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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Quantum Alexey on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Quantum Alexey on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Quantum Alexey on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Post-quantum in 2025: the easy half and the hard half]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/post-quantum-in-2025-the-easy-half-and-the-hard-half-b7484bdc3921?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[pqc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2025 05:44:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-29T05:44:37.211Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The push towards quantum-safe algorithms shows a clear split. Key exchange is the more approachable step that helps defend against “harvest now, decrypt later” attack, but digital signatures are where the real hard yards begin. What’s driving this split — and what challenges are holding the harder half back?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/638/1*i_v_AvLYJxDsxi9qBPbZaw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Migrating to post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming an unavoidable step for businesses looking to stay secure in the years ahead. It represents a new version of public‑key algorithms designed to replace the classical ones that are considered insecure by cryptographic standardisation bodies (NIST, BSI, ANSSI etc.). They perform the same jobs — establishing shared secrets and proving digital signatures — but use very different mathematics under the hood that makes them secure even in the face of quantum computers. There are two families of cryptographic schemes involved in the transition: <strong>key establishment</strong> (also called key encapsulation mechanisms, or KEMs) and <strong>digital signatures</strong>. KEMs migration is essential to protect against “harvest‑now, decrypt‑later” attacks. Without PQ signatures, a future quantum-capable attacker could forge digital certificates and impersonate websites, services, or humans.</p><p>There’s a big practical difference between key agreement and digital signatures on the road to post‑quantum crypto. Key agreement — the step that sets up shared secrets — is mostly a drop‑in upgrade. The tricky parts aren’t about PQC itself so much as the plumbing: you need to move from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3, because TLS 1.3 is required to enable PQC in HTTPS. Signatures, by contrast, are where the wheels wobble — because PQ signatures are bigger, costlier, and deeply embedded across the PKI infrastructure.</p><p>Cloudflare’s latest report (<a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2025/">https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2025/</a>) brings the data to life. Adoption of post-quantum KEMs is advancing, though unevenly — progress in HTTPS (TLS) is strong, while other protocols still face significant hurdles. Meanwhile, digital signature adoption has barely begun. As a bonus, the report offers an intriguing behind-the-scenes look at how Cloudflare is progressing with its own internal rollout.</p><h3>Where Post Quantum KEM adoption stands</h3><p>Post‑quantum key agreement, particularly the KEM family, is rapidly being adopted across the web. Progress is visible in public traffic, business‑to‑business connections. Together, these examples illustrate where the industry stands on PQ KEM implementation and the challenges that still need to be solved before widespread adoption becomes reality.</p><p>To understand how PQC adoption is taking shape, it helps to break down KEM deployment into a few practical perspectives that show where progress is happening and where challenges remain. Think about KEM adoption through two simple lenses:</p><ul><li><strong>Browsers &amp; user‑initiated traffic</strong>: Now well over 50% of human web traffic to Cloudflare is PQ‑protected. This is the fastest‑moving piece, driven by browser’s (Chrome, Edge, Safari, Firefox etc.) defaulting to PQC KEMs in their settings. On the backend, where servers operate, scans of the top 100,000 domains show that support for PQC KEMs rose from 28% to 39% over 2025 — a strong step forward, even if there’s still more ground to cover.</li><li><strong>B2B links</strong>: Cloudflare’s services rely on traffic flowing through its network before reaching the customer’s own server (customer’s server is usually called the Origin). In its report, Cloudflare shared what this looks like from a B2B perspective: only about 3.5% of Origin servers currently support PQC. That lag is largely due to the wide mix of software stacks and middleboxes still in use across enterprises. So if your B2B infrastructure isn’t yet migrated to PQC KEMs, you’re in good company — many others are still on that journey too.</li></ul><p><strong>Internally</strong>, Cloudflare’s comments about their own rollout are both revealing and fascinating. They explained that every engineering team was asked to pause their ongoing work and focus on upgrading internal connections to PQ KEM. Most of these changes turned out to be simple software updates, yet the lingering “long tail” of unfinished work continues to pose challenges. First, asking engineers to enable PQC and pause other projects shows serious organisational commitment — what motivated that prioritisation? Second, it’s encouraging that most updates turned out to be simple software changes. And finally, the mention of a lingering “long tail” is a useful reminder that even in the relatively straightforward KEM space, completing the last bits of work often demands far more effort than expected.</p><h3>Why post-quantum signatures are the hard part</h3><p>The most technically challenging part of PQC adoption is the signature layer. PQ signatures are larger, slower, and harder to implement securely than key exchange mechanisms, making them a major bottleneck for real-world deployment. Without PQ signatures, digital communication will remain vulnerable to future quantum-capable attackers. That means certificates (public keys and signatures) also need upgrading — and that’s where the real difficulties begin.</p><p>NIST has finalised the first wave of standardising PQC digital signatures: <strong>ML‑DSA</strong> and <strong>SLH‑DSA</strong> (both published in 2024). Falcon (now <strong>FN‑DSA</strong>) is still tracking toward standardisation; additional schemes are being researched. NIST standardised multiple signature families for a reason — none are a perfect drop‑in, and each involves trade‑offs in size, speed, assumptions, and implementation safety.</p><p>A typical public‑web TLS handshake today effectively carries five signatures and two public keys. That was fine with tiny ECDSA signatures (currently used elliptic curve based signatures), but PQ signatures and keys are much larger. For instance, if we were to switch entirely to ML‑DSA‑44 — the smallest and least secure variant of the ML‑DSA family — we’d be adding roughly 15 kB of extra data to each TLS handshake, sent from the server to the client. That’s a noticeable increase. Waiting for FN‑DSA‑512, which is more efficient, would reduce that to about 7 kB. However, it comes with its own trade‑offs: it relies on floating‑point arithmetic and demands a highly complex, side‑channel‑resistant implementation, which raises the risk of timing attacks.</p><p>Adding just a few extra kilobytes per handshake can noticeably slow things down — especially on mobile networks or unreliable connections — leading to more dropped sessions. This may not be critical for B2B backend batch transfers, but critical in the consumer space where page loads are tightly measured and optimised.</p><p>Real-world tests have shown that some clients or middleboxes simply can’t handle certificate chains larger than about 10 kB and will drop the connection altogether.</p><p>In TLS, where sessions often transfer hundreds of kilobytes or even megabytes, the performance hit from larger signatures is usually masked by the overall data volume. But not all connections are that heavy. For example, many QUIC connections are lightweight — Cloudflare reports that the median amount of data transferred from server to client is only around 4.4 kB — so with PQ signatures, the handshake itself could end up larger than the actual payload. That’s not a great look.</p><h3>HTTPS (TLS) is not all what we care about</h3><p>Standards work beyond NIST’s algorithmic standardisation is equally vital. For some protocols — like KEM in TLS — the change is little more than assigning a new algorithm ID. But others, including DNSSEC, IPsec, X.509, S/MIME, and OpenPGP, require much deeper re‑engineering to embed PQC properly. Beyond these, additional protocols such as SSH, ACME (for certificate issuance), JOSE/COSE (for API and IoT signing), MLS (for secure group messaging), and even FIDO2WebAuthn are still in the early stages of PQ integration, each facing its own unique set of design and interoperability challenges (<a href="https://pqcc.org/heatmap-current-state-of-pqc-standards-and-adoption">https://pqcc.org/heatmap-current-state-of-pqc-standards-and-adoption</a>/).</p><p>I genuinely appreciate Cloudflare’s work and the insights they share. Much of this article draws on information from their publication (<a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2025/">https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2025/</a>), which offers an excellent overview of the state of post‑quantum cryptography. For anyone interested in going deeper, I highly recommend reading their post for further technical details, research references, and context behind the points discussed here. Where I’ve added my own commentary or additional data, I’ve included supporting references throughout the text.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b7484bdc3921" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The end of long-trusted encryption is already scheduled; how does the actual quantum risk keep up…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/the-end-of-long-trusted-encryption-is-already-scheduled-how-does-the-actual-quantum-risk-keep-up-545d381b7cda?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/545d381b7cda</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2025 06:42:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-27T06:42:11.060Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The end of long-trusted encryption is already scheduled; how does the actual quantum risk keep up with the schedule?