency on a single donor, historically a vulnerability exposed by this crisis. Local firms, once overshadowed by U.S. contractors, can now lead proposals to regional bodies like the African Union, retaining more control and revenue. Second, it forces innovation. Firms are upskilling staff in grant writing and data science to compete globally, while consortia — like a recent West African research alliance — pool resources for resilience. Finally, it prompts a rethink of aid itself. Critics argue USAID’s top-down model often misaligned with African priorities; its absence could foster locally driven research agendas.</p><h4>The Role of Other Development Partners</h4><p>As USAID fades, other players are stepping up — or stepping back. The EU and FCDO aim to maintain influence, with the EU pledging €150 billion through its Global Gateway initiative by 2027, including research components. However, their cuts — Germany slashed €4.8 billion from ODA between 2022 and 2025 — signal a broader donor fatigue post-COVID-19. China’s presence grows, with $160 billion invested in African projects by late 2024, but its aid prioritizes tangible assets over knowledge production, leaving research firms underserved. Middle powers like Turkey and the UAE offer niche support — Turkey funds education studies in Somalia — but lack USAID’s scale. Multilaterals like the World Bank and AfDB are poised to expand, with the latter’s $10 billion annual lending capacity a potential lifeline, though competition for funds will intensify.</p><p>Geopolitically, the U.S. withdrawal cedes soft-power ground. China and Russia may exploit this, but their transactional approaches — loans over grants — contrast with USAID’s development focus, potentially alienating African partners seeking sustainable growth. The uncertainty of USAID’s post-review fate (due April 2025) keeps hope alive for a partial rebound, but few expect a return to its former glory.</p><h4>African Governments: Stepping Into the Breach?</h4><p>Country governments face a dual burden: replacing lost aid and sustaining research. Ethiopia’s government, reeling from a $1.7 billion USAID cut, plans to redirect agricultural taxes to fund local studies, a move echoed in Kenya and Nigeria. Yet, fiscal realities — Africa’s $1 trillion debt stock in 2024 — limit ambition. Governments must also prioritize. Rwanda’s investment in health data systems, leveraging past USAID support, contrasts with Sudan’s focus on emergency relief amid conflict. Regional integration, as suggested by energy expert Daniel Kitwa in February 2025, could pool resources for economies of scale, but political will lags.</p><p>Philanthropy offers a bridge. Nigeria’s government is exploring tax breaks to incentivize corporate research funding, while South Africa courts diaspora contributions for HIV studies. These efforts, if scaled, could reduce reliance on external aid, aligning with calls for self-reliance from leaders like Liberia’s W. Gyude Moore.</p><h4>Conclusion: A New Paradigm Emerging</h4><p>The USAID funding cuts mark a turning point for research and advisory firms in Africa. Survival demands adaptability — diversifying funding, tapping local wealth, and serving private clients — while offering a chance to break from foreign dependency. Other development partners will fill gaps unevenly, with multilaterals and African institutions likely outpacing bilateral donors. Governments, constrained yet compelled, must innovate to sustain knowledge production. The human stakes are high: stalled research on malaria or food security translates to lives lost. Yet, from this disruption, a more autonomous, resilient research ecosystem could emerge — one rooted in African agency, not donor whims. The next year will test whether this vision holds.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fcb842ea7d7d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Kimisitu Sacco at 40: Navigating Challenges and Charting a Path Forward]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/kimisitu-sacco-at-40-navigating-challenges-and-charting-a-path-forward-552b0b493fcc?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/552b0b493fcc</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Mar 2025 09:41:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-07T09:45:45.723Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O9ubxOm8S9hjv3VCWuilCw.jpeg" /><figcaption>[Credit]</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Kimisitu Sacco at 40: Navigating Challenges and Charting a Path Forward</strong></p><p>Kimisitu Sacco, established in March 1985 by a group of staff from the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), has grown over its 40-year history into a significant player in Kenya’s cooperative sector. With a mission to promote thrift and provide affordable financial solutions, the Sacco now serves approximately 16,000 members drawn from NGOs, embassies, international organizations, and individual savers. However, as it celebrates four decades of existence, Kimisitu faces mounting challenges — ranging from member retention to trust issues stemming from the recent KUSCCO heist — that threaten its stability and growth. To secure its future, retain its current membership, recruit new members, and achieve its three-year strategic goals, Kimisitu must address these challenges head-on by enhancing transparency, ensuring regulatory compliance, delivering higher returns, and strengthening its organizational framework under robust leadership.</p><p><strong>Challenges Facing Kimisitu Sacco</strong></p><p>Over its 40 years, Kimisitu has encountered numerous hurdles, including slow decision-making, resistance to change, inadequate budgets, and competition from commercial banks, as noted in a University of Nairobi study on strategy implementation challenges at the Sacco. The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic further strained its operations, testing its resilience. However, the most pressing issue today is the erosion of trust following the KUSCCO heist — a scandal that rocked Kenya’s Sacco sector in early 2025. The forensic audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers revealed financial irregularities at KUSCCO, including Sh3.7 billion in non-performing loans and Sh2.7 billion in irregular commissions, impacting affiliated Saccos like Kimisitu. Members, particularly those reliant on their savings for financial security, now question the safety of their funds, risking a wave of withdrawals that could destabilize Kimisitu’s liquidity.</p><p><strong>Strategies for Member Retention and Recruitment</strong></p><p>To retain its 16,000 members and attract new ones, Kimisitu must prioritize trust-building and value delivery. First, it should enhance member engagement by offering competitive financial products, such as its existing mobile loans (up to KES 300,000) and holiday savings accounts with premium dividends. Raising dividend rates — already a key draw for Sacco members — requires prudent investment strategies and cost management, ensuring higher returns without compromising financial stability. Digital innovation, like the Kimisitu Money app and USSD *503# platform, should be expanded to improve accessibility, especially for younger, tech-savvy prospects.</p><p>Recruitment efforts should target untapped segments, such as SMEs and youth groups, by tailoring products to their needs — e.g., business loans or savings plans with flexible terms. Marketing campaigns highlighting Kimisitu’s 40-year legacy and resilience can differentiate it from competitors, while partnerships with reputable NGOs and corporates can expand its reach. A clear three-year strategy, publicized to members, should set ambitious yet achievable membership growth targets, leveraging Kimisitu’s 7.4% growth from 2020 to 2021 as a benchmark.</p><p><strong>Restoring Trust Post-KUSCCO Heist</strong></p><p>The KUSCCO scandal has cast a shadow over the Sacco sector, amplifying the need for transparency. Kimisitu must distance itself from the fallout by conducting and publicizing an independent audit of its finances, demonstrating that its assets — unlike KUSCCO’s — are secure. Regular communication with members through newsletters, AGMs, and digital updates can reinforce accountability, detailing how funds are managed and protected. Adopting a member-focused service charter, as suggested for KUSCCO’s leadership, would prioritize member benefits and provide mechanisms for feedback and grievance resolution, rebuilding confidence.</p><p><strong>Ensuring Transparency and Regulatory Compliance</strong></p><p>Transparency and compliance are non-negotiable for Kimisitu’s survival. The Sacco must fully adhere to the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) guidelines, which it has historically complied with, as noted by Commissioner David Obonyo. Strengthening internal controls — such as rigorous loan approval processes and risk management systems — can prevent mismanagement. Adopting external audits by reputable firms and aligning with proposed reforms, like the SACCO Deposit Guarantee Fund, would further safeguard member deposits, offering a safety net absent during the KUSCCO crisis. Compliance not only mitigates risks but also enhances Kimisitu’s reputation, convincing members to remain loyal and patronize its products.</p><p><strong>Building Strong Systems and Leadership</strong></p><p>A robust organizational framework is critical to execute these strategies. Kimisitu needs a CEO with a proven track record in financial management and cooperative governance — someone who can enforce internal policies, streamline operations, and work collaboratively with the board. The CEO’s role, as outlined in past Kimisitu job descriptions, includes translating strategic plans into actionable objectives, ensuring regulatory adherence, and fostering a culture of integrity. The board, meanwhile, must align its vision with member needs, approving investments that yield higher returns while maintaining liquidity. Investing in technology — such as automated risk assessment tools — can enhance efficiency, while staff training ensures competence in delivering member services.</p><p><strong>Delivering Higher Returns and Member Loyalty</strong></p><p>Higher returns are the linchpin of member retention. By diversifying its investment portfolio — perhaps into real estate or government securities — Kimisitu can boost profitability without the reckless borrowing that plagued KUSCCO. Avoiding the “financial acrobatics” criticized in the sector, the Sacco should balance dividend payouts with reserve growth, ensuring sustainability. Loyal members, convinced of Kimisitu’s stability and value, will not only stay but also become advocates, driving organic recruitment.