</h3><p>Widely deployed cryptographic algorithms like RSA and ECC — used virtually everywhere — are now on a retirement countdown. International standardisation bodies have mandated their deprecation by 2030 and a full ban by 2035.Meanwhile, the latest optimised blueprint for Shor’s algorithm suggests that breaking a 2048-bit RSA key requires just one million noisy qubits and under a week of runtime. This article unpacks that timeline and explains the terms and jargon used along the way — exploring how risk affects prioritisation, what the role of standards is, and how the scheduled phase-out of current algorithms aligns with the actual pace of quantum computing progress.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GLI5XAGHqfqVwveWkX1DEg.png" /></figure><h3>Cryptographic standards define the gameplay, while the quantum risk story provides the context.</h3><p>Quantum computing has moved conventional public-key cryptography toward obsolescence. International standards organisations — NIST (US), ANSSI (France), BSI (Germany), NCSC (UK), KISA (South Korea) and CNCA (China) — have already concluded that today’s asymmetric primitives must be replaced by post-quantum alternatives. To the casual observer, classical RSA — a widely used public key cryptographic algorithm — and its post-quantum candidate, ML-KEM, may appear similar; in reality, only the latter is expected to withstand a quantum attack. Because only a small circle of institutions can independently vet cryptographic designs, commercial and governmental stakeholders generally adopt the rulings issued by these authorities.</p><p>These standards streamline complex technical decisions within each given organisation, yet monitoring technical progress still pays dividends. A realistic quantum-readiness timeline sharpens budget planning, project phasing and board communication. Clear explanations of why current cryptography is being retired also accelerate organisational buy-in. Standards now serve as the primary compass, and ongoing research supplies valuable context.</p><h3>Computational assumptions that hold asymmetric algorithms secure appeared to be susceptible to quantum algorithms.</h3><p>In the context of quantum risk, quantum computers are a central component in future attacks on modern cryptographic systems.</p><p>Within post-quantum security research, RSA continues to attract more scrutiny than newer asymmetric schemes such as elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC). The focus is somewhat arbitrary and partly historical — RSA has been the workhorse of internet security for decades. Although RSA’s strength rests on the difficulty of factoring a large composite modulus, while ECC relies on the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem, both defences share a critical vulnerability: efficient period finding of an appropriate modular function. There are no known algorithms that can efficiently find the period of such a function. On classical hardware, period finding remains excruciatingly slow, but if there were, it would openboth RSA and ECC secrets. Shor’s algorithm, the flagship quantum technique for breaking public-key cryptography, offers an efficient method of period finding, thereby subsuming the tasks of factoring and solving discrete logarithms in one stroke. Once the period of an appropriate modular function is uncovered, RSA’s factorisation barrier collapses, and the private key emerges; the same principle undermines ECC keys through discrete logs. RSA serves as the standard test case not because it is uniquely weak or strong but because it is widely used and shares a common property with other asymmetric algorithms.</p><p>By contrast, many cryptographic primitives are built on very different foundations where efficient period finding is useless. Symmetric ciphers, hash functions, or random-number generators do not rely on the structure that period-finding exploits. Their security margins are, therefore, entirely indifferent to advances in implementing Shor’s algorithm on a quantum computer.</p><h3>The qubit number alone is not all that it takes to define an algorithmic need or quantum hardware capacity.</h3><p>Modern asymmetric cryptographic systems remain secure — not because quantum attacks are impossible, unknown, or unachievable in principle, but because today’s quantum hardware lacks the scale to run algorithms of sufficient length and depth to break real-world cryptographic protocols. As a result, current security relies on the slow progress of quantum hardware and algorithm development — a fragile and temporary foundation for long-term protection. While some argue that large-scale quantum machines may never be built, industry consensus, as discussed earlier in reference to standardisation body decisions, points in the opposite direction.</p><p>This raises a natural question: what do we really mean by “quantum computing capacity”? Media coverage often equates hardware milestones with qubit counts — spotlighting each new prototype that crosses a headline-grabbing threshold. But focusing solely on the number of qubits can give a misleading impression, as actual capacity depends on algorithmic demands and hardware characteristics well beyond raw qubit totals. True progress hinges on many interlocking metrics, such as:</p><ul><li><strong>Gate fidelity</strong>, the error rate in single- and two-qubit operations;</li><li><strong>Coherence time</strong>, the window before quantum states drift apart;</li><li><strong>Processor topology</strong>, the pattern of connections among qubits. Perfect “all-to-all” connectivity exists only in a handful of trapped-ion systems, whereas most platforms rely on lattice-style layouts that restrict which qubits can interact directly.</li><li><strong>Error-correction codes</strong>, that determine the cost of producing <em>logical qubits </em>— the building blocks of usefulquantum computation. It represents a stable, error-resistant unit constructed from many noisy, short-lived physical qubits, which on their own are too fragile for practical computation.</li><li><strong>Algorithm design</strong> that determines the efficiency of how quantum computing resources are used. I will be writing more about it below.</li></ul><p>In other words, progress in algorithmic efficiency and error-correction techniques matter just as much as new hardware headlines in terms of qubits and overall hardware performance.</p><h3>A newly developed quantum algorithm enhances computational efficiency, reducing hardware demands.</h3><p>A successful quantum attack relies on the seamless integration of multiple components, spanning from quantum hardware to finely tuned algorithms. A recent study (<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917">https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917</a>) offers new insight on this front, estimating that breaking RSA-2048 could be done with fewer than one million noisy qubits in under a week. The paper builds on work dating back to 2019. It proposes a number of optimisations that significantly reduce the estimated quantum resources needed to factor a 2048-bit RSA key.</p><p>Since Peter Shor introduced his groundbreaking period-finding method in 1994 — shaking the foundations of modern cryptography — steady progress has been made across the quantum computing stack components. Researchers have systematically reduced the resource demands of quantum algorithms while advancing supporting technologies, including control systems, error correction codes, and compilation techniques. In many cases, algorithmic research tends to concentrate on improving the core algorithm itself, alongside associated error correction methods, while other areas of the stack are often advanced by different segments of the research community. Combining smart algorithmic choices with the selection of an error correction code can significantly impact the total resource estimate — sometimes dramatically.</p><p>This new study introduces a significantly streamlined version of Shor’s algorithm — achieved without relaxing any of the standard cost assumptions. To appreciate the scale of this advancement, consider earlier benchmarks: Fowler’s 2012 surface-code blueprint estimated the need for around one billion physical qubits. A 2019 update brought that figure down to twenty million. Now, the new architecture reduces the requirement again — to roughly one million — marking a 1,000× drop since 2012 and a 20× improvement over the 2019 estimate.</p><h4>Algorithmic improvements</h4><p>Since 2012, researchers have introduced a series of engineering innovations that have steadily driven down the number of physical qubits required for Shor’s algorithm. To illustrate how this progress took shape, here are three key advances that helped cut the requirement from 20 million to just one million qubits:</p><ol><li><strong>Approximate residue arithmetic.</strong> Think of ordinary integer math carried out on a regular CPU: every add or multiply is exact. Here, the circuit intentionally allows tiny rounding errors to slip through — as long as they cancel out before the final answer appears — which eliminates a significant portion of supporting logic.</li><li><strong>Yoked surface codes.</strong> When a logical qubit is just “sitting in memory,” its protective checks can be shared with a neighbour, much like two virtual machines sharing the same host firewall rules. This halves the physical space needed for parked data.</li><li><strong>Magic-state cultivation.</strong> In quantum computing, non-Clifford operations are quantum gates that fall outside the Clifford group — a set of gates including the Hadamard, Phase (S), and CNOT gates. Clifford gates have the distinctive property of being efficiently simulatable on classical computers, meaning circuits composed entirely of these gates can be simulated in polynomial time. While this makes them useful for certain tasks, it also means they offer no computational advantage over classical systems. To achieve universal quantum computation, however, non-Clifford operations are essential. Without them, a quantum computer cannot perform arbitrary quantum algorithms. Gates such as the T gate serve this crucial role, enabling the full power of quantum processing. Yet, non-Clifford operations come with significant challenges. Unlike Clifford gates, they are difficult to implement in a fault-tolerant manner and often require sophisticated techniques like magic state distillation. These operations are what give quantum computers their advantage — but also what makes them difficult to build and scale reliably. Older blueprints built huge magic-state factories that crank these states out in bulk. The new scheme grows them in small, incremental batches, similar to brewing micro-lots of a specialty chemical instead of running a refinery, slashing real-estate needs.