</p><p>In Summary</p><p><strong>Member Retention and Recruitment Strategies</strong></p><p>To maintain and expand its membership, Kimisitu must implement effective strategies that resonate with both existing and potential members. Key approaches include:</p><ol><li><strong>Crafting a Compelling Value Proposition</strong>: Clearly articulating the benefits of membership is crucial. This involves offering competitive loan products, attractive savings options, and additional services such as financial literacy programs. By demonstrating tangible value, members are more likely to remain loyal and prospective members more inclined to join.</li><li><strong>Leveraging Diverse Communication Channels</strong>: Utilizing a mix of digital platforms (social media, email newsletters) and traditional methods (community meetings, print media) ensures broad outreach. Tailoring messages to address the specific needs and preferences of different demographic groups can enhance engagement and appeal.</li><li><strong>Hosting Engaging Events</strong>: Organizing workshops, seminars, and open days provides platforms for members to interact, learn, and voice their concerns. Such events not only educate but also strengthen the sense of community and belonging among members. For instance, Kimisitu has previously conducted successful member education days focusing on areas like agribusiness and real estate investment, reflecting responsiveness to member interests.<br><a href="https://saccoreview.co.ke/kimisitu-sacco-conducts-a-successful-members-education-day/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"> saccoreview.co.ke</a></li><li><strong>Implementing Referral Programs</strong>: Encouraging existing members to refer new ones through incentives can harness the power of word-of-mouth marketing. Members who have positive experiences are likely to advocate for the Sacco, thereby facilitating organic growth.</li><li><strong>Fostering a Welcoming Environment</strong>: Ensuring that new members feel valued from the onset is vital. A structured onboarding process, opportunities for involvement in decision-making, and recognition of member contributions can enhance satisfaction and loyalty.</li></ol><p><strong>Rebuilding Trust Post-KUSCCO Heist</strong></p><p>The recent financial scandal involving the Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (KUSCCO) has shaken confidence in the Sacco sector. A forensic audit revealed massive fraud and mismanagement, leading to insolvency and jeopardizing member deposits. <a href="https://thinkbusinessafrica.com/kuscco-crisis-exposes-regulatory-gaps-implications-for-kenyas-sacco-sector-and-revival-prospects/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">thinkbusinessafrica.com</a></p><p>Although Kimisitu was not directly implicated, the ripple effects necessitate proactive measures to restore and maintain member trust:</p><ol><li><strong>Transparent Communication</strong>: Regularly updating members on financial standings, decision-making processes, and any challenges faced fosters an environment of openness. Transparency can alleviate fears and build confidence in the Sacco’s operations.</li><li><strong>Strengthening Internal Controls</strong>: Implementing robust financial management systems and internal audits can detect and prevent irregularities. Clear policies and procedures ensure accountability and integrity in operations.</li><li><strong>Engaging External Auditors</strong>: Periodic reviews by reputable external auditors provide an unbiased assessment of the Sacco’s financial health. Sharing audit results with members demonstrates a commitment to accountability.</li></ol><p><strong>Ensuring Transparency and Regulatory Compliance</strong></p><p>Adherence to regulatory standards is non-negotiable for the sustainability of any financial institution. Kimisitu can achieve this through:</p><ol><li><strong>Aligning with Regulatory Bodies</strong>: Collaborating closely with entities like the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) ensures compliance with national standards and guidelines. Staying abreast of regulatory changes and implementing necessary adjustments is crucial.</li><li><strong>Implementing Comprehensive Policies</strong>: Developing and enforcing policies on risk management, anti-money laundering, and data protection safeguards the Sacco and its members. Regular training for staff on these policies ensures effective implementation.</li><li><strong>Utilizing Technology for Compliance</strong>: Adopting digital solutions can streamline compliance processes. For example, automated reporting systems can ensure timely and accurate submissions to regulatory bodies.</li></ol><p><strong>Building Strong Systems and Leadership</strong></p><p>The foundation of a resilient Sacco lies in its systems and leadership. Key initiatives include:</p><ol><li><strong>Investing in Technology</strong>: Modernizing IT infrastructure enhances operational efficiency and member experience. Online platforms for loan applications, account management, and customer service can meet the evolving needs of members.</li><li><strong>Recruiting Competent Leadership</strong>: Appointing a CEO with a proven track record in financial management and a deep understanding of the cooperative movement is essential. Such leadership can drive strategic initiatives and uphold Sacco’s values.<strong>Capacity Building for the Board</strong>: Continuous training for board members on governance, regulatory requirements, and strategic planning ensures informed decision-making. A knowledgeable board can effectively oversee management and steer Sacco towards its goals.</li></ol><p><strong>Enhancing Member Returns and Loyalty</strong></p><p>Ultimately, the success of Kimisitu hinges on its ability to deliver value to its members. Strategies to achieve this include:</p><ol><li><strong>Diversifying Product Offerings</strong>: Introducing tailored financial products that cater to the diverse needs of members can enhance satisfaction. For example, offering micro-loans, investment opportunities, or insurance products adds value.</li><li><strong>Competitive Interest Rates</strong>: Balancing loan interest rates and savings returns ensures that members feel they are receiving fair value. Regular market analysis can help in setting rates that are both competitive and sustainable.</li><li><strong>Rewarding Loyalty</strong>: Implementing programs that recognize and reward long-term members fosters a sense of appreciation. This could include bonuses, special rates, or public acknowledgment of their commitment.</li></ol><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Kimisitu Sacco’s 40-year journey reflects resilience and adaptability, but its next chapter hinges on decisive action. By addressing the KUSCCO fallout with transparency, reinforcing compliance, and delivering tangible benefits under strong leadership, Kimisitu can retain its 16,000 members, grow its base, and achieve its three-year strategy. A revitalized Sacco, trusted and member-centric, will not only survive but thrive, honoring its founding mission for decades to come.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>1. Kimisitu Sacco. (n.d.). *Home*. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.kimisitusacco.or.ke./">www.kimisitusacco.or.ke.</a></p><p>2. University of Nairobi. (n.d.). *Challenges of Strategy Implementation at Kimisitu Sacco Ltd, Kenya*. Retrieved from erepository.uonbi.ac.ke.</p><p>3. Fintech Association of Kenya. (2025, March 2). *The Silent Heist: Inside Kenya’s SACCO Crisis*. Retrieved from fintechassociation.africa.</p><p>4. Pulselive Kenya. (n.d.). *How KUSCCO Fraud Scandal Could Impact Affected SACCO Members*. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.pulselive.co.ke./">www.pulselive.co.ke.</a></p><p>5. Issuu. (n.d.). *With a Rising Asset Base, Kimisitu Sacco Eyes Sturdy Growth*. Retrieved from issuu.com.</p><p>—</p><p>The writer has been a Kimisitu member since 2018. The writer used GROK and CHATGPT for some of the context analysis. This is an opinion article and doesn’t reflect view of Kimisitu sacco or its directors, members or entire fraternity. This is NOT paid advert.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=552b0b493fcc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Role of the Ethical Review Process in Research.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/the-role-of-the-ethical-review-process-in-research-713104d58b8a?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/713104d58b8a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 May 2023 22:17:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-16T22:29:06.976Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KQo32SF6FdRmWCaVXkG37w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image from Unsplash</figcaption></figure><p>By <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/kelvin-qihindas/">Kelvin Qihindas</a> and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/joel-wambua-12894197/">Joel Wambua</a></p><p>When a new research study is commissioned, especially in non-medical research, there are usually conversations about whether they should be subjected to the ethical review process. However, the focus of these conversations should extend beyond evading scrutiny or simply avoiding unethical practices, as pointed out by Macfarlane (2009). Instead, these discussions ought to revolve around the essence of ethical research and the responsibilities of researchers in upholding ethical conduct, with due consideration to the function of Ethics Review Committees in this regard Lindorff (2010). In reality, many research studies may involve the risk of harm to participants and conflicts of interest for researchers. Thus, researchers should go beyond a rule-based approach to ethics and ethical review and critically examine the issues that may be associated with their study and actively protect participants from any harm. The first question then becomes, what principles ought to guide researchers in conducting ethical research? Second, should such research undergo an ethical review process, or is it the Principal Investigators’ responsibility to ensure ethical conduct in their research Lindorff (2010)?