</li></ol><h4><strong>Time required to run the algorithm</strong></h4><p>Algorithm resources are only half the equation; wall-clock time matters, too. The same paper estimates that a 2048-bit RSA key could be cracked in fewer than seven days on a million-qubit machine. A week is not “real-time,” but it is short enough to erode confidence in long-term encrypted archives. In practical terms, that timeline guides how organisations triage data and decide which systems to migrate to quantum-safe alternatives first.</p><h4><strong>Assumptions behind the algorithm</strong></h4><p>The resources and time needed to execute the algorithm are unsustainable without some foundational assumptions about hardware. It’s easy to make an algorithm appear practical by assuming ideal conditions — such as near-perfect hardware with error rates approaching zero and operations running at gigahertz speeds. However, those assumptions would be far from today’s engineering reality.</p><p>The paper that introduced this new algorithm avoids such extremes. Its performance estimates are grounded in assumptions that, while ambitious, remain physically plausible. So, what exactly does it assume?</p><p><strong>A. Surface-code cycle time: 1 microsecond</strong></p><ul><li><em>What it means.</em> A “cycle” is one round of error checks across the entire qubit grid. Finishing it in one microsecond (µs) allows the system to catch mistakes before they spread.</li><li><em>Where things stand.</em> State-of-the-art superconducting chips measure qubits in roughly 0.5–2 µs, but only for devices with dozens of qubits. Maintaining that speed on a million-qubit lattice would require faster readout electronics and cryogenic wiring than are currently available.</li></ul><p><strong>B. Control-system reaction time: 10 microseconds</strong></p><ul><li><em>What it means.</em> After each cycle, classical processors must decode the error pattern and send correction signals within 10 µs.</li><li><em>Where things stand.</em> FPGA-based decoders have hit sub-100-µs latencies for small codes. Scaling tenfold faster while handling a thousand-fold larger data stream remains an open engineering problem, though specialised decoders are under active development.</li></ul><p><strong>C. Target logical error rate: 10⁻¹⁵</strong></p><ul><li><em>What it means.</em> After error correction, the chance that a logical qubit flips during one operation should be no worse than one in a quadrillion.</li><li><em>Where things stand.</em> Recent demonstrations report logical error rates of around 10⁻⁵. Reaching 10⁻¹⁵ demands roughly a million-fold improvement, which is plausible in theory but far beyond current laboratory practice.</li></ul><p><strong>D. ~1,000 physical qubits per logical qubit (code distance 25)</strong></p><ul><li><em>What it means.</em> The efficiency of the error correction code and the number of physical qubits needed to build a reliable logical qubit.</li><li><em>Where things stand.</em> Experiments have reached code distance 5 with ~50 qubits. Distance 25 is conceptually straightforward but calls for uniform fabrication and calibration across chips, two orders of magnitude larger than today’s best.</li></ul><p><strong>E. Nearest-neighbor, square lattice connectivity</strong></p><ul><li><em>What it means.</em> Every qubit talks only to its four immediate neighbors, simplifying control but imposing strict layout rules.</li><li><em>Where things stand.</em> Current quantum-computing platforms — superconducting qubits, neutral-atom arrays, photonics, and more — differ markedly in geometry and control. As a result, mapping an algorithm’s nearest-neighbour constraint onto a real-world lattice is invariably non-trivial.</li></ul><p><strong>F. Uniform gate error rate: 0.1 % (99.9 % fidelity)</strong></p><ul><li><em>What it means.</em> All single- and two-qubit operations must fail less than once in a thousand runs.</li><li><em>Where things stand.</em> Record single-qubit fidelities sit at 99.998 % and isolated two-qubit gates at 99.9–99.94 % on chips containing only a few interacting qubits. Scaling that uniform performance to the millions of qubits needed for fault-tolerant computers is overwhelmingly an engineering problem — fabrication spread, wiring density, crosstalk, and radiation-induced correlated errors — not a show-stopper in fundamental physics.</li></ul><p>In short, none of the paper’s assumptions breaks known limits, but everyone stretches current technology to its next growth curve. Large-scale quantum factoring remains a post-prototype goal — plausible in principle, yet several focused engineering leaps away from present-day machines.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>I just want to cite the last paragraph from the author of the paper I presented to you above.</p><p>I cannot plausibly claim that a 2048-bit RSA integer could be factored with a hundred thousand noisy qubits. But there’s a saying in cryptography: “Attacks always get better”. Over the past decade, that has held true for quantum factoring. Looking forward, I agree with the initial public draft of the NIST internal report on the transition to post-quantum cryptography standards: vulnerable systems should be deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Not because I expect sufficiently large quantum computers to exist by 2030 but because I prefer security not to be contingent on progress being slow.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=545d381b7cda" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When the UK’s top cyber watchdog speaks on quantum security, it pays to listen.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/when-the-uks-top-cyber-watchdog-speaks-on-quantum-security-it-pays-to-listen-2a62d4e9be76?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a62d4e9be76</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 May 2025 02:11:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-02T02:11:17.614Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zAVBCVN_aSxUzEEyHhdq-g.png" /></figure><p>The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has released a timeline and set of recommendations for addressing the risks posed by quantum computing. While the guidance includes familiar steps, it also offers valuable technical insights and some governance practices worth attention. What makes this noteworthy is the authoritative voice behind these recommendations. The NCSC’s guidance can serve as a useful reference point for shaping internal quantum security strategies.</p><p>Understanding the role of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is essential when examining the UK’s approach to post-quantum cryptography. As the UK’s leading authority on cyber security, the NCSC provides trusted guidance on encryption standards, key management, secure protocols, and emerging areas such as post-quantum cryptography. Its publications offer comprehensive recommendations on cryptographic algorithms (including AES, RSA, and ECC), key lengths, and widely used protocols such as TLS and VPN standards. Notably, the NCSC also advises on readiness for post-quantum cryptography.</p><p>To support the security of cryptographic products, the NCSC operates evaluation schemes such as Commercial Product Assurance (CPA) and Common Criteria (CC). These assessments are particularly relevant for technologies deployed in government systems and critical national infrastructure.</p><p>Although the NCSC is not a formal regulator and its guidance is not legally binding, its recommendations carry substantial influence — especially across the public sector. For government departments and organisations handling classified or sensitive information, adherence to NCSC standards is often mandated by policy or contractual obligations. In the private sector, following this guidance is considered best practice.</p><p>The following sections highlight several aspects of the publication that stood out to me. The full publication is available <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/pdfs/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines.pdf">here</a>.</p><h3>Timeline</h3><p>A central takeaway from the publication is the proposed timeline for transitioning to quantum-safe cryptography. The guidance calls for organisations to complete their planning by 2028, ensure that high-criticality systems are migrated by 2031, and finalise the transition across all remaining systems by 2035. The timeline is slightly different from the NIST (US counterpart of the NCSC) recommendation but generally remains the same.</p><p>This is an ambitious schedule, particularly given the scale and complexity of modern digital infrastructure. Meeting these milestones will require a coordinated effort across technical teams, leadership, and supply chains.</p><h3><strong>Different Approaches for Different Organisations</strong></h3><p>The NCSC acknowledges that organisations will follow different paths in adopting post-quantum cryptography, depending largely on their size and the complexity of their IT environments. While the idea that different organisations require different approaches may seem self-evident, the structured comparisons provided by the NCSC offer valuable reference points. These distinctions can help internal stakeholders better articulate their organisation’s current position and prioritise quantum-safe initiatives within broader strategic planning.</p><p>Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) — defined as entities with fewer than 250 employees, and mid-sized organisations as those with 250 to 500 — typically rely on standard, off-the-shelf IT solutions such as mainstream browsers, operating systems, and mobile platforms. For these organisations, PQC migration is expected to be relatively seamless, occurring through routine software updates provided by vendors. However, when SMEs use custom or specialised applications, they will need to identify and implement PQC-compatible updates or replacements. In these cases, the same migration timelines outlined for larger organisations should be followed.</p><p>Larger organisations — those with more than 500 employees — often operate more complex environments, including bespoke software and internal tools. Given their greater technical capacity and broader system landscape, these organisations are expected to develop and implement tailored PQC migration strategies that align with their specific operational needs.</p><h3>Remediation strategies</h3><p>While this may seem clear to those experienced in cyber and IT risk management, it is reassuring to see that the NCSC explicitly acknowledges a range of valid approaches. When post-quantum compatibility cannot be achieved easily, the NCSC outlines several strategic options that organisations can consider as part of a broader architectural review. These include:</p><ul><li>Modernise the system: Use the opportunity to assess whether a move to cloud-based infrastructure or alternative architectures is appropriate.</li><li>Retire the service: Plan for a controlled shutdown of systems that do not justify further investment, avoiding the need for migration.</li><li>Run until end-of-life: Continue operating systems that are already scheduled for decommissioning within a defined timeframe.</li><li>Tolerate the risk: In limited cases, accept the risk of continued operation without quantum-safe protections, with proper oversight.</li></ul><p>It is critical that cyber security and IT teams recognise that inaction is not a viable strategy. Where a technical solution is not feasible, the issue should be escalated to business leadership for a formal risk decision. Risk acceptance — if chosen — must be documented and supported by clear business rationale.</p><h3>Private PKI Update</h3><p>PKI is widely recognised as one of the first areas in enterprise infrastructure requiring attention in the transition to post-quantum cryptography. It delivers cryptography services to other infrastructure elements and, on that merit, needs to be updated first to enable the rest to become quantum safe. However, updating private PKI environments presents a range of technical and operational challenges.</p><p>Many enterprise IT systems use privately managed Public Key Infrastructure to issue certificates for devices and, for example, user authentication. Migrating to a quantum-safe PKI involves establishing a new root of trust and issuing PQC certificates throughout the environment. While much of this can be managed remotely, certain endpoints may require physical access or specialised handling.</p><p>Several migration strategies are available. One common approach involves deploying a PQC-enabled PKI alongside the existing infrastructure. In highly controlled environments, a direct switchover may be possible. More often, a phased transition is needed, where both legacy and PQC systems operate in parallel. Another strategy introduces a PQC root that cross-signs the existing root, allowing backward compatibility during the migration period. Each option comes with its own security trade-offs and should be assessed in the context of the organisation’s risk profile and operational constraints.</p><h3><strong>Operational Technology and Industrial IoT Considerations</strong></h3><p>As enterprise IT environments evolve to become quantum-secure, attention must also turn to operational technology (OT) systems. While the confidentiality of their data may be less critical, maintaining data integrity is essential. Faulty readings or compromised commands can trigger failures in industrial control systems (ICS), with significant operational consequences.</p><p>Historically, these devices migrated to an isolated part of the network called a DMZ (Demilitarised zone), where the firewall controlled all communication inside and outside this zone. However, there is an increasing prevalence of wirelessly connected fielded OT devices and sensors.</p><p>Industrial IoT (IIoT) devices introduce unique challenges for post-quantum migration. The challenges stem from the additional computational demand imposed by Post Quantum Crypotghyic algorithms and operational challengesimposed by the devices themselves. These devices, in many cases:</p><ul><li>Are resource-constrained, limiting cryptographic performance</li><li>Cannot be upgraded due to hardware or software limitations</li><li>Are deployed in remote or hard-to-access locations</li><li>Are embedded within larger systems, making replacement difficult</li><li>Were not originally designed with future cryptographic updates in mind</li><li>Operate using proprietary or non-PQC-compatible communication protocols</li></ul><p>Given these complexities, migration strategies must account for both technical constraints and the broader security architecture. Special consideration is required to mitigate risks posed by legacy or un-upgradeable IIoT infrastructure.</p><h3>Especially challenging areas</h3><p>Two areas where migration is expected to be particularly complex are the Web Public Key Infrastructure (WebPKI) and Industrial Control System (ICS) protocols.</p><h4>WebPKI</h4><p>WebPKI underpins the trust infrastructure of the internet. It relies on a distributed ecosystem that includes Certificate Authorities (CAs), trusted root stores, Certificate Transparency (CT) log providers, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) services. These components work together to authenticate websites and secure digital communications. This is what enables HTTPS communication.</p><p>Adapting WebPKI to support post-quantum cryptography — particularly quantum-resistant digital signatures — is complex. Current standards do not yet fully support quantum-safe certificates, and maintaining backward compatibility with existing browsers and servers adds further difficulty. Because WebPKI is decentralised, coordinating changes across its many participants is challenging. Any misalignment can compromise trust or cause service disruptions.</p><p>Below is a summary of how each key component is affected by the shift to post-quantum cryptography, including anticipated changes and the challenges that come with them:</p><ul><li><strong>Certificate Authorities (CAs):</strong></li><li>Modern Certificate Authorities (CAs) operate using a hierarchical key structure designed to balance security and scalability. At the top of this hierarchy is the offline root key, which is kept in cold storage and used sparingly to sign intermediate certificates. Beneath it, online intermediate keys handle the day-to-day issuance of X.509 certificates, as well as the generation of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses used to verify certificate status.</li><li>To protect these critical cryptographic operations, CAs rely on hardware security modules (HSMs). These tamper-resistant devices enforce strict controls over how private keys are stored and used, helping prevent unauthorised access, key leakage, and operational misuse. This layered trust model not only limits the exposure of the most sensitive keys but also supports the scalability required for large-scale public key infrastructure. Today, CAs use offline root and online intermediate keys to sign X.509 certificates, CRLs, and OCSP responses. These operations are protected by hardware security modules (HSMs).</li><li>With PQC, CAs will need to rotate to new signature schemes such as Dilithium or Falcon. Challenges include the much larger size of PQ signatures — often 10 to 40 times bigger than RSA or ECDSA — which strains issuance pipelines and HSM storage. And root-store owners like Mozilla and Google are tightening policies on key lifecycles and revocation in preparation for this shift.</li><li><strong>Trusted Root Stores:</strong></li><li>Operating systems and browsers maintain carefully curated lists of trusted root certificates, which serve asthe foundation for validating TLS certificate chains. These root certificates belong to certificate authorities (CAs) that have been vetted according to strict security and operational criteria. The purpose of curation isto ensure that only reputable and audited CAs are trusted to issue certificates for websites and digital services. Without this vetting process, any CA could issue a certificate for any domain, making it significantly easier for attackers to impersonate trusted services or intercept encrypted communications.</li><li>Distribution at scale is a major challenge. Many devices — especially IoT and embedded systems — rarely receive updates. Additionally, mobile platforms limit trust-store size, and hard-coded fingerprints in legacy apps must be updated manually.</li><li><strong>Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs:</strong></li><li>Certificate Transparency (CT) logs serve as a public record of all issued TLS certificates, enabling browsers and other clients to verify that a certificate has been properly logged. Once a certificate is submitted to a CT log, the log returns a signed receipt — known as a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) — as proof of inclusion. These SCTs are typically signed using classical digital signature algorithms such as ECDSA.</li><li>Browsers rely on SCTs to validate certificates but generally require at least two SCTs from independent logs to ensure redundancy and detect potential mis-issuance. In practice, browsers trust the SCTs themselves, rather than querying the logs in real time.</li><li>Replacing ECDSA with post-quantum signature algorithms like Dilithium significantly increases SCT size — from just 64 bytes to around 2.4 KB. This added overhead can slow TLS handshakes and, in some cases,exceed the network’s Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU), leading to fragmentation or failure.</li><li>Further complicating the transition, the current CT standard allows each log to use only a single signature algorithm. This limitation creates a challenge during the migration period, as not all clients and infrastructure will support PQC at the same time. To maintain compatibility, new specifications are needed to support hybrid or multi-algorithm SCTs — enabling the use of both classical and quantum-safe signatures during the transition.</li><li><strong>Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Services:</strong></li><li>Certificate Authorities (CAs) use a variety of mechanisms to manage certificate revocation, with Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) remaining a core requirement under many public root programs. CRLs are digitally signed lists that identify certificates no longer considered valid, typically due to compromise or administrative withdrawal. These lists are most often signed using RSA or ECDSA, though some ecosystems rely more heavily on dynamic alternatives like the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or compressed solutions such as CRLite.</li><li>With the adoption of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, each CRL file is expected to grow significantly — adding around 2.4 KB per signature. At the same time, certificate lifespans are shortening to minimise exposure windows, which in turn increases the frequency of CRL updates and further expandsoverall data volume.