</p><p>The topic of research ethics is complex and often involves balancing competing principles and interests. For instance, individual rights may conflict with the potential benefits to a larger group of people. While “being truthful and doing no physical harm” may seem like a straightforward ethical guideline, they do not encompass all the issues related to participant, group, and community realities. Moreover, predicting harm is challenging (Richardson &amp; Godfrey, 2003) and requires a deep understanding of the participant’s context. The reality is, most researchers are usually busy and do not have the time knowledge, or other resources to gather the data necessary to predict every possible outcome of their research. Their area of expertise is usually technical, rather than in research ethics, and their knowledge is limited by the number of projects they have worked on Lindorff (2010). With this reality, there are three options available to researchers. The first is to develop a deep understanding of research ethics and become an expert in both their technical area and ethical principles. The second is to seek out the expertise of others who specialize in research ethics. The third is for researchers to develop awareness of ethical issues and also seek out the expertise of others. The first while possible, requires a lot of time and effort which researchers simply do not have, and also provides no mechanisms to check researcher biases. The second option does not create an opportunity for researchers to fully engage with issues associated with their study. This leaves us with the third option which allows researchers to benefit from the expertise of ethical specialists in improving their research designs, while also developing their awareness of ethical issues.</p><p>The ethical review process should not be viewed as a limitation of researcher autonomy. Instead, it should be viewed as a crucial component of the research process that enables and ensures high-quality, ethical research. Ethical review boards have a wealth of expertise among their members, including experienced members of the scientific community and community representatives who have a broad understanding of ethics in various research contexts. This diverse range of expertise is a valuable resource for researchers who may be limited by time and resources, and it can raise their awareness of ethical considerations beyond their immediate research focus.</p><p>Although the ethical review boards (ERBs) serve as valuable resources, researchers ultimately bear personal responsibility for ensuring the ethical conduct of their work. Ethical research should not be reduced to a mere “box-ticking” exercise, but rather, it should involve critical reflection on the ethical principles guiding research at the proposal stage. Researchers should challenge themselves by asking difficult questions about the potential benefits and harms of their research, ensuring that their work is respectful, and upholding the principles of individual autonomy.</p><h4><strong>The Ethical Review Process</strong></h4><p>For a research protocol to be approved, it must comply with international requirements such as human rights laws, ethical principles, and applicable state legislation (World Health Organization, 2020). As discussed in the section above, the ethics review process helps researchers conduct studies ethically and responsibly. When reviewing a research protocol, the Ethical Review Board pays close attention to the following aspects:</p><h4>A. Ethical considerations</h4><p>The protocol must demonstrate that the researcher has done due diligence on the potential harm that may be associated with their research and well-established solutions to mitigate the risks (Conradie et al., 2018). The ethics review process prioritizes the safety and privacy of human and animal subjects (Shaw et al., 2020). To protect research participants, the ethics review panel assesses the potential benefits and risks of the study design and implementation (Feeney et al., 2022). Specifically, the panel evaluates whether the benefits of the research outweigh any potential harm or risk to the participant, and ensures that the research is conducted in a manner that minimizes harm. In this way, the ethical review process safeguards the safety and welfare of human participants throughout the study (Conradie et al., 2018). Furthermore, the ethical review process assesses whether a study respects participants by obtaining informed consent and assures participants’ privacy and dignity. By upholding these ethical standards, the review process helps to maintain public trust in the research being conducted. Transparency and monitoring are crucial to ensuring that the study is conducted ethically and with the highest standards of integrity.</p><h4>B. Benefits and risk</h4><p>The ethical review process ensures that no particular group bears a disproportionate burden or harm in the study, while also ensuring that every group has an equitable opportunity to benefit from the research (Conradie et al., 2018). This includes assessing whether certain populations may be more vulnerable or at greater risk of harm as study participants and taking appropriate measures to mitigate these risks. To ensure the ethical validity of a study, the recruitment plan must be well-defined, balanced, and clearly articulate the study’s purpose, potential risks, and benefits (Feeney et al., 2022). Additionally, the protocol should provide a thorough explanation of any potential threats to the participants and outline strategies to minimize or prevent these risks, among other relevant details.</p><h4>C. Scientific rigor and validity</h4><p>The protocol must also be based on sound scientific approaches (Feeney et al., 2022). A study that lacks scientific rigor and validity can expose participants or their communities to potential harm without providing any expected benefits. Such studies may not accurately measure the intended outcomes or may produce unreliable results, which could lead to incorrect conclusions or decisions.</p><h4>D. Researcher skill and resources</h4><p>If a prior scientific evaluation has not already identified them, the ethical review process assesses several factors including the researcher’s qualifications and skills, the adequacy of resources for conducting and monitoring the research, the suitability of the study site, and other relevant aspects. These resources may include the availability of sufficient staff and appropriate infrastructure.</p><h4><strong>Compliance with Approved Protocols of the Ethical Review Committees</strong></h4><p>Generally, researchers and institutions are expected to adhere to the set guidelines by the ethical review committees. These requirements are created to ensure that studies are conducted ethically, with a focus on upholding the safety and well-being of the participants (Conradie et al., 2018). The committee may approve study proposals, but modifications to the design and procedures may be required before full support is given. After approval, researchers must adhere to the protocol and processes throughout the study event (Shaw et al., 2020). Although most researchers comply with the approved protocols, some disregard them, resulting in potential harm to participants. In other instances, the researchers that fail to comply with the approved conditions are suspended or revoked from further research funding. Also, disciplinary action is taken against them(Feeney et al., 2022).</p><p>The ethical approval committee ensures that every researcher and organization adheres to the approved protocol by requiring routine reports to be submitted to the review board (Conradie et al., 2018). These reports detail the study’s progress and any changes or variations from the approved protocols (Shaw et al., 2020). Additionally, ethical review committees may conduct site visits or audits to verify compliance with the supported protocols, including the protection of participants’ privacy and confidentiality. Breaches of privacy can be disrespectful and make participants feel embarrassed and under social stigma, potentially leading to rejection by their families and communities (Conradie et al., 2018).</p><h4><strong>Should some studies be exempted from the ethical review process?</strong></h4><p>Lindorff (2010) identifies three common arguments used to justify not submitting a study to ERCs or other external review processes: 1) Non-medical research does not involve ethical issues or risk of harm to participants or others and, therefore, does not require ethical review. 2) Non-medical research involves ethical issues, but these do not pose a risk of harm to participants or others, and hence, ethical review is not necessary. 3) Non-medical research involves ethical issues that may pose a risk to participants or others, but researchers fully understand and address these issues, making ethical review unnecessary. However, in practice, studies always involve some form of risk of harm to participants and conflicts of interest for researchers.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>The ethical review process is crucial for all parties involved, including participants, the community, the researcher, and the research institution. Therefore, it should be regarded as a valuable resource to assist researchers in conducting ethical research, rather than simply a means of enforcement. By following ethical guidelines and obtaining ethical approval, researchers can demonstrate their commitment to conducting research that is respectful, responsible, and beneficial. In this way, the ethical review process serves to protect the rights and welfare of research participants, foster community trust and engagement, and promote scientific integrity</p><h4><strong>References</strong></h4><p>Conradie, A., Duys, R., Forget, P., &amp; Biccard, B. M. (2018). Barriers to clinical research in Africa: a quantitative and qualitative survey of clinical researchers in 27 African countries. <em>British Journal of Anaesthesia</em>, <em>121</em>(4), 813–821. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S000709121830521X">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S000709121830521X</a></p><p>Feeney, L., Kopper, S., Sautmann, A., &amp; Gault, S. (2022). Ethical conduct of randomized evaluations. <a href="https://www.povertyactionlab.org/resource/ethical-conduct-randomized-evaluations">https://www.povertyactionlab.org/resource/ethical-conduct-randomized-evaluations</a></p><p>Kumwenda, S., El Hadji, A. N., Orondo, P. W., William, P., Oyinlola, L., Bongo, G. N., &amp; Chiwona, B. (2017). Challenges facing young African scientists in their research careers: A qualitative exploratory study. <em>Malawi Medical Journal</em>, <em>29</em>(1), 1–4. <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/mmj/article/view/155437/145062">https://www.ajol.info/index.php/mmj/article/view/155437/145062</a></p><p>Shaw, R. M., Howe, J., Beazer, J., &amp; Carr, T. (2020). Ethics and positionality in qualitative research with vulnerable and marginal groups. Qualitative Research, 20(3), 277–293. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Toni_Carr/publication/332453364_Ethics_and_positionality_in_qualitative_research_with_vulnerable_and_marginal_groups/links/5d0c330e299bf1547c715b5d/Ethics-and-positionality-in-qualitative-research-with-vulnerable-and-marginal-groups.pdf">https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Toni_Carr/publication/332453364_Ethics_and_positionality_in_qualitative_research_with_vulnerable_and_marginal_groups/links/5d0c330e299bf1547c715b5d/Ethics-and-positionality-in-qualitative-research-with-vulnerable-and-marginal-groups.pdf</a></p><p>World Health Organization. (2020). Ensuring ethical standards and procedures for research with human beings. Published 2020. <a href="https://www.who.int/activities/ensuring-ethical-standards-and-procedures-for-research-with-human-beings">https://www.who.int/activities/ensuring-ethical-standards-and-procedures-for-research-with-human-beings</a></p><p>Lindorff, M. (2010). Ethics, ethical human research, and human research ethics committees. Monash University.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=713104d58b8a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Assessing the Economics of Insecurity in Africa: A Gender Perspective]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/assessing-the-economics-of-insecurity-in-africa-a-gender-perspective-ab4b804a7b57?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab4b804a7b57</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Aug 2022 10:09:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-29T10:12:25.863Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/kelvin-qihindas/"> Kelvin Qihindas</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*fun5q9wf6QRp9nCxFdouGQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Unsplush Photos</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Economic insecurity has led to rampant academic focus in general, particularly over the past years as a result of the 2008 world economic crisis. The view of security has frequently narrowed its concentration on matters surrounding the protection general boundaries from threats that come from outside. However, a better view of economic insecurity has become extremely significant in the past ten years or so. The objective is to integrate several dimensions of the drawback risks impacting the overall welfare or dignity of individuals. Even with the rising importance, the debates surrounding economic insecurities have failed to address gender matters: particularly how poverty issues and underdevelopment affect both men and women encounters and plans differently.</p><p>Since the introduction of insecurity of economics in 1994 in the Human Development report, the view of economic insecurity has been extremely influential among global development experts and academics. However gendered scopes of economic insecurity have less or not attracted enough focus, yet they are vitally important. Various studies have shown that Women are extremely more susceptible to diseases among other forms of human insecurity. This is due to the differences in privileges, empowerment, and a sequence of other environmental and socio-economic aspects. Kopasker et al. (2018) shows that though the magnitude of its effects changes across degrees of insecurity, studies show that economic insecurities are more destructive for men and their impacts are constant throughout the distribution of income. Conflicts and civilized crises impact both men and women differently because of their different entitlements in the society and firm socio-cultural and economic inequities that are worsened during crises. Gressmann (2016), point that male form the several majorities of directed victims of armed violence and related effects like forced recruitment or subjective detention. According to a study conducted recently in exploration of gender, climate and a nation’s stability, these aspects were positively linked to each other. Thus, this paper seeks to assess the economics of insecurity in Africa in a gender perspective. It also seeks to explain the effects of insecurity and conflicts on the economy of a country by assesses the impacts of insecurity in men and women’s economy. The paper depends on gender focused assessment to evaluate several issues primary to gender economic insecurity and development in Africa.</p><p><strong>Explaining The Effects of Insecurity and Conflicts on the Economy of a Country</strong></p><p>Conflicts in their various forms and displays remain prevalent globally. While a declining trend was seen in the occurrence and magnitude of conflicts in sub- Saharan Africa in early years of 2000, there has been a rise in conflicts in the present years. This reflects the increase in conflicts globally. Generally, approximately a third of the nations in sub–Saharan Africa have been greatly impacted by the recent conflicts. Insecurities can interfere with economic activities in a number of ways. The effects can also be extreme and long lasting. Fear as a result of violence and property damage can be obstacles of economic development by increasing the cost of transport of goods and people, capital flight or even result in postponed investments. Conflicts can also result in political institutions and public amenities including health and education services breaking down. More over the effect of insecurity and conflicts such as refugee crises can spill over to other countries. They are also more likely to weaken law enforcements and threaten property entitlements thus suppressing economic activities.</p><p>Conflicts in Africa to be precise have been more deadly. While the correct number of violence related deaths are difficult to approximate, evaluations display at least 825,000 verified deaths in in the 1990s alone. According to Newiak (2019), high death count was led by the genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda. Additionally, the tolls in deaths rose from the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, prolonged conflict in Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leon just to name a few. As most of the violence came to an end in 2000, the number of deaths as a result of conflict in these areas dropped significantly to approximately 2,200 in 2010. Pape&amp; Finn (2019), confirm that to understand the effects of conflicts to the economy of Sudan for example, a survey was launched by the World Bank on the country. The South Sudan High Frequency Survey allied with the National Bureau of Statistics receiving funds from the U.K Department for International Development. Groups of skilled enumerators performed interviews on family heads in every accessible part of Sudan since 2015. They tracked real time costs and gave voices to the poor by taking their video testimonials. According to the South Sudan Poverty Assessment, poverty count rose from 51% between 2009 and 2016 to 82%. This implied that many individuals in the country were living under global poverty line of 1.90 dollars daily in 2016. The number was inclusive of huge single year rise of 16% points from 2015 to 2016. This was due to the related shocks resulting from conflict. The poverty gap doubled from 23 to 47 percent in 2009 to 2016 respectively.</p><p>In theory, conflicts differ along several lengths. For instance, involved actors (the state against the non-state), motive (religious, radical, racial), and location (domestic against intercontinental, center against periphery) among others. Practically however, groupings are not usually mutually exclusive. They tend to include some subjective reasoning. Additionally, the required data for classification reasons may also be unavailable. Nevertheless, the paper uses available resources on conflicts to assess the various natures and their effects. Newiak (2019) shows a large-scale nation-based conflicts like violence in Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sierra Leone. The article shows the conflicts significantly led to increases in conflict-based deaths in the Sub-Saharan Africa before the year 2000. However, from then onwards the contributions of non-state-based violence deaths significantly outlined to be inclusive of conflicts between two non-state armed teams. The study also shows violent scenarios such as terrorist conflicts have increased in Sahel, Congo, Nigeria and Kenya and their impacts on the economic development of the countries and their neighbors. As war persists in Ukraine, the effects of rising food prices and inadequacy in staple crops are already evident in the North and Near East of African territories. It is further spreading to the most susceptible nations in Africa including the Horn of Africa on a global view. A quarter of the world’s wheat exports originate from Russia and Ukraine. 40% of corn and wheat are imported by the Middle East Africa from Ukraine. The Middle East countries are already experiencing hunger problems thus the current food shortages and rising pieces will drive more of them into poverty. Russia is also the largest fertilizer producer on a global scale. Even before the Russian Conflict, rise in prices of fertilizer in 2021 led to a spike in food prices by approximately 30%. According to IFAD’s evaluation, the impact that the conflict will have on an existing poor small-scale producers and local consumers will be severe. International Funds for Agricultural Development assessments indicate confirm that increase in the prices of fuel, staple foods, and fertilizers among others as a result of the conflict are affecting the developing nations of Africa. According to their study in Somali, around 3.8 million individuals are already experiencing food insecurity. The cost of transport and electricity has risen as a result of the spikes in the cost of fuels. This in turn has affected the poor small-scale farmers and pastoral communities who depend on irrigation powered by low diesel engines due to unstable climates. Similarly in Egypt, wheat and sunflower oil prices have spiked because the country depends on Ukraine and Russia for 85% of its wheat and 73% of its sunflower oil supplies. According to Rome (2022), 22% of Lebanon families are experiencing food insecurity as the country imports about 80% of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia. Lebanon can only keep approximately one month’s value of the crop each time since the explosion in Beirut’s port that occurred in 2020 damaged the nation’s main grain stores.