</li><li>These changes present compatibility challenges for legacy systems, many of which include hard-coded limits on CRL file size or support only specific signature algorithms. Updating these systems may be difficult or infeasible, particularly in embedded or long-life environments.</li></ul><p>The complexity of modern WebPKI, combined with the scale of its deployment, means that even incremental changes must be carefully coordinated.</p><h4>ICS protocols</h4><p>A second major concern lies in the protocols used within Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which are responsible for operating and monitoring critical infrastructure such as energy grids, water treatment facilities, and industrial manufacturing lines. Many of these systems still depend on legacy communication protocols that were never built with cryptographic security in mind.</p><p>Introducing quantum-safe algorithms into these environments is not as simple as updating software libraries. In many cases, the underlying protocol architecture lacks the mechanisms needed for secure key exchange, authentication, or certificate management. Addressing this gap often requires fundamental redesign — not just of the software, but also of the supporting hardware and operational procedures.</p><p>These challenges are compounded by the nature of ICS environments, where uptime is essential, system updates are infrequent, and hardware lifecycles can extend well beyond a decade. As a result, migrating to post-quantum cryptography in these settings demands a careful, long-term approach that balances security with operational continuity.</p><h3>What is missing</h3><p>There are several areas where the publication could be strengthened. It’s also important to consider what has been left unaddressed.</p><ol><li>Concrete, real-world performance metrics for post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) key-agreement and digital-signature schemes remain notably absent. The current documentation offers only general observations, leaving a gap where precise, actionable data would be most valuable.</li><li>The discussion around vendor dependencies could be more closely aligned with established Vendor Risk Management practices. For large organisations, the path to PQC adoption will likely depend on the preparedness and support of their external suppliers.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a62d4e9be76" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Quantum-Safe Future Will Be Built Together — Or Not at All]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/the-quantum-safe-future-will-be-built-together-or-not-at-all-6aef3e50a29d?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6aef3e50a29d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2025 00:34:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-24T00:34:40.578Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Quantum-Safe Future Will Be Built Together — Or Not at All</h3><p>Quantum threats are real, coordination is critical — and the past is full of reminders of what happens when the industry gets it wrong. ETSI’s new report sheds light but leaves gaps.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3sdbz1wJ-a9E8XELVYU2Nw.png" /></figure><p>The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has published a broad overview of quantum security in its report, <a href="https://www.etsi.org/e-brochure/ETSI-QSC-Report-2025/mobile/index.html#p=1">Preparing for a Quantum Secure Future</a>. While the report highlights important challenges in the quantum transition, it stops short of offering the technical depth many had anticipated from a leading standards body. Missing areconcrete implementation roadmaps, details on protocol limitations, and actionable guidance for migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Without these specifics, there is a growing risk that organisations may struggle to build robust quantum-safe infrastructure in time.</p><p>In the early stages of telecom protocol development, the absence of coordination between ETSI and its overseas counterparts led to standards mismatch and costly hardware duplications across the industry. The concern now is that history may repeat itself in the realm of quantum security.</p><p>To be clear, progress is being made. Standards organisations such as NIST in the United States, KISA in South Korea or CAICT in China, among others, have either finalised or are actively developing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. However, cryptographic algorithms alone are not enough — they require practical implementation across infrastructure and software systems. And in a technology ecosystem dominated by complex, layered standards, implementing and adopting such changes can take years. As past experiences have shown, the absence of aligned strategies and shared frameworks can undermine even the most promising technological advances.</p><h3>The Windows Vista Fiasco</h3><p>In early 2000, Microsoft failed to launch Windows Vista, a project that started under the codename Longhorn. What began as an ambitious overhaul of the Windows operating system quickly descended into confusion, delays, and eventual disaster — not because the ideas were bad, but because Microsoft’s internal architecture teams failed to align on shared standards or, in other words, coordinate efforts between teams.</p><p>At the heart of Longhorn was a vision to radically modernise the operating system. It was supposed to introduce a new graphics engine, improved security models, revamped file systems, and a unified user experience that could scale across consumer and enterprise use cases. But instead of building on a stable foundation, Microsoft allowed various teams to develop features in isolation, without enforcing a common integration framework or transparent interfaces. Each group essentially built their part of the house without consulting the architects — or even each other.</p><p>When the time came to stitch these components into a working whole, the engineering teams discovered an ugly truth: many of the parts couldn’t be compiled together into a functional OS. The underlying standards for interfaces, data sharing, system calls, and even basic rendering expectations were either misaligned or entirely missing. Longhorn had become a Frankenstein of disconnected systems.</p><p>This internal lack of standardisation created cascading effects. Microsoft missed internal deadlines repeatedly, and by the time Vista was finally released in 2007, its performance and compatibility issues were so pronounced that consumers avoided upgrading en masse. Hardware vendors and IT departments continued to ship or request Windows XP, a six-year-old OS, well into the following decade. Vista became synonymous with bloat, instability, and poor user experience — despite some genuinely forward-looking innovations buried under the mess.</p><h3>The Wireless “Holy War”</h3><p>In the 1990s, as mobile phones began their global march toward ubiquity, the industry faced a defining moment: which wireless standard would rule the airwaves? Two major standards emerged for digital mobile communication: TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) and CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access). TDMA was backed heavily by European regulators and manufacturers, particularly those aligned with the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) initiative. CDMA, on the other hand, was spearheaded by Qualcomm, a relatively small U.S.-based firm, and supported in a more decentralised fashion by American telecom carriers.</p><p>The European approach was rigid. ETSI and its political backers made the decision to enforce TDMA and GSM across the continent — locking in vendors, governments, and operators into a single framework. In theory, this created a harmonised ecosystem with predictable interoperability. It imposed a top-down model that ignored CDMA’s technical advantages, like superior spectrum efficiency and capacity. In contrast, the United States failed to enforce a national standard, leaving private companies to choose between TDMA, CDMA, and other experimental approaches. Market participants saw more value in CDMA and adopted this standard.</p><p>The result was a fractured global system. Phones and networks in the U.S. were often incompatible with those in Europe and Asia. Consumers faced roaming limitations, manufacturers had to build multiple hardware variants, and developers struggled with interoperability issues. Billions of dollars were spent duplicating efforts, and global innovation slowed as companies fought standards battles instead of scaling solutions.</p><p>The industry limped toward convergence only with the later rise of LTE (4G) — a unifying standard built on lessons from this earlier war.</p><h3>Quantum safe and coordination</h3><p>Achieving quantum security requires coordinated efforts at both the individual organisational level and across entire industries. Attempting to become quantum-safe independently is not just challenging — it is effectively impossible.Historical examples repeatedly illustrate that isolated initiatives often result in failure, delayed timelines, or costly overruns.</p><p>This inherent complexity arises primarily because secure communication is naturally bidirectional. For quantum-safe algorithms to function properly, both communicating parties must adopt compatible standards and protocols.</p><ol><li>For instance, when clients access an organisation’s digital environment, both the client and the organisation must support quantum-safe cryptographic protocols to ensure secure data exchanges.</li><li>Similarly, hardware and software vendors must provide solutions that integrate quantum-safe capabilities from the outset, enabling seamless adoption across entire IT infrastructures.</li><li>Organisations exchanging sensitive information with counterparties, such as financial institutions executing transactions or healthcare providers sharing patient data, need mutual agreement on quantum-safe methods to ensure continuous protection.</li></ol><p>Ultimately, quantum safety hinges on collaborative efforts and consistent standards adoption across all sectors.</p><h3>ETSI Recommendations Summary</h3><p>ETSI’s recommendations align closely with prevailing industry strategies, reinforcing the broader direction of the quantum-safe transition. As a widely respected standards body, ETSI’s voice carries significant weight — its guidance can help raise awareness within organisations and set the stage for meaningful discussions at the board level. This recognition often serves as a catalyst for prioritising quantum security at the highest tiers of strategic planning.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.etsi.org/e-brochure/ETSI-QSC-Report-2025/mobile/index.html#p=1">report</a> acknowledges that quantum computers are rapidly approaching capabilities powerful enough to break current public-key cryptographic systems. This represents a threat to information confidentiality, integrity, and authentication across industries. Critically, the threat is immediate rather than theoretical, given the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” approach, where data intercepted today can potentially be decrypted by future quantum computers.</p><p>In response, quantum-safe algorithms are being standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which finalised three significant PQC algorithms in 2024. ETSI’s working groups are actively involved in integrating these new standards into current infrastructure and communication protocols. Hybrid cryptographic solutions, which blend classical and quantum-safe algorithms, have already seen deployment, notably within cloud environments provided by industry leaders like AWS.</p><p>To manage this transition effectively, organisations are advised to first thoroughly assess their cryptographic assets, including infrastructure, dependencies, and vulnerabilities. Establishing clear leadership and assigning accountability to dedicated teams overseeing quantum transition strategies is equally essential. Organisations can adopt different migration approaches depending on their circumstances: parallel implementation, running classical and quantum-safe systems concurrently; phased migration, gradually transitioning while learning and adapting at each step; or a fullmigration approach, which may be most appropriate for smaller or newer enterprises.</p><p>Successful quantum-readiness extends beyond mere technical adjustments. It involves comprehensive preparation encompassing personnel, policy development, vendor coordination, legal considerations, and crucially, executive buy-in and cross-departmental collaboration. Many organisations lack a complete view of their cryptographic landscape, highlighting the importance of thorough internal reviews led by Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs).</p><p>Across various sectors, preparations are already underway. Cloud providers like AWS are proactively integrating PQC and advocating for wider industry adoption. The financial sector faces particularly high risks and demands urgent global coordination to prevent fragmented or delayed migrations. Meanwhile, the telecommunications industry is exploring Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), a physics-based alternative for secure key exchanges, with global network expansions already underway.</p><p>Overall, ETSI’s report underscores the urgent need for preparedness against quantum threats, calling for comprehensive organisational readiness, clear leadership, and decisive industry-wide action.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6aef3e50a29d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reading between the lines of the IEEE’s PQC algorithms benchmark publication]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/reading-between-the-lines-of-the-ieees-pqc-algorithms-benchmark-publication-e52704e00969?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e52704e00969</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2025 04:20:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-27T04:20:08.640Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The IEEE’s recent publication titled “Benchmarking Post-Quantum TLS” (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&amp;arnumber=10844321) presents a performance analysis of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms within Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementations. I’d like to offer additional context that may assist in interpreting the IEEE’s findings, particularly regarding their broader implications and practical applicability.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*judqHNSTOWN2KTc8PKpO8w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Quantum risk affects Key Establishment Mechanisms and Digital Signatures, both of which fall under the broader category of Public Key Cryptography. This discussion — and the focus of the IEEE paper — centres on these two cryptographic primitives.</p><p>In short, quantum computing has undermined several classical cryptographic algorithms, as their foundational assumptions no longer hold against quantum-capable adversaries. In response, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized new PQC algorithms and provided timelines for phasing out vulnerable legacy algorithms by 2030 and 2035. While PQC algorithms deliver the same cryptographic functionalities as their predecessors, they rely on different mathematical foundations that are resistant to quantum attacks. However, PQC algorithms require more computing resources and memory, potentially causing compatibility challenges and necessitating system redesigns.</p><p>In many practical implementations of internet protocols or applications, a combination of cryptographic primitives (algorithms) is used to deliver an intended functionality in a secure way. For example, in secure messaging protocols, symmetric encryption is often used to protect the actual message content, while Key Exchange Mechanisms (a sub-class of the public key cryptography algorithms) are employed to establish a secure session key. Similarly, digital signatures may be combined with hash functions to ensure both the integrity and authenticity of a message. These primitives — hash functions, digital signatures or key exchange mechanisms — are often orchestrated together in protocols like TLS to provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and forward secrecy.</p><p>Speaking more about Key Establishment Mechanisms (KEMs), they are used at the start of a secure data transmission session to agree on a secret key over an open channel. Although data is exchanged publicly, KEMs ensure that only the communicating parties can derive the shared secret, even if an adversary intercepts all traffic. Adopting PQC at the KEM level protects the master key used for a session, mitigating the risk of future decryption attempts once quantum attacks become feasible. When considering KEM performance, an important observation is that overhead becomes more or less significant depending on the volume of data transferred. Overhead from PQC becomes significant when the data exchanged is minimal. Conversely, for large datasets, the overhead is relatively negligible. Real-world network conditions also influence practical performance. Hardware configuration and capacity, coupled with other common issues like delays, routing issues, and packet drops, can affect PQC implementations outside laboratory conditions in unpredictable ways. Many organizations, for instance, employ Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems that terminate and reestablish TLS sessions, introducing extra steps that degrade performance.</p><p>Digital signatures are equally critical, ensuring data integrity and authenticity by confirming a message’s origin and verifying that it has not been altered. However, transitioning to PQC digital signatures poses even greater computational and memory challenges than KEMs, complicating implementation significantly. Unlike KEMs, digital signatures typically do not face immediate threats from quantum-based “harvest-now-decrypt-later” attacks due to their short-lived nature. Yet, the substantial increase in key sizes and associated storage requirements means proactive remediation is advisable despite the temporary relief provided by short-lived signatures.</p><p>Although the IEEE results for KEMs and digital signatures appear promising, especially regarding execution times, it’s crucial to interpret them cautiously and consider more realistic evaluation scenarios. Several factors limit the scope of the IEEE findings:</p><ol><li><strong>Sole Focus on TLS</strong>: TLS was chosen as a testbed to assess PQC primitives but is just one of hundreds of network protocols (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_network_protocols">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_network_protocols</a>). Many other protocols will need separate PQC evaluations, as they do not rely on TLS for security. Additionally, KEM and digital signature primitives are widely applicable beyond networking — such as in secure storage, encrypted file sharing, and VPNs — where similar cryptographic operations are fundamental.</li><li><strong>Lack of Real-World Deployment Scenarios</strong>: The IEEE paper simulates network delays and packet loss butunder idealized conditions. It excludes real-world constraints like mobile devices, resource-limited hardware, actual internet-scale traffic patterns, mutual authentication scenarios, or heavily loaded web servers.</li><li><strong>No Usability or Integration Testing</strong>: Compatibility with browsers or applications was not assessed, nor does the paper provide insight into post-quantum TLS performance within typical client-server environments, particularly those involving legacy infrastructure.</li><li><strong>Limited Evaluation of Hybrid Approaches</strong>: Hybrid schemes, combining classical and PQC algorithms, are recognized as potential transitional strategies but are not benchmarked or deeply analyzed in this publication.</li></ol><p>Cloudflare’s blog on PQC deployment tests (https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2024/) could serve as a complementary resource to the IEEE publication, providing valuable practical insights into real-world implementations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e52704e00969" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Quantum risk and associated regulations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/quantum-risk-and-associated-regulations-216283bf5789?