</p><p>Conflicts result in a prolonged effect on human labor and capital. In Sub Saharan Africa, violence mirrors wide concerns that the nature of the conflicts has changed. Societies feel the impacts of conflicts and insecurities in Africa. Conflict and insecurity damage the lives of many individuals with different intensity levels. They are also attributed to persistent assaults and abuses. For instance, the conflicts of the Democratic republic of Congo that occurred between 1993 to 2003, reported fatality cases were estimated at 5 million. Mutunga (2017) adds the Darfur war that broke in 2003, against Sudan resulted in the displacement of over 2.3 million individuals who were forced to seek safety in the countries such as Chad and Central African Republic. Lack of control in Somali nation for more than 30 years according to Amnesty (2020) has prolonged due to the downfall of Siadbarre. The estimated casualties were reported to be ranging from 350,000 to 1, 000,000 according to Amnesty International report of 2014 to 2015. The conflicts have been reported to have led to massive destruction of workforce, displacement of productive workforce and reallocation of labor to lowly productive practices. The outcome of Rwandan genocide in 1994 brutally interfered with the competent human capital that recorder over 19.4% losses. Likewise, Mutunga (2017) confirms that the wars in Sierra Leone led to the deaths of 70,000 individuals and the dislocation of approximately 2.6 million individuals from their households. Indirect impacts of such conflicts include amputation of limbs that make an individual less productive to the society and the development of the economy. Children are recruited into wars thus replacing their educational goals with military goals in a militarized nation.</p><p>Conflicts are barely localized in a specific state or region. Spillover effects normally include but not limited to refugees, explosions, terrorist activities and money laundering. Persistent conflicts and boundary problems increase the tendency of resource related insecurities. These further require the countries collaborative political will, firm engagement and joint investment to resolve. In Africa, where nations share ethnic, radical and historical origins, spillover effects of war from one country to another tend to exist. Fang et al (2020) confirms the spillover effects of Burundi conflicts to Rwanda and further to Democratic Republic of Congo. Additionally, the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia were related in terms of the participants and dominant issues. Moreover, apart from conflicts being stimulated in neighboring nations, the flood of refugees is also a noticeable spillover effect. African countries continue to lead in the number of refugees as a result of conflicts within the nations. Sudan, Rwanda and Mozambique conflicts have led to more than one million refugees away from their respective countries. While nations have the responsibility of protecting those who seek shelter, nation less individuals and internally displaced humans, refugees pose a humanitarian crisis. They can also lead to economic and political underdevelopment of countries. Increase in refugee population can lead to job competition with local residents of a country. These scenarios may also lead to shortage of s resources which may cause further discrimination and violence in form of racism as was seen in South Africa since early periods of 2007. The ethnic conflict may rise from fear of losing one’s social status and identity in a society which might be a real threat to the success of the country and citizen’s economy. Faith et al. (2019) reveals that refugees tend to get involved in planned crimes and other kinds of lawlessness. This poses a further threat on the security of a country both internally and externally. In nations with racial cleavages deeply rooted, increased refugee population is likely to change the ethnic balance thus result in inter- ethnic conflicts.</p><p><strong>Impact of Insecurity on Men’s Economy</strong></p><p>Unstable economy affects the aspects that determine one’s mental health. While economic insecurity strengthens risk factors, it weakens the protective ones. Having a source of employment is beneficial to individual’s health (Peterman et al, 2019). Job security, feeling of control of a job and social backup at the workplace are some of the factors that promote employee’s health. Stable and safe employment, income and social finance foresee a good psychological health. Having social capital implies on the quality of association within societies or neighborhoods. These include but not limited to civic association, community networks, morals of cooperation, sense of belonging and trust.</p><p>On the other hand, poverty, financial struggles and social scarcity are the primary socioeconomic risk factors that lead to psychological health struggles and disorders. In several parts of the world, consumption of alcohol is negatively related to people mental health. Consumption of the drink plays a significant role in amplifying the rate of suicide particularly among men. Likewise, mental health concerns play a significant part in the inequality when it comes to health. Reasonably, high occurrence of common psychological problems is linked to poor education, unemployment and money disadvantage. Suicide if frequent among developing countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. Individuals in these countries highly experience socioeconomic scarcities, fragmentation and joblessness. Increasing inequality in income has been associated with high suicide rates. The higher susceptibility of the less privileged people in Sub Saharan communities to mental health concerns may be justified by such aspects. This is due to the reoccurrence of insecurity, unemployment, hopelessness, poor housing and social isolation among other factors. Research studies indicate that financial insecurity, debts and housing payment challenges result in mental disorders, men being highly affected. The more the debts one has the higher the risk of developing depression and its related results.</p><p>Male insecurity has a significant impact on the individual level, their progress, support and sense of self-worth. Unstable economy also impacts their financial security and the securities of those who depend on the individual such as, their families. While the negative impacts of joblessness can be experienced by both genders, research show that men are most likely to feel the health impacts as compared to women, more so in the short term. Jobless males undergo extreme depression and may further to an extent of committing suicide. Cunningham et al (2021), confirms that unemployed males have 20% excess risk of dying in comparison to the remaining population. The count of healthy years has a negative relationship with long term joblessness. This relationship is only found in males.</p><p>The reason that joblessness impacts one’s health and why males are the majority affected are complicated since they change form one individual to the other. Unemployed males are more likely to develop risky habits such as drug abuse and being inactive than women. The mental blow of becoming jobless and the doubt of the circumstance play a part. Other studies also indicate that the firm cultural relationship between work and male status implies that job loss may impact a man’s sense of health more severely as it does on women. Additionally, the male gender is also less likely to make use health facilities (Çağlayan-Akay &amp; Oskonbaeva, 2021). According to studies, employment age males are 40% less likely to go to their respective General Practices for instance.</p><p>Males from lower social classes, economic backgrounds, low expertise and qualifications, and those whose jobs are unstable and lowly paid experience another type of poor wellbeing premium. Males in these situational are not likely to get employed where there are safety intercessions such as adequate health and safety practices, better illness absence rules or policies that require improvement of workplaces for individuals with permanent conditions or defects. These situations guarantee the likelihood of an individual falling out of the employment bracket due to their health conditions (Çağlayan-Akay &amp; Oskonbaeva, 2021). It also implies their less resistant or persistence to the poor health impacts of joblessness.</p><p>Long term shifts in the employment market have been an effect on the results of the link between joblessness and male wellbeing. With the ratio of male joblessness still not back to the above average level, combined with the increase in number of individuals working in risky health jobs, the government is at jeopardy (Heath &amp; Rijkers, 2022). It should be well set to receive an increased count of males who will have developed worse health from their employment period to secure their economy and development. While recessions are likely to practically improve the general health of developed nations, as people have low throwaway income to consume on unhealthy habits such as alcohol, it diminishes the health of the existing vulnerable groups thus widening the health gap.</p><p>Poor health is a result of unemployment. It is also an obstacle to restoring a sustaining an individual’s employment. It is therefore essential to address the unemployment issue and its impacts on males’ wellbeing. However, this has not been the case. According to Bianchi &amp; Bianchi (2021), the Work Programme has been maintaining its persistence in failing people. It only claims a few of the benefits of disability and does little in implementation of preventive actions to support people’s health. The programme is demotivated by a rigid funding aid thus forcing tis providers to concentrate on giving only a minimum ratio of mainstream help. Not only does lack of jobs result in poor health but also act as an obstacle towards returning to work.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Amnesty, (2020). Somalia: Conflict Exacerbates Human Rights Violations and Abuse. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR5233152020ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR5233152020ENGLISH.pdf</a></p><p>Cantens, T., &amp; Raballand, G. (2017). Cross-border trade, insecurity and the role of customs: Some lessons from six field studies in (post-) conflict regions.</p><p>Fajth, V., Bilgili, Ö., Loschmann, C., &amp; Siegel, M. (2019). How do refugees affect social life in host communities? The case of Congolese refugees in Rwanda. Comparative Migration Studies, 7(1), 1–21.</p><p>Fang, X., Kothari, S., McLoughlin, C., &amp;Yenice, M. (2020). The Economic Consequences of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available at SSRN 3758054.</p><p>Gressmann, W. (2016). Relief web. From the ground up: gender and conflict analysis in Yemen. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rr-yemen-gender-conflict-analysis-201016-en_0.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rr-yemen-gender-conflict-analysis-201016-en_0.pdf</a></p><p>Hakura, D et al., (2016). IMF. Inequality, Gender Gaps and Economic Growth: Comparative Evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa.<a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16111.pdf">https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16111.pdf</a></p><p>Kopasker, D et al., (2018). Science direct. Economic insecurity: A socioeconomic determinant of mental health. <a href="https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2352827318300594?token=3B15A97AF1AD605408CF6E342725721C3BFFBCBA56A9A578E0FA8C5E9C1943FDCD63BA39C234433EF91C5C45EDD30A34&amp;originRegion=eu-west-1&amp;originCreation=20220502124505">https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2352827318300594?token=3b15a97af1ad605408cf6e342725721c3bffbcba56a9a578e0fa8c5e9c1943fdcd63ba39c234433ef91c5c45edd30a34&amp;originregion=eu-west-1&amp;originCreation=20220502124505</a></p><p>Kurtenbach, S and Basedau M., (2018). GIGA. Dealing with New Security Threats in Africa. <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/dealing-with-new-security-threats-in-africa">https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/dealing-with-new-security-threats-in-africa</a></p><p>Mutunga, M, J., (2017). ResearchGate. Economic Integration: The Impact of Conflict on Economic Development of Africa. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Julie-Muia-Mutunga/publication/324602024_Economic_Integration_The_Impact_of_Conflict_on_Economic_Development_of_Africa/links/5ad85812aca272fdaf803931/Economic-Integration-The-Impact-of-Conflict-on-Economic-Development-of-Africa?origin=publication_detail">https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Julie-Muia-Mutunga/publication/324602024_Economic_Integration_The_Impact_of_Conflict_on_Economic_Development_of_Africa/links/5ad85812aca272fdaf803931/Economic-Integration-The-Impact-of-Conflict-on-Economic-Development-of-Africa?origin=publication_detail</a></p><p>Nagarajan, C., Le Masson, V., Benoudji, C., Reyes, S. S., Ensor, M. O., Kellogg, M.,&amp;Anjum, G. (2020). Gender, climate &amp; security: Sustaining inclusive peace on the frontlines of climate change.</p><p>Newiak, M., (2019). IMF.2. The Economic Consequences of Conflicts. <a href="https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2019/April/English/ch2.ashx">https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2019/April/English/ch2.ashx</a></p><p>Nyanga, T., Sibanda, R., &amp; Kruger, J. W. (2019). Destruction of the Economic Infrastructure by Armed Conflict: Implications on Job Satisfaction among Workers in Juba, South Sudan. Amity Journal of Economics, 4(2).</p><p>Pape, U., &amp; Finn, A. (2019). How conflict and economic crises exacerbate poverty in South Sudan. World Bank Blogs, 23.</p><p>Peterman, A., Kumar, N., Pereira, A., &amp; Gilligan, D. O. (2019). Toward gender equality: A critical assessment of evidence on social safety nets in Africa. IFPRI book chapters, 140–148.</p><p>Rome, (2022). IFAD. Impacts of Ukraine conflict on food security already being felt in the Near East North Africa region and will quickly spread, warns IFAD. <a href="https://www.ifad.org/en/web/latest/-/impacts-of-ukraine-conflict-on-food-security-already-being-felt-in-the-near-east-north-africa-region-and-will-quickly-spread-warns-ifad?p_l_back_url=/en/web/latest/news">https://www.ifad.org/en/web/latest/-/impacts-of-ukraine-conflict-on-food-security-already-being-felt-in-the-near-east-north-africa-region-and-will-quickly-spread-warns-ifad?p_l_back_url=/en/web/latest/news</a></p><p>Heath, R., Mansuri, G., &amp; Rijkers, B. (2022). Labor Supply Responses to Health Shocks Evidence from High-Frequency Labor Market Data from Urban Ghana. Journal of Human Resources, 57(1), 143–177.</p><p>Bianchi, F., Bianchi, G., &amp; Song, D. (2021). The long-term impact of the COVID-19 unemployment shock on life expectancy and mortality rates (No. w28304). National Bureau of Economic Research.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab4b804a7b57" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Nexus Between Data Protection and Research Ethics in the Changing World.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/the-nexus-between-data-protection-and-research-ethics-in-the-changing-world-57c36aadff2d?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57c36aadff2d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jun 2022 08:29:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-20T08:29:21.652Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/kelvin-qihindas/">Kelvin Qihindas </a>and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/millicent-wanjiku-mwai-7ba184113/">Millicent Wanjiku Mwai</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I8LBUCuHrmCLbEy-xNmBhQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image from unsplash</figcaption></figure><p>Ethics are crucial in a research project. From the initial stage of a research to the end, one of the crucial things to be considered is data protection which is a fundamental human right. Data protection is an ethical issue that entails respect for an individual’s rights to privacy. The collection of the data, ownership of the data and the disclosure of the data during a research process brings us to the intersection between Research ethics and data protection which entails a lawful approach that is accountable for privacy.</p><p>Privacy has been defined over the years as the right of every individual in a country to manage their data and decide whether to keep it discreet or not. With more internet users, as of April 2022, there were five billion internet users worldwide, with 4.65 billion being social media users, online services have become common. Many firms have been moving all their services to online platforms, for instance, the UK Government and their tax system. The development of online services has been stimulated by several individuals storing their details online with regular email addresses linked to over 118 different versions.</p><p>However, the higher the population of online users, the higher the probability of users becoming victims of a data breach. There is therefore a need for every service provider to provide a higher level of security to user data. In recent years, there have been constant reports of data breaches across many social media platforms. A recent report shows how the UK government has been blocking over three times as many cyber frauds from last year compared to the previous years. Microsoft, a leading technology company, is no stranger to data breaches. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1365/s43439-021-00045-4">In March 2022, the company</a> became a target by a group of hackers known as Lapsus$. The hackers had managed to take away some materials from the company. However, the company has reported no user or client data stolen because of its adequate security personnel.</p><p>The reports of cyber-attacks have shown the vulnerability of personal data stored online. Currently, companies and individuals cannot avoid using online services as 98% of their businesses depend on online platforms and messaging such as emails and websites. According to Information Technology Governance findings, data breaches have risen from 3.8 million in 2010 to over 3.1 billion in 2022. There have also been reports from Identity Theft Resource Center about approximately 57 667 and 911 individual online data lost in 1027 information breaches as of late 2018. Meta (previously known as Facebook) is a frequent victim of data protection issues. In 2018 some hackers managed to gain access to more than 50 million online user accounts. This raises the concerns that if a large company like Meta has not been able to protect user data, will smaller companies be able to do better.</p><p>Clearly, data mishandling has been predominant in many online platforms indicating the incompetence of organizations and individual researchers in employing good research ethics towards protecting user data. While cyber security has been more beneficial to individuals and firms, lack of solid understanding is still prevalent in the area. This means that there will still be a lack of trust in firms to protect user data when in their databases.</p><p>On the other hand, research ethics is related to user knowledge and permission, the privacy of their data, and security. It is interlinked with confidentiality, the integrity of data, and the anonymity of the data owner, among others. Research ethics is applicable when accessing data from a given company’s website. The user-developed content has been providing significant opportunities to those researching related topics.</p><p>An increase in the number of people using social media in recent years has led to the social media platforms being utilized as the primary locations for socializing, networking, and reflecting on all life factors. These platforms have also provided simplified ways for users to link with peers, families, and related experts. <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ICS-12-2020-0204/full/html">Online groups of interests have been found to suit the desires of most individuals</a> as the online sites act as means of communication and data sharing across the world. Therefore, the platforms play a significant role in holding vast amounts of naturally occurring information on any topic.</p><p>These topics can range from customers’ behaviors to their attitudes towards environmental rules. They also contain special categories of personal data (sensitive data) such as political opinions, ethnic origin as well as preferences. The topics have therefore been providing relevant research as they help gather data that would have taken a lot of time and resources to acquire.</p><p>Earlier on, researchers used to obtain data on opinions and behaviors using several traditional methods such as but not limited to questionnaires, interviews, and observation. Today, such data is often accessed by a simple ‘tap of a button or typing a few search words into the online site search bar. Perhaps then, these social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, are developing into popular research areas for data collection across different fields.</p><p>However, the benefits of these opportunities have been accompanied by the role of ensuring ethical standards while obtaining and reusing such data. The researcher needs to be sure whether the use in their research is tuned with what the data subjects (online users) have been told would happen to the information. For instance, <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0237875">Twitter users are aware that their social tweets will be used for research purposes</a>. Similarly, Facebook users are guaranteed that their posts will not be accumulated using automated means.