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/216283bf5789</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ćrypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2025 07:36:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-13T07:36:46.693Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Quantum risk and associated regulations may appear distant, but they’re already here. Some standards now explicitly require action or indirectly imply the need for quantum risk management. Below is an overview of key standards currently addressing quantum security considerations, either directly or indirectly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wpxIDcTBFXB2rDKR3uPQEQ.png" /></figure><h3>Quantum risk in the spotlight</h3><p>The advent of quantum computing presents security risks for traditional cryptographic methods, which, once deemed secure, are now considered vulnerable. In response, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms designed to protect sensitive data. Other countries are also working on their own standards; however, these largely align with the mathematical principles underpinning NIST’s standardised algorithms.</p><p>Are PQC algorithms alone sufficient? No. They must be thoughtfully integrated into existing protocols, applications or services. This integration brings additional challenges, resulting in varied governance requirements. A few examples are prioritisation, testing, and scale of change. For the purpose of this article, these requirements typically fall into three categories:</p><p>• Direct Requirements: Explicitly demand quantum-resistant solutions and governance practices.</p><p>• Indirect (Risk-Based) Requirements: Mandate quantum-safe measures as a result of a cybersecurity standard being driven by risk evaluation; consequently, quantum risk affects the risk landscape and defines the measures needed.</p><p>• Cryptography-Focused Standards: define the design or operation of systems heavily dependent on cryptographic assets and inevitably requiring quantum-secure upgrades.</p><h3>1. Standards with Direct Quantum Remediation Requirements</h3><h3>PCI DSS 4.0</h3><p>The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is established by the PCI Security Standards Council and applies to all entities involved in payment card processing. Its latest version (PCI DSS 4.0) includes explicit quantum-related security requirements, such as:</p><p>1. Maintaining an up-to-date inventory of all cryptographic suites and protocols in use.</p><p>2. Actively monitoring industry trends in quantum computing.</p><p>3. Developing a documented strategy to address anticipated quantum vulnerabilities.</p><p>Reference: <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/">PCI DSS 4.0</a></p><h3>2. Standards with Indirect Quantum Remediation Requirements</h3><p>These standards emphasise risk-based security management, implying the necessity to address quantum risks even without explicitly mentioning quantum computing.</p><h3>SWIFT Customer Security Programme (CSP)</h3><p>SWIFT’s CSP framework requires a proactive, risk-based approach to cybersecurity. Given quantum computing’s potential threat to financial messaging security, quantum risk assessment implicitly falls under this umbrella. The CSP applies to all SWIFT users, including financial institutions and related service providers.</p><p>Reference: <a href="https://www.swift.com/">SWIFT CSP</a></p><h3>ISO/IEC 27001</h3><p>ISO/IEC 27001 is an internationally recognised information security standard that mandates risk-based assessment and management of cybersecurity threats. The 2022 edition explicitly requires assessing evolving threats — including quantum computing — to ensure the continued security of cryptographic controls. Therefore, organisations that are compliant with ISO/IEC 27001 must consider a future transition to PQC algorithms as part of their cybersecurity planning.</p><p>Reference: <a href="https://www.iso.org/">ISO/IEC 27001:2022</a></p><h3>3. Standards Expected to Include PQC Requirements Soon</h3><p>Several widely adopted standards are anticipated to integrate PQC requirements due to their cryptography-intensive nature explicitly.</p><h3>eIDAS 2 (EU Digital Identity Regulation)</h3><p>The EU Digital Identity Regulation (eIDAS 2) aims to provide secure digital identity wallets to EU citizens. Quantum-resistant cryptography is likely to become essential, particularly given eIDAS’s reliance on digital signatures to preserve identity privacy and trustworthiness.</p><p>Reference: <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/">eIDAS Regulation</a></p><h3>EMV (Chip Card Technology)</h3><p>The EMV standards, established jointly by Europay, Mastercard, and Visa, govern secure, chip-based payment technologies, including cards, ATMs, terminals, and data tokenisation processes. Overseen by EMVCo, which collaborates with NIST and IETF, these standards are inevitably subject to quantum risk considerations. EMVCo explicitly acknowledged in 2023 that quantum computing’s impact on current cryptographic methods is evolving rapidly and confirmed ongoing collaboration with the PCI Security Standards Council on these issues.</p><p>Reference: <a href="https://www.emvco.com/">EMVCo</a></p><p>This list is far from exhaustive. In the comments, share insights into quantum-related regulatory developments.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7284720652916346880/">Here</a>, you can explore further details on quantum-related regulations worldwide and the differences between national PQC standards.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=216283bf5789" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Quantum Security Timeline: Debunking Skepticism and Taking Action]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/the-quantum-security-timeline-debunking-skepticism-and-taking-action-40acf0fda823?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/40acf0fda823</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:53:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-23T10:53:21.225Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sceptics claim quantum computing will never overcome hurdles like energy use and error correction, but technological progress consistently proves these doubts unfounded, making post-quantum cryptography essential.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2tinMuhsTDwWVkkmTWn-ZA.png" /></figure><h3>The Challenge of Quantum Risks</h3><p>The risk posed by quantum computers breaking today’s encryption is a challenge often discussed with scepticism. While it might appear insurmountable, the steady progress of technology has proven time and again that breakthroughs are achievable. Critics argue that quantum machines will never be practical or powerful enough to threaten RSA-2048, but many of these claims don’t hold up under closer examination.</p><h3>Common Arguments and Their Flaws</h3><p>Critics of the rush to adopt post-quantum cryptography argue that quantum computers may never materialize at a scale capable of breaking RSA-2048, or at least not within the foreseeable future. Here are the most common arguments and why they fall short:</p><ul><li><strong>Immense energy requirements</strong>: Building and operating quantum computers capable of breaking RSA-2048 would require extraordinary amounts of energy, which some argue makes the concept impractical for real-world deployment. However, studies show that quantum computing energy use scales polynomially, not exponentially, making it feasible in principle.</li><li><strong>Error correction challenges</strong>: Quantum systems are notoriously error-prone, and implementing robust error correction mechanisms to maintain reliability at scale is a significant technological hurdle. Yet, methods like surface codes and recent advancements demonstrate that error correction is achievable with current physical error rates below 0.1%.</li><li><strong>Complexity of coherence</strong>: Maintaining coherence across a large number of qubits — essential for meaningful quantum computations — is an immense challenge due to interactions with the environment and quantum decoherence effects. Despite this, modular approaches and error-tolerant architectures have shown promise in overcoming decoherence limits.</li><li><strong>Skepticism of physical scalability</strong>: Some argue that the theoretical scalability of quantum computers doesn’t align with real-world constraints in manufacturing and operating the required components. However, integrated designs and advancements in material sciences are gradually addressing scalability concerns.</li><li><strong>Doubts about the timeline</strong>: Critics point out that optimistic estimates of quantum computing capabilities have been consistently revised over decades, fostering scepticism about realistic timelines for achieving quantum supremacy. However, visible progress in areas like factoring small numbers and discrete logarithms suggests that breakthroughs occur faster than initially anticipated once prerequisites are met.</li><li><strong>Economic feasibility</strong>: There are concerns that the immense costs associated with research, development, and deployment may limit quantum computing to only a few organizations, reducing its likelihood of widespread impact in the near term. Nonetheless, decreasing costs of quantum hardware and increasing public-private investment make its development more accessible over time.</li></ul><p>While these counterarguments are valid to some extent, they often fail to address the gradual progress that builds toward transformative breakthroughs. Step-by-step advancements in quantum computing — whether in error correction, scalability, or energy efficiency — continue to chip away at these challenges. <a href="https://blog.cr.yp.to/20250118-flight.html">This article</a> provides further explanations and references for these points.</p><h3>Moving Beyond Skepticism</h3><p>The quantum security risk timeline <em>does</em> hinge on how fast quantum computing develops. The doubts about “whether it will ever happen” aren’t universally convincing — and responsible leaders should weigh the downside of dismissing these risks entirely. Even if quantum computing progress turns out slower than advertised, moving toward post-quantum cryptography is a smart long-term play for safeguarding data. Waiting for definitive quantum threats risks leaving sensitive data vulnerable to “intercept now, decrypt later” strategies, especially if advancements occur faster than expected.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=40acf0fda823" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The end of one-size-fits-all cryptography as governments mandate varying standards even for the…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/the-end-of-one-size-fits-all-cryptography-as-governments-mandate-varying-standards-even-for-the-c0c9a965f4c6?