</p><p>Conventional ethics outline has been able to inform scientists to some level in this, but internet data has come with advanced related challenges beyond the abilities of traditional approaches. Also, with other means of collecting data, social media information in research poses a significant ethical challenge. Among these challenges, obtaining participants’ informed consent and the protection of their privacy and integrity are the chief concerns. In addition, there have been other problems with verifying participant identities, choosing morally- correct strategies to acquire samples, and protecting the subjects.</p><p><a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0237875">According to Research ethics</a>, it is the researcher’s primary responsibility to guarantee no harm to the participants in their research. In social sciences, physical and mental harm occurs when the research evokes the participant’s bad recalls or if they feel the study lowers their sense of pride and dignity. Damage also occurs when the participant’s anonymity has not been maintained before the survey. Trying to guarantee no harm to the participant during research is particularly more challenging as the researcher might not be able to foresee the effect of the study.</p><p>Research has severely condemned Facebook’s experiment since 2014. This is because it has been shown to manipulate approximately 700 000 feeds from its users to see the effects of the feeds on users’ emotions. Research breaches ethical principles for informed ‘consent.’ In an extensive blog post, one researcher points out that the site had failed to give users informed consent to allow them to choose whether to participate in the research under the American human subject study. <a href="https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4679&amp;context=caselrev">According to the researcher, the study affected the moods of the participants negatively</a>. Thus, due to the modern research environment that relies highly on computers, social media, and the need for databases and records, protecting people’s integrity and privacy has become one of the most significant research challenges.</p><p>Recently, researchers have been studying the behavioral, social, and economic sciences and psychological sciences. This has resulted in an increasing quantity of individual data being gathered. A violation of the confidentiality of a person affects their rights, posing a threat to their dignity. These threats have been reported to be ranging from shame, public embarrassment, and stigmatization to loss of economic status. Some online services collect real-time information, such as location tracking. This has been evident in the Fitness app Polar Flow, which gives users the ability to visit their activity history. However, <a href="https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/74324/digital-id/polar-data-leak.html">this data type has been reported</a> to have resulted in the platform leaking secret locations of military individuals active in service. Researchers discovered the military’s discrete personal data, including their home addresses, submarine personnel, US military in the Green Zone, and Russian military in Crimea.</p><p><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11019-021-10060-1#citeas">Researchers need to obtain informed consent</a> from their participants without interfering with activities online. Whether the study is done online or physically, participants expect privacy. Informed consent allows the subject of the research to confirm that they are aware of the purpose of the study and the approaches taken to ensure their privacy and confidentiality. Similarly, the property owner should be identified wherever an online contact application involves reasonable property. Also, their consent should be sought before their property is used for the study. Some online articles are meant for publications or the original author’s works. Others, such as informal messaging and comments, more closely resemble where confidentiality expectations are different. It is needful that researchers be aware of the foundation, continuum, and environment of their study when doubting the consent of their participants.</p><p>Similarly, the subject should also be aware of the originality of the researcher to avoid responding and giving their details to an imposter who poses as the researcher. This helps prevent the subject’s data from falling into the hands of cyber criminals who aim to steal their identities and damage their reputations.</p><p>People have been concerned about the extensive loss of their discrete data on various online sites. According to present studies, there are already more than 103,446,520 unsolicited emails every minute. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-new-personal-data-protection-law-could-affect-researchers-153558">According to the Information Commissioner’s Office</a>, online users have had over 14% of complaints by online users concerning data protection. Once a person’s information is accessed without their consent, they become susceptible to identity theft. Their identities can be used by the imposters seeking financial benefits from making unlawful transactions and applying for credits in the subject’s name.</p><p><a href="https://ukdiss.com/litreview/personal-data-privacy-solution-3424.php?vref=1.">Social Linked Data</a>, a site that allows online users to have complete control over their online data has been developed. The site can take away big company control over a user’s data. It is likely to repair the existing state of internet privacy problems as it enables the safety of user data while users use internet services. ReactJS has also been developed to establish user links (interfaces) applied to internet services. It is applicable on media platforms containing dynamic user data, such as comments, status updates, and likes. The model has been set to break the diverse parts of changing data into entities that are dependent pieces of code. The components reduce the number of resources a computer uses. It is suitable since famous online platforms like Facebook and Instagram are using it. If Solid Linked Data and ReactJS are compatible when coupled, it is expected that the two will set a strong path for other online services.</p><p>In conclusion, rapid evolution in technology has made it necessary for those conducting research online to stay updated on study methods and threats to data protection. Thus, the virtual environment has been expected to replace the actual world, replacing the distinguishing nature of conducting an online study with more biological research. Therefore, researchers need to be informed of the evolving nature of technology and data protection. The intersection between data protection and research ethics is much closer in that solutions to data protection today might differ from the future as much as ethical policies may still apply. Online users have also taken the active responsibility of safeguarding their data by installing firewalls.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Avaş, S. &amp; Karataş, S. (2022). Cyber governance studies in ensuring cyber security: an overview of cyber security governance. <em>Int. Cybersecur. Law Rev.</em> <strong>3, </strong>7–34 (2022). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1365/s43439-021-00045-4">https://doi.org/10.1365/s43439-021-00045-4</a>.</p><p>Das, S., Nippert-Eng, C., &amp; Camp, L. J. (2022). Evaluating user susceptibility to phishing attacks. Information &amp; Computer Security. <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ICS-12-2020-0204/full/html">https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ICS-12-2020-0204/full/html</a></p><p>Jennings, M., (2022). Techradar. Top data breaches and cyber-attacks of 2022. <a href="https://www.techradar.com/features/top-data-breaches-and-cyber-attacks-of-2022">https://www.techradar.com/features/top-data-breaches-and-cyber-attacks-of-2022</a></p><p>Facca, D., (2020). Plos One. Exploring the ethical issues in research using digital data collection strategies with minors: A scoping review. <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0237875">https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0237875</a></p><p>Waldman. A, E., (2016). Scholarly Comms Law. Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study <a href="https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4679&amp;context=caselrev">https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4679&amp;context=caselrev</a></p><p>Paganini, P., (2018). Security Affairs. Polar fitness app broadcasted sensitive data of intelligence and military personnel. <a href="https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/74324/digital-id/polar-data-leak.html">https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/74324/digital-id/polar-data-leak.html</a></p><p>Gefenas, E., Lekstutiene, J., Lukaseviciene, V., Hartlev, M., Mourby, M., &amp; Cathaoir, K. Ó. (2022). Controversies between regulations of research ethics and protection of personal data: informed consent at a cross-road. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 25(1), 23–30.</p><p><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11019-021-10060-1#citeas">https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11019-021-10060-1#citeas</a></p><p>All Answers Ltd. (November 2018). Literature Review on Personal Data Online and Data Privacy. Retrieved from <a href="https://ukdiss.com/litreview/personal-data-privacy-solution-3424.php?vref=1">https://ukdiss.com/litreview/personal-data-privacy-solution-3424.php?vref=1</a>.</p><p>Kibet, C., (2021). The conversation. How Kenya’s new personal data protection law could affect researchers. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-new-personal-data-protection-law-could-affect-researchers-153558">https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-new-personal-data-protection-law-could-affect-researchers-153558</a></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/kelvin-qihindas/">Kelvin Qihindas </a>is a researcher specializing in experimental design projects focusing on the biases and heuristics that affect actions and decision-making aimed at advancing behavioral science in the Global South. He has keen interests in data protection and implementing ethical research.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/millicent-wanjiku-mwai-7ba184113/">Millicent Wanjiku Mwai</a> a strategic lawyer with extensive knowledge and experience in public policy, research &amp; advocacy has worked with different organizations in different roles to apply her skills and expertise on data protection, policy implementation processes and strategic management.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57c36aadff2d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Institutional Review Boards, IRB applications and Process in Kenya]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qihindas/institutional-review-boards-irb-applications-and-process-in-kenya-526bca6cb8fa?source=rss-5536db47dadc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/526bca6cb8fa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[research-ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[irb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelvin Qihindas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2020 11:56:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-17T16:48:33.001Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/812/1*ymlR3MEUbwF9Dt5T-QE_RA.png" /></figure><p>Introduction</p><p>This article intends to address the gap that exists in the current literature on Institutional Review Boards, IRB applications, and process in Kenya. Having engaged with some of the accredited Ethical Review Committees, ERC in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and even the United States of America my focus would be general but specifically to Kenya.</p><p>Overview</p><p>The National Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation (“NACOSTI”) through the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology is the state agency that is mandated to accredit research institutes and approve all scientific research in Kenya among other functions. Any research involving human participants must obtain approval from Ethical Review Committees, ERC which has been accredited by NACOSTI.<a href="https://www.nacosti.go.ke/images/docs/INSTITUTIONAL%20ETHICS%20REVIEW%20COMMITTEES%20IN%20KENYA.pdf"> A list of accredited institutions</a> can be found on the NACOSTI website. Many people I have interacted with always confuse between research permit approved by NACOSTI for either individuals or organizations and IRB approval approved by Ethical Review Committees. You may note that only NACOSTI is mandated to grant research permits to both local and foreign individuals and organizations engaging in research activities in Kenya. Studies that require IRB approval need to submit documents to Ethical Review Committees to be approved before commencement.</p><p>For foreign individual researchers and organizations, before being granted research permits or IRB approval they must be affiliated to local universities and have a local researcher who will act as Co-Principal Investigator on the study to be conducted amongst many requirements.</p><p>Approval from the NACOSTI and any other accredited Ethical Review Committees is always given in writing. The approval/research permit, typically in the form of a letter will be issued for a period of one (1) year with a provision for renewal for additional years you may want to continue conducting your study. An application for renewal of the research permit shall be submitted to the NACOSTI before the expiry of the permit. This applies to IRB approval which is granted for a period of one (1) year with the provision of renewal for subsequent years, amendments, or able to make changes or alterations in the study protocols and study tools in the course of the study execution.</p><p>Timelines (Initial Submissions, Amendments, Renewals)</p><p>The timeline for review by the NACOSTI varies at any stage of study this is either initial submissions or renewals; however, duly completed application documents must be submitted early enough before the researcher’s intention to start conducting the research in Kenya. This response may be approval, comments for amendment, or rejection. Based on past experience, it takes up to five months to obtain approval for a new protocol, and 3–4 weeks for continuing review approval.</p><p>If a response is required from the Principal Investigator the response should be supplied to the Review Board within the stipulated period of time. The Reviewer Board secretariat will be fair enough to remind the PI to respond to comments after the month grace period elapses. If no response is received within a further period of 3 months, the review will lapse and the PI is required to make a fresh submission and pay again.</p><p><strong>Ethical considerations in the approved studies</strong></p><p>Throughout research which has been obtained IRB, researchers must adhere to the ethical principles of research with human subjects. The researchers must adhere to informed consent principles by informing participants about the identity of the interviewer, the nature of the research project, their right to choose not to participate, to refuse to answer, to drop out of the study at any point, data confidentiality, and we will provide contact information for questions about the study. Once these conditions are met, individuals will be invited to participate and written consent will be obtained. Finally, they will need to adhere to confidentiality by assigning participants with unique numbers and ensuring that no personally identifiable information (PII) presented in any public documents can be traced back to individual participants.</p><p><strong>Human Subjects Rights</strong></p><p>“First, do no harm.”</p><p>There are no or minimal anticipated risks for participating in studies that have been approved by either NACOSTI or Ethical Review Committees. In order to minimize any emotional stress or discomfort that could be potentially experienced by the participant during study procedures, there is no compelled disclosure or mandatory reporting, so that participants will always have the right to refuse to answer any questions that make them uncomfortable. At any potentially sensitive part of the study surveys, the respondent is reminded of this right.</p><p><strong>Informed consenting process</strong></p><p>Prior to the start of the study, all individuals will be informed of the identity of the interviewer, the nature of the research project, their right to choose not to participate, their right to refuse to answer one or more questions, the right to drop out of the study at any point, data confidentiality, and the person to contact for more information about the study. Research Team must show all individuals a copy of the consent form. In order to minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence during consent, individuals should be informed by the research team that they may take time to think about their decision to participate if they are unsure; each potential subject will also be encouraged to ask questions if they are unsure about their participation to minimize any pressure to participate. Once these conditions are met, individuals will be invited to participate in the project. Written consent will be obtained and copy should remain with the participant. In some cases, the consent forms must be in local languages alongside English.</p><p><strong>Confidentiality and Privacy</strong></p><p>The researchers on the team for the proposed study who analyze the data collected will do so using a dataset that is de-identified in the sense that the names and any personally identifiable information (PII) of participants are removed. No information that can be traced back to an individual will be presented in reports, articles, or otherwise public documents produced during this study.</p><p><strong>Ethical Training and Certification</strong></p><p>All Principal, Co-principal investigators and research staff who are listed on the protocol and those who participate in the design, conduct, or reporting of human subjects research MUST complete approved Ethical approved training which includes<a href="https://www.citiprogram.org/"> CITI</a> (Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative),<a href="https://phrp.nihtraining.com/"> NIH</a> training program, <a href="https://www.fhi360.org/sites/all/libraries/webpages/fhi-retc2/index.html">FHi360</a> research ethics training program.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Human subject’s research is not widely appreciated and known to the public compared to market research or public opinions. Ph.D. students, faculty staff through their universities, researchers, state agencies, and private organizations should come out strongly and embrace this kind of research in adherence to ethics in promoting of science in Kenya and Africa.</p><p>There are several gaps I have noticed when coming up with this article and even when dealing IRB submissions or research permits</p><p>1. The membership or composition of these IRBs including NACOSTI is not publicly available. The numbers and educational or professional background of the members is not known. This may undermine the validity of the process</p><p>2. NACOSTI approved <a href="https://www.nacosti.go.ke/images/docs/INSTITUTIONAL%20ETHICS%20REVIEW%20COMMITTEES%20IN%20KENYA.pdf">Ethical Review Committees&#39;</a> accreditation has expired. This may confuse the public and researchers&#39; fraternity on the validity of the IRB process in Kenya.</p><p>3. Concerns of more focus on funds received and politics over protecting research respondents.</p><p>4. Conflict of interest whereby people who sit on these IRBs are also members of the research institutions receiving the funds. As a result, there are external pressures to influence approvals.</p><p>5. Lack of accreditation, not all IRBs are accredited by international bodies and therefore are seen as nothing more than ‘rubberstamping’ institutions.</p><p>6. Media involvement in the reporting of human subjects research-They should stick to ethics pertaining to research and give factual information to the public. This is in regards to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/article/2001283428/want-cash-volunteer-for-a-dose-of-malaria-parasite-says-kemri">a story that was run by The Standard</a> on volunteers participating in one of the clinical studies in Kilifi County. There was so much misreporting.</p><p><em>This article intends to address the gap that exists in the current literature on Institutional Review Boards, IRB applications, and process in Kenya. Having engaged with some of the accredited Ethical Review Committees, ERC in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and even the United States of America my focus would be general but specifically to Kenya. This article was first published on</em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/institutional-review-boards-irb-applications-process-kenya-qihindas"><em> Linkedin.</em></a></p><p><strong>Kelvin Kihindas is a Research Compliance and Ethics Lead at Busara Center. Busara Center is a research and advisory firm dedicated to advancing and applying behavioral science in Global South</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=526bca6cb8fa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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