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c0c9a965f4c6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jan 2025 00:53:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-14T00:53:12.734Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>The end of one-size-fits-all cryptography as governments mandate varying standards even for the same algorithms</strong></h3><p>For decades, organizations have relied on widely adopted cryptographic protocols and algorithms to secure data and communications. However, the introduction of post-quantum secure algorithms marks the end of this straightforward era. Governments around the globe are embracing different post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards. These variations exist even for the same core algorithms — leading to significant complexity for anyone needing to support multiple national or regional requirements.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N1i7iUFLKZoF3H_N48rYMQ.png" /></figure><p>Many of the world’s leading cybersecurity authorities — such as <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/1/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF">CNSA 2.0</a> (USA), <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2022/pqc-candidates-to-be-standardized-and-round-4">NIST </a>(USA), <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/next-steps-preparing-for-post-quantum-cryptography">NCSC</a> (UK), <a href="https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/news-events/nist-announces-post-quantum-cryptography-selections">CCCS</a> (Canada), <a href="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/TechGuidelines/TG02102/BSI-TR-02102-1.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=7">BSI</a> (Germany), <a href="https://www.ncsc.nl/binaries/ncsc/documenten/publicaties/2022/juli/guidelines-for-quantum-safe-transport-layer-encryption/guidelines-for-quantum-safe-transport-layer-encryption/Guidelines_for_PQC_-_Kyber.pdf">NLNCSA</a> (Netherlands), <a href="https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/follow_up_position_paper_on_post_quantum_cryptography.pdf">ANSSI</a> (France), <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-12/Information%20Security%20Manual%20%28December%202024%29.pdf">ASD</a>(Australia) — recommend differing parameter sets for quantum-resistant key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and signature algorithms. South Korea and China were working on standardizing their own algorithms, which are not the same algorithms as US NIST’s. Please refer to the article from <a href="https://pqcc.org/international-pqc-requirements/">Post Quantum Cryptography Coalition</a> for a comparison ofvarying requirements.</p><p>Consequently, a vendor selling to global markets might be expected to implement three or more KEMs just for compliance, as well as manage multiple signature schemes (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, and so on). Each standard has nuances that can affect performance, key management, and interoperability. Further to that, vendors or platform owners need to prepare their platforms for the worst-case scenario concerning both performance and key size requirements.</p><p>This new environment creates both opportunities and challenges. On the plus side, multiple standards can drive innovation. On the downside, vendors must juggle diverging requirements — for instance, different AES key lengths, whether to use hybrid or pure PQ signatures, and whether to implement stateful or stateless signatures.</p><p>Being prepared to support multiple PQC options and track new regulatory changes will be critical for organizations looking to stay secure and compliant in this post-homogeneous cryptography world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0c9a965f4c6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Australia’s Formal Embrace of Post-Quantum Cryptography: What Businesses Need to Know]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/australias-formal-embrace-of-post-quantum-cryptography-what-businesses-need-to-know-0f8509f3bf0d?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0f8509f3bf0d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Dec 2024 04:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-19T08:00:42.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In December 2024, Australia took a significant step forward by formally recognising the need to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within its updated Information Security Manual (ISM). Under these new guidelines, all legacy cryptographic methods must be phased out in favor of PQC solutions by 2030, providing a relatively short window for a complex and far-reaching shift.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*27TJAOav1L3MSt82ytrscw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Why This Matters Now</strong></p><p>The compressed timeline and the challenge of identifying every instance of encryption underscore the urgency of starting preparations promptly. PQC algorithms — used for key establishment and digital signatures — consume considerably more computational resources than current methods. Simply retrofitting existing architectures and hardware is often not an option. Without careful planning, the complexity involved can quickly become unmanageable.</p><p><strong>Implications for Business Leaders</strong></p><p>This update translates into concrete action items for CISOs, CTOs, and IT managers. It is important to recognise that quantum-safe transition cannot be executed as a one-time project; in many cases, it requires setting up new cyber capabilities, updating existing ones, and continuing to work on and improve them. The most common steps include:</p><ul><li><strong>Quantum Strategy:</strong> Develop a clear plan for the transition from current cryptographic standards to PQC-ready solutions. Due to the process’s complexity, it may require setting up a program with robust governance and budget in many cases.</li><li><strong>Migrating Critical Elements:</strong> Begin by transitioning crucial components — such as HSM/PKI solutions, network encryption (WAN encryption, VPNs) and crown jewel business systems — even before completing full analysis and prioritisation.</li><li><strong>Quantum risk quantification: </strong>As quantum-safe migration is of an enormous scale, it would require prioritisation and progress reporting. For quantum risk quantification (or, as it is also referred to, cryptography discovery), a new cyber capability is needed.</li><li><strong>Procurement and Vendor Management:</strong> Update procurement criteria and vendor assessments to ensure new products and services meet PQC standards.</li><li><strong>Skills and Training:</strong> Invest in building the necessary internal expertise. Cybersecurity teams must be equipped to manage, maintain, and evolve quantum-safe practices over time.</li></ul><p>ISM link: <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/ism">https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/ism</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0f8509f3bf0d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AWS has revealed its plan to migrate to quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@quantumalexey/aws-has-revealed-its-plan-to-migrate-to-quantum-resistant-cryptographic-protocols-f9f2a8c6022e?source=rss-197e047fe4cc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f9f2a8c6022e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pqc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quantum Alexey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Dec 2024 10:37:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-06T10:37:14.790Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>umAWS has revealed its plan to migrate to quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols</h3><p>Amazon Web Services (AWS) has unveiled its migration plan to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). By publicly sharing this roadmap, AWS sets the stage for industry-wide collaboration and a smoother transition to quantum-resistant security protocols, ensuring customer data is protected in the quantum era.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XIsOSutEmjMXUYPsqn1WUg.png" /></figure><p>The migration is structured into four distinct workstreams, each addressing critical aspects of the transition:</p><p><strong>1. System Inventory and Migration Planning</strong></p><p>AWS’s first step involves a comprehensive inventory of existing systems, focusing on where public-key cryptography is used and prioritizing areas at the greatest risk from future quantum computers. The emphasis is on encryption in transit, which secures communications over untrusted networks. By addressing these vulnerabilities now, AWS ensures data shared with its services remains confidential, even in a quantum-capable future.</p><p><strong>2. Implementing PQC in Communication Protocols</strong></p><p>Public AWS endpoints will adopt hybrid post-quantum key agreements, combining classical cryptography (like Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman) with post-quantum methods. This approach ensures long-term confidentiality for communications between AWS and its customers, supported by AWS’s FIPS-validated cryptographic library (AWS-LC). Key services like Elastic Load Balancing and Amazon API Gateway will integrate these advancements to shield customer workloads from quantum threats.</p><p><strong>3. Long-Term Roots of Trust for Cryptographic Signing</strong></p><p>AWS will integrate the ML-DSA algorithm into services like AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS), enabling customers to establish quantum-resistant roots of trust for long-lived use cases. These secure signatures are crucial for systems with extended lifecycles, such as IoT devices and critical infrastructure, ensuring their integrity even decades into the quantum future.</p><p><strong>4. Quantum-Resistant Digital Signatures for Authentication</strong></p><p>To protect session-based authentication, AWS will work with industry standards groups to enable post-quantum certificates. While challenges in public certificate issuance remain, AWS Private Certificate Authority (Private CA) will offer quantum-resistant certificates for controlled environments. Customers can also leverage AWS’s open-source solutions to adopt PQC for private networking channels.</p><p>Link: <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-post-quantum-cryptography-migration-plan/">https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-post-quantum-cryptography-migration-plan/</a></p><p>#quantum #cyber #risk #PQC</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9f2a8c6022e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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